Merging upstream version 4.19.269.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
author: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> 2024-05-08 03:43:32 +0000
committer: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> 2024-05-08 03:43:32 +0000
commit: f530fbb7a18f2794e4178dfb7cd07719b9586147 (patch)
tree: 3f704b17427743e26452771cf7da2ed110346ddd /arch
parent: Adding debian version 4.19.260-1. (diff)
download: linux-f530fbb7a18f2794e4178dfb7cd07719b9586147.tar.xz
linux-f530fbb7a18f2794e4178dfb7cd07719b9586147.zip
95 files changed, 1230 insertions, 407 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arc/include/asm/io.h b/arch/arc/include/asm/io.h
index 2f39d9b38..19d0cab60 100644
--- a/arch/arc/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/arc/include/asm/io.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline void ioport_unmap(void __iomem *addr)
 {
 }
 
-extern void iounmap(const void __iomem *addr);
+extern void iounmap(const volatile void __iomem *addr);
 
 #define ioremap_nocache(phy, sz)	ioremap(phy, sz)
 #define ioremap_wc(phy, sz)		ioremap(phy, sz)
diff --git a/arch/arc/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/arc/mm/ioremap.c
index 9881bd740..0719b1280 100644
--- a/arch/arc/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/arc/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void __iomem *ioremap_prot(phys_addr_t paddr, unsigned long size,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ioremap_prot);
 
 
-void iounmap(const void __iomem *addr)
+void iounmap(const volatile void __iomem *addr)
 {
 	/* weird double cast to handle phys_addr_t > 32 bits */
 	if (arc_uncached_addr_space((phys_addr_t)(u32)addr))
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index d89d013f5..41bde0e62 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ config ARM
 	select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS if (CPU_V6 || CPU_V6K || CPU_V7) && MMU
 	select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
 	select HAVE_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD if (!XIP_KERNEL)
-	select HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER if (!THUMB2_KERNEL)
+	select HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER if (!THUMB2_KERNEL && !CC_IS_CLANG)
 	select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER if (!XIP_KERNEL)
 	select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
 	select HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
@@ -1943,7 +1943,6 @@ config CMDLINE
 choice
 	prompt "Kernel command line type" if CMDLINE != ""
 	default CMDLINE_FROM_BOOTLOADER
-	depends on ATAGS
 
 config CMDLINE_FROM_BOOTLOADER
 	bool "Use bootloader kernel arguments if available"
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
index 01c760929..b931fac12 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ config DEBUG_WX
 
 choice
 	prompt "Choose kernel unwinder"
-	default UNWINDER_ARM if AEABI && !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
-	default UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER if !AEABI || FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
+	default UNWINDER_ARM if AEABI
+	default UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER if !AEABI
 	help
 	  This determines which method will be used for unwinding kernel stack
 	  traces for panics, oopses, bugs, warnings, perf, /proc/<pid>/stack,
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ config UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER
 
 config UNWINDER_ARM
 	bool "ARM EABI stack unwinder"
-	depends on AEABI
+	depends on AEABI && !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
 	select ARM_UNWIND
 	help
 	  This option enables stack unwinding support in the kernel
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi
index 572fbd254..495c55e5b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi
@@ -15,22 +15,20 @@
 	compatible = "phytec,am335x-pcm-953", "phytec,am335x-phycore-som", "ti,am33xx";
 
 	/* Power */
-	regulators {
-		vcc3v3: fixedregulator@1 {
-			compatible = "regulator-fixed";
-			regulator-name = "vcc3v3";
-			regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
-			regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
-			regulator-boot-on;
-		};
+	vcc3v3: fixedregulator1 {
+		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+		regulator-name = "vcc3v3";
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
+		regulator-boot-on;
+	};
 
-		vcc1v8: fixedregulator@2 {
-			compatible = "regulator-fixed";
-			regulator-name = "vcc1v8";
-			regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
-			regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
-			regulator-boot-on;
-		};
+	vcc1v8: fixedregulator2 {
+		compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+		regulator-name = "vcc1v8";
+		regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
+		regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
+		regulator-boot-on;
 	};
 
 	/* User IO */
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-385-turris-omnia.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-385-turris-omnia.dts
index fde4c302f..92e08486e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-385-turris-omnia.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-385-turris-omnia.dts
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@
 		marvell,function = "spi0";
 	};
 
-	spi0cs1_pins: spi0cs1-pins {
+	spi0cs2_pins: spi0cs2-pins {
 		marvell,pins = "mpp26";
 		marvell,function = "spi0";
 	};
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@
 		};
 	};
 
-	/* MISO, MOSI, SCLK and CS1 are routed to pin header CN11 */
+	/* MISO, MOSI, SCLK and CS2 are routed to pin header CN11 */
 };
 
 &uart0 {
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g20ek_common.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g20ek_common.dtsi
index ec1f17ab6..0b990761d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g20ek_common.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g20ek_common.dtsi
@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
 
 				};
 
+				usb1 {
+					pinctrl_usb1_vbus_gpio: usb1_vbus_gpio {
+						atmel,pins =
+							<AT91_PIOC 5 AT91_PERIPH_GPIO AT91_PINCTRL_DEGLITCH>;	/* PC5 GPIO */
+					};
+				};
+
 				mmc0_slot1 {
 					pinctrl_board_mmc0_slot1: mmc0_slot1-board {
 						atmel,pins =
@@ -84,6 +91,8 @@
 			};
 
 			usb1: gadget@fffa4000 {
+				pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_usb1_vbus_gpio>;
+				pinctrl-names = "default";
 				atmel,vbus-gpio = <&pioC 5 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 				status = "okay";
 			};
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos4412-midas.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos4412-midas.dtsi
index 60fbad25b..93c8918e5 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos4412-midas.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos4412-midas.dtsi
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@
 		clocks = <&camera 1>;
 		clock-names = "extclk";
 		samsung,camclk-out = <1>;
-		gpios = <&gpm1 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		gpios = <&gpm1 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 
 		port {
 			is_s5k6a3_ep: endpoint {
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos4412-origen.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos4412-origen.dts
index 346f71932..e5bfa7618 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos4412-origen.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos4412-origen.dts
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
 };
 
 &ehci {
-	samsung,vbus-gpio = <&gpx3 5 1>;
+	samsung,vbus-gpio = <&gpx3 5 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 	status = "okay";
 
 	port@1 {
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6dl.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6dl.dtsi
index f0607eb41..079f77c7e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6dl.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6dl.dtsi
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@
 		ocram: sram@900000 {
 			compatible = "mmio-sram";
 			reg = <0x00900000 0x20000>;
+			ranges = <0 0x00900000 0x20000>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <1>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_OCRAM>;
 		};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6q.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6q.dtsi
index 0193ee6fe..a28dce3c6 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6q.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6q.dtsi
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@
 		ocram: sram@900000 {
 			compatible = "mmio-sram";
 			reg = <0x00900000 0x40000>;
+			ranges = <0 0x00900000 0x40000>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <1>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_OCRAM>;
 		};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi
index d91f92f94..3633383db 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi
@@ -9,12 +9,18 @@
 		ocram2: sram@940000 {
 			compatible = "mmio-sram";
 			reg = <0x00940000 0x20000>;
+			ranges = <0 0x00940000 0x20000>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <1>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_OCRAM>;
 		};
 
 		ocram3: sram@960000 {
 			compatible = "mmio-sram";
 			reg = <0x00960000 0x20000>;
+			ranges = <0 0x00960000 0x20000>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <1>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_OCRAM>;
 		};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sl.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sl.dtsi
index 9d19183f4..afde0ed6d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sl.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sl.dtsi
@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@
 		ocram: sram@900000 {
 			compatible = "mmio-sram";
 			reg = <0x00900000 0x20000>;
+			ranges = <0 0x00900000 0x20000>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <1>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6SL_CLK_OCRAM>;
 		};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sll.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sll.dtsi
index 7c7d5c475..d7d092a55 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sll.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sll.dtsi
@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@
 		ocram: sram@900000 {
 			compatible = "mmio-sram";
 			reg = <0x00900000 0x20000>;
+			ranges = <0 0x00900000 0x20000>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <1>;
 		};
 
 		L2: l2-cache@a02000 {
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi
index ae0728df5..b9ab1118b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6sx.dtsi
@@ -167,12 +167,18 @@
 		ocram_s: sram@8f8000 {
 			compatible = "mmio-sram";
 			reg = <0x008f8000 0x4000>;
+			ranges = <0 0x008f8000 0x4000>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <1>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_OCRAM_S>;
 		};
 
 		ocram: sram@900000 {
 			compatible = "mmio-sram";
 			reg = <0x00900000 0x20000>;
+			ranges = <0 0x00900000 0x20000>;
+			#address-cells = <1>;
+			#size-cells = <1>;
 			clocks = <&clks IMX6SX_CLK_OCRAM>;
 		};
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx7d-sdb.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx7d-sdb.dts
index 317f1bcc5..bd2c3c8f4 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx7d-sdb.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx7d-sdb.dts
@@ -163,12 +163,7 @@
 		interrupt-parent = <&gpio2>;
 		interrupts = <29 0>;
 		pendown-gpio = <&gpio2 29 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
-		ti,x-min = /bits/ 16 <0>;
-		ti,x-max = /bits/ 16 <0>;
-		ti,y-min = /bits/ 16 <0>;
-		ti,y-max = /bits/ 16 <0>;
-		ti,pressure-max = /bits/ 16 <0>;
-		ti,x-plate-ohms = /bits/ 16 <400>;
+		touchscreen-max-pressure = <255>;
 		wakeup-source;
 	};
 };
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/integratorap.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/integratorap.dts
index 94d2ff983..e6c5a99e0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/integratorap.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/integratorap.dts
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@
 
 	pci: pciv3@62000000 {
 		compatible = "arm,integrator-ap-pci", "v3,v360epc-pci";
+		device_type = "pci";
 		#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 		#size-cells = <2>;
 		#address-cells = <3>;
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/kirkwood-lsxl.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/kirkwood-lsxl.dtsi
index 7b151acb9..88b70ba1c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/kirkwood-lsxl.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/kirkwood-lsxl.dtsi
@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@
 
 	ocp@f1000000 {
 		pinctrl: pin-controller@10000 {
+			/* Non-default UART pins */
+			pmx_uart0: pmx-uart0 {
+				marvell,pins = "mpp4", "mpp5";
+			};
+
 			pmx_power_hdd: pmx-power-hdd {
 				marvell,pins = "mpp10";
 				marvell,function = "gpo";
@@ -213,22 +218,11 @@
 &mdio {
 	status = "okay";
 
-	ethphy0: ethernet-phy@0 {
-		reg = <0>;
-	};
-
 	ethphy1: ethernet-phy@8 {
 		reg = <8>;
 	};
 };
 
-&eth0 {
-	status = "okay";
-	ethernet0-port@0 {
-		phy-handle = <&ethphy0>;
-	};
-};
-
 &eth1 {
 	status = "okay";
 	ethernet1-port@0 {
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/moxart-uc7112lx.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/moxart-uc7112lx.dts
index 4a962a264..59d8775a3 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/moxart-uc7112lx.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/moxart-uc7112lx.dts
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
 	clocks = <&ref12>;
 };
 
-&sdhci {
+&mmc {
 	status = "okay";
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/moxart.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/moxart.dtsi
index da7b3237b..804a2bc6e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/moxart.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/moxart.dtsi
@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@
 			clock-names = "PCLK";
 		};
 
-		sdhci: sdhci@98e00000 {
-			compatible = "moxa,moxart-sdhci";
+		mmc: mmc@98e00000 {
+			compatible = "moxa,moxart-mmc";
 			reg = <0x98e00000 0x5C>;
 			interrupts = <5 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 			clocks = <&clk_apb>;
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3036-evb.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3036-evb.dts
index 2a7e6624e..ea23ba986 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3036-evb.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3036-evb.dts
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 &i2c1 {
 	status = "okay";
 
-	hym8563: hym8563@51 {
+	hym8563: rtc@51 {
 		compatible = "haoyu,hym8563";
 		reg = <0x51>;
 		#clock-cells = <0>;
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3188-radxarock.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3188-radxarock.dts
index 4a2890618..720d0136f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3188-radxarock.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3188-radxarock.dts
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
 		#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
 	};
 
-	ir_recv: gpio-ir-receiver {
+	ir_recv: ir-receiver {
 		compatible = "gpio-ir-receiver";
 		gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PB2 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 		pinctrl-names = "default";
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3188.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3188.dtsi
index 3b7cae6f4..24efc9b31 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3188.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3188.dtsi
@@ -509,7 +509,6 @@
 
 &global_timer {
 	interrupts = <GIC_PPI 11 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING)>;
-	status = "disabled";
 };
 
 &local_timer {
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-evb-act8846.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-evb-act8846.dts
index 6592c809e..ccc07740e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-evb-act8846.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-evb-act8846.dts
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
 		vin-supply = <&vcc_sys>;
 	};
 
-	hym8563@51 {
+	rtc@51 {
 		compatible = "haoyu,hym8563";
 		reg = <0x51>;
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-firefly.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-firefly.dtsi
index a6ff7eac4..8970b7ad1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-firefly.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-firefly.dtsi
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
 		vin-supply = <&vcc_sys>;
 	};
 
-	hym8563: hym8563@51 {
+	hym8563: rtc@51 {
 		compatible = "haoyu,hym8563";
 		reg = <0x51>;
 		#clock-cells = <0>;
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-miqi.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-miqi.dts
index 504ab1177..ec7c7bf5a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-miqi.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-miqi.dts
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
 		vin-supply = <&vcc_sys>;
 	};
 
-	hym8563: hym8563@51 {
+	hym8563: rtc@51 {
 		compatible = "haoyu,hym8563";
 		reg = <0x51>;
 		#clock-cells = <0>;
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-rock2-square.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-rock2-square.dts
index 6a30cadad..47dd843ae 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-rock2-square.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-rock2-square.dts
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@
 };
 
 &i2c0 {
-	hym8563: hym8563@51 {
+	hym8563: rtc@51 {
 		compatible = "haoyu,hym8563";
 		reg = <0x51>;
 		#clock-cells = <0>;
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3xxx.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3xxx.dtsi
index 86a0d98d2..1b6429843 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3xxx.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3xxx.dtsi
@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@
 		reg = <0x1013c200 0x20>;
 		interrupts = <GIC_PPI 11 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) | IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING)>;
 		clocks = <&cru CORE_PERI>;
+		status = "disabled";
+		/* The clock source and the sched_clock provided by the arm_global_timer
+		 * on Rockchip rk3066a/rk3188 are quite unstable because their rates
+		 * depend on the CPU frequency.
+		 * Keep the arm_global_timer disabled in order to have the
+		 * DW_APB_TIMER (rk3066a) or ROCKCHIP_TIMER (rk3188) selected by default.
+		 */
 	};
 
 	local_timer: local-timer@1013c600 {
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/perf_event.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/perf_event.h
index 4f9dec489..c5d271408 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/perf_event.h
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ extern unsigned long perf_misc_flags(struct pt_regs *regs);
 
 #define perf_arch_fetch_caller_regs(regs, __ip) { \
 	(regs)->ARM_pc = (__ip); \
-	(regs)->ARM_fp = (unsigned long) __builtin_frame_address(0); \
+	frame_pointer((regs)) = (unsigned long) __builtin_frame_address(0); \
 	(regs)->ARM_sp = current_stack_pointer; \
 	(regs)->ARM_cpsr = SVC_MODE; \
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-nommu.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-nommu.h
index a0d726a47..e7ca79851 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-nommu.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-nommu.h
@@ -55,12 +55,6 @@
 typedef pte_t *pte_addr_t;
 
 /*
- * ZERO_PAGE is a global shared page that is always zero: used
- * for zero-mapped memory areas etc..
- */
-#define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr)	(virt_to_page(0))
-
-/*
  * Mark the prot value as uncacheable and unbufferable.
  */
 #define pgprot_noncached(prot)	(prot)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable.h
index a75740112..fdc3bc070 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -13,6 +13,15 @@
 #include <linux/const.h>
 #include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+/*
+ * ZERO_PAGE is a global shared page that is always zero: used
+ * for zero-mapped memory areas etc..
+ */
+extern struct page *empty_zero_page;
+#define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr)	(empty_zero_page)
+#endif
+
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 
 #include <asm-generic/4level-fixup.h>
@@ -166,13 +175,6 @@ extern pgprot_t phys_mem_access_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn,
 #define __S111  __PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
-/*
- * ZERO_PAGE is a global shared page that is always zero: used
- * for zero-mapped memory areas etc..
- */
-extern struct page *empty_zero_page;
-#define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr)	(empty_zero_page)
-
 
 extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD];
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-mxs/mach-mxs.c b/arch/arm/mach-mxs/mach-mxs.c
index 1c6062d24..4063fc1f4 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mach-mxs/mach-mxs.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-mxs/mach-mxs.c
@@ -393,8 +393,10 @@ static void __init mxs_machine_init(void)
 
 	root = of_find_node_by_path("/");
 	ret = of_property_read_string(root, "model", &soc_dev_attr->machine);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(soc_dev_attr);
 		return;
+	}
 
 	soc_dev_attr->family = "Freescale MXS Family";
 	soc_dev_attr->soc_id = mxs_get_soc_id();
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/nommu.c b/arch/arm/mm/nommu.c
index 7d67c70bb..e803fd162 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/nommu.c
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@
 
 unsigned long vectors_base;
 
+/*
+ * empty_zero_page is a special page that is used for
+ * zero-initialized data and COW.
+ */
+struct page *empty_zero_page;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(empty_zero_page);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_MPU
 struct mpu_rgn_info mpu_rgn_info;
 #endif
@@ -147,9 +154,21 @@ void __init adjust_lowmem_bounds(void)
  */
 void __init paging_init(const struct machine_desc *mdesc)
 {
+	void *zero_page;
+
 	early_trap_init((void *)vectors_base);
 	mpu_setup();
+
+	/* allocate the zero page. */
+	zero_page = memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (!zero_page)
+		panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n",
+		      __func__, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+
 	bootmem_init();
+
+	empty_zero_page = virt_to_page(zero_page);
+	flush_dcache_page(empty_zero_page);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index a101f5d2f..e16f0d45b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -515,6 +515,22 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_1542419
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
+config ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+	bool "Cortex-A57/A72: 1742098: ELR recorded incorrectly on interrupt taken between cryptographic instructions in a sequence"
+	depends on COMPAT
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option removes the AES hwcap for aarch32 user-space to
+	  workaround erratum 1742098 on Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72.
+
+	  Affected parts may corrupt the AES state if an interrupt is
+	  taken between a pair of AES instructions. These instructions
+	  are only present if the cryptography extensions are present.
+	  All software should have a fallback implementation for CPUs
+	  that don't implement the cryptography extensions.
+
+	  If unsure, say Y.
+
 config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375
 	bool "Cavium erratum 22375, 24313"
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts
index 1e6a71066..ea990543d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@
 	cap-sd-highspeed;
 	cd-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PA7 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 	disable-wp;
-	max-frequency = <150000000>;
+	max-frequency = <40000000>;
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&sdmmc_clk &sdmmc_cmd &sdmmc_cd &sdmmc_bus4>;
 	vmmc-supply = <&vcc3v3_baseboard>;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
index 64ae14371..61fd28522 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@
 #define ARM64_SSBS				34
 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1542419		35
 #define ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB			36
+#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1742098		37
 
-#define ARM64_NCAPS				37
+#define ARM64_NCAPS				38
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index d0b7dd608..7edb587fe 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -142,9 +142,12 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
 		__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
 	}
 
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start);
+	if (fn != __this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn)) {
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start,
+				 hyp_vecs_start);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
 }
 #else
@@ -683,6 +686,15 @@ static const struct midr_range arm64_harden_el2_vectors[] = {
 
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+static struct midr_range broken_aarch32_aes[] = {
+	MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57, 0, 1, 0xf, 0xf),
+	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+	{},
+};
+#endif
+
+
 const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
 #if	defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_826319) || \
 	defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_827319) || \
@@ -884,6 +896,14 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+	{
+		.desc = "ARM erratum 1742098",
+		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_1742098,
+		CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(broken_aarch32_aes),
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
+	},
+#endif
 	{
 	}
 };
@@ -1186,8 +1206,11 @@ static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start)
 		__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
 	}
 
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start);
+	if (hyp_vecs_start != __this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.template_start)) {
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start,
+				 hyp_vecs_start);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
 }
 #else
@@ -1223,7 +1246,13 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 	} else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
 		switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {
 		case 8:
-			kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start);
+			/*
+			 * A57/A72-r0 will already have selected the
+			 * spectre-indirect vector, which is sufficient
+			 * for BHB too.
+			 */
+			if (!__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn))
+				kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start);
 			break;
 		case 24:
 			kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index 03b0fdcca..d7e73a796 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
 #include <asm/fpsimd.h>
+#include <asm/hwcap.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/sysreg.h>
@@ -1154,6 +1155,14 @@ static void cpu_enable_ssbs(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
 
+static void elf_hwcap_fixup(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_1742098))
+		compat_elf_hwcap2 &= ~COMPAT_HWCAP2_AES;
+#endif /* ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098 */
+}
+
 static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
 	{
 		.desc = "GIC system register CPU interface",
@@ -1802,8 +1811,10 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
 	mark_const_caps_ready();
 	setup_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
 
-	if (system_supports_32bit_el0())
+	if (system_supports_32bit_el0()) {
 		setup_elf_hwcaps(compat_elf_hwcaps);
+		elf_hwcap_fixup();
+	}
 
 	if (system_uses_ttbr0_pan())
 		pr_info("emulated: Privileged Access Never (PAN) using TTBR0_EL1 switching\n");
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
index 4f9acb5fb..5b425ed9c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
@@ -16,6 +16,14 @@
 
 #include <asm/efi.h>
 
+static bool region_is_misaligned(const efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+	if (PAGE_SIZE == EFI_PAGE_SIZE)
+		return false;
+	return !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||
+	       !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
 /*
  * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
  * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
@@ -29,14 +37,22 @@ static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
 	if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
 		return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
 
-	if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),
-		      "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))
+	if (region_is_misaligned(md)) {
+		static bool __initdata code_is_misaligned;
+
 		/*
-		 * If the region is not aligned to the page size of the OS, we
-		 * can not use strict permissions, since that would also affect
-		 * the mapping attributes of the adjacent regions.
+		 * Regions that are not aligned to the OS page size cannot be
+		 * mapped with strict permissions, as those might interfere
+		 * with the permissions that are needed by the adjacent
+		 * region's mapping. However, if we haven't encountered any
+		 * misaligned runtime code regions so far, we can safely use
+		 * non-executable permissions for non-code regions.
 		 */
-		return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+		code_is_misaligned |= (type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE);
+
+		return code_is_misaligned ? pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)
+					  : pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
+	}
 
 	/* R-- */
 	if ((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
@@ -66,19 +82,16 @@ int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
 	bool page_mappings_only = (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
 				   md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
 
-	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||
-	    !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)) {
-		/*
-		 * If the end address of this region is not aligned to page
-		 * size, the mapping is rounded up, and may end up sharing a
-		 * page frame with the next UEFI memory region. If we create
-		 * a block entry now, we may need to split it again when mapping
-		 * the next region, and support for that is going to be removed
-		 * from the MMU routines. So avoid block mappings altogether in
-		 * that case.
-		 */
+	/*
+	 * If this region is not aligned to the page size used by the OS, the
+	 * mapping will be rounded outwards, and may end up sharing a page
+	 * frame with an adjacent runtime memory region. Given that the page
+	 * table descriptor covering the shared page will be rewritten when the
+	 * adjacent region gets mapped, we must avoid block mappings here so we
+	 * don't have to worry about splitting them when that happens.
+	 */
+	if (region_is_misaligned(md))
 		page_mappings_only = true;
-	}
 
 	create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
 			   md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
@@ -106,6 +119,9 @@ int __init efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	BUG_ON(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE &&
 	       md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
 
+	if (region_is_misaligned(md))
+		return 0;
+
 	/*
 	 * Calling apply_to_page_range() is only safe on regions that are
 	 * guaranteed to be mapped down to pages. Since we are only called
diff --git a/arch/mips/bcm47xx/prom.c b/arch/mips/bcm47xx/prom.c
index 135a5407f..d26d9a6f6 100644
--- a/arch/mips/bcm47xx/prom.c
+++ b/arch/mips/bcm47xx/prom.c
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static __init void prom_init_mem(void)
 			pr_debug("Assume 128MB RAM\n");
 			break;
 		}
-		if (!memcmp(prom_init, prom_init + mem, 32))
+		if (!memcmp((void *)prom_init, (void *)prom_init + mem, 32))
 			break;
 	}
 	lowmem = mem;
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void __init bcm47xx_prom_highmem_init(void)
 
 	off = EXTVBASE + __pa(off);
 	for (extmem = 128 << 20; extmem < 512 << 20; extmem <<= 1) {
-		if (!memcmp(prom_init, (void *)(off + extmem), 16))
+		if (!memcmp((void *)prom_init, (void *)(off + extmem), 16))
 			break;
 	}
 	extmem -= lowmem;
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/fw/fw.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/fw/fw.h
index d0ef8b489..d0494ce4b 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/fw/fw.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/fw/fw.h
@@ -26,6 +26,6 @@ extern char *fw_getcmdline(void);
 extern void fw_meminit(void);
 extern char *fw_getenv(char *name);
 extern unsigned long fw_getenvl(char *name);
-extern void fw_init_early_console(char port);
+extern void fw_init_early_console(void);
 
 #endif /* __ASM_FW_H_ */
diff --git a/arch/mips/pic32/pic32mzda/early_console.c b/arch/mips/pic32/pic32mzda/early_console.c
index 8ed4961b1..c00c6149e 100644
--- a/arch/mips/pic32/pic32mzda/early_console.c
+++ b/arch/mips/pic32/pic32mzda/early_console.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 #define U_BRG(x)	(UART_BASE(x) + 0x40)
 
 static void __iomem *uart_base;
-static char console_port = -1;
+static int console_port = -1;
 
 static int __init configure_uart_pins(int port)
 {
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int __init configure_uart_pins(int port)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void __init configure_uart(char port, int baud)
+static void __init configure_uart(int port, int baud)
 {
 	u32 pbclk;
 
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void __init configure_uart(char port, int baud)
 		     uart_base + PIC32_SET(U_STA(port)));
 }
 
-static void __init setup_early_console(char port, int baud)
+static void __init setup_early_console(int port, int baud)
 {
 	if (configure_uart_pins(port))
 		return;
@@ -138,16 +138,15 @@ _out:
 	return baud;
 }
 
-void __init fw_init_early_console(char port)
+void __init fw_init_early_console(void)
 {
 	char *arch_cmdline = pic32_getcmdline();
-	int baud = -1;
+	int baud, port;
 
 	uart_base = ioremap_nocache(PIC32_BASE_UART, 0xc00);
 
 	baud = get_baud_from_cmdline(arch_cmdline);
-	if (port == -1)
-		port = get_port_from_cmdline(arch_cmdline);
+	port = get_port_from_cmdline(arch_cmdline);
 
 	if (port == -1)
 		port = EARLY_CONSOLE_PORT;
diff --git a/arch/mips/pic32/pic32mzda/init.c b/arch/mips/pic32/pic32mzda/init.c
index 406c6c5ce..cf2625551 100644
--- a/arch/mips/pic32/pic32mzda/init.c
+++ b/arch/mips/pic32/pic32mzda/init.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void __init plat_mem_setup(void)
 		strlcpy(arcs_cmdline, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK
-	fw_init_early_console(-1);
+	fw_init_early_console();
 #endif
 	pic32_config_init();
 }
diff --git a/arch/nios2/boot/Makefile b/arch/nios2/boot/Makefile
index 2ba23a679..70139de9a 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/boot/Makefile
+++ b/arch/nios2/boot/Makefile
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ $(obj)/vmlinux.bin: vmlinux FORCE
 $(obj)/vmlinux.gz: $(obj)/vmlinux.bin FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,gzip)
 
-$(obj)/vmImage: $(obj)/vmlinux.gz
+$(obj)/vmImage: $(obj)/vmlinux.gz FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,uimage)
 	@$(kecho) 'Kernel: $@ is ready'
 
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/hardware.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/hardware.h
index d6e1ed145..f4eab68e2 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/hardware.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/hardware.h
@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@
 #define SVERSION_ANY_ID		PA_SVERSION_ANY_ID
 
 struct hp_hardware {
-	unsigned short	hw_type:5;	/* HPHW_xxx */
-	unsigned short	hversion;
-	unsigned long	sversion:28;
-	unsigned short	opt;
-	const char	name[80];	/* The hardware description */
-};
+	unsigned int	hw_type:8;	/* HPHW_xxx */
+	unsigned int	hversion:12;
+	unsigned int	sversion:12;
+	unsigned char	opt;
+	unsigned char	name[59];	/* The hardware description */
+} __packed;
 
 struct parisc_device;
 
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c
index 592e8cec1..01a2ed59d 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c
@@ -861,15 +861,13 @@ void __init walk_central_bus(void)
 			&root);
 }
 
-static void print_parisc_device(struct parisc_device *dev)
+static __init void print_parisc_device(struct parisc_device *dev)
 {
-	char hw_path[64];
-	static int count;
+	static int count __initdata;
 
-	print_pa_hwpath(dev, hw_path);
-	pr_info("%d. %s at %pap [%s] { %d, 0x%x, 0x%.3x, 0x%.5x }",
-		++count, dev->name, &(dev->hpa.start), hw_path, dev->id.hw_type,
-		dev->id.hversion_rev, dev->id.hversion, dev->id.sversion);
+	pr_info("%d. %s at %pap { type:%d, hv:%#x, sv:%#x, rev:%#x }",
+		++count, dev->name, &(dev->hpa.start), dev->id.hw_type,
+		dev->id.hversion, dev->id.sversion, dev->id.hversion_rev);
 
 	if (dev->num_addrs) {
 		int k;
@@ -1058,7 +1056,7 @@ static __init int qemu_print_iodc_data(struct device *lin_dev, void *data)
 
 
 
-static int print_one_device(struct device * dev, void * data)
+static __init int print_one_device(struct device * dev, void * data)
 {
 	struct parisc_device * pdev = to_parisc_device(dev);
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
index 26654d0c2..5987ae0d8 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Makefile
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU) += -mcpu=power8
 CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU) += $(call cc-option,-mtune=power9,-mtune=power8)
 else
 CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU) += $(call cc-option,-mtune=power7,$(call cc-option,-mtune=power5))
-CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU) += $(call cc-option,-mcpu=power5,-mcpu=power4)
+CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU) += -mcpu=power4
 endif
 else ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E_64
 CFLAGS-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU) += -mcpu=powerpc64
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/e500v1_power_isa.dtsi b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/e500v1_power_isa.dtsi
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e2a90cde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/e500v1_power_isa.dtsi
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * e500v1 Power ISA Device Tree Source (include)
+ *
+ * Copyright 2012 Freescale Semiconductor Inc.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *       documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *     * Neither the name of Freescale Semiconductor nor the
+ *       names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products
+ *       derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
+ * GNU General Public License ("GPL") as published by the Free Software
+ * Foundation, either version 2 of that License or (at your option) any
+ * later version.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Freescale Semiconductor "AS IS" AND ANY
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Freescale Semiconductor BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
+ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/ {
+	cpus {
+		power-isa-version = "2.03";
+		power-isa-b;		// Base
+		power-isa-e;		// Embedded
+		power-isa-atb;		// Alternate Time Base
+		power-isa-cs;		// Cache Specification
+		power-isa-e.le;		// Embedded.Little-Endian
+		power-isa-e.pm;		// Embedded.Performance Monitor
+		power-isa-ecl;		// Embedded Cache Locking
+		power-isa-mmc;		// Memory Coherence
+		power-isa-sp;		// Signal Processing Engine
+		power-isa-sp.fs;	// SPE.Embedded Float Scalar Single
+		power-isa-sp.fv;	// SPE.Embedded Float Vector
+		mmu-type = "power-embedded";
+	};
+};
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8540ads.dts b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8540ads.dts
index e6d0b166d..b4314aa67 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8540ads.dts
+++ b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8540ads.dts
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 /dts-v1/;
 
-/include/ "e500v2_power_isa.dtsi"
+/include/ "e500v1_power_isa.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	model = "MPC8540ADS";
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8541cds.dts b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8541cds.dts
index 9fa2c734a..48492c621 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8541cds.dts
+++ b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8541cds.dts
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 /dts-v1/;
 
-/include/ "e500v2_power_isa.dtsi"
+/include/ "e500v1_power_isa.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	model = "MPC8541CDS";
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8555cds.dts b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8555cds.dts
index 272f08cae..325c817de 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8555cds.dts
+++ b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8555cds.dts
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 /dts-v1/;
 
-/include/ "e500v2_power_isa.dtsi"
+/include/ "e500v1_power_isa.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	model = "MPC8555CDS";
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8560ads.dts b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8560ads.dts
index 7a822b08a..b5fb5ae3e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8560ads.dts
+++ b/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/fsl/mpc8560ads.dts
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 /dts-v1/;
 
-/include/ "e500v2_power_isa.dtsi"
+/include/ "e500v1_power_isa.dtsi"
 
 / {
 	model = "MPC8560ADS";
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/pci_dn.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/pci_dn.c
index 7cecc3bd9..bd68c3259 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/pci_dn.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/pci_dn.c
@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ struct pci_dn *pci_add_device_node_info(struct pci_controller *hose,
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pdn->list);
 	parent = of_get_parent(dn);
 	pdn->parent = parent ? PCI_DN(parent) : NULL;
+	of_node_put(parent);
 	if (pdn->parent)
 		list_add_tail(&pdn->list, &pdn->parent->child_list);
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/math-emu/math_efp.c b/arch/powerpc/math-emu/math_efp.c
index 581f404ca..b9848179d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/math-emu/math_efp.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/math-emu/math_efp.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/reg.h>
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c
index edf9032e2..96a3d2313 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal.c
@@ -740,6 +740,7 @@ static void opal_export_attrs(void)
 	kobj = kobject_create_and_add("exports", opal_kobj);
 	if (!kobj) {
 		pr_warn("kobject_create_and_add() of exports failed\n");
+		of_node_put(np);
 		return;
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_msi.c b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_msi.c
index df95102e7..44aedb6b9 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_msi.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_msi.c
@@ -216,8 +216,10 @@ static int fsl_setup_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *pdev, int nvec, int type)
 			dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 				"node %pOF has an invalid fsl,msi phandle %u\n",
 				hose->dn, np->phandle);
+			of_node_put(np);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+		of_node_put(np);
 	}
 
 	for_each_pci_msi_entry(entry, pdev) {
diff --git a/arch/riscv/Makefile b/arch/riscv/Makefile
index b6c972941..e6d09ad41 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Makefile
+++ b/arch/riscv/Makefile
@@ -49,9 +49,16 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C),y)
 	KBUILD_ARCH_C = c
 endif
 
-KBUILD_AFLAGS += -march=$(KBUILD_MARCH)$(KBUILD_ARCH_A)fd$(KBUILD_ARCH_C)
+# Newer binutils versions default to ISA spec version 20191213 which moves some
+# instructions from the I extension to the Zicsr and Zifencei extensions.
+toolchain-need-zicsr-zifencei := $(call cc-option-yn, -march=$(riscv-march-y)_zicsr_zifencei)
+ifeq ($(toolchain-need-zicsr-zifencei),y)
+	KBUILD_ARCH_ZISCR_ZIFENCEI = _zicsr_zifencei
+endif
+
+KBUILD_AFLAGS += -march=$(KBUILD_MARCH)$(KBUILD_ARCH_A)fd$(KBUILD_ARCH_C)$(KBUILD_ARCH_ZISCR_ZIFENCEI)
 
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += -march=$(KBUILD_MARCH)$(KBUILD_ARCH_A)$(KBUILD_ARCH_C)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += -march=$(KBUILD_MARCH)$(KBUILD_ARCH_A)$(KBUILD_ARCH_C)$(KBUILD_ARCH_ZISCR_ZIFENCEI)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-save-restore
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET=$(CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET)
 
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
index d7c6ca7c9..641801080 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
@@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long usp,
 {
 	struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
 
+	memset(&p->thread.s, 0, sizeof(p->thread.s));
+
 	/* p->thread holds context to be restored by __switch_to() */
 	if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
 		/* Kernel thread */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c
index 516aaa19d..3a9d42e66 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c
@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@ static long riscv_sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
 	if (unlikely(offset & (~PAGE_MASK >> page_shift_offset)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (unlikely((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(prot & PROT_READ)))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	return ksys_mmap_pgoff(addr, len, prot, flags, fd,
 			       offset >> (PAGE_SHIFT - page_shift_offset));
 }
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile
index 1dd134fc0..ba833b790 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ obj-vdso := $(addprefix $(obj)/, $(obj-vdso))
 
 obj-y += vdso.o vdso-syms.o
 CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds += -P -C -U$(ARCH)
+ifneq ($(filter vgettimeofday, $(vdso-syms)),)
+CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds += -DHAS_VGETTIMEOFDAY
+endif
 
 # Disable gcov profiling for VDSO code
 GCOV_PROFILE := n
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S
index cd1d47e07..8910712f6 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S
@@ -70,9 +70,11 @@ VERSION
 	LINUX_4.15 {
 	global:
 		__vdso_rt_sigreturn;
+#ifdef HAS_VGETTIMEOFDAY
 		__vdso_gettimeofday;
 		__vdso_clock_gettime;
 		__vdso_clock_getres;
+#endif
 		__vdso_getcpu;
 		__vdso_flush_icache;
 	local: *;
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/futex.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/futex.h
index 5e97a4353..7837c791f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/futex.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/futex.h
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
 		"3: jl    1b\n"						\
 		"   lhi   %0,0\n"					\
 		"4: sacf  768\n"					\
-		EX_TABLE(0b,4b) EX_TABLE(2b,4b) EX_TABLE(3b,4b)		\
+		EX_TABLE(0b,4b) EX_TABLE(1b,4b)				\
+		EX_TABLE(2b,4b) EX_TABLE(3b,4b)				\
 		: "=d" (ret), "=&d" (oldval), "=&d" (newval),		\
 		  "=m" (*uaddr)						\
 		: "0" (-EFAULT), "d" (oparg), "a" (uaddr),		\
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/crash_dump.c b/arch/s390/kernel/crash_dump.c
index 376f6b6df..7fb7d4dc1 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/crash_dump.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/crash_dump.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct save_area {
 	u64 fprs[16];
 	u32 fpc;
 	u32 prefix;
-	u64 todpreg;
+	u32 todpreg;
 	u64 timer;
 	u64 todcmp;
 	u64 vxrs_low[16];
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
index 17d73b71d..df5d44a7c 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
@@ -376,8 +376,10 @@ static int shadow_scb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
 	if (test_kvm_cpu_feat(vcpu->kvm, KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_CEI))
 		scb_s->eca |= scb_o->eca & ECA_CEI;
 	/* Epoch Extension */
-	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 139))
+	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 139)) {
 		scb_s->ecd |= scb_o->ecd & ECD_MEF;
+		scb_s->epdx = scb_o->epdx;
+	}
 
 	/* etoken */
 	if (test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 156))
diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/sections.h
index 8edb82404..0cb0ca149 100644
--- a/arch/sh/include/asm/sections.h
+++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/sections.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <asm-generic/sections.h>
 
-extern long __machvec_start, __machvec_end;
+extern char __machvec_start[], __machvec_end[];
 extern char __uncached_start, __uncached_end;
 extern char __start_eh_frame[], __stop_eh_frame[];
 
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/machvec.c b/arch/sh/kernel/machvec.c
index ec05f491c..a9f797a76 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/machvec.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/machvec.c
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@
 #define MV_NAME_SIZE 32
 
 #define for_each_mv(mv) \
-	for ((mv) = (struct sh_machine_vector *)&__machvec_start; \
-	     (mv) && (unsigned long)(mv) < (unsigned long)&__machvec_end; \
+	for ((mv) = (struct sh_machine_vector *)__machvec_start; \
+	     (mv) && (unsigned long)(mv) < (unsigned long)__machvec_end; \
 	     (mv)++)
 
 static struct sh_machine_vector * __init get_mv_byname(const char *name)
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ void __init sh_mv_setup(void)
 	if (!machvec_selected) {
 		unsigned long machvec_size;
 
-		machvec_size = ((unsigned long)&__machvec_end -
-				(unsigned long)&__machvec_start);
+		machvec_size = ((unsigned long)__machvec_end -
+				(unsigned long)__machvec_start);
 
 		/*
 		 * Sanity check for machvec section alignment. Ensure
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ void __init sh_mv_setup(void)
 		 * vector (usually the only one) from .machvec.init.
 		 */
 		if (machvec_size >= sizeof(struct sh_machine_vector))
-			sh_mv = *(struct sh_machine_vector *)&__machvec_start;
+			sh_mv = *(struct sh_machine_vector *)__machvec_start;
 	}
 
 	printk(KERN_NOTICE "Booting machvec: %s\n", get_system_type());
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c
index a818ccef3..c23f8857a 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 
 static void *c_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
 {
-	return *pos < NR_CPUS ? cpu_data + *pos : NULL;
+	return *pos < nr_cpu_ids ? cpu_data + *pos : NULL;
 }
 
 static void *c_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index 993dd06c8..806729a71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 #include <asm/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 /*
 
@@ -146,27 +148,19 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 
 .endm
 
-.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1 skip_r11rcx=0
+.macro POP_REGS pop_rdi=1
 	popq %r15
 	popq %r14
 	popq %r13
 	popq %r12
 	popq %rbp
 	popq %rbx
-	.if \skip_r11rcx
-	popq %rsi
-	.else
 	popq %r11
-	.endif
 	popq %r10
 	popq %r9
 	popq %r8
 	popq %rax
-	.if \skip_r11rcx
-	popq %rsi
-	.else
 	popq %rcx
-	.endif
 	popq %rdx
 	popq %rsi
 	.if \pop_rdi
@@ -317,6 +311,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 #endif
 
 /*
+ * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2.
+ *
+ * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers
+ * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET
+ * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction)
+ *
+ * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value,
+ * which is used on the paranoid paths.
+ *
+ * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+	rdmsr
+	shl	$32, %rdx
+	or	%rdx, %rax
+	mov	%rax, \save_reg
+	test	$SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax
+	jz	.Ldo_wrmsr_\@
+	lfence
+	jmp	.Lend_\@
+.Ldo_wrmsr_\@:
+.endif
+
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+	movl	%edx, %eax
+	shr	$32, %rdx
+	wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX)
+ * regs. Must be called after the last RET.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+	mov	\save_reg, %rdx
+.else
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+	andl	$(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx
+.endif
+
+	movl	%edx, %eax
+	shr	$32, %rdx
+	wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+/*
  * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
  *
  * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index 37d9016d4..78b308f2f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -643,7 +643,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	movl	%ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
 	 * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -652,7 +651,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
 	popfl
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index dfe26f3cf..3f418aede 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -235,6 +235,10 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
 	/* IRQs are off. */
 	movq	%rax, %rdi
 	movq	%rsp, %rsi
+
+	/* clobbers %rax, make sure it is after saving the syscall nr */
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	call	do_syscall_64		/* returns with IRQs disabled */
 
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ		/* we're about to change IF */
@@ -311,8 +315,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
 	 * perf profiles. Nothing jumps here.
 	 */
 syscall_return_via_sysret:
-	/* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */
-	POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 skip_r11rcx=1
+	IBRS_EXIT
+	POP_REGS pop_rdi=0
 
 	/*
 	 * Now all regs are restored except RSP and RDI.
@@ -363,7 +367,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	movq	%rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_union)+stack_canary_offset
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	/*
 	 * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
 	 * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -372,7 +375,6 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
 	 * speculative execution to prevent attack.
 	 */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
-#endif
 
 	/* restore callee-saved registers */
 	popfq
@@ -685,6 +687,7 @@ GLOBAL(retint_user)
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ
 
 GLOBAL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
+	IBRS_EXIT
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
 	/* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */
 	testb	$3, CS(%rsp)
@@ -1250,7 +1253,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
 	 */
 	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
 
-	ret
+	/*
+	 * Once we have CR3 and %GS setup save and set SPEC_CTRL. Just like
+	 * CR3 above, keep the old value in a callee saved register.
+	 */
+	IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15
+
+	RET
 END(paranoid_entry)
 
 /*
@@ -1278,12 +1287,20 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_exit)
 	jmp	.Lparanoid_exit_restore
 .Lparanoid_exit_no_swapgs:
 	TRACE_IRQS_IRETQ_DEBUG
+
+	/*
+	 * Must restore IBRS state before both CR3 and %GS since we need access
+	 * to the per-CPU x86_spec_ctrl_shadow variable.
+	 */
+	IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
 	/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
 	RESTORE_CR3	scratch_reg=%rbx save_reg=%r14
 .Lparanoid_exit_restore:
 	jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
 END(paranoid_exit)
 
+
 /*
  * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch GS if needed.
  */
@@ -1303,6 +1320,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	/* We have user CR3.  Change to kernel CR3. */
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+	IBRS_ENTER
 
 .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
 	/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
@@ -1367,6 +1385,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	SWAPGS
 	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
+	IBRS_ENTER
 
 	/*
 	 * Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
@@ -1472,6 +1491,8 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
 	PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx)
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
 
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	/*
 	 * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage
 	 * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're
@@ -1695,6 +1716,9 @@ end_repeat_nmi:
 	movq	$-1, %rsi
 	call	do_nmi
 
+	/* Always restore stashed SPEC_CTRL value (see paranoid_entry) */
+	IBRS_EXIT save_reg=%r15
+
 	/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
 	RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 40d2834a8..85dd05de6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
  *
  * Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
  */
-#include "calling.h"
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/current.h>
 #include <asm/errno.h>
@@ -17,6 +16,8 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 
+#include "calling.h"
+
 	.section .entry.text, "ax"
 
 /*
@@ -106,6 +107,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
 	xorl	%r15d, %r15d		/* nospec   r15 */
 	cld
 
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	/*
 	 * SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
 	 * ourselves.  To save a few cycles, we can check whether
@@ -253,6 +256,8 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe)
 	 */
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
 
+	IBRS_ENTER
+
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
 	call	do_fast_syscall_32
 	/* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */
@@ -262,6 +267,9 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe)
 	/* Opportunistic SYSRET */
 sysret32_from_system_call:
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON			/* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
+
+	IBRS_EXIT
+
 	movq	RBX(%rsp), %rbx		/* pt_regs->rbx */
 	movq	RBP(%rsp), %rbp		/* pt_regs->rbp */
 	movq	EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11	/* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */
@@ -403,6 +411,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
 	 * gate turned them off.
 	 */
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
+	IBRS_ENTER
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rdi
 	call	do_int80_syscall_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
index 884466592..cdf39decf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
@@ -1,16 +1,26 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#ifndef _CPU_DEVICE_ID
-#define _CPU_DEVICE_ID 1
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CPU_DEVICE_ID
+#define _ASM_X86_CPU_DEVICE_ID
 
 /*
  * Declare drivers belonging to specific x86 CPUs
  * Similar in spirit to pci_device_id and related PCI functions
+ *
+ * The wildcard initializers are in mod_devicetable.h because
+ * file2alias needs them. Sigh.
  */
-
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
+/* Get the INTEL_FAM* model defines */
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+/* And the X86_VENDOR_* ones */
+#include <asm/processor.h>
 
-#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs)    GENMASK(maxs, mins)
+/* Centaur FAM6 models */
+#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_C7_A		0xa
+#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_C7_D		0xd
+#define X86_CENTAUR_FAM6_NANO		0xf
 
+#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs)    GENMASK(maxs, mins)
 /**
  * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
  * @_vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
@@ -23,8 +33,11 @@
  *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
  *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
  *
- * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants
- * required for this.
+ * Use only if you need all selectors. Otherwise use one of the shorter
+ * macros of the X86_MATCH_* family. If there is no matching shorthand
+ * macro, consider to add one. If you really need to wrap one of the macros
+ * into another macro at the usage site for good reasons, then please
+ * start this local macro with X86_MATCH to allow easy grepping.
  */
 #define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
 						    _steppings, _feature, _data) { \
@@ -36,6 +49,147 @@
 	.driver_data	= (unsigned long) _data				\
 }
 
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE - Macro for CPU matching
+ * @_vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
+ * @_family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @_model:	The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
+ * @_data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * The steppings arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE() is
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, feature, data) \
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(vendor, family, model, \
+						X86_STEPPING_ANY, feature, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE - Macro for matching vendor, family and CPU feature
+ * @vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor
+ * @family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE(vendor, family, feature, data)	\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family,		\
+					   X86_MODEL_ANY, feature, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FEATURE - Macro for matching vendor and CPU feature
+ * @vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor
+ * @feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FEATURE(vendor, feature, data)			\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_FEATURE(vendor, X86_FAMILY_ANY, feature, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_FEATURE - Macro for matching a CPU feature
+ * @feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_FEATURE(feature, data)				\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FEATURE(ANY, feature, data)
+
+/* Transitional to keep the existing code working */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(feature)	X86_MATCH_FEATURE(feature, NULL)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL - Match vendor, family and model
+ * @vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor
+ * @family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @model:	The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set to wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, data)		\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(vendor, family, model,	\
+					   X86_FEATURE_ANY, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM - Match vendor and family
+ * @vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@vendor
+ * @family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * All other missing arguments to X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are
+ * set of wildcards.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM(vendor, family, data)			\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, data)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL - Match vendor INTEL, family 6 and model
+ * @model:	The model name without the INTEL_FAM6_ prefix or ANY
+ *		The model name is expanded to INTEL_FAM6_@model internally
+ * @data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * The vendor is set to INTEL, the family to 6 and all other missing
+ * arguments of X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() are set to wildcards.
+ *
+ * See X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE() for further information.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(model, data)				\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, data)
+
+/*
+ * Match specific microcode revisions.
+ *
+ * vendor/family/model/stepping must be all set.
+ *
+ * Only checks against the boot CPU.  When mixed-stepping configs are
+ * valid for a CPU model, add a quirk for every valid stepping and
+ * do the fine-tuning in the quirk handler.
+ */
+
+struct x86_cpu_desc {
+	u8	x86_family;
+	u8	x86_vendor;
+	u8	x86_model;
+	u8	x86_stepping;
+	u32	x86_microcode_rev;
+};
+
+#define INTEL_CPU_DESC(model, stepping, revision) {		\
+	.x86_family		= 6,				\
+	.x86_vendor		= X86_VENDOR_INTEL,		\
+	.x86_model		= (model),			\
+	.x86_stepping		= (stepping),			\
+	.x86_microcode_rev	= (revision),			\
+}
+
 extern const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match);
+extern bool x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev(const struct x86_cpu_desc *table);
 
-#endif
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPU_DEVICE_ID */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index e9b79bac9..bd4374f56 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		( 7*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	( 7*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS		( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT		( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2		( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL	( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
@@ -283,7 +283,16 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER	(11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
-#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+ 6) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+ 6) */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+ 7) */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+ 8) */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+ 9) */
+/* FREE!				(11*32+10) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL		(11*32+11) /* "" RET prediction control */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		(11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	(11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE	(11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL	(11*32+18) /* "" MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL (Intel) implemented */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
@@ -296,6 +305,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD		(13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD		(13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO		(13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO		(13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM		(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -397,6 +407,7 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
-#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h
index 00e01d215..e1bd23641 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ struct hv_enlightened_vmcs {
 	u64 guest_rip;
 
 	u32 hv_clean_fields;
-	u32 hv_padding_32;
+	u32 padding32_1;
 	u32 hv_synthetic_controls;
 	struct {
 		u32 nested_flush_hypercall:1;
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ struct hv_enlightened_vmcs {
 		u32 reserved:30;
 	} hv_enlightenments_control;
 	u32 hv_vp_id;
-
+	u32 padding32_2;
 	u64 hv_vm_id;
 	u64 partition_assist_page;
 	u64 padding64_4[4];
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
index db06f1662..1f2f52a34 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@
  * that group keep the CPUID for the variants sorted by model number.
  */
 
+/* Wildcard match for FAM6 so X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ANY) works */
+#define INTEL_FAM6_ANY			X86_MODEL_ANY
+
 #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH		0x0E
 
 #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM		0x0F
@@ -101,6 +104,9 @@
 #define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		0x57 /* Knights Landing */
 #define INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		0x85 /* Knights Mill */
 
+/* Family 5 */
+#define INTEL_FAM5_QUARK_X1000		0x09 /* Quark X1000 SoC */
+
 /* Useful macros */
 #define INTEL_CPU_FAM_ANY(_family, _model, _driver_data)	\
 {								\
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 7a7379953..0bd07699d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT	6	   /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S		BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -73,6 +75,7 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		BIT(0)	/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		BIT(1)	/* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA			BIT(2)	/* RET may use alternative branch predictors */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	BIT(3)	/* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			BIT(4)	/*
 						 * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
@@ -120,6 +123,13 @@
 						 * bit available to control VERW
 						 * behavior.
 						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RRSBA			BIT(19)	/*
+						 * Indicates RET may use predictors
+						 * other than the RSB. With eIBRS
+						 * enabled predictions in kernel mode
+						 * are restricted to targets in
+						 * kernel.
+						 */
 #define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO		BIT(24)	/*
 						 * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
 						 * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
@@ -389,6 +399,11 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS		0xc0010141
 #define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG		0xc0011020
 #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG		0xc0011022
+
+#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG		0xc0011029
+#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT	 1
+#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT)
+
 #define MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2		0xc001102a
 #define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL		0xc0011030
 #define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHLINAD		0xc0011031
@@ -457,9 +472,6 @@
 #define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_MASK	0xfffffffULL
 #define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_SHIFT	20
 #define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID		0xc001100c
-#define MSR_F10H_DECFG			0xc0011029
-#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT	1
-#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE		BIT_ULL(MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT)
 
 /* K8 MSRs */
 #define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1			0xc001001a
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 17a236a8b..8dba996e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/percpu.h>
 
 /*
  * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
@@ -70,12 +71,11 @@
 	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
 #endif
 
-/* Sequence to mitigate PBRSB on eIBRS CPUs */
-#define __ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(sp)	\
-	call	881f;				\
+#define ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(sp)		\
+	call 992f;				\
 	int3;					\
-881:						\
-	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8), sp;		\
+992:						\
+	add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), sp;		\
 	lfence;
 
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
@@ -165,13 +165,11 @@
   * monstrosity above, manually.
   */
 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@",				\
 		__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP))	\
 		\ftr
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
-#endif
 .endm
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
@@ -252,6 +250,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
 };
 
 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
@@ -280,26 +279,21 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
  * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
  */
-static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
+static __always_inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	unsigned long loops;
 
 	asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-		      ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
-				  __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
-				  X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+		      ALTERNATIVE_2("jmp 910f", "", X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,
+				    "jmp 911f", X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE)
+		      __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1))
+		      "911:"
+		      __stringify(ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(%1))
 		      "910:"
 		      : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
 		      : : "memory" );
 #endif
-	asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
-		      ALTERNATIVE("jmp 920f",
-				  __stringify(__ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD(%0)),
-				  X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE)
-		      "920:"
-		      : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
-		      : : "memory" );
 }
 
 static __always_inline
@@ -322,6 +316,9 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+extern void update_spec_ctrl_cond(u64 val);
+extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
 
 /*
  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
@@ -331,18 +328,16 @@ extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
  */
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()			\
 do {									\
-	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;			\
-									\
 	preempt_disable();						\
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
+			      spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS,	\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
 } while (0)
 
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()			\
 do {									\
-	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base;					\
-									\
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
+			      spec_ctrl_current(),			\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
 	preempt_enable();						\
 } while (0)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 98c23126f..e017f64e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -789,8 +789,6 @@ static void init_amd_gh(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH);
 }
 
-#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG	0xC0011029
-
 static void init_amd_ln(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	/*
@@ -885,12 +883,21 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
 
-	/*
-	 * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID.
-	 * Always set it, except when running under a hypervisor.
-	 */
-	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+	/* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+
+		/* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */
+		if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+
+		/*
+		 * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
+		 * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
+		 * BTC_NO bit.
+		 */
+		if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO);
+	}
 }
 
 static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -951,16 +958,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		 * msr_set_bit() uses the safe accessors, too, even if the MSR
 		 * is not present.
 		 */
-		msr_set_bit(MSR_F10H_DECFG,
-			    MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
+		msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG,
+			    MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
 
 		/*
 		 * Verify that the MSR write was successful (could be running
 		 * under a hypervisor) and only then assume that LFENCE is
 		 * serializing.
 		 */
-		ret = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_F10H_DECFG, &val);
-		if (!ret && (val & MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE)) {
+		ret = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, &val);
+		if (!ret && (val & MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT)) {
 			/* A serializing LFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
 			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
 		} else {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 501d09d59..f1f57acca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
 
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -46,16 +48,47 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
 
-/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
+/* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */
+static void update_spec_ctrl(u64 val)
+{
+	this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+}
+
 /*
- * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
- * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
+ * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
+ * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update().
  */
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+void update_spec_ctrl_cond(u64 val)
+{
+	if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
+		return;
+
+	this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
+
+	/*
+	 * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless
+	 * forced the update can be delayed until that time.
+	 */
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+}
+
+u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
+{
+	return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
 
 /*
  * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
@@ -105,13 +138,21 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
-	/* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
-		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-
 	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
 	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+	/*
+	 * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+	 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
+	 * spectre_v2=ibrs.
+	 */
+	retbleed_select_mitigation();
+	/*
+	 * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+	 * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
+	 * forced for UNRET.
+	 */
+	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 	md_clear_select_mitigation();
@@ -151,31 +192,17 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+/*
+ * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path.
+ * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead.
+ */
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {
-	u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+	u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
 	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
 
-	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
 	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
-		/*
-		 * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
-		 * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
-		 * modifiable bits from the guest value.
-		 */
-		guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-		guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-
-		/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
-		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
-		    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
-			hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-
-		/* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
-		if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
-			hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-
 		if (hostval != guestval) {
 			msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
 			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
@@ -705,12 +732,103 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
 }
 early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
 
-#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
-
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
 	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "RETBleed: " fmt
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation {
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
+};
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
+	RETBLEED_CMD_OFF,
+	RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO,
+};
+
+const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS]	= "Mitigation: IBRS",
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS]	= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+};
+
+static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
+static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
+	RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+
+static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "auto"))
+		retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+	else
+		pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
+
+#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
+
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+		return;
+
+	switch (retbleed_cmd) {
+	case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF:
+		return;
+
+	case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
+		 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().
+		 */
+
+		break;
+	}
+
+	switch (retbleed_mitigation) {
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
+	 * retbleed= cmdline option.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+		switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+		case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
+			break;
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
+
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
@@ -740,6 +858,7 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
 #define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
 #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
 #define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG "WARNING: IBRS mitigation selected on Enhanced IBRS CPU, this may cause unnecessary performance loss\n"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
 void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
@@ -781,6 +900,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,
 };
 
 enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
@@ -821,13 +941,15 @@ static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
 		pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
 }
 
+static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd;
+
 static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
-spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
 {
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	switch (v2_cmd) {
+	switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
 		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
@@ -853,15 +975,16 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
 }
 
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
 {
-	return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
-		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
-		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
+	return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
+	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+	       mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
 }
 
 static void __init
-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 	bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
@@ -874,7 +997,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	    cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
 		smt_possible = false;
 
-	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
+	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline();
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
 		goto set_mode;
@@ -922,12 +1045,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
-	 * required.
+	 * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
+	 * STIBP is not required.
 	 */
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
 	    !smt_possible ||
-	    spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+	    spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -952,6 +1075,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
 	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS]			= "Mitigation: IBRS",
 };
 
 static const struct {
@@ -969,6 +1093,7 @@ static const struct {
 	{ "eibrs,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,	  false },
 	{ "eibrs,retpoline",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,	  false },
 	{ "auto",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,		  false },
+	{ "ibrs",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,              false },
 };
 
 static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
@@ -1031,6 +1156,24 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
 	spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
 			   mitigation_options[i].secure);
 	return cmd;
@@ -1046,6 +1189,22 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
 	return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
 }
 
+/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
+static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
+		return;
+
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
+		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
+		update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	}
+}
+
 static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
 {
 	/*
@@ -1070,19 +1229,24 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
 	 */
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
-	/* These modes already fill RSB at vmexit */
-	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
-	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 		return;
 
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
-		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
+		    (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)) {
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
 		}
 		return;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+		return;
 	}
 
 	pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit");
@@ -1113,6 +1277,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 			break;
 		}
 
+		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
+		    retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
+		    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
+		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+			mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
 		break;
 
@@ -1129,6 +1301,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
 		break;
 
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+		break;
+
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
 		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
 		break;
@@ -1145,10 +1321,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
 		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
 
-	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
-		/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 	}
 
 	switch (mode) {
@@ -1156,6 +1331,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
 		break;
 
+	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED))
+			pr_warn(SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG);
+		break;
+
 	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
@@ -1167,16 +1348,56 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and
+	 * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET
+	 * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk.
+	 */
+	if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+	    mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+	    mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
+		spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
+
 	spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
 	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 
 	/*
-	 * If spectre v2 protection has been enabled, unconditionally fill
-	 * RSB during a context switch; this protects against two independent
-	 * issues:
+	 * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a
+	 * context switch.  In general there are two types of RSB attacks
+	 * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced.
+	 *
+	 * 1) RSB underflow
+	 *
+	 *    Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB".  When the RSB is empty,
+	 *    speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor,
+	 *    which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry.
+	 *
+	 *    AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB,
+	 *    regardless of the state of the RSB.
+	 *
+	 *    When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack
+	 *    scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation
+	 *    properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to
+	 *    protect against this type of attack.
+	 *
+	 *    The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling.
 	 *
-	 *	- RSB underflow (and switch to BTB) on Skylake+
-	 *	- SpectreRSB variant of spectre v2 on X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 CPUs
+	 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+	 *
+	 *    If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev',
+	 *    'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB
+	 *    entry.
+	 *
+	 *    The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and
+	 *    eIBRS.
+	 *
+	 *    The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires
+	 *    RSB clearing.
+	 *
+	 * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context
+	 * switches.
+	 *
+	 * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD?
 	 */
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
 	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
@@ -1184,28 +1405,29 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
 
 	/*
-	 * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
-	 * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
-	 * speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
-	 * supported.
+	 * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware.  IBRS
+	 * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
+	 * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
+	 * enabled.
 	 *
 	 * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
 	 * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
 	 * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
 	 * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
 		pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
 	}
 
 	/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
-	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
+	spectre_v2_cmd = cmd;
 }
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
 {
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	u64 val = spec_ctrl_current() | (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
+	update_spec_ctrl(val);
 }
 
 /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
@@ -1422,16 +1644,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper
-	 * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
-	 * case where the host does not enable it.
-	 */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
-	    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
-		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-	}
-
-	/*
 	 * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
 	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
@@ -1448,7 +1660,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
 			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 		} else {
 			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+			update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1653,7 +1865,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
 		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
@@ -1888,7 +2100,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
 
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
-	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return "";
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
@@ -1922,7 +2134,7 @@ static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) ||
-		    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE))
+		    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT))
 			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence";
 		else
 			return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable";
@@ -1958,6 +2170,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
 }
 
+static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -2004,6 +2221,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN:
 		return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
+		return retbleed_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -2063,4 +2283,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *at
 	else
 		return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 653ced7cb..55293e5dc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -954,8 +954,8 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #define MSBDS_ONLY		BIT(5)
 #define NO_SWAPGS		BIT(6)
 #define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT	BIT(7)
-#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB		BIT(8)
-#define NO_MMIO			BIT(9)
+#define NO_MMIO			BIT(8)
+#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB		BIT(9)
 
 #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist)	\
 	{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -1022,48 +1022,55 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
+#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)	\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)
+
 #define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues)		   \
 	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
 					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
 					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
 
+#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist)		\
+	VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
 #define SRBDS		BIT(0)
 /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
 #define MMIO		BIT(1)
 /* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
 #define MMIO_SBDS	BIT(2)
+/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
+#define RETBLEED	BIT(3)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X,	BIT(2) | BIT(4),		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_XEON_D,X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5),	MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_XEON_D,X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
-						BIT(7) | BIT(0xB),              MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC),	SRBDS | MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD),	SRBDS | MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_MOBILE,X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1169,6 +1176,11 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
 	}
 
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+	}
+
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
 	    !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
 	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
index 751e59057..ad6776081 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
@@ -16,12 +16,17 @@
  * respective wildcard entries.
  *
  * A typical table entry would be to match a specific CPU
- * { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, 0x12 }
- * or to match a specific CPU feature
- * { X86_FEATURE_MATCH(X86_FEATURE_FOOBAR) }
+ *
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL,
+ *				      X86_FEATURE_ANY, NULL);
  *
  * Fields can be wildcarded with %X86_VENDOR_ANY, %X86_FAMILY_ANY,
- * %X86_MODEL_ANY, %X86_FEATURE_ANY or 0 (except for vendor)
+ * %X86_MODEL_ANY, %X86_FEATURE_ANY (except for vendor)
+ *
+ * asm/cpu_device_id.h contains a set of useful macros which are shortcuts
+ * for various common selections. The above can be shortened to:
+ *
+ * X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL, NULL);
  *
  * Arrays used to match for this should also be declared using
  * MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, ...)
@@ -53,3 +58,34 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
 	return NULL;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(x86_match_cpu);
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_desc *
+x86_match_cpu_with_stepping(const struct x86_cpu_desc *match)
+{
+	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+	const struct x86_cpu_desc *m;
+
+	for (m = match; m->x86_family | m->x86_model; m++) {
+		if (c->x86_vendor != m->x86_vendor)
+			continue;
+		if (c->x86 != m->x86_family)
+			continue;
+		if (c->x86_model != m->x86_model)
+			continue;
+		if (c->x86_stepping != m->x86_stepping)
+			continue;
+		return m;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+bool x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev(const struct x86_cpu_desc *table)
+{
+	const struct x86_cpu_desc *res = x86_match_cpu_with_stepping(table);
+
+	if (!res || res->x86_microcode_rev > boot_cpu_data.microcode)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
index a4e7e100e..8396c77e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
@@ -222,7 +222,13 @@ apply_microcode_early_amd(u32 cpuid_1_eax, void *ucode, size_t size, bool save_p
 		return ret;
 
 	native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
-	if (rev >= mc->hdr.patch_id)
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow application of the same revision to pick up SMT-specific
+	 * changes even if the revision of the other SMT thread is already
+	 * up-to-date.
+	 */
+	if (rev > mc->hdr.patch_id)
 		return ret;
 
 	if (!__apply_microcode_amd(mc)) {
@@ -304,8 +310,12 @@ void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int cpuid_1_eax)
 
 	native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
 
-	/* Check whether we have saved a new patch already: */
-	if (*new_rev && rev < mc->hdr.patch_id) {
+	/*
+	 * Check whether a new patch has been saved already. Also, allow application of
+	 * the same revision in order to pick up SMT-thread-specific configuration even
+	 * if the sibling SMT thread already has an up-to-date revision.
+	 */
+	if (*new_rev && rev <= mc->hdr.patch_id) {
 		if (!__apply_microcode_amd(mc)) {
 			*new_rev = mc->hdr.patch_id;
 			return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 5a52672e3..90bd155d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct cpuid_bit {
 static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF,       CPUID_ECX,  0, 0x00000006, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_EPB,		CPUID_ECX,  3, 0x00000006, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL,	CPUID_EDX,  2, 0x00000007, 2 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC,		CPUID_EDX,  1, 0x0000000f, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC,	CPUID_EDX,  0, 0x0000000f, 1 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL,	CPUID_EDX,  1, 0x0000000f, 1 },
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
index 032509adf..88a553ee7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
@@ -55,24 +55,6 @@ void tsx_enable(void)
 	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
 }
 
-static bool __init tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void)
-{
-	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
-
-	/*
-	 * TSX is controlled via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL.  However, support for this
-	 * MSR is enumerated by ARCH_CAP_TSX_MSR bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
-	 *
-	 * TSX control (aka MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) is only available after a
-	 * microcode update on CPUs that have their MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
-	 * bit MDS_NO=1. CPUs with MDS_NO=0 are not planned to get
-	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support even after a microcode update. Thus,
-	 * tsx= cmdline requests will do nothing on CPUs without
-	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support.
-	 */
-	return !!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR);
-}
-
 static enum tsx_ctrl_states x86_get_tsx_auto_mode(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
@@ -86,9 +68,22 @@ void __init tsx_init(void)
 	char arg[5] = {};
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!tsx_ctrl_is_supported())
+	/*
+	 * TSX is controlled via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL.  However, support for this
+	 * MSR is enumerated by ARCH_CAP_TSX_MSR bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
+	 *
+	 * TSX control (aka MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) is only available after a
+	 * microcode update on CPUs that have their MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+	 * bit MDS_NO=1. CPUs with MDS_NO=0 are not planned to get
+	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support even after a microcode update. Thus,
+	 * tsx= cmdline requests will do nothing on CPUs without
+	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support.
+	 */
+	if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
 		return;
 
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL);
+
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "tsx", arg, sizeof(arg));
 	if (ret >= 0) {
 		if (!strcmp(arg, "on")) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index cd138bfd9..e8d40a597 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
 	}
 
 	if (updmsr)
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+		update_spec_ctrl_cond(msr);
 }
 
 static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
index 5c48d2c4c..0c0f0eda3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state *state, struct task_struct *task,
 	/* Otherwise, skip ahead to the user-specified starting frame: */
 	while (!unwind_done(state) &&
 	       (!on_stack(&state->stack_info, first_frame, sizeof(long)) ||
-			state->sp < (unsigned long)first_frame))
+			state->sp <= (unsigned long)first_frame))
 		unwind_next_frame(state);
 
 	return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 0489ffc3d..768a765c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -680,6 +680,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 			g_phys_as = phys_as;
 
 		entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
+		entry->ecx &= ~(GENMASK(31, 16) | GENMASK(11, 8));
 		entry->edx = 0;
 		/*
 		 * IBRS, IBPB and VIRT_SSBD aren't necessarily present in
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 25bdd0696..0cb75d29e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -759,8 +759,7 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 			   ctxt->mode, linear);
 }
 
-static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst,
-			     enum x86emul_mode mode)
+static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
 {
 	ulong linear;
 	int rc;
@@ -770,41 +769,71 @@ static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst,
 
 	if (ctxt->op_bytes != sizeof(unsigned long))
 		addr.ea = dst & ((1UL << (ctxt->op_bytes << 3)) - 1);
-	rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 1, false, true, mode, &linear);
+	rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 1, false, true, ctxt->mode, &linear);
 	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		ctxt->_eip = addr.ea;
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static inline int emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 efer;
+	struct desc_struct cs;
+	u16 selector;
+	u32 base3;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
+
+	if (!(ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & X86_CR0_PE)) {
+		/* Real mode. cpu must not have long mode active */
+		if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+			return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_REAL;
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) {
+		/* Protected/VM86 mode. cpu must not have long mode active */
+		if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+			return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_VM86;
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	if (!ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &selector, &cs, &base3, VCPU_SREG_CS))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
+		if (cs.l) {
+			/* Proper long mode */
+			ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
+		} else if (cs.d) {
+			/* 32 bit compatibility mode*/
+			ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
+		} else {
+			ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Legacy 32 bit / 16 bit mode */
+		ctxt->mode = cs.d ? X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32 : X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
+	}
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
 static inline int assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
 {
-	return assign_eip(ctxt, dst, ctxt->mode);
+	return assign_eip(ctxt, dst);
 }
 
-static int assign_eip_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst,
-			  const struct desc_struct *cs_desc)
+static int assign_eip_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
 {
-	enum x86emul_mode mode = ctxt->mode;
-	int rc;
+	int rc = emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(ctxt);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16) {
-		if (cs_desc->l) {
-			u64 efer = 0;
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
 
-			ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
-			if (efer & EFER_LMA)
-				mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
-		} else
-			mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32; /* temporary value */
-	}
-#endif
-	if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 || mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32)
-		mode = cs_desc->d ? X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32 : X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
-	rc = assign_eip(ctxt, dst, mode);
-	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
-		ctxt->mode = mode;
-	return rc;
+	return assign_eip(ctxt, dst);
 }
 
 static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)
@@ -1975,7 +2004,7 @@ static int em_pop_sreg(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return rc;
 
-	if (ctxt->modrm_reg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
 		ctxt->interruptibility = KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
 	if (ctxt->op_bytes > 2)
 		rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->op_bytes - 2);
@@ -2192,7 +2221,7 @@ static int em_jmp_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val, &new_desc);
+	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
 	/* Error handling is not implemented. */
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
@@ -2273,7 +2302,7 @@ static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 				       &new_desc);
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return rc;
-	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip, &new_desc);
+	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip);
 	/* Error handling is not implemented. */
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
@@ -2895,6 +2924,7 @@ static int em_sysexit(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
 
 	ctxt->_eip = rdx;
+	ctxt->mode = usermode;
 	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = rcx;
 
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
@@ -3491,7 +3521,7 @@ static int em_call_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val, &new_desc);
+	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		goto fail;
 
@@ -3638,11 +3668,25 @@ static int em_movbe(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 
 static int em_cr_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
-	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg, ctxt->src.val))
+	int cr_num = ctxt->modrm_reg;
+	int r;
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, cr_num, ctxt->src.val))
 		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
 
 	/* Disable writeback. */
 	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+
+	if (cr_num == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * CR0 write might have updated CR0.PE and/or CR0.PG
+		 * which can affect the cpu's execution mode.
+		 */
+		r = emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(ctxt);
+		if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return r;
+	}
+
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index e1492a67e..cd3432df0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <asm/kvm_para.h>
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 
 #include <asm/virtext.h>
 #include "trace.h"
@@ -4154,9 +4155,9 @@ static int svm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
 	msr->data = 0;
 
 	switch (msr->index) {
-	case MSR_F10H_DECFG:
-		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
-			msr->data |= MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE;
+	case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
+		if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
+			msr->data |= MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE;
 		break;
 	default:
 		return 1;
@@ -4258,7 +4259,7 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 			msr_info->data = 0x1E;
 		}
 		break;
-	case MSR_F10H_DECFG:
+	case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
 		msr_info->data = svm->msr_decfg;
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -4445,7 +4446,7 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 	case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
 		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", ecx, data);
 		break;
-	case MSR_F10H_DECFG: {
+	case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG: {
 		struct kvm_msr_entry msr_entry;
 
 		msr_entry.index = msr->index;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 20ce79458..9bb696d73 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/asm.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/vmx.h>
@@ -2132,9 +2133,9 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_disable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	if (!vmx->disable_fb_clear)
 		return;
 
-	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL);
 	msr |= FB_CLEAR_DIS;
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
+	native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, msr);
 	/* Cache the MSR value to avoid reading it later */
 	vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl = msr;
 }
@@ -2145,7 +2146,7 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		return;
 
 	vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~FB_CLEAR_DIS;
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
+	native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, vmx->msr_ia32_mcu_opt_ctrl);
 }
 
 static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
@@ -10759,10 +10760,35 @@ static void vmx_update_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_armed = false;
 }
 
+u64 __always_inline vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u64 guestval, hostval = this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+		return 0;
+
+	guestval = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
+
+	/*
+	 *
+	 * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after
+	 * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of
+	 * whether the guest/host values differ.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) ||
+	    guestval != hostval)
+		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
+
+	barrier_nospec();
+
+	return guestval;
+}
+
 static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
 	unsigned long cr3, cr4, evmcs_rsp;
+	u64 spec_ctrl;
 
 	/* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
 	if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
@@ -10988,9 +11014,24 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 #endif
 	      );
 
-	/* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+	/*
+	 * IMPORTANT: RSB filling and SPEC_CTRL handling must be done before
+	 * the first unbalanced RET after vmexit!
+	 *
+	 * For retpoline or IBRS, RSB filling is needed to prevent poisoned RSB
+	 * entries and (in some cases) RSB underflow.
+	 *
+	 * eIBRS has its own protection against poisoned RSB, so it doesn't
+	 * need the RSB filling sequence.  But it does need to be enabled, and a
+	 * single call to retire, before the first unbalanced RET.
+	 *
+	 * So no RETs before vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() below.
+	 */
 	vmexit_fill_RSB();
 
+	/* Save this for below */
+	spec_ctrl = vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx);
+
 	vmx_enable_fb_clear(vmx);
 
 	/*
@@ -11009,9 +11050,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * save it.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
-		vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
-
-	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
+		vmx->spec_ctrl = spec_ctrl;
 
 	/* All fields are clean at this point */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
@@ -13276,14 +13315,6 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
 		 */
 		vmcs12_save_pending_event(vcpu, vmcs12);
 	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Drop what we picked up for L2 via vmx_complete_interrupts. It is
-	 * preserved above and would only end up incorrectly in L1.
-	 */
-	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
-	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
-	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -13617,6 +13648,17 @@ static void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason,
 			nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_SAVE_GUEST_MSR_FAIL);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Drop events/exceptions that were queued for re-injection to L2
+	 * (picked up via vmx_complete_interrupts()), as well as exceptions
+	 * that were pending for L2.  Note, this must NOT be hoisted above
+	 * prepare_vmcs12(), events/exceptions queued for re-injection need to
+	 * be captured in vmcs12 (see vmcs12_save_pending_event()).
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
 	vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
 	vm_entry_controls_reset_shadow(vmx);
 	vm_exit_controls_reset_shadow(vmx);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index be4697d91..8fe615df8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ static u32 msr_based_features[] = {
 	MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
 	MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC,
 
-	MSR_F10H_DECFG,
+	MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG,
 	MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV,
 	MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES,
 };
@@ -9736,9 +9736,9 @@ void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_end_assignment);
 
-bool kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
+bool noinstr kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
-	return atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
+	return arch_atomic_read(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_has_assigned_device);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index adc77904f..7da9b4270 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -171,9 +171,15 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 	 * Mappings have to be page-aligned
 	 */
 	offset = phys_addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
-	phys_addr &= PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK;
+	phys_addr &= PAGE_MASK;
 	size = PAGE_ALIGN(last_addr+1) - phys_addr;
 
+	/*
+	 * Mask out any bits not part of the actual physical
+	 * address, like memory encryption bits.
+	 */
+	phys_addr &= PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK;
+
 	retval = reserve_memtype(phys_addr, (u64)phys_addr + size,
 						pcm, &new_pcm);
 	if (retval) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/cpu.c b/arch/x86/power/cpu.c
index 794824948..75cd943f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/cpu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/power/cpu.c
@@ -527,15 +527,23 @@ static int pm_cpu_check(const struct x86_cpu_id *c)
 
 static void pm_save_spec_msr(void)
 {
-	u32 spec_msr_id[] = {
-		MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
-		MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
-		MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT,
-		MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL,
-		MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG,
+	struct msr_enumeration {
+		u32 msr_no;
+		u32 feature;
+	} msr_enum[] = {
+		{ MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,	 X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL },
+		{ MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,	 X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL },
+		{ MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT,	 X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT },
+		{ MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL },
+		{ MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG,	 X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD },
+		{ MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG,	 X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC },
 	};
+	int i;
 
-	msr_build_context(spec_msr_id, ARRAY_SIZE(spec_msr_id));
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_enum); i++) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(msr_enum[i].feature))
+			msr_build_context(&msr_enum[i].msr_no, 1);
+	}
 }
 
 static int pm_check_save_msr(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_32.h b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_32.h
index 68fd2cf52..f6e9f8439 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/um/shared/sysdep/syscalls_32.h
@@ -6,10 +6,9 @@
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 #include <sysdep/ptrace.h>
 
-typedef long syscall_handler_t(struct pt_regs);
+typedef long syscall_handler_t(struct syscall_args);
 
 extern syscall_handler_t *sys_call_table[];
 
 #define EXECUTE_SYSCALL(syscall, regs) \
-	((long (*)(struct syscall_args)) \
-	 (*sys_call_table[syscall]))(SYSCALL_ARGS(&regs->regs))
+	((*sys_call_table[syscall]))(SYSCALL_ARGS(&regs->regs))
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/tls_32.c b/arch/x86/um/tls_32.c
index 5bd949da7..b69ab2409 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/tls_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/tls_32.c
@@ -65,9 +65,6 @@ static int get_free_idx(struct task_struct* task)
 	struct thread_struct *t = &task->thread;
 	int idx;
 
-	if (!t->arch.tls_array)
-		return GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
-
 	for (idx = 0; idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES; idx++)
 		if (!t->arch.tls_array[idx].present)
 			return idx + GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
@@ -242,9 +239,6 @@ static int get_tls_entry(struct task_struct *task, struct user_desc *info,
 {
 	struct thread_struct *t = &task->thread;
 
-	if (!t->arch.tls_array)
-		goto clear;
-
 	if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
author	Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>	2024-05-08 03:43:32 +0000
committer	Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>	2024-05-08 03:43:32 +0000
commit	f530fbb7a18f2794e4178dfb7cd07719b9586147 (patch)
tree	3f704b17427743e26452771cf7da2ed110346ddd /arch
parent	Adding debian version 4.19.260-1. (diff)
download	linux-f530fbb7a18f2794e4178dfb7cd07719b9586147.tar.xz linux-f530fbb7a18f2794e4178dfb7cd07719b9586147.zip