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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | debian/patches/79_02-Rework-SPA-fix-to-avoid-overflows.-Bug-2571.patch | 59 |
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/79_02-Rework-SPA-fix-to-avoid-overflows.-Bug-2571.patch b/debian/patches/79_02-Rework-SPA-fix-to-avoid-overflows.-Bug-2571.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5bc18e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/79_02-Rework-SPA-fix-to-avoid-overflows.-Bug-2571.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 5a41d2c2cd2b28a0d1aea21edeaea02bd6db4984 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jeremy Harris <jgh146exb@wizmail.org> +Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 22:31:25 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Rework SPA fix to avoid overflows. Bug 2571 + +Amends: 6a7edbf660 +(cherry picked from commit a04174dc2a84ae1008c23b6a7109e7fa3fb7b8b0) +--- + src/auths/spa.c | 13 +++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/auths/spa.c b/src/auths/spa.c +index ed9aff23b..4e3aef808 100644 +--- a/src/auths/spa.c ++++ b/src/auths/spa.c +@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ SPAAuthResponse response; + SPAAuthResponse *responseptr = &response; + uschar msgbuf[2048]; + uschar *clearpass, *s; ++unsigned off; + + /* send a 334, MS Exchange style, and grab the client's request, + unless we already have it via an initial response. */ +@@ -194,10 +195,13 @@ that causes failure if the size of msgbuf is exceeded. ****/ + + { + int i; +- char *p = ((char*)responseptr) + IVAL(&responseptr->uUser.offset,0); ++ char * p; + int len = SVAL(&responseptr->uUser.len,0)/2; + +- if (p + len*2 >= CS (responseptr+1)) ++ if ( (off = IVAL(&responseptr->uUser.offset,0)) >= sizeof(SPAAuthResponse) ++ || len >= sizeof(responseptr->buffer)/2 ++ || (p = (CS responseptr) + off) + len*2 >= CS (responseptr+1) ++ ) + { + DEBUG(D_auth) + debug_printf("auth_spa_server(): bad uUser spec in response\n"); +@@ -252,13 +256,14 @@ spa_smb_nt_encrypt (clearpass, challenge.challengeData, ntRespData); + + /* compare NT hash (LM may not be available) */ + +-s = (US responseptr) + IVAL(&responseptr->ntResponse.offset,0); +-if (s + 24 >= US (responseptr+1)) ++off = IVAL(&responseptr->ntResponse.offset,0); ++if (off >= sizeof(SPAAuthResponse) - 24) + { + DEBUG(D_auth) + debug_printf("auth_spa_server(): bad ntRespData spec in response\n"); + return FAIL; + } ++s = (US responseptr) + off; + + if (memcmp(ntRespData, s, 24) == 0) + return auth_check_serv_cond(ablock); /* success. we have a winner. */ +-- +2.26.2 + |