Adding upstream version 4.19.249.upstream/4.19.249

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1997 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..058e92b93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1997 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ *  Copyright (C) 1994  Linus Torvalds
+ *
+ *  Cyrix stuff, June 1998 by:
+ *	- Rafael R. Reilova (moved everything from head.S),
+ *        <rreilova@ececs.uc.edu>
+ *	- Channing Corn (tests & fixes),
+ *	- Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup).
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
+
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+#include <asm/paravirt.h>
+#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/e820/api.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
+
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
+u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
+
+/*
+ * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
+ * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
+ */
+static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+
+/*
+ * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
+ */
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+/* Control conditional STIBP in switch_to() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
+/* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+
+/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
+void __init check_bugs(void)
+{
+	identify_boot_cpu();
+
+	/*
+	 * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
+	 * core code know.
+	 */
+	cpu_smt_check_topology();
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
+		pr_info("CPU: ");
+		print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
+	 * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
+	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+	/* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
+	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
+	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+	ssb_select_mitigation();
+	l1tf_select_mitigation();
+	md_clear_select_mitigation();
+	srbds_select_mitigation();
+
+	arch_smt_update();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+	/*
+	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
+	 *
+	 * - i386 is no longer supported.
+	 * - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be
+	 *   compiled for a i486.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
+		panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");
+
+	init_utsname()->machine[1] =
+		'0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
+	alternative_instructions();
+
+	fpu__init_check_bugs();
+#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+	alternative_instructions();
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
+	 * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
+	 * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
+	 *
+	 * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
+	 * very little benefit for that case.
+	 */
+	if (!direct_gbpages)
+		set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
+{
+	u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
+
+	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+		/*
+		 * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
+		 * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
+		 * modifiable bits from the guest value.
+		 */
+		guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
+		guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
+
+		/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+		    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+			hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+		/* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
+		if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
+			hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+		if (hostval != guestval) {
+			msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
+	 * MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
+	 */
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
+	    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
+	 * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
+	 * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
+	 */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
+		hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+	else
+		hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+	/* Sanitize the guest value */
+	guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+
+	if (hostval != guestval) {
+		unsigned long tif;
+
+		tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
+				 ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
+
+		speculation_ctrl_update(tif);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
+
+static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
+{
+	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MDS: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_OFF]	= "Vulnerable",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+};
+
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
+		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
+			cpu_smt_disable(false);
+	}
+}
+
+static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+		mds_nosmt = true;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"TAA: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
+
+static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_VERW]		= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED]	= "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+};
+
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
+	 * tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
+	 */
+	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+	    mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+		return;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	else
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+	/*
+	 * VERW doesn't clear the CPU buffers when MD_CLEAR=1 and MDS_NO=1.
+	 * A microcode update fixes this behavior to clear CPU buffers. It also
+	 * adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the
+	 * ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit.
+	 *
+	 * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
+	 * update is required.
+	 */
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+	/*
+	 * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
+	 * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
+	 *
+	 * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
+	 * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
+	 */
+	static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		cpu_smt_disable(false);
+}
+
+static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+		taa_nosmt = true;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+	MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
+	[MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+	[MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW]		= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+};
+
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+		return;
+
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	/*
+	 * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected
+	 * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
+					      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+	else
+		static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
+	/*
+	 * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
+	 * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
+	 * is required irrespective of SMT state.
+	 */
+	if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the system has the right microcode.
+	 *
+	 * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
+	 * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
+	 * affected systems.
+	 */
+	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+	    (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
+	     boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
+	     !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	else
+		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+	if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		cpu_smt_disable(false);
+}
+
+static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+		mmio_nosmt = true;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "" fmt
+
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		return;
+
+	if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+	 * mitigation, if necessary.
+	 */
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+		mds_select_mitigation();
+	}
+	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+		taa_select_mitigation();
+	}
+	if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+		mmio_select_mitigation();
+	}
+out:
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+		pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+		pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	mds_select_mitigation();
+	taa_select_mitigation();
+	mmio_select_mitigation();
+
+	/*
+	 * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
+	 * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+	 * mitigation selection is done.
+	 */
+	md_clear_update_mitigation();
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SRBDS: " fmt
+
+enum srbds_mitigations {
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL]		= "Mitigation: Microcode",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF]	= "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR]	= "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+static bool srbds_off;
+
+void update_srbds_msr(void)
+{
+	u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+		return;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return;
+
+	if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
+		return;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+	switch (srbds_mitigation) {
+	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF:
+		mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+		break;
+	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
+	 * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
+	 * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
+	 */
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+	else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+	update_srbds_msr();
+	pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off");
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt
+
+enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
+	SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+};
+
+static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+
+static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
+	[SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
+	[SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
+};
+
+/*
+ * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
+ * userspace?
+ */
+static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not
+	 * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache.
+	 * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these
+	 * CPUs.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
+		/*
+		 * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
+		 * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
+		 * value.  The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
+		 *
+		 * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
+		 * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
+		 *
+		 * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the
+		 *	   FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ]
+		 *
+		 * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
+		 * address in GS.  That makes an attack harder, but still
+		 * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
+		 */
+		if (!smap_works_speculatively()) {
+			/*
+			 * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
+			 * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
+			 * is serializing.
+			 *
+			 * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
+			 * stop speculation through swapgs.
+			 */
+			if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
+			    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
+
+			/*
+			 * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
+			 * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
+			 * skipping swapgs.
+			 */
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
+bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
+		return true;
+
+	pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n");
+	spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
+{
+	return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
+}
+#else
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
+#endif
+
+#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
+{
+	if (new_state)
+		return;
+
+	/* Unprivileged eBPF is enabled */
+
+	switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+{
+	int len = strlen(opt);
+
+	return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
+}
+
+/* The kernel command line selection for spectre v2 */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+};
+
+enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,
+	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,
+};
+
+static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
+	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE]			= "User space: Vulnerable",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT]		= "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED]	= "User space: Mitigation: STIBP always-on protection",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL]			= "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP]		= "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+	const char			*option;
+	enum spectre_v2_user_cmd	cmd;
+	bool				secure;
+} v2_user_options[] __initconst = {
+	{ "auto",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,		false },
+	{ "off",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,		false },
+	{ "on",			SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,		true  },
+	{ "prctl",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,		false },
+	{ "prctl,ibpb",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,		false },
+	{ "seccomp",		SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,		false },
+	{ "seccomp,ibpb",	SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,	false },
+};
+
+static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
+		pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
+}
+
+static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
+spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+{
+	char arg[20];
+	int ret, i;
+
+	switch (v2_cmd) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
+				  arg, sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
+		if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
+			spec_v2_user_print_cond(v2_user_options[i].option,
+						v2_user_options[i].secure);
+			return v2_user_options[i].cmd;
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+	return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+}
+
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+	return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
+}
+
+static void __init
+spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+{
+	enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+	bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
+	enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+		return;
+
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED ||
+	    cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+		smt_possible = false;
+
+	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
+		goto set_mode;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+			mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+		else
+			mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+
+		spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
+		switch (cmd) {
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
+			static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+			spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
+			break;
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
+			static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
+			static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
+			"always-on" : "conditional");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
+	 * required.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
+	    !smt_possible ||
+	    spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * At this point, an STIBP mode other than "off" has been set.
+	 * If STIBP support is not being forced, check if STIBP always-on
+	 * is preferred.
+	 */
+	if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
+	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
+
+	spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;
+
+set_mode:
+	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]);
+}
+
+static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE]			= "Mitigation: Retpolines",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE]			= "Mitigation: LFENCE",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+	const char *option;
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+	bool secure;
+} mitigation_options[] __initconst = {
+	{ "off",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,		  false },
+	{ "on",			SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,		  true  },
+	{ "retpoline",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,	  false },
+	{ "retpoline,amd",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,  false },
+	{ "retpoline,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,  false },
+	{ "retpoline,generic",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+	{ "eibrs",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,		  false },
+	{ "eibrs,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,	  false },
+	{ "eibrs,retpoline",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,	  false },
+	{ "auto",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,		  false },
+};
+
+static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
+		pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+}
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	char arg[20];
+	int ret, i;
+
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
+		if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
+			continue;
+		cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
+		pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
+	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
+			   mitigation_options[i].secure);
+	return cmd;
+}
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+		pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+		return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+	}
+
+	return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
+	enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
+	 * then nothing to do.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
+	    (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
+		return;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+		return;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+			mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
+		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG);
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
+		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+
+	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+		/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	}
+
+	switch (mode) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
+		/* fallthrough */
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
+	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+
+	/*
+	 * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
+	 * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
+	 * issues:
+	 *
+	 *	- RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
+	 *	- SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
+	 */
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+
+	/*
+	 * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
+	 * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
+	 * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
+	 * supported.
+	 *
+	 * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
+	 * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
+	 * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
+	 * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
+		pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
+	}
+
+	/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
+	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
+}
+
+static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
+{
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+}
+
+/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
+static void update_stibp_strict(void)
+{
+	u64 mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+	if (sched_smt_active())
+		mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+	if (mask == x86_spec_ctrl_base)
+		return;
+
+	pr_info("Update user space SMT mitigation: STIBP %s\n",
+		mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "always-on" : "off");
+	x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
+	on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the evaluation of TIF_SPEC_IB */
+static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
+{
+	if (sched_smt_active())
+		static_branch_enable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
+static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	/*
+	 * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
+	 * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
+	 *
+	 * The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
+	 * clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
+	 * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+		return;
+
+	if (sched_smt_active()) {
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+	} else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+		   (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
+		static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+	}
+}
+
+#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
+
+void arch_smt_update(void)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+
+	if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+		pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+
+	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
+		update_stibp_strict();
+		break;
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+		update_indir_branch_cond();
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (mds_mitigation) {
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+		if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+			pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
+		update_mds_branch_idle();
+		break;
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (taa_mitigation) {
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode __ro_after_init = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
+	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
+};
+
+static const char * const ssb_strings[] = {
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
+	[SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP]	= "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+	const char *option;
+	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+} ssb_mitigation_options[]  __initconst = {
+	{ "auto",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO },    /* Platform decides */
+	{ "on",		SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON },      /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
+	{ "off",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE },    /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
+	{ "prctl",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL },   /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
+	{ "seccomp",	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */
+};
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+	char arg[20];
+	int ret, i;
+
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
+	} else {
+		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
+					  arg, sizeof(arg));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
+			if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
+				continue;
+
+			cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
+			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+			return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return cmd;
+}
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+	enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
+		return mode;
+
+	cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
+	    (cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
+	     cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
+		return mode;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
+		/*
+		 * Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
+		 * enabled.
+		 */
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+			mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
+		else
+			mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+		break;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
+		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
+		break;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
+		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+		break;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper
+	 * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
+	 * case where the host does not enable it.
+	 */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+	    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
+	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
+	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
+	 */
+	if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
+		/*
+		 * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may
+		 * use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
+		 */
+		if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
+		    !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+		} else {
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return mode;
+}
+
+static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+		pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Speculation prctl: " fmt
+
+static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	/* Force the update of the real TIF bits */
+	set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current
+	 * task, but for a non-current task delay setting the CPU
+	 * mitigation until it is scheduled next.
+	 *
+	 * This can only happen for SECCOMP mitigation. For PRCTL it's
+	 * always the current task.
+	 */
+	if (tsk == current)
+		speculation_ctrl_update_current();
+}
+
+static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+	if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
+	    ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
+		return -ENXIO;
+
+	switch (ctrl) {
+	case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+		/* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
+		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+			return -EPERM;
+		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled(void)
+{
+	return spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+		spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+		spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+		spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+}
+
+static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+	switch (ctrl) {
+	case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
+		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+			return 0;
+		/*
+		 * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
+		 * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,
+		 * unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB
+		 * are independent and either can be set to conditionally
+		 * enabled regardless of the mode of the other.
+		 *
+		 * If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be
+		 * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl
+		 * call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the
+		 * feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the
+		 * kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then
+		 * spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and
+		 * spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED.
+		 */
+		if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled() ||
+		    task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
+		break;
+	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		/*
+		 * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
+		 * mitigation is force disabled.
+		 */
+		if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
+		    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled())
+			return 0;
+
+		task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
+		if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
+			task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
+		task_update_spec_tif(task);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -ERANGE;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+			     unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+	switch (which) {
+	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+		return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+	case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+		return ib_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+	default:
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
+		ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+	if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP)
+		ib_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	switch (ssb_mode) {
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
+		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP:
+	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
+		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+		if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
+			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+	default:
+		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+			return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+	}
+}
+
+static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+
+	if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
+	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+		return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+	else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) {
+		if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
+			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+		if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
+			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+	} else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+	    spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+	else
+		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
+{
+	switch (which) {
+	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+		return ssb_prctl_get(task);
+	case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+		return ib_prctl_get(task);
+	default:
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+}
+
+void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
+		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+}
+
+bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
+#endif
+enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
+
+/*
+ * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
+ * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
+ *
+ * The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
+ * non present PTEs. When the installed memory reaches into the top most
+ * address bit due to memory holes, which has been observed on machines
+ * which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
+ * then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
+ * This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
+ * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
+ * instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
+ * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
+ */
+static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (c->x86 != 6)
+		return;
+
+	switch (c->x86_model) {
+	case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
+	case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+		if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)
+			c->x86_cache_bits = 44;
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 half_pa;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return;
+
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
+	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
+
+	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		break;
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		cpu_smt_disable(false);
+		break;
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+		cpu_smt_disable(true);
+		break;
+	}
+
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
+	pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
+	return;
+#endif
+
+	half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
+	if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+			e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
+		pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
+		pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
+				half_pa);
+		pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
+		pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
+}
+
+static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nowarn"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "flush"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nosmt"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full,force"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+
+#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+static const char * const l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]		= "auto",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]		= "vulnerable",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]		= "conditional cache flushes",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]		= "cache flushes",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED]	= "EPT disabled",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED]	= "flush not necessary"
+};
+
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
+	    (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
+	     sched_smt_active())) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+			       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation)
+		return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages\n");
+	else
+		return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Vulnerable\n");
+}
+#else
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+}
+
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Processor vulnerable\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+			       mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+			       (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ? "vulnerable" :
+			        sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled"));
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
+static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if ((taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
+	    (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF))
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+			       taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation],
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
+static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+				  mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation],
+			  sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
+static char *stibp_state(void)
+{
+	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+		return "";
+
+	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+		return ", STIBP: disabled";
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+		return ", STIBP: forced";
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
+		return ", STIBP: always-on";
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+		if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
+			return ", STIBP: conditional";
+	}
+	return "";
+}
+
+static char *ibpb_state(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+		if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
+			return ", IBPB: always-on";
+		if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb))
+			return ", IBPB: conditional";
+		return ", IBPB: disabled";
+	}
+	return "";
+}
+
+static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n");
+
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS with unprivileged eBPF\n");
+
+	if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+		       spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+		       ibpb_state(),
+		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
+		       stibp_state(),
+		       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
+		       spectre_v2_module_string());
+}
+
+static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	switch (bug) {
+	case X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+			return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+
+		if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV))
+			return sprintf(buf, "Unknown (XEN PV detected, hypervisor mitigation required)\n");
+
+		break;
+
+	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
+
+	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
+		return spectre_v2_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+
+	case X86_BUG_L1TF:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
+			return l1tf_show_state(buf);
+		break;
+
+	case X86_BUG_MDS:
+		return mds_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_TAA:
+		return tsx_async_abort_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
+		return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
+		return srbds_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+		return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TAA);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+}
+#endif