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-rw-r--r--drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h250
1 files changed, 250 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e5b5c02c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * zcrypt 2.1.0
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2006
+ * Author(s): Robert Burroughs
+ * Eric Rossman (edrossma@us.ibm.com)
+ *
+ * Hotplug & misc device support: Jochen Roehrig (roehrig@de.ibm.com)
+ * Major cleanup & driver split: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_
+#define _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_
+
+struct T6_keyBlock_hdr {
+ unsigned short blen;
+ unsigned short ulen;
+ unsigned short flags;
+};
+
+/**
+ * mapping for the cca private ME key token.
+ * Three parts of interest here: the header, the private section and
+ * the public section.
+ *
+ * mapping for the cca key token header
+ */
+struct cca_token_hdr {
+ unsigned char token_identifier;
+ unsigned char version;
+ unsigned short token_length;
+ unsigned char reserved[4];
+} __packed;
+
+#define CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT 0x1E
+
+#define CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL 0x80
+
+/**
+ * mapping for the cca public section
+ * In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public
+ * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be
+ * used, for a section length of 0x0F always.
+ */
+struct cca_public_sec {
+ unsigned char section_identifier;
+ unsigned char version;
+ unsigned short section_length;
+ unsigned char reserved[2];
+ unsigned short exponent_len;
+ unsigned short modulus_bit_len;
+ unsigned short modulus_byte_len; /* In a private key, this is 0 */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * mapping for the cca private CRT key 'token'
+ * The first three parts (the only parts considered in this release)
+ * are: the header, the private section and the public section.
+ * The header and public section are the same as for the
+ * struct cca_private_ext_ME
+ *
+ * Following the structure are the quantities p, q, dp, dq, u, pad,
+ * and modulus, in that order, where pad_len is the modulo 8
+ * complement of the residue modulo 8 of the sum of
+ * (p_len + q_len + dp_len + dq_len + u_len).
+ */
+struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec {
+ unsigned char section_identifier;
+ unsigned char version;
+ unsigned short section_length;
+ unsigned char private_key_hash[20];
+ unsigned char reserved1[4];
+ unsigned char key_format;
+ unsigned char reserved2;
+ unsigned char key_name_hash[20];
+ unsigned char key_use_flags[4];
+ unsigned short p_len;
+ unsigned short q_len;
+ unsigned short dp_len;
+ unsigned short dq_len;
+ unsigned short u_len;
+ unsigned short mod_len;
+ unsigned char reserved3[4];
+ unsigned short pad_len;
+ unsigned char reserved4[52];
+ unsigned char confounder[8];
+} __packed;
+
+#define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT 0x08
+#define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL 0x40
+
+/**
+ * Set up private key fields of a type6 MEX message. The _pad variant
+ * strips leading zeroes from the b_key.
+ * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian,
+ * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian.
+ *
+ * @mex: pointer to user input data
+ * @p: pointer to memory area for the key
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the key area or negative errno value.
+ */
+static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_en(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, void *p)
+{
+ static struct cca_token_hdr static_pub_hdr = {
+ .token_identifier = 0x1E,
+ };
+ static struct cca_public_sec static_pub_sec = {
+ .section_identifier = 0x04,
+ };
+ struct {
+ struct T6_keyBlock_hdr t6_hdr;
+ struct cca_token_hdr pubHdr;
+ struct cca_public_sec pubSec;
+ char exponent[0];
+ } __packed *key = p;
+ unsigned char *temp;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching
+ * function zcrypt_rsa_modexpo(). However, do a plausibility check
+ * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized
+ * to compromise the system.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mex->inputdatalength > 512))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
+
+ key->pubHdr = static_pub_hdr;
+ key->pubSec = static_pub_sec;
+
+ /* key parameter block */
+ temp = key->exponent;
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->b_key, mex->inputdatalength))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ /* Strip leading zeroes from b_key. */
+ for (i = 0; i < mex->inputdatalength; i++)
+ if (temp[i])
+ break;
+ if (i >= mex->inputdatalength)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ memmove(temp, temp + i, mex->inputdatalength - i);
+ temp += mex->inputdatalength - i;
+ /* modulus */
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->n_modulus, mex->inputdatalength))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ key->pubSec.modulus_bit_len = 8 * mex->inputdatalength;
+ key->pubSec.modulus_byte_len = mex->inputdatalength;
+ key->pubSec.exponent_len = mex->inputdatalength - i;
+ key->pubSec.section_length = sizeof(key->pubSec) +
+ 2*mex->inputdatalength - i;
+ key->pubHdr.token_length =
+ key->pubSec.section_length + sizeof(key->pubHdr);
+ key->t6_hdr.ulen = key->pubHdr.token_length + 4;
+ key->t6_hdr.blen = key->pubHdr.token_length + 6;
+ return sizeof(*key) + 2*mex->inputdatalength - i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set up private key fields of a type6 CRT message.
+ * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian,
+ * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian.
+ *
+ * @mex: pointer to user input data
+ * @p: pointer to memory area for the key
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the key area or -EFAULT
+ */
+static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, void *p)
+{
+ static struct cca_public_sec static_cca_pub_sec = {
+ .section_identifier = 4,
+ .section_length = 0x000f,
+ .exponent_len = 0x0003,
+ };
+ static char pk_exponent[3] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
+ struct {
+ struct T6_keyBlock_hdr t6_hdr;
+ struct cca_token_hdr token;
+ struct cca_pvt_ext_CRT_sec pvt;
+ char key_parts[0];
+ } __packed *key = p;
+ struct cca_public_sec *pub;
+ int short_len, long_len, pad_len, key_len, size;
+
+ /*
+ * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching
+ * function zcrypt_rsa_crt(). However, do a plausibility check
+ * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized
+ * to compromise the system.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crt->inputdatalength > 512))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
+
+ short_len = (crt->inputdatalength + 1) / 2;
+ long_len = short_len + 8;
+ pad_len = -(3*long_len + 2*short_len) & 7;
+ key_len = 3*long_len + 2*short_len + pad_len + crt->inputdatalength;
+ size = sizeof(*key) + key_len + sizeof(*pub) + 3;
+
+ /* parameter block.key block */
+ key->t6_hdr.blen = size;
+ key->t6_hdr.ulen = size - 2;
+
+ /* key token header */
+ key->token.token_identifier = CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT;
+ key->token.token_length = size - 6;
+
+ /* private section */
+ key->pvt.section_identifier = CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT;
+ key->pvt.section_length = sizeof(key->pvt) + key_len;
+ key->pvt.key_format = CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL;
+ key->pvt.key_use_flags[0] = CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL;
+ key->pvt.p_len = key->pvt.dp_len = key->pvt.u_len = long_len;
+ key->pvt.q_len = key->pvt.dq_len = short_len;
+ key->pvt.mod_len = crt->inputdatalength;
+ key->pvt.pad_len = pad_len;
+
+ /* key parts */
+ if (copy_from_user(key->key_parts, crt->np_prime, long_len) ||
+ copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len,
+ crt->nq_prime, short_len) ||
+ copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len + short_len,
+ crt->bp_key, long_len) ||
+ copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2*long_len + short_len,
+ crt->bq_key, short_len) ||
+ copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2*long_len + 2*short_len,
+ crt->u_mult_inv, long_len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ memset(key->key_parts + 3*long_len + 2*short_len + pad_len,
+ 0xff, crt->inputdatalength);
+ pub = (struct cca_public_sec *)(key->key_parts + key_len);
+ *pub = static_cca_pub_sec;
+ pub->modulus_bit_len = 8 * crt->inputdatalength;
+ /*
+ * In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public
+ * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be
+ * used.
+ */
+ memcpy((char *) (pub + 1), pk_exponent, 3);
+ return size;
+}
+
+#endif /* _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-26 23:42:07 +0000