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-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/Makefile17
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c1214
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c127
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c314
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S211
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S271
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c593
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c156
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c618
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/prng.c875
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/sha.h32
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c103
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c143
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c149
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c92
15 files changed, 4915 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a51010ea6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Cryptographic API
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390) += sha1_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_S390) += sha256_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390) += sha512_s390.o sha_common.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES_S390) += des_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_S390) += aes_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390) += paes_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM) += arch_random.o
+
+crc32-vx_s390-y := crc32-vx.o crc32le-vx.o crc32be-vx.o
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c663caf37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1214 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2005, 2017
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ * Sebastian Siewior (sebastian@breakpoint.cc> SW-Fallback
+ * Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
+ * Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Derived from "crypto/aes_generic.c"
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "aes_s390"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/ghash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions,
+ kma_functions;
+
+struct s390_aes_ctx {
+ u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ int key_len;
+ unsigned long fc;
+ union {
+ struct crypto_skcipher *blk;
+ struct crypto_cipher *cip;
+ } fallback;
+};
+
+struct s390_xts_ctx {
+ u8 key[32];
+ u8 pcc_key[32];
+ int key_len;
+ unsigned long fc;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *fallback;
+};
+
+struct gcm_sg_walk {
+ struct scatter_walk walk;
+ unsigned int walk_bytes;
+ u8 *walk_ptr;
+ unsigned int walk_bytes_remain;
+ u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned int buf_bytes;
+ u8 *ptr;
+ unsigned int nbytes;
+};
+
+static int setkey_fallback_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ int ret;
+
+ sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
+ sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags |= (tfm->crt_flags &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+ ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.cip, in_key, key_len);
+ if (ret) {
+ tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+ tfm->crt_flags |= (sctx->fallback.cip->base.crt_flags &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ unsigned long fc;
+
+ /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+ fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KM_AES_128 :
+ (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KM_AES_192 :
+ (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_AES_256 : 0;
+
+ /* Check if the function code is available */
+ sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+ if (!sctx->fc)
+ return setkey_fallback_cip(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+ sctx->key_len = key_len;
+ memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) {
+ crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in);
+ return;
+ }
+ cpacf_km(sctx->fc, &sctx->key, out, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (unlikely(!sctx->fc)) {
+ crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(sctx->fallback.cip, out, in);
+ return;
+ }
+ cpacf_km(sctx->fc | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+ &sctx->key, out, in, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static int fallback_init_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ sctx->fallback.cip = crypto_alloc_cipher(name, 0,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.cip)) {
+ pr_err("Allocating AES fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
+ name);
+ return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.cip);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void fallback_exit_cip(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_cipher(sctx->fallback.cip);
+ sctx->fallback.cip = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg aes_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "aes",
+ .cra_driver_name = "aes-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = fallback_init_cip,
+ .cra_exit = fallback_exit_cip,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .cipher = {
+ .cia_min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+ .cia_max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ .cia_setkey = aes_set_key,
+ .cia_encrypt = aes_encrypt,
+ .cia_decrypt = aes_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int setkey_fallback_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ unsigned int ret;
+
+ crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(sctx->fallback.blk, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(sctx->fallback.blk, tfm->crt_flags &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(sctx->fallback.blk, key, len);
+
+ tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+ tfm->crt_flags |= crypto_skcipher_get_flags(sctx->fallback.blk) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int fallback_blk_dec(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ unsigned int ret;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, sctx->fallback.blk);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, sctx->fallback.blk);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, desc->flags, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, nbytes, desc->info);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int fallback_blk_enc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ unsigned int ret;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, sctx->fallback.blk);
+
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, sctx->fallback.blk);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, desc->flags, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, nbytes, desc->info);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ unsigned long fc;
+
+ /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+ fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KM_AES_128 :
+ (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KM_AES_192 :
+ (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_AES_256 : 0;
+
+ /* Check if the function code is available */
+ sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+ if (!sctx->fc)
+ return setkey_fallback_blk(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+ sctx->key_len = key_len;
+ memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int nbytes, n;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* only use complete blocks */
+ n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ cpacf_km(sctx->fc | modifier, sctx->key,
+ walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+ return fallback_blk_enc(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ecb_aes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ecb_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+ return fallback_blk_dec(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ecb_aes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static int fallback_init_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ sctx->fallback.blk = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(sctx->fallback.blk)) {
+ pr_err("Allocating AES fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
+ name);
+ return PTR_ERR(sctx->fallback.blk);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void fallback_exit_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_skcipher(sctx->fallback.blk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ecb_aes_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 401, /* combo: aes + ecb + 1 */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = fallback_init_blk,
+ .cra_exit = fallback_exit_blk,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ .setkey = ecb_aes_set_key,
+ .encrypt = ecb_aes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = ecb_aes_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int cbc_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ unsigned long fc;
+
+ /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+ fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_128 :
+ (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_192 :
+ (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KMC_AES_256 : 0;
+
+ /* Check if the function code is available */
+ sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+ if (!sctx->fc)
+ return setkey_fallback_blk(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+ sctx->key_len = key_len;
+ memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cbc_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int nbytes, n;
+ int ret;
+ struct {
+ u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ } param;
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+ memcpy(param.iv, walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(param.key, sctx->key, sctx->key_len);
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* only use complete blocks */
+ n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ cpacf_kmc(sctx->fc | modifier, &param,
+ walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+ }
+ memcpy(walk->iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+ return fallback_blk_enc(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return cbc_aes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int cbc_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+ return fallback_blk_dec(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return cbc_aes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg cbc_aes_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "cbc(aes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = fallback_init_blk,
+ .cra_exit = fallback_exit_blk,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = cbc_aes_set_key,
+ .encrypt = cbc_aes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = cbc_aes_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int xts_fallback_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ unsigned int ret;
+
+ crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(xts_ctx->fallback, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(xts_ctx->fallback, tfm->crt_flags &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(xts_ctx->fallback, key, len);
+
+ tfm->crt_flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+ tfm->crt_flags |= crypto_skcipher_get_flags(xts_ctx->fallback) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_fallback_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
+ struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, xts_ctx->fallback);
+ unsigned int ret;
+
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, xts_ctx->fallback);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, desc->flags, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, nbytes, desc->info);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_fallback_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
+ struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+ SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, xts_ctx->fallback);
+ unsigned int ret;
+
+ skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, xts_ctx->fallback);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, desc->flags, NULL, NULL);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, nbytes, desc->info);
+
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
+
+ skcipher_request_zero(req);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ unsigned long fc;
+ int err;
+
+ err = xts_check_key(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* In fips mode only 128 bit or 256 bit keys are valid */
+ if (fips_enabled && key_len != 32 && key_len != 64) {
+ tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+ fc = (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_128 :
+ (key_len == 64) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_256 : 0;
+
+ /* Check if the function code is available */
+ xts_ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+ if (!xts_ctx->fc)
+ return xts_fallback_setkey(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+ /* Split the XTS key into the two subkeys */
+ key_len = key_len / 2;
+ xts_ctx->key_len = key_len;
+ memcpy(xts_ctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+ memcpy(xts_ctx->pcc_key, in_key + key_len, key_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int offset, nbytes, n;
+ int ret;
+ struct {
+ u8 key[32];
+ u8 tweak[16];
+ u8 block[16];
+ u8 bit[16];
+ u8 xts[16];
+ } pcc_param;
+ struct {
+ u8 key[32];
+ u8 init[16];
+ } xts_param;
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+ offset = xts_ctx->key_len & 0x10;
+ memset(pcc_param.block, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.block));
+ memset(pcc_param.bit, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.bit));
+ memset(pcc_param.xts, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.xts));
+ memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk->iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak));
+ memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, xts_ctx->pcc_key, xts_ctx->key_len);
+ cpacf_pcc(xts_ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset);
+
+ memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, xts_ctx->key, xts_ctx->key_len);
+ memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16);
+
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* only use complete blocks */
+ n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ cpacf_km(xts_ctx->fc | modifier, xts_param.key + offset,
+ walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ if (!nbytes)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (unlikely(!xts_ctx->fc))
+ return xts_fallback_encrypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return xts_aes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ if (!nbytes)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (unlikely(!xts_ctx->fc))
+ return xts_fallback_decrypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return xts_aes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static int xts_fallback_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
+ struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ xts_ctx->fallback = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback)) {
+ pr_err("Allocating XTS fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
+ name);
+ return PTR_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void xts_fallback_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_skcipher(xts_ctx->fallback);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg xts_aes_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "xts(aes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "xts-aes-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_xts_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = xts_fallback_init,
+ .cra_exit = xts_fallback_exit,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = 2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = 2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = xts_aes_set_key,
+ .encrypt = xts_aes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = xts_aes_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int ctr_aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ unsigned long fc;
+
+ /* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
+ fc = (key_len == 16) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_128 :
+ (key_len == 24) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_192 :
+ (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KMCTR_AES_256 : 0;
+
+ /* Check if the function code is available */
+ sctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+ if (!sctx->fc)
+ return setkey_fallback_blk(tfm, in_key, key_len);
+
+ sctx->key_len = key_len;
+ memcpy(sctx->key, in_key, key_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ unsigned int i, n;
+
+ /* only use complete blocks, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+ memcpy(ctrptr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ for (i = (n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ memcpy(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ crypto_inc(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ctrptr += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+ return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+ unsigned int n, nbytes;
+ int ret, locked;
+
+ locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, walk, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+ n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk->iv, nbytes);
+ ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk->iv;
+ cpacf_kmctr(sctx->fc | modifier, sctx->key,
+ walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+ n, ctrptr);
+ if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+ memcpy(walk->iv, ctrptr + n - AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+ }
+ if (locked)
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+ /*
+ * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes
+ */
+ if (nbytes) {
+ cpacf_kmctr(sctx->fc | modifier, sctx->key,
+ buf, walk->src.virt.addr,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE, walk->iv);
+ memcpy(walk->dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+ crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, 0);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ctr_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+ return fallback_blk_enc(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ctr_aes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ctr_aes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ if (unlikely(!sctx->fc))
+ return fallback_blk_dec(desc, dst, src, nbytes);
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ctr_aes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ctr_aes_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "ctr(aes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ctr-aes-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-aes-s390 + 1 */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK,
+ .cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = fallback_init_blk,
+ .cra_exit = fallback_exit_blk,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = ctr_aes_set_key,
+ .encrypt = ctr_aes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = ctr_aes_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int gcm_aes_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+ switch (keylen) {
+ case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
+ ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_128;
+ break;
+ case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
+ ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_192;
+ break;
+ case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
+ ctx->fc = CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_256;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen);
+ ctx->key_len = keylen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
+{
+ switch (authsize) {
+ case 4:
+ case 8:
+ case 12:
+ case 13:
+ case 14:
+ case 15:
+ case 16:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void gcm_walk_start(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, struct scatterlist *sg,
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ memset(gw, 0, sizeof(*gw));
+ gw->walk_bytes_remain = len;
+ scatterwalk_start(&gw->walk, sg);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int _gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw)
+{
+ struct scatterlist *nextsg;
+
+ gw->walk_bytes = scatterwalk_clamp(&gw->walk, gw->walk_bytes_remain);
+ while (!gw->walk_bytes) {
+ nextsg = sg_next(gw->walk.sg);
+ if (!nextsg)
+ return 0;
+ scatterwalk_start(&gw->walk, nextsg);
+ gw->walk_bytes = scatterwalk_clamp(&gw->walk,
+ gw->walk_bytes_remain);
+ }
+ gw->walk_ptr = scatterwalk_map(&gw->walk);
+ return gw->walk_bytes;
+}
+
+static inline void _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ gw->walk_bytes_remain -= nbytes;
+ scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr);
+ scatterwalk_advance(&gw->walk, nbytes);
+ scatterwalk_done(&gw->walk, 0, gw->walk_bytes_remain);
+ gw->walk_ptr = NULL;
+}
+
+static int gcm_in_walk_go(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int minbytesneeded)
+{
+ int n;
+
+ if (gw->buf_bytes && gw->buf_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+ gw->ptr = gw->buf;
+ gw->nbytes = gw->buf_bytes;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (gw->walk_bytes_remain == 0) {
+ gw->ptr = NULL;
+ gw->nbytes = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) {
+ gw->ptr = NULL;
+ gw->nbytes = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!gw->buf_bytes && gw->walk_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+ gw->ptr = gw->walk_ptr;
+ gw->nbytes = gw->walk_bytes;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ n = min(gw->walk_bytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - gw->buf_bytes);
+ memcpy(gw->buf + gw->buf_bytes, gw->walk_ptr, n);
+ gw->buf_bytes += n;
+ _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, n);
+ if (gw->buf_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+ gw->ptr = gw->buf;
+ gw->nbytes = gw->buf_bytes;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) {
+ gw->ptr = NULL;
+ gw->nbytes = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ return gw->nbytes;
+}
+
+static int gcm_out_walk_go(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int minbytesneeded)
+{
+ if (gw->walk_bytes_remain == 0) {
+ gw->ptr = NULL;
+ gw->nbytes = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw)) {
+ gw->ptr = NULL;
+ gw->nbytes = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (gw->walk_bytes >= minbytesneeded) {
+ gw->ptr = gw->walk_ptr;
+ gw->nbytes = gw->walk_bytes;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ scatterwalk_unmap(gw->walk_ptr);
+ gw->walk_ptr = NULL;
+
+ gw->ptr = gw->buf;
+ gw->nbytes = sizeof(gw->buf);
+
+out:
+ return gw->nbytes;
+}
+
+static int gcm_in_walk_done(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int bytesdone)
+{
+ if (gw->ptr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (gw->ptr == gw->buf) {
+ int n = gw->buf_bytes - bytesdone;
+ if (n > 0) {
+ memmove(gw->buf, gw->buf + bytesdone, n);
+ gw->buf_bytes = n;
+ } else
+ gw->buf_bytes = 0;
+ } else
+ _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, bytesdone);
+
+ return bytesdone;
+}
+
+static int gcm_out_walk_done(struct gcm_sg_walk *gw, unsigned int bytesdone)
+{
+ int i, n;
+
+ if (gw->ptr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (gw->ptr == gw->buf) {
+ for (i = 0; i < bytesdone; i += n) {
+ if (!_gcm_sg_clamp_and_map(gw))
+ return i;
+ n = min(gw->walk_bytes, bytesdone - i);
+ memcpy(gw->walk_ptr, gw->buf + i, n);
+ _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, n);
+ }
+ } else
+ _gcm_sg_unmap_and_advance(gw, bytesdone);
+
+ return bytesdone;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_crypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct s390_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+ unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ unsigned int taglen = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+ unsigned int aadlen = req->assoclen;
+ unsigned int pclen = req->cryptlen;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ unsigned int n, len, in_bytes, out_bytes,
+ min_bytes, bytes, aad_bytes, pc_bytes;
+ struct gcm_sg_walk gw_in, gw_out;
+ u8 tag[GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+ struct {
+ u32 _[3]; /* reserved */
+ u32 cv; /* Counter Value */
+ u8 t[GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE];/* Tag */
+ u8 h[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* Hash-subkey */
+ u64 taadl; /* Total AAD Length */
+ u64 tpcl; /* Total Plain-/Cipher-text Length */
+ u8 j0[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];/* initial counter value */
+ u8 k[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; /* Key */
+ } param;
+
+ /*
+ * encrypt
+ * req->src: aad||plaintext
+ * req->dst: aad||ciphertext||tag
+ * decrypt
+ * req->src: aad||ciphertext||tag
+ * req->dst: aad||plaintext, return 0 or -EBADMSG
+ * aad, plaintext and ciphertext may be empty.
+ */
+ if (flags & CPACF_DECRYPT)
+ pclen -= taglen;
+ len = aadlen + pclen;
+
+ memset(&param, 0, sizeof(param));
+ param.cv = 1;
+ param.taadl = aadlen * 8;
+ param.tpcl = pclen * 8;
+ memcpy(param.j0, req->iv, ivsize);
+ *(u32 *)(param.j0 + ivsize) = 1;
+ memcpy(param.k, ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
+
+ gcm_walk_start(&gw_in, req->src, len);
+ gcm_walk_start(&gw_out, req->dst, len);
+
+ do {
+ min_bytes = min_t(unsigned int,
+ aadlen > 0 ? aadlen : pclen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ in_bytes = gcm_in_walk_go(&gw_in, min_bytes);
+ out_bytes = gcm_out_walk_go(&gw_out, min_bytes);
+ bytes = min(in_bytes, out_bytes);
+
+ if (aadlen + pclen <= bytes) {
+ aad_bytes = aadlen;
+ pc_bytes = pclen;
+ flags |= CPACF_KMA_LAAD | CPACF_KMA_LPC;
+ } else {
+ if (aadlen <= bytes) {
+ aad_bytes = aadlen;
+ pc_bytes = (bytes - aadlen) &
+ ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ flags |= CPACF_KMA_LAAD;
+ } else {
+ aad_bytes = bytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ pc_bytes = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (aad_bytes > 0)
+ memcpy(gw_out.ptr, gw_in.ptr, aad_bytes);
+
+ cpacf_kma(ctx->fc | flags, &param,
+ gw_out.ptr + aad_bytes,
+ gw_in.ptr + aad_bytes, pc_bytes,
+ gw_in.ptr, aad_bytes);
+
+ n = aad_bytes + pc_bytes;
+ if (gcm_in_walk_done(&gw_in, n) != n)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (gcm_out_walk_done(&gw_out, n) != n)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ aadlen -= aad_bytes;
+ pclen -= pc_bytes;
+ } while (aadlen + pclen > 0);
+
+ if (flags & CPACF_DECRYPT) {
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tag, req->src, len, taglen, 0);
+ if (crypto_memneq(tag, param.t, taglen))
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ } else
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(param.t, req->dst, len, taglen, 1);
+
+ memzero_explicit(&param, sizeof(param));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ return gcm_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_ENCRYPT);
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ return gcm_aes_crypt(req, CPACF_DECRYPT);
+}
+
+static struct aead_alg gcm_aes_aead = {
+ .setkey = gcm_aes_setkey,
+ .setauthsize = gcm_aes_setauthsize,
+ .encrypt = gcm_aes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = gcm_aes_decrypt,
+
+ .ivsize = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(u32),
+ .maxauthsize = GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+
+ .base = {
+ .cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_aes_ctx),
+ .cra_priority = 900,
+ .cra_name = "gcm(aes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "gcm-aes-s390",
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ },
+};
+
+static struct crypto_alg *aes_s390_algs_ptr[5];
+static int aes_s390_algs_num;
+static struct aead_alg *aes_s390_aead_alg;
+
+static int aes_s390_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = crypto_register_alg(alg);
+ if (!ret)
+ aes_s390_algs_ptr[aes_s390_algs_num++] = alg;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void aes_s390_fini(void)
+{
+ while (aes_s390_algs_num--)
+ crypto_unregister_alg(aes_s390_algs_ptr[aes_s390_algs_num]);
+ if (ctrblk)
+ free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+
+ if (aes_s390_aead_alg)
+ crypto_unregister_aead(aes_s390_aead_alg);
+}
+
+static int __init aes_s390_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Query available functions for KM, KMC, KMCTR and KMA */
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KMA, &kma_functions);
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_128) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_192) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_AES_256)) {
+ ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&aes_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&ecb_aes_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_128) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_192) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_AES_256)) {
+ ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&cbc_aes_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_XTS_128) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_XTS_256)) {
+ ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&xts_aes_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_128) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_192) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_AES_256)) {
+ ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctrblk) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ ret = aes_s390_register_alg(&ctr_aes_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_128) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_192) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kma_functions, CPACF_KMA_GCM_AES_256)) {
+ ret = crypto_register_aead(&gcm_aes_aead);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ aes_s390_aead_alg = &gcm_aes_aead;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+out_err:
+ aes_s390_fini();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, aes_s390_init);
+module_exit(aes_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("aes-all");
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4cbb4b6d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * s390 arch random implementation.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2018
+ * Author(s): Harald Freudenberger
+ *
+ * The s390_arch_random_generate() function may be called from random.c
+ * in interrupt context. So this implementation does the best to be very
+ * fast. There is a buffer of random data which is asynchronously checked
+ * and filled by a workqueue thread.
+ * If there are enough bytes in the buffer the s390_arch_random_generate()
+ * just delivers these bytes. Otherwise false is returned until the
+ * worker thread refills the buffer.
+ * The worker fills the rng buffer by pulling fresh entropy from the
+ * high quality (but slow) true hardware random generator. This entropy
+ * is then spread over the buffer with an pseudo random generator PRNG.
+ * As the arch_get_random_seed_long() fetches 8 bytes and the calling
+ * function add_interrupt_randomness() counts this as 1 bit entropy the
+ * distribution needs to make sure there is in fact 1 bit entropy contained
+ * in 8 bytes of the buffer. The current values pull 32 byte entropy
+ * and scatter this into a 2048 byte buffer. So 8 byte in the buffer
+ * will contain 1 bit of entropy.
+ * The worker thread is rescheduled based on the charge level of the
+ * buffer but at least with 500 ms delay to avoid too much CPU consumption.
+ * So the max. amount of rng data delivered via arch_get_random_seed is
+ * limited to 4k bytes per second.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available);
+
+atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_counter);
+
+#define ARCH_REFILL_TICKS (HZ/2)
+#define ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE 32
+#define ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE 2048
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(arch_rng_lock);
+static u8 *arch_rng_buf;
+static unsigned int arch_rng_buf_idx;
+
+static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *);
+static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(arch_rng_work, arch_rng_refill_buffer);
+
+bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ /* max hunk is ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE */
+ if (nbytes > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ /* lock rng buffer */
+ if (!spin_trylock(&arch_rng_lock))
+ return false;
+
+ /* try to resolve the requested amount of bytes from the buffer */
+ arch_rng_buf_idx -= nbytes;
+ if (arch_rng_buf_idx < ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {
+ memcpy(buf, arch_rng_buf + arch_rng_buf_idx, nbytes);
+ atomic64_add(nbytes, &s390_arch_random_counter);
+ spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ /* not enough bytes in rng buffer, refill is done asynchronously */
+ spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
+
+ return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_generate);
+
+static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *unused)
+{
+ unsigned int delay = ARCH_REFILL_TICKS;
+
+ spin_lock(&arch_rng_lock);
+ if (arch_rng_buf_idx > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {
+ /* buffer is exhausted and needs refill */
+ u8 seed[ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE];
+ u8 prng_wa[240];
+ /* fetch ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE bytes of entropy */
+ cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+ /* blow this entropy up to ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE with PRNG */
+ memset(prng_wa, 0, sizeof(prng_wa));
+ cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+ &prng_wa, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+ cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+ &prng_wa, arch_rng_buf, ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, NULL, 0);
+ arch_rng_buf_idx = ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
+ }
+ delay += (ARCH_REFILL_TICKS * arch_rng_buf_idx) / ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
+ spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
+
+ /* kick next check */
+ queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &arch_rng_work, delay);
+}
+
+static int __init s390_arch_random_init(void)
+{
+ /* all the needed PRNO subfunctions available ? */
+ if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG) &&
+ cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) {
+
+ /* alloc arch random working buffer */
+ arch_rng_buf = kmalloc(ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!arch_rng_buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* kick worker queue job to fill the random buffer */
+ queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq,
+ &arch_rng_work, ARCH_REFILL_TICKS);
+
+ /* enable arch random to the outside world */
+ static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+arch_initcall(s390_arch_random_init);
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..423ee0588
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32-vx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Crypto-API module for CRC-32 algorithms implemented with the
+ * z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015
+ * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "crc32-vx"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/crc32.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+
+
+#define CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE 1
+#define CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE 4
+
+#define VX_MIN_LEN 64
+#define VX_ALIGNMENT 16L
+#define VX_ALIGN_MASK (VX_ALIGNMENT - 1)
+
+struct crc_ctx {
+ u32 key;
+};
+
+struct crc_desc_ctx {
+ u32 crc;
+};
+
+/* Prototypes for functions in assembly files */
+u32 crc32_le_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size);
+u32 crc32_be_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size);
+u32 crc32c_le_vgfm_16(u32 crc, unsigned char const *buf, size_t size);
+
+/*
+ * DEFINE_CRC32_VX() - Define a CRC-32 function using the vector extension
+ *
+ * Creates a function to perform a particular CRC-32 computation. Depending
+ * on the message buffer, the hardware-accelerated or software implementation
+ * is used. Note that the message buffer is aligned to improve fetch
+ * operations of VECTOR LOAD MULTIPLE instructions.
+ *
+ */
+#define DEFINE_CRC32_VX(___fname, ___crc32_vx, ___crc32_sw) \
+ static u32 __pure ___fname(u32 crc, \
+ unsigned char const *data, size_t datalen) \
+ { \
+ struct kernel_fpu vxstate; \
+ unsigned long prealign, aligned, remaining; \
+ \
+ if (datalen < VX_MIN_LEN + VX_ALIGN_MASK) \
+ return ___crc32_sw(crc, data, datalen); \
+ \
+ if ((unsigned long)data & VX_ALIGN_MASK) { \
+ prealign = VX_ALIGNMENT - \
+ ((unsigned long)data & VX_ALIGN_MASK); \
+ datalen -= prealign; \
+ crc = ___crc32_sw(crc, data, prealign); \
+ data = (void *)((unsigned long)data + prealign); \
+ } \
+ \
+ aligned = datalen & ~VX_ALIGN_MASK; \
+ remaining = datalen & VX_ALIGN_MASK; \
+ \
+ kernel_fpu_begin(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR_LOW); \
+ crc = ___crc32_vx(crc, data, aligned); \
+ kernel_fpu_end(&vxstate, KERNEL_VXR_LOW); \
+ \
+ if (remaining) \
+ crc = ___crc32_sw(crc, data + aligned, remaining); \
+ \
+ return crc; \
+ }
+
+DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32_le_vx, crc32_le_vgfm_16, crc32_le)
+DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32_be_vx, crc32_be_vgfm_16, crc32_be)
+DEFINE_CRC32_VX(crc32c_le_vx, crc32c_le_vgfm_16, __crc32c_le)
+
+
+static int crc32_vx_cra_init_zero(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ mctx->key = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32_vx_cra_init_invert(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ mctx->key = ~0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32_vx_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ ctx->crc = mctx->key;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32_vx_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *newkey,
+ unsigned int newkeylen)
+{
+ struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (newkeylen != sizeof(mctx->key)) {
+ crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ mctx->key = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)newkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32be_vx_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *newkey,
+ unsigned int newkeylen)
+{
+ struct crc_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (newkeylen != sizeof(mctx->key)) {
+ crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ mctx->key = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)newkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32le_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ *(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32p(&ctx->crc);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32be_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ *(__be32 *)out = cpu_to_be32p(&ctx->crc);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crc32c_vx_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ /*
+ * Perform a final XOR with 0xFFFFFFFF to be in sync
+ * with the generic crc32c shash implementation.
+ */
+ *(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32p(&ctx->crc);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __crc32le_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
+ u8 *out)
+{
+ *(__le32 *)out = cpu_to_le32(crc32_le_vx(*crc, data, len));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __crc32be_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
+ u8 *out)
+{
+ *(__be32 *)out = cpu_to_be32(crc32_be_vx(*crc, data, len));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __crc32c_vx_finup(u32 *crc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len,
+ u8 *out)
+{
+ /*
+ * Perform a final XOR with 0xFFFFFFFF to be in sync
+ * with the generic crc32c shash implementation.
+ */
+ *(__le32 *)out = ~cpu_to_le32(crc32c_le_vx(*crc, data, len));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+#define CRC32_VX_FINUP(alg, func) \
+ static int alg ## _vx_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \
+ unsigned int datalen, u8 *out) \
+ { \
+ return __ ## alg ## _vx_finup(shash_desc_ctx(desc), \
+ data, datalen, out); \
+ }
+
+CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32le, crc32_le_vx)
+CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32be, crc32_be_vx)
+CRC32_VX_FINUP(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx)
+
+#define CRC32_VX_DIGEST(alg, func) \
+ static int alg ## _vx_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \
+ unsigned int len, u8 *out) \
+ { \
+ return __ ## alg ## _vx_finup(crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm), \
+ data, len, out); \
+ }
+
+CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32le, crc32_le_vx)
+CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32be, crc32_be_vx)
+CRC32_VX_DIGEST(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx)
+
+#define CRC32_VX_UPDATE(alg, func) \
+ static int alg ## _vx_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, \
+ unsigned int datalen) \
+ { \
+ struct crc_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); \
+ ctx->crc = func(ctx->crc, data, datalen); \
+ return 0; \
+ }
+
+CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32le, crc32_le_vx)
+CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32be, crc32_be_vx)
+CRC32_VX_UPDATE(crc32c, crc32c_le_vx)
+
+
+static struct shash_alg crc32_vx_algs[] = {
+ /* CRC-32 LE */
+ {
+ .init = crc32_vx_init,
+ .setkey = crc32_vx_setkey,
+ .update = crc32le_vx_update,
+ .final = crc32le_vx_final,
+ .finup = crc32le_vx_finup,
+ .digest = crc32le_vx_digest,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx),
+ .digestsize = CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "crc32",
+ .cra_driver_name = "crc32-vx",
+ .cra_priority = 200,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .cra_blocksize = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = crc32_vx_cra_init_zero,
+ },
+ },
+ /* CRC-32 BE */
+ {
+ .init = crc32_vx_init,
+ .setkey = crc32be_vx_setkey,
+ .update = crc32be_vx_update,
+ .final = crc32be_vx_final,
+ .finup = crc32be_vx_finup,
+ .digest = crc32be_vx_digest,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx),
+ .digestsize = CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "crc32be",
+ .cra_driver_name = "crc32be-vx",
+ .cra_priority = 200,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .cra_blocksize = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = crc32_vx_cra_init_zero,
+ },
+ },
+ /* CRC-32C LE */
+ {
+ .init = crc32_vx_init,
+ .setkey = crc32_vx_setkey,
+ .update = crc32c_vx_update,
+ .final = crc32c_vx_final,
+ .finup = crc32c_vx_finup,
+ .digest = crc32c_vx_digest,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct crc_desc_ctx),
+ .digestsize = CRC32_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "crc32c",
+ .cra_driver_name = "crc32c-vx",
+ .cra_priority = 200,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .cra_blocksize = CRC32_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crc_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = crc32_vx_cra_init_invert,
+ },
+ },
+};
+
+
+static int __init crc_vx_mod_init(void)
+{
+ return crypto_register_shashes(crc32_vx_algs,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(crc32_vx_algs));
+}
+
+static void __exit crc_vx_mod_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_shashes(crc32_vx_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(crc32_vx_algs));
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(VXRS, crc_vx_mod_init);
+module_exit(crc_vx_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32-vx");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32c");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("crc32c-vx");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2bf01ba44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32be-vx.S
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Hardware-accelerated CRC-32 variants for Linux on z Systems
+ *
+ * Use the z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility to accelerate the
+ * computing of CRC-32 checksums.
+ *
+ * This CRC-32 implementation algorithm processes the most-significant
+ * bit first (BE).
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015
+ * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-insn.h>
+#include <asm/vx-insn.h>
+
+/* Vector register range containing CRC-32 constants */
+#define CONST_R1R2 %v9
+#define CONST_R3R4 %v10
+#define CONST_R5 %v11
+#define CONST_R6 %v12
+#define CONST_RU_POLY %v13
+#define CONST_CRC_POLY %v14
+
+.data
+.align 8
+
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 constant block contains reduction constants to fold and
+ * process particular chunks of the input data stream in parallel.
+ *
+ * For the CRC-32 variants, the constants are precomputed according to
+ * these defintions:
+ *
+ * R1 = x4*128+64 mod P(x)
+ * R2 = x4*128 mod P(x)
+ * R3 = x128+64 mod P(x)
+ * R4 = x128 mod P(x)
+ * R5 = x96 mod P(x)
+ * R6 = x64 mod P(x)
+ *
+ * Barret reduction constant, u, is defined as floor(x**64 / P(x)).
+ *
+ * where P(x) is the polynomial in the normal domain and the P'(x) is the
+ * polynomial in the reversed (bitreflected) domain.
+ *
+ * Note that the constant definitions below are extended in order to compute
+ * intermediate results with a single VECTOR GALOIS FIELD MULTIPLY instruction.
+ * The righmost doubleword can be 0 to prevent contribution to the result or
+ * can be multiplied by 1 to perform an XOR without the need for a separate
+ * VECTOR EXCLUSIVE OR instruction.
+ *
+ * CRC-32 (IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, ...) polynomials:
+ *
+ * P(x) = 0x04C11DB7
+ * P'(x) = 0xEDB88320
+ */
+
+.Lconstants_CRC_32_BE:
+ .quad 0x08833794c, 0x0e6228b11 # R1, R2
+ .quad 0x0c5b9cd4c, 0x0e8a45605 # R3, R4
+ .quad 0x0f200aa66, 1 << 32 # R5, x32
+ .quad 0x0490d678d, 1 # R6, 1
+ .quad 0x104d101df, 0 # u
+ .quad 0x104C11DB7, 0 # P(x)
+
+.previous
+
+ GEN_BR_THUNK %r14
+
+.text
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 function(s) use these calling conventions:
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ *
+ * %r2: Initial CRC value, typically ~0; and final CRC (return) value.
+ * %r3: Input buffer pointer, performance might be improved if the
+ * buffer is on a doubleword boundary.
+ * %r4: Length of the buffer, must be 64 bytes or greater.
+ *
+ * Register usage:
+ *
+ * %r5: CRC-32 constant pool base pointer.
+ * V0: Initial CRC value and intermediate constants and results.
+ * V1..V4: Data for CRC computation.
+ * V5..V8: Next data chunks that are fetched from the input buffer.
+ *
+ * V9..V14: CRC-32 constants.
+ */
+ENTRY(crc32_be_vgfm_16)
+ /* Load CRC-32 constants */
+ larl %r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32_BE
+ VLM CONST_R1R2,CONST_CRC_POLY,0,%r5
+
+ /* Load the initial CRC value into the leftmost word of V0. */
+ VZERO %v0
+ VLVGF %v0,%r2,0
+
+ /* Load a 64-byte data chunk and XOR with CRC */
+ VLM %v1,%v4,0,%r3 /* 64-bytes into V1..V4 */
+ VX %v1,%v0,%v1 /* V1 ^= CRC */
+ aghi %r3,64 /* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+ aghi %r4,-64 /* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+ /* Check remaining buffer size and jump to proper folding method */
+ cghi %r4,64
+ jl .Lless_than_64bytes
+
+.Lfold_64bytes_loop:
+ /* Load the next 64-byte data chunk into V5 to V8 */
+ VLM %v5,%v8,0,%r3
+
+ /*
+ * Perform a GF(2) multiplication of the doublewords in V1 with
+ * the reduction constants in V0. The intermediate result is
+ * then folded (accumulated) with the next data chunk in V5 and
+ * stored in V1. Repeat this step for the register contents
+ * in V2, V3, and V4 respectively.
+ */
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R1R2,%v1,%v5
+ VGFMAG %v2,CONST_R1R2,%v2,%v6
+ VGFMAG %v3,CONST_R1R2,%v3,%v7
+ VGFMAG %v4,CONST_R1R2,%v4,%v8
+
+ /* Adjust buffer pointer and length for next loop */
+ aghi %r3,64 /* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+ aghi %r4,-64 /* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+ cghi %r4,64
+ jnl .Lfold_64bytes_loop
+
+.Lless_than_64bytes:
+ /* Fold V1 to V4 into a single 128-bit value in V1 */
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v2
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v3
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v4
+
+ /* Check whether to continue with 64-bit folding */
+ cghi %r4,16
+ jl .Lfinal_fold
+
+.Lfold_16bytes_loop:
+
+ VL %v2,0,,%r3 /* Load next data chunk */
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R3R4,%v1,%v2 /* Fold next data chunk */
+
+ /* Adjust buffer pointer and size for folding next data chunk */
+ aghi %r3,16
+ aghi %r4,-16
+
+ /* Process remaining data chunks */
+ cghi %r4,16
+ jnl .Lfold_16bytes_loop
+
+.Lfinal_fold:
+ /*
+ * The R5 constant is used to fold a 128-bit value into an 96-bit value
+ * that is XORed with the next 96-bit input data chunk. To use a single
+ * VGFMG instruction, multiply the rightmost 64-bit with x^32 (1<<32) to
+ * form an intermediate 96-bit value (with appended zeros) which is then
+ * XORed with the intermediate reduction result.
+ */
+ VGFMG %v1,CONST_R5,%v1
+
+ /*
+ * Further reduce the remaining 96-bit value to a 64-bit value using a
+ * single VGFMG, the rightmost doubleword is multiplied with 0x1. The
+ * intermediate result is then XORed with the product of the leftmost
+ * doubleword with R6. The result is a 64-bit value and is subject to
+ * the Barret reduction.
+ */
+ VGFMG %v1,CONST_R6,%v1
+
+ /*
+ * The input values to the Barret reduction are the degree-63 polynomial
+ * in V1 (R(x)), degree-32 generator polynomial, and the reduction
+ * constant u. The Barret reduction result is the CRC value of R(x) mod
+ * P(x).
+ *
+ * The Barret reduction algorithm is defined as:
+ *
+ * 1. T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u
+ * 2. T2(x) = floor( T1(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL P(x)
+ * 3. C(x) = R(x) XOR T2(x) mod x^32
+ *
+ * Note: To compensate the division by x^32, use the vector unpack
+ * instruction to move the leftmost word into the leftmost doubleword
+ * of the vector register. The rightmost doubleword is multiplied
+ * with zero to not contribute to the intermedate results.
+ */
+
+ /* T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u */
+ VUPLLF %v2,%v1
+ VGFMG %v2,CONST_RU_POLY,%v2
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the GF(2) product of the CRC polynomial in VO with T1(x) in
+ * V2 and XOR the intermediate result, T2(x), with the value in V1.
+ * The final result is in the rightmost word of V2.
+ */
+ VUPLLF %v2,%v2
+ VGFMAG %v2,CONST_CRC_POLY,%v2,%v1
+
+.Ldone:
+ VLGVF %r2,%v2,3
+ BR_EX %r14
+
+.previous
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7d6f568bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/crc32le-vx.S
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Hardware-accelerated CRC-32 variants for Linux on z Systems
+ *
+ * Use the z/Architecture Vector Extension Facility to accelerate the
+ * computing of bitreflected CRC-32 checksums for IEEE 802.3 Ethernet
+ * and Castagnoli.
+ *
+ * This CRC-32 implementation algorithm is bitreflected and processes
+ * the least-significant bit first (Little-Endian).
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2015
+ * Author(s): Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-insn.h>
+#include <asm/vx-insn.h>
+
+/* Vector register range containing CRC-32 constants */
+#define CONST_PERM_LE2BE %v9
+#define CONST_R2R1 %v10
+#define CONST_R4R3 %v11
+#define CONST_R5 %v12
+#define CONST_RU_POLY %v13
+#define CONST_CRC_POLY %v14
+
+.data
+.align 8
+
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 constant block contains reduction constants to fold and
+ * process particular chunks of the input data stream in parallel.
+ *
+ * For the CRC-32 variants, the constants are precomputed according to
+ * these definitions:
+ *
+ * R1 = [(x4*128+32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ * R2 = [(x4*128-32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ * R3 = [(x128+32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ * R4 = [(x128-32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ * R5 = [(x64 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ * R6 = [(x32 mod P'(x) << 32)]' << 1
+ *
+ * The bitreflected Barret reduction constant, u', is defined as
+ * the bit reversal of floor(x**64 / P(x)).
+ *
+ * where P(x) is the polynomial in the normal domain and the P'(x) is the
+ * polynomial in the reversed (bitreflected) domain.
+ *
+ * CRC-32 (IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, ...) polynomials:
+ *
+ * P(x) = 0x04C11DB7
+ * P'(x) = 0xEDB88320
+ *
+ * CRC-32C (Castagnoli) polynomials:
+ *
+ * P(x) = 0x1EDC6F41
+ * P'(x) = 0x82F63B78
+ */
+
+.Lconstants_CRC_32_LE:
+ .octa 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100 # BE->LE mask
+ .quad 0x1c6e41596, 0x154442bd4 # R2, R1
+ .quad 0x0ccaa009e, 0x1751997d0 # R4, R3
+ .octa 0x163cd6124 # R5
+ .octa 0x1F7011641 # u'
+ .octa 0x1DB710641 # P'(x) << 1
+
+.Lconstants_CRC_32C_LE:
+ .octa 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100 # BE->LE mask
+ .quad 0x09e4addf8, 0x740eef02 # R2, R1
+ .quad 0x14cd00bd6, 0xf20c0dfe # R4, R3
+ .octa 0x0dd45aab8 # R5
+ .octa 0x0dea713f1 # u'
+ .octa 0x105ec76f0 # P'(x) << 1
+
+.previous
+
+ GEN_BR_THUNK %r14
+
+.text
+
+/*
+ * The CRC-32 functions use these calling conventions:
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ *
+ * %r2: Initial CRC value, typically ~0; and final CRC (return) value.
+ * %r3: Input buffer pointer, performance might be improved if the
+ * buffer is on a doubleword boundary.
+ * %r4: Length of the buffer, must be 64 bytes or greater.
+ *
+ * Register usage:
+ *
+ * %r5: CRC-32 constant pool base pointer.
+ * V0: Initial CRC value and intermediate constants and results.
+ * V1..V4: Data for CRC computation.
+ * V5..V8: Next data chunks that are fetched from the input buffer.
+ * V9: Constant for BE->LE conversion and shift operations
+ *
+ * V10..V14: CRC-32 constants.
+ */
+
+ENTRY(crc32_le_vgfm_16)
+ larl %r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32_LE
+ j crc32_le_vgfm_generic
+
+ENTRY(crc32c_le_vgfm_16)
+ larl %r5,.Lconstants_CRC_32C_LE
+ j crc32_le_vgfm_generic
+
+
+crc32_le_vgfm_generic:
+ /* Load CRC-32 constants */
+ VLM CONST_PERM_LE2BE,CONST_CRC_POLY,0,%r5
+
+ /*
+ * Load the initial CRC value.
+ *
+ * The CRC value is loaded into the rightmost word of the
+ * vector register and is later XORed with the LSB portion
+ * of the loaded input data.
+ */
+ VZERO %v0 /* Clear V0 */
+ VLVGF %v0,%r2,3 /* Load CRC into rightmost word */
+
+ /* Load a 64-byte data chunk and XOR with CRC */
+ VLM %v1,%v4,0,%r3 /* 64-bytes into V1..V4 */
+ VPERM %v1,%v1,%v1,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+ VPERM %v2,%v2,%v2,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+ VPERM %v3,%v3,%v3,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+ VPERM %v4,%v4,%v4,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+
+ VX %v1,%v0,%v1 /* V1 ^= CRC */
+ aghi %r3,64 /* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+ aghi %r4,-64 /* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+ cghi %r4,64
+ jl .Lless_than_64bytes
+
+.Lfold_64bytes_loop:
+ /* Load the next 64-byte data chunk into V5 to V8 */
+ VLM %v5,%v8,0,%r3
+ VPERM %v5,%v5,%v5,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+ VPERM %v6,%v6,%v6,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+ VPERM %v7,%v7,%v7,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+ VPERM %v8,%v8,%v8,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+
+ /*
+ * Perform a GF(2) multiplication of the doublewords in V1 with
+ * the R1 and R2 reduction constants in V0. The intermediate result
+ * is then folded (accumulated) with the next data chunk in V5 and
+ * stored in V1. Repeat this step for the register contents
+ * in V2, V3, and V4 respectively.
+ */
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R2R1,%v1,%v5
+ VGFMAG %v2,CONST_R2R1,%v2,%v6
+ VGFMAG %v3,CONST_R2R1,%v3,%v7
+ VGFMAG %v4,CONST_R2R1,%v4,%v8
+
+ aghi %r3,64 /* BUF = BUF + 64 */
+ aghi %r4,-64 /* LEN = LEN - 64 */
+
+ cghi %r4,64
+ jnl .Lfold_64bytes_loop
+
+.Lless_than_64bytes:
+ /*
+ * Fold V1 to V4 into a single 128-bit value in V1. Multiply V1 with R3
+ * and R4 and accumulating the next 128-bit chunk until a single 128-bit
+ * value remains.
+ */
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v2
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v3
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v4
+
+ cghi %r4,16
+ jl .Lfinal_fold
+
+.Lfold_16bytes_loop:
+
+ VL %v2,0,,%r3 /* Load next data chunk */
+ VPERM %v2,%v2,%v2,CONST_PERM_LE2BE
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R4R3,%v1,%v2 /* Fold next data chunk */
+
+ aghi %r3,16
+ aghi %r4,-16
+
+ cghi %r4,16
+ jnl .Lfold_16bytes_loop
+
+.Lfinal_fold:
+ /*
+ * Set up a vector register for byte shifts. The shift value must
+ * be loaded in bits 1-4 in byte element 7 of a vector register.
+ * Shift by 8 bytes: 0x40
+ * Shift by 4 bytes: 0x20
+ */
+ VLEIB %v9,0x40,7
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare V0 for the next GF(2) multiplication: shift V0 by 8 bytes
+ * to move R4 into the rightmost doubleword and set the leftmost
+ * doubleword to 0x1.
+ */
+ VSRLB %v0,CONST_R4R3,%v9
+ VLEIG %v0,1,0
+
+ /*
+ * Compute GF(2) product of V1 and V0. The rightmost doubleword
+ * of V1 is multiplied with R4. The leftmost doubleword of V1 is
+ * multiplied by 0x1 and is then XORed with rightmost product.
+ * Implicitly, the intermediate leftmost product becomes padded
+ */
+ VGFMG %v1,%v0,%v1
+
+ /*
+ * Now do the final 32-bit fold by multiplying the rightmost word
+ * in V1 with R5 and XOR the result with the remaining bits in V1.
+ *
+ * To achieve this by a single VGFMAG, right shift V1 by a word
+ * and store the result in V2 which is then accumulated. Use the
+ * vector unpack instruction to load the rightmost half of the
+ * doubleword into the rightmost doubleword element of V1; the other
+ * half is loaded in the leftmost doubleword.
+ * The vector register with CONST_R5 contains the R5 constant in the
+ * rightmost doubleword and the leftmost doubleword is zero to ignore
+ * the leftmost product of V1.
+ */
+ VLEIB %v9,0x20,7 /* Shift by words */
+ VSRLB %v2,%v1,%v9 /* Store remaining bits in V2 */
+ VUPLLF %v1,%v1 /* Split rightmost doubleword */
+ VGFMAG %v1,CONST_R5,%v1,%v2 /* V1 = (V1 * R5) XOR V2 */
+
+ /*
+ * Apply a Barret reduction to compute the final 32-bit CRC value.
+ *
+ * The input values to the Barret reduction are the degree-63 polynomial
+ * in V1 (R(x)), degree-32 generator polynomial, and the reduction
+ * constant u. The Barret reduction result is the CRC value of R(x) mod
+ * P(x).
+ *
+ * The Barret reduction algorithm is defined as:
+ *
+ * 1. T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u
+ * 2. T2(x) = floor( T1(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL P(x)
+ * 3. C(x) = R(x) XOR T2(x) mod x^32
+ *
+ * Note: The leftmost doubleword of vector register containing
+ * CONST_RU_POLY is zero and, thus, the intermediate GF(2) product
+ * is zero and does not contribute to the final result.
+ */
+
+ /* T1(x) = floor( R(x) / x^32 ) GF2MUL u */
+ VUPLLF %v2,%v1
+ VGFMG %v2,CONST_RU_POLY,%v2
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the GF(2) product of the CRC polynomial with T1(x) in
+ * V2 and XOR the intermediate result, T2(x), with the value in V1.
+ * The final result is stored in word element 2 of V2.
+ */
+ VUPLLF %v2,%v2
+ VGFMAG %v2,CONST_CRC_POLY,%v2,%v1
+
+.Ldone:
+ VLGVF %r2,%v2,2
+ BR_EX %r14
+
+.previous
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..65bda1178
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the DES Cipher Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2003, 2011
+ * Author(s): Thomas Spatzier
+ * Jan Glauber (jan.glauber@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/des.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#define DES3_KEY_SIZE (3 * DES_KEY_SIZE)
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions;
+
+struct s390_des_ctx {
+ u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 key[DES3_KEY_SIZE];
+};
+
+static int des_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ u32 tmp[DES_EXPKEY_WORDS];
+
+ /* check for weak keys */
+ if (!des_ekey(tmp, key) &&
+ (tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY)) {
+ tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ctx->key, key, key_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void des_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+ struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_DEA, ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void des_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
+{
+ struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+ ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg des_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "des",
+ .cra_driver_name = "des-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .cipher = {
+ .cia_min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
+ .cia_max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
+ .cia_setkey = des_setkey,
+ .cia_encrypt = des_encrypt,
+ .cia_decrypt = des_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int ecb_desall_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long fc,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int nbytes, n;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= DES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* only use complete blocks */
+ n = nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ cpacf_km(fc, ctx->key, walk->dst.virt.addr,
+ walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_desall_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long fc,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int nbytes, n;
+ int ret;
+ struct {
+ u8 iv[DES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 key[DES3_KEY_SIZE];
+ } param;
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+ memcpy(param.iv, walk->iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(param.key, ctx->key, DES3_KEY_SIZE);
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= DES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* only use complete blocks */
+ n = nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ cpacf_kmc(fc, &param, walk->dst.virt.addr,
+ walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+ }
+ memcpy(walk->iv, param.iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_des_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ecb_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KM_DEA, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ecb_des_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ecb_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KM_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ecb_des_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "ecb(des)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ecb-des-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des + ecb */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
+ .setkey = des_setkey,
+ .encrypt = ecb_des_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = ecb_des_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int cbc_des_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMC_DEA, &walk);
+}
+
+static int cbc_des_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMC_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg cbc_des_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "cbc(des)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "cbc-des-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des + cbc */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = des_setkey,
+ .encrypt = cbc_des_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = cbc_des_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * RFC2451:
+ *
+ * For DES-EDE3, there is no known need to reject weak or
+ * complementation keys. Any weakness is obviated by the use of
+ * multiple keys.
+ *
+ * However, if the first two or last two independent 64-bit keys are
+ * equal (k1 == k2 or k2 == k3), then the DES3 operation is simply the
+ * same as DES. Implementers MUST reject keys that exhibit this
+ * property.
+ *
+ * In fips mode additinally check for all 3 keys are unique.
+ *
+ */
+static int des3_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (!(crypto_memneq(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE) &&
+ crypto_memneq(&key[DES_KEY_SIZE], &key[DES_KEY_SIZE * 2],
+ DES_KEY_SIZE)) &&
+ (tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY)) {
+ tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* in fips mode, ensure k1 != k2 and k2 != k3 and k1 != k3 */
+ if (fips_enabled &&
+ !(crypto_memneq(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE) &&
+ crypto_memneq(&key[DES_KEY_SIZE], &key[DES_KEY_SIZE * 2],
+ DES_KEY_SIZE) &&
+ crypto_memneq(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE * 2], DES_KEY_SIZE))) {
+ tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ctx->key, key, key_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void des3_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+ struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_TDEA_192, ctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void des3_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+ struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ cpacf_km(CPACF_KM_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+ ctx->key, dst, src, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg des3_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "des3_ede",
+ .cra_driver_name = "des3_ede-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .cipher = {
+ .cia_min_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+ .cia_max_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+ .cia_setkey = des3_setkey,
+ .cia_encrypt = des3_encrypt,
+ .cia_decrypt = des3_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int ecb_des3_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ecb_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ecb_des3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ecb_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+ &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ecb_des3_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "ecb(des3_ede)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ecb-des3_ede-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des3 + ecb */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+ .setkey = des3_setkey,
+ .encrypt = ecb_des3_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = ecb_des3_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int cbc_des3_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192, &walk);
+}
+
+static int cbc_des3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+ &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg cbc_des3_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "cbc(des3_ede)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "cbc-des3_ede-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des3 + cbc */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = des3_setkey,
+ .encrypt = cbc_des3_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = cbc_des3_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ unsigned int i, n;
+
+ /* align to block size, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+ n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(DES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ memcpy(ctrptr, iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ for (i = (n / DES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ memcpy(ctrptr + DES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ crypto_inc(ctrptr + DES_BLOCK_SIZE, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ctrptr += DES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+ return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_desall_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long fc,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ u8 buf[DES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+ unsigned int n, nbytes;
+ int ret, locked;
+
+ locked = mutex_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, walk, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= DES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ n = DES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ if (nbytes >= 2*DES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+ n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk->iv, nbytes);
+ ctrptr = (n > DES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk->iv;
+ cpacf_kmctr(fc, ctx->key, walk->dst.virt.addr,
+ walk->src.virt.addr, n, ctrptr);
+ if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+ memcpy(walk->iv, ctrptr + n - DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ crypto_inc(walk->iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+ }
+ if (locked)
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+ /* final block may be < DES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes */
+ if (nbytes) {
+ cpacf_kmctr(fc, ctx->key, buf, walk->src.virt.addr,
+ DES_BLOCK_SIZE, walk->iv);
+ memcpy(walk->dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+ crypto_inc(walk->iv, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, 0);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ctr_des_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ctr_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ctr_des_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ctr_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA | CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ctr_des_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "ctr(des)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ctr-des-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des + ctr */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = DES_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = des_setkey,
+ .encrypt = ctr_des_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = ctr_des_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int ctr_des3_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ctr_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ctr_des3_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ctr_desall_crypt(desc, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192 | CPACF_DECRYPT,
+ &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ctr_des3_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "ctr(des3_ede)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ctr-des3_ede-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 400, /* combo: des3 + ede */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_des_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+ .max_keysize = DES3_KEY_SIZE,
+ .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = des3_setkey,
+ .encrypt = ctr_des3_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = ctr_des3_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static struct crypto_alg *des_s390_algs_ptr[8];
+static int des_s390_algs_num;
+
+static int des_s390_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = crypto_register_alg(alg);
+ if (!ret)
+ des_s390_algs_ptr[des_s390_algs_num++] = alg;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void des_s390_exit(void)
+{
+ while (des_s390_algs_num--)
+ crypto_unregister_alg(des_s390_algs_ptr[des_s390_algs_num]);
+ if (ctrblk)
+ free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+}
+
+static int __init des_s390_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Query available functions for KM, KMC and KMCTR */
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_DEA)) {
+ ret = des_s390_register_alg(&des_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ ret = des_s390_register_alg(&ecb_des_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_DEA)) {
+ ret = des_s390_register_alg(&cbc_des_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_TDEA_192)) {
+ ret = des_s390_register_alg(&des3_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ ret = des_s390_register_alg(&ecb_des3_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_TDEA_192)) {
+ ret = des_s390_register_alg(&cbc_des3_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192)) {
+ ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctrblk) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_DEA)) {
+ ret = des_s390_register_alg(&ctr_des_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_TDEA_192)) {
+ ret = des_s390_register_alg(&ctr_des3_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+out_err:
+ des_s390_exit();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, des_s390_init);
+module_exit(des_s390_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("des");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("des3_ede");
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DES & Triple DES EDE Cipher Algorithms");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..86aed30fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/ghash_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the GHASH algorithm for GCM (Galois/Counter Mode).
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2011
+ * Author(s): Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#define GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+#define GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE 16
+
+struct ghash_ctx {
+ u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+};
+
+struct ghash_desc_ctx {
+ u8 icv[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 key[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 buffer[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u32 bytes;
+};
+
+static int ghash_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+
+ memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(*dctx));
+ memcpy(dctx->key, ctx->key, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct ghash_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (keylen != GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ctx->key, key, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
+{
+ struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ unsigned int n;
+ u8 *buf = dctx->buffer;
+
+ if (dctx->bytes) {
+ u8 *pos = buf + (GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->bytes);
+
+ n = min(srclen, dctx->bytes);
+ dctx->bytes -= n;
+ srclen -= n;
+
+ memcpy(pos, src, n);
+ src += n;
+
+ if (!dctx->bytes) {
+ cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, buf,
+ GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ n = srclen & ~(GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ if (n) {
+ cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, src, n);
+ src += n;
+ srclen -= n;
+ }
+
+ if (srclen) {
+ dctx->bytes = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - srclen;
+ memcpy(buf, src, srclen);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_flush(struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx)
+{
+ u8 *buf = dctx->buffer;
+
+ if (dctx->bytes) {
+ u8 *pos = buf + (GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - dctx->bytes);
+
+ memset(pos, 0, dctx->bytes);
+ cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_GHASH, dctx, buf, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ dctx->bytes = 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ghash_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *dst)
+{
+ struct ghash_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ghash_flush(dctx);
+ if (!ret)
+ memcpy(dst, dctx->icv, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg ghash_alg = {
+ .digestsize = GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .init = ghash_init,
+ .update = ghash_update,
+ .final = ghash_final,
+ .setkey = ghash_setkey,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct ghash_desc_ctx),
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "ghash",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ghash-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_blocksize = GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct ghash_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ },
+};
+
+static int __init ghash_mod_init(void)
+{
+ if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_GHASH))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return crypto_register_shash(&ghash_alg);
+}
+
+static void __exit ghash_mod_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&ghash_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, ghash_mod_init);
+module_exit(ghash_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ghash");
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("GHASH Message Digest Algorithm, s390 implementation");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ab9a0ebec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/paes_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the AES Cipher Algorithm with protected keys.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2017
+ * Author(s): Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
+ * Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "paes_s390"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+#include <asm/pkey.h>
+
+static u8 *ctrblk;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ctrblk_lock);
+
+static cpacf_mask_t km_functions, kmc_functions, kmctr_functions;
+
+struct s390_paes_ctx {
+ struct pkey_seckey sk;
+ struct pkey_protkey pk;
+ unsigned long fc;
+};
+
+struct s390_pxts_ctx {
+ struct pkey_seckey sk[2];
+ struct pkey_protkey pk[2];
+ unsigned long fc;
+};
+
+static inline int __paes_convert_key(struct pkey_seckey *sk,
+ struct pkey_protkey *pk)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+
+ /* try three times in case of failure */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ ret = pkey_skey2pkey(sk, pk);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned long fc;
+
+ if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk, &ctx->pk))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+ fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_128 :
+ (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_192 :
+ (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KM_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+ /* Check if the function code is available */
+ ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+ return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (key_len != SECKEYBLOBSIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memcpy(ctx->sk.seckey, in_key, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+ if (__paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+ tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ unsigned long modifier,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* only use complete blocks */
+ n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, ctx->pk.protkey,
+ walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+ if (k)
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - k);
+ if (k < n) {
+ if (__paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+ return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ecb_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_ENCRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ecb_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ecb_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ecb_paes_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "ecb(paes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ecb-paes-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 401, /* combo: aes + ecb + 1 */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(ecb_paes_alg.cra_list),
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+ .max_keysize = SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+ .setkey = ecb_paes_set_key,
+ .encrypt = ecb_paes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = ecb_paes_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int __cbc_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned long fc;
+
+ if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk, &ctx->pk))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+ fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_128 :
+ (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_192 :
+ (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ? CPACF_KMC_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+ /* Check if the function code is available */
+ ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+ return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ memcpy(ctx->sk.seckey, in_key, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+ if (__cbc_paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+ tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+ int ret;
+ struct {
+ u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE];
+ } param;
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+ memcpy(param.iv, walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* only use complete blocks */
+ n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ k = cpacf_kmc(ctx->fc | modifier, &param,
+ walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+ if (k)
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - k);
+ if (k < n) {
+ if (__cbc_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+ return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+ memcpy(param.key, ctx->pk.protkey, MAXPROTKEYSIZE);
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(walk->iv, param.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return cbc_paes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int cbc_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return cbc_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg cbc_paes_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "cbc(paes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "cbc-paes-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(cbc_paes_alg.cra_list),
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+ .max_keysize = SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = cbc_paes_set_key,
+ .encrypt = cbc_paes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = cbc_paes_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int __xts_paes_set_key(struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned long fc;
+
+ if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk[0], &ctx->pk[0]) ||
+ __paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk[1], &ctx->pk[1]))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ctx->pk[0].type != ctx->pk[1].type)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+ fc = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KM_PXTS_128 :
+ (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ?
+ CPACF_KM_PXTS_256 : 0;
+
+ /* Check if the function code is available */
+ ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+ return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ u8 ckey[2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ unsigned int ckey_len;
+
+ memcpy(ctx->sk[0].seckey, in_key, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+ memcpy(ctx->sk[1].seckey, in_key + SECKEYBLOBSIZE, SECKEYBLOBSIZE);
+ if (__xts_paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+ tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * xts_check_key verifies the key length is not odd and makes
+ * sure that the two keys are not the same. This can be done
+ * on the two protected keys as well
+ */
+ ckey_len = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ?
+ AES_KEYSIZE_128 : AES_KEYSIZE_256;
+ memcpy(ckey, ctx->pk[0].protkey, ckey_len);
+ memcpy(ckey + ckey_len, ctx->pk[1].protkey, ckey_len);
+ return xts_check_key(tfm, ckey, 2*ckey_len);
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_pxts_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int keylen, offset, nbytes, n, k;
+ int ret;
+ struct {
+ u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; /* key + verification pattern */
+ u8 tweak[16];
+ u8 block[16];
+ u8 bit[16];
+ u8 xts[16];
+ } pcc_param;
+ struct {
+ u8 key[MAXPROTKEYSIZE]; /* key + verification pattern */
+ u8 init[16];
+ } xts_param;
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
+ keylen = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 48 : 64;
+ offset = (ctx->pk[0].type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? 16 : 0;
+retry:
+ memset(&pcc_param, 0, sizeof(pcc_param));
+ memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk->iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak));
+ memcpy(pcc_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[1].protkey, keylen);
+ cpacf_pcc(ctx->fc, pcc_param.key + offset);
+
+ memcpy(xts_param.key + offset, ctx->pk[0].protkey, keylen);
+ memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16);
+
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* only use complete blocks */
+ n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ k = cpacf_km(ctx->fc | modifier, xts_param.key + offset,
+ walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr, n);
+ if (k)
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - k);
+ if (k < n) {
+ if (__xts_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+ return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return xts_paes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int xts_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return xts_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg xts_paes_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "xts(paes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "xts-paes-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_pxts_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(xts_paes_alg.cra_list),
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = 2 * SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+ .max_keysize = 2 * SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = xts_paes_set_key,
+ .encrypt = xts_paes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = xts_paes_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static int __ctr_paes_set_key(struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned long fc;
+
+ if (__paes_convert_key(&ctx->sk, &ctx->pk))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Pick the correct function code based on the protected key type */
+ fc = (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_128) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128 :
+ (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_192) ? CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192 :
+ (ctx->pk.type == PKEY_KEYTYPE_AES_256) ?
+ CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256 : 0;
+
+ /* Check if the function code is available */
+ ctx->fc = (fc && cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, fc)) ? fc : 0;
+
+ return ctx->fc ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+ unsigned int key_len)
+{
+ struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ memcpy(ctx->sk.seckey, in_key, key_len);
+ if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx)) {
+ tfm->crt_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int __ctrblk_init(u8 *ctrptr, u8 *iv, unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ unsigned int i, n;
+
+ /* only use complete blocks, max. PAGE_SIZE */
+ memcpy(ctrptr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ n = (nbytes > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
+ for (i = (n / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ memcpy(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, ctrptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ crypto_inc(ctrptr + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ctrptr += AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+ return n;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, unsigned long modifier,
+ struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
+{
+ struct s390_paes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE], *ctrptr;
+ unsigned int nbytes, n, k;
+ int ret, locked;
+
+ locked = spin_trylock(&ctrblk_lock);
+
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, walk, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ n = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ if (nbytes >= 2*AES_BLOCK_SIZE && locked)
+ n = __ctrblk_init(ctrblk, walk->iv, nbytes);
+ ctrptr = (n > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ? ctrblk : walk->iv;
+ k = cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc | modifier, ctx->pk.protkey,
+ walk->dst.virt.addr, walk->src.virt.addr,
+ n, ctrptr);
+ if (k) {
+ if (ctrptr == ctrblk)
+ memcpy(walk->iv, ctrptr + k - AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes - n);
+ }
+ if (k < n) {
+ if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0) {
+ if (locked)
+ spin_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+ return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (locked)
+ spin_unlock(&ctrblk_lock);
+ /*
+ * final block may be < AES_BLOCK_SIZE, copy only nbytes
+ */
+ if (nbytes) {
+ while (1) {
+ if (cpacf_kmctr(ctx->fc | modifier,
+ ctx->pk.protkey, buf,
+ walk->src.virt.addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ walk->iv) == AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ break;
+ if (__ctr_paes_set_key(ctx) != 0)
+ return blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, -EIO);
+ }
+ memcpy(walk->dst.virt.addr, buf, nbytes);
+ crypto_inc(walk->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, 0);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ctr_paes_crypt(desc, 0, &walk);
+}
+
+static int ctr_paes_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+ struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+
+ blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+ return ctr_paes_crypt(desc, CPACF_DECRYPT, &walk);
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ctr_paes_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "ctr(paes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ctr-paes-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 402, /* ecb-paes-s390 + 1 */
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_paes_ctx),
+ .cra_type = &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(ctr_paes_alg.cra_list),
+ .cra_u = {
+ .blkcipher = {
+ .min_keysize = SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+ .max_keysize = SECKEYBLOBSIZE,
+ .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .setkey = ctr_paes_set_key,
+ .encrypt = ctr_paes_encrypt,
+ .decrypt = ctr_paes_decrypt,
+ }
+ }
+};
+
+static inline void __crypto_unregister_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+ if (!list_empty(&alg->cra_list))
+ crypto_unregister_alg(alg);
+}
+
+static void paes_s390_fini(void)
+{
+ if (ctrblk)
+ free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
+ __crypto_unregister_alg(&ctr_paes_alg);
+ __crypto_unregister_alg(&xts_paes_alg);
+ __crypto_unregister_alg(&cbc_paes_alg);
+ __crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_paes_alg);
+}
+
+static int __init paes_s390_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Query available functions for KM, KMC and KMCTR */
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KM, &km_functions);
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KMC, &kmc_functions);
+ cpacf_query(CPACF_KMCTR, &kmctr_functions);
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_128) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_192) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PAES_256)) {
+ ret = crypto_register_alg(&ecb_paes_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_128) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_192) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kmc_functions, CPACF_KMC_PAES_256)) {
+ ret = crypto_register_alg(&cbc_paes_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_128) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&km_functions, CPACF_KM_PXTS_256)) {
+ ret = crypto_register_alg(&xts_paes_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_128) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_192) ||
+ cpacf_test_func(&kmctr_functions, CPACF_KMCTR_PAES_256)) {
+ ret = crypto_register_alg(&ctr_paes_alg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_err;
+ ctrblk = (u8 *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctrblk) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+out_err:
+ paes_s390_fini();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+module_init(paes_s390_init);
+module_exit(paes_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("paes");
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm with protected keys");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a97a1802c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/prng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,875 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2006, 2015
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@de.ibm.com>
+ * Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+ * Driver for the s390 pseudo random number generator
+ */
+
+#define KMSG_COMPONENT "prng"
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KMSG_COMPONENT ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+
+#include <asm/debug.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/timex.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("IBM Corporation");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 PRNG interface");
+
+
+#define PRNG_MODE_AUTO 0
+#define PRNG_MODE_TDES 1
+#define PRNG_MODE_SHA512 2
+
+static unsigned int prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_AUTO;
+module_param_named(mode, prng_mode, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_mode, "PRNG mode: 0 - auto, 1 - TDES, 2 - SHA512");
+
+
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MIN 8
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MAX (64*1024)
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MIN 64
+#define PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MAX (64*1024)
+
+static unsigned int prng_chunk_size = 256;
+module_param_named(chunksize, prng_chunk_size, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_chunk_size, "PRNG read chunk size in bytes");
+
+
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES 4096
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER 4096
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512 100000
+#define PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER 10000
+
+static unsigned int prng_reseed_limit;
+module_param_named(reseed_limit, prng_reseed_limit, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(prng_reseed_limit, "PRNG reseed limit");
+
+
+/*
+ * Any one who considers arithmetical methods of producing random digits is,
+ * of course, in a state of sin. -- John von Neumann
+ */
+
+static int prng_errorflag;
+
+#define PRNG_GEN_ENTROPY_FAILED 1
+#define PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED 2
+#define PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED 3
+#define PRNG_SEED_FAILED 4
+#define PRNG_RESEED_FAILED 5
+#define PRNG_GEN_FAILED 6
+
+struct prng_ws_s {
+ u8 parm_block[32];
+ u32 reseed_counter;
+ u64 byte_counter;
+};
+
+struct prno_ws_s {
+ u32 res;
+ u32 reseed_counter;
+ u64 stream_bytes;
+ u8 V[112];
+ u8 C[112];
+};
+
+struct prng_data_s {
+ struct mutex mutex;
+ union {
+ struct prng_ws_s prngws;
+ struct prno_ws_s prnows;
+ };
+ u8 *buf;
+ u32 rest;
+ u8 *prev;
+};
+
+static struct prng_data_s *prng_data;
+
+/* initial parameter block for tdes mode, copied from libica */
+static const u8 initial_parm_block[32] __initconst = {
+ 0x0F, 0x2B, 0x8E, 0x63, 0x8C, 0x8E, 0xD2, 0x52,
+ 0x64, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x7B, 0x75, 0x28, 0xB8, 0xF4,
+ 0x75, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0x97, 0x11, 0xFF,
+ 0x49, 0xD8, 0x23, 0xF3, 0x7E, 0x21, 0xEC, 0xA0 };
+
+
+/*** helper functions ***/
+
+/*
+ * generate_entropy:
+ * This algorithm produces 64 bytes of entropy data based on 1024
+ * individual stckf() invocations assuming that each stckf() value
+ * contributes 0.25 bits of entropy. So the caller gets 256 bit
+ * entropy per 64 byte or 4 bits entropy per byte.
+ */
+static int generate_entropy(u8 *ebuf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ int n, ret = 0;
+ u8 *pg, *h, hash[64];
+
+ /* allocate 2 pages */
+ pg = (u8 *) __get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+ if (!pg) {
+ prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_ENTROPY_FAILED;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ while (nbytes) {
+ /* fill pages with urandom bytes */
+ get_random_bytes(pg, 2*PAGE_SIZE);
+ /* exor pages with 1024 stckf values */
+ for (n = 0; n < 2 * PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(u64); n++) {
+ u64 *p = ((u64 *)pg) + n;
+ *p ^= get_tod_clock_fast();
+ }
+ n = (nbytes < sizeof(hash)) ? nbytes : sizeof(hash);
+ if (n < sizeof(hash))
+ h = hash;
+ else
+ h = ebuf;
+ /* hash over the filled pages */
+ cpacf_kimd(CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512, h, pg, 2*PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (n < sizeof(hash))
+ memcpy(ebuf, hash, n);
+ ret += n;
+ ebuf += n;
+ nbytes -= n;
+ }
+
+ free_pages((unsigned long)pg, 1);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*** tdes functions ***/
+
+static void prng_tdes_add_entropy(void)
+{
+ __u64 entropy[4];
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
+ (char *) entropy, (char *) entropy,
+ sizeof(entropy));
+ memcpy(prng_data->prngws.parm_block, entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void prng_tdes_seed(int nbytes)
+{
+ char buf[16];
+ int i = 0;
+
+ BUG_ON(nbytes > sizeof(buf));
+
+ get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+
+ /* Add the entropy */
+ while (nbytes >= 8) {
+ *((__u64 *)prng_data->prngws.parm_block) ^= *((__u64 *)(buf+i));
+ prng_tdes_add_entropy();
+ i += 8;
+ nbytes -= 8;
+ }
+ prng_tdes_add_entropy();
+ prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter = 0;
+}
+
+
+static int __init prng_tdes_instantiate(void)
+{
+ int datalen;
+
+ pr_debug("prng runs in TDES mode with "
+ "chunksize=%d and reseed_limit=%u\n",
+ prng_chunk_size, prng_reseed_limit);
+
+ /* memory allocation, prng_data struct init, mutex init */
+ datalen = sizeof(struct prng_data_s) + prng_chunk_size;
+ prng_data = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!prng_data) {
+ prng_errorflag = PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ mutex_init(&prng_data->mutex);
+ prng_data->buf = ((u8 *)prng_data) + sizeof(struct prng_data_s);
+ memcpy(prng_data->prngws.parm_block, initial_parm_block, 32);
+
+ /* initialize the PRNG, add 128 bits of entropy */
+ prng_tdes_seed(16);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void prng_tdes_deinstantiate(void)
+{
+ pr_debug("The prng module stopped "
+ "after running in triple DES mode\n");
+ kzfree(prng_data);
+}
+
+
+/*** sha512 functions ***/
+
+static int __init prng_sha512_selftest(void)
+{
+ /* NIST DRBG testvector for Hash Drbg, Sha-512, Count #0 */
+ static const u8 seed[] __initconst = {
+ 0x6b, 0x50, 0xa7, 0xd8, 0xf8, 0xa5, 0x5d, 0x7a,
+ 0x3d, 0xf8, 0xbb, 0x40, 0xbc, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x22,
+ 0xd8, 0x70, 0x8d, 0xe6, 0x7f, 0xda, 0x01, 0x0b,
+ 0x03, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0x4d, 0x72, 0x09, 0x6f, 0x8c,
+ 0x3e, 0xc6, 0x49, 0xcc, 0x62, 0x56, 0xd9, 0xfa,
+ 0x31, 0xdb, 0x7a, 0x29, 0x04, 0xaa, 0xf0, 0x25 };
+ static const u8 V0[] __initconst = {
+ 0x00, 0xad, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0x9a, 0x01, 0xc7, 0x76,
+ 0x61, 0x34, 0x35, 0xf5, 0x4e, 0x24, 0x74, 0x22,
+ 0x21, 0x9a, 0x29, 0x89, 0xc7, 0x93, 0x2e, 0x60,
+ 0x1e, 0xe8, 0x14, 0x24, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x03, 0xf1,
+ 0x65, 0x5d, 0x08, 0x22, 0x72, 0xd5, 0xad, 0x95,
+ 0xe1, 0x23, 0x1e, 0x8a, 0xa7, 0x13, 0xd9, 0x2b,
+ 0x5e, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0x80, 0xab, 0x8d, 0xe5, 0x79,
+ 0xab, 0x5b, 0x47, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xee, 0x6b, 0x03,
+ 0x8f, 0x0f, 0x5c, 0x5e, 0xa9, 0x1a, 0x83, 0xdd,
+ 0xd3, 0x88, 0xb2, 0x75, 0x4b, 0xce, 0x83, 0x36,
+ 0x57, 0x4b, 0xf1, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x09, 0xc0,
+ 0xd3, 0x89, 0xc6, 0xe0, 0xda, 0xc4, 0x81, 0x7e,
+ 0x5b, 0xf9, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xc1, 0x92, 0x05, 0xea,
+ 0xf5, 0x2f, 0xc6, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xf4 };
+ static const u8 C0[] __initconst = {
+ 0x00, 0xf4, 0xa3, 0xe5, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x63, 0x95,
+ 0xc6, 0x4f, 0x48, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x5b, 0x5f, 0x8e,
+ 0x6b, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x16, 0xed, 0xbc, 0x66, 0x94,
+ 0x45, 0x31, 0xd7, 0x47, 0x73, 0x22, 0xa5, 0x86,
+ 0xce, 0xc0, 0x4c, 0xac, 0x63, 0xb8, 0x39, 0x50,
+ 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x59, 0x6c, 0x38, 0x58, 0x99, 0x1f,
+ 0x27, 0xa7, 0x9d, 0x71, 0x2a, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xf9,
+ 0xfb, 0x17, 0x86, 0xaa, 0x99, 0x81, 0xaa, 0x43,
+ 0xe4, 0x37, 0xd3, 0x1e, 0x6e, 0xe5, 0xe6, 0xee,
+ 0xc2, 0xed, 0x95, 0x4f, 0x53, 0x0e, 0x46, 0x8a,
+ 0xcc, 0x45, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0x69, 0x0d, 0x81, 0xc9,
+ 0x32, 0x92, 0xbc, 0x8f, 0x33, 0xe6, 0xf6, 0x09,
+ 0x7c, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x19, 0x0d, 0xf1, 0xb6, 0xcc,
+ 0xf3, 0x02, 0x21, 0x90, 0x25, 0xec, 0xed, 0x0e };
+ static const u8 random[] __initconst = {
+ 0x95, 0xb7, 0xf1, 0x7e, 0x98, 0x02, 0xd3, 0x57,
+ 0x73, 0x92, 0xc6, 0xa9, 0xc0, 0x80, 0x83, 0xb6,
+ 0x7d, 0xd1, 0x29, 0x22, 0x65, 0xb5, 0xf4, 0x2d,
+ 0x23, 0x7f, 0x1c, 0x55, 0xbb, 0x9b, 0x10, 0xbf,
+ 0xcf, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0x77, 0xa3, 0x78, 0xb8, 0x26,
+ 0x6a, 0x00, 0x99, 0x14, 0x3b, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0x64,
+ 0x61, 0x1e, 0xee, 0xb6, 0x9a, 0xcd, 0xc0, 0x55,
+ 0x95, 0x7c, 0x13, 0x9e, 0x8b, 0x19, 0x0c, 0x7a,
+ 0x06, 0x95, 0x5f, 0x2c, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x27, 0x78,
+ 0xde, 0x94, 0x03, 0x96, 0xa5, 0x01, 0xf4, 0x0e,
+ 0x91, 0x39, 0x6a, 0xcf, 0x8d, 0x7e, 0x45, 0xeb,
+ 0xdb, 0xb5, 0x3b, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x97, 0x52, 0x30,
+ 0xd2, 0xf0, 0xff, 0x91, 0x06, 0xc7, 0x61, 0x19,
+ 0xae, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x7f, 0xbc, 0x03, 0xd9, 0x0f,
+ 0x8e, 0x4c, 0x51, 0x62, 0x7a, 0xed, 0x5c, 0x8d,
+ 0x42, 0x63, 0xd5, 0xd2, 0xb9, 0x78, 0x87, 0x3a,
+ 0x0d, 0xe5, 0x96, 0xee, 0x6d, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xc2,
+ 0x9e, 0x37, 0xee, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0x4c, 0x90, 0xdd,
+ 0x1c, 0xf6, 0xa9, 0xdd, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x4c, 0xbd,
+ 0x08, 0x6b, 0x14, 0xb3, 0x5d, 0xe9, 0x3d, 0xa2,
+ 0xd5, 0xcb, 0x18, 0x06, 0x69, 0x8c, 0xbd, 0x7b,
+ 0xbb, 0x67, 0xbf, 0xe3, 0xd3, 0x1f, 0xd2, 0xd1,
+ 0xdb, 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0x58, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0x99,
+ 0xd7, 0xe5, 0x1f, 0x1a, 0x93, 0x8e, 0xed, 0x5e,
+ 0x1c, 0x1d, 0xe2, 0x3a, 0x6b, 0x43, 0x45, 0xd3,
+ 0x19, 0x14, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x2f, 0x39, 0xb3, 0x67,
+ 0x0d, 0x8d, 0xbf, 0xb6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xa3,
+ 0x69, 0x32, 0xd8, 0x10, 0x33, 0xd1, 0x44, 0x8d,
+ 0x63, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xdd, 0xf8, 0x8e, 0x12, 0x1b,
+ 0x6e, 0x81, 0x9a, 0xc3, 0x81, 0x22, 0x6c, 0x13,
+ 0x21, 0xe4, 0xb0, 0x86, 0x44, 0xf6, 0x72, 0x7c,
+ 0x36, 0x8c, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x7a, 0x4b, 0x3e, 0xe2 };
+
+ u8 buf[sizeof(random)];
+ struct prno_ws_s ws;
+
+ memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+
+ /* initial seed */
+ cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+ &ws, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+ /* check working states V and C */
+ if (memcmp(ws.V, V0, sizeof(V0)) != 0
+ || memcmp(ws.C, C0, sizeof(C0)) != 0) {
+ pr_err("The prng self test state test "
+ "for the SHA-512 mode failed\n");
+ prng_errorflag = PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ /* generate random bytes */
+ cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+ &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
+ cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+ &ws, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0);
+
+ /* check against expected data */
+ if (memcmp(buf, random, sizeof(random)) != 0) {
+ pr_err("The prng self test data test "
+ "for the SHA-512 mode failed\n");
+ prng_errorflag = PRNG_SELFTEST_FAILED;
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int __init prng_sha512_instantiate(void)
+{
+ int ret, datalen;
+ u8 seed[64 + 32 + 16];
+
+ pr_debug("prng runs in SHA-512 mode "
+ "with chunksize=%d and reseed_limit=%u\n",
+ prng_chunk_size, prng_reseed_limit);
+
+ /* memory allocation, prng_data struct init, mutex init */
+ datalen = sizeof(struct prng_data_s) + prng_chunk_size;
+ if (fips_enabled)
+ datalen += prng_chunk_size;
+ prng_data = kzalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!prng_data) {
+ prng_errorflag = PRNG_INSTANTIATE_FAILED;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ mutex_init(&prng_data->mutex);
+ prng_data->buf = ((u8 *)prng_data) + sizeof(struct prng_data_s);
+
+ /* selftest */
+ ret = prng_sha512_selftest();
+ if (ret)
+ goto outfree;
+
+ /* generate initial seed bytestring, with 256 + 128 bits entropy */
+ ret = generate_entropy(seed, 64 + 32);
+ if (ret != 64 + 32)
+ goto outfree;
+ /* followed by 16 bytes of unique nonce */
+ get_tod_clock_ext(seed + 64 + 32);
+
+ /* initial seed of the prno drng */
+ cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+ &prng_data->prnows, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+ /* if fips mode is enabled, generate a first block of random
+ bytes for the FIPS 140-2 Conditional Self Test */
+ if (fips_enabled) {
+ prng_data->prev = prng_data->buf + prng_chunk_size;
+ cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+ &prng_data->prnows,
+ prng_data->prev, prng_chunk_size, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+outfree:
+ kfree(prng_data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static void prng_sha512_deinstantiate(void)
+{
+ pr_debug("The prng module stopped after running in SHA-512 mode\n");
+ kzfree(prng_data);
+}
+
+
+static int prng_sha512_reseed(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u8 seed[64];
+
+ /* fetch 256 bits of fresh entropy */
+ ret = generate_entropy(seed, sizeof(seed));
+ if (ret != sizeof(seed))
+ return ret;
+
+ /* do a reseed of the prno drng with this bytestring */
+ cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
+ &prng_data->prnows, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int prng_sha512_generate(u8 *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* reseed needed ? */
+ if (prng_data->prnows.reseed_counter > prng_reseed_limit) {
+ ret = prng_sha512_reseed();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* PRNO generate */
+ cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
+ &prng_data->prnows, buf, nbytes, NULL, 0);
+
+ /* FIPS 140-2 Conditional Self Test */
+ if (fips_enabled) {
+ if (!memcmp(prng_data->prev, buf, nbytes)) {
+ prng_errorflag = PRNG_GEN_FAILED;
+ return -EILSEQ;
+ }
+ memcpy(prng_data->prev, buf, nbytes);
+ }
+
+ return nbytes;
+}
+
+
+/*** file io functions ***/
+
+static int prng_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
+}
+
+
+static ssize_t prng_tdes_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int chunk, n, ret = 0;
+
+ /* lock prng_data struct */
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+ while (nbytes) {
+ if (need_resched()) {
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* give mutex free before calling schedule() */
+ mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+ schedule();
+ /* occopy mutex again */
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) {
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we lose some random bytes if an attacker issues
+ * reads < 8 bytes, but we don't care
+ */
+ chunk = min_t(int, nbytes, prng_chunk_size);
+
+ /* PRNG only likes multiples of 8 bytes */
+ n = (chunk + 7) & -8;
+
+ if (prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter > prng_reseed_limit)
+ prng_tdes_seed(8);
+
+ /* if the CPU supports PRNG stckf is present too */
+ *((unsigned long long *)prng_data->buf) = get_tod_clock_fast();
+
+ /*
+ * Beside the STCKF the input for the TDES-EDE is the output
+ * of the last operation. We differ here from X9.17 since we
+ * only store one timestamp into the buffer. Padding the whole
+ * buffer with timestamps does not improve security, since
+ * successive stckf have nearly constant offsets.
+ * If an attacker knows the first timestamp it would be
+ * trivial to guess the additional values. One timestamp
+ * is therefore enough and still guarantees unique input values.
+ *
+ * Note: you can still get strict X9.17 conformity by setting
+ * prng_chunk_size to 8 bytes.
+ */
+ cpacf_kmc(CPACF_KMC_PRNG, prng_data->prngws.parm_block,
+ prng_data->buf, prng_data->buf, n);
+
+ prng_data->prngws.byte_counter += n;
+ prng_data->prngws.reseed_counter += n;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(ubuf, prng_data->buf, chunk)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ nbytes -= chunk;
+ ret += chunk;
+ ubuf += chunk;
+ }
+
+ /* unlock prng_data struct */
+ mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static ssize_t prng_sha512_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int n, ret = 0;
+ u8 *p;
+
+ /* if errorflag is set do nothing and return 'broken pipe' */
+ if (prng_errorflag)
+ return -EPIPE;
+
+ /* lock prng_data struct */
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+ while (nbytes) {
+ if (need_resched()) {
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* give mutex free before calling schedule() */
+ mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+ schedule();
+ /* occopy mutex again */
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex)) {
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ if (prng_data->rest) {
+ /* push left over random bytes from the previous read */
+ p = prng_data->buf + prng_chunk_size - prng_data->rest;
+ n = (nbytes < prng_data->rest) ?
+ nbytes : prng_data->rest;
+ prng_data->rest -= n;
+ } else {
+ /* generate one chunk of random bytes into read buf */
+ p = prng_data->buf;
+ n = prng_sha512_generate(p, prng_chunk_size);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ ret = n;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (nbytes < prng_chunk_size) {
+ n = nbytes;
+ prng_data->rest = prng_chunk_size - n;
+ } else {
+ n = prng_chunk_size;
+ prng_data->rest = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (copy_to_user(ubuf, p, n)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ ubuf += n;
+ nbytes -= n;
+ ret += n;
+ }
+
+ /* unlock prng_data struct */
+ mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*** sysfs stuff ***/
+
+static const struct file_operations prng_sha512_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = &prng_open,
+ .release = NULL,
+ .read = &prng_sha512_read,
+ .llseek = noop_llseek,
+};
+static const struct file_operations prng_tdes_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = &prng_open,
+ .release = NULL,
+ .read = &prng_tdes_read,
+ .llseek = noop_llseek,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice prng_sha512_dev = {
+ .name = "prandom",
+ .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .fops = &prng_sha512_fops,
+};
+static struct miscdevice prng_tdes_dev = {
+ .name = "prandom",
+ .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .fops = &prng_tdes_fops,
+};
+
+
+/* chunksize attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_chunksize_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", prng_chunk_size);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(chunksize, 0444, prng_chunksize_show, NULL);
+
+/* counter attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_counter_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ u64 counter;
+
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512)
+ counter = prng_data->prnows.stream_bytes;
+ else
+ counter = prng_data->prngws.byte_counter;
+ mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n", counter);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(byte_counter, 0444, prng_counter_show, NULL);
+
+/* errorflag attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_errorflag_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", prng_errorflag);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(errorflag, 0444, prng_errorflag_show, NULL);
+
+/* mode attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_mode_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_TDES)
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "TDES\n");
+ else
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "SHA512\n");
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(mode, 0444, prng_mode_show, NULL);
+
+/* reseed attribute (w) */
+static ssize_t prng_reseed_store(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&prng_data->mutex))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ prng_sha512_reseed();
+ mutex_unlock(&prng_data->mutex);
+
+ return count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(reseed, 0200, NULL, prng_reseed_store);
+
+/* reseed limit attribute (rw) */
+static ssize_t prng_reseed_limit_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%u\n", prng_reseed_limit);
+}
+static ssize_t prng_reseed_limit_store(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ unsigned limit;
+
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%u\n", &limit) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+ if (limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ if (limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ prng_reseed_limit = limit;
+
+ return count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(reseed_limit, 0644,
+ prng_reseed_limit_show, prng_reseed_limit_store);
+
+/* strength attribute (ro) */
+static ssize_t prng_strength_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "256\n");
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(strength, 0444, prng_strength_show, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *prng_sha512_dev_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_errorflag.attr,
+ &dev_attr_chunksize.attr,
+ &dev_attr_byte_counter.attr,
+ &dev_attr_mode.attr,
+ &dev_attr_reseed.attr,
+ &dev_attr_reseed_limit.attr,
+ &dev_attr_strength.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+static struct attribute *prng_tdes_dev_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_chunksize.attr,
+ &dev_attr_byte_counter.attr,
+ &dev_attr_mode.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group prng_sha512_dev_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = prng_sha512_dev_attrs
+};
+static struct attribute_group prng_tdes_dev_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = prng_tdes_dev_attrs
+};
+
+
+/*** module init and exit ***/
+
+static int __init prng_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* check if the CPU has a PRNG */
+ if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KMC, CPACF_KMC_PRNG))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ /* choose prng mode */
+ if (prng_mode != PRNG_MODE_TDES) {
+ /* check for MSA5 support for PRNO operations */
+ if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) {
+ if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+ pr_err("The prng module cannot "
+ "start in SHA-512 mode\n");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+ prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_TDES;
+ } else
+ prng_mode = PRNG_MODE_SHA512;
+ }
+
+ if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+
+ /* SHA512 mode */
+
+ if (prng_chunk_size < PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MIN
+ || prng_chunk_size > PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_SHA512_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ prng_chunk_size = (prng_chunk_size + 0x3f) & ~0x3f;
+
+ if (prng_reseed_limit == 0)
+ prng_reseed_limit = PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512;
+ else if (prng_reseed_limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_SHA512_LOWER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = prng_sha512_instantiate();
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = misc_register(&prng_sha512_dev);
+ if (ret) {
+ prng_sha512_deinstantiate();
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = sysfs_create_group(&prng_sha512_dev.this_device->kobj,
+ &prng_sha512_dev_attr_group);
+ if (ret) {
+ misc_deregister(&prng_sha512_dev);
+ prng_sha512_deinstantiate();
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+
+ /* TDES mode */
+
+ if (prng_chunk_size < PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MIN
+ || prng_chunk_size > PRNG_CHUNKSIZE_TDES_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ prng_chunk_size = (prng_chunk_size + 0x07) & ~0x07;
+
+ if (prng_reseed_limit == 0)
+ prng_reseed_limit = PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES;
+ else if (prng_reseed_limit < PRNG_RESEED_LIMIT_TDES_LOWER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = prng_tdes_instantiate();
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = misc_register(&prng_tdes_dev);
+ if (ret) {
+ prng_tdes_deinstantiate();
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = sysfs_create_group(&prng_tdes_dev.this_device->kobj,
+ &prng_tdes_dev_attr_group);
+ if (ret) {
+ misc_deregister(&prng_tdes_dev);
+ prng_tdes_deinstantiate();
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static void __exit prng_exit(void)
+{
+ if (prng_mode == PRNG_MODE_SHA512) {
+ sysfs_remove_group(&prng_sha512_dev.this_device->kobj,
+ &prng_sha512_dev_attr_group);
+ misc_deregister(&prng_sha512_dev);
+ prng_sha512_deinstantiate();
+ } else {
+ sysfs_remove_group(&prng_tdes_dev.this_device->kobj,
+ &prng_tdes_dev_attr_group);
+ misc_deregister(&prng_tdes_dev);
+ prng_tdes_deinstantiate();
+ }
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, prng_init);
+module_exit(prng_exit);
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h b/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d6f8258b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 generic implementation of the SHA Secure Hash Algorithms.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_ARCH_S390_SHA_H
+#define _CRYPTO_ARCH_S390_SHA_H
+
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+
+/* must be big enough for the largest SHA variant */
+#define SHA_MAX_STATE_SIZE (SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE / 4)
+#define SHA_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE
+
+struct s390_sha_ctx {
+ u64 count; /* message length in bytes */
+ u32 state[SHA_MAX_STATE_SIZE];
+ u8 buf[2 * SHA_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ int func; /* KIMD function to use */
+};
+
+struct shash_desc;
+
+int s390_sha_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len);
+int s390_sha_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..009572e82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Derived from cryptoapi implementation, adapted for in-place
+ * scatterlist interface. Originally based on the public domain
+ * implementation written by Steve Reid.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2003, 2007
+ * Author(s): Thomas Spatzier
+ * Jan Glauber (jan.glauber@de.ibm.com)
+ *
+ * Derived from "crypto/sha1_generic.c"
+ * Copyright (c) Alan Smithee.
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew McDonald <andrew@mcdonald.org.uk>
+ * Copyright (c) Jean-Francois Dive <jef@linuxbe.org>
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int sha1_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ sctx->state[0] = SHA1_H0;
+ sctx->state[1] = SHA1_H1;
+ sctx->state[2] = SHA1_H2;
+ sctx->state[3] = SHA1_H3;
+ sctx->state[4] = SHA1_H4;
+ sctx->count = 0;
+ sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha1_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ struct sha1_state *octx = out;
+
+ octx->count = sctx->count;
+ memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state));
+ memcpy(octx->buffer, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buffer));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha1_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ const struct sha1_state *ictx = in;
+
+ sctx->count = ictx->count;
+ memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
+ memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buffer, sizeof(ictx->buffer));
+ sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg alg = {
+ .digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .init = sha1_init,
+ .update = s390_sha_update,
+ .final = s390_sha_final,
+ .export = sha1_export,
+ .import = sha1_import,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha1_state),
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "sha1",
+ .cra_driver_name= "sha1-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ }
+};
+
+static int __init sha1_s390_init(void)
+{
+ if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
+}
+
+static void __exit sha1_s390_fini(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, sha1_s390_init);
+module_exit(sha1_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha1");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA1 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..62833a1d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * s390 Version:
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2005, 2011
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int sha256_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ sctx->state[0] = SHA256_H0;
+ sctx->state[1] = SHA256_H1;
+ sctx->state[2] = SHA256_H2;
+ sctx->state[3] = SHA256_H3;
+ sctx->state[4] = SHA256_H4;
+ sctx->state[5] = SHA256_H5;
+ sctx->state[6] = SHA256_H6;
+ sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
+ sctx->count = 0;
+ sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha256_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ struct sha256_state *octx = out;
+
+ octx->count = sctx->count;
+ memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state));
+ memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha256_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ const struct sha256_state *ictx = in;
+
+ sctx->count = ictx->count;
+ memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
+ memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+ sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha256_alg = {
+ .digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .init = sha256_init,
+ .update = s390_sha_update,
+ .final = s390_sha_final,
+ .export = sha256_export,
+ .import = sha256_import,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "sha256",
+ .cra_driver_name= "sha256-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ }
+};
+
+static int sha224_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ sctx->state[0] = SHA224_H0;
+ sctx->state[1] = SHA224_H1;
+ sctx->state[2] = SHA224_H2;
+ sctx->state[3] = SHA224_H3;
+ sctx->state[4] = SHA224_H4;
+ sctx->state[5] = SHA224_H5;
+ sctx->state[6] = SHA224_H6;
+ sctx->state[7] = SHA224_H7;
+ sctx->count = 0;
+ sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha224_alg = {
+ .digestsize = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .init = sha224_init,
+ .update = s390_sha_update,
+ .final = s390_sha_final,
+ .export = sha256_export,
+ .import = sha256_import,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state),
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "sha224",
+ .cra_driver_name= "sha224-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_blocksize = SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ }
+};
+
+static int __init sha256_s390_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha256_alg);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha224_alg);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit sha256_s390_fini(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&sha224_alg);
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&sha256_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, sha256_s390_init);
+module_exit(sha256_s390_fini);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha256");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha224");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA256 and SHA224 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..be589c340
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 implementation of the SHA512 and SHA38 Secure Hash Algorithm.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+
+#include "sha.h"
+
+static int sha512_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[0] = 0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[2] = 0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[4] = 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[6] = 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[8] = 0x510e527fade682d1ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[10] = 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[12] = 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = 0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL;
+ ctx->count = 0;
+ ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha512_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ struct sha512_state *octx = out;
+
+ octx->count[0] = sctx->count;
+ octx->count[1] = 0;
+ memcpy(octx->state, sctx->state, sizeof(octx->state));
+ memcpy(octx->buf, sctx->buf, sizeof(octx->buf));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sha512_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ const struct sha512_state *ictx = in;
+
+ if (unlikely(ictx->count[1]))
+ return -ERANGE;
+ sctx->count = ictx->count[0];
+
+ memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
+ memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
+ sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha512_alg = {
+ .digestsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .init = sha512_init,
+ .update = s390_sha_update,
+ .final = s390_sha_final,
+ .export = sha512_export,
+ .import = sha512_import,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha512_state),
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "sha512",
+ .cra_driver_name= "sha512-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_blocksize = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ }
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha512");
+
+static int sha384_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[0] = 0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[2] = 0x629a292a367cd507ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[4] = 0x9159015a3070dd17ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[6] = 0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[8] = 0x67332667ffc00b31ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[10] = 0x8eb44a8768581511ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[12] = 0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL;
+ *(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = 0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL;
+ ctx->count = 0;
+ ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct shash_alg sha384_alg = {
+ .digestsize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .init = sha384_init,
+ .update = s390_sha_update,
+ .final = s390_sha_final,
+ .export = sha512_export,
+ .import = sha512_import,
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct sha512_state),
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "sha384",
+ .cra_driver_name= "sha384-s390",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_blocksize = SHA384_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct s390_sha_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ }
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("sha384");
+
+static int __init init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!cpacf_query_func(CPACF_KIMD, CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if ((ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha512_alg)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((ret = crypto_register_shash(&sha384_alg)) < 0)
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&sha512_alg);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit fini(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&sha512_alg);
+ crypto_unregister_shash(&sha384_alg);
+}
+
+module_cpu_feature_match(MSA, init);
+module_exit(fini);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SHA512 and SHA-384 Secure Hash Algorithm");
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c b/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf0718d12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/sha_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic API.
+ *
+ * s390 generic implementation of the SHA Secure Hash Algorithms.
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2007
+ * Author(s): Jan Glauber (jang@de.ibm.com)
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
+#include "sha.h"
+
+int s390_sha_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ unsigned int bsize = crypto_shash_blocksize(desc->tfm);
+ unsigned int index, n;
+
+ /* how much is already in the buffer? */
+ index = ctx->count & (bsize - 1);
+ ctx->count += len;
+
+ if ((index + len) < bsize)
+ goto store;
+
+ /* process one stored block */
+ if (index) {
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + index, data, bsize - index);
+ cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, ctx->buf, bsize);
+ data += bsize - index;
+ len -= bsize - index;
+ index = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* process as many blocks as possible */
+ if (len >= bsize) {
+ n = len & ~(bsize - 1);
+ cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, data, n);
+ data += n;
+ len -= n;
+ }
+store:
+ if (len)
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + index , data, len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_sha_update);
+
+int s390_sha_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ struct s390_sha_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ unsigned int bsize = crypto_shash_blocksize(desc->tfm);
+ u64 bits;
+ unsigned int index, end, plen;
+
+ /* SHA-512 uses 128 bit padding length */
+ plen = (bsize > SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) ? 16 : 8;
+
+ /* must perform manual padding */
+ index = ctx->count & (bsize - 1);
+ end = (index < bsize - plen) ? bsize : (2 * bsize);
+
+ /* start pad with 1 */
+ ctx->buf[index] = 0x80;
+ index++;
+
+ /* pad with zeros */
+ memset(ctx->buf + index, 0x00, end - index - 8);
+
+ /*
+ * Append message length. Well, SHA-512 wants a 128 bit length value,
+ * nevertheless we use u64, should be enough for now...
+ */
+ bits = ctx->count * 8;
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + end - 8, &bits, sizeof(bits));
+ cpacf_kimd(ctx->func, ctx->state, ctx->buf, end);
+
+ /* copy digest to out */
+ memcpy(out, ctx->state, crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm));
+ /* wipe context */
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_sha_final);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("s390 SHA cipher common functions");
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-26 02:41:52 +0000