Adding debian version 2.4.38-3+deb10u9.debian/2.4.38-3+deb10u9

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

5 files changed, 895 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2006-20001.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2006-20001.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ba150b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2006-20001.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 7469547c3f617717ca545d0f7c56d01134703813 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:21:48 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906487 from trunk:
+
+* modules/dav/main/util.c (dav_process_if_header): Fix error
+  path for "Not" prefix parsing.
+
+
+Submitted By: jorton
+Reviewed By: jorton, covener, rpluem
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906543 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+---
+ STATUS                  | 8 --------
+ modules/dav/main/util.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/modules/dav/main/util.c
++++ b/modules/dav/main/util.c
+@@ -746,8 +746,14 @@
+                                                  "for the same state.");
+                         }
+                         condition = DAV_IF_COND_NOT;
++                        list += 2;
++                    }
++                    else {
++                        return dav_new_error(r->pool, HTTP_BAD_REQUEST,
++                                             DAV_ERR_IF_UNK_CHAR, 0,
++                                             "Invalid \"If:\" header: "
++                                             "Unexpected character in List");
+                     }
+-                    list += 2;
+                     break;
+ 
+                 case ' ':
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2021-33193.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2021-33193.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2737b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2021-33193.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,702 @@
+Description: Fix for CVE-2021-33193: mod_proxy HTTP/2 validation bypass
+ A crafted method sent through HTTP/2 will bypass validation and be forwarded by
+ mod_proxy, which can lead to request splitting or cache poisoning.
+Origin: other, https://git.centos.org/rpms/httpd/blob/c496dea5e0b6e82a9f503e973fc5d5ea93a94180/f/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.37-CVE-2021-33193.patch
+Forwarded: not-needed
+Applied-Upstream: 2.4.49, https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/ecebcc035ccd8d0e2984fe41420d9e944f456b3c
+Last-Update: 2023-02-24
+---
+This patch header follows DEP-3: http://dep.debian.net/deps/dep3/
+--- a/include/http_core.h
++++ b/include/http_core.h
+@@ -741,6 +741,7 @@
+ #define AP_HTTP_METHODS_REGISTERED    2
+     char http_methods;
+     unsigned int merge_slashes;
++    unsigned int strict_host_check;
+ } core_server_config;
+ 
+ /* for AddOutputFiltersByType in core.c */
+@@ -769,6 +770,11 @@
+ typedef struct core_output_filter_ctx core_output_filter_ctx_t;
+ typedef struct core_filter_ctx        core_ctx_t;
+ 
++struct core_filter_ctx {
++    apr_bucket_brigade *b;
++    apr_bucket_brigade *tmpbb;
++};
++
+ typedef struct core_net_rec {
+     /** Connection to the client */
+     apr_socket_t *client_socket;
+--- a/include/http_protocol.h
++++ b/include/http_protocol.h
+@@ -54,6 +54,13 @@
+  */
+ 
+ /**
++ * Read an empty request and set reasonable defaults.
++ * @param c The current connection
++ * @return The new request_rec
++ */
++AP_DECLARE(request_rec *) ap_create_request(conn_rec *c);
++
++/**
+  * Read a request and fill in the fields.
+  * @param c The current connection
+  * @return The new request_rec
+@@ -61,6 +68,20 @@
+ request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *c);
+ 
+ /**
++ * Parse and validate the request line.
++ * @param r The current request
++ * @return 1 on success, 0 on failure
++ */
++AP_DECLARE(int) ap_parse_request_line(request_rec *r);
++
++/**
++ * Validate the request header and select vhost.
++ * @param r The current request
++ * @return 1 on success, 0 on failure
++ */
++AP_DECLARE(int) ap_check_request_header(request_rec *r);
++
++/**
+  * Read the mime-encoded headers.
+  * @param r The current request
+  */
+--- a/include/http_vhost.h
++++ b/include/http_vhost.h
+@@ -100,6 +100,19 @@
+ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_update_vhost_from_headers(request_rec *r);
+ 
+ /**
++ * Updates r->server with the best name-based virtual host match, within
++ * the chain of matching virtual hosts selected by ap_update_vhost_given_ip.
++ * @param r The current request
++ * @param require_match 1 to return an HTTP error if the requested hostname is
++ * not explicitly matched to a VirtualHost.
++ * @return return HTTP_OK unless require_match was specified and the requested
++ * hostname did not match any ServerName, ServerAlias, or VirtualHost
++ * address-spec.
++ */
++AP_DECLARE(int) ap_update_vhost_from_headers_ex(request_rec *r, int require_match);
++
++
++/**
+  * Match the host in the header with the hostname of the server for this
+  * request.
+  * @param r The current request
+--- a/server/core.c
++++ b/server/core.c
+@@ -494,6 +494,8 @@
+     conf->protocols_honor_order = -1;
+     conf->merge_slashes = AP_CORE_CONFIG_UNSET; 
+     
++    conf->strict_host_check= AP_CORE_CONFIG_UNSET;
++
+     return (void *)conf;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -559,7 +561,13 @@
+                                        base->protocols_honor_order :
+                                        virt->protocols_honor_order);
+     AP_CORE_MERGE_FLAG(merge_slashes, conf, base, virt);
+-    
++
++    conf->strict_host_check = (virt->strict_host_check != AP_CORE_CONFIG_UNSET)
++                              ? virt->strict_host_check
++                              : base->strict_host_check;
++
++    AP_CORE_MERGE_FLAG(strict_host_check, conf, base, virt);
++
+     return conf;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -4518,7 +4526,10 @@
+ AP_INIT_FLAG("QualifyRedirectURL", set_qualify_redirect_url, NULL, OR_FILEINFO,
+              "Controls whether HTTP authorization headers, normally hidden, will "
+              "be passed to scripts"),
+-
++AP_INIT_FLAG("StrictHostCheck", set_core_server_flag,
++             (void *)APR_OFFSETOF(core_server_config, strict_host_check),
++             RSRC_CONF,
++             "Controls whether a hostname match is required"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("ForceType", ap_set_string_slot_lower,
+        (void *)APR_OFFSETOF(core_dir_config, mime_type), OR_FILEINFO,
+      "a mime type that overrides other configured type"),
+@@ -5492,4 +5503,3 @@
+     core_cmds,                    /* command apr_table_t */
+     register_hooks                /* register hooks */
+ };
+-
+--- a/server/core_filters.c
++++ b/server/core_filters.c
+@@ -84,11 +84,6 @@
+     apr_size_t bytes_written;
+ };
+ 
+-struct core_filter_ctx {
+-    apr_bucket_brigade *b;
+-    apr_bucket_brigade *tmpbb;
+-};
+-
+ 
+ apr_status_t ap_core_input_filter(ap_filter_t *f, apr_bucket_brigade *b,
+                                   ap_input_mode_t mode, apr_read_type_e block,
+--- a/server/protocol.c
++++ b/server/protocol.c
+@@ -611,8 +611,15 @@
+         }
+ 
+         r->args = r->parsed_uri.query;
+-        r->uri = r->parsed_uri.path ? r->parsed_uri.path
+-                 : apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "/");
++        if (r->parsed_uri.path) {
++            r->uri = r->parsed_uri.path;
++        }
++        else if (r->method_number == M_OPTIONS) {
++            r->uri = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "*");
++        }
++        else {
++            r->uri = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "/");
++        }
+ 
+ #if defined(OS2) || defined(WIN32)
+         /* Handle path translations for OS/2 and plug security hole.
+@@ -649,13 +656,6 @@
+ 
+ static int read_request_line(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
+ {
+-    enum {
+-        rrl_none, rrl_badmethod, rrl_badwhitespace, rrl_excesswhitespace,
+-        rrl_missinguri, rrl_baduri, rrl_badprotocol, rrl_trailingtext,
+-        rrl_badmethod09, rrl_reject09
+-    } deferred_error = rrl_none;
+-    char *ll;
+-    char *uri;
+     apr_size_t len;
+     int num_blank_lines = DEFAULT_LIMIT_BLANK_LINES;
+     core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
+@@ -720,6 +720,20 @@
+     }
+ 
+     r->request_time = apr_time_now();
++    return 1;
++}
++
++AP_DECLARE(int) ap_parse_request_line(request_rec *r)
++{
++    core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
++    int strict = (conf->http_conformance != AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE);
++    enum {
++        rrl_none, rrl_badmethod, rrl_badwhitespace, rrl_excesswhitespace,
++        rrl_missinguri, rrl_baduri, rrl_badprotocol, rrl_trailingtext,
++        rrl_badmethod09, rrl_reject09
++    } deferred_error = rrl_none;
++    apr_size_t len = 0;
++    char *uri, *ll;
+ 
+     r->method = r->the_request;
+ 
+@@ -751,7 +765,6 @@
+         if (deferred_error == rrl_none)
+             deferred_error = rrl_missinguri;
+         r->protocol = uri = "";
+-        len = 0;
+         goto rrl_done;
+     }
+     else if (strict && ll[0] && apr_isspace(ll[1])
+@@ -782,7 +795,6 @@
+     /* Verify URI terminated with a single SP, or mark as specific error */
+     if (!ll) {
+         r->protocol = "";
+-        len = 0;
+         goto rrl_done;
+     }
+     else if (strict && ll[0] && apr_isspace(ll[1])
+@@ -875,6 +887,14 @@
+         r->header_only = 1;
+ 
+     ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
++    if (r->status == HTTP_OK
++            && (r->parsed_uri.path != NULL)
++            && (r->parsed_uri.path[0] != '/')
++            && (r->method_number != M_OPTIONS
++                || strcmp(r->parsed_uri.path, "*") != 0)) {
++        /* Invalid request-target per RFC 7230 section 5.3 */
++        r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++    }
+ 
+     /* With the request understood, we can consider HTTP/0.9 specific errors */
+     if (r->proto_num == HTTP_VERSION(0, 9) && deferred_error == rrl_none) {
+@@ -982,6 +1002,79 @@
+     return 0;
+ }
+ 
++AP_DECLARE(int) ap_check_request_header(request_rec *r)
++{
++    core_server_config *conf;
++    int strict_host_check;
++    const char *expect;
++    int access_status;
++
++    conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
++
++    /* update what we think the virtual host is based on the headers we've
++     * now read. may update status.
++     */
++    strict_host_check = (conf->strict_host_check == AP_CORE_CONFIG_ON);
++    access_status = ap_update_vhost_from_headers_ex(r, strict_host_check);
++    if (strict_host_check && access_status != HTTP_OK) {
++        if (r->server == ap_server_conf) {
++            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(10156)
++                          "Requested hostname '%s' did not match any ServerName/ServerAlias "
++                          "in the global server configuration ", r->hostname);
++        }
++        else {
++            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(10157)
++                          "Requested hostname '%s' did not match any ServerName/ServerAlias "
++                          "in the matching virtual host (default vhost for "
++                          "current connection is %s:%u)",
++                          r->hostname, r->server->defn_name, r->server->defn_line_number);
++        }
++        r->status = access_status;
++    }
++    if (r->status != HTTP_OK) {
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if ((!r->hostname && (r->proto_num >= HTTP_VERSION(1, 1)))
++        || ((r->proto_num == HTTP_VERSION(1, 1))
++            && !apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Host"))) {
++        /*
++         * Client sent us an HTTP/1.1 or later request without telling us the
++         * hostname, either with a full URL or a Host: header. We therefore
++         * need to (as per the 1.1 spec) send an error.  As a special case,
++         * HTTP/1.1 mentions twice (S9, S14.23) that a request MUST contain
++         * a Host: header, and the server MUST respond with 400 if it doesn't.
++         */
++        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(00569)
++                      "client sent HTTP/1.1 request without hostname "
++                      "(see RFC2616 section 14.23): %s", r->uri);
++        r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++        return 0;
++    }
++
++    if (((expect = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Expect")) != NULL)
++        && (expect[0] != '\0')) {
++        /*
++         * The Expect header field was added to HTTP/1.1 after RFC 2068
++         * as a means to signal when a 100 response is desired and,
++         * unfortunately, to signal a poor man's mandatory extension that
++         * the server must understand or return 417 Expectation Failed.
++         */
++        if (ap_cstr_casecmp(expect, "100-continue") == 0) {
++            r->expecting_100 = 1;
++        }
++        else {
++            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00570)
++                          "client sent an unrecognized expectation value "
++                          "of Expect: %s", expect);
++            r->status = HTTP_EXPECTATION_FAILED;
++            return 0;
++        }
++    }
++
++    return 1;
++}
++
+ static int table_do_fn_check_lengths(void *r_, const char *key,
+                                      const char *value)
+ {
+@@ -1265,16 +1358,10 @@
+     apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
+ }
+ 
+-request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
++AP_DECLARE(request_rec *) ap_create_request(conn_rec *conn)
+ {
+     request_rec *r;
+     apr_pool_t *p;
+-    const char *expect;
+-    int access_status;
+-    apr_bucket_brigade *tmp_bb;
+-    apr_socket_t *csd;
+-    apr_interval_time_t cur_timeout;
+-
+ 
+     apr_pool_create(&p, conn->pool);
+     apr_pool_tag(p, "request");
+@@ -1313,6 +1400,7 @@
+     r->read_body       = REQUEST_NO_BODY;
+ 
+     r->status          = HTTP_OK;  /* Until further notice */
++    r->header_only     = 0;
+     r->the_request     = NULL;
+ 
+     /* Begin by presuming any module can make its own path_info assumptions,
+@@ -1323,12 +1411,33 @@
+     r->useragent_addr = conn->client_addr;
+     r->useragent_ip = conn->client_ip;
+ 
++    return r;
++}
++
++/* Apply the server's timeout/config to the connection/request. */
++static void apply_server_config(request_rec *r)
++{
++    apr_socket_t *csd;
++
++    csd = ap_get_conn_socket(r->connection);
++    apr_socket_timeout_set(csd, r->server->timeout);
++
++    r->per_dir_config = r->server->lookup_defaults;
++}
++
++request_rec *ap_read_request(conn_rec *conn)
++{
++    int access_status;
++    apr_bucket_brigade *tmp_bb;
++
++    request_rec *r = ap_create_request(conn);
+     tmp_bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, r->connection->bucket_alloc);
+ 
+     ap_run_pre_read_request(r, conn);
+ 
+     /* Get the request... */
+-    if (!read_request_line(r, tmp_bb)) {
++    if (!read_request_line(r, tmp_bb) || !ap_parse_request_line(r)) {
++        apr_brigade_cleanup(tmp_bb);
+         switch (r->status) {
+         case HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE:
+         case HTTP_BAD_REQUEST:
+@@ -1344,49 +1453,38 @@
+                               "request failed: malformed request line");
+             }
+             access_status = r->status;
+-            r->status = HTTP_OK;
+-            ap_die(access_status, r);
+-            ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
+-            ap_run_log_transaction(r);
+-            r = NULL;
+-            apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
+-            goto traceout;
++            goto die_unusable_input;
++
+         case HTTP_REQUEST_TIME_OUT:
++            /* Just log, no further action on this connection. */
+             ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, NULL);
+             if (!r->connection->keepalives)
+                 ap_run_log_transaction(r);
+-            apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
+-            goto traceout;
+-        default:
+-            apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
+-            r = NULL;
+-            goto traceout;
++            break;
+         }
++        /* Not worth dying with. */
++        conn->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
++        apr_pool_destroy(r->pool);
++        goto ignore;
+     }
++    apr_brigade_cleanup(tmp_bb);
+ 
+     /* We may have been in keep_alive_timeout mode, so toggle back
+      * to the normal timeout mode as we fetch the header lines,
+      * as necessary.
+      */
+-    csd = ap_get_conn_socket(conn);
+-    apr_socket_timeout_get(csd, &cur_timeout);
+-    if (cur_timeout != conn->base_server->timeout) {
+-        apr_socket_timeout_set(csd, conn->base_server->timeout);
+-        cur_timeout = conn->base_server->timeout;
+-    }
++    apply_server_config(r);
+ 
+     if (!r->assbackwards) {
+         const char *tenc;
+ 
+         ap_get_mime_headers_core(r, tmp_bb);
++        apr_brigade_cleanup(tmp_bb);
+         if (r->status != HTTP_OK) {
+             ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(00567)
+                           "request failed: error reading the headers");
+-            ap_send_error_response(r, 0);
+-            ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
+-            ap_run_log_transaction(r);
+-            apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
+-            goto traceout;
++            access_status = r->status;
++            goto die_unusable_input;
+         }
+ 
+         tenc = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Transfer-Encoding");
+@@ -1402,13 +1500,8 @@
+                 ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02539)
+                               "client sent unknown Transfer-Encoding "
+                               "(%s): %s", tenc, r->uri);
+-                r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+-                conn->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
+-                ap_send_error_response(r, 0);
+-                ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
+-                ap_run_log_transaction(r);
+-                apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
+-                goto traceout;
++                access_status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
++                goto die_unusable_input;
+             }
+ 
+             /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-23
+@@ -1421,88 +1514,81 @@
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
+-
+-    /* update what we think the virtual host is based on the headers we've
+-     * now read. may update status.
+-     */
+-    ap_update_vhost_from_headers(r);
+-    access_status = r->status;
+-
+-    /* Toggle to the Host:-based vhost's timeout mode to fetch the
+-     * request body and send the response body, if needed.
+-     */
+-    if (cur_timeout != r->server->timeout) {
+-        apr_socket_timeout_set(csd, r->server->timeout);
+-        cur_timeout = r->server->timeout;
+-    }
+-
+-    /* we may have switched to another server */
+-    r->per_dir_config = r->server->lookup_defaults;
+-
+-    if ((!r->hostname && (r->proto_num >= HTTP_VERSION(1, 1)))
+-        || ((r->proto_num == HTTP_VERSION(1, 1))
+-            && !apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Host"))) {
+-        /*
+-         * Client sent us an HTTP/1.1 or later request without telling us the
+-         * hostname, either with a full URL or a Host: header. We therefore
+-         * need to (as per the 1.1 spec) send an error.  As a special case,
+-         * HTTP/1.1 mentions twice (S9, S14.23) that a request MUST contain
+-         * a Host: header, and the server MUST respond with 400 if it doesn't.
+-         */
+-        access_status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+-        ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(00569)
+-                      "client sent HTTP/1.1 request without hostname "
+-                      "(see RFC2616 section 14.23): %s", r->uri);
+-    }
+-
+     /*
+      * Add the HTTP_IN filter here to ensure that ap_discard_request_body
+      * called by ap_die and by ap_send_error_response works correctly on
+      * status codes that do not cause the connection to be dropped and
+      * in situations where the connection should be kept alive.
+      */
+-
+     ap_add_input_filter_handle(ap_http_input_filter_handle,
+                                NULL, r, r->connection);
+ 
+-    if (access_status != HTTP_OK
+-        || (access_status = ap_post_read_request(r))) {
+-        ap_die(access_status, r);
+-        ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
+-        ap_run_log_transaction(r);
+-        r = NULL;
+-        goto traceout;
++    /* Validate Host/Expect headers and select vhost. */
++    if (!ap_check_request_header(r)) {
++        /* we may have switched to another server still */
++        apply_server_config(r);
++        access_status = r->status;
++        goto die_before_hooks;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (((expect = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Expect")) != NULL)
+-        && (expect[0] != '\0')) {
+-        /*
+-         * The Expect header field was added to HTTP/1.1 after RFC 2068
+-         * as a means to signal when a 100 response is desired and,
+-         * unfortunately, to signal a poor man's mandatory extension that
+-         * the server must understand or return 417 Expectation Failed.
+-         */
+-        if (strcasecmp(expect, "100-continue") == 0) {
+-            r->expecting_100 = 1;
+-        }
+-        else {
+-            r->status = HTTP_EXPECTATION_FAILED;
+-            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, APLOGNO(00570)
+-                          "client sent an unrecognized expectation value of "
+-                          "Expect: %s", expect);
+-            ap_send_error_response(r, 0);
+-            ap_update_child_status(conn->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_LOG, r);
+-            ap_run_log_transaction(r);
+-            goto traceout;
+-        }
++    /* we may have switched to another server */
++    apply_server_config(r);
++
++    if ((access_status = ap_run_post_read_request(r))) {
++        goto die;
+     }
+ 
+-    AP_READ_REQUEST_SUCCESS((uintptr_t)r, (char *)r->method, (char *)r->uri, (char *)r->server->defn_name, r->status);
++    AP_READ_REQUEST_SUCCESS((uintptr_t)r, (char *)r->method,
++                            (char *)r->uri, (char *)r->server->defn_name,
++                            r->status);
++
+     return r;
+-    traceout:
++
++    /* Everything falls through on failure */
++
++die_unusable_input:
++    /* Input filters are in an undeterminate state, cleanup (including
++     * CORE_IN's socket) such that any further attempt to read is EOF.
++     */
++    {
++        ap_filter_t *f = conn->input_filters;
++        while (f) {
++            if (f->frec == ap_core_input_filter_handle) {
++                core_net_rec *net = f->ctx;
++                apr_brigade_cleanup(net->in_ctx->b);
++                break;
++            }
++            ap_remove_input_filter(f);
++            f = f->next;
++        }
++        conn->input_filters = r->input_filters = f;
++        conn->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
++    }
++
++die_before_hooks:
++    /* First call to ap_die() (non recursive) */
++    r->status = HTTP_OK;
++
++die:
++    ap_die(access_status, r);
++
++    /* ap_die() sent the response through the output filters, we must now
++     * end the request with an EOR bucket for stream/pipeline accounting.
++     */
++    {
++        apr_bucket_brigade *eor_bb;
++        eor_bb = apr_brigade_create(conn->pool, conn->bucket_alloc);
++        APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(eor_bb,
++                                ap_bucket_eor_create(conn->bucket_alloc, r));
++        ap_pass_brigade(conn->output_filters, eor_bb);
++        apr_brigade_cleanup(eor_bb);
++    }
++
++ignore:
++    r = NULL;
++
+     AP_READ_REQUEST_FAILURE((uintptr_t)r);
+-    return r;
++    return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_post_read_request(request_rec *r)
+--- a/server/vhost.c
++++ b/server/vhost.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include "http_vhost.h"
+ #include "http_protocol.h"
+ #include "http_core.h"
++#include "http_main.h"
+ 
+ #if APR_HAVE_ARPA_INET_H
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+@@ -973,7 +974,13 @@
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static void check_hostalias(request_rec *r)
++/*
++ * Updates r->server from ServerName/ServerAlias. Per the interaction
++ * of ip and name-based vhosts, it only looks in the best match from the
++ * connection-level ip-based matching.
++ * Returns HTTP_BAD_REQUEST if there was no match.
++ */
++static int update_server_from_aliases(request_rec *r)
+ {
+     /*
+      * Even if the request has a Host: header containing a port we ignore
+@@ -1050,11 +1057,18 @@
+         goto found;
+     }
+ 
+-    return;
++    if (!r->connection->vhost_lookup_data) {
++        if (matches_aliases(r->server, host)) {
++            s = r->server;
++            goto found;
++        }
++    }
++    return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ 
+ found:
+     /* s is the first matching server, we're done */
+     r->server = s;
++    return HTTP_OK;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1071,7 +1085,7 @@
+      * This is in conjunction with the ServerPath code in http_core, so we
+      * get the right host attached to a non- Host-sending request.
+      *
+-     * See the comment in check_hostalias about how each vhost can be
++     * See the comment in update_server_from_aliases about how each vhost can be
+      * listed multiple times.
+      */
+ 
+@@ -1135,10 +1149,16 @@
+ 
+ AP_DECLARE(void) ap_update_vhost_from_headers(request_rec *r)
+ {
++    ap_update_vhost_from_headers_ex(r, 0);
++}
++
++AP_DECLARE(int) ap_update_vhost_from_headers_ex(request_rec *r, int require_match)
++{
+     core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
+     const char *host_header = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Host");
+     int is_v6literal = 0;
+     int have_hostname_from_url = 0;
++    int rc = HTTP_OK;
+ 
+     if (r->hostname) {
+         /*
+@@ -1151,8 +1171,8 @@
+     else if (host_header != NULL) {
+         is_v6literal = fix_hostname(r, host_header, conf->http_conformance);
+     }
+-    if (r->status != HTTP_OK)
+-        return;
++    if (!require_match && r->status != HTTP_OK)
++        return HTTP_OK;
+ 
+     if (conf->http_conformance != AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_UNSAFE) {
+         /*
+@@ -1173,10 +1193,16 @@
+     /* check if we tucked away a name_chain */
+     if (r->connection->vhost_lookup_data) {
+         if (r->hostname)
+-            check_hostalias(r);
++            rc = update_server_from_aliases(r);
+         else
+             check_serverpath(r);
+     }
++    else if (require_match && r->hostname) {
++        /* check the base server config */
++        rc = update_server_from_aliases(r);
++    }
++
++    return rc;
+ }
+ 
+ /**
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2022-36760.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2022-36760.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebeefa3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2022-36760.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From d93e61e3e9622bacff746772cb9c97fdcaed8baf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:55 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906540 from trunk:
+
+cleanup on error
+
+
+Reviewed By: rpluem, gbechis, covener
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906542 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+---
+ modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c
+@@ -255,6 +255,8 @@
+             ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10396)
+                           "%s Transfer-Encoding is not supported",
+                           tenc);
++            /* We had a failure: Close connection to backend */
++            conn->close = 1;
+             return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+         }
+     } else {
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a123959
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906539 from trunk:
+
+fail on bad header
+
+Submitted By: covener
+Reviewed By: covener, rpluem, gbechis
+
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+---
+ modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ server/protocol.c              |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@
+  * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing
+  * what was read by ap_getline() upon return.
+  */
+-static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
++static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
+                                   char *buffer, int size,
+                                   conn_rec *c, int *pread_len)
+ {
+@@ -1043,19 +1043,26 @@
+         rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr,
+                              AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len);
+ 
+-        if (len <= 0)
+-            break;
+ 
+-        if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
+-            /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn.
+-             * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead?
+-             */
+-            int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
+-            ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
+-                    "header size is over the limit allowed by "
+-                    "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
+-                    "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
+-                    size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
++        if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) {
++            if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
++                int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
++                        "header size is over the limit allowed by "
++                        "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
++                        "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
++                        size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
++            }
++            else {
++                ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404)
++                              "Error reading headers from backend");
++            }
++            r->headers_out = NULL;
++            return rc;
++        }
++
++        if (len <= 0) {
++            break;
+         }
+         else {
+             ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer);
+@@ -1078,7 +1085,7 @@
+                 if (psc->badopt == bad_error) {
+                     /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */
+                     r->headers_out = NULL;
+-                    return;
++                    return APR_EINVAL;
+                 }
+                 else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) {
+                     /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then
+@@ -1092,13 +1099,13 @@
+                                       "in headers returned by %s (%s)",
+                                       r->uri, r->method);
+                         *pread_len = len;
+-                        return;
++                        return APR_SUCCESS;
+                     }
+                     else {
+                         ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099)
+                                       "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)",
+                                       r->uri, r->method);
+-                        return;
++                        return APR_SUCCESS;
+                     }
+                 }
+             }
+@@ -1128,6 +1135,7 @@
+         process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value);
+         saw_headers = 1;
+     }
++    return APR_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1398,10 +1406,10 @@
+                          "Set-Cookie", NULL);
+ 
+             /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */
+-            ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, origin,
+-                                  &pread_len);
++            rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size,
++                                       origin, &pread_len);
+ 
+-            if (r->headers_out == NULL) {
++            if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) {
+                 ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106)
+                               "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)",
+                               major, minor, r->uri, r->method);
+--- a/server/protocol.c
++++ b/server/protocol.c
+@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@
+         /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */
+         bytes_handled = strlen(*s);
+         if (bytes_handled < *read) {
++            ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf,
++                        "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0);
+             *read = bytes_handled;
+             if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
+                 rv = APR_EINVAL;
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 5ac5730..c430013 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -49,3 +49,7 @@ CVE-2022-29404.patch
 CVE-2022-30522.patch
 CVE-2022-30556.patch
 CVE-2022-31813.patch
+CVE-2006-20001.patch
+CVE-2022-36760.patch
+CVE-2022-37436.patch
+CVE-2021-33193.patch