Adding debian version 3.2.1-3+deb10u2.debian/3.2.1-3+deb10u2debian

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 90 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12667-part1.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12667-part1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8505f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2020-12667-part1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+From: Markus Koschany <apo@debian.org>
+Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 16:40:42 +0200
+Subject: CVE-2020-12667 part1
+
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/961076
+Origin: https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/knot/knot-resolver/-/commit/54f05e4d7b2e47c0bdd30b84272fc503cc65304b
+---
+ daemon/lua/kres-gen.lua |  1 +
+ lib/defines.h           |  1 +
+ lib/resolve.c           | 15 +++++++++++----
+ lib/resolve.h           |  1 +
+ 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/daemon/lua/kres-gen.lua b/daemon/lua/kres-gen.lua
+index a92288b..ad2f40e 100644
+--- a/daemon/lua/kres-gen.lua
++++ b/daemon/lua/kres-gen.lua
+@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ struct kr_request {
+ 	knot_mm_t pool;
+ 	unsigned int uid;
+ 	void *daemon_context;
++	unsigned int count_no_nsaddr;
+ };
+ enum kr_rank {KR_RANK_INITIAL, KR_RANK_OMIT, KR_RANK_TRY, KR_RANK_INDET = 4, KR_RANK_BOGUS, KR_RANK_MISMATCH, KR_RANK_MISSING, KR_RANK_INSECURE, KR_RANK_AUTH = 16, KR_RANK_SECURE = 32};
+ struct kr_cache {
+diff --git a/lib/defines.h b/lib/defines.h
+index 84da059..aa3a349 100644
+--- a/lib/defines.h
++++ b/lib/defines.h
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static inline int KR_COLD kr_error(int x) {
+ #define KR_CNAME_CHAIN_LIMIT 40 /* Built-in maximum CNAME chain length */
+ #define KR_TIMEOUT_LIMIT 4   /* Maximum number of retries after timeout. */
+ #define KR_QUERY_NSRETRY_LIMIT 4 /* Maximum number of retries per query. */
++#define KR_COUNT_NO_NSADDR_LIMIT 5
+ 
+ /*
+  * Defines.
+diff --git a/lib/resolve.c b/lib/resolve.c
+index 65b167f..7e1f334 100644
+--- a/lib/resolve.c
++++ b/lib/resolve.c
+@@ -306,10 +306,10 @@ static int ns_fetch_cut(struct kr_query *qry, const knot_dname_t *requested_name
+ 	return KR_STATE_PRODUCE;
+ }
+ 
+-static int ns_resolve_addr(struct kr_query *qry, struct kr_request *param)
++static int ns_resolve_addr(struct kr_query *qry, struct kr_request *req)
+ {
+-	struct kr_rplan *rplan = &param->rplan;
+-	struct kr_context *ctx = param->ctx;
++	struct kr_rplan *rplan = &req->rplan;
++	struct kr_context *ctx = req->ctx;
+ 
+ 
+ 	/* Start NS queries from root, to avoid certain cases
+@@ -340,7 +340,9 @@ static int ns_resolve_addr(struct kr_query *qry, struct kr_request *param)
+ 			return kr_error(EAGAIN);
+ 		}
+ 		/* No IPv4 nor IPv6, flag server as unusable. */
+-		VERBOSE_MSG(qry, "=> unresolvable NS address, bailing out\n");
++		++req->count_no_nsaddr;
++		VERBOSE_MSG(qry, "=> unresolvable NS address, bailing out (counter: %u)\n",
++				req->count_no_nsaddr);
+ 		qry->ns.reputation |= KR_NS_NOIP4 | KR_NS_NOIP6;
+ 		kr_nsrep_update_rep(&qry->ns, qry->ns.reputation, ctx->cache_rep);
+ 		invalidate_ns(rplan, qry);
+@@ -1408,6 +1410,11 @@ int kr_resolve_produce(struct kr_request *request, struct sockaddr **dst, int *t
+ 
+ ns_election:
+ 
++	if (unlikely(request->count_no_nsaddr >= KR_COUNT_NO_NSADDR_LIMIT)) {
++		VERBOSE_MSG(qry, "=> too many unresolvable NSs, bail out "
++				"(mitigation for NXNSAttack CVE-2020-12667)\n");
++		return KR_STATE_FAIL;
++	}
+ 	/* If the query has already selected a NS and is waiting for IPv4/IPv6 record,
+ 	 * elect best address only, otherwise elect a completely new NS.
+ 	 */
+diff --git a/lib/resolve.h b/lib/resolve.h
+index 18372a3..5900a8c 100644
+--- a/lib/resolve.h
++++ b/lib/resolve.h
+@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ struct kr_request {
+ 	knot_mm_t pool;
+ 	unsigned int uid; /** for logging purposes only */
+ 	void *daemon_context; /** pointer to worker from daemon. Can be used in modules. */
++	unsigned int count_no_nsaddr;
+ };
+ 
+ /** Initializer for an array of *_selected. */