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| author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-08 04:17:38 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-08 04:17:38 +0000 |
| commit | 9db339b27f903add3e85b6448c6ca4681450c187 (patch) | |
| tree | 2e9f25d374e0b322841a7cabe8100b5b52c0e69d /net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | |
| parent | Adding upstream version 4.19.282. (diff) | |
| download | linux-upstream/4.19.289.tar.xz linux-upstream/4.19.289.zip | |
Adding upstream version 4.19.289.upstream/4.19.289
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | 37 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c index 6908817a5..182c3c5b8 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c @@ -973,6 +973,34 @@ static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg); + /* Make sure the cmd is valid before doing anything */ + switch (cmd) { + case HCIGETDEVLIST: + case HCIGETDEVINFO: + case HCIGETCONNLIST: + case HCIDEVUP: + case HCIDEVDOWN: + case HCIDEVRESET: + case HCIDEVRESTAT: + case HCISETSCAN: + case HCISETAUTH: + case HCISETENCRYPT: + case HCISETPTYPE: + case HCISETLINKPOL: + case HCISETLINKMODE: + case HCISETACLMTU: + case HCISETSCOMTU: + case HCIINQUIRY: + case HCISETRAW: + case HCIGETCONNINFO: + case HCIGETAUTHINFO: + case HCIBLOCKADDR: + case HCIUNBLOCKADDR: + break; + default: + return -ENOIOCTLCMD; + } + lock_sock(sk); if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) { @@ -989,7 +1017,14 @@ static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, if (hci_sock_gen_cookie(sk)) { struct sk_buff *skb; - if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + /* Perform careful checks before setting the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED + * flag. Make sure that not only the current task but also + * the socket opener has the required capability, since + * privileged programs can be tricked into making ioctl calls + * on HCI sockets, and the socket should not be marked as + * trusted simply because the ioctl caller is privileged. + */ + if (sk_capable(sk, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED); /* Send event to monitor */ |