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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c209
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c117
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c38
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c25
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S2
14 files changed, 358 insertions, 102 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index 8b1aa1206..2f0fa294d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_madt(struct acpi_table_header *table)
madt->address);
}
+ if (madt->flags & ACPI_MADT_PCAT_COMPAT)
+ legacy_pic_pcat_compat();
+
default_acpi_madt_oem_check(madt->header.oem_id,
madt->header.oem_table_id);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 918a23704..33882d5ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -366,6 +366,17 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
u8 insnbuf[MAX_PATCH_LEN];
DPRINTK("alt table %px, -> %px", start, end);
+
+ /*
+ * In the case CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y, KASAN_SHADOW_START is defined using
+ * cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57) and is therefore patched here.
+ * During the process, KASAN becomes confused seeing partial LA57
+ * conversion and triggers a false-positive out-of-bound report.
+ *
+ * Disable KASAN until the patching is complete.
+ */
+ kasan_disable_current();
+
/*
* The scan order should be from start to end. A later scanned
* alternative code can overwrite previously scanned alternative code.
@@ -426,6 +437,8 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_alternatives(struct alt_instr *start,
text_poke_early(instr, insnbuf, insnbuf_sz);
}
+
+ kasan_enable_current();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
@@ -677,8 +690,8 @@ void *__init_or_module text_poke_early(void *addr, const void *opcode,
} else {
local_irq_save(flags);
memcpy(addr, opcode, len);
- local_irq_restore(flags);
sync_core();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
/*
* Could also do a CLFLUSH here to speed up CPU recovery; but
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c
index f7151cd03..3d7a8049f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apm_32.c
@@ -247,12 +247,6 @@ extern int (*console_blank_hook)(int);
#endif
/*
- * The apm_bios device is one of the misc char devices.
- * This is its minor number.
- */
-#define APM_MINOR_DEV 134
-
-/*
* Various options can be changed at boot time as follows:
* (We allow underscores for compatibility with the modules code)
* apm=on/off enable/disable APM
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 256f2c612..84667781c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -69,8 +69,13 @@ static const int amd_erratum_1054[] =
static const int amd_zenbleed[] =
AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x30, 0x0, 0x4f, 0xf),
AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x60, 0x0, 0x7f, 0xf),
+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x90, 0x0, 0x91, 0xf),
AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf));
+static const int amd_erratum_1485[] =
+ AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x10, 0x0, 0x1f, 0xf),
+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x60, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf));
+
static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum)
{
int osvw_id = *erratum++;
@@ -1121,6 +1126,10 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
zenbleed_check(c);
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) &&
+ cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1485))
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -1244,5 +1253,8 @@ static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused)
void amd_check_microcode(void)
{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ return;
+
on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 680fa070e..6e1acbdd2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
* - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup).
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
-#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
@@ -25,9 +24,7 @@
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/vmx.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
-#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
-#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -47,6 +44,7 @@ static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -115,21 +113,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
-void __init check_bugs(void)
+void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
{
- identify_boot_cpu();
-
- /*
- * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
- * core code know.
- */
- cpu_smt_check_topology();
-
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
- pr_info("CPU: ");
- print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
- }
-
/*
* Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
* have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
@@ -165,39 +150,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
l1tf_select_mitigation();
md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
-
- arch_smt_update();
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
- /*
- * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
- *
- * - i386 is no longer supported.
- * - In order to run on anything without a TSC, we need to be
- * compiled for a i486.
- */
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
- panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");
-
- init_utsname()->machine[1] =
- '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
- alternative_instructions();
-
- fpu__init_check_bugs();
-#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
- alternative_instructions();
-
- /*
- * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
- * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
- * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
- *
- * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
- * very little benefit for that case.
- */
- if (!direct_gbpages)
- set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
-#endif
+ gds_select_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -649,6 +602,149 @@ static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "GDS: " fmt
+
+enum gds_mitigations {
+ GDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION)
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+#else
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+#endif
+
+static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE] = "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED] = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)
+{
+ return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
+ gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated);
+
+void update_gds_msr(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_ctrl_after;
+ u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+ switch (gds_mitigation) {
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+ mcu_ctrl |= GDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED:
+ /*
+ * The LOCKED state comes from the boot CPU. APs might not have
+ * the same state. Make sure the mitigation is enabled on all
+ * CPUs.
+ */
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+ mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE:
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR:
+ return;
+ };
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+ /*
+ * Check to make sure that the WRMSR value was not ignored. Writes to
+ * GDS_MITG_DIS will be ignored if this processor is locked but the boot
+ * processor was not.
+ */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl_after);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(mcu_ctrl != mcu_ctrl_after);
+}
+
+static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+ return;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ /* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
+
+ /* No microcode */
+ if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
+ /*
+ * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
+ * here rather than in update_gds_msr()
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX);
+ pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation.\n");
+ } else {
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Microcode has mitigation, use it */
+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE)
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+ if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) {
+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ pr_warn("Mitigation locked. Disable failed.\n");
+
+ /*
+ * The mitigation is selected from the boot CPU. All other CPUs
+ * _should_ have the same state. If the boot CPU isn't locked
+ * but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state
+ * mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will
+ * ensure the other CPUs have the mitigation enabled.
+ */
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
+ }
+
+ update_gds_msr();
+out:
+ pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "force"))
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("gather_data_sampling", gds_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
@@ -2196,6 +2292,11 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
}
+static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
+}
+
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
@@ -2245,6 +2346,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
return retbleed_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_GDS:
+ return gds_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -2309,4 +2413,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, cha
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index ec324be00..d315e928b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -13,14 +13,20 @@
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/kgdb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
#include <asm/stackprotector.h>
+#include <linux/utsname.h>
+
+#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/archrandom.h>
@@ -56,6 +62,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
#endif
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include "cpu.h"
@@ -1040,6 +1047,12 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
#define RETBLEED BIT(3)
+/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */
+#define SMT_RSB BIT(4)
+/* CPU is affected by SRSO */
+#define SRSO BIT(5)
+/* CPU is affected by GDS */
+#define GDS BIT(6)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
@@ -1052,18 +1065,20 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_MOBILE,X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_MOBILE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_XEON_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
@@ -1186,6 +1201,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
+ /*
+ * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on
+ * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by
+ * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2],
+ * which means that AVX will be disabled.
+ */
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
@@ -1271,8 +1296,6 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
cpu_set_bug_bits(c);
- fpu__init_system(c);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says
@@ -1661,6 +1684,8 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
update_srbds_msr();
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+ update_gds_msr();
}
static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg)
@@ -1978,8 +2003,6 @@ void cpu_init(void)
clear_all_debug_regs();
dbg_restore_debug_regs();
- fpu__init_cpu();
-
if (is_uv_system())
uv_cpu_init();
@@ -2043,8 +2066,6 @@ void cpu_init(void)
clear_all_debug_regs();
dbg_restore_debug_regs();
- fpu__init_cpu();
-
load_fixmap_gdt(cpu);
}
#endif
@@ -2097,3 +2118,69 @@ void microcode_check(void)
pr_warn("x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect.\n");
pr_warn("x86/CPU: Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
}
+
+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
+{
+ identify_boot_cpu();
+
+ /*
+ * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
+ * core code know.
+ */
+ cpu_smt_check_topology();
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
+ pr_info("CPU: ");
+ print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
+ }
+
+ cpu_select_mitigations();
+
+ arch_smt_update();
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
+ /*
+ * Check whether this is a real i386 which is not longer
+ * supported and fixup the utsname.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
+ panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");
+
+ init_utsname()->machine[1] =
+ '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Must be before alternatives because it might set or clear
+ * feature bits.
+ */
+ fpu__init_system();
+ fpu__init_cpu();
+
+ alternative_instructions();
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
+ * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
+ * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
+ *
+ * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
+ * very little benefit for that case.
+ */
+ if (!direct_gbpages)
+ set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
+ } else {
+ fpu__init_check_bugs();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
+ * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
+ * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
+ * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
+ * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
+ * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
+ */
+ mem_encrypt_init();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
index 4eb9bf68b..ca1b8bf38 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -79,9 +79,11 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
extern void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
+void cpu_select_mitigations(void);
extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
+extern void update_gds_msr(void);
extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
index 71ca064e3..31fe56a90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* initial apic id, which also represents 32-bit extended x2apic id.
*/
c->initial_apicid = edx;
- smp_num_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx);
+ smp_num_siblings = max_t(int, smp_num_siblings, LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx));
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ int detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* Populate HT related information from sub-leaf level 0.
*/
cpuid_count(0xb, SMT_LEVEL, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
- core_level_siblings = smp_num_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx);
+ core_level_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx);
+ smp_num_siblings = max_t(int, smp_num_siblings, LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx));
core_plus_mask_width = ht_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax);
sub_index = 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
index 9692ccc58..644372a10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ void fpu__init_cpu(void)
fpu__init_cpu_xstate();
}
-static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void)
+static bool __init fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void)
{
unsigned long cr0;
u16 fsw, fcw;
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static bool fpu__probe_without_cpuid(void)
return fsw == 0 && (fcw & 0x103f) == 0x003f;
}
-static void fpu__init_system_early_generic(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+static void __init fpu__init_system_early_generic(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPUID) &&
!test_bit(X86_FEATURE_FPU, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) {
@@ -297,10 +297,10 @@ static void __init fpu__init_parse_early_param(void)
* Called on the boot CPU once per system bootup, to set up the initial
* FPU state that is later cloned into all processes:
*/
-void __init fpu__init_system(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+void __init fpu__init_system(void)
{
fpu__init_parse_early_param();
- fpu__init_system_early_generic(c);
+ fpu__init_system_early_generic();
/*
* The FPU has to be operational for some of the
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 7d372db8b..e33b732ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -811,6 +811,14 @@ void __init fpu__init_system_xstate(void)
fpu__init_prepare_fx_sw_frame();
setup_init_fpu_buf();
setup_xstate_comp();
+
+ /*
+ * CPU capabilities initialization runs before FPU init. So
+ * X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE is not set. Now that XSAVE is completely
+ * functional, set the feature bit so depending code works.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE);
+
print_xstate_offset_size();
pr_info("x86/fpu: Enabled xstate features 0x%llx, context size is %d bytes, using '%s' format.\n",
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c b/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
index 8821d0ab0..82753622f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
*/
static void init_8259A(int auto_eoi);
+static bool pcat_compat __ro_after_init;
static int i8259A_auto_eoi;
DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(i8259A_lock);
@@ -301,15 +302,32 @@ static void unmask_8259A(void)
static int probe_8259A(void)
{
+ unsigned char new_val, probe_val = ~(1 << PIC_CASCADE_IR);
unsigned long flags;
- unsigned char probe_val = ~(1 << PIC_CASCADE_IR);
- unsigned char new_val;
+
+ /*
+ * If MADT has the PCAT_COMPAT flag set, then do not bother probing
+ * for the PIC. Some BIOSes leave the PIC uninitialized and probing
+ * fails.
+ *
+ * Right now this causes problems as quite some code depends on
+ * nr_legacy_irqs() > 0 or has_legacy_pic() == true. This is silly
+ * when the system has an IO/APIC because then PIC is not required
+ * at all, except for really old machines where the timer interrupt
+ * must be routed through the PIC. So just pretend that the PIC is
+ * there and let legacy_pic->init() initialize it for nothing.
+ *
+ * Alternatively this could just try to initialize the PIC and
+ * repeat the probe, but for cases where there is no PIC that's
+ * just pointless.
+ */
+ if (pcat_compat)
+ return nr_legacy_irqs();
+
/*
- * Check to see if we have a PIC.
- * Mask all except the cascade and read
- * back the value we just wrote. If we don't
- * have a PIC, we will read 0xff as opposed to the
- * value we wrote.
+ * Check to see if we have a PIC. Mask all except the cascade and
+ * read back the value we just wrote. If we don't have a PIC, we
+ * will read 0xff as opposed to the value we wrote.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&i8259A_lock, flags);
@@ -431,5 +449,9 @@ static int __init i8259A_init_ops(void)
return 0;
}
-
device_initcall(i8259A_init_ops);
+
+void __init legacy_pic_pcat_compat(void)
+{
+ pcat_compat = true;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c b/arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c
index 736348ead..2ecf1dcc8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void ich_force_hpet_resume(void)
static void ich_force_enable_hpet(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
u32 val;
- u32 uninitialized_var(rcba);
+ u32 rcba;
int err = 0;
if (hpet_address || force_hpet_address)
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static void hpet_print_force_info(void)
static void old_ich_force_hpet_resume(void)
{
u32 val;
- u32 uninitialized_var(gen_cntl);
+ u32 gen_cntl;
if (!force_hpet_address || !cached_dev)
return;
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static void old_ich_force_hpet_resume(void)
static void old_ich_force_enable_hpet(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
u32 val;
- u32 uninitialized_var(gen_cntl);
+ u32 gen_cntl;
if (hpet_address || force_hpet_address)
return;
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static void vt8237_force_hpet_resume(void)
static void vt8237_force_enable_hpet(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
- u32 uninitialized_var(val);
+ u32 val;
if (hpet_address || force_hpet_address)
return;
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static void nvidia_force_hpet_resume(void)
static void nvidia_force_enable_hpet(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
- u32 uninitialized_var(val);
+ u32 val;
if (hpet_address || force_hpet_address)
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 8783d065f..2e4f6a1eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -96,6 +96,17 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(cpumask_var_t, cpu_llc_shared_map);
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct cpuinfo_x86, cpu_info);
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_info);
+struct mwait_cpu_dead {
+ unsigned int control;
+ unsigned int status;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Cache line aligned data for mwait_play_dead(). Separate on purpose so
+ * that it's unlikely to be touched by other CPUs.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(struct mwait_cpu_dead, mwait_cpu_dead);
+
/* Logical package management. We might want to allocate that dynamically */
unsigned int __max_logical_packages __read_mostly;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_logical_packages);
@@ -231,6 +242,7 @@ static void notrace start_secondary(void *unused)
#endif
load_current_idt();
cpu_init();
+ fpu__init_cpu();
x86_cpuinit.early_percpu_clock_init();
preempt_disable();
smp_callin();
@@ -1594,10 +1606,10 @@ static bool wakeup_cpu0(void)
*/
static inline void mwait_play_dead(void)
{
+ struct mwait_cpu_dead *md = this_cpu_ptr(&mwait_cpu_dead);
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
unsigned int highest_cstate = 0;
unsigned int highest_subcstate = 0;
- void *mwait_ptr;
int i;
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
@@ -1631,13 +1643,6 @@ static inline void mwait_play_dead(void)
(highest_subcstate - 1);
}
- /*
- * This should be a memory location in a cache line which is
- * unlikely to be touched by other processors. The actual
- * content is immaterial as it is not actually modified in any way.
- */
- mwait_ptr = &current_thread_info()->flags;
-
wbinvd();
while (1) {
@@ -1649,9 +1654,9 @@ static inline void mwait_play_dead(void)
* case where we return around the loop.
*/
mb();
- clflush(mwait_ptr);
+ clflush(md);
mb();
- __monitor(mwait_ptr, 0, 0);
+ __monitor(md, 0, 0);
mb();
__mwait(eax, 0);
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 34c0652ca..20d09355c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ SECTIONS
.brk : AT(ADDR(.brk) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__brk_base = .;
. += 64 * 1024; /* 64k alignment slop space */
- *(.brk_reservation) /* areas brk users have reserved */
+ *(.bss..brk) /* areas brk users have reserved */
__brk_limit = .;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-26 06:05:42 +0000