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diff --git a/modules/policy/README.rst b/modules/policy/README.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a68ad4d --- /dev/null +++ b/modules/policy/README.rst @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +.. _mod-policy: + +Query policies +-------------- + +This module can block, rewrite, or alter inbound queries based on user-defined policies. + +Each policy *rule* has two parts: a *filter* and an *action*. A *filter* selects which queries will be affected by the policy, and *action* which modifies queries matching the associated filter. + +Typically a rule is defined as follows: ``filter(action(action parameters), filter parameters)``. For example, a filter can be ``suffix`` which matches queries whose suffix part is in specified set, and one of possible actions is ``DENY``, which denies resolution. These are combined together into ``policy.suffix(policy.DENY, {todname('badguy.example.')})``. The rule is effective when it is added into rule table using ``policy.add()``, please see `Policy examples`_. + +This module is enabled by default because it implements mandatory :rfc:`6761` logic. +When no rule applies to a query, built-in rules for `special-use <https://www.iana.org/assignments/special-use-domain-names/special-use-domain-names.xhtml>`_ and `locally-served <http://www.iana.org/assignments/locally-served-dns-zones>`_ domain names are applied. +These rules can be overriden by action ``PASS``, see `Policy examples`_ below. For debugging purposes you can also add ``modules.unload('policy')`` to your config to unload the module. + + +Filters +^^^^^^^ +A *filter* selects which queries will be affected by specified *action*. There are several policy filters available in the ``policy.`` table: + +* ``all(action)`` + - always applies the action +* ``pattern(action, pattern)`` + - applies the action if QNAME matches a `regular expression <http://lua-users.org/wiki/PatternsTutorial>`_ +* ``suffix(action, table)`` + - applies the action if QNAME suffix matches one of suffixes in the table (useful for "is domain in zone" rules), + uses `Aho-Corasick`_ string matching algorithm `from CloudFlare <https://github.com/cloudflare/lua-aho-corasick>`_ (BSD 3-clause) +* :any:`policy.suffix_common` +* ``rpz(default_action, path)`` + - implements a subset of RPZ_ in zonefile format. See below for details: :any:`policy.rpz`. +* custom filter function + +.. _mod-policy-actions: + +Actions +^^^^^^^ +An *action* is function which modifies DNS query, and is either of type *chain* or *non-chain*. So-called *chain* actions modify the query and allow other rules to evaluate and modify the same query. *Non-chain* actions have opposite behavior, i.e. modify the query and stop rule processing. + +Resolver comes with several actions available in the ``policy.`` table: + +**Non-chain actions** + +Following actions stop the policy matching on the query, i.e. other rules are not evaluated once rule with following actions matches: + +* ``PASS`` - let the query pass through; it's useful to make exceptions before wider rules +* ``DENY`` - reply NXDOMAIN authoritatively +* ``DENY_MSG(msg)`` - reply NXDOMAIN authoritatively and add explanatory message to additional section +* ``DROP`` - terminate query resolution and return SERVFAIL to the requestor +* ``REFUSE`` - terminate query resolution and return REFUSED to the requestor +* ``TC`` - set TC=1 if the request came through UDP, forcing client to retry with TCP +* ``FORWARD(ip)`` - resolve a query via forwarding to an IP while validating and caching locally; +* ``TLS_FORWARD({{ip, authentication}})`` - resolve a query via TLS connection forwarding to an IP while validating and caching locally; + the parameter can be a single IP (string) or a lua list of up to four IPs. +* ``STUB(ip)`` - similar to ``FORWARD(ip)`` but *without* attempting DNSSEC validation. + Each request may be either answered from cache or simply sent to one of the IPs with proxying back the answer. +* ``REROUTE({{subnet,target}, ...})`` - reroute addresses in response matching given subnet to given target, e.g. ``{'192.0.2.0/24', '127.0.0.0'}`` will rewrite '192.0.2.55' to '127.0.0.55', see :ref:`renumber module <mod-renumber>` for more information. + + +**Chain actions** + +Following actions allow to keep trying to match other rules, until a non-chain action is triggered: + +* ``MIRROR(ip)`` - mirror query to given IP and continue solving it (useful for partial snooping). +* ``QTRACE`` - pretty-print DNS response packets into the log for the query and its sub-queries. It's useful for debugging weird DNS servers. +* ``FLAGS(set, clear)`` - set and/or clear some flags for the query. There can be multiple flags to set/clear. You can just pass a single flag name (string) or a set of names. + + +Also, it is possible to write your own action (i.e. Lua function). It is possible to implement complex heuristics, e.g. to deflect `Slow drip DNS attacks <https://secure64.com/water-torture-slow-drip-dns-ddos-attack>`_ or gray-list resolution of misbehaving zones. + +.. warning:: The policy module currently only looks at whole DNS requests. The rules won't be re-applied e.g. when following CNAMEs. + +.. note:: The module (and ``kres``) expects domain names in wire format, not textual representation. So each label in name is prefixed with its length, e.g. "example.com" equals to ``"\7example\3com"``. You can use convenience function ``todname('example.com')`` for automatic conversion. + +Forwarding over TLS protocol (DNS-over-TLS) +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Policy `TLS_FORWARD` allows you to forward queries using `Transport Layer Security`_ protocol, which hides the content of your queries from an attacker observing the network traffic. Further details about this protocol can be found in :rfc:`7858` and `IETF draft dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles`_. + +Queries affected by `TLS_FORWARD` policy will always be resolved over TLS connection. Knot Resolver does not implement fallback to non-TLS connection, so if TLS connection cannot be established or authenticated according to the configuration, the resolution will fail. + +To test this feature you need to either :ref:`configure Knot Resolver as DNS-over-TLS server <tls-server-config>`, or pick some public DNS-over-TLS server. Please see `DNS Privacy Project`_ homepage for list of public servers. + +When multiple servers are specified, the one with the lowest round-trip time is used. + +CA+hostname authentication +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Traditional PKI authentication requires server to present certificate with specified hostname, which is issued by one of trusted CAs. Example policy is: + +.. code-block:: lua + + policy.TLS_FORWARD({ + {'2001:DB8::d0c', hostname='res.example.com'}}) + +- `hostname` must exactly match hostname in server's certificate, i.e. in most cases it must not contain trailing dot (`res.example.com`). +- System CA certificate store will be used if no `ca_file` option is specified. +- Optional `ca_file` option can specify path to CA certificate (or certificate bundle) in `PEM format`_. + +TLS Examples +~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +.. code-block:: lua + + modules = { 'policy' } + -- forward all queries over TLS to the specified server + policy.add(policy.all(policy.TLS_FORWARD({{'192.0.2.1', pin_sha256='YQ=='}}))) + -- for brevity, other TLS examples omit policy.add(policy.all()) + -- single server authenticated using its certificate pin_sha256 + policy.TLS_FORWARD({{'192.0.2.1', pin_sha256='YQ=='}}) -- pin_sha256 is base64-encoded + -- single server authenticated using hostname and system-wide CA certificates + policy.TLS_FORWARD({{'192.0.2.1', hostname='res.example.com'}}) + -- single server using non-standard port + policy.TLS_FORWARD({{'192.0.2.1@443', pin_sha256='YQ=='}}) -- use @ or # to specify port + -- single server with multiple valid pins (e.g. anycast) + policy.TLS_FORWARD({{'192.0.2.1', pin_sha256={'YQ==', 'Wg=='}}) + -- multiple servers, each with own authenticator + policy.TLS_FORWARD({ -- please note that { here starts list of servers + {'192.0.2.1', pin_sha256='Wg=='}, + -- server must present certificate issued by specified CA and hostname must match + {'2001:DB8::d0c', hostname='res.example.com', ca_file='/etc/knot-resolver/tlsca.crt'} + }) + +.. _policy_examples: + +Policy examples +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +.. code-block:: lua + + -- Whitelist 'www[0-9].badboy.cz' + policy.add(policy.pattern(policy.PASS, '\4www[0-9]\6badboy\2cz')) + -- Block all names below badboy.cz + policy.add(policy.suffix(policy.DENY, {todname('badboy.cz.')})) + + -- Custom rule + local ffi = require('ffi') + local function genRR (state, req) + local answer = req.answer + local qry = req:current() + if qry.stype ~= kres.type.A then + return state + end + ffi.C.kr_pkt_make_auth_header(answer) + answer:rcode(kres.rcode.NOERROR) + answer:begin(kres.section.ANSWER) + answer:put(qry.sname, 900, answer:qclass(), kres.type.A, '\192\168\1\3') + return kres.DONE + end + policy.add(policy.suffix(genRR, { todname('my.example.cz.') })) + + -- Disallow ANY queries + policy.add(function (req, query) + if query.stype == kres.type.ANY then + return policy.DROP + end + end) + -- Enforce local RPZ + policy.add(policy.rpz(policy.DENY, 'blacklist.rpz')) + -- Forward all queries below 'company.se' to given resolver; + -- beware: typically this won't work due to DNSSEC - see "Replacing part..." below + policy.add(policy.suffix(policy.FORWARD('192.168.1.1'), {todname('company.se')})) + -- Forward reverse queries about the 192.168.1.1/24 space to .1 port 5353 + -- and do it directly without attempts to validate DNSSEC etc. + policy.add(policy.suffix(policy.STUB('192.168.1.1@5353'), {todname('1.168.192.in-addr.arpa')})) + -- Forward all queries matching pattern + policy.add(policy.pattern(policy.FORWARD('2001:DB8::1'), '\4bad[0-9]\2cz')) + -- Forward all queries (to public resolvers https://www.nic.cz/odvr) + policy.add(policy.all(policy.FORWARD({'2001:678:1::206', '193.29.206.206'}))) + -- Print all responses with matching suffix + policy.add(policy.suffix(policy.QTRACE, {todname('rhybar.cz.')})) + -- Print all responses + policy.add(policy.all(policy.QTRACE)) + -- Mirror all queries and retrieve information + local rule = policy.add(policy.all(policy.MIRROR('127.0.0.2'))) + -- Print information about the rule + print(string.format('id: %d, matched queries: %d', rule.id, rule.count) + -- Reroute all addresses found in answer from 192.0.2.0/24 to 127.0.0.x + -- this policy is enforced on answers, therefore 'postrule' + local rule = policy.add(policy.REROUTE({'192.0.2.0/24', '127.0.0.0'}), true) + -- Delete rule that we just created + policy.del(rule.id) + + +Replacing part of the DNS tree +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +You may want to resolve most of the DNS namespace by usual means while letting some other resolver solve specific subtrees. +Such data would typically be rejected by DNSSEC validation starting from the ICANN root keys. Therefore, if you trust the resolver and your link to it, you can simply use the ``STUB`` action instead of ``FORWARD`` to avoid validation only for those subtrees. + +Another issue is caused by caching, because Knot Resolver only keeps a single cache for everything. +For example, if you add an alternative top-level domain while using the ICANN root zone for the rest, at some point the cache may obtain records proving that your top-level domain does not exist, and those records could then be used when the positive records fall out of cache. The easiest work-around is to disable reading from cache for those subtrees; the other resolver is often very close anyway. + + +.. code-block:: lua + :caption: Example configuration: graft DNS sub-trees ``faketldtest``, ``sld.example``, and ``internal.example.com`` into existing namespace + + extraTrees = policy.todnames({'faketldtest', 'sld.example', 'internal.example.com'}) + -- Beware: the rule order is important, as STUB is not a chain action. + policy.add(policy.suffix(policy.FLAGS({'NO_CACHE'}), extraTrees)) + policy.add(policy.suffix(policy.STUB({'2001:db8::1'}), extraTrees)) + + +Additional properties +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +Most properties (actions, filters) are described above. + +.. function:: policy.add(rule, postrule) + + :param rule: added rule, i.e. ``policy.pattern(policy.DENY, '[0-9]+\2cz')`` + :param postrule: boolean, if true the rule will be evaluated on answer instead of query + :return: rule description + + Add a new policy rule that is executed either or queries or answers, depending on the ``postrule`` parameter. You can then use the returned rule description to get information and unique identifier for the rule, as well as match count. + +.. function:: policy.del(id) + + :param id: identifier of a given rule + :return: boolean + + Remove a rule from policy list. + +.. function:: policy.suffix_common(action, suffix_table[, common_suffix]) + + :param action: action if the pattern matches QNAME + :param suffix_table: table of valid suffixes + :param common_suffix: common suffix of entries in suffix_table + + Like suffix match, but you can also provide a common suffix of all matches for faster processing (nil otherwise). + This function is faster for small suffix tables (in the order of "hundreds"). + +.. function:: policy.rpz(action, path) + + :param action: the default action for match in the zone; typically you want ``policy.DENY`` + :param path: path to zone file | database + + Enforce RPZ_ rules. This can be used in conjunction with published blocklist feeds. + The RPZ_ operation is well described in this `Jan-Piet Mens's post`_, + or the `Pro DNS and BIND`_ book. Here's compatibility table: + + .. csv-table:: + :header: "Policy Action", "RH Value", "Support" + + "``action`` is used", "``.``", "**yes**, if ``action`` is ``DENY``" + "``action`` is used ", "``*.``", "*partial* [#]_" + "``policy.PASS``", "``rpz-passthru.``", "**yes**" + "``policy.DROP``", "``rpz-drop.``", "**yes**" + "``policy.TC``", "``rpz-tcp-only.``", "**yes**" + "Modified", "anything", "no" + + .. [#] The specification for ``*.`` wants a ``NODATA`` answer. + For now, ``policy.DENY`` action doing ``NXDOMAIN`` is typically used instead. + + .. csv-table:: + :header: "Policy Trigger", "Support" + + "QNAME", "**yes**" + "CLIENT-IP", "*partial*, may be done with :ref:`views <mod-view>`" + "IP", "no" + "NSDNAME", "no" + "NS-IP", "no" + +.. function:: policy.todnames({name, ...}) + + :param: names table of domain names in textual format + + Returns table of domain names in wire format converted from strings. + + .. code-block:: lua + + -- Convert single name + assert(todname('example.com') == '\7example\3com\0') + -- Convert table of names + policy.todnames({'example.com', 'me.cz'}) + { '\7example\3com\0', '\2me\2cz\0' } + + +.. _`Aho-Corasick`: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aho%E2%80%93Corasick_string_matching_algorithm +.. _`@jgrahamc`: https://github.com/jgrahamc/aho-corasick-lua +.. _RPZ: https://dnsrpz.info/ +.. _`PEM format`: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy-enhanced_Electronic_Mail +.. _`Pro DNS and BIND`: http://www.zytrax.com/books/dns/ch7/rpz.html +.. _`Jan-Piet Mens's post`: http://jpmens.net/2011/04/26/how-to-configure-your-bind-resolvers-to-lie-using-response-policy-zones-rpz/ +.. _`Transport Layer Security`: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security +.. _`DNS Privacy Project`: https://dnsprivacy.org/ +.. _`IETF draft dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles |