Adding upstream version 4.19.260.upstream/4.19.260

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

2 files changed, 11 insertions, 28 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c
index 96688986d..94aae1e67 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c
@@ -244,29 +244,6 @@ failed:
 }
 
 /**
- * efi_capsule_flush - called by file close or file flush
- * @file: file pointer
- * @id: not used
- *
- *	If a capsule is being partially uploaded then calling this function
- *	will be treated as upload termination and will free those completed
- *	buffer pages and -ECANCELED will be returned.
- **/
-static int efi_capsule_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id)
-{
-	int ret = 0;
-	struct capsule_info *cap_info = file->private_data;
-
-	if (cap_info->index > 0) {
-		pr_err("capsule upload not complete\n");
-		efi_free_all_buff_pages(cap_info);
-		ret = -ECANCELED;
-	}
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/**
  * efi_capsule_release - called by file close
  * @inode: not used
  * @file: file pointer
@@ -278,6 +255,13 @@ static int efi_capsule_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	struct capsule_info *cap_info = file->private_data;
 
+	if (cap_info->index > 0 &&
+	    (cap_info->header.headersize == 0 ||
+	     cap_info->count < cap_info->total_size)) {
+		pr_err("capsule upload not complete\n");
+		efi_free_all_buff_pages(cap_info);
+	}
+
 	kfree(cap_info->pages);
 	kfree(cap_info->phys);
 	kfree(file->private_data);
@@ -325,7 +309,6 @@ static const struct file_operations efi_capsule_fops = {
 	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
 	.open = efi_capsule_open,
 	.write = efi_capsule_write,
-	.flush = efi_capsule_flush,
 	.release = efi_capsule_release,
 	.llseek = no_llseek,
 };
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
index 72d9dfbeb..ea0309603 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static const efi_char16_t efi_SetupMode_name[] = L"SetupMode";
 
 /* SHIM variables */
 static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
-static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] = L"MokSBState";
+static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] = L"MokSBStateRT";
 
 #define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
 	efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
 
 	/*
 	 * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
-	 * variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well
-	 * honor that.
+	 * variable doesn't have the non-volatile attribute set, we might as
+	 * well honor that.
 	 */
 	size = sizeof(moksbstate);
 	status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
 	/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		goto secure_boot_enabled;
-	if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS) && moksbstate == 1)
+	if (!(attr & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) && moksbstate == 1)
 		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
 
 secure_boot_enabled: