218 lines
6 KiB
C
218 lines
6 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
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/*
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* Implementation of Password-Based Cryptography as per PKCS#5
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* Copyright (C) 2002,2003 Simon Josefsson
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* Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation
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*
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* cryptsetup related changes
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* Copyright (C) 2012-2024 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (C) 2012-2024 Milan Broz
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*/
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <alloca.h>
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#include "crypto_backend_internal.h"
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static int hash_buf(const char *src, size_t src_len,
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char *dst, size_t dst_len,
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const char *hash_name)
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{
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struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL;
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int r;
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if (crypt_hash_init(&hd, hash_name))
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return -EINVAL;
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r = crypt_hash_write(hd, src, src_len);
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if (!r)
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r = crypt_hash_final(hd, dst, dst_len);
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crypt_hash_destroy(hd);
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return r;
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}
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/*
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* 5.2 PBKDF2
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*
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* PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function (see Appendix B.1 for an
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* example) to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially
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* unbounded. (However, the maximum effective search space for the
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* derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying
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* pseudorandom function. See Appendix B.1 for further discussion.)
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* PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications.
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*
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* PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen)
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*
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* Options: PRF underlying pseudorandom function (hLen
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* denotes the length in octets of the
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* pseudorandom function output)
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*
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* Input: P password, an octet string (ASCII or UTF-8)
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* S salt, an octet string
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* c iteration count, a positive integer
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* dkLen intended length in octets of the derived
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* key, a positive integer, at most
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* (2^32 - 1) * hLen
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*
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* Output: DK derived key, a dkLen-octet string
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*/
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/*
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* if hash_block_size is not zero, the HMAC key is pre-hashed
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* inside this function.
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* This prevents situation when crypto backend doesn't support
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* long HMAC keys or it tries hash long key in every iteration
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* (because of crypt_final() cannot do simple key reset.
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*/
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#define MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN 80
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int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash,
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const char *P, size_t Plen,
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const char *S, size_t Slen,
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unsigned int c, unsigned int dkLen,
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char *DK, unsigned int hash_block_size)
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{
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struct crypt_hmac *hmac;
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char U[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN];
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char T[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN];
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char P_hash[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN];
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int i, k, rc = -EINVAL;
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unsigned int u, hLen, l, r;
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size_t tmplen = Slen + 4;
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char *tmp;
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tmp = alloca(tmplen);
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if (tmp == NULL)
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return -ENOMEM;
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hLen = crypt_hmac_size(hash);
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if (hLen == 0 || hLen > MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (c == 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (dkLen == 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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*
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* Steps:
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*
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* 1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * hLen, output "derived key too long" and
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* stop.
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*/
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if (dkLen > 4294967295U)
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* 2. Let l be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key,
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* rounding up, and let r be the number of octets in the last
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* block:
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*
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* l = CEIL (dkLen / hLen) ,
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* r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen .
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*
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* Here, CEIL (x) is the "ceiling" function, i.e. the smallest
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* integer greater than, or equal to, x.
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*/
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l = dkLen / hLen;
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if (dkLen % hLen)
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l++;
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r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen;
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/*
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* 3. For each block of the derived key apply the function F defined
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* below to the password P, the salt S, the iteration count c, and
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* the block index to compute the block:
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*
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* T_1 = F (P, S, c, 1) ,
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* T_2 = F (P, S, c, 2) ,
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* ...
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* T_l = F (P, S, c, l) ,
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*
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* where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of the
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* first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function PRF
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* applied to the password P and the concatenation of the salt S
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* and the block index i:
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*
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* F (P, S, c, i) = U_1 \xor U_2 \xor ... \xor U_c
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*
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* where
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*
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* U_1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) ,
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* U_2 = PRF (P, U_1) ,
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* ...
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* U_c = PRF (P, U_{c-1}) .
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*
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* Here, INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most
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* significant octet first.
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*
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* 4. Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dkLen octets to
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* produce a derived key DK:
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*
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* DK = T_1 || T_2 || ... || T_l<0..r-1>
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*
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* 5. Output the derived key DK.
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*
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* Note. The construction of the function F follows a "belt-and-
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* suspenders" approach. The iterates U_i are computed recursively to
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* remove a degree of parallelism from an opponent; they are exclusive-
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* ored together to reduce concerns about the recursion degenerating
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* into a small set of values.
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*
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*/
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/* If hash_block_size is provided, hash password in advance. */
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if (hash_block_size > 0 && Plen > hash_block_size) {
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if (hash_buf(P, Plen, P_hash, hLen, hash))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P_hash, hLen))
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return -EINVAL;
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crypt_backend_memzero(P_hash, sizeof(P_hash));
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} else {
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if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P, Plen))
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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for (i = 1; (unsigned int) i <= l; i++) {
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memset(T, 0, hLen);
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for (u = 1; u <= c ; u++) {
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if (u == 1) {
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memcpy(tmp, S, Slen);
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tmp[Slen + 0] = (i & 0xff000000) >> 24;
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tmp[Slen + 1] = (i & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
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tmp[Slen + 2] = (i & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
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tmp[Slen + 3] = (i & 0x000000ff) >> 0;
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if (crypt_hmac_write(hmac, tmp, tmplen))
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goto out;
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} else {
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if (crypt_hmac_write(hmac, U, hLen))
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goto out;
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}
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if (crypt_hmac_final(hmac, U, hLen))
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goto out;
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for (k = 0; (unsigned int) k < hLen; k++)
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T[k] ^= U[k];
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}
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memcpy(DK + (i - 1) * hLen, T, (unsigned int) i == l ? r : hLen);
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}
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rc = 0;
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out:
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crypt_hmac_destroy(hmac);
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crypt_backend_memzero(U, sizeof(U));
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crypt_backend_memzero(T, sizeof(T));
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crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, tmplen);
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return rc;
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}
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