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path: root/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c')
-rw-r--r--drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c136
1 files changed, 136 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a90b0b8fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/*
+ * TPM handling.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 CoreOS, Inc
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Google, Inc.
+ * Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
+ * Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
+ *
+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
+ * terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+#include "efistub.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
+static const efi_char16_t efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name[] =
+ L"MemoryOverwriteRequestControl";
+
+#define MEMORY_ONLY_RESET_CONTROL_GUID \
+ EFI_GUID(0xe20939be, 0x32d4, 0x41be, 0xa1, 0x50, 0x89, 0x7f, 0x85, 0xd4, 0x98, 0x29)
+
+#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
+ efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
+ (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
+ __VA_ARGS__)
+
+#define set_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
+ efi_call_runtime(set_variable, \
+ (efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
+ __VA_ARGS__)
+
+/*
+ * Enable reboot attack mitigation. This requests that the firmware clear the
+ * RAM on next reboot before proceeding with boot, ensuring that any secrets
+ * are cleared. If userland has ensured that all secrets have been removed
+ * from RAM before reboot it can simply reset this variable.
+ */
+void efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+ u8 val = 1;
+ efi_guid_t var_guid = MEMORY_ONLY_RESET_CONTROL_GUID;
+ efi_status_t status;
+ unsigned long datasize = 0;
+
+ status = get_efi_var(efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name, &var_guid,
+ NULL, &datasize, NULL);
+
+ if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
+ return;
+
+ set_efi_var(efi_MemoryOverWriteRequest_name, &var_guid,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS, sizeof(val), &val);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+ efi_guid_t tcg2_guid = EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID;
+ efi_guid_t linux_eventlog_guid = LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID;
+ efi_status_t status;
+ efi_physical_addr_t log_location = 0, log_last_entry = 0;
+ struct linux_efi_tpm_eventlog *log_tbl = NULL;
+ unsigned long first_entry_addr, last_entry_addr;
+ size_t log_size, last_entry_size;
+ efi_bool_t truncated;
+ void *tcg2_protocol = NULL;
+
+ status = efi_call_early(locate_protocol, &tcg2_guid, NULL,
+ &tcg2_protocol);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return;
+
+ status = efi_call_proto(efi_tcg2_protocol, get_event_log, tcg2_protocol,
+ EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2,
+ &log_location, &log_last_entry, &truncated);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ return;
+
+ if (!log_location)
+ return;
+ first_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_location;
+
+ /*
+ * We populate the EFI table even if the logs are empty.
+ */
+ if (!log_last_entry) {
+ log_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ last_entry_addr = (unsigned long) log_last_entry;
+ /*
+ * get_event_log only returns the address of the last entry.
+ * We need to calculate its size to deduce the full size of
+ * the logs.
+ */
+ last_entry_size = sizeof(struct tcpa_event) +
+ ((struct tcpa_event *) last_entry_addr)->event_size;
+ log_size = log_last_entry - log_location + last_entry_size;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate space for the logs and copy them. */
+ status = efi_call_early(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
+ sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size,
+ (void **) &log_tbl);
+
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+ efi_printk(sys_table_arg,
+ "Unable to allocate memory for event log\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ memset(log_tbl, 0, sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size);
+ log_tbl->size = log_size;
+ log_tbl->version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
+ memcpy(log_tbl->log, (void *) first_entry_addr, log_size);
+
+ status = efi_call_early(install_configuration_table,
+ &linux_eventlog_guid, log_tbl);
+ if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+ goto err_free;
+ return;
+
+err_free:
+ efi_call_early(free_pool, log_tbl);
+}
+
+void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
+{
+ /* Only try to retrieve the logs in 1.2 format. */
+ efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog_1_2(sys_table_arg);
+}