Adding upstream version 4.19.249.upstream/4.19.249

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 256 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/kcmp.c b/kernel/kcmp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a0e3d7a0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcmp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kcmp.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+/*
+ * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
+ * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
+ * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
+ *
+ * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
+ * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
+ * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
+ * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
+ * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
+ * relative prime to 2^n).
+ *
+ * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
+ * it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
+ */
+static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
+
+static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
+{
+	return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
+ * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
+ * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
+ * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
+ */
+static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
+{
+	long t1, t2;
+
+	t1 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type);
+	t2 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);
+
+	return (t1 < t2) | ((t1 > t2) << 1);
+}
+
+/* The caller must have pinned the task */
+static struct file *
+get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
+{
+	struct file *file = NULL;
+
+	task_lock(task);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	if (task->files)
+		file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	task_unlock(task);
+
+	return file;
+}
+
+static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
+{
+	if (likely(m2 != m1))
+		mutex_unlock(m2);
+	mutex_unlock(m1);
+}
+
+static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (m2 > m1)
+		swap(m1, m2);
+
+	err = mutex_lock_killable(m1);
+	if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) {
+		err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+		if (err)
+			mutex_unlock(m1);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EPOLL
+static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
+			     struct task_struct *task2,
+			     unsigned long idx1,
+			     struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot)
+{
+	struct file *filp, *filp_epoll, *filp_tgt;
+	struct kcmp_epoll_slot slot;
+	struct files_struct *files;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&slot, uslot, sizeof(slot)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	filp = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
+	if (!filp)
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	files = get_files_struct(task2);
+	if (!files)
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+	filp_epoll = fcheck_files(files, slot.efd);
+	if (filp_epoll)
+		get_file(filp_epoll);
+	else
+		filp_tgt = ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
+	spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+	put_files_struct(files);
+
+	if (filp_epoll) {
+		filp_tgt = get_epoll_tfile_raw_ptr(filp_epoll, slot.tfd, slot.toff);
+		fput(filp_epoll);
+	}
+
+	if (IS_ERR(filp_tgt))
+		return PTR_ERR(filp_tgt);
+
+	return kcmp_ptr(filp, filp_tgt, KCMP_FILE);
+}
+#else
+static int kcmp_epoll_target(struct task_struct *task1,
+			     struct task_struct *task2,
+			     unsigned long idx1,
+			     struct kcmp_epoll_slot __user *uslot)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
+		unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
+{
+	struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
+	int ret;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+
+	/*
+	 * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
+	 */
+	task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
+	task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
+	if (!task1 || !task2)
+		goto err_no_task;
+
+	get_task_struct(task1);
+	get_task_struct(task2);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/*
+	 * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
+	 */
+	ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
+			&task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+	if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) ||
+	    !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		goto err_unlock;
+	}
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case KCMP_FILE: {
+		struct file *filp1, *filp2;
+
+		filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
+		filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);
+
+		if (filp1 && filp2)
+			ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
+		else
+			ret = -EBADF;
+		break;
+	}
+	case KCMP_VM:
+		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
+		break;
+	case KCMP_FILES:
+		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
+		break;
+	case KCMP_FS:
+		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
+		break;
+	case KCMP_SIGHAND:
+		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
+		break;
+	case KCMP_IO:
+		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
+		break;
+	case KCMP_SYSVSEM:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
+		ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
+			       task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
+			       KCMP_SYSVSEM);
+#else
+		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#endif
+		break;
+	case KCMP_EPOLL_TFD:
+		ret = kcmp_epoll_target(task1, task2, idx1, (void *)idx2);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+err_unlock:
+	kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
+		    &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+err:
+	put_task_struct(task1);
+	put_task_struct(task2);
+
+	return ret;
+
+err_no_task:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return -ESRCH;
+}
+
+static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
+		cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >>  1) | 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);