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-rw-r--r--modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c355
1 files changed, 263 insertions, 92 deletions
diff --git a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
index 81c0f63..fe0496f 100644
--- a/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
+++ b/modules/ssl/ssl_engine_kernel.c
@@ -114,6 +114,45 @@ static int has_buffered_data(request_rec *r)
return result;
}
+/* If a renegotiation is required for the location, and the request
+ * includes a message body (and the client has not requested a "100
+ * Continue" response), then the client will be streaming the request
+ * body over the wire already. In that case, it is not possible to
+ * stop and perform a new SSL handshake immediately; once the SSL
+ * library moves to the "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets
+ * which the client is sending for the request body.
+ *
+ * To allow authentication to complete in the hook, the solution used
+ * here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the request body, and then
+ * to reinject that request body later.
+ *
+ * This function is called to fill the renegotiation buffer for the
+ * location as required, or fail. Returns zero on success or HTTP_
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+static int fill_reneg_buffer(request_rec *r, SSLDirConfigRec *dc)
+{
+ int rv;
+ apr_size_t rsize;
+
+ /* ### this is HTTP/1.1 specific, special case for protocol? */
+ if (r->expecting_100 || !ap_request_has_body(r)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE : dc->nRenegBufferSize;
+ if (rsize > 0) {
+ /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */
+ rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize);
+ }
+ else {
+ /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */
+ rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE;
+ }
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT
static int ap_array_same_str_set(apr_array_header_t *s1, apr_array_header_t *s2)
{
@@ -814,41 +853,14 @@ static int ssl_hook_Access_classic(request_rec *r, SSLSrvConfigRec *sc, SSLDirCo
}
}
- /* If a renegotiation is now required for this location, and the
- * request includes a message body (and the client has not
- * requested a "100 Continue" response), then the client will be
- * streaming the request body over the wire already. In that
- * case, it is not possible to stop and perform a new SSL
- * handshake immediately; once the SSL library moves to the
- * "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets which the client
- * is sending for the request body.
- *
- * To allow authentication to complete in this auth hook, the
- * solution used here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the
- * request body, and then to reinject that request body later.
- */
- if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick
- && !r->expecting_100
- && ap_request_has_body(r)) {
- int rv;
- apr_size_t rsize;
-
- rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE :
- dc->nRenegBufferSize;
- if (rsize > 0) {
- /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */
- rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize);
- }
- else {
- /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */
- rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE;
- }
-
- if (rv) {
+ /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */
+ if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick) {
+ rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc);
+ if (rc) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02257)
"could not buffer message body to allow "
"SSL renegotiation to proceed");
- return rv;
+ return rc;
}
}
@@ -1132,6 +1144,7 @@ static int ssl_hook_Access_modern(request_rec *r, SSLSrvConfigRec *sc, SSLDirCon
}
}
+ /* Fill reneg buffer if required. */
if (change_vmode) {
char peekbuf[1];
@@ -1144,7 +1157,16 @@ static int ssl_hook_Access_modern(request_rec *r, SSLSrvConfigRec *sc, SSLDirCon
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10129) "verify client post handshake");
+ rc = fill_reneg_buffer(r, dc);
+ if (rc) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10228)
+ "could not buffer message body to allow "
+ "TLS Post-Handshake Authentication to proceed");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(10129)
+ "verify client post handshake");
SSL_set_verify(ssl, vmode_needed, ssl_callback_SSLVerify);
@@ -1154,6 +1176,7 @@ static int ssl_hook_Access_modern(request_rec *r, SSLSrvConfigRec *sc, SSLDirCon
ssl_log_ssl_error(SSLLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server);
apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes",
"Reason: Cannot perform Post-Handshake Authentication.<br />");
+ SSL_set_verify(ssl, vmode_inplace, NULL);
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
@@ -1175,6 +1198,7 @@ static int ssl_hook_Access_modern(request_rec *r, SSLSrvConfigRec *sc, SSLDirCon
* Finally check for acceptable renegotiation results
*/
if (OK != (rc = ssl_check_post_client_verify(r, sc, dc, sslconn, ssl))) {
+ SSL_set_verify(ssl, vmode_inplace, NULL);
return rc;
}
}
@@ -1661,6 +1685,7 @@ const authz_provider ssl_authz_provider_verify_client =
** _________________________________________________________________
*/
+#if MODSSL_USE_OPENSSL_PRE_1_1_API
/*
* Hand out standard DH parameters, based on the authentication strength
*/
@@ -1706,6 +1731,7 @@ DH *ssl_callback_TmpDH(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen)
return modssl_get_dh_params(keylen);
}
+#endif
/*
* This OpenSSL callback function is called when OpenSSL
@@ -1723,7 +1749,7 @@ int ssl_callback_SSLVerify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(conn);
SSLDirConfigRec *dc = r ? myDirConfig(r) : sslconn->dc;
- modssl_ctx_t *mctx = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc);
+ modssl_ctx_t *mctx = myConnCtxConfig(conn, sc);
int crl_check_mode = mctx->crl_check_mask & ~SSL_CRLCHECK_FLAGS;
/* Get verify ingredients */
@@ -1747,7 +1773,7 @@ int ssl_callback_SSLVerify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* Check for optionally acceptable non-verifiable issuer situation
*/
if (dc) {
- if (sslconn->is_proxy) {
+ if (conn->outgoing) {
verify = dc->proxy->auth.verify_mode;
}
else {
@@ -1810,8 +1836,8 @@ int ssl_callback_SSLVerify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Perform OCSP-based revocation checks
*/
- if (ok && ((sc->server->ocsp_mask & SSL_OCSPCHECK_CHAIN) ||
- (errdepth == 0 && (sc->server->ocsp_mask & SSL_OCSPCHECK_LEAF)))) {
+ if (ok && ((mctx->ocsp_mask & SSL_OCSPCHECK_CHAIN) ||
+ (errdepth == 0 && (mctx->ocsp_mask & SSL_OCSPCHECK_LEAF)))) {
/* If there was an optional verification error, it's not
* possible to perform OCSP validation since the issuer may be
* missing/untrusted. Fail in that case. */
@@ -1859,7 +1885,7 @@ int ssl_callback_SSLVerify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* Finally check the depth of the certificate verification
*/
if (dc) {
- if (sslconn->is_proxy) {
+ if (conn->outgoing) {
depth = dc->proxy->auth.verify_depth;
}
else {
@@ -1911,7 +1937,7 @@ static void modssl_proxy_info_log(conn_rec *c,
*cert = info->x509; \
CRYPTO_add(&(*cert)->references, +1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); \
*pkey = info->x_pkey->dec_pkey; \
- CRYPTO_add(&(*pkey)->references, +1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_PKEY)
+ CRYPTO_add(&(*pkey)->references, +1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY)
#else
#define modssl_set_cert_info(info, cert, pkey) \
*cert = info->x509; \
@@ -2268,7 +2294,7 @@ void ssl_callback_Info(const SSL *ssl, int where, int rc)
/* If the reneg state is to reject renegotiations, check the SSL
* state machine and move to ABORT if a Client Hello is being
* read. */
- if (!sslconn->is_proxy &&
+ if (!c->outgoing &&
(where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) &&
sslconn->reneg_state == RENEG_REJECT) {
sslconn->reneg_state = RENEG_ABORT;
@@ -2290,60 +2316,89 @@ void ssl_callback_Info(const SSL *ssl, int where, int rc)
}
#ifdef HAVE_TLSEXT
+
+static apr_status_t set_challenge_creds(conn_rec *c, const char *servername,
+ SSL *ssl, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key,
+ const char *cert_pem, const char *key_pem)
+{
+ SSLConnRec *sslcon = myConnConfig(c);
+ apr_status_t rv = APR_SUCCESS;
+ int our_data = 0;
+
+ sslcon->service_unavailable = 1;
+ if (cert_pem) {
+ cert = NULL;
+ key = NULL;
+ our_data = 1;
+
+ rv = modssl_read_cert(c->pool, cert_pem, key_pem, NULL, NULL, &cert, &key);
+ if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10266)
+ "Failed to parse PEM of challenge certificate %s",
+ servername);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((SSL_use_certificate(ssl, cert) < 1)) {
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10086)
+ "Failed to configure challenge certificate %s",
+ servername);
+ rv = APR_EGENERAL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, key)) {
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10087)
+ "error '%s' using Challenge key: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_last_error(), NULL),
+ servername);
+ rv = APR_EGENERAL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_check_private_key(ssl) < 1) {
+ ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10088)
+ "Challenge certificate and private key %s "
+ "do not match", servername);
+ rv = APR_EGENERAL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ if (our_data && cert) X509_free(cert);
+ if (our_data && key) EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
/*
* This function sets the virtual host from an extended
* client hello with a server name indication extension ("SNI", cf. RFC 6066).
*/
-static apr_status_t init_vhost(conn_rec *c, SSL *ssl)
+static apr_status_t init_vhost(conn_rec *c, SSL *ssl, const char *servername)
{
- const char *servername;
- X509 *cert;
- EVP_PKEY *key;
-
if (c) {
SSLConnRec *sslcon = myConnConfig(c);
-
- if (sslcon->server != c->base_server) {
- /* already found the vhost */
- return APR_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (sslcon->vhost_found) {
+ /* already found the vhost? */
+ return sslcon->vhost_found > 0 ? APR_SUCCESS : APR_NOTFOUND;
}
+ sslcon->vhost_found = -1;
- servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+ if (!servername) {
+ servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+ }
if (servername) {
if (ap_vhost_iterate_given_conn(c, ssl_find_vhost,
(void *)servername)) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02043)
"SSL virtual host for servername %s found",
servername);
-
+
+ sslcon->vhost_found = +1;
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
- else if (ssl_is_challenge(c, servername, &cert, &key)) {
-
- sslcon->service_unavailable = 1;
- if ((SSL_use_certificate(ssl, cert) < 1)) {
- ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10086)
- "Failed to configure challenge certificate %s",
- servername);
- return APR_EGENERAL;
- }
-
- if (!SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, key)) {
- ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10087)
- "error '%s' using Challenge key: %s",
- ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_last_error(), NULL),
- servername);
- return APR_EGENERAL;
- }
-
- if (SSL_check_private_key(ssl) < 1) {
- ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, c, APLOGNO(10088)
- "Challenge certificate and private key %s "
- "do not match", servername);
- return APR_EGENERAL;
- }
-
- }
else {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02044)
"No matching SSL virtual host for servername "
@@ -2383,11 +2438,71 @@ static apr_status_t init_vhost(conn_rec *c, SSL *ssl)
int ssl_callback_ServerNameIndication(SSL *ssl, int *al, modssl_ctx_t *mctx)
{
conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
- apr_status_t status = init_vhost(c, ssl);
+ apr_status_t status = init_vhost(c, ssl, NULL);
return (status == APR_SUCCESS)? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+/*
+ * This callback function is called when the ClientHello is received.
+ */
+int ssl_callback_ClientHello(SSL *ssl, int *al, void *arg)
+{
+ char *servername = NULL;
+ conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
+ const unsigned char *pos;
+ size_t len, remaining;
+ (void)arg;
+
+ /* We can't use SSL_get_servername() at this earliest OpenSSL connection
+ * stage, and there is no SSL_client_hello_get0_servername() provided as
+ * of OpenSSL 1.1.1. So the code below, that extracts the SNI from the
+ * ClientHello's TLS extensions, is taken from some test code in OpenSSL,
+ * i.e. client_hello_select_server_ctx() in "test/handshake_helper.c".
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * The server_name extension was given too much extensibility when it
+ * was written, so parsing the normal case is a bit complex.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(ssl, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, &pos,
+ &remaining)
+ || remaining <= 2)
+ goto give_up;
+
+ /* Extract the length of the supplied list of names. */
+ len = (*(pos++) << 8);
+ len += *(pos++);
+ if (len + 2 != remaining)
+ goto give_up;
+ remaining = len;
+
+ /*
+ * The list in practice only has a single element, so we only consider
+ * the first one.
+ */
+ if (remaining <= 3 || *pos++ != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+ goto give_up;
+ remaining--;
+
+ /* Now we can finally pull out the byte array with the actual hostname. */
+ len = (*(pos++) << 8);
+ len += *(pos++);
+ if (len + 2 != remaining)
+ goto give_up;
+
+ /* Use the SNI to switch to the relevant vhost, should it differ from
+ * c->base_server.
+ */
+ servername = apr_pstrmemdup(c->pool, (const char *)pos, len);
+
+give_up:
+ init_vhost(c, ssl, servername);
+ return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10101000L */
+
/*
* Find a (name-based) SSL virtual host where either the ServerName
* or one of the ServerAliases matches the supplied name (to be used
@@ -2407,12 +2522,25 @@ static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s)
if (found && (ssl = sslcon->ssl) &&
(sc = mySrvConfig(s))) {
SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, sc->server->ssl_ctx);
+
/*
* SSL_set_SSL_CTX() only deals with the server cert,
* so we need to duplicate a few additional settings
* from the ctx by hand
*/
SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx));
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1010007fL \
+ && (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) \
+ || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x20800000L)
+ /*
+ * Don't switch the protocol if none is configured for this vhost,
+ * the default in this case is still the base server's SSLProtocol.
+ */
+ if (myConnCtxConfig(c, sc)->protocol_set) {
+ SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_min_proto_version(ctx));
+ SSL_set_max_proto_version(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_max_proto_version(ctx));
+ }
+#endif
if ((SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl) == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) ||
(SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) == 0)) {
/*
@@ -2453,6 +2581,7 @@ static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s)
sc->server->pks->service_unavailable : 0;
ap_update_child_status_from_server(c->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_READ, c, s);
+
/*
* There is one special filter callback, which is set
* very early depending on the base_server's log level.
@@ -2461,14 +2590,7 @@ static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s)
* we need to set that callback here.
*/
if (APLOGtrace4(s)) {
- BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl),
- *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(ssl);
- BIO_set_callback(rbio, ssl_io_data_cb);
- BIO_set_callback_arg(rbio, (void *)ssl);
- if (wbio && wbio != rbio) {
- BIO_set_callback(wbio, ssl_io_data_cb);
- BIO_set_callback_arg(wbio, (void *)ssl);
- }
+ modssl_set_io_callbacks(ssl);
}
return 1;
@@ -2488,14 +2610,17 @@ int ssl_callback_SessionTicket(SSL *ssl,
unsigned char *keyname,
unsigned char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
- HMAC_CTX *hctx,
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+ HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx,
+#else
+ EVP_MAC_CTX *mac_ctx,
+#endif
int mode)
{
conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(c);
SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s);
- SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c);
- modssl_ctx_t *mctx = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc);
+ modssl_ctx_t *mctx = myConnCtxConfig(c, sc);
modssl_ticket_key_t *ticket_key = mctx->ticket_key;
if (mode == 1) {
@@ -2515,7 +2640,13 @@ int ssl_callback_SessionTicket(SSL *ssl,
}
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(cipher_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
ticket_key->aes_key, iv);
- HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, ticket_key->hmac_secret, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+ HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, ticket_key->hmac_secret, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+#else
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(mac_ctx, ticket_key->mac_params);
+#endif
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02289)
"TLS session ticket key for %s successfully set, "
@@ -2536,7 +2667,13 @@ int ssl_callback_SessionTicket(SSL *ssl,
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(cipher_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
ticket_key->aes_key, iv);
- HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, ticket_key->hmac_secret, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L
+ HMAC_Init_ex(hmac_ctx, ticket_key->hmac_secret, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+#else
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(mac_ctx, ticket_key->mac_params);
+#endif
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(02290)
"TLS session ticket key for %s successfully set, "
@@ -2609,7 +2746,7 @@ int ssl_callback_alpn_select(SSL *ssl,
* they callback the SNI. We need to make sure that we know which vhost
* we are dealing with so we respect the correct protocols.
*/
- init_vhost(c, ssl);
+ init_vhost(c, ssl, NULL);
proposed = ap_select_protocol(c, NULL, sslconn->server, client_protos);
if (!proposed) {
@@ -2635,6 +2772,26 @@ int ssl_callback_alpn_select(SSL *ssl,
proposed);
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
}
+
+ /* protocol was switched, this could be a challenge protocol such as "acme-tls/1".
+ * For that to work, we need to allow overrides to our ssl certificate.
+ * However, exclude challenge checks on our best known traffic protocol.
+ * (http/1.1 is the default, we never switch to it anyway.)
+ */
+ if (strcmp("h2", proposed)) {
+ const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+ X509 *cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *key;
+ const char *cert_pem, *key_pem;
+
+ if (ssl_is_challenge(c, servername, &cert, &key, &cert_pem, &key_pem)) {
+ if (set_challenge_creds(c, servername, ssl, cert, key,
+ cert_pem, key_pem) != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+ SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, ssl_callback_SSLVerify);
+ }
+ }
}
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
@@ -2676,3 +2833,17 @@ int ssl_callback_SRPServerParams(SSL *ssl, int *ad, void *arg)
}
#endif /* HAVE_SRP */
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_KEYLOG
+/* Callback used with SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback. */
+void modssl_callback_keylog(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
+{
+ conn_rec *conn = SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
+ SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(conn->base_server);
+
+ if (sc && sc->mc->keylog_file) {
+ apr_file_printf(sc->mc->keylog_file, "%s\n", line);
+ }
+}
+#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-29 03:37:16 +0000