Adding upstream version 4.19.249.upstream/4.19.249

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 576 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..650d5a6ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -0,0 +1,576 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#define DISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+
+/*
+ * Since we're dealing with identity mappings, physical and virtual
+ * addresses are the same, so override these defines which are ultimately
+ * used by the headers in misc.h.
+ */
+#define __pa(x)  ((unsigned long)(x))
+#define __va(x)  ((void *)((unsigned long)(x)))
+
+/*
+ * Special hack: we have to be careful, because no indirections are
+ * allowed here, and paravirt_ops is a kind of one. As it will only run in
+ * baremetal anyway, we just keep it from happening. (This list needs to
+ * be extended when new paravirt and debugging variants are added.)
+ */
+#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
+#undef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS
+
+/*
+ * This code runs before CPU feature bits are set. By default, the
+ * pgtable_l5_enabled() function uses bit X86_FEATURE_LA57 to determine if
+ * 5-level paging is active, so that won't work here. USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5
+ * is provided to handle this situation and, instead, use a variable that
+ * has been set by the early boot code.
+ */
+#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+#include "mm_internal.h"
+
+#define PGD_FLAGS		_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define P4D_FLAGS		_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define PUD_FLAGS		_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define PMD_FLAGS		_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+
+#define PMD_FLAGS_LARGE		(__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
+
+#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC		PMD_FLAGS_LARGE
+#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP	((PMD_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_LARGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
+				 (_PAGE_PAT_LARGE | _PAGE_PWT))
+
+#define PMD_FLAGS_ENC		(PMD_FLAGS_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC)
+
+#define PTE_FLAGS		(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
+
+#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC		PTE_FLAGS
+#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP	((PTE_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
+				 (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
+
+#define PTE_FLAGS_ENC		(PTE_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC)
+
+struct sme_populate_pgd_data {
+	void    *pgtable_area;
+	pgd_t   *pgd;
+
+	pmdval_t pmd_flags;
+	pteval_t pte_flags;
+	unsigned long paddr;
+
+	unsigned long vaddr;
+	unsigned long vaddr_end;
+};
+
+static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
+static char sme_cmdline_on[]  __initdata = "on";
+static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
+
+static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+	unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
+	pgd_t *pgd_p;
+
+	pgd_start = ppd->vaddr & PGDIR_MASK;
+	pgd_end = ppd->vaddr_end & PGDIR_MASK;
+
+	pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(pgd_t);
+
+	pgd_p = ppd->pgd + pgd_index(ppd->vaddr);
+
+	memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size);
+}
+
+static pud_t __init *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+
+	pgd = ppd->pgd + pgd_index(ppd->vaddr);
+	if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
+		p4d = ppd->pgtable_area;
+		memset(p4d, 0, sizeof(*p4d) * PTRS_PER_P4D);
+		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(PGD_FLAGS | __pa(p4d)));
+	}
+
+	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, ppd->vaddr);
+	if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
+		pud = ppd->pgtable_area;
+		memset(pud, 0, sizeof(*pud) * PTRS_PER_PUD);
+		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(P4D_FLAGS | __pa(pud)));
+	}
+
+	pud = pud_offset(p4d, ppd->vaddr);
+	if (pud_none(*pud)) {
+		pmd = ppd->pgtable_area;
+		memset(pmd, 0, sizeof(*pmd) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
+		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+		set_pud(pud, __pud(PUD_FLAGS | __pa(pmd)));
+	}
+
+	if (pud_large(*pud))
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pud;
+}
+
+static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+
+	pud = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd);
+	if (!pud)
+		return;
+
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
+	if (pmd_large(*pmd))
+		return;
+
+	set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags));
+}
+
+static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	pud = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd);
+	if (!pud)
+		return;
+
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
+	if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
+		pte = ppd->pgtable_area;
+		memset(pte, 0, sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
+		ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
+		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(PMD_FLAGS | __pa(pte)));
+	}
+
+	if (pmd_large(*pmd))
+		return;
+
+	pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, ppd->vaddr);
+	if (pte_none(*pte))
+		set_pte(pte, __pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags));
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+	while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
+		sme_populate_pgd_large(ppd);
+
+		ppd->vaddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+		ppd->paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+	while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
+		sme_populate_pgd(ppd);
+
+		ppd->vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
+		ppd->paddr += PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
+				   pmdval_t pmd_flags, pteval_t pte_flags)
+{
+	unsigned long vaddr_end;
+
+	ppd->pmd_flags = pmd_flags;
+	ppd->pte_flags = pte_flags;
+
+	/* Save original end value since we modify the struct value */
+	vaddr_end = ppd->vaddr_end;
+
+	/* If start is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */
+	ppd->vaddr_end = ALIGN(ppd->vaddr, PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
+	__sme_map_range_pte(ppd);
+
+	/* Create PMD entries */
+	ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end & PMD_PAGE_MASK;
+	__sme_map_range_pmd(ppd);
+
+	/* If end is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */
+	ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end;
+	__sme_map_range_pte(ppd);
+}
+
+static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+	__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC);
+}
+
+static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+	__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC);
+}
+
+static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+	__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP, PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP);
+}
+
+static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
+{
+	unsigned long entries = 0, tables = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Perform a relatively simplistic calculation of the pagetable
+	 * entries that are needed. Those mappings will be covered mostly
+	 * by 2MB PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required
+	 * number of P4D, PUD and PMD structures needed to perform the
+	 * mappings.  For mappings that are not 2MB aligned, PTE mappings
+	 * would be needed for the start and end portion of the address range
+	 * that fall outside of the 2MB alignment.  This results in, at most,
+	 * two extra pages to hold PTE entries for each range that is mapped.
+	 * Incrementing the count for each covers the case where the addresses
+	 * cross entries.
+	 */
+
+	/* PGDIR_SIZE is equal to P4D_SIZE on 4-level machine. */
+	if (PTRS_PER_P4D > 1)
+		entries += (DIV_ROUND_UP(len, PGDIR_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(p4d_t) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+	entries += (DIV_ROUND_UP(len, P4D_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+	entries += (DIV_ROUND_UP(len, PUD_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+	entries += 2 * sizeof(pte_t) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Now calculate the added pagetable structures needed to populate
+	 * the new pagetables.
+	 */
+
+	if (PTRS_PER_P4D > 1)
+		tables += DIV_ROUND_UP(entries, PGDIR_SIZE) * sizeof(p4d_t) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+	tables += DIV_ROUND_UP(entries, P4D_SIZE) * sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+	tables += DIV_ROUND_UP(entries, PUD_SIZE) * sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+
+	return entries + tables;
+}
+
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+	unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
+	unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
+	unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_end, kernel_len;
+	unsigned long initrd_start, initrd_end, initrd_len;
+	struct sme_populate_pgd_data ppd;
+	unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
+	unsigned long decrypted_base;
+
+	if (!sme_active())
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare for encrypting the kernel and initrd by building new
+	 * pagetables with the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the
+	 * kernel in place.
+	 *
+	 *   One range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
+	 *   by the kernel and initrd as encrypted.
+	 *
+	 *   Another range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
+	 *   by the kernel and initrd as decrypted and write-protected.
+	 *
+	 *     The use of write-protect attribute will prevent any of the
+	 *     memory from being cached.
+	 */
+
+	/* Physical addresses gives us the identity mapped virtual addresses */
+	kernel_start = __pa_symbol(_text);
+	kernel_end = ALIGN(__pa_symbol(_end), PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
+	kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start;
+
+	initrd_start = 0;
+	initrd_end = 0;
+	initrd_len = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
+	initrd_len = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_size |
+		     ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_size << 32);
+	if (initrd_len) {
+		initrd_start = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_image |
+			       ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_image << 32);
+		initrd_end = PAGE_ALIGN(initrd_start + initrd_len);
+		initrd_len = initrd_end - initrd_start;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* Set the encryption workarea to be immediately after the kernel */
+	workarea_start = kernel_end;
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate required number of workarea bytes needed:
+	 *   executable encryption area size:
+	 *     stack page (PAGE_SIZE)
+	 *     encryption routine page (PAGE_SIZE)
+	 *     intermediate copy buffer (PMD_PAGE_SIZE)
+	 *   pagetable structures for the encryption of the kernel
+	 *   pagetable structures for workarea (in case not currently mapped)
+	 */
+	execute_start = workarea_start;
+	execute_end = execute_start + (PAGE_SIZE * 2) + PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+	execute_len = execute_end - execute_start;
+
+	/*
+	 * One PGD for both encrypted and decrypted mappings and a set of
+	 * PUDs and PMDs for each of the encrypted and decrypted mappings.
+	 */
+	pgtable_area_len = sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
+	pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_end - kernel_start) * 2;
+	if (initrd_len)
+		pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(initrd_len) * 2;
+
+	/* PUDs and PMDs needed in the current pagetables for the workarea */
+	pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_len + pgtable_area_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * The total workarea includes the executable encryption area and
+	 * the pagetable area. The start of the workarea is already 2MB
+	 * aligned, align the end of the workarea on a 2MB boundary so that
+	 * we don't try to create/allocate PTE entries from the workarea
+	 * before it is mapped.
+	 */
+	workarea_len = execute_len + pgtable_area_len;
+	workarea_end = ALIGN(workarea_start + workarea_len, PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the address to the start of where newly created pagetable
+	 * structures (PGDs, PUDs and PMDs) will be allocated. New pagetable
+	 * structures are created when the workarea is added to the current
+	 * pagetables and when the new encrypted and decrypted kernel
+	 * mappings are populated.
+	 */
+	ppd.pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the current pagetable structure has entries for
+	 * addressing the workarea.
+	 */
+	ppd.pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa();
+	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
+	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start;
+	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end;
+	sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
+
+	/* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
+	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
+
+	/*
+	 * A new pagetable structure is being built to allow for the kernel
+	 * and initrd to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will
+	 * then be populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and
+	 * decrypted kernel mappings are created.
+	 */
+	ppd.pgd = ppd.pgtable_area;
+	memset(ppd.pgd, 0, sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD);
+	ppd.pgtable_area += sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
+
+	/*
+	 * A different PGD index/entry must be used to get different
+	 * pagetable entries for the decrypted mapping. Choose the next
+	 * PGD index and convert it to a virtual address to be used as
+	 * the base of the mapping.
+	 */
+	decrypted_base = (pgd_index(workarea_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
+	if (initrd_len) {
+		unsigned long check_base;
+
+		check_base = (pgd_index(initrd_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
+		decrypted_base = max(decrypted_base, check_base);
+	}
+	decrypted_base <<= PGDIR_SHIFT;
+
+	/* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */
+	ppd.paddr = kernel_start;
+	ppd.vaddr = kernel_start;
+	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end;
+	sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd);
+
+	/* Add decrypted, write-protected kernel (non-identity) mappings */
+	ppd.paddr = kernel_start;
+	ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base;
+	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
+	sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
+
+	if (initrd_len) {
+		/* Add encrypted initrd (identity) mappings */
+		ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
+		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start;
+		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end;
+		sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd);
+		/*
+		 * Add decrypted, write-protected initrd (non-identity) mappings
+		 */
+		ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
+		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
+		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
+		sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
+	}
+
+	/* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */
+	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
+	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start;
+	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end;
+	sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
+
+	ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
+	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
+	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
+	sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
+
+	/* Perform the encryption */
+	sme_encrypt_execute(kernel_start, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
+			    kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
+
+	if (initrd_len)
+		sme_encrypt_execute(initrd_start, initrd_start + decrypted_base,
+				    initrd_len, workarea_start,
+				    (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
+
+	/*
+	 * At this point we are running encrypted.  Remove the mappings for
+	 * the decrypted areas - all that is needed for this is to remove
+	 * the PGD entry/entries.
+	 */
+	ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base;
+	ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
+	sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
+
+	if (initrd_len) {
+		ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
+		ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
+		sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
+	}
+
+	ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
+	ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
+	sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
+
+	/* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
+	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
+}
+
+void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+	unsigned long feature_mask;
+	bool active_by_default;
+	unsigned long me_mask;
+	char buffer[16];
+	u64 msr;
+
+	/* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */
+	eax = 0x80000000;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
+		return;
+
+#define AMD_SME_BIT	BIT(0)
+#define AMD_SEV_BIT	BIT(1)
+	/*
+	 * Set the feature mask (SME or SEV) based on whether we are
+	 * running under a hypervisor.
+	 */
+	eax = 1;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	feature_mask = (ecx & BIT(31)) ? AMD_SEV_BIT : AMD_SME_BIT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for the SME/SEV feature:
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX]
+	 *   - Bit 0 - Secure Memory Encryption support
+	 *   - Bit 1 - Secure Encrypted Virtualization support
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX]
+	 *   - Bits 5:0 - Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
+	 */
+	eax = 0x8000001f;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (!(eax & feature_mask))
+		return;
+
+	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
+
+	/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
+	if (feature_mask == AMD_SME_BIT) {
+		/* For SME, check the SYSCFG MSR */
+		msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
+		if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+			return;
+	} else {
+		/* For SEV, check the SEV MSR */
+		msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
+		if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED))
+			return;
+
+		/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
+		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+		sev_enabled = true;
+		physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running
+	 * identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command
+	 * line argument data using rip-relative addressing.
+	 */
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
+		active_by_default = true;
+	else
+		active_by_default = false;
+
+	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
+
+	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+
+	if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)))
+		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+	else if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)))
+		sme_me_mask = 0;
+	else
+		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
+
+	physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
+}