Adding debian version 1:7.9p1-10+deb10u4.debian/1%7.9p1-10+deb10u4debian

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 31 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 0e30cc0..d219da9 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,34 @@
+openssh (1:7.9p1-10+deb10u4) buster-security; urgency=medium
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload by the LTS Team.
+  * Rename debian/.gitlab-ci.yml to debian/salsa-ci.yml and use
+    lts-team/pipeline recipe for buster in it.
+  * [CVE-2023-48795] ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to
+    thwart the so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer,
+    Marcus Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect
+    a limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport
+    protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of
+    encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages
+    immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server would
+    not be able to detect that messages were deleted.
+  * [CVE-2023-51385] ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained
+    shell metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand,
+    LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the user
+    or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then an attacker
+    who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1) could potentially
+    perform command injection depending on what quoting was present in the
+    user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive. ssh(1) now bans most shell
+    metacharacters from user and hostnames supplied via the command-line.
+  * [CVE-2021-41617]: sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.2 through 8.7 failed to
+    correctly initialise supplemental groups when executing an
+    AuthorizedKeysCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, where a
+    AuthorizedKeysCommandUser or AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser directive
+    has been set to run the command as a different user. Instead these
+    commands would inherit the groups that sshd(8) was started with
+    (closes: #995130).
+
+ -- Santiago Ruano Rincón <santiago@freexian.com>  Sun, 24 Dec 2023 15:39:13 -0500
+
 openssh (1:7.9p1-10+deb10u3) buster-security; urgency=high
 
   * Non-maintainer upload.