1 files changed, 432 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a587f9013
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/pkeys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * PowerPC Memory Protection Keys management
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017, Ram Pai, IBM Corporation.
+ */
+
+#include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
+#include <linux/of_device.h>
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(pkey_disabled);
+bool pkey_execute_disable_supported;
+int  pkeys_total;		/* Total pkeys as per device tree */
+bool pkeys_devtree_defined;	/* pkey property exported by device tree */
+u32  initial_allocation_mask;   /* Bits set for the initially allocated keys */
+u32  reserved_allocation_mask;  /* Bits set for reserved keys */
+u64  pkey_amr_mask;		/* Bits in AMR not to be touched */
+u64  pkey_iamr_mask;		/* Bits in AMR not to be touched */
+u64  pkey_uamor_mask;		/* Bits in UMOR not to be touched */
+int  execute_only_key = 2;
+
+#define AMR_BITS_PER_PKEY 2
+#define AMR_RD_BIT 0x1UL
+#define AMR_WR_BIT 0x2UL
+#define IAMR_EX_BIT 0x1UL
+#define PKEY_REG_BITS (sizeof(u64)*8)
+#define pkeyshift(pkey) (PKEY_REG_BITS - ((pkey+1) * AMR_BITS_PER_PKEY))
+
+static void scan_pkey_feature(void)
+{
+	u32 vals[2];
+	struct device_node *cpu;
+
+	cpu = of_find_node_by_type(NULL, "cpu");
+	if (!cpu)
+		return;
+
+	if (of_property_read_u32_array(cpu,
+			"ibm,processor-storage-keys", vals, 2))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since any pkey can be used for data or execute, we will just treat
+	 * all keys as equal and track them as one entity.
+	 */
+	pkeys_total = vals[0];
+	pkeys_devtree_defined = true;
+}
+
+static inline bool pkey_mmu_enabled(void)
+{
+	if (firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_LPAR))
+		return pkeys_total;
+	else
+		return cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_PKEY);
+}
+
+int pkey_initialize(void)
+{
+	int os_reserved, i;
+
+	/*
+	 * We define PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE in addition to the arch-neutral
+	 * generic defines for PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS and PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE.
+	 * Ensure that the bits a distinct.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE &
+		     (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE));
+
+	/*
+	 * pkey_to_vmflag_bits() assumes that the pkey bits are contiguous
+	 * in the vmaflag. Make sure that is really the case.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(__builtin_clzl(ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT) +
+		     __builtin_popcountl(ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT)
+				!= (sizeof(u64) * BITS_PER_BYTE));
+
+	/* scan the device tree for pkey feature */
+	scan_pkey_feature();
+
+	/*
+	 * Let's assume 32 pkeys on P8/P9 bare metal, if its not defined by device
+	 * tree. We make this exception since some version of skiboot forgot to
+	 * expose this property on power8/9.
+	 */
+	if (!pkeys_devtree_defined && !firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_LPAR)) {
+		unsigned long pvr = mfspr(SPRN_PVR);
+
+		if (PVR_VER(pvr) == PVR_POWER8 || PVR_VER(pvr) == PVR_POWER8E ||
+		    PVR_VER(pvr) == PVR_POWER8NVL || PVR_VER(pvr) == PVR_POWER9)
+			pkeys_total = 32;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Adjust the upper limit, based on the number of bits supported by
+	 * arch-neutral code.
+	 */
+	pkeys_total = min_t(int, pkeys_total,
+			((ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT)+1));
+
+	if (!pkey_mmu_enabled() || radix_enabled() || !pkeys_total)
+		static_branch_enable(&pkey_disabled);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&pkey_disabled);
+
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * The device tree cannot be relied to indicate support for
+	 * execute_disable support. Instead we use a PVR check.
+	 */
+	if (pvr_version_is(PVR_POWER7) || pvr_version_is(PVR_POWER7p))
+		pkey_execute_disable_supported = false;
+	else
+		pkey_execute_disable_supported = true;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_4K_PAGES
+	/*
+	 * The OS can manage only 8 pkeys due to its inability to represent them
+	 * in the Linux 4K PTE.
+	 */
+	os_reserved = pkeys_total - 8;
+#else
+	os_reserved = 0;
+#endif
+	/* Bits are in LE format. */
+	reserved_allocation_mask = (0x1 << 1) | (0x1 << execute_only_key);
+
+	/* register mask is in BE format */
+	pkey_amr_mask = ~0x0ul;
+	pkey_amr_mask &= ~(0x3ul << pkeyshift(0));
+
+	pkey_iamr_mask = ~0x0ul;
+	pkey_iamr_mask &= ~(0x3ul << pkeyshift(0));
+	pkey_iamr_mask &= ~(0x3ul << pkeyshift(execute_only_key));
+
+	pkey_uamor_mask = ~0x0ul;
+	pkey_uamor_mask &= ~(0x3ul << pkeyshift(0));
+	pkey_uamor_mask &= ~(0x3ul << pkeyshift(execute_only_key));
+
+	/* mark the rest of the keys as reserved and hence unavailable */
+	for (i = (pkeys_total - os_reserved); i < pkeys_total; i++) {
+		reserved_allocation_mask |= (0x1 << i);
+		pkey_uamor_mask &= ~(0x3ul << pkeyshift(i));
+	}
+	initial_allocation_mask = reserved_allocation_mask | (0x1 << 0);
+
+	if (unlikely((pkeys_total - os_reserved) <= execute_only_key)) {
+		/*
+		 * Insufficient number of keys to support
+		 * execute only key. Mark it unavailable.
+		 * Any AMR, UAMOR, IAMR bit set for
+		 * this key is irrelevant since this key
+		 * can never be allocated.
+		 */
+		execute_only_key = -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+arch_initcall(pkey_initialize);
+
+void pkey_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return;
+	mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) = initial_allocation_mask;
+	mm->context.execute_only_pkey = execute_only_key;
+}
+
+static inline u64 read_amr(void)
+{
+	return mfspr(SPRN_AMR);
+}
+
+static inline void write_amr(u64 value)
+{
+	mtspr(SPRN_AMR, value);
+}
+
+static inline u64 read_iamr(void)
+{
+	if (!likely(pkey_execute_disable_supported))
+		return 0x0UL;
+
+	return mfspr(SPRN_IAMR);
+}
+
+static inline void write_iamr(u64 value)
+{
+	if (!likely(pkey_execute_disable_supported))
+		return;
+
+	mtspr(SPRN_IAMR, value);
+}
+
+static inline u64 read_uamor(void)
+{
+	return mfspr(SPRN_UAMOR);
+}
+
+static inline void write_uamor(u64 value)
+{
+	mtspr(SPRN_UAMOR, value);
+}
+
+static bool is_pkey_enabled(int pkey)
+{
+	u64 uamor = read_uamor();
+	u64 pkey_bits = 0x3ul << pkeyshift(pkey);
+	u64 uamor_pkey_bits = (uamor & pkey_bits);
+
+	/*
+	 * Both the bits in UAMOR corresponding to the key should be set or
+	 * reset.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON(uamor_pkey_bits && (uamor_pkey_bits != pkey_bits));
+	return !!(uamor_pkey_bits);
+}
+
+static inline void init_amr(int pkey, u8 init_bits)
+{
+	u64 new_amr_bits = (((u64)init_bits & 0x3UL) << pkeyshift(pkey));
+	u64 old_amr = read_amr() & ~((u64)(0x3ul) << pkeyshift(pkey));
+
+	write_amr(old_amr | new_amr_bits);
+}
+
+static inline void init_iamr(int pkey, u8 init_bits)
+{
+	u64 new_iamr_bits = (((u64)init_bits & 0x1UL) << pkeyshift(pkey));
+	u64 old_iamr = read_iamr() & ~((u64)(0x1ul) << pkeyshift(pkey));
+
+	write_iamr(old_iamr | new_iamr_bits);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the access rights in AMR IAMR and UAMOR registers for @pkey to that
+ * specified in @init_val.
+ */
+int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey,
+				unsigned long init_val)
+{
+	u64 new_amr_bits = 0x0ul;
+	u64 new_iamr_bits = 0x0ul;
+
+	if (!is_pkey_enabled(pkey))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE) {
+		if (!pkey_execute_disable_supported)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		new_iamr_bits |= IAMR_EX_BIT;
+	}
+	init_iamr(pkey, new_iamr_bits);
+
+	/* Set the bits we need in AMR: */
+	if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS)
+		new_amr_bits |= AMR_RD_BIT | AMR_WR_BIT;
+	else if (init_val & PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
+		new_amr_bits |= AMR_WR_BIT;
+
+	init_amr(pkey, new_amr_bits);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void thread_pkey_regs_save(struct thread_struct *thread)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: Skip saving registers if @thread hasn't used any keys yet.
+	 */
+	thread->amr = read_amr();
+	thread->iamr = read_iamr();
+	thread->uamor = read_uamor();
+}
+
+void thread_pkey_regs_restore(struct thread_struct *new_thread,
+			      struct thread_struct *old_thread)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return;
+
+	if (old_thread->amr != new_thread->amr)
+		write_amr(new_thread->amr);
+	if (old_thread->iamr != new_thread->iamr)
+		write_iamr(new_thread->iamr);
+	if (old_thread->uamor != new_thread->uamor)
+		write_uamor(new_thread->uamor);
+}
+
+void thread_pkey_regs_init(struct thread_struct *thread)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return;
+
+	thread->amr = pkey_amr_mask;
+	thread->iamr = pkey_iamr_mask;
+	thread->uamor = pkey_uamor_mask;
+
+	write_uamor(pkey_uamor_mask);
+	write_amr(pkey_amr_mask);
+	write_iamr(pkey_iamr_mask);
+}
+
+static inline bool pkey_allows_readwrite(int pkey)
+{
+	int pkey_shift = pkeyshift(pkey);
+
+	if (!is_pkey_enabled(pkey))
+		return true;
+
+	return !(read_amr() & ((AMR_RD_BIT|AMR_WR_BIT) << pkey_shift));
+}
+
+int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	return mm->context.execute_only_pkey;
+}
+
+static inline bool vma_is_pkey_exec_only(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	/* Do this check first since the vm_flags should be hot */
+	if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC)) != VM_EXEC)
+		return false;
+
+	return (vma_pkey(vma) == vma->vm_mm->context.execute_only_pkey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This should only be called for *plain* mprotect calls.
+ */
+int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot,
+				  int pkey)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If the currently associated pkey is execute-only, but the requested
+	 * protection is not execute-only, move it back to the default pkey.
+	 */
+	if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) && (prot != PROT_EXEC))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * The requested protection is execute-only. Hence let's use an
+	 * execute-only pkey.
+	 */
+	if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
+		pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm);
+		if (pkey > 0)
+			return pkey;
+	}
+
+	/* Nothing to override. */
+	return vma_pkey(vma);
+}
+
+static bool pkey_access_permitted(int pkey, bool write, bool execute)
+{
+	int pkey_shift;
+	u64 amr;
+
+	if (!is_pkey_enabled(pkey))
+		return true;
+
+	pkey_shift = pkeyshift(pkey);
+	if (execute)
+		return !(read_iamr() & (IAMR_EX_BIT << pkey_shift));
+
+	amr = read_amr();
+	if (write)
+		return !(amr & (AMR_WR_BIT << pkey_shift));
+
+	return !(amr & (AMR_RD_BIT << pkey_shift));
+}
+
+bool arch_pte_access_permitted(u64 pte, bool write, bool execute)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return true;
+
+	return pkey_access_permitted(pte_to_pkey_bits(pte), write, execute);
+}
+
+/*
+ * We only want to enforce protection keys on the current thread because we
+ * effectively have no access to AMR/IAMR for other threads or any way to tell
+ * which AMR/IAMR in a threaded process we could use.
+ *
+ * So do not enforce things if the VMA is not from the current mm, or if we are
+ * in a kernel thread.
+ */
+static inline bool vma_is_foreign(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (!current->mm)
+		return true;
+
+	/* if it is not our ->mm, it has to be foreign */
+	if (current->mm != vma->vm_mm)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+bool arch_vma_access_permitted(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool write,
+			       bool execute, bool foreign)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return true;
+	/*
+	 * Do not enforce our key-permissions on a foreign vma.
+	 */
+	if (foreign || vma_is_foreign(vma))
+		return true;
+
+	return pkey_access_permitted(vma_pkey(vma), write, execute);
+}
+
+void arch_dup_pkeys(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&pkey_disabled))
+		return;
+
+	/* Duplicate the oldmm pkey state in mm: */
+	mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) = mm_pkey_allocation_map(oldmm);
+	mm->context.execute_only_pkey = oldmm->context.execute_only_pkey;
+}