Index: openssl/Configure diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.19 --- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:46 2016 +++ openssl/Configure Mon Jun 13 15:20:23 2016 @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ # see INSTALL for instructions. -my $usage="Usage: Configure [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; +my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no- ...] [enable- ...] [experimental- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; # Options: # @@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". # +# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. +# (No default) +# +# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only +# (No default) +# # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in # include/. A value is required. @@ -355,24 +361,23 @@ #### # *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate... -"linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", # It's believed that majority of ARM toolchains predefine appropriate -march. # If you compiler does not, do complement config command line with one! -"linux-armv4", "gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", #### IA-32 targets... -"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", +"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", #### -"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", -"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -"linux-x86_64-clang","clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", -"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of @@ -668,6 +673,10 @@ my $idx_arflags = $idx++; my $idx_multilib = $idx++; +# PKCS#11 engine patch +my $pk11_libname=""; +my $pk11_flavor=""; + my $prefix=""; my $libdir=""; my $openssldir=""; @@ -895,6 +904,14 @@ $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei; $flags.=$_." "; } + elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) + { + $pk11_libname=$1; + } + elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/) + { + $pk11_flavor=$1; + } elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) { $prefix=$1; @@ -1062,6 +1079,22 @@ exit 0; } +if (! $pk11_libname) + { + print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; + print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; + exit 1; + } + +if (! $pk11_flavor + || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only")) + { + print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n"; + print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n"; + print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; + exit 1; + } + if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { $target = "Cygwin".$1; } @@ -1139,6 +1172,25 @@ $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO"; } +if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator") + { + $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; + $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; + $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; + $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so"; + print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]"; + print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; + } +else + { + $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; + $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; + $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; + $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca"; + print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]"; + print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; +} + my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds; $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/); @@ -1228,6 +1280,8 @@ if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } else { $no_user_cflags=1; } +$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; + # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through # the script "config" or manually. if (!$no_krb5) @@ -1626,6 +1680,7 @@ s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; + s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; Index: openssl/Makefile.org diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.10.1.2.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.12 --- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.10.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:47 2016 +++ openssl/Makefile.org Mon Jun 13 15:20:23 2016 @@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ INSTALL_PREFIX= INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl +# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. +PK11_LIB_LOCATION= + # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl Index: openssl/README.pkcs11 diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.8 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:28 2016 +++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:16:43 2013 @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +ISC modified +============ + +The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility. + +The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and +sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the +PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second +is a stripped down version which provides only the useful +function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device +protected key store and key loading). + +As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor, +external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example +of the first, AEP Keyper of the second. + +Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in +config/Configure. + +It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine. +The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared +(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine +(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs). + +PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l +========================================= + +[Nov 19, 2009] + +Contents: + +Overview +Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch +FAQs +Feedback + +Overview +======== + +This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11 +engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against +OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system +must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the +PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below. + +Patch can be applied like this: + + # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris + tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz + # now download the patch to the current directory + # ... + cd openssl-0.9.8l + # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system) + patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19 + +It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the +symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share +except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA. + +According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support +following mechanisms: + + RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4, + AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB, + AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224, + SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 + +Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP +functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may +see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an +example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety +problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested). + +You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the +configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the +config script: + + $ ./config + Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2 + Configuring for solaris-x86-cc + You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library. + See README.pkcs11 for more information. + +Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run +configure script like this: + + ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so + +To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run +"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the +output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary +and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits. + +The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against +PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and +OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project +(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more +information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the +system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself +and has functional PKCS#11 library. + +The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface +(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are +copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information. + +Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems, +Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more +information). + +Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch +======================================= + +2009-11-19 +- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l + +- bugs and RFEs: + + 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores + 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split + 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the + PKCS#11 engine + +2009-03-11 +- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j + +- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a + tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied. + +- fixed bugs: + + 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4 + 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if + meta slot is disabled + +2008-12-02 +- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal) + + 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine + 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true + 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean + 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take + it seriously + 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean + 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11 + engine code + 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API + 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if + meta slot is disabled + +2008-08-01 +- fixed bug + + 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers + and digests + +- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic + +2008-07-29 +- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version +- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version: + + 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users + +- fixed bugs in the engine code: + + 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for + asymmetric key operations + 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called + atomically + 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys + 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners + 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in + suboptimal way + 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more + resilient to destroy failures + 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free() + 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys + 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine + 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size + of big numbers leading to failures + 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of + -1 + 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references + 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not + checked + 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to + structure reuse + 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of + OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH} + defines but fails miserably + 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss + 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing + generate_params parameter + 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes + 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the + PKCS#11 engine + 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish() + +- new features and enhancements: + + 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512 + 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes + 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric + ciphers and digests + +2007-10-15 +- update for 0.9.8f version +- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" + +2007-10-02 +- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" +- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys" + +2007-09-26 +- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes + significant performance drop +- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine + +2007-05-25 +- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers + +2007-05-19 +- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code + +FAQs +==== + +(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error: + +../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init': +hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork' + +Answer: + + - don't use "no-threads" when configuring + - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by + default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the + architecture that Configure printed, for example: + +Configured for linux-elf. + + - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes), + and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string. + If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With + "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after + "-D_REENTRANT", like this: + +....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:..... + +(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for +pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch. + +Answer: + + Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32 + (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there. + + +Feedback +======== + +Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was +created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris. + +Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp. + Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.6.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.10 --- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.6.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:49 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Mon Jun 13 15:20:26 2016 @@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS +# define OPENSSL_THREADS +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE #endif @@ -94,6 +97,8 @@ # endif #endif +#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ + /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */ /* Generate 80386 code? */ @@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. */ -#undef RC4_CHUNK +#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long #endif #endif @@ -148,7 +153,7 @@ /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ #ifndef DES_LONG -#define DES_LONG unsigned long +#define DES_LONG unsigned int #endif #endif @@ -159,9 +164,9 @@ /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ /* Only one for the following should be defined */ -#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG +#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT -#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT +#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT #endif #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) @@ -173,7 +178,7 @@ #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H -#undef BF_PTR +#define BF_PTR2 #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */ #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) @@ -203,7 +208,7 @@ /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. * Very mucy CPU dependant */ #ifndef DES_UNROLL -#undef DES_UNROLL +#define DES_UNROLL #endif /* These default values were supplied by Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.10 --- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 18:09:29 2015 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Wed Dec 23 18:27:10 2015 @@ -22,13 +22,15 @@ tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \ - eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c + eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c \ + hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \ - eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o + eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o \ + hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) @@ -296,6 +298,83 @@ eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h eng_table.o: eng_table.c +hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h +hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c +hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h +hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h +hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h +hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h +hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h +hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008 @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * CDDL HEADER START + * + * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the + * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only + * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance + * with the License. + * + * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE + * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions + * and limitations under the License. + * + * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each + * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. + * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the + * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying + * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] + * + * CDDL HEADER END + */ +/* + * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H +#define _CRYPTOKI_H + +/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#ifndef CK_PTR +#define CK_PTR * +#endif + +#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION +#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name +#endif + +#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name +#endif + +#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name) +#endif + +#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION +#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name) +#endif + +#ifndef NULL_PTR +#include /* For NULL */ +#define NULL_PTR NULL +#endif + +/* + * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint + */ +#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE +#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE +#ifndef TRUE +#define TRUE 1 +#endif /* TRUE */ +#ifndef FALSE +#define FALSE 0 +#endif /* FALSE */ +#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */ + +#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO + +#include "pkcs11.h" + +/* Solaris specific functions */ + +#include + +/* + * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all + * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of + * providing operations on the requested mechanism + */ +CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, + CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession); + +/* + * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given + * mechanism from the rawkey data. + */ +CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len, + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj); + + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */ Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.8 --- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:52 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Mon Jun 13 15:20:31 2016 @@ -122,6 +122,14 @@ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG) ENGINE_load_capi(); # endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA + ENGINE_load_pk11ca(); +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO + ENGINE_load_pk11so(); +# endif +# endif #endif ENGINE_register_all_complete(); } Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.7 --- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 18:09:30 2015 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Dec 23 18:27:11 2015 @@ -416,6 +416,12 @@ void ENGINE_load_rsax(void); void ENGINE_load_rdrand(void); void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA +void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void); +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO +void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void); +# endif /* * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.33 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:07:41 2013 @@ -0,0 +1,4010 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#include +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#include +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +typedef int pid_t; +#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() +#define NOPTHREADS +#ifndef NULL_PTR +#define NULL_PTR NULL +#endif +#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllexport) name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllimport) name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) +#else +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +/* Debug mutexes */ +/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ +#define DEBUG_MUTEX + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ +#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX +#define __USE_UNIX98 +#endif +#include +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA + +/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ +#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" +/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ +/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ +/* + * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more + * information. + */ +#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) +#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#endif + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) +#include "cryptoki.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) +#else +#include "cryptoki.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#endif +#include "hw_pk11ca.h" +#include "hw_pk11_err.c" + +/* + * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), + * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the + * RSA keys by reference feature. + */ +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; +#endif + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel + * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. + */ +static int *hw_cnids; +static int *hw_dnids; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ +static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; + +/* + * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when + * logging into the token. + */ +CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; + +/* + * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for + * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given + * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be + * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already + * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each + * PK11_SESSION object. + * + * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the + * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also + * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another + * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in + * invalid handle returned from the search operation. + * + * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. + * They are also used for active list protection. + */ +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; +#endif + +/* + * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one + * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session + * list) for given algorithm type + */ +PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; + +/* + * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available + * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed + * without losing the secret key objects. + */ +static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + +/* ENGINE level stuff */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); + +/* RAND stuff */ +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static int pk11_rand_status(void); + +/* These functions are also used in other files */ +PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); + +/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ +extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); +extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); +#endif + +/* Local helper functions */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent); +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); + +/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ +static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); +static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); +static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); +static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc); +static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L +static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); +#else +static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); +#endif +static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); +static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, + const int **nids, int nid); +static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, + const int **nids, int nid); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); +static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, + int key_len); +static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); +static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); +static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, + size_t count); +static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); +static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); +static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); + +static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); +static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, + int *local_cipher_nids); +static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, + int *local_digest_nids); +static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, + int id); +static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, + int id); + +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); +static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +/* Index for the supported ciphers */ +enum pk11_cipher_id { + PK11_DES_CBC, + PK11_DES3_CBC, + PK11_DES_ECB, + PK11_DES3_ECB, + PK11_RC4, + PK11_AES_128_CBC, + PK11_AES_192_CBC, + PK11_AES_256_CBC, + PK11_AES_128_ECB, + PK11_AES_192_ECB, + PK11_AES_256_ECB, + PK11_AES_128_CTR, + PK11_AES_192_CTR, + PK11_AES_256_CTR, + PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, + PK11_CIPHER_MAX +}; + +/* Index for the supported digests */ +enum pk11_digest_id { + PK11_MD5, + PK11_SHA1, + PK11_SHA224, + PK11_SHA256, + PK11_SHA384, + PK11_SHA512, + PK11_DIGEST_MAX +}; + +#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ + { \ + if (uselock) \ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ + { \ + retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ + priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ + } \ + if (uselock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + } + +static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; +static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; +static int cipher_count = 0; +static int digest_count = 0; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; + +typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st + { + enum pk11_cipher_id id; + int nid; + int iv_len; + int min_key_len; + int max_key_len; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; + } PK11_CIPHER; + +static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = + { + { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, + { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, + { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, + CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, + { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, + { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, + CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, + { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, + { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, + { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, + { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, + { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32, + CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, + { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, + CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, + }; + +typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st + { + enum pk11_digest_id id; + int nid; + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; + } PK11_DIGEST; + +static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = + { + {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, + {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, + {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, + {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, + {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, + {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, + {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, + }; + +/* + * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in + * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 + * session in multiple cipher_update calls + */ +typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st + { + PK11_SESSION *sp; + } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; + + +/* + * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets + * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. + * + * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. + */ + +/* DES CBC EVP */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = + { + NID_des_cbc, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* 3DES CBC EVP */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = + { + NID_des_ede3_cbc, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* + * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = + { + NID_des_ecb, + 8, 8, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = + { + NID_des_ede3_ecb, + 8, 24, 8, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = + { + NID_aes_128_cbc, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = + { + NID_aes_192_cbc, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = + { + NID_aes_256_cbc, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +/* + * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and + * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. + */ +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = + { + NID_aes_128_ecb, + 16, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = + { + NID_aes_192_ecb, + 16, 24, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = + { + NID_aes_256_ecb, + 16, 32, 0, + EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = + { + NID_aes_128_ctr, + 16, 16, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = + { + NID_aes_192_ctr, + 16, 24, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = + { + NID_aes_256_ctr, + 16, 32, 16, + EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = + { + NID_bf_cbc, + 8, 16, 8, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, + EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = + { + NID_rc4, + 1, 16, 0, + EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, + pk11_cipher_init, + pk11_cipher_do_cipher, + pk11_cipher_cleanup, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = + { + NID_md5, + NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, + 0, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + MD5_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = + { + NID_sha1, + NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, + EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = + { + NID_sha224, + NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, + SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, + EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ + SHA256_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = + { + NID_sha256, + NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, + EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA256_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = + { + NID_sha384, + NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, + EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ + SHA512_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = + { + NID_sha512, + NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, + SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, + EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, + pk11_digest_init, + pk11_digest_update, + pk11_digest_final, + pk11_digest_copy, + pk11_digest_cleanup, + EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, + SHA512_CBLOCK, + sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), + }; + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine + */ +#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE +#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) +#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) +static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = + { + { + PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, + "SO_PATH", + "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", + ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING + }, + { + PK11_CMD_PIN, + "PIN", + "Specifies the pin code", + ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING + }, + { + PK11_CMD_SLOT, + "SLOT", + "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", + ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, + }, + {0, NULL, NULL, 0} + }; + + +static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = + { + pk11_rand_seed, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_cleanup, + pk11_rand_add, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_status + }; + + +/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO +#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" +#endif +static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; +static const char *engine_pk11_name = + "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)"; + +CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; +static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; + +/* + * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function + * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether + * this is 32 or 64 bit build. + */ +static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; + +static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; +static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; +/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ +CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; +char *pk11_pin = NULL; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; +static int pk11_pid = 0; + +static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; + +/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int type; + pthread_mutexattr_t attr; + + if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); + return (0); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX + if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); + return (0); + } +#endif + + if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + session_cache[type].lock = + OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); + } + + return (1); + +malloc_err: + pk11_free_all_locks(); + PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); +#else + return (1); +#endif + } + +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int type; + + if (token_lock != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); + OPENSSL_free(token_lock); + token_lock = NULL; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); + find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); + find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); + OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); + session_cache[type].lock = NULL; + } + } +#endif + } + +/* + * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. + */ +static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; + RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + if (!pk11_library_init(e)) + return (0); + + if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || + !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || + !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || + !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) + return (0); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || + !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || + !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + if (pk11_have_random) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } + if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || + !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || + !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || + !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || + !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) + return (0); + +/* + * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup + * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp + * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. + * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); + pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; + pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; + if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE) + pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + + /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ + ERR_load_pk11_strings(); + + return (1); + } + +/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ +#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT +#error "dynamic engine not supported" +static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) + { + if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) + return (0); + + if (!bind_pk11(e)) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) + +#else +static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); + + if (!ret) + return (NULL); + + if (!bind_pk11(ret)) + { + ENGINE_free(ret); + return (NULL); + } + + return (ret); + } + +void +ENGINE_load_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; + + /* + * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to + * security reasons. We will link it in statically. + */ + /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ + if (!pk11_dso) + pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + return; + } + + e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); + if (!e_pk11) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + return; + } + + /* + * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically + * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 + * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter + * needs cipher and digest algorithm information + */ + if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + return; + } + + ENGINE_add(e_pk11); + + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + ERR_clear_error(); + } +#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and + * the function symbol names to bind to. + */ +static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + return (PK11_LIBNAME); + + return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); + } + +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); + + PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + } + +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + + return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); + } + +/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ +static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + { + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); + } +#endif + } + +/* release all engine specific mutexes */ +static void pk11_fork_parent(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#endif + } + +/* + * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them + * accessible to all threads. + */ +static void pk11_fork_child(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#endif + } + +/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) +{ + return (pk11_library_init(e)); +} + +static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = + { + NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ + NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ + NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ + NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ + CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ + NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ + }; + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also + * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and + * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function + * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) + { + CK_C_GetFunctionList p; + CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; + CK_INFO info; + CK_ULONG ul_state_len; + int any_slot_found; + int i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 + struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; +#endif + + /* + * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which + * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still + * at least one existing functional reference to the engine + * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is + * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application + * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() + * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can + * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional + * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In + * that case we need the PID check so that we properly + * initialize the engine again. + */ + if (pk11_library_initialized) + { + if (pk11_pid == getpid()) + { + return (1); + } + else + { + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + /* + * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case + * the application calls fork() without finishing the + * engine first. + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + } + } + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ + p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, + PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); + if (!p) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ + rv = p(&pFuncList); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 + /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ + + (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); + (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); + (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); + (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); + (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); + (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); +#endif + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); +#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 + (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); +#endif + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any + * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an + * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 + * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just + * because no slot was present. + */ + if (any_slot_found == 0) + return (1); + + if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, + PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since + * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function + */ + /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */ + if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) + != CKR_OK) { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " + "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + digest_count = 0; + } + + pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; + pk11_pid = getpid(); + /* + * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() + * will do the cleanup. + */ + if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) + goto err; + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + session_cache[i].head = NULL; + /* + * initialize active lists. We only use active lists + * for asymmetric ciphers. + */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + active_list[i] = NULL; + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) + { + if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, + pk11_fork_child) != 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); + goto err; + } + pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; + } +#endif + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); + if (pk11_pin) { + memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); + OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); + } + pk11_pin = NULL; + return (1); + } + +/* + * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 + * library. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) + { + int i; + + if (pk11_pin) { + memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); + OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); + } + pk11_pin = NULL; + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); + + if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) + goto err; + + /* free all active lists */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + pk11_free_active_list(i); + + pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + /* + * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function + * may have side-effects. + */ +#if 0 + pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); +#endif + + if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + pk11_dso = NULL; + pFuncList = NULL; + pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; + pk11_pid = 0; + /* + * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than + * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason + * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out + * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes + * the engine before calling fork(). + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) + { + int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); + + switch (cmd) + { + case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: + if (p == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return (0); + } + + if (initialized) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); + return (0); + } + + return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); + case PK11_CMD_PIN: + if (pk11_pin) { + memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); + OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); + } + pk11_pin = NULL; + + if (p == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return (0); + } + + pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); + if (pk11_pin == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + case PK11_CMD_SLOT: + SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif + return (1); + default: + break; + } + + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + + return (0); + } + + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) + { + return; + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return; + + /* + * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since + * the calling functions do not care anyway + */ + pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + + return; + } + +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) + { + pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); + } + +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (0); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (1); + } + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static int pk11_rand_status(void) + { + return (1); + } + +/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ +static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + switch (optype) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case OP_RSA: + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case OP_DSA: + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + case OP_DH: + if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + } + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + } + +/* + * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have + * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here + * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. + * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. + */ +PK11_SESSION * +pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; +#endif + static pid_t pid = 0; + pid_t new_pid; + CK_RV rv; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; +#endif + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (NULL); + } +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + /* + * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in + * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session + * here, with no PID information. + */ + if (pid == 0) + pid = getpid(); + + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp = freelist; + + /* + * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled + * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first + * structure from the freelist. + */ + if (sp == NULL) + { + if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); + + /* + * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the + * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so + * mark them as unused. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + else + { + freelist = sp->next; + } + + /* + * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all + * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. + */ + if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) + { + pid = new_pid; + + /* + * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited + * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which + * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the + * head of the list). + */ + while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) + { + freelist = sp1->next; + /* + * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() + * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 + * sessions and destroy all objects. + */ + pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp1); + } + + /* we have to free the active list as well. */ + pk11_free_active_list(optype); + + /* Initialize the process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this + * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one + * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. + * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more + * information. + */ +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) + goto err; +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) + goto err; + + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs + * re-initialization. + */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) + { + /* + * We will keep the session in the cache list and let + * the caller cope with the situation. + */ + freelist = sp; + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + } + + if (sp->pid == 0) + { + /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + } + } + + /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ + session_cache[optype].head = freelist; + +err: + if (sp != NULL) + sp->next = NULL; + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + return (sp); + } + + +void +pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; +#endif + PK11_SESSION *freelist; + + /* + * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and + * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the + * next time we will ask for a new session. + */ + if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) + return; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; +#endif + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return; + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp->next = freelist; + session_cache[optype].head = sp; +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + } + + +/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions() + { + int ret = 1; + int type; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); + + /* + * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will + * return 0 on exit. + */ + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) + ret = 0; + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many + * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we + * return an error on return. + */ +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; + pid_t mypid = getpid(); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; +#endif + int ret = 1; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; +#endif + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) + { + if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); + ret = 0; + } + } + freelist = sp->next; + pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (ret); + } + + +static int +pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID myslot; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; + break; + case OP_RAND: + myslot = rand_SLOTID; + break; + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: + myslot = SLOTID; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + + sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) + { + /* + * We are probably a child process so force the + * reinitialize of the session + */ + pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; + if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) + return (0); + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + } + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + sp->pid = getpid(); + + switch (optype) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case OP_RSA: + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case OP_DSA: + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + case OP_DH: + sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dh = NULL; + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + break; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + case OP_CIPHER: + sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; + break; + default: + break; + } + + /* + * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent + * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. + */ + sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; + sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; + return (1); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + + /* + * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' + * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We + * must free those as well. + */ + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all + * objects in the free list. + */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; + uselock = FALSE; + } + + /* + * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects + */ + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + if (session == NULL) + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); +#else + if (session == NULL) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all + * objects in the free list. + */ +int +pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; + uselock = FALSE; + } + + /* + * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects + */ + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + if (session == NULL) + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); +#else + if (session == NULL) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, + ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE); + sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_dh = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); + sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy DH key object wrapper. + * + * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure + * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list + */ +int +pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; + uselock = FALSE; + } + + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + if (session == NULL) + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); +#else + if (session == NULL) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + return (ret); + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +static int +pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent) + { + CK_RV rv; + + /* + * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects + * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so + * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. + */ + if (persistent == CK_TRUE) + return (1); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, + rv); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + + +/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ + +static int +cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) + if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) + return (ciphers[i].id); + return (-1); + } + +static int +pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) + { + if (cipher_count > 0) + *nids = cipher_nids; + else + *nids = NULL; + return (cipher_count); + } + +static int +pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) + { + if (digest_count > 0) + *nids = digest_nids; + else + *nids = NULL; + return (digest_count); + } + +/* + * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. + */ +static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, + PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; + + /* + * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and + * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before + * pk11_init_symetric() is called. + */ + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0); + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); + OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); + + if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || + ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) + { + pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); + pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); + /* + * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, + * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 + * needs. For more information on internal structure of the + * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can + * add code so that the counter length can be set via + * ENGINE_ctrl() function. + */ + ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; + OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + else + { + if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) + { + pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; + pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; + } + } + + /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ + if (ctx->encrypt) + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, + sp->opdata_cipher_key); + else + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, + sp->opdata_cipher_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? + PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + const unsigned char *iv, int enc) + { + CK_MECHANISM mech; + int index; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; + + state->sp = NULL; + + index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); + if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) + return (0); + + p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; + /* + * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the + * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our + * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From + * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a + * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key + * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this + * code serves as a sanity check. + * + * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be + * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs + * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES + * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. + */ + if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || + ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || + ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { + PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); + return (0); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ + mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; + mech.pParameter = NULL; + mech.ulParameterLen = 0; + + /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ + (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); + + /* + * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then + * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the + * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). + */ + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && + sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) + { + state->sp = sp; + if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + + /* + * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object + * needs to be created. + */ + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( + ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); + } + + if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) + { + /* + * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to + * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. + */ + if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) + { + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + } + + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + /* now initialize the context with a new key */ + if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) + return (0); + + sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; + state->sp = sp; + + return (1); + } + +/* + * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a + * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session + * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so + * that it needs not be recreated. + * + * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this + * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return + * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good + * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix + * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + + rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient + * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. + */ +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L +static int +pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) +#else +static int +pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, + const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) +#endif + { + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + CK_RV rv; + unsigned long outl = inl; + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; + + if (!inl) + return (1); + + /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ + if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) + return (0); + + if (ctx->encrypt) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); + return (0); + } + } + else + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, + PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); + return (0); + } + } + + /* + * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always + * the same size of input. + * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with + * correctly aligned buffers. + */ + if (inl != outl) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() + * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's + * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but + * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't + * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with + * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, + * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used + * context is initialized without finalizing it first. + */ +static int +pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; + CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; + + if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) + { + /* + * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get + * rid of the context. + */ + if (ctx->encrypt) + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( + state->sp->session, buf, &len); + else + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( + state->sp->session, buf, &len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? + PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); + return (0); + } + + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); + state->sp = NULL; + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with + * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the + * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, + const int **nids, int nid) + { + if (!cipher) + return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_des_ede3_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; + break; + case NID_des_ede3_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; + break; + case NID_des_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_128_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_192_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_256_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; + break; + case NID_aes_128_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_192_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; + break; + case NID_aes_256_ecb: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; + break; + case NID_bf_cbc: + *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; + break; + case NID_rc4: + *cipher = &pk11_rc4; + break; + case NID_aes_128_ctr: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; + break; + case NID_aes_192_ctr: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; + break; + case NID_aes_256_ctr: + *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; + break; + default: + *cipher = NULL; + break; + } + return (*cipher != NULL); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, + const int **nids, int nid) + { + if (!digest) + return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); + + switch (nid) + { + case NID_md5: + *digest = &pk11_md5; + break; + case NID_sha1: + *digest = &pk11_sha1; + break; + case NID_sha224: + *digest = &pk11_sha224; + break; + case NID_sha256: + *digest = &pk11_sha256; + break; + case NID_sha384: + *digest = &pk11_sha384; + break; + case NID_sha512: + *digest = &pk11_sha512; + break; + default: + *digest = NULL; + break; + } + return (*digest != NULL); + } + + +/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; + unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, + }; + + /* + * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions + * can use the key handles. Here is why: + * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. + * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. + * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with + * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES + * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and + * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session + * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key + * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to + * terminate the active operation. + */ + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; + a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) + { + a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; + } + else + { + memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); + memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len); + if ((key_type == CKK_DES) || + (key_type == CKK_DES2) || + (key_type == CKK_DES3)) + DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]); + if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) || + (key_type == CKK_DES3)) + DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]); + if (key_type == CKK_DES3) + DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]); + a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf; + } + a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Save the key information used in this session. + * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. + */ + if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) + { + sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX; + (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); + } + else + { + sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len; + (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len); + } + memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); +err: + + return (h_key); + } + +static int +md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) + if (digests[i].nid == nid) + return (digests[i].id); + return (-1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech; + int index; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + PK11_DIGEST *pdp; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + + state->sp = NULL; + + index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); + if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) + return (0); + + pdp = &digests[index]; + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) + return (0); + + /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ + mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; + mech.pParameter = NULL; + mech.ulParameterLen = 0; + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); + return (0); + } + + state->sp = sp; + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + + /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ + if (count == 0) + return (1); + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, + count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) + { + CK_RV rv; + unsigned long len; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; + len = ctx->digest->md_size; + + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + return (0); + } + + if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) + return (0); + + /* + * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session + * to the pool + */ + pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); + state->sp = NULL; + + return (1); + } + +static int +pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) + { + CK_RV rv; + int ret = 0; + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; + CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; + CK_ULONG ul_state_len; + + /* The copy-from state */ + state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; + if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Initialize the copy-to state */ + if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) + goto err; + state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; + + /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, + &ul_state_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, + rv); + goto err; + } + if (ul_state_len == 0) + { + goto err; + } + + pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); + if (pstate == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, + &ul_state_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ + rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, + ul_state_len, 0, 0); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, + PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; +err: + if (pstate != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pstate); + + return (ret); + } + +/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ +static int +pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; + unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + + if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) + { + /* + * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not + * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory + * that might have been allocated in the token when + * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() + * will return the session to the cache. + */ + if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key + * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key + * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for + * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first + * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same + * prefix. + */ +static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, + int key_len) + { + if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || + memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) + { + (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ +static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 0; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; + } + + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + /* + * The secret key object is created in the + * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). + */ + if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, + sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) + goto err; + sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + } + ret = 1; +err: + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + if (session == NULL) + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); +#else + if (session == NULL) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + return (ret); + } + + +/* + * Public key mechanisms optionally supported + * + * CKM_RSA_X_509 + * CKM_RSA_PKCS + * CKM_DSA + * + * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a + * public key slot. + * + * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported + * + * CKM_DES3_CBC + * CKM_DES_CBC + * CKM_AES_CBC + * CKM_DES3_ECB + * CKM_DES_ECB + * CKM_AES_ECB + * CKM_AES_CTR + * CKM_RC4 + * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC + * + * Digests optionally supported + * + * CKM_MD5 + * CKM_SHA_1 + * CKM_SHA224 + * CKM_SHA256 + * CKM_SHA384 + * CKM_SHA512 + * + * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which + * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of + * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global + * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key + * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. + */ +static int +pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) + { + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; + CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; + unsigned int i; + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; + CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; + int slot_n_cipher = 0; + int slot_n_digest = 0; + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; + int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; + int current_slot_n_digest = 0; + + int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; + int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; + + /* let's initialize the output parameter */ + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 0; + + /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + return (0); + } + + /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ + if (ulSlotCount == 0) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + } + + pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); + + if (pSlotList == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + + /* Get the slot list for processing */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + return (0); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); + + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + /* Check if slot has random support. */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; + rand_SLOTID = current_slot; + break; + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, + &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, + * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) + { + slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; + if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) + { + slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE; + } + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing and + * verifying with CKM_DSA. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, + &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) + { + slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and + * derivation. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, + CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); + if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) + { + slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + if (!found_candidate_slot && + (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + best_slot_sofar = current_slot; + pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; + pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover; + pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; + pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; + found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; + /* + * Cache the flags for later use. We might + * need those if RSA keys by reference feature + * is used. + */ + pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", + PK11_DBG); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, + best_slot_sofar); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " + "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); + } + else + { + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); + } +#else + } /* if */ +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } /* for */ + + if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) + { + pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; + } + + found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; + best_slot_sofar = 0; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + current_slot_n_cipher = 0; + current_slot_n_digest = 0; + (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + + pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); + + pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, + ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_cipher); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, + current_slot_n_digest); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", + PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* + * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than + * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, + * otherwise leave it where it is. + */ + if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > + (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", + PK11_DBG, current_slot); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; + cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; + digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; + (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, + sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); + (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, + sizeof (local_digest_nids)); + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (pSlotList != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); + OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 1; + return (1); + } + +static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, + int *local_cipher_nids, int id) + { + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_RV rv; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return; + } + + if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && + (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) + { +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = + ciphers[id].nid; + } +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + return; + } + +static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, + int id) + { + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_RV rv; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return; + } + + if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) + { +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION + if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = + digests[id].nid; + } +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + else + { + fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); + } +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + return; + } + +/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ +static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) + { + pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, + ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, + local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); + } + } + +/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ +static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) + { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) + { + pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, + current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); + } + } + +#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION +/* + * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library + * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation + * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code + * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the + * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some + * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a + * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, + * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the + * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte + * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products + * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression + * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the + * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. + * + * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for + * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same + * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 + * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without + * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use + * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since + * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said + * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with + * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code + * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for + * asymmetric operations. + * + * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what + * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can + * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be + * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, + * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. + * + * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find + * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric + * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table + * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays + * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the + * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token + * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more + * information. + * + * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined + * the code won't be used. + */ +#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) +static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; +#else +static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; +#endif + +/* + * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, + * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware + * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. + */ +static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) + { + int i; + CK_RV rv; + void *handle; + CK_C_GetFunctionList p; + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; + CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; + int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; + int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; + int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", + PK11_DBG); +#endif + if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, + PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ + if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, + PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); + goto err; + } + + /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ + if (ulSlotCount == 0) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif + hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); + hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); + if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + /* this means empty tables */ + hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; + hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; + return (1); + } + + pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); + if (pSlotList == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the slot list for processing */ + if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also + * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the + * search. + */ + hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; + hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; + tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); + tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); + if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef + * is zero now. + */ + for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) + tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; + for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) + tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", + PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* + * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are + * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. + */ + pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], + &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); + pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], + &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); + } + + /* + * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function + * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by + * dlclose(3C). + */ +#if 0 + pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); +#endif + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + (void) dlclose(handle); + hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; + hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + +err: + if (pSlotList != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); + if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); + + return (0); + } + +/* + * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., + * non-existent). + */ +static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) + { + int i = 0; + + /* + * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new + * table. + */ + if (nid_table == NULL) + return (1); + + /* + * the table is never full, there is always at least one + * NID_undef. + */ + while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) + { + if (nid_table[i++] == nid) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + } + } + + return (0); + } +#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011 @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include "hw_pk11_err.h" + +/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR +static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= +{ +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, +{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, +{ 0, NULL} +}; + +static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= +{ +{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, +{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, +{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, +{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, +{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, +{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, +{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, +{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, +{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, +{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, +{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, +{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, +{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, +{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, +{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, +{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, +{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, +{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, +{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, +{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, +{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, +{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, +{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, +{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, +{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, +{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, +{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, +{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, +{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, +{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, +{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, +{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" }, +{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, +{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, +{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, +{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, +{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" }, +{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" }, +{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, +{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, +{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, +{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, +{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, +{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, +{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" }, +{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" }, +{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, +{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" }, +{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" }, +{ 0, NULL} +}; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ + +static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; +static int pk11_error_init = 1; + +static void +ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) + { + if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) + pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); + + if (pk11_error_init) + { + pk11_error_init = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR + ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); + ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); +#endif + } +} + +static void +ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) + { + if (pk11_error_init == 0) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR + ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); + ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); +#endif + pk11_error_init = 1; + } +} + +void +ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) +{ + if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) + pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); + ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); +} + +void +PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) +{ + char tmp_buf[20]; + + PK11err(function, reason); + (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); + ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); +} Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.13 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:04:20 2013 @@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + */ + +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H +#define HW_PK11_ERR_H + +void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); +void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); +#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) + +/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ + +/* Function codes. */ + +#define PK11_F_INIT 100 +#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 +#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 +#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 +#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 +#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 +#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 +#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 +#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 +#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 +#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 +#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 +#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 +#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 +#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 +#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 +#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 +#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 +#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 +#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 +#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 +#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 +#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 +#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 +#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 +#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 +#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 +#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 +#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 +#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 +#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 +#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 +#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 +#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 +#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 +#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 +#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 +#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 +#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 +#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 +#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 +#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 +#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 +#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 +#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 +#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 +#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 +#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 +#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 +#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 +#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 +#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 +#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 +#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 + +/* Reason codes. */ +#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 +#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 +#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 +#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 +#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 +#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 +#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 +#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 +#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 +#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 +#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 +#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 +#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 +#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 +#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 +#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 +#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 +#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 +#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 +#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 +#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 +#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 +#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 +#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 +#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 +#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 +#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 +#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 +#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 +#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 +#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 +#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 +#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 +#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 +#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 +#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 +#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 +#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 +#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 +#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 +#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 +#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 +#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 +#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 +#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 +#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 +#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 +#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 +#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 +#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 +#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 +#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 +#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 +#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 + +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 +#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 +#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 +#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 +#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 +#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 +#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 +#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 +#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 +#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 +#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 +#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 +#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 +#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 +#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 +#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 +#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 +#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 + +/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ +#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 + +#ifdef NOPTHREADS +/* + * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the + * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global + * per-process lock for the whole engine. + * + * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as + * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but + * it's safe. + */ +#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC +#endif + +/* + * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 + * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the + * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation + * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. + * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object + * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. + * + * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list + * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request + * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. + */ +typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION + { + struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ + pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ + CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */ + CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */ + union + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ + RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ + BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ + BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ + RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ + BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */ + BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */ + BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ + } u_RSA; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ + DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ + BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ + DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ + BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ + } u_DSA; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ + DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ + BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ + } u_DH; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + struct + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ + unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; + int key_len; /* priv key len */ + int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ + } u_cipher; + } opdata_u; + } PK11_SESSION; + +#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key +#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key +#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub +#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv +#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num +#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num +#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num +#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num +#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num +#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key +#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key +#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub +#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num +#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv +#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num +#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key +#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh +#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num +#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key +#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key +#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len +#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt + +/* + * We have 3 different groups of operation types: + * 1) asymmetric operations + * 2) random operations + * 3) symmetric and digest operations + * + * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware + * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware + * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support + * only a single group of operations. + * + * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have + * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from + * different groups may be initialized in different slots. + * + * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are + * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. + */ +typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM + { + OP_RAND, + OP_RSA, + OP_DSA, + OP_DH, + OP_CIPHER, + OP_DIGEST, + OP_MAX + } PK11_OPTYPE; + +/* + * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches + * and locks associated with the lists. + */ +typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE + { + PK11_SESSION *head; +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + pthread_mutex_t *lock; +#endif + } PK11_CACHE; + +/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ +typedef struct PK11_active_st + { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; + unsigned int refcnt; + struct PK11_active_st *prev; + struct PK11_active_st *next; + } PK11_active; + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; +#endif +extern PK11_active *active_list[]; +/* + * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See + * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. + */ +extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) +#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) +#else +#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) +#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) +#endif + +extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); +extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; + +#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */ Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.42 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:27:06 2013 @@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#include +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#include +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +#define NOPTHREADS +typedef int pid_t; +#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE +static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); +#ifndef NULL_PTR +#define NULL_PTR NULL +#endif +#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllexport) name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllimport) name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) +#else +#include +#endif + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +#include +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) +#include "cryptoki.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) +#else +#include "cryptoki.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#endif +#include "hw_pk11ca.h" +#include "hw_pk11_err.h" + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; +extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; +#endif + +#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) +#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* RSA stuff */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa); +#else +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa); +#endif +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); + +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, + BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, + BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); +static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); +#endif + +/* DSA stuff */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); +static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); +static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, + DSA *dsa); +static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); +static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); +#endif + +/* DH stuff */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); +static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, + const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, + BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); +#endif + +static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); +static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, + CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); +static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); + +static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, + CK_BBOOL is_private); + +/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ +#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL +static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; +#else +static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; +#endif + +/* + * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list + * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error + * variable and jump to the specified label. + */ +#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ + { \ + if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ + { \ + var = TRUE; \ + if (unlock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + goto label; \ + } \ + } + +/* + * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the + * entry otherwise return NULL. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) + if (entry->h == h) + return (entry); + + return (NULL); + } + +/* + * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a + * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of + * failure. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + /* search for entry in the active list */ + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) + entry->refcnt++; + else + { + /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ + entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); + if (entry == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + entry->h = h; + entry->refcnt = 1; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ + if (active_list[type] == NULL) + active_list[type] = entry; + else /* make the entry first in the list */ + { + entry->next = active_list[type]; + active_list[type]->prev = entry; + active_list[type] = entry; + } + } + + return (entry->refcnt); + } + +/* + * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +void +pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *prev_entry; + + /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ + if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) + { + prev_entry->next = entry->next; + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = prev_entry; + } + else + { + active_list[type] = entry->next; + /* we were the first but not the only one */ + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = NULL; + } + + /* sanitization */ + entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(entry); + } + +/* Free all entries from the active list. */ +void +pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ + switch (type) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + break; + default: + return; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + } + +/* + * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, + * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. + * + * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, + * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); + entry->refcnt--; + if (entry->refcnt == 0) + { + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + return (1); + } + + return (0); + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = + { + "PKCS#11 RSA method", + pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ + pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ + pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ + pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ + NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ + pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ + RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ + NULL, /* app_data */ + pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ + pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ + }; + +RSA_METHOD * +PK11_RSA(void) + { + return (&pk11_rsa); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = + { + "PKCS#11 DSA method", + pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ + NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ + pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ + NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ + pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ + 0, /* flags */ + NULL /* app_data */ + }; + +DSA_METHOD * +PK11_DSA(void) + { + return (&pk11_dsa); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* + * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for + * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but + * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by + * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be + * enough. + */ +#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 + +/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = + { + "PKCS#11 DH method", + pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ + pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ + NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ + pk11_DH_init, /* init */ + pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ + 0, /* flags */ + NULL, /* app_data */ + NULL /* generate_params */ + }; + +DH_METHOD * +PK11_DH(void) + { + return (&pk11_dh); + } +#endif + +/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ +#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 + +/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ +#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 +#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 + +static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; +static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* + * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to + * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not + * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. + * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); + break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + default: + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) goto err; + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); +err: + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + + +/* + * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors + * should be catched in the padding functions + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); + break; + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + default: + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (i <= 0) goto err; + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); +err: + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + BIGNUM f; + int j, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + BN_init(&f); + + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + + if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) + { + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) + { + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + /* make data into a big number */ + if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) + { + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); + + /* + * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. + * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. + */ + for (j = 0; j < r; j++) + if (buf[j] != 0) + break; + + p = buf + j; + j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); + break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); + break; +#endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); + break; + default: + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + +err: + BN_clear_free(&f); + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) + { + BIGNUM f; + int i, num = 0, r = -1; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + BN_init(&f); + num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); + if (buf == NULL) + { + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things + * and chops off the top '0' bytes + */ + if (flen > num) + { + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); + goto err; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) + { + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, + PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); + goto err; + } + + /* PK11 functions are called here */ + r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); + + /* + * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. + * Needs to skip these 0's here + */ + for (i = 0; i < r; i++) + if (buf[i] != 0) + break; + + p = buf + i; + i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ + + switch (padding) + { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); + break; + default: + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (r < 0) + RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + +err: + BN_clear_free(&f); + if (buf != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return (r); + } + +/* + * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and + * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, + &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, + sp->session); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_encrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and + * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, + &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); + } + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, + PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, + rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + retval = ul_sig_len; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and + * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, + &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_decrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit + * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. + * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. + */ +static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) + { + CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; + int retval = -1; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, + &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, + sp->session); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, + p_mech, h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, + (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, + PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (-1); + } + retval = bytes_decrypted; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (retval); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, + * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. + */ + rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; + + return (1); + } + +static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need + * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum + * structures. + */ + if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); + if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); + if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); + + return (1); + } + +/* + * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from + * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. + * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c + */ +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) + { + X509_SIG sig; + ASN1_TYPE parameter; + int i, j = 0; + unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; + X509_ALGOR algor; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + int ret = 0; + unsigned long ulsiglen; + + /* Encode the digest */ + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) + { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; + s = (unsigned char *)m; + } + else + { + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); + goto err; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; + sig.digest->length = m_len; + + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); + goto err; + } + + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); + if (s == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p = s; + (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + goto err; + + (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, + &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, + sp->session); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + ulsiglen = j; + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, + (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); + *siglen = ulsiglen; + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + } + +err: + if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) + { + (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (ret); + } + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa) +#else +static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, + unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, + const RSA *rsa) +#endif + { + X509_SIG sig; + ASN1_TYPE parameter; + int i, j = 0; + unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; + X509_ALGOR algor; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + /* Encode the digest */ + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) + { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; + s = (unsigned char *)m; + } + else + { + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); + goto err; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; + sig.digest->length = m_len; + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); + goto err; + } + + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); + if (s == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p = s; + (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + goto err; + + (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, + &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, + sp->session); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, + rv); + goto err; + } + rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, + (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + } + +err: + if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) + { + (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (ret); + } + +static int hndidx_rsa = -1; + +#define MAXATTR 1024 + +/* + * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the + * PKCS#11 token. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *privkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; + CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + /* we look for private keys only */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we + * never ask for private components. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* + * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. + */ + if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) + { + search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + CK_TRUE) == 0) + goto err; + + /* see find_lock array definition + for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + /* + * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure + * if we can't find it. + */ + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto err; + } + + if (hndidx_rsa == -1) + hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, + "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", + NULL, NULL, NULL); + + /* + * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm + * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer + * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, + * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect + * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We + * do not check the return value because even in case + * of failure the sp structure will have both key + * pointer and object handle cleaned and + * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the + * OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); + + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; + /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ + sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; + + /* + * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not + * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for + * consistency reasons. + */ + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, + * everything else is 0 or NULL. + */ + rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; + RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we + * must take care of handle management ourselves. + */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); + + /* + * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export + * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + /* + * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as + * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key + * in the keystore. + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], + &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], + &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + } + else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(privkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + /* + * This will always destroy the RSA + * object since we have a new RSA + * structure here. + */ + (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, + &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, + &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + goto err; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + rollback = rollback; + return (pkey); + } + +/* + * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the + * PKCS#11 token. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *pubkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + /* we look for public keys only */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* + * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. + */ + if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) + { + search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + CK_FALSE) == 0) + goto err; + + /* see find_lock array definition + for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + /* + * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure + * if we can't find it. + */ + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA + * structure. No cache hit is possible. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); + + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; + /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ + sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; + + /* + * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. + */ + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, + * everything else is 0 or NULL. + */ + rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Create a session object from it so that when calling + * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The + * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA + * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for + * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears + * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if + * we always have a session key. Note that this is different + * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that + * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore + * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. + */ + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(pubkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + /* + * This will always destroy the RSA + * object since we have a new RSA + * structure here. + */ + (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + goto err; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + return (pkey); + } + +/* + * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. + * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, + RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; + CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + int i; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); + + a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); + a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (rsa_n_num != NULL) + if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = TRUE; + goto err; + } + if (rsa_e_num != NULL) + if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BN_free(*rsa_n_num); + *rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. + * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE +pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, + BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + int i; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; + CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; + + /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + }; + + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { + h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto set; + } + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + /* Put the private key components into the template */ + if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, + &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, + &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, + &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, + &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, + &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, + &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + /* + * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' + * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA + * key. In that case, we can use only public components for + * searching for the private key handle. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + ul_key_attr_count = 8; + /* + * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing + * session keys. + */ + a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + /* + * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components + * only so we tried to find the private key in the + * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a + * problem. Note that for other key types we just + * create a new session key using the private + * components from the RSA structure. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + +set: + if (rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + /* + * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never + * extract private components from the keystore. In + * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the + * application to properly cope with that. It is + * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by + * reference are used we expect it to be used + * exclusively using the high level API and then there + * is no problem. If the application expects the + * private components to be read from the keystore + * then that is not a supported way of usage. + */ + if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = TRUE; + goto err; + } + else + *rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + + /* + * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well + * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache + * 'n'/'e' components as well. + */ + *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); + *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0 && + (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + /* + * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. + * They need to be freed upon exit or error. + */ + for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, + a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA + * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + * + * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public + * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we + * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public + * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for + * both data signing and verifying. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || + (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making + * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent + * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure + * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the + * public component since with the keys by reference + * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA + * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we + * compare the handle as well. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || + (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || + (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || + (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* The DSA function implementation */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) + { + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) + { + return (1); + } + + +static DSA_SIG * +pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) + { + BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; + int i; + DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; + + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + + /* + * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, + * each is 20 bytes long + */ + unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; + unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; + + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); + goto ret; + } + + i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ + if (dlen > i) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto ret; + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) + goto ret; + + (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, + &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, + &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + goto ret; + } + + (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, + (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret, + (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); + goto ret; + } + } + + + if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || + BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto ret; + } + + dsa_sig->r = r; + dsa_sig->s = s; + +ret: + if (dsa_sig == NULL) + { + if (r != NULL) + BN_free(r); + if (s != NULL) + BN_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); + return (dsa_sig); + } + +static int +pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, + DSA *dsa) + { + int i; + CK_RV rv; + int retval = 0; + CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; + + unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; + unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; + unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; + + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); + goto ret; + } + + if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); + goto ret; + } + + i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ + + if (dlen > i) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, + PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto ret; + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) + goto ret; + + (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, + &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, + h_pub_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, + rv); + goto ret; + } + + /* + * The representation of each of the two big numbers could + * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need + * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. + */ + (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); + BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); + BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - + BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); + + rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, + (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); + goto ret; + } + } + + retval = 1; +ret: + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); + return (retval); + } + + +/* + * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. + * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, + DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; + CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; + int i; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ + {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, + &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, + &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) + if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure + * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, + DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + int i; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; + CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; + + /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ + {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ + }; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + /* Put the private key components into the template */ + if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, + &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, + &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) + if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); + +malloc_err: + /* + * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. + * They need to be freed apon exit or error. + */ + for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, + a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA + * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA + * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } +#endif + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* The DH function implementation */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) + { + return (1); + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) + { + return (1); + } + +/* + * Generate DH key-pair. + * + * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key + * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key + * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard + * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem + * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. + */ +static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) + { + CK_ULONG i; + CK_RV rv, rv1; + int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; + + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)} + }; + + CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); + if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) + { + /* + * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that + * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of + * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. + */ + pub_key_template[1].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + + DH_BUF_RESERVE); + if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); + } + else + goto err; + + pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); + if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) + { + pub_key_template[2].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + + DH_BUF_RESERVE); + if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); + } + else + goto err; + + /* + * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting + * a session handle. The objects created in this function are + * destroyed before return and thus not cached. + */ + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) + goto err; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, + &mechanism, + pub_key_template, + ul_pub_key_attr_count, + priv_key_template, + ul_priv_key_attr_count, + &h_pub_key, + &h_priv_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory + * should be sufficient for reuse. + */ + if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) + { + reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; + reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; + } + else + { + reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; + reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, + pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); + rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) + { + rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || + ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); + goto err; + } + + /* Reuse the memory allocated */ + pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; + pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, + pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + if (dh->pub_key == NULL) + if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, + pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); + if (dh->pub_key == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* Reuse the memory allocated */ + priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } + + ret = 1; + +err: + + if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + + for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) + { + if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); + pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); + return (ret); + } + +static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, + DH *dh) + { + unsigned int i; + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + CK_ULONG seclen; + CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, + {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)}, + }; + + CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; + CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = + { + {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + CK_RV rv; + int ret = -1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + + if (dh->priv_key == NULL) + goto err; + + priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; + priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) + goto err; + + mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); + mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); + if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); + + (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); + + h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; + if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = + pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, + &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); + + if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, + &mechanism, + h_key, + priv_key_template, + ul_priv_key_attr_count, + &h_derived_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); + goto err; + } + priv_key_result[0].pValue = + OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); + if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, + priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, + rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same + * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key + */ + if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) + { + /* + * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip + * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, + * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The + * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was + * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading + * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the + * pre-master secret. + */ + for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) + { + if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) + break; + } + + (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, + priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); + ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; + } + +err: + + if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, + PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); + } + } + if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) + { + OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); + priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; + } + + if (mechanism.pParameter) + { + OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); + mechanism.pParameter = NULL; + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); + return (ret); + } + + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, + DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; + int i; + + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; + CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, + {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, + {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, + {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, + }; + + key_template[0].pValue = &class; + key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; + + key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); + key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); + + key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); + key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); + + key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); + key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); + if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, + rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, + rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (dh_priv_num != NULL) + if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = dh; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) + { + if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); + key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + * + * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh + * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. + */ +static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) + { + /* + * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key + * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached + * in PK11_SESSION structure. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } +#endif + +/* + * Local function to simplify key template population + * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error + */ +static int +init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, + CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) + { + CK_ULONG len = 0; + + /* + * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is + * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. + */ + if (bn != NULL) + len = BN_num_bytes(bn); + + if (bn == NULL || len == 0) + return (1); + + *ul_value_len = len; + *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); + if (*p_value == NULL) + return (0); + + BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); + + return (1); + } + +static void +attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) + { + if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) + *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); + } + +/* + * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the + * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. + * Assume object store locked. + * + * Returns: + * 1 OK + * 0 no object or more than 1 object found + */ +static int +find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG objcnt; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + return (0); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, + rv); + return (0); + } + + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); + + if (objcnt > 1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); + return (0); + } + else if (objcnt == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* from uri stuff */ + +extern char *pk11_pin; + +static int pk11_get_pin(void); + +static int +pk11_get_pin(void) +{ + char *pin; + + /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); + if (pin == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (0); + } + pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); + if (pk11_pin == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (0); + } + memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (1); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of + * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from + * multiple threads. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +static int +pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, + CK_BBOOL is_private) + { + CK_RV rv; + +#if 0 + /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return (0); + } +#endif + + /* + * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been + * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we + * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access + * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for + * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED + * flag is set. + */ + if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || + (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && + (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); + return (0); + } + + /* + * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread + * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We + * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with + * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the + * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment + * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to + * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call + * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We + * lock right before C_Login(). + */ + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || + (is_private == CK_TRUE)) + { + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) + { + if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); + return (0); + } + } + + /* + * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from + * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. + * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in + * the engine. + * + * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. + * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. + */ + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) + { + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, + CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, + strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); + goto err_locked; + } + + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + + } +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + } + else + { + /* + * If token does not require login we take it as the + * login was done. + */ + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + } + + return (1); + +err_locked: + if (pk11_pin) { + memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); + OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); + } + pk11_pin = NULL; +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (0); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the + * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() + * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for + * this. + * + * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is + * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + + if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) + return (0); + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, + (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (0); + } +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + return (1); + } + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) + { + static char buf[128]; + HANDLE h; + DWORD cc, mode; + int cnt; + + h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); + fputs(prompt, stderr); + fflush(stderr); + fflush(stdout); + FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); + GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); + SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); + + for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) + { + ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); + if (buf[cnt] == '\r') + break; + fputc('*', stdout); + fflush(stderr); + fflush(stdout); + } + + SetConsoleMode(h, mode); + buf[cnt] = '\0'; + fputs("\n", stderr); + return buf; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */ + +#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock +#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock +#define active_list pk11ca_active_list +#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags +#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID +#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error +#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data +#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session +#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session +#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add +#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete +#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove +#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list +#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects +#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub +#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv +#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey +#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey +#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA +#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects +#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub +#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv +#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA +#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects +#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object +#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH +#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin +#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList +#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin +#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.8 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:16 2013 @@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#error RSA is disabled +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +typedef int pid_t; +#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() +#define NOPTHREADS +#ifndef NULL_PTR +#define NULL_PTR NULL +#endif +#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllexport) name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllimport) name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) +#else +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +/* Debug mutexes */ +/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ +#define DEBUG_MUTEX + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ +#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX +#define __USE_UNIX98 +#endif +#include +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO + +/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ +#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" +/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ +/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#define OPENSSL_NO_DH +#endif + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) +#include "cryptoki.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) +#else +#include "cryptoki.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#endif +#include "hw_pk11so.h" +#include "hw_pk11_err.c" + +/* + * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), + * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the + * RSA keys by reference feature. + */ +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; +#endif + +/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ +static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; + +/* + * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when + * logging into the token. + */ +CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; + +/* + * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for + * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given + * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be + * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already + * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each + * PK11_SESSION object. + * + * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the + * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also + * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another + * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in + * invalid handle returned from the search operation. + * + * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. + * They are also used for active list protection. + */ +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; +#endif + +/* + * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one + * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session + * list) for given algorithm type + */ +PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; + +/* + * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available + * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed + * without losing the secret key objects. + */ +static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + +/* ENGINE level stuff */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); + +/* RAND stuff */ +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static int pk11_rand_status(void); + +/* These functions are also used in other files */ +PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); + +/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ +extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); +extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); + +int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); +int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); + +/* Local helper functions */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); +static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent); +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); + +static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); + +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); + +#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ + { \ + if (uselock) \ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ + { \ + retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ + priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ + } \ + if (uselock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + } + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine + */ +#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE +#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) +#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) +static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = + { + { + PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, + "SO_PATH", + "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", + ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING + }, + { + PK11_CMD_PIN, + "PIN", + "Specifies the pin code", + ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING + }, + { + PK11_CMD_SLOT, + "SLOT", + "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", + ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, + }, + {0, NULL, NULL, 0} + }; + + +static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = + { + pk11_rand_seed, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_cleanup, + pk11_rand_add, + pk11_rand_bytes, + pk11_rand_status + }; + + +/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA +#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" +#endif +static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; +static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)"; + +CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; +static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; + +/* + * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function + * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether + * this is 32 or 64 bit build. + */ +static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; + +/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ +CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; +static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; +char *pk11_pin = NULL; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; +static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; +static int pk11_pid = 0; + +static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; + +/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ +static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int type; + pthread_mutexattr_t attr; + + if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); + return (0); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX + if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); + return (0); + } +#endif + + if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); + + find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + session_cache[type].lock = + OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); + if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) + goto malloc_err; + (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); + } + + return (1); + +malloc_err: + pk11_free_all_locks(); + PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); +#else + return (1); +#endif + } + +static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int type; + + if (token_lock != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); + OPENSSL_free(token_lock); + token_lock = NULL; + } + + if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); + find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; + } + + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) + { + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); + OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); + session_cache[type].lock = NULL; + } + } +#endif + } + +/* + * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. + */ +static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) + { + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + if (!pk11_library_init(e)) + return (0); + + if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || + !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name)) + return (0); + + if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || + !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || + !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } + + if (pk11_have_random) + { + if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) + return (0); +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } + if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || + !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || + !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || + !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || + !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) + return (0); + + /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ + ERR_load_pk11_strings(); + + return (1); + } + +/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ +#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT +#error "dynamic engine not supported" +static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) + { + if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) + return (0); + + if (!bind_pk11(e)) + return (0); + + return (1); + } + +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) + +#else +static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); + + if (!ret) + return (NULL); + + if (!bind_pk11(ret)) + { + ENGINE_free(ret); + return (NULL); + } + + return (ret); + } + +void +ENGINE_load_pk11(void) + { + ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; + + /* + * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to + * security reasons. We will link it in statically. + */ + /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ + if (!pk11_dso) + pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + return; + } + + e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); + if (!e_pk11) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + return; + } + + /* + * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically + * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 + * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter + * needs cipher and digest algorithm information + */ + if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) + { + DSO_free(pk11_dso); + pk11_dso = NULL; + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + return; + } + + ENGINE_add(e_pk11); + + ENGINE_free(e_pk11); + ERR_clear_error(); + } +#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and + * the function symbol names to bind to. + */ +static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + +static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + return (PK11_LIBNAME); + + return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); + } + +static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) + { + if (PK11_LIBNAME) + OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); + + PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; + } + +static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + + return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); + } + +/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ +static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + { + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); + } +#endif + } + +/* release all engine specific mutexes */ +static void pk11_fork_parent(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#endif + } + +/* + * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them + * accessible to all threads. + */ +static void pk11_fork_child(void) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + int i; + + if (!pk11_library_initialized) + return; + + for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); + } + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#endif + } + +/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ +static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) +{ + return (pk11_library_init(e)); +} + +static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = + { + NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ + NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ + NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ + NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ + CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ + NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ + }; + +/* + * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. + * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also + * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and + * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function + * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) + { + CK_C_GetFunctionList p; + CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; + CK_INFO info; + int any_slot_found; + int i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 + struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; +#endif + + /* + * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which + * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still + * at least one existing functional reference to the engine + * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is + * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application + * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() + * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can + * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional + * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In + * that case we need the PID check so that we properly + * initialize the engine again. + */ + if (pk11_library_initialized) + { + if (pk11_pid == getpid()) + { + return (1); + } + else + { + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + /* + * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case + * the application calls fork() without finishing the + * engine first. + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + } + } + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ + p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, + PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); + if (!p) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ + rv = p(&pFuncList); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 + /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ + + (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); + (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); + (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); + (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); + (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); + (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); +#endif + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); +#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 + (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); + (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); +#endif + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any + * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an + * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 + * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just + * because no slot was present. + */ + if (any_slot_found == 0) + return (1); + + if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, + PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; + pk11_pid = getpid(); + /* + * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() + * will do the cleanup. + */ + if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) + goto err; + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + session_cache[i].head = NULL; + /* + * initialize active lists. We only use active lists + * for asymmetric ciphers. + */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + active_list[i] = NULL; + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) + { + if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, + pk11_fork_child) != 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); + goto err; + } + pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; + } +#endif + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) + { + free_PK11_LIBNAME(); + ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); + if (pk11_pin) { + memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); + OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); + } + pk11_pin = NULL; + return (1); + } + +/* + * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 + * library. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) + { + int i; + + if (pk11_pin) { + memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); + OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); + } + pk11_pin = NULL; + + if (pk11_dso == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); + + if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) + goto err; + + /* free all active lists */ + for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) + pk11_free_active_list(i); + + pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); + global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + /* + * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function + * may have side-effects. + */ +#if 0 + pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); +#endif + + if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + pk11_dso = NULL; + pFuncList = NULL; + pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; + pk11_pid = 0; + /* + * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than + * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason + * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out + * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes + * the engine before calling fork(). + */ + pk11_free_all_locks(); + + return (1); + +err: + return (0); + } + +/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) + { + int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); + + switch (cmd) + { + case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: + if (p == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return (0); + } + + if (initialized) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); + return (0); + } + + return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); + case PK11_CMD_PIN: + if (pk11_pin) { + memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); + OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); + } + pk11_pin = NULL; + + if (p == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return (0); + } + + pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); + if (pk11_pin == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + case PK11_CMD_SLOT: + SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif + return (1); + default: + break; + } + + PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + + return (0); + } + + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) + { + return; + } + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return; + + /* + * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since + * the calling functions do not care anyway + */ + pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + + return; + } + +static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) + { + pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); + } + +static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) + return (0); + + rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (0); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); + return (1); + } + +/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ +static int pk11_rand_status(void) + { + return (1); + } + +/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ +static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + } + +/* + * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have + * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here + * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. + * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. + */ +PK11_SESSION * +pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; +#endif + static pid_t pid = 0; + pid_t new_pid; + CK_RV rv; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; +#endif + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (NULL); + } +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + /* + * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in + * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session + * here, with no PID information. + */ + if (pid == 0) + pid = getpid(); + + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp = freelist; + + /* + * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled + * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first + * structure from the freelist. + */ + if (sp == NULL) + { + if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, + PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); + + /* + * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the + * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so + * mark them as unused. + */ + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + else + { + freelist = sp->next; + } + + /* + * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all + * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. + */ + if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) + { + pid = new_pid; + + /* + * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited + * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which + * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the + * head of the list). + */ + while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) + { + freelist = sp1->next; + /* + * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() + * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 + * sessions and destroy all objects. + */ + pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp1); + } + + /* we have to free the active list as well. */ + pk11_free_active_list(optype); + + /* Initialize the process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); + if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this + * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one + * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. + * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more + * information. + */ + if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) + goto err; + + /* Open the global_session for the new process */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, + rv); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + + /* + * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs + * re-initialization. + */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) + { + /* + * We will keep the session in the cache list and let + * the caller cope with the situation. + */ + freelist = sp; + sp = NULL; + goto err; + } + } + + if (sp->pid == 0) + { + /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ + if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(sp); + sp = NULL; + } + } + + /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ + session_cache[optype].head = freelist; + +err: + if (sp != NULL) + sp->next = NULL; + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + return (sp); + } + + +void +pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; +#endif + PK11_SESSION *freelist; + + /* + * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and + * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the + * next time we will ask for a new session. + */ + if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) + return; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; +#endif + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return; + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + sp->next = freelist; + session_cache[optype].head = sp; +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + } + + +/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ +static int pk11_free_all_sessions() + { + int ret = 1; + int type; + + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); + + /* + * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will + * return 0 on exit. + */ + for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) + { + if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) + ret = 0; + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many + * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we + * return an error on return. + */ +static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; + pid_t mypid = getpid(); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; +#endif + int ret = 1; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + case OP_DSA: + case OP_DH: + case OP_RAND: + case OP_DIGEST: + case OP_CIPHER: +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; +#endif + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + freelist = session_cache[optype].head; + while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) + { + if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, + PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); + ret = 0; + } + } + freelist = sp->next; + pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); + OPENSSL_free(sp); + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (ret); + } + + +static int +pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID myslot; + + switch (optype) + { + case OP_RSA: + myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; + break; + case OP_RAND: + myslot = rand_SLOTID; + break; + default: + PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, + PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); + return (0); + } + + sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) + { + /* + * We are probably a child process so force the + * reinitialize of the session + */ + pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; + if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) + return (0); + rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, + NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); + } + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); + return (0); + } + + sp->pid = getpid(); + + if (optype == OP_RSA) + { + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + + /* + * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent + * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. + */ + sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; + sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; + return (1); + } + +/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) + { + int ret = 0; + + if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, + ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; + if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + + /* + * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' + * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We + * must free those as well. + */ + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; + } + if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) + { + BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); + sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; + } + } + + return (ret); + } + +/* + * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all + * objects in the free list. + */ +int +pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) + { + int ret = 1; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; + CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; + + if (session != NULL) + local_free_session = session; + else + { +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; + uselock = FALSE; + } + + /* + * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects + */ + while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) + { + local_free_session = sp->next; + + /* + * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the + * destroy operations fails. + */ + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) + { + ret = 0; + continue; + } + } + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + if (session == NULL) + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); +#else + if (session == NULL) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + return (ret); + } + +static int +pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, + CK_BBOOL persistent) + { + CK_RV rv; + + /* + * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects + * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so + * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. + */ + if (persistent == CK_TRUE) + return (1); + + rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, + rv); + return (0); + } + + return (1); + } + + +/* + * Public key mechanisms optionally supported + * + * CKM_RSA_PKCS + * + * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a + * public key slot. + * + * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which + * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of + * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global + * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key + * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. + */ +static int +pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) + { + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; + CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; + CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; + CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; + unsigned int i; + CK_RV rv; + CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; + CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; + CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; + + /* let's initialize the output parameter */ + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 0; + + /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + return (0); + } + + /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ + if (ulSlotCount == 0) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + return (1); + } + + pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); + + if (pSlotList == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (0); + } + + /* Get the slot list for processing */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + return (0); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); + + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + /* Check if slot has random support. */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; + rand_SLOTID = current_slot; + break; + } + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; + for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) + { + CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; + current_slot = pSlotList[i]; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + continue; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + /* + * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS. + */ + rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, + &mech_info); + + if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN))) + { + slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; + } + + if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa) + { +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + best_slot_sofar = current_slot; + pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; + found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; + /* + * Cache the flags for later use. We might + * need those if RSA keys by reference feature + * is used. + */ + pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", + PK11_DBG); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, + best_slot_sofar); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " + "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); + } + else + { + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG); + } +#else + } /* if */ +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + } /* for */ + + if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) + { + pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; + } + + /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/ + +#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); + fprintf(stderr, + "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); +#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ + + if (pSlotList != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); + + if (any_slot_found != NULL) + *any_slot_found = 1; + return (1); + } + +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */ + +#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock +#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock +#define active_list pk11so_active_list +#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags +#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID +#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error +#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data +#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session +#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session +#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add +#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete +#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove +#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list +#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects +#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub +#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv +#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey +#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey +#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA +#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects +#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub +#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv +#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA +#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects +#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object +#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH +#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin +#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList +#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin +#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.10 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:38 2013 @@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + */ + +/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ +/* + * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for + * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). + * + * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by + * Afchine Madjlessi. + */ +/* + * ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ + +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#error RSA is disabled +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +#define NOPTHREADS +typedef int pid_t; +#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE +static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); +#ifndef NULL_PTR +#define NULL_PTR NULL +#endif +#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllexport) name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllimport) name +#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ + returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) +#else +#include +#endif + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +#include +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) +#include "cryptoki.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) +#else +#include "cryptoki.h" +#include "pkcs11.h" +#endif +#include "hw_pk11so.h" +#include "hw_pk11_err.h" + +static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; +extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; +#ifndef NOPTHREADS +extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; +#endif + +#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) +#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) +#endif + +/* RSA stuff */ +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); + +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, + BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, + BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); + +static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); +static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); + +static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); +static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, + CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); +static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); + +static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, + CK_BBOOL is_private); + +/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ +#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL +static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; +#else +static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; +#endif + +/* + * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list + * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error + * variable and jump to the specified label. + */ +#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ + { \ + if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ + { \ + var = TRUE; \ + if (unlock) \ + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ + goto label; \ + } \ + } + +/* + * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the + * entry otherwise return NULL. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) + if (entry->h == h) + return (entry); + + return (NULL); + } + +/* + * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a + * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of + * failure. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + /* search for entry in the active list */ + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) + entry->refcnt++; + else + { + /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ + entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); + if (entry == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return (-1); + } + entry->h = h; + entry->refcnt = 1; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ + if (active_list[type] == NULL) + active_list[type] = entry; + else /* make the entry first in the list */ + { + entry->next = active_list[type]; + active_list[type]->prev = entry; + active_list[type] = entry; + } + } + + return (entry->refcnt); + } + +/* + * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +void +pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *prev_entry; + + /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ + if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) + { + prev_entry->next = entry->next; + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = prev_entry; + } + else + { + active_list[type] = entry->next; + /* we were the first but not the only one */ + if (entry->next != NULL) + entry->next->prev = NULL; + } + + /* sanitization */ + entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + entry->prev = NULL; + entry->next = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(entry); + } + +/* Free all entries from the active list. */ +void +pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry; + + /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ + switch (type) + { + case OP_RSA: + break; + default: + return; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); + } + +/* + * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, + * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. + * + * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, + * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. + * + * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list + * held. + */ +int +pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) + { + PK11_active *entry = NULL; + + if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); + return (-1); + } + + OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); + entry->refcnt--; + if (entry->refcnt == 0) + { + pk11_active_remove(entry, type); + return (1); + } + + return (0); + } + +/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa; + +RSA_METHOD * +PK11_RSA(void) + { + const RSA_METHOD *rsa; + + if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL) + { + rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); + memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); + pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method"; + pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign; + } + return (&pk11_rsa); + } + +/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ +#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 + +static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; +static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; + +/* + * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from + * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. + * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c + */ +static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, + unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) + { + X509_SIG sig; + ASN1_TYPE parameter; + int i, j = 0; + unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; + X509_ALGOR algor; + ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; + CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; + PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; + int ret = 0; + unsigned long ulsiglen; + + /* Encode the digest */ + /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ + if (type == NID_md5_sha1) + { + if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; + s = (unsigned char *)m; + } + else + { + sig.algor = &algor; + sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); + if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, + PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); + goto err; + } + parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; + parameter.value.ptr = NULL; + sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; + + sig.digest = &digest; + sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; + sig.digest->length = m_len; + + i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); + } + + j = RSA_size(rsa); + if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); + goto err; + } + + if (type != NID_md5_sha1) + { + s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); + if (s == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p = s; + (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); + } + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + goto err; + + (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, + &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, + sp->session); + + if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + ulsiglen = j; + rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, + (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); + *siglen = ulsiglen; + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + } + +err: + if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) + { + (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); + OPENSSL_free(s); + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (ret); + } + +static int hndidx_rsa = -1; + +#define MAXATTR 1024 + +/* + * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the + * PKCS#11 token. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *privkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; + CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + /* we look for private keys only */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we + * never ask for private components. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* + * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. + */ + if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) + { + search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + CK_TRUE) == 0) + goto err; + + /* see find_lock array definition + for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + /* + * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure + * if we can't find it. + */ + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto err; + } + + if (hndidx_rsa == -1) + hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, + "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", + NULL, NULL, NULL); + + /* + * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm + * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer + * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, + * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect + * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We + * do not check the return value because even in case + * of failure the sp structure will have both key + * pointer and object handle cleaned and + * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the + * OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); + + sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; + /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ + sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; + + /* + * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not + * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for + * consistency reasons. + */ + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, + * everything else is 0 or NULL. + */ + rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; + RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we + * must take care of handle management ourselves. + */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); + + /* + * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export + * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + /* + * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as + * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key + * in the keystore. + */ + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], + &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], + &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + } + else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(privkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + /* + * This will always destroy the RSA + * object since we have a new RSA + * structure here. + */ + (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); + sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; + + h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = + pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, + &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, + &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); + if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + goto err; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + rollback = rollback; + return (pkey); + } + +/* + * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the + * PKCS#11 token. + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) + { + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + FILE *pubkey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + PK11_SESSION *sp; + /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ + CK_RV rv; + CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; + CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ + + /* we look for public keys only */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = + { + {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, + {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, + {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} + }; + + /* + * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA + * structure with something we can use to look up the key. + */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = + { + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ + }; + + if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* + * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:" for now. + */ + if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) + { + search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; + search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); + + if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, + CK_FALSE) == 0) + goto err; + + /* see find_lock array definition + for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + /* + * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure + * if we can't find it. + */ + if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, + &ks_key) == 0) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA + * structure. No cache hit is possible. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); + + sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; + /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ + sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; + + /* + * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. + */ + if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, + * everything else is 0 or NULL. + */ + rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, + get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) + { + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, + PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); + goto err; + } + + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); + attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) + goto err; + + /* + * Create a session object from it so that when calling + * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The + * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA + * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for + * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears + * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if + * we always have a session key. Note that this is different + * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that + * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore + * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. + */ + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) + { + pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + (void) fclose(pubkey); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa != NULL) + { + /* + * This will always destroy the RSA + * object since we have a new RSA + * structure here. + */ + (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); + sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; + + h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = + pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, + &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, + &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); + if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) + goto err; + } + else + goto err; + } + } + + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + return (pkey); +err: + pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + if (pkey != NULL) + { + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + pkey = NULL; + } + return (pkey); + } + +/* + * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. + * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, + RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; + CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; + + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} + }; + + int i; + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); + a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); + + a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); + a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( + (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); + if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + + if (rsa_n_num != NULL) + if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = TRUE; + goto err; + } + if (rsa_e_num != NULL) + if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + BN_free(*rsa_n_num); + *rsa_n_num = NULL; + rollback = TRUE; + goto err; + } + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. + * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. + */ +static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE +pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, + BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + int i; + CK_ULONG found; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; + CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; + CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; + + /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = + { + {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, + {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, + {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, + {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, + {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, + {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, + }; + + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { + h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + goto set; + } + + a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; + a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; + + /* Put the private key components into the template */ + if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, + &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, + &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, + &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, + &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, + &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, + &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, + &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || + init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, + &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto malloc_err; + } + + /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ + LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + + /* + * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' + * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA + * key. In that case, we can use only public components for + * searching for the private key handle. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + ul_key_attr_count = 8; + /* + * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing + * session keys. + */ + a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, + ul_key_attr_count); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); + + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); + goto err; + } + + if (found == 0) + { + /* + * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components + * only so we tried to find the private key in the + * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a + * problem. Note that for other key types we just + * create a new session key using the private + * components from the RSA structure. + */ + if (rsa->d == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); + goto err; + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, + a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, + PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); + goto err; + } + } + +set: + if (rsa_d_num != NULL) + { + /* + * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never + * extract private components from the keystore. In + * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the + * application to properly cope with that. It is + * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by + * reference are used we expect it to be used + * exclusively using the high level API and then there + * is no problem. If the application expects the + * private components to be read from the keystore + * then that is not a supported way of usage. + */ + if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + rollback = TRUE; + goto err; + } + else + *rsa_d_num = NULL; + } + + /* + * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well + * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache + * 'n'/'e' components as well. + */ + *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); + *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); + + /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ + KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); + if (key_ptr != NULL) + *key_ptr = rsa; + +err: + if (rollback) + { + /* + * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() + * since we are doing rollback. + */ + if (found == 0 && + (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) + (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); + h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); + +malloc_err: + /* + * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. + * They need to be freed upon exit or error. + */ + for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) + { + if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) + { + (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, + a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); + OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); + a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; + } + } + + return (h_key); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the + * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA + * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values + * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. + * + * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public + * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we + * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public + * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for + * both data signing and verifying. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || + (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* + * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle + * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. + */ +static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) + { + /* + * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making + * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent + * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure + * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the + * public component since with the keys by reference + * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA + * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we + * compare the handle as well. + */ + if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || + (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || + (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || + (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || + (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) + { + /* + * We do not check the return value because even in case of + * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer + * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() + * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. + */ + (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* + * Local function to simplify key template population + * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error + */ +static int +init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, + CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) + { + CK_ULONG len = 0; + + /* + * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is + * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. + */ + if (bn != NULL) + len = BN_num_bytes(bn); + + if (bn == NULL || len == 0) + return (1); + + *ul_value_len = len; + *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); + if (*p_value == NULL) + return (0); + + BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); + + return (1); + } + +static void +attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) + { + if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) + *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); + } + +/* + * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the + * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. + * Assume object store locked. + * + * Returns: + * 1 OK + * 0 no object or more than 1 object found + */ +static int +find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) + { + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG objcnt; + + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); + return (0); + } + + rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); + if (rv != CKR_OK) + { + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, + rv); + return (0); + } + + (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); + + if (objcnt > 1) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, + PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); + return (0); + } + else if (objcnt == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); + return (0); + } + return (1); + } + +/* from uri stuff */ + +extern char *pk11_pin; + +static int pk11_get_pin(void); + +static int +pk11_get_pin(void) +{ + char *pin; + + /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); + if (pin == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (0); + } + pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); + if (pk11_pin == NULL) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (0); + } + memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (1); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of + * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from + * multiple threads. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +static int +pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, + CK_BBOOL is_private) + { + CK_RV rv; + +#if 0 + /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); + return (0); + } +#endif + + /* + * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been + * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we + * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access + * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for + * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED + * flag is set. + */ + if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || + (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && + (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); + return (0); + } + + /* + * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread + * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We + * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with + * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the + * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment + * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to + * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call + * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We + * lock right before C_Login(). + */ + if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || + (is_private == CK_TRUE)) + { + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) + { + if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) + { + PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); + return (0); + } + } + + /* + * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from + * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. + * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in + * the engine. + * + * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. + * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. + */ + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) + { + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, + CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, + strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); + goto err_locked; + } + + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + + } +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + } + else + { + /* + * If token does not require login we take it as the + * login was done. + */ + *login_done = CK_TRUE; + } + + return (1); + +err_locked: + if (pk11_pin) { + memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); + OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); + } + pk11_pin = NULL; +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (0); + } + +/* + * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the + * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() + * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for + * this. + * + * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is + * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. + * + * Returns: + * 1 on success + * 0 on failure + */ +int +pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) + { + CK_RV rv; + + if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) + return (0); + +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, + (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) + { + PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, + PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + return (0); + } +#ifndef NOPTHREADS + OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); +#else + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); +#endif + + return (1); + } + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 +char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) + { + static char buf[128]; + HANDLE h; + DWORD cc, mode; + int cnt; + + h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); + fputs(prompt, stderr); + fflush(stderr); + fflush(stdout); + FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); + GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); + SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); + + for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) + { + ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); + if (buf[cnt] == '\r') + break; + fputc('*', stdout); + fflush(stderr); + fflush(stdout); + } + + SetConsoleMode(h, mode); + buf[cnt] = '\0'; + fputs("\n", stderr); + return buf; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */ +/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ + +/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is + * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface + * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. + + * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that + * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 + * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or + * referencing the derived work. + + * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the + * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for + * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied + * warranty of any kind. + */ + +#ifndef _PKCS11_H_ +#define _PKCS11_H_ 1 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by + * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These + * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them + * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend + * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also + * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or + * dynamically). + * + * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention + * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki + * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte + * aligned. + * + * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce + * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following + * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: + * + * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) + * + * and using the following preprocessor directive after including + * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: + * + * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) + * + * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer + * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using + * the following preprocessor directive before including + * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: + * + * #pragma pack(1) + * + * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might + * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything. + * + * + * Now for the macros: + * + * + * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an + * object. It can be used like this: + * + * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; + * + * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce + * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_PTR * + * + * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer + * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_PTR far * + * + * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_PTR * + * + * + * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes + * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a + * return type and a function name. It should be used in the + * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in + * a Cryptoki library: + * + * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( + * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved + * ) + * { + * ... + * } + * + * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a + * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name + * + * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer + * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it + * might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType __export _far _pascal name + * + * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType name + * + * + * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes + * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a + * return type and a function name. It should be used in the + * following fashion: + * + * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( + * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved + * ); + * + * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a + * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name + * + * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer + * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it + * might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType __export _far _pascal name + * + * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType name + * + * + * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro + * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or + * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a + * function name. It should be used in the following fashion: + * + * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function + * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV. + * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args); + * + * or + * + * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a + * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning + * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type + * // funcPtrType. + * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args); + * funcPtrType funcPtr; + * + * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access + * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ + * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) + * + * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer + * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might + * be defined by: + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ + * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name) + * + * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ + * returnType (* name) + * + * + * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes + * a function pointer type for an application callback out of + * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback. + * It should be used in the following fashion: + * + * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args); + * + * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback + * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also + * be used like this: + * + * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args); + * myCallbackType myCallback; + * + * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32 + * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType (* name) + * + * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer + * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType _far _pascal (* name) + * + * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: + * + * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ + * returnType (* name) + * + * + * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer. + * + * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well), + * this should best be defined by + * + * #ifndef NULL_PTR + * #define NULL_PTR 0 + * #endif + */ + + +/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the + * file pkcs11t.h. */ +#include "pkcs11t.h" + +#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y + + +/* ============================================================== + * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points. + * ============================================================== + */ + +#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 +#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ + extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name) + +/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki + * function prototypes. */ +#include "pkcs11f.h" + +#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO + + +/* ============================================================== + * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for + * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is + * a pointer to that kind of function. + * ============================================================== + */ + +#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 +#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ + typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name)) + +/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki + * function prototypes. */ +#include "pkcs11f.h" + +#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO + + +/* ============================================================== + * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST + * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version + * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in + * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in + * pkcs11t.h. + * ============================================================== + */ + +#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ + __PASTE(CK_,name) name; + +struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { + + CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */ + +/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */ +/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki + * function prototypes. */ +#include "pkcs11f.h" + +}; + +#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO + + +#undef __PASTE + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 @@ -0,0 +1,912 @@ +/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */ +/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ + +/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is + * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface + * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. + + * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that + * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 + * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or + * referencing the derived work. + + * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the + * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for + * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied + * warranty of any kind. + */ + +/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */ +/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */ +/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */ +/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */ +/* should not be altered. */ + +/* General-purpose */ + +/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets + * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR + * and dereferenced */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the + * Cryptoki library. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to + * function list */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Slot and token management */ + +/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */ + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in + * the system. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */ + CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token + * in the system. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ + CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types + * supported by a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular + * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */ + CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */ +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Session management */ + +/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a + * token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */ + CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */ + CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */ + CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */ + CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a + * token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation + * in a session. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic + * operation in a session. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */ + CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */ + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */ + CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Object management */ + +/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */ + CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the + * copy. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */ + CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object + * attributes. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */ + CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object + * attributes */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */ + CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session + * objects that match a template. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */ + CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session + * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object + * handles. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */ + CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session + * objects. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Encryption and decryption */ + +/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */ + CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Message digesting */ + +/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting + * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of + * the data already digested. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting + * operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Signing and MACing */ + +/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption) + * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to + * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the + *signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single + * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the + * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, + * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, + * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, + * returning the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where + * the data can be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the + * data can be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Verifying signatures and MACs */ + +/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the + * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot + * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, + * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext + * cannot be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */ + CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */ + CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/ +); +#endif + + +/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification + * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, + * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification + * operation, checking the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ + CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification + * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part + * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ + CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ + +/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting + * and encryption operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and + * digesting operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and + * encryption operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ + CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and + * verify operation. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ + CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Key management */ + +/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key + * object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */ + CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, + * creating new key objects. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session + * handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen + * mech. */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template + * for pub. + * key */ + CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. + * attrs. */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template + * for priv. + * key */ + CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. + * attrs. */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. + * key + * handle */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets + * priv. key + * handle */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */ + CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new + * key object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */ + CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ + CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key + * object. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */ + CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ + CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Random number generation */ + +/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's + * random number generator. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */ + CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */ + CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Parallel function management */ + +/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an + * updated status of a function running in parallel with an + * application. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ +); +#endif + + +/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function + * running in parallel. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ +); +#endif + + + +/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */ + +/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion, + * removal, etc.) to occur. */ +CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent) +#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST +( + CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */ + CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */ + CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ +); +#endif Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2 --- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 +++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008 @@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@ +/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */ +/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */ + +/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is + * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface + * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. + + * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that + * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 + * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or + * referencing the derived work. + + * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the + * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for + * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied + * warranty of any kind. + */ + +/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that + * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that + * must be set before including this file. */ + +#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_ +#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1 + +#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 +#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 +#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3 + +#define CK_TRUE 1 +#define CK_FALSE 0 + +#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE +#ifndef FALSE +#define FALSE CK_FALSE +#endif + +#ifndef TRUE +#define TRUE CK_TRUE +#endif +#endif + +/* an unsigned 8-bit value */ +typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; + +/* an unsigned 8-bit character */ +typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR; + +/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */ +typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR; + +/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */ +typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL; + +/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */ +typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; + +/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */ +/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */ +typedef long int CK_LONG; + +/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS; + + +/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */ +#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL) +#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0 + + +typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; +typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR; +typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; +typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR; +typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR; + +/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */ +typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; + + +/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */ +/* handle or object handle */ +#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0 + + +typedef struct CK_VERSION { + CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */ + CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */ +} CK_VERSION; + +typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR; + + +typedef struct CK_INFO { + /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from + * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ + CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */ + CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */ + + /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */ + CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */ +} CK_INFO; + +typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR; + + +/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that + * Cryptoki provides to an application */ +/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG + * for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION; +#define CKN_SURRENDER 0 + +/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1 + + +typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID; + +typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; + + +/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */ +typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO { + /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from + * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ + CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */ + CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_FLAGS flags; + + /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */ + CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ + CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ +} CK_SLOT_INFO; + +/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning + */ +#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */ +#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/ +#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */ + +typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; + + +/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */ +typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO { + /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from + * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ + CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ + CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */ + CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */ + CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ + + /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, + * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been + * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */ + CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */ + CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */ + CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */ + CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ + CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ + + /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for + * v2.0 */ + CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ + CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ + CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */ +} CK_TOKEN_INFO; + +/* The flags parameter is defined as follows: + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning + */ +#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # + * generator */ +#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is + * write- + * protected */ +#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must + * login */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's + * PIN is set */ + +/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set, + * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic + * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys + * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */ +#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020 + +/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means + * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that + * clock is returned in the token info structure */ +#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040 + +/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is + * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login + * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */ +#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100 + +/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true, + * that means that a single session with the token can perform + * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and + * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt + * and sign) */ +#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200 + +/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the + * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an + * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11. + * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause + * the token to be reinitialized. */ +#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400 + +/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is + * true, the token supports secondary authentication for + * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and + onwards. */ +#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800 + +/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an + * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once + * since the last successful authentication. */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000 + +/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, + * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000 + +/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the + * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not + * possible. */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000 + +/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, + * the user PIN value is the default value set by token + * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been + * expired by the card. */ +#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000 + +/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an + * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since + * the last successful authentication. */ +#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000 + +/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, + * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */ +#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000 + +/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO + * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible. + */ +#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000 + +/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, + * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token + * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been + * expired by the card. */ +#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000 + +typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; + + +/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that + * identifies a session */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE; + +typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; + + +/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */ +/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE; +/* Security Officer */ +#define CKU_SO 0 +/* Normal user */ +#define CKU_USER 1 +/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */ +#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2 + +/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */ +/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE; +#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0 +#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1 +#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2 +#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3 +#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4 + + +/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */ +typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO { + CK_SLOT_ID slotID; + CK_STATE state; + CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ + + /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */ +} CK_SESSION_INFO; + +/* The flags are defined in the following table: + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning + */ +#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */ +#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */ + +typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; + + +/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an + * object */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; + +typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; + + +/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or + * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined + * as follows: */ +/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS; + +/* The following classes of objects are defined: */ +/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */ +/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */ +/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000 +#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001 +#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002 +#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003 +#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004 +#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005 +#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006 +#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007 + +/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ +#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008 + +#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; + +/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a + * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object + * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE; + +/* The following hardware feature types are defined */ +/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001 +#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002 +#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003 +#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */ +/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE; + +/* the following key types are defined: */ +#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000 +#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001 +#define CKK_DH 0x00000002 + +/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */ +/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */ +#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003 +#define CKK_EC 0x00000003 +#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004 +#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005 + +#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010 +#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011 +#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012 +#define CKK_DES 0x00000013 +#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014 +#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015 + +/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016 +#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017 +/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */ +#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018 +#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018 +#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019 +#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A +#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B +#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C +#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D +#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E +#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F + +/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020 +#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021 + +/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ +#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022 +#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023 +#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024 + +/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025 +/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026 + + +#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + + +/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate + * type */ +/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG + * for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; + +/* The following certificate types are defined: */ +/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */ +/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000 +#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001 +#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002 +#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + + +/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute + * type */ +/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE; + +/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which + consists of an array of values. */ +#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000 + +/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 + and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */ +#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0 +#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1 +#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2 +#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3 + +/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 + and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */ +#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0 +#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1 +#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2 + +/* The following attribute types are defined: */ +#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000 +#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001 +#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002 +#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003 +#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010 +#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011 + +/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */ +#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012 + +#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080 +#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081 +#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082 + +/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new + * for v2.10 */ +#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083 +#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084 +#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085 + +/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */ +#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086 + +/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ... + * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087 +#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088 +#define CKA_URL 0x00000089 +#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A +#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B +#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090 + +#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100 +#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101 +#define CKA_ID 0x00000102 +#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103 +#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104 +#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105 +#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106 +#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107 +#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108 +#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109 +#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A +#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B +#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C +#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110 +#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111 +#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120 +#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121 +#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122 +#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123 +#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124 +#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125 +#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126 +#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127 +#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128 +#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130 +#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131 +#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132 + +/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */ +#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133 +#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134 +#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS +/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */ + +#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160 +#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161 + +/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, + * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS, + * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162 +#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163 +#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164 +#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165 + +/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */ +#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166 + +#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170 + +/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11, + * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */ +#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180 +#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180 + +#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181 + +/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, + * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */ +#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200 +#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201 + +/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ... + * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202 + +#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210 +#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211) +#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212) + +/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */ +#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220 +#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221 +#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222 +#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223 +#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224 +#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225 +#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226 +#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227 +#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E +#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F +#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A +#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B +#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C +#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D + + +/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET + * are new for v2.10 */ +#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300 +#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301 +#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302 + +/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400 +#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401 +#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402 +#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403 +#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404 +#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405 +#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406 +#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480 +#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481 +#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482 +#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500 +#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501 +#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502 +#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503 +#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600) + +#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length + * and value of an attribute */ +typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE { + CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type; + CK_VOID_PTR pValue; + + /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */ +} CK_ATTRIBUTE; + +typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; + + +/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */ +typedef struct CK_DATE{ + CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */ + CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */ + CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */ +} CK_DATE; + + +/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism + * type */ +/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; + +/* the following mechanism types are defined: */ +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000 +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001 +#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002 +#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003 + +/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS + * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */ +#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004 +#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005 +#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006 + +/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and + * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */ +#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007 +#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008 +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009 + +/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31, + * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */ +#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A +#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B +#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D +#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E + +#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 +#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 +#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 +#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 +#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 + +/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, + * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for + * v2.11 */ +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030 +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031 +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032 +#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033 + +/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040 +#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041 +#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042 +#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043 +#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044 +#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045 + +/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046 +#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047 + +#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100 +#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101 +#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102 +#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103 + +/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104 +#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105 + +#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110 +#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111 +#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120 +#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121 +#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122 +#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123 + +/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124 +#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125 + +#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130 +#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131 +#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132 +#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133 +#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134 + +/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN, + * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC, + * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135 +#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136 +#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140 +#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141 +#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142 +#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143 +#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144 +#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145 + +/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150 +#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151 +#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152 +#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153 + +#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200 + +/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201 +#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202 + +#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210 + +/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211 +#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212 + +#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220 + +/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221 +#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222 + +/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC, + * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, + * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */ +#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230 +#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231 +#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232 +#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240 +#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241 +#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242 + +/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250 +#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251 +#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252 + +/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255 +#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256 +#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257 + +#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260 +#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261 +#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262 +#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270 +#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271 +#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272 + +/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ +#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280 +#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282 + +/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ +#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290 +#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291 + +/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ +#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0 +#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1 + +/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */ +/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */ +#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300 +#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301 +#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302 +#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303 +#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304 +#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305 +#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310 +#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311 +#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312 +#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313 +#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314 +#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315 +#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 +#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 +#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321 +#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321 +#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322 +#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322 +#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323 +#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323 +#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 +#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 +#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 +#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 +#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330 +#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331 +#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332 +#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333 +#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334 +#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335 +#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340 +#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341 +#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342 +#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343 +#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344 +#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345 +#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350 +#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360 +#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362 +#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363 +#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364 +#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365 +#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370 +#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371 +#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372 + +/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, + * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and + * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */ +#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373 +#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374 +#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375 +#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376 +#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377 + +/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378 + +#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380 +#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381 +#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390 +#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391 +#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392 + +/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393 +#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394 +#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395 + +/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396 + +#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4 +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9 +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB + +/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */ +#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0 + +#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0 + +/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0 +#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1 +#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2 +#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3 +#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4 +#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5 + +#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400 +#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401 + +/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500 + +/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ +#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510 +#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511 +#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512 + +/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557 +#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558 + +/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560 +#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561 +#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562 +#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563 +#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564 +#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565 +#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566 +#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567 + +/* Fortezza mechanisms */ +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009 +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a +#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010 +#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011 +#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020 +#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030 +#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031 +#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032 +#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033 +#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034 +#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035 +#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036 + +/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11, + * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */ +#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 +#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 + +#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 +#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 + +/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE + * are new for v2.11 */ +#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050 +#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051 +#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052 + +#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064 +#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065 +#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070 + +/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC, + * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, + * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are + * new for v2.11 */ +#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080 +#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081 +#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082 +#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083 +#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084 +#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085 + +/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086 + +/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090 +#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091 +#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092 +#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093 + + +/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100 +#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101 +#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102 +#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103 +#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104 +#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105 + +#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000 +#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001 +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002 + +#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + +typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; + + +/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular + * mechanism */ +typedef struct CK_MECHANISM { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; + CK_VOID_PTR pParameter; + + /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */ +} CK_MECHANISM; + +typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR; + + +/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular + * mechanism */ +typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO { + CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize; + CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize; + CK_FLAGS flags; +} CK_MECHANISM_INFO; + +/* The flags are defined as follows: + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */ +#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */ + +/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN, + * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, + * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP, + * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not + * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */ +#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100 +#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200 +#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400 +#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800 +#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000 +#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000 +#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000 +#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000 +#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000 +#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000 +#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000 +#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000 + +/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE, + * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They + * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism + * information. */ +#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000 +#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000 +#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000 +#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000 +#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000 +#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000 + +#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */ + +typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; + + +/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a + * Cryptoki function */ +/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV; + +#define CKR_OK 0x00000000 +#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001 +#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002 +#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003 + +/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */ + +/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005 +#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006 + +/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, + * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */ +#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007 +#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008 +#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009 +#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A + +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010 +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011 +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012 +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013 +#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020 +#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021 +#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030 +#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031 +#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032 +#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040 +#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041 +#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050 +#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051 + +/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054 + +#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060 + +/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */ + +#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062 +#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063 + +/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, + * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, + * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for + * v2.0 */ +#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064 +#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065 +#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066 +#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067 +#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068 +#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069 +#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A + +#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070 +#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071 + +/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID + * were removed for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082 +#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090 +#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091 +#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0 +#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1 +#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2 + +/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3 +#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4 + +#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0 +#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1 +#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3 +#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4 +#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5 +#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6 + +/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and + * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */ +#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7 +#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8 + +#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0 +#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1 +#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0 +#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1 +#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0 +#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1 +#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2 +#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0 +#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1 +#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2 +#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100 +#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101 +#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102 +#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103 + +/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES + * are new to v2.01 */ +#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104 +#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105 + +#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110 +#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112 +#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113 +#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114 +#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115 +#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120 + +/* These are new to v2.0 */ +#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121 + +/* These are new to v2.11 */ +#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130 + +/* These are new to v2.0 */ +#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150 +#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160 +#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170 +#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180 + +/* These are new to v2.01 */ +#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190 +#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191 +#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0 +#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1 + +/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0 +#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1 + +/* This is new to v2.20 */ +#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200 + +#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 + + +/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)( + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ + CK_NOTIFICATION event, + CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */ +); + + +/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec + * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the + * Cryptoki functions */ +/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST; + +typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; + +typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; + + +/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a + * mutex object */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)( + CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */ +); + + +/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a + * mutex object */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)( + CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ +); + + +/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)( + CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ +); + + +/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a + * mutex */ +typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)( + CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ +); + + +/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to + * C_Initialize */ +typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS { + CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex; + CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex; + CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex; + CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex; + CK_FLAGS flags; + CK_VOID_PTR pReserved; +} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; + +/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot + * Bit Flag Mask Meaning + */ +#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001 +#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002 + +typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; + + +/* additional flags for parameters to functions */ + +/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */ +#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1 + +/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10. + * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message + * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when + * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption + * scheme. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; + +typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following MGFs are defined */ +/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512 + * are new for v2.20 */ +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001 +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002 +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003 +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004 +/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005 + +/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. + * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source + * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block + * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; + +typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */ +#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 + +/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10. + * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */ +typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; + CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; + CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source; + CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData; + CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen; +} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */ +typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; + CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; + CK_ULONG sLen; +} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE; + +/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */ +#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001 +#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002 + +/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms, + * where each party contributes one key pair. + */ +typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; +} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + + +/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */ +typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; +} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; +} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the + * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE; +typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined + (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */ +#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003 +#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004 + +/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party + * contributes one key pair */ +typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; +} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. + * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation + * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */ +typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; +} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; + CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; +} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */ +/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_BBOOL isSender; + CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; +} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + + +/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and + * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just + * holds the effective keysize */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR; + + +/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC + * mechanism */ +typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS { + /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for + * v2.0 */ + CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ + + CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */ +} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; + + +/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the + * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ +/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ + CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ +} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ + CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; + + +/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and + * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */ +/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ + CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ +} CK_RC5_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR; + + +/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC + * mechanism */ +/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ + CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */ + CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */ +} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; + + +/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the + * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ +/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ + CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ + CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ +} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ + CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; + + +/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block + * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of + * the MAC */ +/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */ +typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE iv[8]; + CK_BYTE_PTR pData; + CK_ULONG length; +} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE iv[16]; + CK_BYTE_PTR pData; + CK_ULONG length; +} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */ +/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword; + CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen; + CK_ULONG ulQLen; + CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; + CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP; + CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ; +} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ + CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR; + + +/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */ +/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX; + CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword; + CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA; + CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword; + CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData; + CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA; +} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \ + CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR; + + +typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector; + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; + CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; + CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; + CK_ULONG ulIteration; +} CK_PBE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR; + + +/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the + * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */ +/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */ + CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */ + CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */ +} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ + CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; + + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA { + CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; + CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; + CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; +} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA; + + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; +} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ + CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey; + CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient; + CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer; +} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; + +typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; + + +typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; + CK_BBOOL bIsExport; + CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; +} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */ +typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; + CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; + CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; + CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; +} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */ +typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA { + CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; + CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; + CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; +} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; + +typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; + CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion; +} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ + CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; + CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; + CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; + CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; +} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; + CK_BYTE_PTR pIV; +} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; + +typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; + CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; + CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber; + CK_BBOOL bIsExport; + CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; + CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; +} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */ +typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS { + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle; + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism; + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism; + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes; + CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen; + CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes; + CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen; +} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA { + CK_BYTE_PTR pData; + CK_ULONG ulLen; +} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; + +typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \ + CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR; + + +/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the + * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit + * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the + * derived key */ +/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10. + * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to + * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate + * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; + +typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ +#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001 + + +/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. + * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the + * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 + * PBKDF2. */ +typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; + +typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; + +/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ +#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 + +/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10. + * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the + * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */ +typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS { + CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource; + CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData; + CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen; + CK_ULONG iterations; + CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf; + CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData; + CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen; + CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; + CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen; +} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ + +typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE; +typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */ + +typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM { + CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type; + CK_VOID_PTR pValue; + CK_ULONG ulValueLen; +} CK_OTP_PARAM; + +typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS { + CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; + CK_ULONG ulCount; +} CK_OTP_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR; + +typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO { + CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; + CK_ULONG ulCount; +} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO; + +typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR; + +/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ +#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0 +#define CK_OTP_PIN 1 +#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2 +#define CK_OTP_TIME 3 +#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4 +#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5 +#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6 +#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7 + +/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ +#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001 +#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002 +#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004 +#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008 +#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010 +#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020 + +/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ +typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS { + CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; + CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; + CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; +} CK_KIP_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; + CK_BYTE cb[16]; +} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS { + CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; + CK_BYTE cb[16]; +} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE iv[16]; + CK_BYTE_PTR pData; + CK_ULONG length; +} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; + +/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ +typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { + CK_BYTE iv[16]; + CK_BYTE_PTR pData; + CK_ULONG length; +} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; + +typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; + +#endif Index: openssl/util/libeay.num diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.15 --- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:04 2016 +++ openssl/util/libeay.num Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 @@ -4316,3 +4316,5 @@ BIO_s_datagram_sctp 4680 EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP BIO_dgram_is_sctp 4681 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb 4682 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP +ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE +ENGINE_load_pk11so 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.14 --- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016 +++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 @@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ no-ecdh - No ECDH no-engine - No engine no-hw - No hw + no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor + no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare @@ -278,6 +280,8 @@ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw; +$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca; +$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m; @@ -347,6 +351,9 @@ $dir=$val; } + if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION") + { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";} + if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES") { $cflags .= " $val";} @@ -1136,6 +1143,8 @@ "no-gost" => \$no_gost, "no-engine" => \$no_engine, "no-hw" => \$no_hw, + "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca, + "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so, "no-rsax" => 0, "just-ssl" => [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast, Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.6.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.12 --- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.6.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016 +++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ # External "algorithms" "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM", # Engines - "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", + "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO", # RFC3779 "RFC3779", # TLS @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2; my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5; my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; +my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so; my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated; my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc; @@ -248,6 +249,8 @@ elsif (/^no-sctp$/) { $no_sctp=1; } elsif (/^no-srtp$/) { $no_srtp=1; } elsif (/^no-unit-test$/){ $no_unit_test=1; } + elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; } + elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; } } @@ -1202,6 +1205,8 @@ if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; } if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; } if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; } + if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; } + if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; } if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; } if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; } if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; } Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.12 --- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016 +++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT'; $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox'; - $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; + $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref"; *::perlasm_compile_target = sub {