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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 130 |
1 files changed, 130 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9c556ea2e --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * GCC stack protector support. + * + * Stack protector works by putting predefined pattern at the start of + * the stack frame and verifying that it hasn't been overwritten when + * returning from the function. The pattern is called stack canary + * and unfortunately gcc requires it to be at a fixed offset from %gs. + * On x86_64, the offset is 40 bytes and on x86_32 20 bytes. x86_64 + * and x86_32 use segment registers differently and thus handles this + * requirement differently. + * + * On x86_64, %gs is shared by percpu area and stack canary. All + * percpu symbols are zero based and %gs points to the base of percpu + * area. The first occupant of the percpu area is always + * irq_stack_union which contains stack_canary at offset 40. Userland + * %gs is always saved and restored on kernel entry and exit using + * swapgs, so stack protector doesn't add any complexity there. + * + * On x86_32, it's slightly more complicated. As in x86_64, %gs is + * used for userland TLS. Unfortunately, some processors are much + * slower at loading segment registers with different value when + * entering and leaving the kernel, so the kernel uses %fs for percpu + * area and manages %gs lazily so that %gs is switched only when + * necessary, usually during task switch. + * + * As gcc requires the stack canary at %gs:20, %gs can't be managed + * lazily if stack protector is enabled, so the kernel saves and + * restores userland %gs on kernel entry and exit. This behavior is + * controlled by CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and accessors are defined in + * system.h to hide the details. + */ + +#ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H +#define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1 + +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR + +#include <asm/tsc.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> +#include <asm/percpu.h> +#include <asm/desc.h> + +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> + +/* + * 24 byte read-only segment initializer for stack canary. Linker + * can't handle the address bit shifting. Address will be set in + * head_32 for boot CPU and setup_per_cpu_areas() for others. + */ +#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT \ + [GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4090, 0, 0x18), + +/* + * Initialize the stackprotector canary value. + * + * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return + * and it must always be inlined. + * + * In addition, it should be called from a compilation unit for which + * stack protector is disabled. Alternatively, the caller should not end + * with a function call which gets tail-call optimized as that would + * lead to checking a modified canary value. + */ +static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) +{ + u64 canary; + u64 tsc; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(union irq_stack_union, stack_canary) != 40); +#endif + /* + * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source + * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, + * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later + * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too. + */ + get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); + tsc = rdtsc(); + canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL); + canary &= CANARY_MASK; + + current->stack_canary = canary; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + this_cpu_write(irq_stack_union.stack_canary, canary); +#else + this_cpu_write(stack_canary.canary, canary); +#endif +} + +static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + unsigned long canary = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(stack_canary, cpu); + struct desc_struct *gdt_table = get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu); + struct desc_struct desc; + + desc = gdt_table[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY]; + set_desc_base(&desc, canary); + write_gdt_entry(gdt_table, GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY, &desc, DESCTYPE_S); +#endif +} + +static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + asm("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY) : "memory"); +#endif +} + +#else /* STACKPROTECTOR */ + +#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT + +/* dummy boot_init_stack_canary() is defined in linux/stackprotector.h */ + +static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu) +{ } + +static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0)); +#endif +} + +#endif /* STACKPROTECTOR */ +#endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */ |