Adding upstream version 4.19.249.upstream/4.19.249

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 268 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9d975f39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Encryption policy functions for per-file encryption support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility.
+ *
+ * Written by Michael Halcrow, 2015.
+ * Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include "fscrypt_private.h"
+
+/*
+ * check whether an encryption policy is consistent with an encryption context
+ */
+static bool is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(
+				const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
+				const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
+{
+	return memcmp(ctx->master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
+		      FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
+		(ctx->flags == policy->flags) &&
+		(ctx->contents_encryption_mode ==
+		 policy->contents_encryption_mode) &&
+		(ctx->filenames_encryption_mode ==
+		 policy->filenames_encryption_mode);
+}
+
+static int create_encryption_context_from_policy(struct inode *inode,
+				const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
+{
+	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
+
+	ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
+	memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
+					FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+
+	if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
+				     policy->filenames_encryption_mode))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (policy->flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ctx.contents_encryption_mode = policy->contents_encryption_mode;
+	ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = policy->filenames_encryption_mode;
+	ctx.flags = policy->flags;
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx.nonce) != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
+	get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
+
+	return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx), NULL);
+}
+
+int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct fscrypt_policy policy;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
+	int ret;
+	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&policy, arg, sizeof(policy)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (policy.version != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	inode_lock(inode);
+
+	ret = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+	if (ret == -ENODATA) {
+		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+			ret = -ENOTDIR;
+		else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode))
+			ret = -ENOENT;
+		else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
+			ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
+		else
+			ret = create_encryption_context_from_policy(inode,
+								    &policy);
+	} else if (ret == sizeof(ctx) &&
+		   is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(&ctx,
+								&policy)) {
+		/* The file already uses the same encryption policy. */
+		ret = 0;
+	} else if (ret >= 0 || ret == -ERANGE) {
+		/* The file already uses a different encryption policy. */
+		ret = -EEXIST;
+	}
+
+	inode_unlock(inode);
+
+	mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy);
+
+int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
+	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
+	struct fscrypt_policy policy;
+	int res;
+
+	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+	if (res < 0 && res != -ERANGE)
+		return res;
+	if (res != sizeof(ctx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	policy.version = 0;
+	policy.contents_encryption_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
+	policy.filenames_encryption_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
+	policy.flags = ctx.flags;
+	memcpy(policy.master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
+				FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+
+	if (copy_to_user(arg, &policy, sizeof(policy)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy);
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_has_permitted_context() - is a file's encryption policy permitted
+ *				     within its directory?
+ *
+ * @parent: inode for parent directory
+ * @child: inode for file being looked up, opened, or linked into @parent
+ *
+ * Filesystems must call this before permitting access to an inode in a
+ * situation where the parent directory is encrypted (either before allowing
+ * ->lookup() to succeed, or for a regular file before allowing it to be opened)
+ * and before any operation that involves linking an inode into an encrypted
+ * directory, including link, rename, and cross rename.  It enforces the
+ * constraint that within a given encrypted directory tree, all files use the
+ * same encryption policy.  The pre-access check is needed to detect potentially
+ * malicious offline violations of this constraint, while the link and rename
+ * checks are needed to prevent online violations of this constraint.
+ *
+ * Return: 1 if permitted, 0 if forbidden.
+ */
+int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
+{
+	const struct fscrypt_operations *cops = parent->i_sb->s_cop;
+	const struct fscrypt_info *parent_ci, *child_ci;
+	struct fscrypt_context parent_ctx, child_ctx;
+	int res;
+
+	/* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */
+	if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) &&
+	    !S_ISLNK(child->i_mode))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* No restrictions if the parent directory is unencrypted */
+	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Encrypted directories must not contain unencrypted files */
+	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(child))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Both parent and child are encrypted, so verify they use the same
+	 * encryption policy.  Compare the fscrypt_info structs if the keys are
+	 * available, otherwise retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts.
+	 *
+	 * Note that the fscrypt_context retrieval will be required frequently
+	 * when accessing an encrypted directory tree without the key.
+	 * Performance-wise this is not a big deal because we already don't
+	 * really optimize for file access without the key (to the extent that
+	 * such access is even possible), given that any attempted access
+	 * already causes a fscrypt_context retrieval and keyring search.
+	 *
+	 * In any case, if an unexpected error occurs, fall back to "forbidden".
+	 */
+
+	res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
+	if (res)
+		return 0;
+	res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child);
+	if (res)
+		return 0;
+	parent_ci = parent->i_crypt_info;
+	child_ci = child->i_crypt_info;
+
+	if (parent_ci && child_ci) {
+		return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key, child_ci->ci_master_key,
+			      FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
+			(parent_ci->ci_data_mode == child_ci->ci_data_mode) &&
+			(parent_ci->ci_filename_mode ==
+			 child_ci->ci_filename_mode) &&
+			(parent_ci->ci_flags == child_ci->ci_flags);
+	}
+
+	res = cops->get_context(parent, &parent_ctx, sizeof(parent_ctx));
+	if (res != sizeof(parent_ctx))
+		return 0;
+
+	res = cops->get_context(child, &child_ctx, sizeof(child_ctx));
+	if (res != sizeof(child_ctx))
+		return 0;
+
+	return memcmp(parent_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
+		      child_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
+		      FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
+		(parent_ctx.contents_encryption_mode ==
+		 child_ctx.contents_encryption_mode) &&
+		(parent_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode ==
+		 child_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode) &&
+		(parent_ctx.flags == child_ctx.flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context);
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_inherit_context() - Sets a child context from its parent
+ * @parent: Parent inode from which the context is inherited.
+ * @child:  Child inode that inherits the context from @parent.
+ * @fs_data:  private data given by FS.
+ * @preload:  preload child i_crypt_info if true
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
+ */
+int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child,
+						void *fs_data, bool preload)
+{
+	struct fscrypt_context ctx;
+	struct fscrypt_info *ci;
+	int res;
+
+	res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
+	if (res < 0)
+		return res;
+
+	ci = parent->i_crypt_info;
+	if (ci == NULL)
+		return -ENOKEY;
+
+	ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
+	ctx.contents_encryption_mode = ci->ci_data_mode;
+	ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = ci->ci_filename_mode;
+	ctx.flags = ci->ci_flags;
+	memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key,
+	       FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+	get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE);
+	res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx,
+						sizeof(ctx), fs_data);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
+	return preload ? fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child): 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context);