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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-06 01:02:30 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-06 01:02:30 +0000 |
commit | 76cb841cb886eef6b3bee341a2266c76578724ad (patch) | |
tree | f5892e5ba6cc11949952a6ce4ecbe6d516d6ce58 /Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-76cb841cb886eef6b3bee341a2266c76578724ad.tar.xz linux-76cb841cb886eef6b3bee341a2266c76578724ad.zip |
Adding upstream version 4.19.249.upstream/4.19.249
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 105 |
1 files changed, 105 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy new file mode 100644 index 000000000..74c6702de --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +What: security/ima/policy +Date: May 2008 +Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> +Description: + The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity + Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash + values of executables and other sensitive system files + loaded into the run-time of this system. At runtime, + the policy can be constrained based on LSM specific data. + Policies are loaded into the securityfs file ima/policy + by opening the file, writing the rules one at a time and + then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after + the file ima/policy is closed. + + IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements + for local measurement appraisal. + + rule format: action [condition ...] + + action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | + audit | hash | dont_hash + condition:= base | lsm [option] + base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=] + [euid=] [fowner=] [fsname=]] + lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] + option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio] + + base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] + [FIRMWARE_CHECK] + [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] + mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] + [[^]MAY_EXEC] + fsmagic:= hex value + fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6) + uid:= decimal value + euid:= decimal value + fowner:= decimal value + lsm: are LSM specific + option: appraise_type:= [imasig] + pcr:= decimal value + + default policy: + # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0 + # SYSFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572 + # DEBUGFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720 + # TMPFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994 + # RAMFS_MAGIC + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6 + # DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1 + # BINFMTFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d + # SECURITYFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673 + # SELINUX_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c + dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c + # CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb + # NSFS_MAGIC + dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673 + dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673 + + measure func=BPRM_CHECK + measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC + measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 + measure func=MODULE_CHECK + measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK + appraise fowner=0 + + The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check, + all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files + open for read by root in do_filp_open. The default appraisal + policy appraises all files owned by root. + + Examples of LSM specific definitions: + + SELinux: + dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t + dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t + dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t + dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t + measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ + measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ + + Smack: + measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ + + Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs: + + measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4 + measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5 |