Adding debian version 2.4.38-3+deb10u9.debian/2.4.38-3+deb10u9

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 125 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a123959
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906539 from trunk:
+
+fail on bad header
+
+Submitted By: covener
+Reviewed By: covener, rpluem, gbechis
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+---
+ modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ server/protocol.c              |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@
+  * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing
+  * what was read by ap_getline() upon return.
+  */
+-static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
++static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+                                   char *buffer, int size,
+                                   conn_rec *c, int *pread_len)
+ {
+@@ -1043,19 +1043,26 @@
+         rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr,
+                              AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len);
+ 
+-        if (len <= 0)
+-            break;
+ 
+-        if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
+-            /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn.
+-             * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead?
+-             */
+-            int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
+-            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
+-                    "header size is over the limit allowed by "
+-                    "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
+-                    "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
+-                    size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
++        if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) {
++            if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
++                int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
++                        "header size is over the limit allowed by "
++                        "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
++                        "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
++                        size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
++            }
++            else {
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404)
++                              "Error reading headers from backend");
++            }
++            r->headers_out = NULL;
++            return rc;
++        }
++
++        if (len <= 0) {
++            break;
+         }
+         else {
+             ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer);
+@@ -1078,7 +1085,7 @@
+                 if (psc->badopt == bad_error) {
+                     /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */
+                     r->headers_out = NULL;
+-                    return;
++                    return APR_EINVAL;
+                 }
+                 else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) {
+                     /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then
+@@ -1092,13 +1099,13 @@
+                                       "in headers returned by %s (%s)",
+                                       r->uri, r->method);
+                         *pread_len = len;
+-                        return;
++                        return APR_SUCCESS;
+                     }
+                     else {
+                         ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099)
+                                       "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)",
+                                       r->uri, r->method);
+-                        return;
++                        return APR_SUCCESS;
+                     }
+                 }
+             }
+@@ -1128,6 +1135,7 @@
+         process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value);
+         saw_headers = 1;
+     }
++    return APR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1398,10 +1406,10 @@
+                          "Set-Cookie", NULL);
+ 
+             /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */
+-            ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, origin,
+-                                  &pread_len);
++            rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size,
++                                       origin, &pread_len);
+ 
+-            if (r->headers_out == NULL) {
++            if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) {
+                 ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106)
+                               "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)",
+                               major, minor, r->uri, r->method);
+--- a/server/protocol.c
++++ b/server/protocol.c
+@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@
+         /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */
+         bytes_handled = strlen(*s);
+         if (bytes_handled < *read) {
++            ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf,
++                        "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0);
+             *read = bytes_handled;
+             if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
+                 rv = APR_EINVAL;