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| author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-08 04:21:41 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-08 04:21:41 +0000 |
| commit | b488a8b2c3eaf68ad4778dbdc99bdda0b0d1ce6d (patch) | |
| tree | 9f60f0d41af253fa943e7811f231d36852f10f1e /debian/patches/bugfix | |
| parent | Merging upstream version 4.19.304. (diff) | |
| download | linux-b488a8b2c3eaf68ad4778dbdc99bdda0b0d1ce6d.tar.xz linux-b488a8b2c3eaf68ad4778dbdc99bdda0b0d1ce6d.zip | |
Adding debian version 4.19.304-1.debian/4.19.304-1debian
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
21 files changed, 0 insertions, 2402 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/arm-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/arm-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8b3c04d39..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/arm-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -From 980d7eb01638f535e9ab885449c0bbb4cec0fde6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:25 +0200 -Subject: ARM: cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit ee31bb0524a2e7c99b03f50249a411cc1eaa411f upstream - -check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new -arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. - -No functional change. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.078124882@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/arm/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 4 ---- - arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c | 3 ++- - 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - ---- a/arch/arm/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig -@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config ARM - default y - select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA - select ARCH_DISCARD_MEMBLOCK if !HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID && !KEXEC -+ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if MMU - select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL if MMU - select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED - select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE ---- a/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h -@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@ - /* -- * arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h -- * - * Copyright (C) 1995-2003 Russell King - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify -@@ -13,10 +11,8 @@ - extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void); - - #ifdef CONFIG_MMU --extern void check_bugs(void); - extern void check_other_bugs(void); - #else --#define check_bugs() do { } while (0) - #define check_other_bugs() do { } while (0) - #endif - ---- a/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c -+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c -@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ - // SPDX-Identifier: GPL-2.0 - #include <linux/init.h> -+#include <linux/cpu.h> - #include <asm/bugs.h> - #include <asm/proc-fns.h> - -@@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ void check_other_bugs(void) - #endif - } - --void __init check_bugs(void) -+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) - { - check_writebuffer_bugs(); - check_other_bugs(); diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/documentation-x86-fix-backwards-on-off-logic-about-ymm-support.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/documentation-x86-fix-backwards-on-off-logic-about-ymm-support.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7bb1f3261..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/documentation-x86-fix-backwards-on-off-logic-about-ymm-support.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -From 1b0fc0345f2852ffe54fb9ae0e12e2ee69ad6a20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> -Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 07:31:07 -0700 -Subject: Documentation/x86: Fix backwards on/off logic about YMM support - -From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> - -commit 1b0fc0345f2852ffe54fb9ae0e12e2ee69ad6a20 upstream - -These options clearly turn *off* XSAVE YMM support. Correct the -typo. - -Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> -Fixes: 553a5c03e90a ("x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation") -Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - ---- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst -+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst -@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ GDS can also be mitigated on systems tha - disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or - "clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line. - --If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning on XSAVE YMM support. -+If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support. - However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that - does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM - support will break. diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/ia64-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/ia64-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 12aa098f7..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/ia64-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -From dff0dc6635f86b571b1bb61f3f3525b3763c3566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:27 +0200 -Subject: ia64/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 6c38e3005621800263f117fb00d6787a76e16de7 upstream - -check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new -arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. - -No functional change. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.137045745@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/ia64/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h | 20 -------------------- - arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c | 3 +-- - 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) - delete mode 100644 arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h - ---- a/arch/ia64/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/ia64/Kconfig -@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ menu "Processor type and features" - - config IA64 - bool -+ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT - select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT - select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO - select PCI if (!IA64_HP_SIM) ---- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ --/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ --/* -- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. -- * -- * Needs: -- * void check_bugs(void); -- * -- * Based on <asm-alpha/bugs.h>. -- * -- * Modified 1998, 1999, 2003 -- * David Mosberger-Tang <davidm@hpl.hp.com>, Hewlett-Packard Co. -- */ --#ifndef _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H --#define _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H -- --#include <asm/processor.h> -- --extern void check_bugs (void); -- --#endif /* _ASM_IA64_BUGS_H */ ---- a/arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c -+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/setup.c -@@ -1050,8 +1050,7 @@ cpu_init (void) - platform_cpu_init(); - } - --void __init --check_bugs (void) -+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) - { - ia64_patch_mckinley_e9((unsigned long) __start___mckinley_e9_bundles, - (unsigned long) __end___mckinley_e9_bundles); diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-invoke-arch_cpu_finalize_init-earlier.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-invoke-arch_cpu_finalize_init-earlier.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bcb206f87..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-invoke-arch_cpu_finalize_init-earlier.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -From 4f8644b469a237107a34deb77ca301377c7def7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:39 +0200 -Subject: init: Invoke arch_cpu_finalize_init() earlier - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 9df9d2f0471b4c4702670380b8d8a45b40b23a7d upstream - -X86 is reworking the boot process so that initializations which are not -required during early boot can be moved into the late boot process and out -of the fragile and restricted initial boot phase. - -arch_cpu_finalize_init() is the obvious place to do such initializations, -but arch_cpu_finalize_init() is invoked too late in start_kernel() e.g. for -initializing the FPU completely. fork_init() requires that the FPU is -initialized as the size of task_struct on X86 depends on the size of the -required FPU register buffer. - -Fortunately none of the init calls between calibrate_delay() and -arch_cpu_finalize_init() is relevant for the functionality of -arch_cpu_finalize_init(). - -Invoke it right after calibrate_delay() where everything which is relevant -for arch_cpu_finalize_init() has been set up already. - -No functional change intended. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.612182854@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - init/main.c | 5 +++-- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/init/main.c -+++ b/init/main.c -@@ -699,6 +699,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_k - late_time_init(); - sched_clock_init(); - calibrate_delay(); -+ -+ arch_cpu_finalize_init(); -+ - pid_idr_init(); - anon_vma_init(); - #ifdef CONFIG_X86 -@@ -726,8 +729,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_k - delayacct_init(); - - -- arch_cpu_finalize_init(); -- - acpi_subsystem_init(); - arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(); - sfi_init_late(); diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-provide-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-provide-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9e56c09a8..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-provide-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -From 11bc27b01a313cc489c807ceddb0a93a6770fd11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:22 +0200 -Subject: init: Provide arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 7725acaa4f0c04fbefb0e0d342635b967bb7d414 upstream - -check_bugs() has become a dumping ground for all sorts of activities to -finalize the CPU initialization before running the rest of the init code. - -Most are empty, a few do actual bug checks, some do alternative patching -and some cobble a CPU advertisement string together.... - -Aside of that the current implementation requires duplicated function -declaration and mostly empty header files for them. - -Provide a new function arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Provide a generic -declaration if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT is selected and a stub -inline otherwise. - -This requires a temporary #ifdef in start_kernel() which will be removed -along with check_bugs() once the architectures are converted over. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224544.957805717@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/Kconfig | 3 +++ - include/linux/cpu.h | 6 ++++++ - init/main.c | 5 +++++ - 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+) - ---- a/arch/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/Kconfig -@@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE - config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY - bool - -+config ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT -+ bool -+ - # Select if arch init_task must go in the __init_task_data section - config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK - bool ---- a/include/linux/cpu.h -+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h -@@ -170,6 +170,12 @@ void arch_cpu_idle_enter(void); - void arch_cpu_idle_exit(void); - void arch_cpu_idle_dead(void); - -+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT -+void arch_cpu_finalize_init(void); -+#else -+static inline void arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) { } -+#endif -+ - int cpu_report_state(int cpu); - int cpu_check_up_prepare(int cpu); - void cpu_set_state_online(int cpu); ---- a/init/main.c -+++ b/init/main.c -@@ -726,7 +726,12 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_k - taskstats_init_early(); - delayacct_init(); - -+ -+ arch_cpu_finalize_init(); -+ /* Temporary conditional until everything has been converted */ -+#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT - check_bugs(); -+#endif - - acpi_subsystem_init(); - arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(); diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-remove-check_bugs-leftovers.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-remove-check_bugs-leftovers.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8698e892d..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-remove-check_bugs-leftovers.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,155 +0,0 @@ -From eb6d42cbbc5b7384bebb9b783970c5b07ac10fc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:38 +0200 -Subject: init: Remove check_bugs() leftovers - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 61235b24b9cb37c13fcad5b9596d59a1afdcec30 upstream - -Everything is converted over to arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Remove the -check_bugs() leftovers including the empty stubs in asm-generic, alpha, -parisc, powerpc and xtensa. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.553215951@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h | 20 -------------------- - arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h | 20 -------------------- - arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h | 18 ------------------ - arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h | 18 ------------------ - include/asm-generic/bugs.h | 11 ----------- - init/main.c | 5 ----- - 6 files changed, 92 deletions(-) - delete mode 100644 arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h - delete mode 100644 arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h - delete mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h - delete mode 100644 arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h - delete mode 100644 include/asm-generic/bugs.h - ---- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ --/* -- * include/asm-alpha/bugs.h -- * -- * Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds -- */ -- --/* -- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. -- * -- * Needs: -- * void check_bugs(void); -- */ -- --/* -- * I don't know of any alpha bugs yet.. Nice chip -- */ -- --static void check_bugs(void) --{ --} ---- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ --/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ --/* -- * include/asm-parisc/bugs.h -- * -- * Copyright (C) 1999 Mike Shaver -- */ -- --/* -- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. -- * -- * Needs: -- * void check_bugs(void); -- */ -- --#include <asm/processor.h> -- --static inline void check_bugs(void) --{ --// identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data); --} ---- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ --#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H --#define _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H -- --/* -- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License -- * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version -- * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. -- */ -- --/* -- * This file is included by 'init/main.c' to check for -- * architecture-dependent bugs. -- */ -- --static inline void check_bugs(void) { } -- --#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_BUGS_H */ ---- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ --/* -- * include/asm-xtensa/bugs.h -- * -- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. -- * -- * Xtensa processors don't have any bugs. :) -- * -- * This file is subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General -- * Public License. See the file "COPYING" in the main directory of -- * this archive for more details. -- */ -- --#ifndef _XTENSA_BUGS_H --#define _XTENSA_BUGS_H -- --static void check_bugs(void) { } -- --#endif /* _XTENSA_BUGS_H */ ---- a/include/asm-generic/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ --/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ --#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H --#define __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H --/* -- * This file is included by 'init/main.c' to check for -- * architecture-dependent bugs. -- */ -- --static inline void check_bugs(void) { } -- --#endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_BUGS_H */ ---- a/init/main.c -+++ b/init/main.c -@@ -94,7 +94,6 @@ - #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> - - #include <asm/io.h> --#include <asm/bugs.h> - #include <asm/setup.h> - #include <asm/sections.h> - #include <asm/cacheflush.h> -@@ -728,10 +727,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_k - - - arch_cpu_finalize_init(); -- /* Temporary conditional until everything has been converted */ --#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT -- check_bugs(); --#endif - - acpi_subsystem_init(); - arch_post_acpi_subsys_init(); diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-x86-move-mem_encrypt_init-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-x86-move-mem_encrypt_init-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index aede33ff2..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/init-x86-move-mem_encrypt_init-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -From 555b9962472818fba44eb42f31cfd1e118d20478 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:41 +0200 -Subject: init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 439e17576eb47f26b78c5bbc72e344d4206d2327 upstream - -Invoke the X86ism mem_encrypt_init() from X86 arch_cpu_finalize_init() and -remove the weak fallback from the core code. - -No functional change. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.670360645@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 ++ - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ - init/main.c | 11 ----------- - 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) - ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h -@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long - static inline int __init - early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size) { return 0; } - -+static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { } -+ - #define __bss_decrypted - - #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ - #include <linux/init.h> - #include <linux/kprobes.h> - #include <linux/kgdb.h> -+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> - #include <linux/smp.h> - #include <linux/cpu.h> - #include <linux/io.h> -@@ -2151,4 +2152,14 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) - } else { - fpu__init_check_bugs(); - } -+ -+ /* -+ * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA -+ * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will -+ * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will -+ * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It -+ * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64 -+ * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted. -+ */ -+ mem_encrypt_init(); - } ---- a/init/main.c -+++ b/init/main.c -@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ - #include <linux/cache.h> - #include <linux/rodata_test.h> - #include <linux/jump_label.h> --#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> - - #include <asm/io.h> - #include <asm/setup.h> -@@ -492,8 +491,6 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_in - } - #endif - --void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { } -- - bool initcall_debug; - core_param(initcall_debug, initcall_debug, bool, 0644); - -@@ -673,14 +670,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_k - */ - locking_selftest(); - -- /* -- * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA -- * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will -- * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will -- * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. -- */ -- mem_encrypt_init(); -- - #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD - if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok && - page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) { diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e16870f6e..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ -From e9a103c76a5ffb605204f25222e6217931ff129b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 19:43:14 -0700 -Subject: KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM - -From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> - -commit 81ac7e5d741742d650b4ed6186c4826c1a0631a7 upstream - -Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a transient execution attack using -gather instructions from the AVX2 and AVX512 extensions. This attack -allows malicious code to infer data that was previously stored in -vector registers. Systems that are not vulnerable to GDS will set the -GDS_NO bit of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. This is useful for VM -guests that may think they are on vulnerable systems that are, in -fact, not affected. Guests that are running on affected hosts where -the mitigation is enabled are protected as if they were running -on an unaffected system. - -On all hosts that are not affected or that are mitigated, set the -GDS_NO bit. - -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> -Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++++ - arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +++++ - 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) - ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -@@ -628,6 +628,13 @@ static const char * const gds_strings[] - [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", - }; - -+bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void) -+{ -+ return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL || -+ gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED); -+} -+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated); -+ - void update_gds_msr(void) - { - u64 mcu_ctrl_after; ---- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c -@@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item debugfs_en - - u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0; - -+extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void); -+ - static int emulator_fix_hypercall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt); - - static inline void kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -@@ -1224,6 +1226,9 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void) - /* Guests don't need to know "Fill buffer clear control" exists */ - data &= ~ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL; - -+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated()) -+ data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO; -+ - return data; - } - diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/m68k-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/m68k-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8cece9900..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/m68k-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,79 +0,0 @@ -From ca442015ccef31abd0a73cd621c4a4da3a76d20b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:30 +0200 -Subject: m68k/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 9ceecc2589b9d7cef6b321339ed8de484eac4b20 upstream - -check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new -arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. - -No functional change. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.254342916@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/m68k/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h | 21 --------------------- - arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c | 3 ++- - 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) - delete mode 100644 arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h - ---- a/arch/m68k/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/m68k/Kconfig -@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ - config M68K - bool - default y -+ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if MMU - select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_DMA_FOR_DEVICE if HAS_DMA - select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT if ISA - select ARCH_NO_COHERENT_DMA_MMAP if !MMU ---- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ --/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ --/* -- * include/asm-m68k/bugs.h -- * -- * Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds -- */ -- --/* -- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. -- * -- * Needs: -- * void check_bugs(void); -- */ -- --#ifdef CONFIG_MMU --extern void check_bugs(void); /* in arch/m68k/kernel/setup.c */ --#else --static void check_bugs(void) --{ --} --#endif ---- a/arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c -+++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/setup_mm.c -@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ - */ - - #include <linux/kernel.h> -+#include <linux/cpu.h> - #include <linux/mm.h> - #include <linux/sched.h> - #include <linux/delay.h> -@@ -526,7 +527,7 @@ static int __init proc_hardware_init(voi - module_init(proc_hardware_init); - #endif - --void check_bugs(void) -+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) - { - #if defined(CONFIG_FPU) && !defined(CONFIG_M68KFPU_EMU) - if (m68k_fputype == 0) { diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/mips-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/mips-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 575e1e0a5..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/mips-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@ -From 2bedb079d39e87a51a6af0a9606dbd147a9bbfde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:32 +0200 -Subject: mips/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 7f066a22fe353a827a402ee2835e81f045b1574d upstream - -check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new -arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. - -No functional change. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.312438573@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/mips/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h | 17 ----------------- - arch/mips/kernel/setup.c | 13 +++++++++++++ - 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) - ---- a/arch/mips/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig -@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config MIPS - default y - select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE - select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA -+ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT - select ARCH_DISCARD_MEMBLOCK - select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE - select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST ---- a/arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/bugs.h -@@ -1,17 +1,11 @@ - /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ - /* -- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. -- * - * Copyright (C) 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki -- * -- * Needs: -- * void check_bugs(void); - */ - #ifndef _ASM_BUGS_H - #define _ASM_BUGS_H - - #include <linux/bug.h> --#include <linux/delay.h> - #include <linux/smp.h> - - #include <asm/cpu.h> -@@ -31,17 +25,6 @@ static inline void check_bugs_early(void - #endif - } - --static inline void check_bugs(void) --{ -- unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); -- -- cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; -- check_bugs32(); --#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT -- check_bugs64(); --#endif --} -- - static inline int r4k_daddiu_bug(void) - { - #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT ---- a/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c -+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c -@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ - * Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki - */ - #include <linux/init.h> -+#include <linux/cpu.h> -+#include <linux/delay.h> - #include <linux/ioport.h> - #include <linux/export.h> - #include <linux/screen_info.h> -@@ -1108,3 +1110,14 @@ static int __init setnocoherentio(char * - } - early_param("nocoherentio", setnocoherentio); - #endif -+ -+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) -+{ -+ unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); -+ -+ cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; -+ check_bugs32(); -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_R4X00_BUGS64)) -+ check_bugs64(); -+} diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/sh-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/sh-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 55c9d37fd..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/sh-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,207 +0,0 @@ -From 3ea1c65b457df5417ae78185f0381816b6d0c22c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:33 +0200 -Subject: sh/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 01eb454e9bfe593f320ecbc9aaec60bf87cd453d upstream - -check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new -arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. - -No functional change. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.371697797@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/sh/Kconfig | 1 - arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h | 78 ---------------------------------------- - arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + - arch/sh/kernel/idle.c | 1 - arch/sh/kernel/setup.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 5 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-) - delete mode 100644 arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h - ---- a/arch/sh/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig -@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ - # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 - config SUPERH - def_bool y -+ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT - select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL - select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST - select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT ---- a/arch/sh/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@ --/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ --#ifndef __ASM_SH_BUGS_H --#define __ASM_SH_BUGS_H -- --/* -- * This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs. -- * -- * Needs: -- * void check_bugs(void); -- */ -- --/* -- * I don't know of any Super-H bugs yet. -- */ -- --#include <asm/processor.h> -- --extern void select_idle_routine(void); -- --static void __init check_bugs(void) --{ -- extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy; -- char *p = &init_utsname()->machine[2]; /* "sh" */ -- -- select_idle_routine(); -- -- current_cpu_data.loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy; -- -- switch (current_cpu_data.family) { -- case CPU_FAMILY_SH2: -- *p++ = '2'; -- break; -- case CPU_FAMILY_SH2A: -- *p++ = '2'; -- *p++ = 'a'; -- break; -- case CPU_FAMILY_SH3: -- *p++ = '3'; -- break; -- case CPU_FAMILY_SH4: -- *p++ = '4'; -- break; -- case CPU_FAMILY_SH4A: -- *p++ = '4'; -- *p++ = 'a'; -- break; -- case CPU_FAMILY_SH4AL_DSP: -- *p++ = '4'; -- *p++ = 'a'; -- *p++ = 'l'; -- *p++ = '-'; -- *p++ = 'd'; -- *p++ = 's'; -- *p++ = 'p'; -- break; -- case CPU_FAMILY_SH5: -- *p++ = '6'; -- *p++ = '4'; -- break; -- case CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN: -- /* -- * Specifically use CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN rather than -- * default:, so we're able to have the compiler whine -- * about unhandled enumerations. -- */ -- break; -- } -- -- printk("CPU: %s\n", get_cpu_subtype(¤t_cpu_data)); -- --#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ -- /* 'eb' means 'Endian Big' */ -- *p++ = 'e'; -- *p++ = 'b'; --#endif -- *p = '\0'; --} --#endif /* __ASM_SH_BUGS_H */ ---- a/arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h -+++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/processor.h -@@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ extern unsigned int instruction_size(uns - #define instruction_size(insn) (4) - #endif - -+void select_idle_routine(void); -+ - #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ - - #ifdef CONFIG_SUPERH32 ---- a/arch/sh/kernel/idle.c -+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/idle.c -@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ - #include <linux/smp.h> - #include <linux/atomic.h> - #include <asm/pgalloc.h> -+#include <asm/processor.h> - #include <asm/smp.h> - #include <asm/bl_bit.h> - ---- a/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c -+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/setup.c -@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ - #include <asm/smp.h> - #include <asm/mmu_context.h> - #include <asm/mmzone.h> -+#include <asm/processor.h> - #include <asm/sparsemem.h> - - /* -@@ -361,3 +362,57 @@ int test_mode_pin(int pin) - { - return sh_mv.mv_mode_pins() & pin; - } -+ -+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) -+{ -+ char *p = &init_utsname()->machine[2]; /* "sh" */ -+ -+ select_idle_routine(); -+ -+ current_cpu_data.loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy; -+ -+ switch (current_cpu_data.family) { -+ case CPU_FAMILY_SH2: -+ *p++ = '2'; -+ break; -+ case CPU_FAMILY_SH2A: -+ *p++ = '2'; -+ *p++ = 'a'; -+ break; -+ case CPU_FAMILY_SH3: -+ *p++ = '3'; -+ break; -+ case CPU_FAMILY_SH4: -+ *p++ = '4'; -+ break; -+ case CPU_FAMILY_SH4A: -+ *p++ = '4'; -+ *p++ = 'a'; -+ break; -+ case CPU_FAMILY_SH4AL_DSP: -+ *p++ = '4'; -+ *p++ = 'a'; -+ *p++ = 'l'; -+ *p++ = '-'; -+ *p++ = 'd'; -+ *p++ = 's'; -+ *p++ = 'p'; -+ break; -+ case CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN: -+ /* -+ * Specifically use CPU_FAMILY_UNKNOWN rather than -+ * default:, so we're able to have the compiler whine -+ * about unhandled enumerations. -+ */ -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ pr_info("CPU: %s\n", get_cpu_subtype(¤t_cpu_data)); -+ -+#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ -+ /* 'eb' means 'Endian Big' */ -+ *p++ = 'e'; -+ *p++ = 'b'; -+#endif -+ *p = '\0'; -+} diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/sparc-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/sparc-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a1677f487..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/sparc-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -From e7a2caf480097e1131b5239e95083c3e8995be07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:35 +0200 -Subject: sparc/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 44ade508e3bfac45ae97864587de29eb1a881ec0 upstream - -check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new -arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. - -No functional change. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Reviewed-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.431995857@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/sparc/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h | 18 ------------------ - arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c | 7 +++++++ - 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) - delete mode 100644 arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h - ---- a/arch/sparc/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/sparc/Kconfig -@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config 64BIT - config SPARC - bool - default y -+ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if !SMP - select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT if SPARC64 && PCI - select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO - select OF ---- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ --/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ --/* include/asm/bugs.h: Sparc probes for various bugs. -- * -- * Copyright (C) 1996, 2007 David S. Miller (davem@davemloft.net) -- */ -- --#ifdef CONFIG_SPARC32 --#include <asm/cpudata.h> --#endif -- --extern unsigned long loops_per_jiffy; -- --static void __init check_bugs(void) --{ --#if defined(CONFIG_SPARC32) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP) -- cpu_data(0).udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; --#endif --} ---- a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c -+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_32.c -@@ -422,3 +422,10 @@ static int __init topology_init(void) - } - - subsys_initcall(topology_init); -+ -+#if defined(CONFIG_SPARC32) && !defined(CONFIG_SMP) -+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) -+{ -+ cpu_data(0).udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy; -+} -+#endif diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/um-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/um-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 372822010..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/um-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -From 760b926637a95305fe8b066e8943ef688607dc0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:36 +0200 -Subject: um/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 9349b5cd0908f8afe95529fc7a8cbb1417df9b0c upstream - -check_bugs() is about to be phased out. Switch over to the new -arch_cpu_finalize_init() implementation. - -No functional change. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.493148694@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/um/Kconfig | 1 + - arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h | 7 ------- - arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c | 3 ++- - 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - delete mode 100644 arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h - ---- a/arch/um/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/um/Kconfig -@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ menu "UML-specific options" - config UML - bool - default y -+ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT - select ARCH_HAS_KCOV - select ARCH_NO_PREEMPT - select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL ---- a/arch/um/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ /dev/null -@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ --/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ --#ifndef __UM_BUGS_H --#define __UM_BUGS_H -- --void check_bugs(void); -- --#endif ---- a/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c -+++ b/arch/um/kernel/um_arch.c -@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ - * Licensed under the GPL - */ - -+#include <linux/cpu.h> - #include <linux/delay.h> - #include <linux/init.h> - #include <linux/mm.h> -@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) - setup_hostinfo(host_info, sizeof host_info); - } - --void __init check_bugs(void) -+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) - { - arch_check_bugs(); - os_check_bugs(); diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 7d9b171a2..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,228 +0,0 @@ -From b3454eb2d26a6cecada04b38e72e255ae702ccdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:24 +0200 -Subject: x86/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 7c7077a72674402654f3291354720cd73cdf649e upstream - -check_bugs() is a dumping ground for finalizing the CPU bringup. Only parts of -it has to do with actual CPU bugs. - -Split it apart into arch_cpu_finalize_init() and cpu_select_mitigations(). - -Fixup the bogus 32bit comments while at it. - -No functional change. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.019583869@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 - arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h | 2 - - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 51 --------------------------------------- - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 - 5 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) - ---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig -@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ config X86 - select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA - select ARCH_DISCARD_MEMBLOCK - select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI -+ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT - select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL - select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED - select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h -@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ - - #include <asm/processor.h> - --extern void check_bugs(void); -- - #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL) - void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); - #else ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ - * - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup). - */ - #include <linux/init.h> --#include <linux/utsname.h> - #include <linux/cpu.h> - #include <linux/module.h> - #include <linux/nospec.h> -@@ -25,9 +24,7 @@ - #include <asm/msr.h> - #include <asm/vmx.h> - #include <asm/paravirt.h> --#include <asm/alternative.h> - #include <asm/pgtable.h> --#include <asm/set_memory.h> - #include <asm/intel-family.h> - #include <asm/e820/api.h> - #include <asm/hypervisor.h> -@@ -115,21 +112,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear); - DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); - EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear); - --void __init check_bugs(void) -+void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) - { -- identify_boot_cpu(); -- -- /* -- * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the -- * core code know. -- */ -- cpu_smt_check_topology(); -- -- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { -- pr_info("CPU: "); -- print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); -- } -- - /* - * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may - * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD -@@ -165,39 +149,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) - l1tf_select_mitigation(); - md_clear_select_mitigation(); - srbds_select_mitigation(); -- -- arch_smt_update(); -- --#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 -- /* -- * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP. -- * -- * - i386 is no longer supported. -- * - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be -- * compiled for a i486. -- */ -- if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4) -- panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features"); -- -- init_utsname()->machine[1] = -- '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); -- alternative_instructions(); -- -- fpu__init_check_bugs(); --#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ -- alternative_instructions(); -- -- /* -- * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages -- * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping -- * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs. -- * -- * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems -- * very little benefit for that case. -- */ -- if (!direct_gbpages) -- set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); --#endif - } - - /* ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -@@ -13,14 +13,19 @@ - #include <linux/sched/mm.h> - #include <linux/sched/clock.h> - #include <linux/sched/task.h> -+#include <linux/sched/smt.h> - #include <linux/init.h> - #include <linux/kprobes.h> - #include <linux/kgdb.h> - #include <linux/smp.h> -+#include <linux/cpu.h> - #include <linux/io.h> - #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> - - #include <asm/stackprotector.h> -+#include <linux/utsname.h> -+ -+#include <asm/alternative.h> - #include <asm/perf_event.h> - #include <asm/mmu_context.h> - #include <asm/archrandom.h> -@@ -56,6 +61,7 @@ - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC - #include <asm/uv/uv.h> - #endif -+#include <asm/set_memory.h> - - #include "cpu.h" - -@@ -2097,3 +2103,52 @@ void microcode_check(void) - pr_warn("x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect.\n"); - pr_warn("x86/CPU: Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n"); - } -+ -+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) -+{ -+ identify_boot_cpu(); -+ -+ /* -+ * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the -+ * core code know. -+ */ -+ cpu_smt_check_topology(); -+ -+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { -+ pr_info("CPU: "); -+ print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data); -+ } -+ -+ cpu_select_mitigations(); -+ -+ arch_smt_update(); -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) { -+ /* -+ * Check whether this is a real i386 which is not longer -+ * supported and fixup the utsname. -+ */ -+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4) -+ panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features"); -+ -+ init_utsname()->machine[1] = -+ '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); -+ } -+ -+ alternative_instructions(); -+ -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { -+ /* -+ * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages -+ * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping -+ * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs. -+ * -+ * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems -+ * very little benefit for that case. -+ */ -+ if (!direct_gbpages) -+ set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1); -+ } else { -+ fpu__init_check_bugs(); -+ } -+} ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h -@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 - extern void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); - - unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu); -+void cpu_select_mitigations(void); - - extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); - extern void update_srbds_msr(void); diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-fpu-mark-init-functions-__init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-fpu-mark-init-functions-__init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b6e116465..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-fpu-mark-init-functions-__init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -From 677d1e9bb0bff552b161e9058f1b6fdfd88ece91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:45 +0200 -Subject: x86/fpu: Mark init functions __init - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 1703db2b90c91b2eb2d699519fc505fe431dde0e upstream - -No point in keeping them around. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.841685728@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c -@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void fpu__init_cpu(void) - fpu__init_cpu_xstate(); - } - --static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) -+static bool __init fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void) - { - unsigned long cr0; - u16 fsw, fcw; -@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(voi - return fsw == 0 && (fcw & 0x103f) == 0x003f; - } - --static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(void) -+static void __init fpu__init_system_early_generic(void) - { - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID) && - !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_FPU, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) { diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-fpu-move-fpu-initialization-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-fpu-move-fpu-initialization-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch deleted file mode 100644 index b0423f814..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-fpu-move-fpu-initialization-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ -From 8a3b312da29169625141ff9c984a796724240ac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:46 +0200 -Subject: x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into arch_cpu_finalize_init() - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit b81fac906a8f9e682e513ddd95697ec7a20878d4 upstream - -Initializing the FPU during the early boot process is a pointless -exercise. Early boot is convoluted and fragile enough. - -Nothing requires that the FPU is set up early. It has to be initialized -before fork_init() because the task_struct size depends on the FPU register -buffer size. - -Move the initialization to arch_cpu_finalize_init() which is the perfect -place to do so. - -No functional change. - -This allows to remove quite some of the custom early command line parsing, -but that's subject to the next installment. - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.902376621@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 13 +++++++------ - arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 1 + - 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -@@ -1278,8 +1278,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st - - cpu_set_bug_bits(c); - -- fpu__init_system(); -- - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - /* - * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says -@@ -1985,8 +1983,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) - clear_all_debug_regs(); - dbg_restore_debug_regs(); - -- fpu__init_cpu(); -- - if (is_uv_system()) - uv_cpu_init(); - -@@ -2050,8 +2046,6 @@ void cpu_init(void) - clear_all_debug_regs(); - dbg_restore_debug_regs(); - -- fpu__init_cpu(); -- - load_fixmap_gdt(cpu); - } - #endif -@@ -2136,6 +2130,13 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) - '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86); - } - -+ /* -+ * Must be before alternatives because it might set or clear -+ * feature bits. -+ */ -+ fpu__init_system(); -+ fpu__init_cpu(); -+ - alternative_instructions(); - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c -@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ static void notrace start_secondary(void - #endif - load_current_idt(); - cpu_init(); -+ fpu__init_cpu(); - x86_cpuinit.early_percpu_clock_init(); - preempt_disable(); - smp_callin(); diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-fpu-remove-cpuinfo-argument-from-init-functions.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-fpu-remove-cpuinfo-argument-from-init-functions.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f5eddda28..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-fpu-remove-cpuinfo-argument-from-init-functions.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ -From a03b110dad183d18d01f0f8e370228c2747133e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2023 01:39:43 +0200 -Subject: x86/fpu: Remove cpuinfo argument from init functions - -From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> - -commit 1f34bb2a24643e0087652d81078e4f616562738d upstream - -Nothing in the call chain requires it - -Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.783704297@linutronix.de -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 2 +- - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +- - arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c | 6 +++--- - 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h -@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ extern int dump_fpu(struct pt_regs *ptr - extern void fpu__init_cpu(void); - extern void fpu__init_system_xstate(void); - extern void fpu__init_cpu_xstate(void); --extern void fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); -+extern void fpu__init_system(void); - extern void fpu__init_check_bugs(void); - extern void fpu__resume_cpu(void); - extern u64 fpu__get_supported_xfeatures_mask(void); ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -@@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st - - cpu_set_bug_bits(c); - -- fpu__init_system(c); -+ fpu__init_system(); - - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 - /* ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c -@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(voi - return fsw == 0 && (fcw & 0x103f) == 0x003f; - } - --static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -+static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(void) - { - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID) && - !test_bit(X86_FEATURE_FPU, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) { -@@ -297,10 +297,10 @@ static void __init fpu__init_parse_early - * Called on the boot CPU once per system bootup, to set up the initial - * FPU state that is later cloned into all processes: - */ --void __init fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -+void __init fpu__init_system(void) - { - fpu__init_parse_early_param(); -- fpu__init_system_early_generic(c); -+ fpu__init_system_early_generic(); - - /* - * The FPU has to be operational for some of the diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 65c4594b1..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,163 +0,0 @@ -From ead252286b6800873dd961075a36939f15e9b163 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 19:43:12 -0700 -Subject: x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation - -From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> - -commit 553a5c03e90a6087e88f8ff878335ef0621536fb upstream - -The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability allows malicious software -to infer stale data previously stored in vector registers. This may -include sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. GDS is mitigated in -microcode, and systems with up-to-date microcode are protected by -default. However, any affected system that is running with older -microcode will still be vulnerable to GDS attacks. - -Since the gather instructions used by the attacker are part of the -AVX2 and AVX512 extensions, disabling these extensions prevents gather -instructions from being executed, thereby mitigating the system from -GDS. Disabling AVX2 is sufficient, but we don't have the granularity -to do this. The XCR0[2] disables AVX, with no option to just disable -AVX2. - -Add a kernel parameter gather_data_sampling=force that will enable the -microcode mitigation if available, otherwise it will disable AVX on -affected systems. - -This option will be ignored if cmdline mitigations=off. - -This is a *big* hammer. It is known to break buggy userspace that -uses incomplete, buggy AVX enumeration. Unfortunately, such userspace -does exist in the wild: - - https://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg33046.html - -[ dhansen: add some more ominous warnings about disabling AVX ] - -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> -Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst | 18 +++++++++-- - Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++++- - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++- - 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) - ---- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst -+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst -@@ -60,14 +60,21 @@ bits: - ================================ === ============================ - - GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by --disabling AVX. This can be done by setting "clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel --command-line. -+disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or -+"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line. -+ -+If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning on XSAVE YMM support. -+However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that -+does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM -+support will break. - - Mitigation control on the kernel command line - --------------------------------------------- - The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or --"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will --default to the mitigation being enabled. -+"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default -+to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will -+use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems -+where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation. - - GDS System Information - ------------------------ -@@ -83,6 +90,9 @@ The possible values contained in this fi - Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled. - Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing - mitigation. -+ Mitigation: AVX disabled, -+ no microcode Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing -+ mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation. - Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in - effect. - Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in ---- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -@@ -1300,7 +1300,13 @@ - - This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode. - The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be -- disabled. -+ disabled. On systems without the microcode mitigation -+ disabling AVX serves as a mitigation. -+ -+ force: Disable AVX to mitigate systems without -+ microcode mitigation. No effect if the microcode -+ mitigation is present. Known to cause crashes in -+ userspace with buggy AVX enumeration. - - off: Disable GDS mitigation. - ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -@@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline - enum gds_mitigations { - GDS_MITIGATION_OFF, - GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, -+ GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE, - GDS_MITIGATION_FULL, - GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED, - GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, -@@ -617,6 +618,7 @@ static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigati - static const char * const gds_strings[] = { - [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", - [GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", -+ [GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE] = "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode", - [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode", - [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED] = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)", - [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", -@@ -642,6 +644,7 @@ void update_gds_msr(void) - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); - mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS; - break; -+ case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE: - case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED: - case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR: - return; -@@ -676,10 +679,23 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation - - /* No microcode */ - if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) { -- gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; -+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) { -+ /* -+ * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it -+ * here rather than in update_gds_msr() -+ */ -+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX); -+ pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation.\n"); -+ } else { -+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; -+ } - goto out; - } - -+ /* Microcode has mitigation, use it */ -+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) -+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; -+ - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); - if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) { - if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF) -@@ -710,6 +726,8 @@ static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char - - if (!strcmp(str, "off")) - gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; -+ else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) -+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE; - - return 0; - } diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-speculation-add-gather-data-sampling-mitigation.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-speculation-add-gather-data-sampling-mitigation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c426811c6..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-speculation-add-gather-data-sampling-mitigation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,562 +0,0 @@ -From d63b3f0e819275ee64648eb01330aad3e347d9ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 19:43:11 -0700 -Subject: x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation - -From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> - -commit 8974eb588283b7d44a7c91fa09fcbaf380339f3a upstream - -Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows -unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in -vector registers. - -Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions -that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable -hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and -encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector -registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector -register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical -side channel techniques like cache timing attacks. - -This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons. -First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it. -This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can -be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control -bit alone. - -Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the -mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX. -It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be -mitigated against GDS. - -The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by -setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with -mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading: - - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling - -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> -Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 11 - - Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst | 99 +++++++++ - Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 - Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 33 ++- - arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 - arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 11 + - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 129 +++++++++++++ - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 34 ++- - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 - drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 - 10 files changed, 305 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst - ---- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu -+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu -@@ -472,16 +472,17 @@ Description: information about CPUs hete - cpu_capacity: capacity of cpu#. - - What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities -+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling -+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit -+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf -+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown -+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data -+ /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 -- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass -- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf -- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds - /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort -- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit -- /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data - Date: January 2018 - Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> - Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities ---- /dev/null -+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst -@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ -+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -+ -+GDS - Gather Data Sampling -+========================== -+ -+Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged -+speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers. -+ -+Problem -+------- -+When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements -+are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather -+instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from -+architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the -+destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to -+infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing -+attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack. -+ -+The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data. -+The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector -+registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be -+vulnerable. -+ -+Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks -+are possible. -+ -+Attack scenarios -+---------------- -+Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all -+permission boundaries: -+ -+ Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data -+ Userspace can infer kernel data -+ Guests can infer data from hosts -+ Guest can infer guest from other guests -+ Users can infer data from other users -+ -+Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in -+lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves. -+ -+The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should ensure -+that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and -+allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an -+attack, and re-enable it. -+ -+Mitigation mechanism -+-------------------- -+This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new -+bits: -+ -+ ================================ === ============================ -+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL] R/O Enumerates GDS vulnerability -+ and mitigation support. -+ IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO] R/O Processor is not vulnerable. -+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS] R/W Disables the mitigation -+ 0 by default. -+ IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK] R/W Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes -+ to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored -+ Can't be cleared once set. -+ ================================ === ============================ -+ -+GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by -+disabling AVX. This can be done by setting "clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel -+command-line. -+ -+Mitigation control on the kernel command line -+--------------------------------------------- -+The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or -+"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will -+default to the mitigation being enabled. -+ -+GDS System Information -+------------------------ -+The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For -+GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file: -+ -+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling -+ -+The possible values contained in this file are: -+ -+ ============================== ============================================= -+ Not affected Processor not vulnerable. -+ Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled. -+ Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing -+ mitigation. -+ Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in -+ effect. -+ Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in -+ effect and cannot be disabled. -+ Unknown: Dependent on -+ hypervisor status Running on a virtual guest processor that is -+ affected but with no way to know if host -+ processor is mitigated or vulnerable. -+ ============================== ============================================= -+ -+GDS Default mitigation -+---------------------- -+The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's -+default action is to leave the mitigation enabled. ---- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst -+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst -@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run - multihit.rst - special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst - processor_mmio_stale_data.rst -+ gather_data_sampling.rst ---- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt -@@ -1290,6 +1290,20 @@ - Format: off | on - default: on - -+ gather_data_sampling= -+ [X86,INTEL] Control the Gather Data Sampling (GDS) -+ mitigation. -+ -+ Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which -+ allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was -+ previously stored in vector registers. -+ -+ This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode. -+ The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be -+ disabled. -+ -+ off: Disable GDS mitigation. -+ - gcov_persist= [GCOV] When non-zero (default), profiling data for - kernel modules is saved and remains accessible via - debugfs, even when the module is unloaded/reloaded. -@@ -2555,22 +2569,23 @@ - Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This - improves system performance, but it may also - expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities. -- Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC] -+ Equivalent to: gather_data_sampling=off [X86] - kpti=0 [ARM64] -- nospectre_v1 [PPC] -+ kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] -+ l1tf=off [X86] -+ mds=off [X86] -+ mmio_stale_data=off [X86] -+ no_entry_flush [PPC] -+ no_uaccess_flush [PPC] - nobp=0 [S390] -+ nopti [X86,PPC] -+ nospectre_v1 [PPC] - nospectre_v1 [X86] - nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] -- spectre_v2_user=off [X86] - spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC] -+ spectre_v2_user=off [X86] - ssbd=force-off [ARM64] -- l1tf=off [X86] -- mds=off [X86] - tsx_async_abort=off [X86] -- kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] -- no_entry_flush [PPC] -- no_uaccess_flush [PPC] -- mmio_stale_data=off [X86] - - Exceptions: - This does not have any effect on ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h -@@ -409,5 +409,6 @@ - #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */ - #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */ - #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */ -+#define X86_BUG_GDS X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */ - - #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */ ---- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h -+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h -@@ -138,6 +138,15 @@ - * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier - * Return Stack Buffer Predictions. - */ -+#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL BIT(25) /* -+ * CPU is vulnerable to Gather -+ * Data Sampling (GDS) and -+ * has controls for mitigation. -+ */ -+#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO BIT(26) /* -+ * CPU is not vulnerable to Gather -+ * Data Sampling (GDS). -+ */ - - #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b - #define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /* -@@ -156,6 +165,8 @@ - #define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 - #define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) - #define FB_CLEAR_DIS BIT(3) /* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */ -+#define GDS_MITG_DIS BIT(4) /* Disable GDS mitigation */ -+#define GDS_MITG_LOCKED BIT(5) /* GDS mitigation locked */ - - #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174 - #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175 ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ static void __init md_clear_select_mitig - static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); - static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void); - static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); -+static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void); - - /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */ - u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; -@@ -149,6 +150,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void) - l1tf_select_mitigation(); - md_clear_select_mitigation(); - srbds_select_mitigation(); -+ gds_select_mitigation(); - } - - /* -@@ -600,6 +602,120 @@ static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(ch - early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline); - - #undef pr_fmt -+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "GDS: " fmt -+ -+enum gds_mitigations { -+ GDS_MITIGATION_OFF, -+ GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED, -+ GDS_MITIGATION_FULL, -+ GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED, -+ GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, -+}; -+ -+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; -+ -+static const char * const gds_strings[] = { -+ [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", -+ [GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode", -+ [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode", -+ [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED] = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)", -+ [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status", -+}; -+ -+void update_gds_msr(void) -+{ -+ u64 mcu_ctrl_after; -+ u64 mcu_ctrl; -+ -+ switch (gds_mitigation) { -+ case GDS_MITIGATION_OFF: -+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); -+ mcu_ctrl |= GDS_MITG_DIS; -+ break; -+ case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED: -+ /* -+ * The LOCKED state comes from the boot CPU. APs might not have -+ * the same state. Make sure the mitigation is enabled on all -+ * CPUs. -+ */ -+ case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL: -+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); -+ mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS; -+ break; -+ case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED: -+ case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR: -+ return; -+ }; -+ -+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); -+ -+ /* -+ * Check to make sure that the WRMSR value was not ignored. Writes to -+ * GDS_MITG_DIS will be ignored if this processor is locked but the boot -+ * processor was not. -+ */ -+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl_after); -+ WARN_ON_ONCE(mcu_ctrl != mcu_ctrl_after); -+} -+ -+static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void) -+{ -+ u64 mcu_ctrl; -+ -+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) -+ return; -+ -+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) { -+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ if (cpu_mitigations_off()) -+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; -+ /* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */ -+ -+ /* No microcode */ -+ if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) { -+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); -+ if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) { -+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF) -+ pr_warn("Mitigation locked. Disable failed.\n"); -+ -+ /* -+ * The mitigation is selected from the boot CPU. All other CPUs -+ * _should_ have the same state. If the boot CPU isn't locked -+ * but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state -+ * mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will -+ * ensure the other CPUs have the mitigation enabled. -+ */ -+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED; -+ } -+ -+ update_gds_msr(); -+out: -+ pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]); -+} -+ -+static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str) -+{ -+ if (!str) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ -+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) -+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+early_param("gather_data_sampling", gds_parse_cmdline); -+ -+#undef pr_fmt - #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt - - enum spectre_v1_mitigation { -@@ -2147,6 +2263,11 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char - return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]); - } - -+static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf) -+{ -+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]); -+} -+ - static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, - char *buf, unsigned int bug) - { -@@ -2196,6 +2317,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de - case X86_BUG_RETBLEED: - return retbleed_show_state(buf); - -+ case X86_BUG_GDS: -+ return gds_show_state(buf); -+ - default: - break; - } -@@ -2260,4 +2384,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device - { - return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED); - } -+ -+ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) -+{ -+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS); -+} - #endif ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c -@@ -1047,6 +1047,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_ - #define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2) - /* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */ - #define RETBLEED BIT(3) -+/* CPU is affected by GDS */ -+#define GDS BIT(4) - - static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = { - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), -@@ -1059,18 +1061,20 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_ - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), -- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), -- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), -- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_MOBILE,X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED), -- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), -- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), -- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), -- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), -- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED), -- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED), -+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO), - VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS), -@@ -1193,6 +1197,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru - !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)) - setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB); - -+ /* -+ * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on -+ * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by -+ * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2], -+ * which means that AVX will be disabled. -+ */ -+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) && -+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) -+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS); -+ - if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN)) - return; - -@@ -1666,6 +1680,8 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuin - validate_apic_and_package_id(c); - x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(); - update_srbds_msr(); -+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS)) -+ update_gds_msr(); - } - - static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg) ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h -@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ void cpu_select_mitigations(void); - - extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void); - extern void update_srbds_msr(void); -+extern void update_gds_msr(void); - - extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void); - ---- a/drivers/base/cpu.c -+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c -@@ -584,6 +584,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct - return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); - } - -+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, -+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) -+{ -+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); -+} -+ - static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); - static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); - static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL); -@@ -595,6 +601,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, - static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL); - static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL); - static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL); -+static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL); - - static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { - &dev_attr_meltdown.attr, -@@ -608,6 +615,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner - &dev_attr_srbds.attr, - &dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr, - &dev_attr_retbleed.attr, -+ &dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr, - NULL - }; - diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-speculation-add-kconfig-option-for-gds.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-speculation-add-kconfig-option-for-gds.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5d01d4fa9..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-speculation-add-kconfig-option-for-gds.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -From dc9710d3e8c3a26fbd764f4bd733814c9464bf31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 19:43:13 -0700 -Subject: x86/speculation: Add Kconfig option for GDS - -From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> - -commit 53cf5797f114ba2bd86d23a862302119848eff19 upstream - -Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is mitigated in microcode. However, on -systems that haven't received the updated microcode, disabling AVX -can act as a mitigation. Add a Kconfig option that uses the microcode -mitigation if available and disables AVX otherwise. Setting this -option has no effect on systems not affected by GDS. This is the -equivalent of setting gather_data_sampling=force. - -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> -Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> -Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/x86/Kconfig | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ - arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++++ - 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+) - ---- a/arch/x86/Kconfig -+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig -@@ -2438,6 +2438,25 @@ config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK - def_bool y - depends on X86_64 || X86_PAE - -+config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION -+ bool "Force GDS Mitigation" -+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL -+ default n -+ help -+ Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows -+ unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in -+ vector registers. -+ -+ This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the -+ command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise -+ AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing -+ the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will -+ break with this option set. -+ -+ Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect. -+ -+ If in doubt, say N. -+ - config ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION - def_bool y - depends on X86_64 && HUGETLB_PAGE && MIGRATION ---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c -@@ -613,7 +613,11 @@ enum gds_mitigations { - GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR, - }; - -+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION) -+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE; -+#else - static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL; -+#endif - - static const char * const gds_strings[] = { - [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable", diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-xen-fix-secondary-processors-fpu-initialization.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-xen-fix-secondary-processors-fpu-initialization.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 658710bb5..000000000 --- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/x86-xen-fix-secondary-processors-fpu-initialization.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -From fe3e0a13e597c1c8617814bf9b42ab732db5c26e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> -Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 15:00:32 +0200 -Subject: x86/xen: Fix secondary processors' FPU initialization - -From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> - -commit fe3e0a13e597c1c8617814bf9b42ab732db5c26e upstream. - -Moving the call of fpu__init_cpu() from cpu_init() to start_secondary() -broke Xen PV guests, as those don't call start_secondary() for APs. - -Call fpu__init_cpu() in Xen's cpu_bringup(), which is the Xen PV -replacement of start_secondary(). - -Fixes: b81fac906a8f ("x86/fpu: Move FPU initialization into arch_cpu_finalize_init()") -Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> -Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> -Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> -Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> -Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230703130032.22916-1-jgross@suse.com -Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> ---- - arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c | 2 ++ - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) - ---- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c -+++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c -@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ - #include <asm/desc.h> - #include <asm/pgtable.h> - #include <asm/cpu.h> -+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h> - - #include <xen/interface/xen.h> - #include <xen/interface/vcpu.h> -@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ static void cpu_bringup(void) - int cpu; - - cpu_init(); -+ fpu__init_cpu(); - touch_softlockup_watchdog(); - preempt_disable(); - |