Adding upstream version 1:9.11.5.P4+dfsg.upstream/1%9.11.5.P4+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 3985 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/dns/validator.c b/lib/dns/validator.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ae11a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/dns/validator.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3985 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+ *
+ * See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
+ * information regarding copyright ownership.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#include <isc/base32.h>
+#include <isc/mem.h>
+#include <isc/print.h>
+#include <isc/sha2.h>
+#include <isc/string.h>
+#include <isc/task.h>
+#include <isc/util.h>
+
+#include <dns/db.h>
+#include <dns/dnssec.h>
+#include <dns/ds.h>
+#include <dns/events.h>
+#include <dns/keytable.h>
+#include <dns/keyvalues.h>
+#include <dns/log.h>
+#include <dns/message.h>
+#include <dns/ncache.h>
+#include <dns/nsec.h>
+#include <dns/nsec3.h>
+#include <dns/rdata.h>
+#include <dns/rdataset.h>
+#include <dns/rdatatype.h>
+#include <dns/resolver.h>
+#include <dns/result.h>
+#include <dns/validator.h>
+#include <dns/view.h>
+
+/*! \file
+ * \brief
+ * Basic processing sequences.
+ *
+ * \li When called with rdataset and sigrdataset:
+ * validator_start -> validate -> proveunsecure -> startfinddlvsep ->
+ *	dlv_validator_start -> validator_start -> validate -> proveunsecure
+ *
+ * validator_start -> validate -> nsecvalidate	(secure wildcard answer)
+ *
+ * \li When called with rdataset, sigrdataset and with DNS_VALIDATOR_DLV:
+ * validator_start -> startfinddlvsep -> dlv_validator_start ->
+ *	validator_start -> validate -> proveunsecure
+ *
+ * \li When called with rdataset:
+ * validator_start -> proveunsecure -> startfinddlvsep ->
+ *	dlv_validator_start -> validator_start -> proveunsecure
+ *
+ * \li When called with rdataset and with DNS_VALIDATOR_DLV:
+ * validator_start -> startfinddlvsep -> dlv_validator_start ->
+ *	validator_start -> proveunsecure
+ *
+ * \li When called without a rdataset:
+ * validator_start -> nsecvalidate -> proveunsecure -> startfinddlvsep ->
+ *	dlv_validator_start -> validator_start -> nsecvalidate -> proveunsecure
+ *
+ * Note: there isn't a case for DNS_VALIDATOR_DLV here as we want nsecvalidate()
+ * to always validate the authority section even when it does not contain
+ * signatures.
+ *
+ * validator_start: determines what type of validation to do.
+ * validate: attempts to perform a positive validation.
+ * proveunsecure: attempts to prove the answer comes from a unsecure zone.
+ * nsecvalidate: attempts to prove a negative response.
+ * startfinddlvsep: starts the DLV record lookup.
+ * dlv_validator_start: resets state and restarts the lookup using the
+ *	DLV RRset found by startfinddlvsep.
+ */
+
+#define VALIDATOR_MAGIC			ISC_MAGIC('V', 'a', 'l', '?')
+#define VALID_VALIDATOR(v)		ISC_MAGIC_VALID(v, VALIDATOR_MAGIC)
+
+#define VALATTR_SHUTDOWN		0x0001	/*%< Shutting down. */
+#define VALATTR_CANCELED		0x0002	/*%< Canceled. */
+#define VALATTR_TRIEDVERIFY		0x0004  /*%< We have found a key and
+						 * have attempted a verify. */
+#define VALATTR_INSECURITY		0x0010	/*%< Attempting proveunsecure. */
+#define VALATTR_DLVTRIED		0x0020	/*%< Looked for a DLV record. */
+
+/*!
+ * NSEC proofs to be looked for.
+ */
+#define VALATTR_NEEDNOQNAME		0x00000100
+#define VALATTR_NEEDNOWILDCARD		0x00000200
+#define VALATTR_NEEDNODATA		0x00000400
+
+/*!
+ * NSEC proofs that have been found.
+ */
+#define VALATTR_FOUNDNOQNAME		0x00001000
+#define VALATTR_FOUNDNOWILDCARD		0x00002000
+#define VALATTR_FOUNDNODATA		0x00004000
+#define VALATTR_FOUNDCLOSEST		0x00008000
+
+/*
+ *
+ */
+#define VALATTR_FOUNDOPTOUT		0x00010000
+#define VALATTR_FOUNDUNKNOWN		0x00020000
+
+#define NEEDNODATA(val) ((val->attributes & VALATTR_NEEDNODATA) != 0)
+#define NEEDNOQNAME(val) ((val->attributes & VALATTR_NEEDNOQNAME) != 0)
+#define NEEDNOWILDCARD(val) ((val->attributes & VALATTR_NEEDNOWILDCARD) != 0)
+#define DLVTRIED(val) ((val->attributes & VALATTR_DLVTRIED) != 0)
+#define FOUNDNODATA(val) ((val->attributes & VALATTR_FOUNDNODATA) != 0)
+#define FOUNDNOQNAME(val) ((val->attributes & VALATTR_FOUNDNOQNAME) != 0)
+#define FOUNDNOWILDCARD(val) ((val->attributes & VALATTR_FOUNDNOWILDCARD) != 0)
+#define FOUNDCLOSEST(val) ((val->attributes & VALATTR_FOUNDCLOSEST) != 0)
+#define FOUNDOPTOUT(val) ((val->attributes & VALATTR_FOUNDOPTOUT) != 0)
+
+#define SHUTDOWN(v)		(((v)->attributes & VALATTR_SHUTDOWN) != 0)
+#define CANCELED(v)		(((v)->attributes & VALATTR_CANCELED) != 0)
+
+#define NEGATIVE(r)	(((r)->attributes & DNS_RDATASETATTR_NEGATIVE) != 0)
+
+static void
+destroy(dns_validator_t *val);
+
+static isc_result_t
+get_dst_key(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdata_rrsig_t *siginfo,
+	    dns_rdataset_t *rdataset);
+
+static isc_result_t
+validate(dns_validator_t *val, bool resume);
+
+static isc_result_t
+validatezonekey(dns_validator_t *val);
+
+static isc_result_t
+nsecvalidate(dns_validator_t *val, bool resume);
+
+static isc_result_t
+proveunsecure(dns_validator_t *val, bool have_ds,
+	      bool resume);
+
+static void
+validator_logv(dns_validator_t *val, isc_logcategory_t *category,
+	       isc_logmodule_t *module, int level, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+     ISC_FORMAT_PRINTF(5, 0);
+
+static void
+validator_log(void *val, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
+     ISC_FORMAT_PRINTF(3, 4);
+
+static void
+validator_logcreate(dns_validator_t *val,
+		    dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type,
+		    const char *caller, const char *operation);
+
+static isc_result_t
+dlv_validatezonekey(dns_validator_t *val);
+
+static void
+dlv_validator_start(dns_validator_t *val);
+
+static isc_result_t
+finddlvsep(dns_validator_t *val, bool resume);
+
+static isc_result_t
+startfinddlvsep(dns_validator_t *val, dns_name_t *unsecure);
+
+/*%
+ * Mark the RRsets as a answer.
+ */
+static inline void
+markanswer(dns_validator_t *val, const char *where) {
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "marking as answer (%s)", where);
+	if (val->event->rdataset != NULL)
+		dns_rdataset_settrust(val->event->rdataset, dns_trust_answer);
+	if (val->event->sigrdataset != NULL)
+		dns_rdataset_settrust(val->event->sigrdataset,
+				      dns_trust_answer);
+}
+
+static inline void
+marksecure(dns_validatorevent_t *event) {
+	dns_rdataset_settrust(event->rdataset, dns_trust_secure);
+	if (event->sigrdataset != NULL)
+		dns_rdataset_settrust(event->sigrdataset, dns_trust_secure);
+	event->secure = true;
+}
+
+static void
+validator_done(dns_validator_t *val, isc_result_t result) {
+	isc_task_t *task;
+
+	if (val->event == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Caller must be holding the lock.
+	 */
+
+	val->event->result = result;
+	task = val->event->ev_sender;
+	val->event->ev_sender = val;
+	val->event->ev_type = DNS_EVENT_VALIDATORDONE;
+	val->event->ev_action = val->action;
+	val->event->ev_arg = val->arg;
+	isc_task_sendanddetach(&task, (isc_event_t **)&val->event);
+}
+
+static inline bool
+exit_check(dns_validator_t *val) {
+	/*
+	 * Caller must be holding the lock.
+	 */
+	if (!SHUTDOWN(val))
+		return (false);
+
+	INSIST(val->event == NULL);
+
+	if (val->fetch != NULL || val->subvalidator != NULL)
+		return (false);
+
+	return (true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that we have atleast one supported algorithm in the DLV RRset.
+ */
+static inline bool
+dlv_algorithm_supported(dns_validator_t *val) {
+	dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dns_rdata_dlv_t dlv;
+	isc_result_t result;
+
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(&val->dlv);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(&val->dlv)) {
+		dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
+		dns_rdataset_current(&val->dlv, &rdata);
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &dlv, NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_algorithm_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      dlv.algorithm))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_ds_digest_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      dlv.digest_type))
+			continue;
+
+		return (true);
+	}
+	return (false);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Look in the NSEC record returned from a DS query to see if there is
+ * a NS RRset at this name.  If it is found we are at a delegation point.
+ */
+static bool
+isdelegation(dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset,
+	     isc_result_t dbresult)
+{
+	dns_fixedname_t fixed;
+	dns_label_t hashlabel;
+	dns_name_t nsec3name;
+	dns_rdata_nsec3_t nsec3;
+	dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dns_rdataset_t set;
+	int order;
+	int scope;
+	bool found;
+	isc_buffer_t buffer;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	unsigned char hash[NSEC3_MAX_HASH_LENGTH];
+	unsigned char owner[NSEC3_MAX_HASH_LENGTH];
+	unsigned int length;
+
+	REQUIRE(dbresult == DNS_R_NXRRSET || dbresult == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET);
+
+	dns_rdataset_init(&set);
+	if (dbresult == DNS_R_NXRRSET)
+		dns_rdataset_clone(rdataset, &set);
+	else {
+		result = dns_ncache_getrdataset(rdataset, name,
+						dns_rdatatype_nsec, &set);
+		if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND)
+			goto trynsec3;
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			return (false);
+	}
+
+	INSIST(set.type == dns_rdatatype_nsec);
+
+	found = false;
+	result = dns_rdataset_first(&set);
+	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		dns_rdataset_current(&set, &rdata);
+		found = dns_nsec_typepresent(&rdata, dns_rdatatype_ns);
+		dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
+	}
+	dns_rdataset_disassociate(&set);
+	return (found);
+
+ trynsec3:
+	/*
+	 * Iterate over the ncache entry.
+	 */
+	found = false;
+	dns_name_init(&nsec3name, NULL);
+	dns_fixedname_init(&fixed);
+	dns_name_downcase(name, dns_fixedname_name(&fixed), NULL);
+	name = dns_fixedname_name(&fixed);
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(rdataset))
+	{
+		dns_ncache_current(rdataset, &nsec3name, &set);
+		if (set.type != dns_rdatatype_nsec3) {
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&set);
+			continue;
+		}
+		dns_name_getlabel(&nsec3name, 0, &hashlabel);
+		isc_region_consume(&hashlabel, 1);
+		isc_buffer_init(&buffer, owner, sizeof(owner));
+		result = isc_base32hexnp_decoderegion(&hashlabel, &buffer);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&set);
+			continue;
+		}
+		for (result = dns_rdataset_first(&set);
+		     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+		     result = dns_rdataset_next(&set))
+		{
+			dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
+			dns_rdataset_current(&set, &rdata);
+			(void)dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &nsec3, NULL);
+			if (nsec3.hash != 1)
+				continue;
+			length = isc_iterated_hash(hash, nsec3.hash,
+						   nsec3.iterations, nsec3.salt,
+						   nsec3.salt_length,
+						   name->ndata, name->length);
+			if (length != isc_buffer_usedlength(&buffer))
+				continue;
+			order = memcmp(hash, owner, length);
+			if (order == 0) {
+				found = dns_nsec3_typepresent(&rdata,
+							      dns_rdatatype_ns);
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(&set);
+				return (found);
+			}
+			if ((nsec3.flags & DNS_NSEC3FLAG_OPTOUT) == 0)
+				continue;
+			/*
+			 * Does this optout span cover the name?
+			 */
+			scope = memcmp(owner, nsec3.next, nsec3.next_length);
+			if ((scope < 0 && order > 0 &&
+			     memcmp(hash, nsec3.next, length) < 0) ||
+			    (scope >= 0 && (order > 0 ||
+					memcmp(hash, nsec3.next, length) < 0)))
+			{
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(&set);
+				return (true);
+			}
+		}
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&set);
+	}
+	return (found);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * We have been asked to look for a key.
+ * If found resume the validation process.
+ * If not found fail the validation process.
+ */
+static void
+fetch_callback_validator(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	dns_fetchevent_t *devent;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	dns_rdataset_t *rdataset;
+	bool want_destroy;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	isc_result_t eresult;
+	isc_result_t saved_result;
+	dns_fetch_t *fetch;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	INSIST(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_FETCHDONE);
+	devent = (dns_fetchevent_t *)event;
+	val = devent->ev_arg;
+	rdataset = &val->frdataset;
+	eresult = devent->result;
+
+	/* Free resources which are not of interest. */
+	if (devent->node != NULL)
+		dns_db_detachnode(devent->db, &devent->node);
+	if (devent->db != NULL)
+		dns_db_detach(&devent->db);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+	isc_event_free(&event);
+
+	INSIST(val->event != NULL);
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in fetch_callback_validator");
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+	fetch = val->fetch;
+	val->fetch = NULL;
+	if (CANCELED(val)) {
+		validator_done(val, ISC_R_CANCELED);
+	} else if (eresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "keyset with trust %s",
+			      dns_trust_totext(rdataset->trust));
+		/*
+		 * Only extract the dst key if the keyset is secure.
+		 */
+		if (rdataset->trust >= dns_trust_secure) {
+			result = get_dst_key(val, val->siginfo, rdataset);
+			if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				val->keyset = &val->frdataset;
+		}
+		result = validate(val, true);
+		if (result == DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG &&
+		    (val->attributes & VALATTR_TRIEDVERIFY) == 0)
+		{
+			saved_result = result;
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "falling back to insecurity proof");
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_INSECURITY;
+			result = proveunsecure(val, false, false);
+			if (result == DNS_R_NOTINSECURE)
+				result = saved_result;
+		}
+		if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+			validator_done(val, result);
+	} else {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "fetch_callback_validator: got %s",
+			      isc_result_totext(eresult));
+		if (eresult == ISC_R_CANCELED)
+			validator_done(val, eresult);
+		else
+			validator_done(val, DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN);
+	}
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (fetch != NULL)
+		dns_resolver_destroyfetch(&fetch);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * We were asked to look for a DS record as part of following a key chain
+ * upwards.  If found resume the validation process.  If not found fail the
+ * validation process.
+ */
+static void
+dsfetched(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	dns_fetchevent_t *devent;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	dns_rdataset_t *rdataset;
+	bool want_destroy;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	isc_result_t eresult;
+	dns_fetch_t *fetch;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	INSIST(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_FETCHDONE);
+	devent = (dns_fetchevent_t *)event;
+	val = devent->ev_arg;
+	rdataset = &val->frdataset;
+	eresult = devent->result;
+
+	/* Free resources which are not of interest. */
+	if (devent->node != NULL)
+		dns_db_detachnode(devent->db, &devent->node);
+	if (devent->db != NULL)
+		dns_db_detach(&devent->db);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+	isc_event_free(&event);
+
+	INSIST(val->event != NULL);
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in dsfetched");
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+	fetch = val->fetch;
+	val->fetch = NULL;
+	if (CANCELED(val)) {
+		validator_done(val, ISC_R_CANCELED);
+	} else if (eresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "dsset with trust %s",
+			       dns_trust_totext(rdataset->trust));
+		val->dsset = &val->frdataset;
+		result = validatezonekey(val);
+		if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+			validator_done(val, result);
+	} else if (eresult == DNS_R_CNAME ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_NXRRSET ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_SERVFAIL)	/* RFC 1034 parent? */
+	{
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "falling back to insecurity proof (%s)",
+			      dns_result_totext(eresult));
+		val->attributes |= VALATTR_INSECURITY;
+		result = proveunsecure(val, false, false);
+		if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+			validator_done(val, result);
+	} else {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "dsfetched: got %s",
+			      isc_result_totext(eresult));
+		if (eresult == ISC_R_CANCELED)
+			validator_done(val, eresult);
+		else
+			validator_done(val, DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN);
+	}
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (fetch != NULL)
+		dns_resolver_destroyfetch(&fetch);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * We were asked to look for the DS record as part of proving that a
+ * name is unsecure.
+ *
+ * If the DS record doesn't exist and the query name corresponds to
+ * a delegation point we are transitioning from a secure zone to a
+ * unsecure zone.
+ *
+ * If the DS record exists it will be secure.  We can continue looking
+ * for the break point in the chain of trust.
+ */
+static void
+dsfetched2(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	dns_fetchevent_t *devent;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	dns_name_t *tname;
+	bool want_destroy;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	isc_result_t eresult;
+	dns_fetch_t *fetch;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	INSIST(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_FETCHDONE);
+	devent = (dns_fetchevent_t *)event;
+	val = devent->ev_arg;
+	eresult = devent->result;
+
+	/* Free resources which are not of interest. */
+	if (devent->node != NULL)
+		dns_db_detachnode(devent->db, &devent->node);
+	if (devent->db != NULL)
+		dns_db_detach(&devent->db);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+
+	INSIST(val->event != NULL);
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in dsfetched2: %s",
+		      dns_result_totext(eresult));
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+	fetch = val->fetch;
+	val->fetch = NULL;
+	if (CANCELED(val)) {
+		validator_done(val, ISC_R_CANCELED);
+	} else if (eresult == DNS_R_CNAME ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_NXRRSET ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * There is no DS.  If this is a delegation, we're done.
+		 */
+		tname = dns_fixedname_name(&devent->foundname);
+		if (eresult != DNS_R_CNAME &&
+		    isdelegation(tname, &val->frdataset, eresult)) {
+			if (val->mustbesecure) {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+					      "must be secure failure, no DS"
+					      " and this is a delegation");
+				validator_done(val, DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE);
+			} else if (val->view->dlv == NULL || DLVTRIED(val)) {
+				markanswer(val, "dsfetched2");
+				validator_done(val, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+			} else {
+				result = startfinddlvsep(val, tname);
+				if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+					validator_done(val, result);
+			}
+		} else {
+			result = proveunsecure(val, false, true);
+			if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+				validator_done(val, result);
+		}
+	} else if (eresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_NXDOMAIN ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * There is a DS which may or may not be a zone cut.
+		 * In either case we are still in a secure zone resume
+		 * validation.
+		 */
+		result = proveunsecure(val, (eresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS),
+				       true);
+		if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+			validator_done(val, result);
+	} else {
+		if (eresult == ISC_R_CANCELED)
+			validator_done(val, eresult);
+		else
+			validator_done(val, DNS_R_NOVALIDDS);
+	}
+	isc_event_free(&event);
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (fetch != NULL)
+		dns_resolver_destroyfetch(&fetch);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Callback from when a DNSKEY RRset has been validated.
+ *
+ * Resumes the stalled validation process.
+ */
+static void
+keyvalidated(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	dns_validatorevent_t *devent;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	bool want_destroy;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	isc_result_t eresult;
+	isc_result_t saved_result;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	INSIST(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_VALIDATORDONE);
+
+	devent = (dns_validatorevent_t *)event;
+	val = devent->ev_arg;
+	eresult = devent->result;
+
+	isc_event_free(&event);
+	dns_validator_destroy(&val->subvalidator);
+
+	INSIST(val->event != NULL);
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in keyvalidated");
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (CANCELED(val)) {
+		validator_done(val, ISC_R_CANCELED);
+	} else if (eresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "keyset with trust %s",
+			      dns_trust_totext(val->frdataset.trust));
+		/*
+		 * Only extract the dst key if the keyset is secure.
+		 */
+		if (val->frdataset.trust >= dns_trust_secure)
+			(void) get_dst_key(val, val->siginfo, &val->frdataset);
+		result = validate(val, true);
+		if (result == DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG &&
+		    (val->attributes & VALATTR_TRIEDVERIFY) == 0)
+		{
+			saved_result = result;
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "falling back to insecurity proof");
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_INSECURITY;
+			result = proveunsecure(val, false, false);
+			if (result == DNS_R_NOTINSECURE)
+				result = saved_result;
+		}
+		if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+			validator_done(val, result);
+	} else {
+		if (eresult != DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN) {
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_expire(&val->frdataset);
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_expire(&val->fsigrdataset);
+		}
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "keyvalidated: got %s",
+			      isc_result_totext(eresult));
+		validator_done(val, DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN);
+	}
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Callback when the DS record has been validated.
+ *
+ * Resumes validation of the zone key or the unsecure zone proof.
+ */
+static void
+dsvalidated(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	dns_validatorevent_t *devent;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	bool want_destroy;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	isc_result_t eresult;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	INSIST(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_VALIDATORDONE);
+
+	devent = (dns_validatorevent_t *)event;
+	val = devent->ev_arg;
+	eresult = devent->result;
+
+	isc_event_free(&event);
+	dns_validator_destroy(&val->subvalidator);
+
+	INSIST(val->event != NULL);
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in dsvalidated");
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (CANCELED(val)) {
+		validator_done(val, ISC_R_CANCELED);
+	} else if (eresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		bool have_dsset;
+		dns_name_t *name;
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "%s with trust %s",
+			      val->frdataset.type == dns_rdatatype_ds ?
+			      "dsset" : "ds non-existance",
+			      dns_trust_totext(val->frdataset.trust));
+		have_dsset = (val->frdataset.type == dns_rdatatype_ds);
+		name = dns_fixedname_name(&val->fname);
+		if ((val->attributes & VALATTR_INSECURITY) != 0 &&
+		    val->frdataset.covers == dns_rdatatype_ds &&
+		    NEGATIVE(&val->frdataset) &&
+		    isdelegation(name, &val->frdataset, DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET)) {
+			if (val->mustbesecure) {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+					      "must be secure failure, no DS "
+					      "and this is a delegation");
+				result = DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE;
+			} else if (val->view->dlv == NULL || DLVTRIED(val)) {
+				markanswer(val, "dsvalidated");
+				result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;;
+			} else
+				result = startfinddlvsep(val, name);
+		} else if ((val->attributes & VALATTR_INSECURITY) != 0) {
+			result = proveunsecure(val, have_dsset, true);
+		} else
+			result = validatezonekey(val);
+		if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+			validator_done(val, result);
+	} else {
+		if (eresult != DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN) {
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_expire(&val->frdataset);
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_expire(&val->fsigrdataset);
+		}
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "dsvalidated: got %s",
+			      isc_result_totext(eresult));
+		validator_done(val, DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN);
+	}
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Callback when the CNAME record has been validated.
+ *
+ * Resumes validation of the unsecure zone proof.
+ */
+static void
+cnamevalidated(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	dns_validatorevent_t *devent;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	bool want_destroy;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	isc_result_t eresult;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	INSIST(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_VALIDATORDONE);
+
+	devent = (dns_validatorevent_t *)event;
+	val = devent->ev_arg;
+	eresult = devent->result;
+
+	isc_event_free(&event);
+	dns_validator_destroy(&val->subvalidator);
+
+	INSIST(val->event != NULL);
+	INSIST((val->attributes & VALATTR_INSECURITY) != 0);
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in cnamevalidated");
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (CANCELED(val)) {
+		validator_done(val, ISC_R_CANCELED);
+	} else if (eresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "cname with trust %s",
+			      dns_trust_totext(val->frdataset.trust));
+		result = proveunsecure(val, false, true);
+		if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+			validator_done(val, result);
+	} else {
+		if (eresult != DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN) {
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_expire(&val->frdataset);
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_expire(&val->fsigrdataset);
+		}
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "cnamevalidated: got %s",
+			      isc_result_totext(eresult));
+		validator_done(val, DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN);
+	}
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Callback for when NSEC records have been validated.
+ *
+ * Looks for NOQNAME, NODATA and OPTOUT proofs.
+ *
+ * Resumes nsecvalidate.
+ */
+static void
+authvalidated(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	dns_validatorevent_t *devent;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	dns_rdataset_t *rdataset;
+	bool want_destroy;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	bool exists, data;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	INSIST(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_VALIDATORDONE);
+
+	devent = (dns_validatorevent_t *)event;
+	rdataset = devent->rdataset;
+	val = devent->ev_arg;
+	result = devent->result;
+	dns_validator_destroy(&val->subvalidator);
+
+	INSIST(val->event != NULL);
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in authvalidated");
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (CANCELED(val)) {
+		validator_done(val, ISC_R_CANCELED);
+	} else if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "authvalidated: got %s",
+			      isc_result_totext(result));
+		if (result == DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN)
+			val->authfail++;
+		if (result == ISC_R_CANCELED)
+			validator_done(val, result);
+		else {
+			result = nsecvalidate(val, true);
+			if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+				validator_done(val, result);
+		}
+	} else {
+		dns_name_t **proofs = val->event->proofs;
+		dns_name_t *wild = dns_fixedname_name(&val->wild);
+
+		if (rdataset->trust == dns_trust_secure)
+			val->seensig = true;
+
+		if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_nsec &&
+		    rdataset->trust == dns_trust_secure &&
+		    (NEEDNODATA(val) || NEEDNOQNAME(val)) &&
+		    !FOUNDNODATA(val) && !FOUNDNOQNAME(val) &&
+		    dns_nsec_noexistnodata(val->event->type, val->event->name,
+					   devent->name, rdataset, &exists,
+					   &data, wild, validator_log, val)
+				      == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+		{
+			if (exists && !data) {
+				val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDNODATA;
+				if (NEEDNODATA(val))
+					proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_NODATAPROOF] =
+						devent->name;
+			}
+			if (!exists) {
+				dns_name_t *closest;
+				unsigned int clabels;
+
+				val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDNOQNAME;
+
+				closest = dns_fixedname_name(&val->closest);
+				clabels = dns_name_countlabels(closest);
+				/*
+				 * If we are validating a wildcard response
+				 * clabels will not be zero.  We then need
+				 * to check if the generated wilcard from
+				 * dns_nsec_noexistnodata is consistent with
+				 * the wildcard used to generate the response.
+				 */
+				if (clabels == 0 ||
+				    dns_name_countlabels(wild) == clabels + 1)
+					val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDCLOSEST;
+				/*
+				 * The NSEC noqname proof also contains
+				 * the closest encloser.
+				 */
+				if (NEEDNOQNAME(val))
+					proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_NOQNAMEPROOF] =
+						devent->name;
+			}
+		}
+
+		result = nsecvalidate(val, true);
+		if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+			validator_done(val, result);
+	}
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+
+	/*
+	 * Free stuff from the event.
+	 */
+	isc_event_free(&event);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Looks for the requested name and type in the view (zones and cache).
+ *
+ * When looking for a DLV record also checks to make sure the NSEC record
+ * returns covers the query name as part of aggressive negative caching.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * \li	ISC_R_SUCCESS
+ * \li	ISC_R_NOTFOUND
+ * \li	DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN
+ * \li	DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET
+ * \li	DNS_R_NXRRSET
+ * \li	DNS_R_NXDOMAIN
+ * \li	DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN
+ */
+static inline isc_result_t
+view_find(dns_validator_t *val, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type) {
+	dns_fixedname_t fixedname;
+	dns_name_t *foundname;
+	dns_rdata_nsec_t nsec;
+	dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	unsigned int options;
+	isc_time_t now;
+	char buf1[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	char buf2[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	char buf3[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	char namebuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	char typebuf[DNS_RDATATYPE_FORMATSIZE];
+
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+
+	if (isc_time_now(&now) == ISC_R_SUCCESS &&
+	    dns_resolver_getbadcache(val->view->resolver, name, type, &now)) {
+
+		dns_name_format(name, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+		dns_rdatatype_format(type, typebuf, sizeof(typebuf));
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_INFO, "bad cache hit (%s/%s)",
+			      namebuf, typebuf);
+		return (DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN);
+	}
+
+	options = DNS_DBFIND_PENDINGOK;
+	if (type == dns_rdatatype_dlv)
+		options |= DNS_DBFIND_COVERINGNSEC;
+	foundname = dns_fixedname_initname(&fixedname);
+	result = dns_view_find(val->view, name, type, 0, options,
+			       false, NULL, NULL, foundname,
+			       &val->frdataset, &val->fsigrdataset);
+
+	if (result == DNS_R_NXDOMAIN) {
+		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+	} else if (result == DNS_R_COVERINGNSEC) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DNS_R_COVERINGNSEC");
+		/*
+		 * Check if the returned NSEC covers the name.
+		 */
+		INSIST(type == dns_rdatatype_dlv);
+		if (val->frdataset.trust != dns_trust_secure) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "covering nsec: trust %s",
+				      dns_trust_totext(val->frdataset.trust));
+			goto notfound;
+		}
+		result = dns_rdataset_first(&val->frdataset);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			goto notfound;
+		dns_rdataset_current(&val->frdataset, &rdata);
+		if (dns_nsec_typepresent(&rdata, dns_rdatatype_ns) &&
+		    !dns_nsec_typepresent(&rdata, dns_rdatatype_soa)) {
+			/* Parent NSEC record. */
+			if (dns_name_issubdomain(name, foundname)) {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "covering nsec: for parent");
+				goto notfound;
+			}
+		}
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &nsec, NULL);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			goto notfound;
+		if (dns_name_compare(foundname, &nsec.next) >= 0) {
+			/* End of zone chain. */
+			if (!dns_name_issubdomain(name, &nsec.next)) {
+				/*
+				 * XXXMPA We could look for a parent NSEC
+				 * at nsec.next and if found retest with
+				 * this NSEC.
+				 */
+				dns_rdata_freestruct(&nsec);
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "covering nsec: not in zone");
+				goto notfound;
+			}
+		} else if (dns_name_compare(name, &nsec.next) >= 0) {
+			/*
+			 * XXXMPA We could check if this NSEC is at a zone
+			 * apex and if the qname is not below it and look for
+			 * a parent NSEC with the same name.  This requires
+			 * that we can cache both NSEC records which we
+			 * currently don't support.
+			 */
+			dns_rdata_freestruct(&nsec);
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "covering nsec: not in range");
+			goto notfound;
+		}
+		if (isc_log_wouldlog(dns_lctx,ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3))) {
+			dns_name_format(name, buf1, sizeof buf1);
+			dns_name_format(foundname, buf2, sizeof buf2);
+			dns_name_format(&nsec.next, buf3, sizeof buf3);
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "covering nsec found: '%s' '%s' '%s'",
+				      buf1, buf2, buf3);
+		}
+		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+		dns_rdata_freestruct(&nsec);
+		result = DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN;
+	} else if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS &&
+		   result != DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN &&
+		   result != DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET &&
+		   result != DNS_R_EMPTYNAME &&
+		   result != DNS_R_NXRRSET &&
+		   result != ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
+		goto  notfound;
+	}
+	return (result);
+
+ notfound:
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+	return (ISC_R_NOTFOUND);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Checks to make sure we are not going to loop.  As we use a SHARED fetch
+ * the validation process will stall if looping was to occur.
+ */
+static inline bool
+check_deadlock(dns_validator_t *val, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type,
+	       dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset)
+{
+	dns_validator_t *parent;
+
+	for (parent = val; parent != NULL; parent = parent->parent) {
+		if (parent->event != NULL &&
+		    parent->event->type == type &&
+		    dns_name_equal(parent->event->name, name) &&
+		    /*
+		     * As NSEC3 records are meta data you sometimes
+		     * need to prove a NSEC3 record which says that
+		     * itself doesn't exist.
+		     */
+		    (parent->event->type != dns_rdatatype_nsec3 ||
+		     rdataset == NULL || sigrdataset == NULL ||
+		     parent->event->message == NULL ||
+		     parent->event->rdataset != NULL ||
+		     parent->event->sigrdataset != NULL))
+		{
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "continuing validation would lead to "
+				      "deadlock: aborting validation");
+			return (true);
+		}
+	}
+	return (false);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Start a fetch for the requested name and type.
+ */
+static inline isc_result_t
+create_fetch(dns_validator_t *val, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type,
+	     isc_taskaction_t callback, const char *caller)
+{
+	unsigned int fopts = 0;
+
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+
+	if (check_deadlock(val, name, type, NULL, NULL)) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "deadlock found (create_fetch)");
+		return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+	}
+
+	if ((val->options & DNS_VALIDATOR_NOCDFLAG) != 0)
+		fopts |= DNS_FETCHOPT_NOCDFLAG;
+
+	if ((val->options & DNS_VALIDATOR_NONTA) != 0)
+		fopts |= DNS_FETCHOPT_NONTA;
+
+	validator_logcreate(val, name, type, caller, "fetch");
+	return (dns_resolver_createfetch(val->view->resolver, name, type,
+					 NULL, NULL, NULL, fopts,
+					 val->event->ev_sender,
+					 callback, val,
+					 &val->frdataset,
+					 &val->fsigrdataset,
+					 &val->fetch));
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Start a subvalidation process.
+ */
+static inline isc_result_t
+create_validator(dns_validator_t *val, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type,
+		 dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset,
+		 isc_taskaction_t action, const char *caller)
+{
+	isc_result_t result;
+	unsigned int vopts = 0;
+
+	if (check_deadlock(val, name, type, rdataset, sigrdataset)) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "deadlock found (create_validator)");
+		return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+	}
+
+	/* OK to clear other options, but preserve NOCDFLAG and NONTA. */
+	vopts |= (val->options & (DNS_VALIDATOR_NOCDFLAG|DNS_VALIDATOR_NONTA));
+
+	validator_logcreate(val, name, type, caller, "validator");
+	result = dns_validator_create(val->view, name, type,
+				      rdataset, sigrdataset, NULL, vopts,
+				      val->task, action, val,
+				      &val->subvalidator);
+	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		val->subvalidator->parent = val;
+		val->subvalidator->depth = val->depth + 1;
+	}
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Try to find a key that could have signed 'siginfo' among those
+ * in 'rdataset'.  If found, build a dst_key_t for it and point
+ * val->key at it.
+ *
+ * If val->key is non-NULL, this returns the next matching key.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+get_dst_key(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdata_rrsig_t *siginfo,
+	    dns_rdataset_t *rdataset)
+{
+	isc_result_t result;
+	isc_buffer_t b;
+	dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dst_key_t *oldkey = val->key;
+	bool foundold;
+
+	if (oldkey == NULL)
+		foundold = true;
+	else {
+		foundold = false;
+		val->key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
+	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+		goto failure;
+	do {
+		dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &rdata);
+
+		isc_buffer_init(&b, rdata.data, rdata.length);
+		isc_buffer_add(&b, rdata.length);
+		INSIST(val->key == NULL);
+		result = dst_key_fromdns(&siginfo->signer, rdata.rdclass, &b,
+					 val->view->mctx, &val->key);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			goto failure;
+		if (siginfo->algorithm ==
+		    (dns_secalg_t)dst_key_alg(val->key) &&
+		    siginfo->keyid ==
+		    (dns_keytag_t)dst_key_id(val->key) &&
+		    dst_key_iszonekey(val->key))
+		{
+			if (foundold)
+				/*
+				 * This is the key we're looking for.
+				 */
+				return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+			else if (dst_key_compare(oldkey, val->key) == true)
+			{
+				foundold = true;
+				dst_key_free(&oldkey);
+			}
+		}
+		dst_key_free(&val->key);
+		dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
+		result = dns_rdataset_next(rdataset);
+	} while (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE)
+		result = ISC_R_NOTFOUND;
+
+ failure:
+	if (oldkey != NULL)
+		dst_key_free(&oldkey);
+
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Get the key that generated this signature.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+get_key(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdata_rrsig_t *siginfo) {
+	isc_result_t result;
+	unsigned int nlabels;
+	int order;
+	dns_namereln_t namereln;
+
+	/*
+	 * Is the signer name appropriate for this signature?
+	 *
+	 * The signer name must be at the same level as the owner name
+	 * or closer to the DNS root.
+	 */
+	namereln = dns_name_fullcompare(val->event->name, &siginfo->signer,
+					&order, &nlabels);
+	if (namereln != dns_namereln_subdomain &&
+	    namereln != dns_namereln_equal)
+		return (DNS_R_CONTINUE);
+
+	if (namereln == dns_namereln_equal) {
+		/*
+		 * If this is a self-signed keyset, it must not be a zone key
+		 * (since get_key is not called from validatezonekey).
+		 */
+		if (val->event->rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_dnskey)
+			return (DNS_R_CONTINUE);
+
+		/*
+		 * Records appearing in the parent zone at delegation
+		 * points cannot be self-signed.
+		 */
+		if (dns_rdatatype_atparent(val->event->rdataset->type))
+			return (DNS_R_CONTINUE);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * SOA and NS RRsets can only be signed by a key with
+		 * the same name.
+		 */
+		if (val->event->rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_soa ||
+		    val->event->rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_ns) {
+			const char *typename;
+
+			if (val->event->rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_soa)
+				typename = "SOA";
+			else
+				typename = "NS";
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "%s signer mismatch", typename);
+			return (DNS_R_CONTINUE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do we know about this key?
+	 */
+	result = view_find(val, &siginfo->signer, dns_rdatatype_dnskey);
+	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		/*
+		 * We have an rrset for the given keyname.
+		 */
+		val->keyset = &val->frdataset;
+		if ((DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust) ||
+		     DNS_TRUST_ANSWER(val->frdataset.trust)) &&
+		    dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		{
+			/*
+			 * We know the key but haven't validated it yet or
+			 * we have a key of trust answer but a DS/DLV
+			 * record for the zone may have been added.
+			 */
+			result = create_validator(val, &siginfo->signer,
+						  dns_rdatatype_dnskey,
+						  &val->frdataset,
+						  &val->fsigrdataset,
+						  keyvalidated,
+						  "get_key");
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				return (result);
+			return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+		} else if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust)) {
+			/*
+			 * Having a pending key with no signature means that
+			 * something is broken.
+			 */
+			result = DNS_R_CONTINUE;
+		} else if (val->frdataset.trust < dns_trust_secure) {
+			/*
+			 * The key is legitimately insecure.  There's no
+			 * point in even attempting verification.
+			 */
+			val->key = NULL;
+			result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * See if we've got the key used in the signature.
+			 */
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "keyset with trust %s",
+				      dns_trust_totext(val->frdataset.trust));
+			result = get_dst_key(val, siginfo, val->keyset);
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+				/*
+				 * Either the key we're looking for is not
+				 * in the rrset, or something bad happened.
+				 * Give up.
+				 */
+				result = DNS_R_CONTINUE;
+			}
+		}
+	} else if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
+		/*
+		 * We don't know anything about this key.
+		 */
+		result = create_fetch(val, &siginfo->signer,
+				      dns_rdatatype_dnskey,
+				      fetch_callback_validator, "get_key");
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			return (result);
+		return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+	} else if (result ==  DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN ||
+		   result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET ||
+		   result == DNS_R_EMPTYNAME ||
+		   result == DNS_R_NXDOMAIN ||
+		   result == DNS_R_NXRRSET)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * This key doesn't exist.
+		 */
+		result = DNS_R_CONTINUE;
+	} else if (result == DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN)
+		return (result);
+
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset) &&
+	    val->keyset != &val->frdataset)
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+
+	return (result);
+}
+
+static dns_keytag_t
+compute_keytag(dns_rdata_t *rdata, dns_rdata_dnskey_t *key) {
+	isc_region_t r;
+
+	dns_rdata_toregion(rdata, &r);
+	return (dst_region_computeid(&r, key->algorithm));
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Is this keyset self-signed?
+ */
+static bool
+isselfsigned(dns_validator_t *val) {
+	dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, *sigrdataset;
+	dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dns_rdata_t sigrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dns_rdata_dnskey_t key;
+	dns_rdata_rrsig_t sig;
+	dns_keytag_t keytag;
+	dns_name_t *name;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	dst_key_t *dstkey;
+	isc_mem_t *mctx;
+	bool answer = false;
+
+	rdataset = val->event->rdataset;
+	sigrdataset = val->event->sigrdataset;
+	name = val->event->name;
+	mctx = val->view->mctx;
+
+	if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_cname ||
+	    rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_dname)
+		return (answer);
+
+	INSIST(rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_dnskey);
+
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(rdataset))
+	{
+		dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
+		dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &rdata);
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &key, NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		keytag = compute_keytag(&rdata, &key);
+		for (result = dns_rdataset_first(sigrdataset);
+		     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+		     result = dns_rdataset_next(sigrdataset))
+		{
+			dns_rdata_reset(&sigrdata);
+			dns_rdataset_current(sigrdataset, &sigrdata);
+			result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&sigrdata, &sig, NULL);
+			RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+			if (sig.algorithm != key.algorithm ||
+			    sig.keyid != keytag ||
+			    !dns_name_equal(name, &sig.signer))
+				continue;
+
+			dstkey = NULL;
+			result = dns_dnssec_keyfromrdata(name, &rdata, mctx,
+							 &dstkey);
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				continue;
+
+			result = dns_dnssec_verify3(name, rdataset, dstkey,
+						    true,
+						    val->view->maxbits,
+						    mctx, &sigrdata, NULL);
+			dst_key_free(&dstkey);
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				continue;
+			if ((key.flags & DNS_KEYFLAG_REVOKE) == 0) {
+				answer = true;
+				continue;
+			}
+			dns_view_untrust(val->view, name, &key, mctx);
+		}
+	}
+	return (answer);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Attempt to verify the rdataset using the given key and rdata (RRSIG).
+ * The signature was good and from a wildcard record and the QNAME does
+ * not match the wildcard we need to look for a NOQNAME proof.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * \li	ISC_R_SUCCESS if the verification succeeds.
+ * \li	Others if the verification fails.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+verify(dns_validator_t *val, dst_key_t *key, dns_rdata_t *rdata,
+       uint16_t keyid)
+{
+	isc_result_t result;
+	dns_fixedname_t fixed;
+	bool ignore = false;
+	dns_name_t *wild;
+
+	val->attributes |= VALATTR_TRIEDVERIFY;
+	wild = dns_fixedname_initname(&fixed);
+ again:
+	result = dns_dnssec_verify3(val->event->name, val->event->rdataset,
+				    key, ignore, val->view->maxbits,
+				    val->view->mctx, rdata, wild);
+	if ((result == DNS_R_SIGEXPIRED || result == DNS_R_SIGFUTURE) &&
+	    val->view->acceptexpired)
+	{
+		ignore = true;
+		goto again;
+	}
+	if (ignore && (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS || result == DNS_R_FROMWILDCARD))
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_INFO,
+			      "accepted expired %sRRSIG (keyid=%u)",
+			      (result == DNS_R_FROMWILDCARD) ?
+			      "wildcard " : "", keyid);
+	else if (result == DNS_R_SIGEXPIRED || result == DNS_R_SIGFUTURE)
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_INFO,
+			      "verify failed due to bad signature (keyid=%u): "
+			      "%s", keyid, isc_result_totext(result));
+	else
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "verify rdataset (keyid=%u): %s",
+			      keyid, isc_result_totext(result));
+	if (result == DNS_R_FROMWILDCARD) {
+		if (!dns_name_equal(val->event->name, wild)) {
+			dns_name_t *closest;
+			unsigned int labels;
+
+			/*
+			 * Compute the closest encloser in case we need it
+			 * for the NSEC3 NOQNAME proof.
+			 */
+			closest = dns_fixedname_name(&val->closest);
+			dns_name_copy(wild, closest, NULL);
+			labels = dns_name_countlabels(closest) - 1;
+			dns_name_getlabelsequence(closest, 1, labels, closest);
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_NEEDNOQNAME;
+		}
+		result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	}
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Attempts positive response validation of a normal RRset.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * \li	ISC_R_SUCCESS	Validation completed successfully
+ * \li	DNS_R_WAIT	Validation has started but is waiting
+ *			for an event.
+ * \li	Other return codes are possible and all indicate failure.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+validate(dns_validator_t *val, bool resume) {
+	isc_result_t result, vresult = DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG;
+	dns_validatorevent_t *event;
+	dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Caller must be holding the validator lock.
+	 */
+
+	event = val->event;
+
+	if (resume) {
+		/*
+		 * We already have a sigrdataset.
+		 */
+		result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "resuming validate");
+	} else {
+		result = dns_rdataset_first(event->sigrdataset);
+	}
+
+	for (;
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(event->sigrdataset))
+	{
+		dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
+		dns_rdataset_current(event->sigrdataset, &rdata);
+		if (val->siginfo == NULL) {
+			val->siginfo = isc_mem_get(val->view->mctx,
+						   sizeof(*val->siginfo));
+			if (val->siginfo == NULL)
+				return (ISC_R_NOMEMORY);
+		}
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, val->siginfo, NULL);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			return (result);
+
+		/*
+		 * At this point we could check that the signature algorithm
+		 * was known and "sufficiently good".
+		 */
+		if (!dns_resolver_algorithm_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						    event->name,
+						    val->siginfo->algorithm)) {
+			resume = false;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!resume) {
+			result = get_key(val, val->siginfo);
+			if (result == DNS_R_CONTINUE)
+				continue; /* Try the next SIG RR. */
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				return (result);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * There isn't a secure DNSKEY for this signature so move
+		 * onto the next RRSIG.
+		 */
+		if (val->key == NULL) {
+			resume = false;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		do {
+			vresult = verify(val, val->key, &rdata,
+					val->siginfo->keyid);
+			if (vresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				break;
+			if (val->keynode != NULL) {
+				dns_keynode_t *nextnode = NULL;
+				result = dns_keytable_findnextkeynode(
+							val->keytable,
+							val->keynode,
+							&nextnode);
+				dns_keytable_detachkeynode(val->keytable,
+							   &val->keynode);
+				val->keynode = nextnode;
+				if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+					val->key = NULL;
+					break;
+				}
+				val->key = dns_keynode_key(val->keynode);
+				if (val->key == NULL)
+					break;
+			} else {
+				if (get_dst_key(val, val->siginfo, val->keyset)
+				    != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+					break;
+			}
+		} while (1);
+		if (vresult != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "failed to verify rdataset");
+		else {
+			dns_rdataset_trimttl(event->rdataset,
+					     event->sigrdataset,
+					     val->siginfo, val->start,
+					     val->view->acceptexpired);
+		}
+
+		if (val->keynode != NULL)
+			dns_keytable_detachkeynode(val->keytable,
+						   &val->keynode);
+		else {
+			if (val->key != NULL)
+				dst_key_free(&val->key);
+			if (val->keyset != NULL) {
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(val->keyset);
+				val->keyset = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		val->key = NULL;
+		if (NEEDNOQNAME(val)) {
+			if (val->event->message == NULL) {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "no message available for noqname proof");
+				return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+			}
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "looking for noqname proof");
+			return (nsecvalidate(val, false));
+		} else if (vresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			marksecure(event);
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "marking as secure, "
+				      "noqname proof not needed");
+			return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		} else {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "verify failure: %s",
+				      isc_result_totext(result));
+			resume = false;
+		}
+	}
+	if (result != ISC_R_NOMORE) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "failed to iterate signatures: %s",
+			      isc_result_totext(result));
+		return (result);
+	}
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_INFO, "no valid signature found");
+	return (vresult);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Check whether this DNSKEY (keyrdata) signed the DNSKEY RRset
+ * (val->event->rdataset).
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+checkkey(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdata_t *keyrdata, uint16_t keyid,
+	 dns_secalg_t algorithm)
+{
+	dns_rdata_rrsig_t sig;
+	dst_key_t *dstkey = NULL;
+	isc_result_t result;
+
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(val->event->sigrdataset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(val->event->sigrdataset))
+	{
+		dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+
+		dns_rdataset_current(val->event->sigrdataset, &rdata);
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &sig, NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		if (keyid != sig.keyid || algorithm != sig.algorithm)
+			continue;
+		if (dstkey == NULL) {
+			result = dns_dnssec_keyfromrdata(val->event->name,
+							 keyrdata,
+							 val->view->mctx,
+							 &dstkey);
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				/*
+				 * This really shouldn't happen, but...
+				 */
+				continue;
+		}
+		result = verify(val, dstkey, &rdata, sig.keyid);
+		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (dstkey != NULL)
+		dst_key_free(&dstkey);
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Find the DNSKEY that corresponds to the DS.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+keyfromds(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_rdata_t *dsrdata,
+	  uint8_t digest, uint16_t keyid, dns_secalg_t algorithm,
+	  dns_rdata_t *keyrdata)
+{
+	dns_keytag_t keytag;
+	dns_rdata_dnskey_t key;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	unsigned char dsbuf[DNS_DS_BUFFERSIZE];
+
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(rdataset))
+	{
+		dns_rdata_t newdsrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+
+		dns_rdata_reset(keyrdata);
+		dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, keyrdata);
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(keyrdata, &key, NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		keytag = compute_keytag(keyrdata, &key);
+		if (keyid != keytag || algorithm != key.algorithm)
+			continue;
+		dns_rdata_reset(&newdsrdata);
+		result = dns_ds_buildrdata(val->event->name, keyrdata, digest,
+					   dsbuf, &newdsrdata);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "dns_ds_buildrdata() -> %s",
+				      dns_result_totext(result));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (dns_rdata_compare(dsrdata, &newdsrdata) == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Validate the DNSKEY RRset by looking for a DNSKEY that matches a
+ * DLV record and that also verifies the DNSKEY RRset.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+dlv_validatezonekey(dns_validator_t *val) {
+	dns_rdata_dlv_t dlv;
+	dns_rdata_t dlvrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dns_rdata_t keyrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dns_rdataset_t trdataset;
+	bool supported_algorithm;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	char digest_types[256];
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "dlv_validatezonekey");
+
+	/*
+	 * Look through the DLV record and find the keys that can sign the
+	 * key set and the matching signature.  For each such key, attempt
+	 * verification.
+	 */
+	supported_algorithm = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA256 or DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA384 is present we
+	 * are required to prefer it over DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA1.  This in
+	 * practice means that we need to ignore DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA1 if a
+	 * DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA256 or DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA384 is present.
+	 */
+	memset(digest_types, 1, sizeof(digest_types));
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(&val->dlv);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(&val->dlv)) {
+		dns_rdata_reset(&dlvrdata);
+		dns_rdataset_current(&val->dlv, &dlvrdata);
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&dlvrdata, &dlv, NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_ds_digest_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      dlv.digest_type))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_algorithm_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      dlv.algorithm))
+			continue;
+
+		if ((dlv.digest_type == DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA256 &&
+		     dlv.length == ISC_SHA256_DIGESTLENGTH) ||
+		    (dlv.digest_type == DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA384 &&
+		     dlv.length == ISC_SHA384_DIGESTLENGTH))
+		{
+			digest_types[DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA1] = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(&val->dlv);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(&val->dlv))
+	{
+		dns_rdata_reset(&dlvrdata);
+		dns_rdataset_current(&val->dlv, &dlvrdata);
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&dlvrdata, &dlv, NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+		if (digest_types[dlv.digest_type] == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_ds_digest_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      dlv.digest_type))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_algorithm_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      dlv.algorithm))
+			continue;
+
+		supported_algorithm = true;
+
+		dns_rdataset_init(&trdataset);
+		dns_rdataset_clone(val->event->rdataset, &trdataset);
+
+		/*
+		 * Convert to DLV to DS and find matching DNSKEY.
+		 */
+		dlvrdata.type = dns_rdatatype_ds;
+		result = keyfromds(val, &trdataset, &dlvrdata,
+				   dlv.digest_type, dlv.key_tag,
+				   dlv.algorithm, &keyrdata);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&trdataset);
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "no DNSKEY matching DLV");
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+		      "Found matching DLV record: checking for signature");
+		/*
+		 * Check that this DNSKEY signed the DNSKEY rrset.
+		 */
+		result = checkkey(val, &keyrdata, dlv.key_tag, dlv.algorithm);
+
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&trdataset);
+		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "no RRSIG matching DLV key");
+	}
+	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		marksecure(val->event);
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "marking as secure (dlv)");
+		return (result);
+	} else if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE && !supported_algorithm) {
+		if (val->mustbesecure) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+				      "must be secure failure,"
+				      "no supported algorithm/digest (dlv)");
+			return (DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE);
+		}
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "no supported algorithm/digest (dlv)");
+		markanswer(val, "dlv_validatezonekey (2)");
+		return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	} else
+		return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Attempts positive response validation of an RRset containing zone keys
+ * (i.e. a DNSKEY rrset).
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * \li	ISC_R_SUCCESS	Validation completed successfully
+ * \li	DNS_R_WAIT	Validation has started but is waiting
+ *			for an event.
+ * \li	Other return codes are possible and all indicate failure.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+validatezonekey(dns_validator_t *val) {
+	isc_result_t result;
+	dns_validatorevent_t *event;
+	dns_rdataset_t trdataset;
+	dns_rdata_t dsrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dns_rdata_t keyrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dns_rdata_t sigrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	char namebuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	dns_rdata_ds_t ds;
+	dns_rdata_rrsig_t sig;
+	dst_key_t *dstkey;
+	bool supported_algorithm;
+	bool atsep = false;
+	char digest_types[256];
+
+	/*
+	 * Caller must be holding the validator lock.
+	 */
+
+	event = val->event;
+
+	if (val->havedlvsep && val->dlv.trust >= dns_trust_secure &&
+	    dns_name_equal(event->name, dns_fixedname_name(&val->dlvsep)))
+		return (dlv_validatezonekey(val));
+
+	if (val->dsset == NULL) {
+
+		/*
+		 * We have a dlv sep.  Skip looking up the SEP from
+		 * {trusted,managed}-keys.  If the dlv sep is for the
+		 * root then it will have been handled above so we don't
+		 * need to check whether val->event->name is "." prior to
+		 * looking up the DS.
+		 */
+		if (val->havedlvsep)
+			goto find_ds;
+
+		/*
+		 * First, see if this key was signed by a trusted key.
+		 */
+		for (result = dns_rdataset_first(val->event->sigrdataset);
+		     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+		     result = dns_rdataset_next(val->event->sigrdataset))
+		{
+			dns_keynode_t *keynode = NULL;
+			dns_fixedname_t fixed;
+			dns_name_t *found;
+
+			found = dns_fixedname_initname(&fixed);
+			dns_rdata_reset(&sigrdata);
+			dns_rdataset_current(val->event->sigrdataset,
+					     &sigrdata);
+			result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&sigrdata, &sig, NULL);
+			RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+			if (!dns_name_equal(val->event->name, &sig.signer))
+				continue;
+
+			result = dns_keytable_findkeynode(val->keytable,
+							  val->event->name,
+							  sig.algorithm,
+							  sig.keyid, &keynode);
+			if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND &&
+			    dns_keytable_finddeepestmatch(val->keytable,
+				  val->event->name, found) != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+				if (val->mustbesecure) {
+					validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+						     "must be secure failure, "
+						     "not beneath secure root");
+					return (DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE);
+				} else
+					validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+						     "not beneath secure root");
+				if (val->view->dlv == NULL) {
+					markanswer(val, "validatezonekey (1)");
+					return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+				}
+				return (startfinddlvsep(val, dns_rootname));
+			}
+			if (result == DNS_R_PARTIALMATCH ||
+			    result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				atsep = true;
+			while (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+				dns_keynode_t *nextnode = NULL;
+				dstkey = dns_keynode_key(keynode);
+				if (dstkey == NULL) {
+					dns_keytable_detachkeynode(
+								val->keytable,
+								&keynode);
+					break;
+				}
+				result = verify(val, dstkey, &sigrdata,
+						sig.keyid);
+				if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+					dns_keytable_detachkeynode(
+								val->keytable,
+								&keynode);
+					break;
+				}
+				result = dns_keytable_findnextkeynode(
+								val->keytable,
+								keynode,
+								&nextnode);
+				dns_keytable_detachkeynode(val->keytable,
+							   &keynode);
+				keynode = nextnode;
+			}
+			if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+				marksecure(event);
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "signed by trusted key; "
+					      "marking as secure");
+				return (result);
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (atsep) {
+			/*
+			 * We have not found a key to verify this DNSKEY
+			 * RRset.  As this is a SEP we have to assume that
+			 * the RRset is invalid.
+			 */
+			dns_name_format(val->event->name, namebuf,
+					sizeof(namebuf));
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_NOTICE,
+				      "unable to find a DNSKEY which verifies "
+				      "the DNSKEY RRset and also matches a "
+				      "trusted key for '%s'",
+				      namebuf);
+			return (DNS_R_NOVALIDKEY);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If this is the root name and there was no trusted key,
+		 * give up, since there's no DS at the root.
+		 */
+		if (dns_name_equal(event->name, dns_rootname)) {
+			if ((val->attributes & VALATTR_TRIEDVERIFY) != 0) {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "root key failed to validate");
+				return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+			} else {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "no trusted root key");
+				return (DNS_R_NOVALIDDS);
+			}
+		}
+ find_ds:
+		/*
+		 * Otherwise, try to find the DS record.
+		 */
+		result = view_find(val, val->event->name, dns_rdatatype_ds);
+		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			/*
+			 * We have DS records.
+			 */
+			val->dsset = &val->frdataset;
+			if ((DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust) ||
+			     DNS_TRUST_ANSWER(val->frdataset.trust)) &&
+			    dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+			{
+				result = create_validator(val,
+							  val->event->name,
+							  dns_rdatatype_ds,
+							  &val->frdataset,
+							  &val->fsigrdataset,
+							  dsvalidated,
+							  "validatezonekey");
+				if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+					return (result);
+				return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+			} else if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust)) {
+				/*
+				 * There should never be an unsigned DS.
+				 */
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(2),
+					      "unsigned DS record");
+				return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+			} else {
+				result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+				POST(result);
+			}
+		} else if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
+			/*
+			 * We don't have the DS.  Find it.
+			 */
+			result = create_fetch(val, val->event->name,
+					      dns_rdatatype_ds, dsfetched,
+					      "validatezonekey");
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				return (result);
+			return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+		} else if (result == DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN ||
+			   result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET ||
+			   result == DNS_R_EMPTYNAME ||
+			   result == DNS_R_NXDOMAIN ||
+			   result == DNS_R_NXRRSET ||
+			   result == DNS_R_CNAME)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * The DS does not exist.
+			 */
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(2), "no DS record");
+			return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+		} else if (result == DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN)
+			return (result);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We have a DS set.
+	 */
+	INSIST(val->dsset != NULL);
+
+	if (val->dsset->trust < dns_trust_secure) {
+		if (val->mustbesecure) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+				      "must be secure failure,"
+				      " insecure DS");
+			return (DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE);
+		}
+		if (val->view->dlv == NULL || DLVTRIED(val)) {
+			markanswer(val, "validatezonekey (2)");
+			return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		}
+		return (startfinddlvsep(val, val->event->name));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Look through the DS record and find the keys that can sign the
+	 * key set and the matching signature.  For each such key, attempt
+	 * verification.
+	 */
+
+	supported_algorithm = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * If DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA256 or DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA384 is present we
+	 * are required to prefer it over DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA1.  This in
+	 * practice means that we need to ignore DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA1 if a
+	 * DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA256 or DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA384 is present.
+	 */
+	memset(digest_types, 1, sizeof(digest_types));
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(val->dsset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(val->dsset)) {
+		dns_rdata_reset(&dsrdata);
+		dns_rdataset_current(val->dsset, &dsrdata);
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&dsrdata, &ds, NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_ds_digest_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      ds.digest_type))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_algorithm_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      ds.algorithm))
+			continue;
+
+		if ((ds.digest_type == DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA256 &&
+		     ds.length == ISC_SHA256_DIGESTLENGTH) ||
+		    (ds.digest_type == DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA384 &&
+		     ds.length == ISC_SHA384_DIGESTLENGTH))
+		{
+			digest_types[DNS_DSDIGEST_SHA1] = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(val->dsset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(val->dsset))
+	{
+		dns_rdata_reset(&dsrdata);
+		dns_rdataset_current(val->dsset, &dsrdata);
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&dsrdata, &ds, NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+		if (digest_types[ds.digest_type] == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_ds_digest_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      ds.digest_type))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!dns_resolver_algorithm_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						      val->event->name,
+						      ds.algorithm))
+			continue;
+
+		supported_algorithm = true;
+
+		dns_rdataset_init(&trdataset);
+		dns_rdataset_clone(val->event->rdataset, &trdataset);
+
+		/*
+		 * Find matching DNSKEY from DS.
+		 */
+		result = keyfromds(val, &trdataset, &dsrdata, ds.digest_type,
+				   ds.key_tag, ds.algorithm, &keyrdata);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&trdataset);
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "no DNSKEY matching DS");
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Check that this DNSKEY signed the DNSKEY rrset.
+		 */
+		result = checkkey(val, &keyrdata, ds.key_tag, ds.algorithm);
+
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&trdataset);
+		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "no RRSIG matching DS key");
+	}
+	if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		marksecure(event);
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "marking as secure (DS)");
+		return (result);
+	} else if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE && !supported_algorithm) {
+		if (val->mustbesecure) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+				      "must be secure failure, "
+				      "no supported algorithm/digest (DS)");
+			return (DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE);
+		}
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "no supported algorithm/digest (DS)");
+		markanswer(val, "validatezonekey (3)");
+		return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	} else {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_INFO,
+			      "no valid signature found (DS)");
+		return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+	}
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Starts a positive response validation.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * \li	ISC_R_SUCCESS	Validation completed successfully
+ * \li	DNS_R_WAIT	Validation has started but is waiting
+ *			for an event.
+ * \li	Other return codes are possible and all indicate failure.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+start_positive_validation(dns_validator_t *val) {
+	/*
+	 * If this is not a key, go straight into validate().
+	 */
+	if (val->event->type != dns_rdatatype_dnskey || !isselfsigned(val))
+		return (validate(val, false));
+
+	return (validatezonekey(val));
+}
+
+/*%
+ * val_rdataset_first and val_rdataset_next provide iteration methods
+ * that hide whether we are iterating across a message or a  negative
+ * cache rdataset.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+val_rdataset_first(dns_validator_t *val, dns_name_t **namep,
+		   dns_rdataset_t **rdatasetp)
+{
+	dns_message_t *message = val->event->message;
+	isc_result_t result;
+
+	REQUIRE(rdatasetp != NULL);
+	REQUIRE(namep != NULL);
+	if (message == NULL) {
+		REQUIRE(*rdatasetp != NULL);
+		REQUIRE(*namep != NULL);
+	} else {
+		REQUIRE(*rdatasetp == NULL);
+		REQUIRE(*namep == NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (message != NULL) {
+		result = dns_message_firstname(message, DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			return (result);
+		dns_message_currentname(message, DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, namep);
+		*rdatasetp = ISC_LIST_HEAD((*namep)->list);
+		INSIST(*rdatasetp != NULL);
+	} else {
+		result = dns_rdataset_first(val->event->rdataset);
+		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			dns_ncache_current(val->event->rdataset, *namep,
+					   *rdatasetp);
+	}
+	return (result);
+}
+
+static isc_result_t
+val_rdataset_next(dns_validator_t *val, dns_name_t **namep,
+		  dns_rdataset_t **rdatasetp)
+{
+	dns_message_t *message = val->event->message;
+	isc_result_t result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+
+	REQUIRE(rdatasetp != NULL && *rdatasetp != NULL);
+	REQUIRE(namep != NULL && *namep != NULL);
+
+	if (message != NULL) {
+		dns_rdataset_t *rdataset = *rdatasetp;
+		rdataset = ISC_LIST_NEXT(rdataset, link);
+		if (rdataset == NULL) {
+			*namep = NULL;
+			result = dns_message_nextname(message,
+						      DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY);
+			if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+				dns_message_currentname(message,
+							DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY,
+							namep);
+				rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD((*namep)->list);
+				INSIST(rdataset != NULL);
+			}
+		}
+		*rdatasetp = rdataset;
+	} else {
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(*rdatasetp);
+		result = dns_rdataset_next(val->event->rdataset);
+		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			dns_ncache_current(val->event->rdataset, *namep,
+					   *rdatasetp);
+	}
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Look for NODATA at the wildcard and NOWILDCARD proofs in the
+ * previously validated NSEC records.  As these proofs are mutually
+ * exclusive we stop when one is found.
+ *
+ * Returns
+ * \li	ISC_R_SUCCESS
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+checkwildcard(dns_validator_t *val, dns_rdatatype_t type, dns_name_t *zonename)
+{
+	dns_name_t *name, *wild, tname;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	bool exists, data;
+	char namebuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, trdataset;
+
+	dns_name_init(&tname, NULL);
+	dns_rdataset_init(&trdataset);
+	wild = dns_fixedname_name(&val->wild);
+
+	if (dns_name_countlabels(wild) == 0) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "in checkwildcard: no wildcard to check");
+		return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	}
+
+	dns_name_format(wild, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in checkwildcard: %s", namebuf);
+
+	if (val->event->message == NULL) {
+		name = &tname;
+		rdataset = &trdataset;
+	} else {
+		name = NULL;
+		rdataset = NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (result = val_rdataset_first(val, &name, &rdataset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = val_rdataset_next(val, &name, &rdataset))
+	{
+		if (rdataset->type != type ||
+		    rdataset->trust != dns_trust_secure)
+			continue;
+
+		if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_nsec &&
+		    (NEEDNODATA(val) || NEEDNOWILDCARD(val)) &&
+		    !FOUNDNODATA(val) && !FOUNDNOWILDCARD(val) &&
+		    dns_nsec_noexistnodata(val->event->type, wild, name,
+					   rdataset, &exists, &data, NULL,
+					   validator_log, val)
+				       == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+		{
+			dns_name_t **proofs = val->event->proofs;
+			if (exists && !data)
+				val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDNODATA;
+			if (exists && !data && NEEDNODATA(val))
+				proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_NODATAPROOF] =
+						 name;
+			if (!exists)
+				val->attributes |=
+					 VALATTR_FOUNDNOWILDCARD;
+			if (!exists && NEEDNOQNAME(val))
+				proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_NOWILDCARDPROOF] =
+						 name;
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&trdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(&trdataset);
+			return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		}
+
+		if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_nsec3 &&
+		    (NEEDNODATA(val) || NEEDNOWILDCARD(val)) &&
+		    !FOUNDNODATA(val) && !FOUNDNOWILDCARD(val) &&
+		    dns_nsec3_noexistnodata(val->event->type, wild, name,
+					    rdataset, zonename, &exists, &data,
+					    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+					    validator_log, val)
+					    == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+		{
+			dns_name_t **proofs = val->event->proofs;
+			if (exists && !data)
+				val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDNODATA;
+			if (exists && !data && NEEDNODATA(val))
+				proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_NODATAPROOF] =
+						 name;
+			if (!exists)
+				val->attributes |=
+					 VALATTR_FOUNDNOWILDCARD;
+			if (!exists && NEEDNOQNAME(val))
+				proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_NOWILDCARDPROOF] =
+						 name;
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&trdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(&trdataset);
+			return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		}
+	}
+	if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE)
+		result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&trdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&trdataset);
+	return (result);
+}
+
+static isc_result_t
+findnsec3proofs(dns_validator_t *val) {
+	dns_name_t *name, tname;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	bool exists, data, optout, unknown;
+	bool setclosest, setnearest, *setclosestp;
+	dns_fixedname_t fclosest, fnearest, fzonename;
+	dns_name_t *closest, *nearest, *zonename, *closestp;
+	dns_name_t **proofs = val->event->proofs;
+	dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, trdataset;
+
+	dns_name_init(&tname, NULL);
+	dns_rdataset_init(&trdataset);
+	closest = dns_fixedname_initname(&fclosest);
+	nearest = dns_fixedname_initname(&fnearest);
+	zonename = dns_fixedname_initname(&fzonename);
+
+	if (val->event->message == NULL) {
+		name = &tname;
+		rdataset = &trdataset;
+	} else {
+		name = NULL;
+		rdataset = NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (result = val_rdataset_first(val, &name, &rdataset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = val_rdataset_next(val, &name, &rdataset))
+	{
+		if (rdataset->type != dns_rdatatype_nsec3 ||
+		    rdataset->trust != dns_trust_secure)
+			continue;
+
+		result = dns_nsec3_noexistnodata(val->event->type,
+						 val->event->name, name,
+						 rdataset, zonename, NULL,
+						 NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+						 NULL, NULL, validator_log,
+						 val);
+		if (result != ISC_R_IGNORE && result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&trdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_disassociate(&trdataset);
+			return (result);
+		}
+	}
+	if (result != ISC_R_NOMORE)
+		result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	POST(result);
+
+	if (dns_name_countlabels(zonename) == 0)
+		return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the val->closest is set then we want to use it otherwise
+	 * we need to discover it.
+	 */
+	if (dns_name_countlabels(dns_fixedname_name(&val->closest)) != 0) {
+		char namebuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+
+		dns_name_format(dns_fixedname_name(&val->closest),
+				 namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "closest encloser from "
+			      "wildcard signature '%s'", namebuf);
+		dns_name_copy(dns_fixedname_name(&val->closest), closest, NULL);
+		closestp = NULL;
+		setclosestp = NULL;
+	} else {
+		closestp = closest;
+		setclosestp = &setclosest;
+	}
+
+	for (result = val_rdataset_first(val, &name, &rdataset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = val_rdataset_next(val, &name, &rdataset))
+	{
+		if (rdataset->type != dns_rdatatype_nsec3 ||
+		    rdataset->trust != dns_trust_secure)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * We process all NSEC3 records to find the closest
+		 * encloser and nearest name to the closest encloser.
+		 */
+		setclosest = setnearest = false;
+		optout = false;
+		unknown = false;
+		result = dns_nsec3_noexistnodata(val->event->type,
+						 val->event->name,
+						 name, rdataset, zonename,
+						 &exists, &data, &optout,
+						 &unknown, setclosestp,
+						 &setnearest, closestp,
+						 nearest, validator_log, val);
+		if (unknown)
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDUNKNOWN;
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			continue;
+		if (setclosest)
+			proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_CLOSESTENCLOSER] = name;
+		if (exists && !data && NEEDNODATA(val)) {
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDNODATA;
+			proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_NODATAPROOF] = name;
+		}
+		if (!exists && setnearest) {
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDNOQNAME;
+			proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_NOQNAMEPROOF] = name;
+			if (optout)
+				val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDOPTOUT;
+		}
+	}
+	if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE)
+		result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+
+	/*
+	 * To know we have a valid noqname and optout proofs we need to also
+	 * have a valid closest encloser.  Otherwise we could still be looking
+	 * at proofs from the parent zone.
+	 */
+	if (dns_name_countlabels(closest) > 0 &&
+	    dns_name_countlabels(nearest) ==
+	    dns_name_countlabels(closest) + 1 &&
+	    dns_name_issubdomain(nearest, closest))
+	{
+		val->attributes |= VALATTR_FOUNDCLOSEST;
+		result = dns_name_concatenate(dns_wildcardname, closest,
+					      dns_fixedname_name(&val->wild),
+					      NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	} else {
+		val->attributes &= ~VALATTR_FOUNDNOQNAME;
+		val->attributes &= ~VALATTR_FOUNDOPTOUT;
+		proofs[DNS_VALIDATOR_NOQNAMEPROOF] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do we need to check for the wildcard?
+	 */
+	if (FOUNDNOQNAME(val) && FOUNDCLOSEST(val) &&
+	    ((NEEDNODATA(val) && !FOUNDNODATA(val)) || NEEDNOWILDCARD(val))) {
+		result = checkwildcard(val, dns_rdatatype_nsec3, zonename);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			return (result);
+	}
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Validate the authority section records.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+validate_authority(dns_validator_t *val, bool resume) {
+	dns_name_t *name;
+	dns_message_t *message = val->event->message;
+	isc_result_t result;
+
+	if (!resume)
+		result = dns_message_firstname(message, DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY);
+	else
+		result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+
+	for (;
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_message_nextname(message, DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY))
+	{
+		dns_rdataset_t *rdataset = NULL, *sigrdataset = NULL;
+
+		name = NULL;
+		dns_message_currentname(message, DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, &name);
+		if (resume) {
+			rdataset = ISC_LIST_NEXT(val->currentset, link);
+			val->currentset = NULL;
+			resume = false;
+		} else
+			rdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list);
+
+		for (;
+		     rdataset != NULL;
+		     rdataset = ISC_LIST_NEXT(rdataset, link))
+		{
+			if (rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig)
+				continue;
+
+			for (sigrdataset = ISC_LIST_HEAD(name->list);
+			     sigrdataset != NULL;
+			     sigrdataset = ISC_LIST_NEXT(sigrdataset,
+							 link))
+			{
+				if (sigrdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig &&
+				    sigrdataset->covers == rdataset->type)
+					break;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * If a signed zone is missing the zone key, bad
+			 * things could happen.  A query for data in the zone
+			 * would lead to a query for the zone key, which
+			 * would return a negative answer, which would contain
+			 * an SOA and an NSEC signed by the missing key, which
+			 * would trigger another query for the DNSKEY (since
+			 * the first one is still in progress), and go into an
+			 * infinite loop.  Avoid that.
+			 */
+			if (val->event->type == dns_rdatatype_dnskey &&
+			    rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_nsec &&
+			    dns_name_equal(name, val->event->name))
+			{
+				dns_rdata_t nsec = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+
+				result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
+				if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+					return (result);
+				dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &nsec);
+				if (dns_nsec_typepresent(&nsec,
+							dns_rdatatype_soa))
+					continue;
+			}
+			val->currentset = rdataset;
+			result = create_validator(val, name, rdataset->type,
+						  rdataset, sigrdataset,
+						  authvalidated,
+						  "validate_authority");
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				return (result);
+			val->authcount++;
+			return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+		}
+	}
+	if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE)
+		result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Validate the ncache elements.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+validate_ncache(dns_validator_t *val, bool resume) {
+	dns_name_t *name;
+	isc_result_t result;
+
+	if (!resume)
+		result = dns_rdataset_first(val->event->rdataset);
+	else
+		result = dns_rdataset_next(val->event->rdataset);
+
+	for (;
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(val->event->rdataset))
+	{
+		dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, *sigrdataset = NULL;
+
+		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+		if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+			dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+
+		name = dns_fixedname_initname(&val->fname);
+		rdataset = &val->frdataset;
+		dns_ncache_current(val->event->rdataset, name, rdataset);
+
+		if (val->frdataset.type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig)
+			continue;
+
+		result = dns_ncache_getsigrdataset(val->event->rdataset, name,
+						   rdataset->type,
+						   &val->fsigrdataset);
+		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			sigrdataset = &val->fsigrdataset;
+
+		/*
+		 * If a signed zone is missing the zone key, bad
+		 * things could happen.  A query for data in the zone
+		 * would lead to a query for the zone key, which
+		 * would return a negative answer, which would contain
+		 * an SOA and an NSEC signed by the missing key, which
+		 * would trigger another query for the DNSKEY (since
+		 * the first one is still in progress), and go into an
+		 * infinite loop.  Avoid that.
+		 */
+		if (val->event->type == dns_rdatatype_dnskey &&
+		    rdataset->type == dns_rdatatype_nsec &&
+		    dns_name_equal(name, val->event->name))
+		{
+			dns_rdata_t nsec = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+
+			result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				return (result);
+			dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &nsec);
+			if (dns_nsec_typepresent(&nsec,
+						dns_rdatatype_soa))
+				continue;
+		}
+		val->currentset = rdataset;
+		result = create_validator(val, name, rdataset->type,
+					  rdataset, sigrdataset,
+					  authvalidated,
+					  "validate_ncache");
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			return (result);
+		val->authcount++;
+		return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+	}
+	if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE)
+		result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Prove a negative answer is good or that there is a NOQNAME when the
+ * answer is from a wildcard.
+ *
+ * Loop through the authority section looking for NODATA, NOWILDCARD
+ * and NOQNAME proofs in the NSEC records by calling authvalidated().
+ *
+ * If the required proofs are found we are done.
+ *
+ * If the proofs are not found attempt to prove this is a unsecure
+ * response.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+nsecvalidate(dns_validator_t *val, bool resume) {
+	isc_result_t result;
+
+	if (resume)
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "resuming nsecvalidate");
+
+	if (val->event->message == NULL)
+		result = validate_ncache(val, resume);
+	else
+		result = validate_authority(val, resume);
+
+	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+		return (result);
+
+	/*
+	 * Do we only need to check for NOQNAME?  To get here we must have
+	 * had a secure wildcard answer.
+	 */
+	if (!NEEDNODATA(val) && !NEEDNOWILDCARD(val) && NEEDNOQNAME(val)) {
+		if (!FOUNDNOQNAME(val))
+			findnsec3proofs(val);
+		if (FOUNDNOQNAME(val) && FOUNDCLOSEST(val) &&
+		    !FOUNDOPTOUT(val)) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "marking as secure, noqname proof found");
+			marksecure(val->event);
+			return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		} else if (FOUNDOPTOUT(val) &&
+			   dns_name_countlabels(dns_fixedname_name(&val->wild))
+					 != 0) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "optout proof found");
+			val->event->optout = true;
+			markanswer(val, "nsecvalidate (1)");
+			return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		} else if ((val->attributes & VALATTR_FOUNDUNKNOWN) != 0) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "unknown NSEC3 hash algorithm found");
+			markanswer(val, "nsecvalidate (2)");
+			return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		}
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "noqname proof not found");
+		return (DNS_R_NOVALIDNSEC);
+	}
+
+	if (!FOUNDNOQNAME(val) && !FOUNDNODATA(val))
+		findnsec3proofs(val);
+
+	/*
+	 * Do we need to check for the wildcard?
+	 */
+	if (FOUNDNOQNAME(val) && FOUNDCLOSEST(val) &&
+	    ((NEEDNODATA(val) && !FOUNDNODATA(val)) || NEEDNOWILDCARD(val))) {
+		result = checkwildcard(val, dns_rdatatype_nsec, NULL);
+		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			return (result);
+	}
+
+	if ((NEEDNODATA(val) && (FOUNDNODATA(val) || FOUNDOPTOUT(val))) ||
+	    (NEEDNOQNAME(val) && FOUNDNOQNAME(val) &&
+	     NEEDNOWILDCARD(val) && FOUNDNOWILDCARD(val) &&
+	     FOUNDCLOSEST(val))) {
+		if ((val->attributes & VALATTR_FOUNDOPTOUT) != 0)
+			val->event->optout = true;
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "nonexistence proof(s) found");
+		if (val->event->message == NULL)
+			marksecure(val->event);
+		else
+			val->event->secure = true;
+		return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	}
+
+	if (val->authfail != 0 && val->authcount == val->authfail)
+		return (DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN);
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+		      "nonexistence proof(s) not found");
+	val->attributes |= VALATTR_INSECURITY;
+	return (proveunsecure(val, false, false));
+}
+
+static bool
+check_ds(dns_validator_t *val, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset) {
+	dns_rdata_t dsrdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
+	dns_rdata_ds_t ds;
+	isc_result_t result;
+
+	for (result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
+	     result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+	     result = dns_rdataset_next(rdataset)) {
+		dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &dsrdata);
+		result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&dsrdata, &ds, NULL);
+		RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+		if (dns_resolver_ds_digest_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						     name, ds.digest_type) &&
+		    dns_resolver_algorithm_supported(val->view->resolver,
+						     name, ds.algorithm)) {
+			dns_rdata_reset(&dsrdata);
+			return (true);
+		}
+		dns_rdata_reset(&dsrdata);
+	}
+	return (false);
+}
+
+static void
+dlvvalidated(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	dns_validatorevent_t *devent;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	isc_result_t eresult;
+	bool want_destroy;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	INSIST(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_VALIDATORDONE);
+
+	devent = (dns_validatorevent_t *)event;
+	val = devent->ev_arg;
+	eresult = devent->result;
+
+	isc_event_free(&event);
+	dns_validator_destroy(&val->subvalidator);
+
+	INSIST(val->event != NULL);
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in dlvvalidated");
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (CANCELED(val)) {
+		validator_done(val, ISC_R_CANCELED);
+	} else if (eresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "dlvset with trust %s",
+			      dns_trust_totext(val->frdataset.trust));
+		dns_rdataset_clone(&val->frdataset, &val->dlv);
+		val->havedlvsep = true;
+		if (dlv_algorithm_supported(val))
+			dlv_validator_start(val);
+		else {
+			markanswer(val, "dlvvalidated");
+			validator_done(val, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (eresult != DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN) {
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_expire(&val->frdataset);
+			if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+				dns_rdataset_expire(&val->fsigrdataset);
+		}
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "dlvvalidated: got %s",
+			      isc_result_totext(eresult));
+		validator_done(val, DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN);
+	}
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Callback from fetching a DLV record.
+ *
+ * Resumes the DLV lookup process.
+ */
+static void
+dlvfetched(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	char namebuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	dns_fetchevent_t *devent;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	bool want_destroy;
+	isc_result_t eresult;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	dns_fetch_t *fetch;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	INSIST(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_FETCHDONE);
+	devent = (dns_fetchevent_t *)event;
+	val = devent->ev_arg;
+	eresult = devent->result;
+
+	/* Free resources which are not of interest. */
+	if (devent->node != NULL)
+		dns_db_detachnode(devent->db, &devent->node);
+	if (devent->db != NULL)
+		dns_db_detach(&devent->db);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+	isc_event_free(&event);
+
+	INSIST(val->event != NULL);
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "in dlvfetched: %s",
+		      dns_result_totext(eresult));
+
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+	fetch = val->fetch;
+	val->fetch = NULL;
+	if (eresult == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		dns_name_format(dns_fixedname_name(&val->dlvsep), namebuf,
+				sizeof(namebuf));
+		dns_rdataset_clone(&val->frdataset, &val->dlv);
+		val->havedlvsep = true;
+		if (dlv_algorithm_supported(val)) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DLV %s found",
+				      namebuf);
+			dlv_validator_start(val);
+		} else {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "DLV %s found with no supported algorithms",
+				      namebuf);
+			markanswer(val, "dlvfetched (1)");
+			validator_done(val, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		}
+	} else if (eresult == DNS_R_NXRRSET ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_NXDOMAIN ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET ||
+		   eresult == DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN) {
+		result = finddlvsep(val, true);
+		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			if (dlv_algorithm_supported(val)) {
+				dns_name_format(dns_fixedname_name(&val->dlvsep),
+						namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "DLV %s found", namebuf);
+				dlv_validator_start(val);
+			} else {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "DLV %s found with no supported "
+					      "algorithms", namebuf);
+				markanswer(val, "dlvfetched (2)");
+				validator_done(val, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+			}
+		} else if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DLV not found");
+			markanswer(val, "dlvfetched (3)");
+			validator_done(val, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		} else {
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DLV lookup: %s",
+				      dns_result_totext(result));
+			if (result != DNS_R_WAIT)
+				validator_done(val, result);
+		}
+	} else {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DLV lookup: %s",
+			      dns_result_totext(eresult));
+		validator_done(val, eresult);
+	}
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (fetch != NULL)
+		dns_resolver_destroyfetch(&fetch);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Start the DLV lookup process.
+ *
+ * Returns
+ * \li	ISC_R_SUCCESS
+ * \li	DNS_R_WAIT
+ * \li	Others on validation failures.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+startfinddlvsep(dns_validator_t *val, dns_name_t *unsecure) {
+	char namebuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	isc_result_t result;
+
+	INSIST(!DLVTRIED(val));
+
+	val->attributes |= VALATTR_DLVTRIED;
+
+	dns_name_format(unsecure, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+		      "plain DNSSEC returns unsecure (%s): looking for DLV",
+		      namebuf);
+
+	if (dns_name_issubdomain(val->event->name, val->view->dlv)) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING, "must be secure failure, "
+			      " %s is under DLV (startfinddlvsep)", namebuf);
+		return (DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE);
+	}
+
+	val->dlvlabels = dns_name_countlabels(unsecure) - 1;
+	result = finddlvsep(val, false);
+	if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DLV not found");
+		markanswer(val, "startfinddlvsep (1)");
+		return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	}
+	if (result == DNS_R_NTACOVERED) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DLV covered by NTA");
+		validator_done(val, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	}
+	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DLV lookup: %s",
+			      dns_result_totext(result));
+		return (result);
+	}
+	dns_name_format(dns_fixedname_name(&val->dlvsep), namebuf,
+			sizeof(namebuf));
+	if (dlv_algorithm_supported(val)) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DLV %s found", namebuf);
+		dlv_validator_start(val);
+		return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+	}
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "DLV %s found with no supported "
+		      "algorithms", namebuf);
+	markanswer(val, "startfinddlvsep (2)");
+	validator_done(val, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+	return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Continue the DLV lookup process.
+ *
+ * Returns
+ * \li	ISC_R_SUCCESS
+ * \li	ISC_R_NOTFOUND
+ * \li	DNS_R_WAIT
+ * \li	Others on validation failure.
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+finddlvsep(dns_validator_t *val, bool resume) {
+	char namebuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	dns_fixedname_t dlvfixed;
+	dns_name_t *dlvname;
+	dns_name_t *dlvsep;
+	dns_name_t noroot;
+	isc_result_t result;
+	unsigned int labels;
+
+	INSIST(val->view->dlv != NULL);
+
+	if (!resume) {
+		if (dns_name_issubdomain(val->event->name, val->view->dlv)) {
+			dns_name_format(val->event->name, namebuf,
+					sizeof(namebuf));
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+				      "must be secure failure, "
+				      "%s is under DLV (finddlvsep)", namebuf);
+			return (DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE);
+		}
+
+		dlvsep = dns_fixedname_initname(&val->dlvsep);
+		dns_name_copy(val->event->name, dlvsep, NULL);
+		/*
+		 * If this is a response to a DS query, we need to look in
+		 * the parent zone for the trust anchor.
+		 */
+		if (val->event->type == dns_rdatatype_ds) {
+			labels = dns_name_countlabels(dlvsep);
+			if (labels == 0)
+				return (ISC_R_NOTFOUND);
+			dns_name_getlabelsequence(dlvsep, 1, labels - 1,
+						  dlvsep);
+		}
+	} else {
+		dlvsep = dns_fixedname_name(&val->dlvsep);
+		labels = dns_name_countlabels(dlvsep);
+		dns_name_getlabelsequence(dlvsep, 1, labels - 1, dlvsep);
+	}
+	dns_name_init(&noroot, NULL);
+	dlvname = dns_fixedname_initname(&dlvfixed);
+	labels = dns_name_countlabels(dlvsep);
+	if (labels == 0)
+		return (ISC_R_NOTFOUND);
+	dns_name_getlabelsequence(dlvsep, 0, labels - 1, &noroot);
+	result = dns_name_concatenate(&noroot, val->view->dlv, dlvname, NULL);
+	while (result == ISC_R_NOSPACE) {
+		labels = dns_name_countlabels(dlvsep);
+		dns_name_getlabelsequence(dlvsep, 1, labels - 1, dlvsep);
+		dns_name_getlabelsequence(dlvsep, 0, labels - 2, &noroot);
+		result = dns_name_concatenate(&noroot, val->view->dlv,
+					      dlvname, NULL);
+	}
+	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(2), "DLV concatenate failed");
+		return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+	}
+
+	if (((val->options & DNS_VALIDATOR_NONTA) == 0) &&
+	    dns_view_ntacovers(val->view, val->start, dlvname, val->view->dlv))
+		return (DNS_R_NTACOVERED);
+
+	while (dns_name_countlabels(dlvname) >=
+	       dns_name_countlabels(val->view->dlv) + val->dlvlabels) {
+		dns_name_format(dlvname, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "looking for DLV %s",
+			      namebuf);
+		result = view_find(val, dlvname, dns_rdatatype_dlv);
+		if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust) &&
+			    dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+			{
+				dns_fixedname_init(&val->fname);
+				dns_name_copy(dlvname,
+					      dns_fixedname_name(&val->fname),
+					      NULL);
+				result = create_validator(val,
+						dns_fixedname_name(&val->fname),
+							  dns_rdatatype_dlv,
+							  &val->frdataset,
+							  &val->fsigrdataset,
+							  dlvvalidated,
+							  "finddlvsep");
+				if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+					return (result);
+				return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+			}
+			if (val->frdataset.trust < dns_trust_secure) {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "DLV not validated");
+				return (DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG);
+			}
+			val->havedlvsep = true;
+			dns_rdataset_clone(&val->frdataset, &val->dlv);
+			return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+		}
+		if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
+			result = create_fetch(val, dlvname, dns_rdatatype_dlv,
+					      dlvfetched, "finddlvsep");
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				return (result);
+			return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+		}
+		if (result != DNS_R_NXRRSET &&
+		    result != DNS_R_NXDOMAIN &&
+		    result != DNS_R_EMPTYNAME &&
+		    result != DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET &&
+		    result != DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN)
+			return (result);
+		/*
+		 * Strip first labels from both dlvsep and dlvname.
+		 */
+		labels = dns_name_countlabels(dlvsep);
+		if (labels == 0)
+			break;
+		dns_name_getlabelsequence(dlvsep, 1, labels - 1, dlvsep);
+		labels = dns_name_countlabels(dlvname);
+		dns_name_getlabelsequence(dlvname, 1, labels - 1, dlvname);
+	}
+	return (ISC_R_NOTFOUND);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * proveunsecure walks down from the SEP looking for a break in the
+ * chain of trust.  That occurs when we can prove the DS record does
+ * not exist at a delegation point or the DS exists at a delegation
+ * but we don't support the algorithm/digest.
+ *
+ * If DLV is active and we look for a DLV record at or below the
+ * point we go insecure.  If found we restart the validation process.
+ * If not found or DLV isn't active we mark the response as a answer.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * \li	ISC_R_SUCCESS		val->event->name is in a unsecure zone
+ * \li	DNS_R_WAIT		validation is in progress.
+ * \li	DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE	val->event->name is supposed to be secure
+ *				(policy) but we proved that it is unsecure.
+ * \li	DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG
+ * \li	DNS_R_NOVALIDNSEC
+ * \li	DNS_R_NOTINSECURE
+ * \li	DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN
+ */
+static isc_result_t
+proveunsecure(dns_validator_t *val, bool have_ds, bool resume)
+{
+	isc_result_t result;
+	dns_fixedname_t fixedsecroot;
+	dns_name_t *secroot;
+	dns_name_t *tname;
+	char namebuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	dns_name_t *found;
+	dns_fixedname_t fixedfound;
+
+	secroot = dns_fixedname_initname(&fixedsecroot);
+	found = dns_fixedname_initname(&fixedfound);
+	if (val->havedlvsep)
+		dns_name_copy(dns_fixedname_name(&val->dlvsep), secroot, NULL);
+	else {
+		unsigned int labels;
+		dns_name_copy(val->event->name, secroot, NULL);
+		/*
+		 * If this is a response to a DS query, we need to look in
+		 * the parent zone for the trust anchor.
+		 */
+
+		labels = dns_name_countlabels(secroot);
+		if (val->event->type == dns_rdatatype_ds && labels > 1U)
+			dns_name_getlabelsequence(secroot, 1, labels - 1,
+						  secroot);
+		result = dns_keytable_finddeepestmatch(val->keytable,
+						       secroot, secroot);
+		if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
+			if (val->mustbesecure) {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+					      "must be secure failure, "
+					      "not beneath secure root");
+				result = DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE;
+				goto out;
+			} else
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "not beneath secure root");
+			if (val->view->dlv == NULL || DLVTRIED(val)) {
+				markanswer(val, "proveunsecure (1)");
+				return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+			}
+			return (startfinddlvsep(val, dns_rootname));
+		} else if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+			return (result);
+	}
+
+	if (!resume) {
+		/*
+		 * We are looking for breaks below the SEP so add a label.
+		 */
+		val->labels = dns_name_countlabels(secroot) + 1;
+	} else {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "resuming proveunsecure");
+		/*
+		 * If we have a DS rdataset and it is secure then check if
+		 * the DS rdataset has a supported algorithm combination.
+		 * If not this is an insecure delegation as far as this
+		 * resolver is concerned.  Fall back to DLV if available.
+		 */
+		if (have_ds && val->frdataset.trust >= dns_trust_secure &&
+		    !check_ds(val, dns_fixedname_name(&val->fname),
+			      &val->frdataset)) {
+			dns_name_format(dns_fixedname_name(&val->fname),
+					namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+			if ((val->view->dlv == NULL || DLVTRIED(val)) &&
+			    val->mustbesecure) {
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+					      "must be secure failure at '%s', "
+					      "can't fall back to DLV",
+					      namebuf);
+				result = DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "no supported algorithm/digest (%s/DS)",
+				      namebuf);
+			if (val->view->dlv == NULL || DLVTRIED(val)) {
+				markanswer(val, "proveunsecure (2)");
+				result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			return(startfinddlvsep(val,
+					      dns_fixedname_name(&val->fname)));
+		}
+		val->labels++;
+	}
+
+	for (;
+	     val->labels <= dns_name_countlabels(val->event->name);
+	     val->labels++)
+	{
+
+		tname = dns_fixedname_initname(&val->fname);
+		if (val->labels == dns_name_countlabels(val->event->name))
+			dns_name_copy(val->event->name, tname, NULL);
+		else
+			dns_name_split(val->event->name, val->labels,
+				       NULL, tname);
+
+		dns_name_format(tname, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "checking existence of DS at '%s'",
+			      namebuf);
+
+		result = view_find(val, tname, dns_rdatatype_ds);
+		if (result == DNS_R_NXRRSET || result == DNS_R_NCACHENXRRSET) {
+			/*
+			 * There is no DS.  If this is a delegation,
+			 * we may be done.
+			 */
+			/*
+			 * If we have "trust == answer" then this namespace
+			 * has switched from insecure to should be secure.
+			 */
+			if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust) ||
+			    DNS_TRUST_ANSWER(val->frdataset.trust)) {
+				result = create_validator(val, tname,
+							  dns_rdatatype_ds,
+							  &val->frdataset,
+							  NULL, dsvalidated,
+							  "proveunsecure");
+				if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+					goto out;
+				return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Zones using NSEC3 don't return a NSEC RRset so
+			 * we need to use dns_view_findzonecut2 to find
+			 * the zone cut.
+			 */
+			if (result == DNS_R_NXRRSET &&
+			    !dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset) &&
+			    dns_view_findzonecut2(val->view, tname, found,
+						 0, 0, false, false,
+						 NULL, NULL) == ISC_R_SUCCESS &&
+			    dns_name_equal(tname, found)) {
+				if (val->mustbesecure) {
+					validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+						      "must be secure failure, "
+						      "no DS at zone cut");
+					return (DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE);
+				}
+				if (val->view->dlv == NULL || DLVTRIED(val)) {
+					markanswer(val, "proveunsecure (3)");
+					return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+				}
+				return (startfinddlvsep(val, tname));
+			}
+			if (val->frdataset.trust < dns_trust_secure) {
+				/*
+				 * This shouldn't happen, since the negative
+				 * response should have been validated.  Since
+				 * there's no way of validating existing
+				 * negative response blobs, give up.
+				 */
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+					      "can't validate existing "
+					      "negative responses (no DS)");
+				result = DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (isdelegation(tname, &val->frdataset, result)) {
+				if (val->mustbesecure) {
+					validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+						      "must be secure failure, "
+						      "%s is a delegation",
+						      namebuf);
+					return (DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE);
+				}
+				if (val->view->dlv == NULL || DLVTRIED(val)) {
+					markanswer(val, "proveunsecure (4)");
+					return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+				}
+				return (startfinddlvsep(val, tname));
+			}
+			continue;
+		} else if (result == DNS_R_CNAME) {
+			if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust) ||
+			    DNS_TRUST_ANSWER(val->frdataset.trust)) {
+				result = create_validator(val, tname,
+							  dns_rdatatype_cname,
+							  &val->frdataset,
+							  NULL, cnamevalidated,
+							  "proveunsecure "
+							  "(cname)");
+				if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+					goto out;
+				return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+			}
+			continue;
+		} else if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+			/*
+			 * There is a DS here.  Verify that it's secure and
+			 * continue.
+			 */
+			if (val->frdataset.trust >= dns_trust_secure) {
+				if (!check_ds(val, tname, &val->frdataset)) {
+					validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+						     "no supported algorithm/"
+						     "digest (%s/DS)", namebuf);
+					if (val->mustbesecure) {
+						validator_log(val,
+							      ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+						      "must be secure failure, "
+						      "no supported algorithm/"
+						      "digest (%s/DS)",
+						      namebuf);
+						result = DNS_R_MUSTBESECURE;
+						goto out;
+					}
+					if (val->view->dlv == NULL ||
+					    DLVTRIED(val)) {
+						markanswer(val,
+							   "proveunsecure (5)");
+						result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
+						goto out;
+					}
+					return(startfinddlvsep(val, tname));
+				}
+				continue;
+			}
+			else if (!dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+			{
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+					      "DS is unsigned");
+				result = DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Validate / re-validate answer.
+			 */
+			result = create_validator(val, tname, dns_rdatatype_ds,
+						  &val->frdataset,
+						  &val->fsigrdataset,
+						  dsvalidated,
+						  "proveunsecure");
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				goto out;
+			return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+		} else if (result == DNS_R_NXDOMAIN ||
+			   result == DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN) {
+			/*
+			 * This is not a zone cut.  Assuming things are
+			 * as expected, continue.
+			 */
+			if (!dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset)) {
+				/*
+				 * There should be an NSEC here, since we
+				 * are still in a secure zone.
+				 */
+				result = DNS_R_NOVALIDNSEC;
+				goto out;
+			} else if (DNS_TRUST_PENDING(val->frdataset.trust) ||
+				   DNS_TRUST_ANSWER(val->frdataset.trust)) {
+				/*
+				 * If we have "trust == answer" then this namespace
+				 * has switched from insecure to should be secure.
+				 */
+				result = create_validator(val, tname,
+							  dns_rdatatype_ds,
+							  &val->frdataset,
+							  NULL, dsvalidated,
+							  "proveunsecure");
+				if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+					goto out;
+				return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+			} else if (val->frdataset.trust < dns_trust_secure) {
+				/*
+				 * This shouldn't happen, since the negative
+				 * response should have been validated.  Since
+				 * there's no way of validating existing
+				 * negative response blobs, give up.
+				 */
+				validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_WARNING,
+					      "can't validate existing "
+					      "negative responses "
+					      "(not a zone cut)");
+				result = DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			continue;
+		} else if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
+			/*
+			 * We don't know anything about the DS.  Find it.
+			 */
+			result = create_fetch(val, tname, dns_rdatatype_ds,
+					      dsfetched2, "proveunsecure");
+			if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+				goto out;
+			return (DNS_R_WAIT);
+		} else if (result == DNS_R_BROKENCHAIN)
+			return (result);
+	}
+
+	/* Couldn't complete insecurity proof */
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "insecurity proof failed");
+	return (DNS_R_NOTINSECURE);
+
+ out:
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+	return (result);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Reset state and revalidate the answer using DLV.
+ */
+static void
+dlv_validator_start(dns_validator_t *val) {
+	isc_event_t *event;
+
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "dlv_validator_start");
+
+	/*
+	 * Reset state and try again.
+	 */
+	val->attributes &= VALATTR_DLVTRIED;
+	val->options &= ~DNS_VALIDATOR_DLV;
+
+	event = (isc_event_t *)val->event;
+	isc_task_send(val->task, &event);
+}
+
+/*%
+ * Start the validation process.
+ *
+ * Attempt to validate the answer based on the category it appears to
+ * fall in.
+ * \li	1. secure positive answer.
+ * \li	2. unsecure positive answer.
+ * \li	3. a negative answer (secure or unsecure).
+ *
+ * Note a answer that appears to be a secure positive answer may actually
+ * be an unsecure positive answer.
+ */
+static void
+validator_start(isc_task_t *task, isc_event_t *event) {
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	dns_validatorevent_t *vevent;
+	bool want_destroy = false;
+	isc_result_t result = ISC_R_FAILURE;
+
+	UNUSED(task);
+	REQUIRE(event->ev_type == DNS_EVENT_VALIDATORSTART);
+	vevent = (dns_validatorevent_t *)event;
+	val = vevent->validator;
+
+	/* If the validator has been canceled, val->event == NULL */
+	if (val->event == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (DLVTRIED(val))
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "restarting using DLV");
+	else
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "starting");
+
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+
+	if ((val->options & DNS_VALIDATOR_DLV) != 0 &&
+	     val->event->rdataset != NULL) {
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "looking for DLV");
+		result = startfinddlvsep(val, dns_rootname);
+	} else if (val->event->rdataset != NULL &&
+		   val->event->sigrdataset != NULL) {
+		isc_result_t saved_result;
+
+		/*
+		 * This looks like a simple validation.  We say "looks like"
+		 * because it might end up requiring an insecurity proof.
+		 */
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "attempting positive response validation");
+
+		INSIST(dns_rdataset_isassociated(val->event->rdataset));
+		INSIST(dns_rdataset_isassociated(val->event->sigrdataset));
+		result = start_positive_validation(val);
+		if (result == DNS_R_NOVALIDSIG &&
+		    (val->attributes & VALATTR_TRIEDVERIFY) == 0)
+		{
+			saved_result = result;
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+				      "falling back to insecurity proof");
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_INSECURITY;
+			result = proveunsecure(val, false, false);
+			if (result == DNS_R_NOTINSECURE)
+				result = saved_result;
+		}
+	} else if (val->event->rdataset != NULL &&
+		   val->event->rdataset->type != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * This is either an unsecure subdomain or a response from
+		 * a broken server.
+		 */
+		INSIST(dns_rdataset_isassociated(val->event->rdataset));
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "attempting insecurity proof");
+
+		val->attributes |= VALATTR_INSECURITY;
+		result = proveunsecure(val, false, false);
+		if (result == DNS_R_NOTINSECURE)
+			validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_INFO,
+				      "got insecure response; "
+				      "parent indicates it should be secure");
+	} else if (val->event->rdataset == NULL &&
+		   val->event->sigrdataset == NULL)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * This is a nonexistence validation.
+		 */
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "attempting negative response validation");
+
+		if (val->event->message->rcode == dns_rcode_nxdomain) {
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_NEEDNOQNAME;
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_NEEDNOWILDCARD;
+		} else
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_NEEDNODATA;
+		result = nsecvalidate(val, false);
+	} else if (val->event->rdataset != NULL &&
+		    NEGATIVE(val->event->rdataset))
+	{
+		/*
+		 * This is a nonexistence validation.
+		 */
+		validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3),
+			      "attempting negative response validation");
+
+		if (val->event->rdataset->covers == dns_rdatatype_any) {
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_NEEDNOQNAME;
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_NEEDNOWILDCARD;
+		} else
+			val->attributes |= VALATTR_NEEDNODATA;
+		result = nsecvalidate(val, false);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * This shouldn't happen.
+		 */
+		INSIST(0);
+	}
+
+	if (result != DNS_R_WAIT) {
+		want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+		validator_done(val, result);
+	}
+
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+}
+
+isc_result_t
+dns_validator_create(dns_view_t *view, dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type,
+		     dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, dns_rdataset_t *sigrdataset,
+		     dns_message_t *message, unsigned int options,
+		     isc_task_t *task, isc_taskaction_t action, void *arg,
+		     dns_validator_t **validatorp)
+{
+	isc_result_t result = ISC_R_FAILURE;
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	isc_task_t *tclone = NULL;
+	dns_validatorevent_t *event;
+
+	REQUIRE(name != NULL);
+	REQUIRE(rdataset != NULL ||
+		(rdataset == NULL && sigrdataset == NULL && message != NULL));
+	REQUIRE(validatorp != NULL && *validatorp == NULL);
+
+	val = isc_mem_get(view->mctx, sizeof(*val));
+	if (val == NULL)
+		return (ISC_R_NOMEMORY);
+	val->view = NULL;
+	dns_view_weakattach(view, &val->view);
+
+	event = (dns_validatorevent_t *)
+		isc_event_allocate(view->mctx, task,
+				   DNS_EVENT_VALIDATORSTART,
+				   validator_start, NULL,
+				   sizeof(dns_validatorevent_t));
+	if (event == NULL) {
+		result = ISC_R_NOMEMORY;
+		goto cleanup_val;
+	}
+	isc_task_attach(task, &tclone);
+	event->validator = val;
+	event->result = ISC_R_FAILURE;
+	event->name = name;
+	event->type = type;
+	event->rdataset = rdataset;
+	event->sigrdataset = sigrdataset;
+	event->message = message;
+	memset(event->proofs, 0, sizeof(event->proofs));
+	event->optout = false;
+	event->secure = false;
+	result = isc_mutex_init(&val->lock);
+	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+		goto cleanup_event;
+	val->event = event;
+	val->options = options;
+	val->attributes = 0;
+	val->fetch = NULL;
+	val->subvalidator = NULL;
+	val->parent = NULL;
+
+	val->keytable = NULL;
+	result = dns_view_getsecroots(val->view, &val->keytable);
+	if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS)
+		goto cleanup_mutex;
+	val->keynode = NULL;
+	val->key = NULL;
+	val->siginfo = NULL;
+	val->task = task;
+	val->action = action;
+	val->arg = arg;
+	val->labels = 0;
+	val->currentset = NULL;
+	val->keyset = NULL;
+	val->dsset = NULL;
+	dns_rdataset_init(&val->dlv);
+	val->seensig = false;
+	val->havedlvsep = false;
+	val->depth = 0;
+	val->authcount = 0;
+	val->authfail = 0;
+	val->mustbesecure = dns_resolver_getmustbesecure(view->resolver, name);
+	dns_rdataset_init(&val->frdataset);
+	dns_rdataset_init(&val->fsigrdataset);
+	dns_fixedname_init(&val->wild);
+	dns_fixedname_init(&val->nearest);
+	dns_fixedname_init(&val->closest);
+	isc_stdtime_get(&val->start);
+	ISC_LINK_INIT(val, link);
+	val->magic = VALIDATOR_MAGIC;
+
+	if ((options & DNS_VALIDATOR_DEFER) == 0)
+		isc_task_send(task, ISC_EVENT_PTR(&event));
+
+	*validatorp = val;
+
+	return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
+
+ cleanup_mutex:
+	DESTROYLOCK(&val->lock);
+
+ cleanup_event:
+	isc_task_detach(&tclone);
+	isc_event_free(ISC_EVENT_PTR(&event));
+
+ cleanup_val:
+	dns_view_weakdetach(&val->view);
+	isc_mem_put(view->mctx, val, sizeof(*val));
+
+	return (result);
+}
+
+void
+dns_validator_send(dns_validator_t *validator) {
+	isc_event_t *event;
+	REQUIRE(VALID_VALIDATOR(validator));
+
+	LOCK(&validator->lock);
+
+	INSIST((validator->options & DNS_VALIDATOR_DEFER) != 0);
+	event = (isc_event_t *)validator->event;
+	validator->options &= ~DNS_VALIDATOR_DEFER;
+	UNLOCK(&validator->lock);
+
+	isc_task_send(validator->task, ISC_EVENT_PTR(&event));
+}
+
+void
+dns_validator_cancel(dns_validator_t *validator) {
+	dns_fetch_t *fetch = NULL;
+
+	REQUIRE(VALID_VALIDATOR(validator));
+
+	LOCK(&validator->lock);
+
+	validator_log(validator, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), "dns_validator_cancel");
+
+	if ((validator->attributes & VALATTR_CANCELED) == 0) {
+		validator->attributes |= VALATTR_CANCELED;
+		if (validator->event != NULL) {
+			fetch = validator->fetch;
+			validator->fetch = NULL;
+
+			if (validator->subvalidator != NULL)
+				dns_validator_cancel(validator->subvalidator);
+			if ((validator->options & DNS_VALIDATOR_DEFER) != 0) {
+				validator->options &= ~DNS_VALIDATOR_DEFER;
+				validator_done(validator, ISC_R_CANCELED);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	UNLOCK(&validator->lock);
+
+	/* Need to cancel and destroy the fetch outside validator lock */
+	if (fetch != NULL) {
+		dns_resolver_cancelfetch(fetch);
+		dns_resolver_destroyfetch(&fetch);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+destroy(dns_validator_t *val) {
+	isc_mem_t *mctx;
+
+	REQUIRE(SHUTDOWN(val));
+	REQUIRE(val->event == NULL);
+	REQUIRE(val->fetch == NULL);
+
+	if (val->keynode != NULL)
+		dns_keytable_detachkeynode(val->keytable, &val->keynode);
+	else if (val->key != NULL)
+		dst_key_free(&val->key);
+	if (val->keytable != NULL)
+		dns_keytable_detach(&val->keytable);
+	if (val->subvalidator != NULL)
+		dns_validator_destroy(&val->subvalidator);
+	if (val->havedlvsep)
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->dlv);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->frdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->frdataset);
+	if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&val->fsigrdataset))
+		dns_rdataset_disassociate(&val->fsigrdataset);
+	mctx = val->view->mctx;
+	if (val->siginfo != NULL)
+		isc_mem_put(mctx, val->siginfo, sizeof(*val->siginfo));
+	DESTROYLOCK(&val->lock);
+	dns_view_weakdetach(&val->view);
+	val->magic = 0;
+	isc_mem_put(mctx, val, sizeof(*val));
+}
+
+void
+dns_validator_destroy(dns_validator_t **validatorp) {
+	dns_validator_t *val;
+	bool want_destroy = false;
+
+	REQUIRE(validatorp != NULL);
+	val = *validatorp;
+	REQUIRE(VALID_VALIDATOR(val));
+
+	LOCK(&val->lock);
+
+	val->attributes |= VALATTR_SHUTDOWN;
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(4), "dns_validator_destroy");
+
+	want_destroy = exit_check(val);
+
+	UNLOCK(&val->lock);
+
+	if (want_destroy)
+		destroy(val);
+
+	*validatorp = NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+validator_logv(dns_validator_t *val, isc_logcategory_t *category,
+	       isc_logmodule_t *module, int level, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+	char msgbuf[2048];
+	static const char spaces[] = "        *";
+	int depth = val->depth * 2;
+
+	vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, ap);
+
+	if ((unsigned int) depth >= sizeof spaces)
+		depth = sizeof spaces - 1;
+
+	if (val->event != NULL && val->event->name != NULL) {
+		char namebuf[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+		char typebuf[DNS_RDATATYPE_FORMATSIZE];
+
+		dns_name_format(val->event->name, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
+		dns_rdatatype_format(val->event->type, typebuf,
+				     sizeof(typebuf));
+		isc_log_write(dns_lctx, category, module, level,
+			      "%.*svalidating %s/%s: %s", depth, spaces,
+			      namebuf, typebuf, msgbuf);
+	} else {
+		isc_log_write(dns_lctx, category, module, level,
+			      "%.*svalidator @%p: %s", depth, spaces,
+			       val, msgbuf);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+validator_log(void *val, int level, const char *fmt, ...) {
+	va_list ap;
+
+	if (! isc_log_wouldlog(dns_lctx, level))
+		return;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+
+	validator_logv(val, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_DNSSEC,
+		       DNS_LOGMODULE_VALIDATOR, level, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+}
+
+static void
+validator_logcreate(dns_validator_t *val,
+		    dns_name_t *name, dns_rdatatype_t type,
+		    const char *caller, const char *operation)
+{
+	char namestr[DNS_NAME_FORMATSIZE];
+	char typestr[DNS_RDATATYPE_FORMATSIZE];
+
+	dns_name_format(name, namestr, sizeof(namestr));
+	dns_rdatatype_format(type, typestr, sizeof(typestr));
+	validator_log(val, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(9), "%s: creating %s for %s %s",
+		      caller, operation, namestr, typestr);
+}