Adding upstream version 4.19.269.upstream/4.19.269

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 5295a579e..3c58019f0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -718,13 +718,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
  * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
  * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
  * property might be used by clever attacker.
+ *
  * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
- * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
- * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
- * memory.
+ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 by default instead
+ * to really give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB
+ * of kernel memory.
  */
-#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
-#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << CONFIG_INET_TABLE_PERTURB_ORDER)
 static u32 *table_perturb;
 
 int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
@@ -765,8 +765,8 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 	if (likely(remaining > 1))
 		remaining &= ~1U;
 
-	net_get_random_once(table_perturb,
-			    INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb));
+	get_random_slow_once(table_perturb,
+			     INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb));
 	index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1);
 
 	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32);