From 999ae6be3243c7b4a815247199447b53c39a3d65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Mon, 6 May 2024 03:26:58 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 1:7.9p1. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- .depend | 175 + .gitignore | 28 + .skipped-commit-ids | 33 + CREDITS | 102 + ChangeLog | 9706 ++++++++ INSTALL | 264 + LICENCE | 319 + Makefile.in | 658 + OVERVIEW | 161 + PROTOCOL | 499 + PROTOCOL.agent | 5 + PROTOCOL.certkeys | 306 + PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 | 107 + PROTOCOL.key | 68 + PROTOCOL.krl | 171 + PROTOCOL.mux | 298 + README | 62 + README.dns | 47 + README.platform | 96 + README.privsep | 54 + README.tun | 132 + TODO | 80 + aclocal.m4 | 186 + addrmatch.c | 498 + atomicio.c | 170 + atomicio.h | 51 + audit-bsm.c | 454 + audit-linux.c | 126 + audit.c | 184 + audit.h | 55 + auth-bsdauth.c | 145 + auth-krb5.c | 272 + auth-options.c | 935 + auth-options.h | 95 + auth-pam.c | 1349 ++ auth-pam.h | 47 + auth-passwd.c | 223 + auth-rhosts.c | 324 + auth-shadow.c | 141 + auth-sia.c | 115 + auth-sia.h | 31 + auth-skey.c | 107 + auth.c | 1202 + auth.h | 244 + auth2-chall.c | 383 + auth2-gss.c | 335 + auth2-hostbased.c | 261 + auth2-kbdint.c | 69 + auth2-none.c | 78 + auth2-passwd.c | 76 + auth2-pubkey.c | 1045 + auth2.c | 794 + authfd.c | 580 + authfd.h | 90 + authfile.c | 538 + authfile.h | 52 + bitmap.c | 214 + bitmap.h | 57 + buildpkg.sh.in | 677 + canohost.c | 204 + canohost.h | 26 + chacha.c | 219 + chacha.h | 36 + channels.c | 4876 ++++ channels.h | 344 + cipher-aes.c | 161 + cipher-aesctr.c | 83 + cipher-aesctr.h | 35 + cipher-chachapoly.c | 119 + cipher-chachapoly.h | 41 + cipher-ctr.c | 146 + cipher.c | 527 + cipher.h | 75 + cleanup.c | 32 + clientloop.c | 2358 ++ clientloop.h | 83 + compat.c | 235 + compat.h | 73 + config.guess | 1456 ++ config.h.in | 1951 ++ config.sub | 1823 ++ configure | 22926 +++++++++++++++++++ configure.ac | 5363 +++++ contrib/Makefile | 22 + contrib/README | 70 + contrib/aix/README | 49 + contrib/aix/buildbff.sh | 366 + contrib/aix/inventory.sh | 62 + contrib/aix/pam.conf | 20 + contrib/cygwin/Makefile | 78 + contrib/cygwin/README | 91 + contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config | 693 + 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dispatch.c | 135 + dispatch.h | 56 + dns.c | 356 + dns.h | 58 + ed25519.c | 144 + entropy.c | 250 + entropy.h | 34 + fatal.c | 45 + fe25519.c | 337 + fe25519.h | 70 + fixalgorithms | 26 + fixpaths | 22 + ge25519.c | 321 + ge25519.h | 43 + ge25519_base.data | 858 + groupaccess.c | 133 + groupaccess.h | 35 + gss-genr.c | 305 + gss-serv-krb5.c | 211 + gss-serv.c | 404 + hash.c | 27 + hmac.c | 197 + hmac.h | 38 + hostfile.c | 834 + hostfile.h | 108 + includes.h | 179 + install-sh | 527 + kex.c | 1043 + kex.h | 239 + kexc25519.c | 133 + kexc25519c.c | 169 + kexc25519s.c | 158 + kexdh.c | 96 + kexdhc.c | 224 + kexdhs.c | 222 + kexecdh.c | 100 + kexecdhc.c | 222 + kexecdhs.c | 203 + kexgex.c | 104 + kexgexc.c | 270 + kexgexs.c | 256 + krl.c | 1366 ++ krl.h | 66 + log.c | 480 + log.h | 81 + loginrec.c | 1724 ++ loginrec.h | 131 + logintest.c | 308 + mac.c | 265 + mac.h | 53 + match.c | 350 + match.h | 29 + md5crypt.c | 165 + md5crypt.h | 22 + mdoc2man.awk | 370 + misc.c | 2039 ++ misc.h | 175 + mkinstalldirs | 38 + moduli | 428 + moduli.0 | 74 + moduli.5 | 127 + moduli.c | 808 + monitor.c | 1875 ++ monitor.h | 92 + monitor_fdpass.c | 187 + monitor_fdpass.h | 34 + monitor_wrap.c | 1006 + monitor_wrap.h | 100 + msg.c | 94 + msg.h | 32 + mux.c | 2391 ++ myproposal.h | 209 + nchan.c | 446 + nchan.ms | 99 + nchan2.ms | 88 + opacket.c | 320 + opacket.h | 154 + openbsd-compat/Makefile.in | 115 + openbsd-compat/arc4random.c | 338 + openbsd-compat/base64.c | 315 + openbsd-compat/base64.h | 63 + openbsd-compat/basename.c | 67 + openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c | 179 + openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c | 119 + openbsd-compat/blf.h | 88 + openbsd-compat/blowfish.c | 696 + openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c | 98 + openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c | 109 + openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c | 120 + openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h | 65 + openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c | 77 + openbsd-compat/bsd-flock.c | 81 + openbsd-compat/bsd-getline.c | 113 + openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c | 25 + 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/dev/null +++ b/.depend @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +# DO NOT DELETE + +addrmatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h match.h log.h +atomicio.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h +audit-bsm.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +audit-linux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +audit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +auth-bsdauth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +auth-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h misc.h servconf.h uidswap.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h +auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h sshkey.h match.h ssh2.h auth-options.h +auth-pam.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +auth-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h +auth-rhosts.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h uidswap.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h servconf.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h +auth-shadow.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +auth-sia.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +auth-skey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +auth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h groupaccess.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h canohost.h uidswap.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h +auth.o: authfile.h monitor_wrap.h ssherr.h compat.h channels.h +auth2-chall.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h +auth2-gss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h +auth2-hostbased.o: pathnames.h ssherr.h match.h +auth2-kbdint.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h log.h misc.h servconf.h ssherr.h +auth2-none.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h ssh2.h ssherr.h monitor_wrap.h +auth2-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h ssherr.h log.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h monitor_wrap.h misc.h servconf.h +auth2-pubkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h uidswap.h +auth2-pubkey.o: auth-options.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h authfile.h match.h ssherr.h channels.h session.h +auth2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h ssherr.h +auth2.o: monitor_wrap.h digest.h +authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h compat.h log.h atomicio.h misc.h ssherr.h +authfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh.h log.h authfile.h misc.h atomicio.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h krl.h +bitmap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h bitmap.h +canohost.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h canohost.h misc.h +chacha.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h chacha.h +channels.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h 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openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crc32.h +dh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +digest-libc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h +digest-openssl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h 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openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h groupaccess.h match.h log.h +gss-genr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +gss-serv-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +gss-serv.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h 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openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h misc.h +md5crypt.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h log.h ssh.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h +moduli.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +monitor.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h +monitor.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h dh.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h auth-options.h sshpty.h channels.h session.h sshlogin.h canohost.h log.h misc.h servconf.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h monitor_fdpass.h compat.h ssh2.h authfd.h match.h ssherr.h +monitor_fdpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h monitor_fdpass.h +monitor_wrap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h +monitor_wrap.o: auth-options.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h atomicio.h monitor_fdpass.h misc.h channels.h session.h servconf.h ssherr.h +msg.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h atomicio.h msg.h misc.h +mux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h log.h ssh.h ssh2.h pathnames.h misc.h match.h sshbuf.h channels.h msg.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h monitor_fdpass.h sshpty.h sshkey.h readconf.h clientloop.h ssherr.h +nchan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h channels.h compat.h log.h +opacket.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h 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defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h poly1305.h +progressmeter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h 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openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h +ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h misc.h digest.h ssherr.h match.h +ssh-dss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +ssh-ecdsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +ssh-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssherr.h ssh.h +ssh-keygen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h authfile.h uuencode.h sshbuf.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h match.h hostfile.h dns.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h ssh-pkcs11.h atomicio.h krl.h digest.h utf8.h authfd.h +ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h +ssh-keyscan.o: atomicio.h misc.h hostfile.h ssherr.h ssh_api.h ssh2.h dns.h +ssh-keysign.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh2.h misc.h sshbuf.h authfile.h msg.h canohost.h pathnames.h readconf.h uidswap.h ssherr.h +ssh-pkcs11-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +ssh-pkcs11-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sshkey.h authfd.h ssh-pkcs11.h ssherr.h +ssh-pkcs11.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +ssh-rsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +ssh-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +ssh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h canohost.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h +ssh.o: sshbuf.h channels.h sshkey.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h clientloop.h log.h misc.h readconf.h sshconnect.h kex.h mac.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h version.h ssherr.h myproposal.h utf8.h +ssh_api.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh_api.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h compat.h log.h authfile.h misc.h +ssh_api.o: version.h myproposal.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h +sshbuf-getput-basic.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h +sshbuf-getput-crypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h +sshbuf-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h +sshbuf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h +sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h compat.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h +sshconnect.o: ssherr.h authfd.h +sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h myproposal.h +sshconnect2.o: sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h ssherr.h utf8.h +sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h +sshd.o: poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h ssherr.h +ssherr.o: ssherr.h +sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h sshkey-xmss.h match.h xmss_fast.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h +sshlogin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshlogin.h ssherr.h loginrec.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h +sshpty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h log.h misc.h +sshtty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h +ttymodes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h opacket.h log.h compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h ttymodes.h +uidswap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h uidswap.h xmalloc.h +umac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h +umac128.o: umac.c includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h +utf8.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h utf8.h +uuencode.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h uuencode.h +verify.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h +xmalloc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h +xmss_commons.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +xmss_fast.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +xmss_hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +xmss_hash_address.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h +xmss_wots.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..650eb3c --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +Makefile +buildpkg.sh +config.h +config.h.in +config.status +configure +openbsd-compat/Makefile +openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile +openssh.xml +opensshd.init +survey.sh +**/*.0 +**/*.o +**/*.out +**/*.a +autom4te.cache/ +scp +sftp +sftp-server +ssh +ssh-add +ssh-agent +ssh-keygen +ssh-keyscan +ssh-keysign +ssh-pkcs11-helper +sshd +!regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile diff --git a/.skipped-commit-ids b/.skipped-commit-ids new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1b3b76 --- /dev/null +++ b/.skipped-commit-ids @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +5317f294d63a876bfc861e19773b1575f96f027d remove libssh from makefiles +a337e886a49f96701ccbc4832bed086a68abfa85 Makefile changes +f2c9feb26963615c4fece921906cf72e248b61ee more Makefile +fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62 more Makefile refactoring +1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e moduli update +814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f remove redundant make defs +04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40 moduli update + +Old upstream tree: + +321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35 Update DH groups +d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca Remove 1k bit groups +aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7 Remove intermediate moduli +8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120 put back SSH1 for 6.9 +f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a Generate new moduli +edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef Regen moduli +052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2 Switch to tame-based sandbox +7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660 Remove moduli <2k +180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae Update moduli +f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee systrace is dead. +96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 remove DEBUGLIBS from Makefile +6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8 Update moduli file +77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b unset REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY +38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384 Change COMPILER_VERSION tests +30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c resync integrity.sh shell +1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 integrity.sh reliability +fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217 Makefile.inc bits +5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913 Delete sshconnect1.c +ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c Makefile.inc warning flags +b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157 moduli-gen.sh tweak +b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95 Updated moduli +1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac rsa.[ch] already removed +e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604 Makefile changes diff --git a/CREDITS b/CREDITS new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43be5e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/CREDITS @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +Tatu Ylonen - Creator of SSH + +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH + +Ahsan Rashid - UnixWare long passwords +Alain St-Denis - Irix fix +Alexandre Oliva - AIX fixes +Andre Lucas - new login code, many fixes +Andreas Steinmetz - Shadow password expiry support +Andrew McGill - SCO fixes +Andrew Morgan - PAM bugfixes +Andrew Stribblehill - Bugfixes +Andy Sloane - bugfixes +Aran Cox - SCO bugfixes +Arkadiusz Miskiewicz - IPv6 compat fixes +Ben Lindstrom - NeXT support +Ben Taylor - Solaris debugging and fixes +Bratislav ILICH - Configure fix +Charles Levert - SunOS 4 & bug fixes +Chip Salzenberg - Assorted patches +Chris Adams - OSF SIA support +Chris Saia - SuSE packaging +Chris, the Young One - Password auth fixes +Christos Zoulas - Autoconf fixes +Chun-Chung Chen - RPM fixes +Corinna Vinschen - Cygwin support +Chad Mynhier - Solaris Process Contract support +Dan Brosemer - Autoconf support, build fixes +Darren Hall - AIX patches +Darren Tucker - AIX BFF package scripts +David Agraz - Build fixes +David Del Piero - bug fixes +David Hesprich - Configure fixes +David Rankin - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes +Dag-Erling Smørgrav - Challenge-Response PAM code. +Dhiraj Gulati - UnixWare long passwords +Ed Eden - configure fixes +Garrick James - configure fixes +Gary E. Miller - SCO support +Ged Lodder - HPUX fixes and enhancements +Gert Doering - bug and portability fixes +HARUYAMA Seigo - Translations & doc fixes +Hideaki YOSHIFUJI - IPv6 and bug fixes +Hiroshi Takekawa - Configure fixes +Holger Trapp - KRB4/AFS config patch +IWAMURO Motonori - bugfixes +Jani Hakala - Patches +Jarno Huuskonen - Bugfixes +Jim Knoble - Many patches +Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH +Juergen Keil - scp bugfixing +KAMAHARA Junzo - Configure fixes +Kees Cook - scp fixes +Kenji Miyake - Configure fixes +Kevin Cawlfield - AIX fixes. +Kevin O'Connor - RSAless operation +Kevin Steves - HP support, bugfixes, improvements +Kiyokazu SUTO - Bugfixes +Larry Jones - Bugfixes +Lutz Jaenicke - Bugfixes +Marc G. Fournier - Solaris patches +Mark D. Baushke - bug fixes +Martin Johansson - Linux fixes +Mark D. Roth - Features, bug fixes +Mark Miller - Bugfixes +Matt Richards - AIX patches +Michael Steffens - HP-UX fixes +Michael Stone - Irix enhancements +Nakaji Hiroyuki - Sony News-OS patch +Nalin Dahyabhai - PAM environment patch +Nate Itkin - SunOS 4.1.x fixes +Niels Kristian Bech Jensen - Assorted patches +Pavel Kankovsky - Security fixes +Pavel Troller - Bugfixes +Pekka Savola - Bugfixes +Peter Kocks - Makefile fixes +Peter Stuge - mdoc2man.awk script +Phil Hands - Debian scripts, assorted patches +Phil Karn - Autoconf fixes +Philippe WILLEM - Bugfixes +Phill Camp - login code fix +Rip Loomis - Solaris package support, fixes +Robert Dahlem - Reliant Unix fixes +Roumen Petrov - Compile & configure fixes +SAKAI Kiyotaka - Multiple bugfixes +Simon Wilkinson - PAM fixes, Compat with MIT KrbV +Solar Designer - many patches and technical assistance +Svante Signell - Bugfixes +Thomas Neumann - Shadow passwords +Tim Rice - Portability & SCO fixes +Tobias Oetiker - Bugfixes +Tom Bertelson's - AIX auth fixes +Tor-Ake Fransson - AIX support +Tudor Bosman - MD5 password support +Udo Schweigert - ReliantUNIX support +Wendy Palm - Cray support. +Zack Weinberg - GNOME askpass enhancement + +Apologies to anyone I have missed. + +Damien Miller diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0307f62 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -0,0 +1,9706 @@ +commit aede1c34243a6f7feae2fb2cb686ade5f9be6f3d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 17 11:01:20 2018 +1100 + + Require OpenSSL 1.1.x series 1.1.0g or greater + + Previous versions have a bug with EVP_CipherInit() when passed a + NULL EVP_CIPHER, per https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613 + + ok dtucker@ + +commit 08300c211409c212e010fe2e2f2883e573a04ce2 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 17 08:12:02 2018 +1100 + + unbreak compilation with --with-ssl-engine + + Missing last argument to OPENSSL_init_crypto() + +commit 1673274aee67ce0eb6f00578b6f3d2bcbd58f937 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Oct 16 14:45:57 2018 +1100 + + Remove gcc spectre mitigation flags. + + Current impementions of the gcc spectre mitigation flags cause + miscompilations when combined with other flags and do not provide much + protection. Found by fweimer at redhat.com, ok djm@ + +commit 4e23deefd7959ef83c73ed9cce574423438f6133 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Oct 16 10:51:52 2018 +1100 + + Avoid deprecated OPENSSL_config when using 1.1.x + + OpenSSL 1.1.x soft-deprecated OPENSSL_config in favour of + OPENSSL_init_crypto; pointed out by Jakub Jelen + +commit 797cdd9c8468ed1125ce60d590ae3f1397866af4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 12 16:58:47 2018 +1100 + + Don't avoid our *sprintf replacements. + + Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements + via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally. From djm@ + +commit e526127cbd2f8ad88fb41229df0c9b850c722830 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 12 16:43:35 2018 +1100 + + Check if snprintf understands %zu. + + If the platforms snprintf and friends don't understand %zu, use the + compat replacement. Prevents segfaults on those platforms. + +commit cf39f875191708c5f2f1a3c1c9019f106e74aea3 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 12 09:48:05 2018 +1100 + + remove stale link, tweak + +commit a7205e68decf7de2005810853b4ce6b222b65e2a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 12 09:47:20 2018 +1100 + + update version numbers ahead of release + +commit 1a4a9cf80f5b92b9d1dadd0bfa8867c04d195391 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 11 03:48:04 2018 +0000 + + upstream: don't send new-style rsa-sha2-*-cert-v01@openssh.com names to + + older OpenSSH that can't handle them. spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 662bbc402e3d7c9b6c322806269698106a6ae631 + +commit dc8ddcdf1a95e011c263486c25869bb5bf4e30ec +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 11 13:08:59 2018 +1100 + + update depends + +commit 26841ac265603fd2253e6832e03602823dbb4022 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 11 13:02:11 2018 +1100 + + some more duplicated key algorithm lines + + From Adam Eijdenberg + +commit 5d9d17603bfbb620195a4581025052832b4c4adc +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 11 11:56:36 2018 +1100 + + fix duplicated algorithm specification lines + + Spotted by Adam Eijdenberg + +commit ebfafd9c7a5b2a7fb515ee95dbe0e44e11d0a663 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 11 00:52:46 2018 +0000 + + upstream: typo in plain RSA algorithm counterpart names for + + certificates; spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfcdeb6f4fc9e7607f5096574c8f118f2e709e00 + +commit c29b111e7d87c2324ff71c80653dd8da168c13b9 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 11 11:29:35 2018 +1100 + + check pw_passwd != NULL here too + + Again, for systems with broken NIS implementations. + + Prompted by coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com + +commit fe8e8f349a553ef4c567acd418aac769a82b7729 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 11 11:03:15 2018 +1100 + + check for NULL return from shadow_pw() + + probably unreachable on this platform; pointed out by + coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com + +commit acc59cbe7a1fb169e1c3caba65a39bd74d6e030d +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 10 16:43:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream: introducing openssh 7.9 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42d526a9fe01a40dd299ac58014d3349adf40e25 + +commit 12731158c75c8760a8bea06350eeb3e763fe1a07 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Oct 11 10:29:29 2018 +1100 + + supply callback to PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey + + OpenSSL 1.1.0i has changed the behaviour of their PEM APIs, + so that empty passphrases are interpreted differently. This + probabalistically breaks loading some keys, because the PEM format + is terrible and doesn't include a proper MAC. + + Avoid this by providing a basic callback to avoid passing empty + passphrases to OpenSSL in cases where one is required. + + Based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2913; ok dtucker@ + +commit d1d301a1dd5d6cc3a9ed93ab7ab09dda4cb456e0 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 10 14:57:00 2018 +1100 + + in pick_salt() avoid dereference of NULL passwords + + Apparently some NIS implementations can leave pw->pw_passwd (or the + shadow equivalent) NULL. + + bz#2909; based on patch from Todd Eigenschink + +commit edbb6febccee084d212fdc0cb05b40cb1c646ab1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 9 05:42:23 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Treat all PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() errors when a passphrase + + is specified as "incorrect passphrase" instead of trying to choose between + that and "invalid format". + + libcrypto can return ASN1 parsing errors rather than the expected + decrypt error in certain infrequent cases when trying to decrypt/parse + PEM private keys when supplied with an invalid passphrase. + + Report and repro recipe from Thomas Deutschmann in bz#2901 + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b1d4cd92395f9743f81c0d23aab2524109580870 + +commit 2581333d564d8697837729b3d07d45738eaf5a54 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 5 14:26:09 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Support using service names for port numbers. + + * Try to resolve a port specification with getservbyname(3) if a + numeric conversion fails. + * Make the "Port" option in ssh_config handle its argument as a + port rather than a plain integer. + + ok dtucker@ deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7f03633133205ab3dfbc67f9df7475fabae660d + +commit e0d6501e86734c48c8c503f81e1c0926e98c5c4c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 4 07:47:35 2018 +0000 + + upstream: when the peer sends a channel-close message, make sure we + + close the local extended read fd (stderr) along with the regular read fd + (stdout). Avoids weird stuck processed in multiplexing mode. + + Report and analysis by Nelson Elhage and Geoffrey Thomas in bz#2863 + + ok dtucker@ markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a48a2467fe938de4de69d2e7193d5fa701f12ae9 + +commit 6f1aabb128246f445e33b8844fad3de9cb1d18cb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 4 01:04:52 2018 +0000 + + upstream: factor out channel status formatting from + + channel_open_message() so we can use it in other debug messages + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c3903ca28fcabad57f566c9d0045b41ab7d52ba + +commit f1dd179e122bdfdb7ca3072d9603607740efda05 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 4 00:10:11 2018 +0000 + + upstream: include a little more information about the status and + + disposition of channel's extended (stderr) fd; makes debugging some things a + bit easier. No behaviour change. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 483eb6467dc7d5dbca8eb109c453e7a43075f7ce + +commit 2d1428b11c8b6f616f070f2ecedce12328526944 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 4 00:04:41 2018 +0000 + + upstream: explicit_bzero here to be consistent with other kex*.c; + + report from coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90f146c5b5f5b1408700395e394f70b440856cb + +commit 5eff5b858e717e901e6af6596306a114de9f79f2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 3 06:38:35 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Allow ssh_config IdentityAgent directive to accept + + environment variable names as well as explicit paths. ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f0996e103876c53d8c9dd51dcce9889d700767b + +commit a46ac4d86b25414d78b632e8173578b37e5f8a83 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 2 12:51:58 2018 +0000 + + upstream: mention INFO@openssh.com for sending SIGINFO + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132471eeb0df658210afd27852fe65131b26e900 + +commit ff3a411cae0b484274b7900ef52ff4dad3e12876 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Oct 2 22:49:40 2018 +1000 + + only support SIGINFO on systems with SIGINFO + +commit cd98925c6405e972dc9f211afc7e75e838abe81c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 2 12:40:07 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add server support for signalling sessions via the SSH + + channel/ session protocol. Signalling is only supported to sesssions that are + not subsystems and were not started with a forced command. + + Long requested in bz#1424 + + Based on a patch from markus@ and reworked by dtucker@; + ok markus@ dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bea826f575862eaac569c4bedd1056a268be1c3 + +commit dba50258333f2604a87848762af07ba2cc40407a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 26 07:32:44 2018 +0000 + + upstream: remove big ugly TODO comment from start of file. Some of + + the mentioned tasks are obsolete and, of the remainder, most are already + captured in PROTOCOL.mux where they better belong + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16d9d76dee42a5bb651c9d6740f7f0ef68aeb407 + +commit 92b61a38ee9b765f5049f03cd1143e13f3878905 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 26 07:30:05 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Document mux proxy mode; added by Markus in openssh-7.4 + + Also add a little bit of information about the overall packet format + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdb6f6ea8580ef96792e270cae7857786ad84a95 + +commit 9d883a1ce4f89b175fd77405ff32674620703fb2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 26 01:48:57 2018 +0000 + + upstream: s/process_mux_master/mux_master_process/ in mux master + + function names, + + Gives better symmetry with the existing mux_client_*() names and makes + it more obvious when a message comes from the master vs client (they + are interleved in ControlMaster=auto mode). + + no functional change beyond prefixing a could of log messages with + __func__ where they were previously lacking. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b01f7c3fdf92692e1713a822a89dc499333daf75 + +commit c2fa53cd6462da82d3a851dc3a4a3f6b920337c8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Sep 22 14:41:24 2018 +1000 + + Remove unused variable in _ssh_compat_fflush. + +commit d1b3540c21212624af907488960d703c7d987b42 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Sep 20 18:08:43 2018 +1000 + + Import updated moduli. + +commit b5e412a8993ad17b9e1141c78408df15d3d987e1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 21 12:46:22 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Allow ssh_config ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the + + timeout and allow X11 connections in untrusted mode indefinitely. ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ceed3f540b48e5803f933e59a03b20db10c69 + +commit cb24d9fcc901429d77211f274031653476864ec6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 21 12:23:17 2018 +0000 + + upstream: when compiled with GSSAPI support, cache supported method + + OIDs by calling ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids() regardless of whether + GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the main config. + + This avoids sandbox violations for configurations that enable GSSAPI + auth later, e.g. + + Match user djm + GSSAPIAuthentication yes + + bz#2107; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5dd42d87c74e27cfb712b15b0f97ab20e0afd1d + +commit bbc8af72ba68da014d4de6e21a85eb5123384226 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 21 12:20:12 2018 +0000 + + upstream: In sshkey_in_file(), ignore keys that are considered for + + being too short (i.e. SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH). These keys will not be considered + to be "in the file". This allows key revocation lists to contain short keys + without the entire revocation list being considered invalid. + + bz#2897; ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9f3d857d07194a42ad7e62889a74dc3f9d9924b + +commit 383a33d160cefbfd1b40fef81f72eadbf9303a66 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 21 03:11:36 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Treat connections with ProxyJump specified the same as ones + + with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname canonicalisation (i.e. don't + try to canonicalise the hostname unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to + 'always'). + + Patch from Sven Wegener via bz#2896 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 527ff501cf98bf65fb4b29ed0cb847dda10f4d37 + +commit 0cbed248ed81584129b67c348dbb801660f25a6a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 20 23:40:16 2018 +0000 + + upstream: actually make CASignatureAlgorithms available as a config + + option + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93fa7ff58314ed7b1ab7744090a6a91232e6ae52 + +commit 62528870c0ec48cd86a37dd7320fb85886c3e6ee +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 20 08:07:03 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Import updated moduli. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40 + +commit e6933a2ffa0659d57f3c7b7c457b2c62b2a84613 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 20 06:58:48 2018 +0000 + + upstream: reorder CASignatureAlgorithms, and add them to the + + various -o lists; ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ecb88baecc3c54988b4d1654446ea033da359288 + +commit aa083aa9624ea7b764d5a81c4c676719a1a3e42b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 20 03:31:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix "ssh -Q sig" to show correct signature algorithm list + + (it was erroneously showing certificate algorithms); prompted by markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdee002f2f0c21456979deeb887fc889afb154d + +commit ecac7e1f7add6b28874959a11f2238d149dc2c07 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 20 03:30:44 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add CASignatureAlgorithms option for the client, allowing + + it to specify which signature algorithms may be used by CAs when signing + certificates. Useful if you want to ban RSA/SHA1; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9159e5e9f67504829bf53ff222057307a6e3230f + +commit 86e5737c39153af134158f24d0cab5827cbd5852 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 20 03:28:06 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add sshd_config CASignatureAlgorithms option to allow + + control over which signature algorithms a CA may use when signing + certificates. In particular, this allows a sshd to ban certificates signed + with RSA/SHA1. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b05c86ef8b52b913ed48d54a9b9c1a7714d96bac + +commit f80e68ea7d62e2dfafc12f1a60ab544ae4033a0f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 19 02:03:02 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Make "ssh-add -q" do what it says on the tin: silence + + output from successful operations. + + Based on patch from Thijs van Dijk; ok dtucker@ deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4f754ecc055c10af166116ce7515104aa8522e1 + +commit 5e532320e9e51de720d5f3cc2596e95d29f6e98f +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 17 15:40:14 2018 +0000 + + upstream: When choosing a prime from the moduli file, avoid + + re-using the linenum variable for something that is not a line number to + avoid the confusion that resulted in the bug in rev. 1.64. This also lets us + pass the actual linenum to parse_prime() so the error messages include the + correct line number. OK markus@ some time ago. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d8e5d3e924d6e8eb70053e3defa23c151a00084 + +commit cce8cbe0ed7d1ba3a575310e0b63c193326ae616 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Sep 15 19:44:06 2018 +1000 + + Fix openssl-1.1 fallout for --without-openssl. + + ok djm@ + +commit 149519b9f201dac755f3cba4789f4d76fecf0ee1 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Sep 15 19:37:48 2018 +1000 + + add futex(2) syscall to seccomp sandbox + + Apparently needed for some glibc/openssl combinations. + + Patch from Arkadiusz MiÅ›kiewicz + +commit 4488ae1a6940af704c4dbf70f55bf2f756a16536 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Sep 15 19:36:55 2018 +1000 + + really add source for authopt_fuzz this time + +commit 9201784b4a257c8345fbd740bcbdd70054885707 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Sep 15 19:35:40 2018 +1000 + + remove accidentally checked-in authopt_fuzz binary + +commit beb9e522dc7717df08179f9e59f36b361bfa14ab +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 14 05:26:27 2018 +0000 + + upstream: second try, deals properly with missing and private-only + + Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and + received during public key authentication. + + This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message + now contains (where available) the key filename, its type and fingerprint, + and whether the key is hosted in an agent or a token. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1c6a8e9cfc4e108c359db77f24f9a40e1e25ea7 + +commit 6bc5a24ac867bfdc3ed615589d69ac640f51674b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Sep 14 15:16:34 2018 +1000 + + fuzzer harness for authorized_keys option parsing + +commit 6c8b82fc6929b6a9a3f645151b6ec26c5507d9ef +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 14 04:44:04 2018 +0000 + + upstream: revert following; deals badly with agent keys + + revision 1.285 + date: 2018/09/14 04:17:12; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +47 -26; commitid: lflGFcNb2X2HebaK; + Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and + received during public key authentication. + + This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message + now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether + the key is hosted in an agent or a token. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e496bd004e452d4b051f33ed9ae6a54ab918f56d + +commit 6da046f9c3374ce7e269ded15d8ff8bc45017301 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:44 2018 +0000 + + upstream: garbage-collect moribund ssh_new_private() API. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c05bf13b094093dfa01848a9306c82eb6e95f6c + +commit 1f24ac5fc05252ceb1c1d0e8cab6a283b883c780 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:12 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, + + offered and received during public key authentication. + + This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message + now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether + the key is hosted in an agent or a token. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a01d59285a8a7e01185bb0a43316084b4f06a1f + +commit 488c9325bb7233e975dbfbf89fa055edc3d3eddc +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 13 15:23:32 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Fix warnings caused by user_from_uid() and group_from_gid() + + now returning const char *. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5fe571ea77cfa7b9035062829ab05eb87d7cc6f + +commit 0aa1f230846ebce698e52051a107f3127024a05a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Sep 14 10:31:47 2018 +1000 + + allow SIGUSR1 as synonym for SIGINFO + + Lets users on those unfortunate operating systems that lack SIGINFO + still be able to obtain progress information from unit tests :) + +commit d64e78526596f098096113fcf148216798c327ff +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Sep 13 19:05:48 2018 +1000 + + add compat header + +commit a3fd8074e2e2f06602e25618721f9556c731312c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 13 09:03:20 2018 +0000 + + upstream: missed a bit of openssl-1.0.x API in this unittest + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a73a54d7f7381856a3f3a2d25947bee7a9a5dbc9 + +commit 86e0a9f3d249d5580390daf58e015e68b01cef10 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 13 05:06:51 2018 +0000 + + upstream: use only openssl-1.1.x API here too + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ae877064597c349954b1b443769723563cecbc8f + +commit 48f54b9d12c1c79fba333bc86d455d8f4cda8cfc +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Sep 13 12:13:50 2018 +1000 + + adapt -portable to OpenSSL 1.1x API + + Polyfill missing API with replacement functions extracted from LibreSSL + +commit 86112951d63d48839f035b5795be62635a463f99 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Sep 13 12:12:42 2018 +1000 + + forgot to stage these test files in commit d70d061 + +commit 482d23bcacdd3664f21cc82a5135f66fc598275f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 13 02:08:33 2018 +0000 + + upstream: hold our collective noses and use the openssl-1.1.x API in + + OpenSSH; feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cacbcac87ce5da0d3ca7ef1b38a6f7fb349e4417 + +commit d70d061828730a56636ab6f1f24fe4a8ccefcfc1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 01:36:45 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Include certs with multiple RSA signature variants in + + test data Ensure that cert->signature_key is populated correctly + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 56e68f70fe46cb3a193ca207385bdb301fd6603a + +commit f803b2682992cfededd40c91818b653b5d923ef5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 01:23:48 2018 +0000 + + upstream: test revocation by explicit hash and by fingerprint + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 079c18a9ab9663f4af419327c759fc1e2bc78fd8 + +commit 2de78bc7da70e1338b32feeefcc6045cf49efcd4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 01:22:43 2018 +0000 + + upstream: s/sshkey_demote/sshkey_from_private/g + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 782bde7407d94a87aa8d1db7c23750e09d4443c4 + +commit 41c115a5ea1cb79a6a3182773c58a23f760e8076 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Sep 12 16:50:01 2018 +1000 + + delete the correct thing; kexfuzz binary + +commit f0fcd7e65087db8c2496f13ed39d772f8e38b088 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 06:18:59 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix edit mistake; spotted by jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd724e1c52c9d6084f4cd260ec7e1b2b138261c6 + +commit 4cc259bac699f4d2a5c52b92230f9e488c88a223 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 01:34:02 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of + + signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes + ssh-dsa. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4 + +commit ba9e788315b1f6a350f910cb2a9e95b2ce584e89 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 01:32:54 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add sshkey_check_cert_sigtype() that checks a + + cert->signature_type against a supplied whitelist; ok markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caadb8073292ed7a9535e5adc067d11d356d9302 + +commit a70fd4ad7bd9f2ed223ff635a3d41e483057f23b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 01:31:30 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add cert->signature_type field and keep it in sync with + + certificate signature wrt loading and certification operations; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8b8b9f76b66707a0cd926109c4383db8f664df3 + +commit 357128ac48630a9970e3af0e6ff820300a28da47 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 01:30:10 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add "ssh -Q sig" to allow listing supported signature + + algorithms ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a8c6eb6c249dc37823ba5081fce64876d10fe2b + +commit 9405c6214f667be604a820c6823b27d0ea77937d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 01:21:34 2018 +0000 + + upstream: allow key revocation by SHA256 hash and allow ssh-keygen + + to create KRLs using SHA256/base64 key fingerprints; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0590fd34e7f1141f2873ab3acc57442560e6a94 + +commit 50e2687ee0941c0ea216d6ffea370ffd2c1f14b9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 12 01:19:12 2018 +0000 + + upstream: log certificate fingerprint in authentication + + success/failure message (previously we logged only key ID and CA key + fingerprint). + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8ef2d172b7f1ddbcce26d6434b2de6d94f6c05d + +commit de37ca909487d23e5844aca289b3f5e75d3f1e1f +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 7 04:26:56 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add FALLTHROUGH comments where appropriate. Patch from + + jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c48eb457be697a19d6d2950c6d0879f3ccc851d3 + +commit 247766cd3111d5d8c6ea39833a3257ca8fb820f2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 7 01:42:54 2018 +0000 + + upstream: ssh -MM requires confirmation for all operations that + + change the multiplexing state, not just new sessions. + + mention that confirmation is checked via ssh-askpass + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f1b45551ebb9cc5c9a4fe54ad3b23ce90f1f5c2 + +commit db8bb80e3ac1bcb3e1305d846cd98c6b869bf03f +Author: mestre@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 28 12:25:53 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix misplaced parenthesis inside if-clause. it's harmless + + and the only issue is showing an unknown error (since it's not defined) + during fatal(), if it ever an error occurs inside that condition. + + OK deraadt@ markus@ djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: acb0a8e6936bfbe590504752d01d1d251a7101d8 + +commit 086cc614f550b7d4f100c95e472a6b6b823938ab +Author: mestre@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 28 12:17:45 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix build with DEBUG_PK enabled + + OK dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ec1568cf27726e9638a0415481c20c406e7b441c + +commit 2678833013e97f8b18f09779b7f70bcbf5eb2ab2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 7 14:41:53 2018 +1000 + + Handle ngroups>_SC_NGROUPS_MAX. + + Based on github pull request #99 from Darren Maffat at Oracle: Solaris' + getgrouplist considers _SC_NGROUPS_MAX more of a guideline and can return + a larger number of groups. In this case, retry getgrouplist with a + larger array and defer allocating groups_byname. ok djm@ + +commit 039bf2a81797b8f3af6058d34005a4896a363221 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 7 14:06:57 2018 +1000 + + Initial len for the fmt=NULL case. + + Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. (OpenSSH never calls + setproctitle with a null format so len is always initialized). + +commit ea9c06e11d2e8fb2f4d5e02f8a41e23d2bd31ca9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Sep 7 14:01:39 2018 +1000 + + Include stdlib.h. + + Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. + +commit 9617816dbe73ec4d65075f4d897443f63a97c87f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Aug 27 13:08:01 2018 +1000 + + document some more regress control env variables + + Specifically SKIP_UNIT, USE_VALGRING and LTESTS. Sort the list of + environment variables. + + Based on patch from Jakub Jelen + +commit 71508e06fab14bc415a79a08f5535ad7bffa93d9 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Aug 23 15:41:42 2018 +1000 + + shorten temporary SSH_REGRESS_TMP path + + Previous path was exceeding max socket length on at least one platform (OSX) + +commit 26739cf5bdc9030a583b41ae5261dedd862060f0 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Aug 23 13:06:02 2018 +1000 + + rebuild dependencies + +commit ff729025c7463cf5d0a8d1ca1823306e48c6d4cf +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Aug 23 13:03:32 2018 +1000 + + fix path in distclean target + + Patch from Jakub Jelen + +commit 7fef173c28f7462dcd8ee017fdf12b5073f54c02 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Aug 23 03:01:08 2018 +0000 + + upstream: memleak introduced in r1.83; from Colin Watson + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c019104c280cbd549a264a7217b67665e5732dc + +commit b8ae02a2896778b8984c7f51566c7f0f56fa8b56 +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 21 13:56:27 2018 +0000 + + upstream: AIX reports the CODESET as "ISO8859-1" in the POSIX locale. + + Treating that as a safe encoding is OK because even when other systems return + that string for real ISO8859-1, it is still safe in the sense that it is + ASCII-compatible and stateless. + + Issue reported by Val dot Baranov at duke dot edu. Additional + information provided by Michael dot Felt at felt dot demon dot nl. + Tested by Michael Felt on AIX 6.1 and by Val Baranov on AIX 7.1. + Tweak and OK djm@. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f1210e0b229817d10eb490d6038f507b8256a7 + +commit bc44ee088ad269d232e514f037c87ada4c2fd3f0 +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Tue Aug 21 08:57:24 2018 -0700 + + modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c + remove obsolete and un-needed include + +commit 829fc28a9c54e3f812ee7248c7a3e31eeb4f0b3a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Aug 20 15:57:29 2018 +1000 + + Missing unistd.h for regress/mkdtemp.c + +commit c8313e492355a368a91799131520d92743d8d16c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Aug 17 05:45:20 2018 +1000 + + update version numbers in anticipation of release + +commit 477b49a34b89f506f4794b35e3c70b3e2e83cd38 +Author: Corinna Vinschen +Date: Mon Aug 13 17:08:51 2018 +0200 + + configure: work around GCC shortcoming on Cygwin + + Cygwin's latest 7.x GCC allows to specify -mfunction-return=thunk + as well as -mindirect-branch=thunk on the command line, albeit + producing invalid code, leading to an error at link stage. + + The check in configure.ac only checks if the option is present, + but not if it produces valid code. + + This patch fixes it by special-casing Cygwin. Another solution + may be to change these to linker checks. + + Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen + +commit b0917945efa374be7648d67dbbaaff323ab39edc +Author: Corinna Vinschen +Date: Mon Aug 13 17:05:05 2018 +0200 + + cygwin: add missing stdarg.h include + + Further header file standarization in Cygwin uncovered a lazy + indirect include in bsd-cygwin_util.c + + Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen + +commit c3903c38b0fd168ab3d925c2b129d1a599593426 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 13 02:41:05 2018 +0000 + + upstream: revert compat.[ch] section of the following change. It + + causes double-free under some circumstances. + + -- + + date: 2018/07/31 03:07:24; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +33 -18; commitid: f7g4UI8eeOXReTPh; + fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen in bz#2366 + feedback and ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e77547f60fdb5e2ffe23e2e4733c54d8d2d1137 + +commit 1b9dd4aa15208100fbc3650f33ea052255578282 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Aug 12 20:19:13 2018 +0000 + + upstream: better diagnosics on alg list assembly errors; ok + + deraadt@ markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a557e74b839daf13cc105924d2af06a1560faee + +commit e36a5f61b0f5bebf6d49c215d228cd99dfe86e28 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Aug 11 18:08:45 2018 -0700 + + Some AIX fixes; report from Michael Felt + +commit 2f4766ceefe6657c5ad5fe92d13c411872acae0e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 10 01:35:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream: The script that cooks up PuTTY format host keys does not + + understand the new key format so convert back to old format to create the + PuTTY key and remove it once done. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a449a18846c3a144bc645135b551ba6177e38d3 + +commit e1b26ce504662a5d5b991091228984ccfd25f280 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 10 00:44:01 2018 +0000 + + upstream: improve + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 40d839db0977b4e7ac8b647b16d5411d4faf2f60 + +commit 7c712966a3139622f7fb55045368d05de4e6782c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 10 00:42:29 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Describe pubkey format, prompted by bz#2853 + + While I'm here, describe and link to the remaining local PROTOCOL.* + docs that weren't already mentioned (PROTOCOL.key, PROTOCOL.krl and + PROTOCOL.mux) + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a900f9b994ba4d53e7aeb467d44d75829fd1231 + +commit ef100a2c5a8ed83afac0b8f36520815803da227a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 10 00:27:15 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix numbering + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc7a1764dff23fa4c5ff0e3379c9c4d5b63c9596 + +commit ed7bd5d93fe14c7bd90febd29b858ea985d14d45 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Aug 8 01:16:01 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Use new private key format by default. This format is + + suported by OpenSSH >= 6.5 (released January 2014), so it should be supported + by most OpenSSH versions in active use. + + It is possible to convert new-format private keys to the older + format using "ssh-keygen -f /path/key -pm PEM". + + ok deraadt dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3bd4f2509a2103bfa2f710733426af3ad6d8ab8 + +commit 967226a1bdde59ea137e8f0df871854ff7b91366 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 4 00:55:06 2018 +0000 + + upstream: invalidate dh->priv_key after freeing it in error path; + + avoids unlikely double-free later. Reported by Viktor Dukhovni via + https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/96 feedback jsing@ tb@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e317eb17c3e05500ae851f279ef6486f0457c805 + +commit 74287f5df9966a0648b4a68417451dd18f079ab8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 31 03:10:27 2018 +0000 + + upstream: delay bailout for invalid authentic + + =?UTF-8?q?ating=20user=20until=20after=20the=20packet=20containing=20the?= + =?UTF-8?q?=20request=20has=20been=20fully=20parsed.=20Reported=20by=20Dar?= + =?UTF-8?q?iusz=20Tytko=20and=20Micha=C5=82=20Sajdak;=20ok=20deraadt?= + MIME-Version: 1.0 + Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 + Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4891882fbe413f230fe8ac8a37349b03bd0b70d + +commit 1a66079c0669813306cc69e5776a4acd9fb49015 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 31 03:07:24 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen + + in bz#2366 feedback and ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8402bbae67d578bedbadb0ce68ff7c5a136ef563 + +commit 87f08be054b7eeadbb9cdeb3fb4872be79ccf218 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 20 13:18:28 2018 +1000 + + Remove support for S/Key + + Most people will 1) be using modern multi-factor authentication methods + like TOTP/OATH etc and 2) be getting support for multi-factor + authentication via PAM or BSD Auth. + +commit 5d14019ba2ff54acbfd20a6b9b96bb860a8c7c31 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 27 12:03:17 2018 +0000 + + upstream: avoid expensive channel_open_message() calls; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aea3b5512ad681cd8710367d743e8a753d4425d9 + +commit e655ee04a3cb7999dbf9641b25192353e2b69418 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 27 05:34:42 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Now that ssh can't be setuid, remove the + + original_real_uid and original_effective_uid globals and replace with calls + to plain getuid(). ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92561c0cd418d34e6841e20ba09160583e27b68c + +commit 73ddb25bae4c33a0db361ac13f2e3a60d7c6c4a5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 27 05:13:02 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Remove uid checks from low port binds. Now that ssh + + cannot be setuid and sshd always has privsep on, we can remove the uid checks + for low port binds and just let the system do the check. We leave a sanity + check for the !privsep case so long as the code is stil there. with & ok + djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9535cfdbd1cd54486fdbedfaee44ce4367ec7ca0 + +commit c12033e102760d043bc5c98e6c8180e4d331b0df +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 27 03:55:22 2018 +0000 + + upstream: ssh(1) no longer supports being setuid root. Remove reference + + to crc32 which went with protocol 1. Pointed out by deraadt@. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8763c25fd96ed91dd1abdab5667fd2e27e377b6 + +commit 4492e2ec4e1956a277ef507f51d66e5c2aafaaf8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 27 14:15:28 2018 +1000 + + correct snprintf truncation check in closefrom() + + Truncation cannot happen unless the system has set PATH_MAX to some + nonsensically low value. + + bz#2862, patch from Daniel Le + +commit 149cab325a8599a003364ed833f878449c15f259 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 27 13:46:06 2018 +1000 + + Include stdarg.h in mkdtemp for va_list. + +commit 6728f31bdfdc864d192773c32465b1860e23f556 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 25 17:12:35 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Don't redefine Makefile choices which come correct from + + bsd.*.mk ok markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f + +commit 21fd477a855753c1a8e450963669e28e39c3b5d2 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 25 13:56:23 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix indent; Clemens Goessnitzer + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5149a6d92b264d35f879d24608087b254857a83 + +commit 8e433c2083db8664c41499ee146448ea7ebe7dbf +Author: beck@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 25 13:10:56 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Use the caller provided (copied) pwent struct in + + load_public_identity_files instead of calling getpwuid() again and discarding + the argument. This prevents a client crash where tilde_expand_filename calls + getpwuid() again before the pwent pointer is used. Issue noticed and reported + by Pierre-Olivier Martel ok djm@ deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a067d74b5b098763736c94cc1368de8ea3f0b157 + +commit e2127abb105ae72b6fda64fff150e6b24b3f1317 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 23 19:53:55 2018 +0000 + + upstream: oops, failed to notice that SEE ALSO got messed up; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61c1306542cefdc6e59ac331751afe961557427d + +commit ddf1b797c2d26bbbc9d410aa4f484cbe94673587 +Author: kn@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 23 19:02:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Point to glob in section 7 for the actual list of special + + characters instead the C API in section 3. + + OK millert jmc nicm, "the right idea" deraadt + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a74fd215488c382809e4d041613aeba4a4b1ffc6 + +commit 01c98d9661d0ed6156e8602b650f72eed9fc4d12 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jul 22 12:16:59 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Switch authorized_keys example from ssh-dss to ssh-rsa + + since the former is no longer enabled by default. Pointed out by Daniel A. + Maierhofer, ok jmc + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a196cef53d7524e0c9b58cdbc1b5609debaf8c7 + +commit 472269f8fe19343971c2d08f504ab5cbb8234b33 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 20 05:01:10 2018 +0000 + + upstream: slightly-clearer description for AuthenticationMethods - the + + lists have comma-separated elements; bz#2663 from Hans Meier + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931c983d0fde4764d0942fb2c2b5017635993b5a + +commit c59aca8adbdf7f5597084ad360a19bedb3f80970 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 20 14:53:42 2018 +1000 + + Create control sockets in clean temp directories + + Adds a regress/mkdtemp tool and uses it to create empty temp + directories for tests needing control sockets. + + Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2660; ok dtucker + +commit 6ad8648e83e4f4ace37b742a05c2a6b6b872514e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 20 03:46:34 2018 +0000 + + upstream: remove unused zlib.h + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d274a9b467c7958df12668b49144056819f79f1 + +commit 3ba6e6883527fe517b6e4a824876e2fe62af22fc +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jul 19 23:03:16 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Fix typo in comment. From Alexandru Iacob via github. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eff4ec07c6c8c5483533da43a4dda37d72ef7f1d + +commit c77bc73c91bc656e343a1961756e09dd1b170820 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 20 13:48:51 2018 +1000 + + Explicitly include openssl before zlib. + + Some versions of OpenSSL have "free_func" in their headers, which zlib + typedefs. Including openssl after zlib (eg via sshkey.h) results in + "syntax error before `free_func'", which this fixes. + +commit 95d41e90eafcd1286a901e8e361e4a37b98aeb52 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jul 19 10:28:47 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Deprecate UsePrivilegedPort now that support for running + + ssh(1) setuid has been removed, remove supporting code and clean up + references to it in the man pages + + We have not shipped ssh(1) the setuid bit since 2002. If ayone + really needs to make connections from a low port number this can + be implemented via a small setuid ProxyCommand. + + ok markus@ jmc@ djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d03364610b7123ae4c6792f5274bd147b6de717e + +commit 258dc8bb07dfb35a46e52b0822a2c5b7027df60a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 18 11:34:04 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Remove support for running ssh(1) setuid and fatal if + + attempted. Do not link uidwap.c into ssh any more. Neuters + UsePrivilegedPort, which will be marked as deprecated shortly. ok markus@ + djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4ba5bf9c096f57a6ed15b713a1d7e9e2e373c42 + +commit ac590760b251506b0a152551abbf8e8d6dc2f527 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 16 22:25:01 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Slot 0 in the hostbased key array was previously RSA1, + + but that is now gone and the slot is unused so remove it. Remove two + now-unused macros, and add an array bounds check to the two remaining ones + (array is statically sized, so mostly a safety check on future changes). ok + markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e4c0ca6cc1d8daeccead2aa56192a3f9d5e1e7a + +commit 26efc2f5df0e3bcf6a6bbdd0506fd682d60c2145 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 16 11:05:41 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Remove support for loading HostBasedAuthentication keys + + directly in ssh(1) and always use ssh-keysign. This removes one of the few + remaining reasons why ssh(1) might be setuid. ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97f01e1448707129a20d75f86bad5d27c3cf0b7d + +commit 3eb7f1038d17af7aea3c2c62d1e30cd545607640 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 16 07:06:50 2018 +0000 + + upstream: keep options.identity_file_userprovided array in sync when we + + load keys, fixing some spurious error messages; ok markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c63e3d5200ee2cf9e35bda98de847302566c6a00 + +commit 2f131e1b34502aa19f345e89cabf6fa3fc097f09 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:59 2018 +0000 + + upstream: memleak in unittest; found by valgrind + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 168c23b0fb09fc3d0b438628990d3fd9260a8a5e + +commit de2997a4cf22ca0a524f0e5b451693c583e2fd89 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:13 2018 +0000 + + upstream: memleaks; found by valgrind + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ba22be53e753c899545f771e8399fc93cd844 + +commit 61cc0003eb37fa07603c969c12b7c795caa498f3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Jul 14 16:49:01 2018 +1000 + + Undef a few new macros in sys-queue.h. + + Prevents macro redefinition warnings on OSX. + +commit 30a2c213877a54a44dfdffb6ca8db70be5b457e0 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 13 13:40:20 2018 +1000 + + Include unistd.h for geteuid declaration. + +commit 1dd32c23f2a85714dfafe2a9cc516971d187caa4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 13 13:38:10 2018 +1000 + + Fallout from buffer conversion in AUDIT_EVENTS. + + Supply missing "int r" and fix error path for sshbuf_new(). + +commit 7449c178e943e5c4f6c8416a4e41d93b70c11c9e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:50 2018 +0000 + + upstream: make this use ssh_proxy rather than starting/stopping a + + daemon for each testcase + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 608b7655ea65b1ba8fff5a13ce9caa60ef0c8166 + +commit dbab02f9208d9baa134cec1d007054ec82b96ca9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:19 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix leaks in unit test; with this, all unit tests are + + leak free (as far as valgrind can spot anyway) + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b824d8b27998365379963440e5d18b95ca03aa17 + +commit 2f6accff5085eb79b0dbe262d8b85ed017d1a51c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 13 11:39:25 2018 +1000 + + Enable leak checks for unit tests with valgrind + + Leave the leak checking on unconditionally when running with valgrind. + The unit tests are leak-free and I want them to stay that way. + +commit e46cfbd9db5e907b821bf4fd0184d4dab99815ee +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 13 11:38:59 2018 +1000 + + increase timeout to match cfgmatch.sh + + lets test pass under valgrind (on my workstation at least) + +commit 6aa1bf475cf3e7a2149acc5a1e80e904749f064c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jul 12 14:54:18 2018 +1000 + + rm regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o in distclean target + +commit eef1447ddb559c03725a23d4aa6d03f40e8b0049 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:26 2018 +1000 + + repair !WITH_OPENSSL build + +commit 4d3b2f36fd831941d1627ac587faae37b6d3570f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:14 2018 +1000 + + missing headers + +commit 3f420a692b293921216549c1099c2e46ff284eae +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jul 12 14:57:46 2018 +1000 + + Remove key.h from portable files too. + + Commit 5467fbcb removed key.h so stop including it in portable files + too. Fixes builds on lots of platforms. + +commit e2c4af311543093f16005c10044f7e06af0426f0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jul 12 04:35:25 2018 +0000 + + upstream: remove prototype to long-gone function + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0414642ac7ce01d176b9f359091a66a8bbb640bd + +commit 394a842e60674bf8ee5130b9f15b01452a0b0285 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 11 18:55:11 2018 +0000 + + upstream: treat ssh_packet_write_wait() errors as fatal; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f88ba43c9d54ed2d911218aa8d3f6285430629c3 + +commit 5467fbcb09528ecdcb914f4f2452216c24796790 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 11 18:53:29 2018 +0000 + + upstream: remove legacy key emulation layer; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b1f9619259e222bbd4fe9a8d3a0973eafb9dd8d + +commit 5dc4c59d5441a19c99e7945779f7ec9051126c25 +Author: martijn@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 11 08:19:35 2018 +0000 + + upstream: s/wuth/with/ in comment + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9de41468afd75f54a7f47809d2ad664aa577902c + +commit 1c688801e9dd7f9889fb2a29bc2b6fbfbc35a11f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 11 12:12:38 2018 +1000 + + Include stdlib.h for declaration of free. + + Fixes build with -Werror on at least Fedora and probably others. + +commit fccfa239def497615f92ed28acc57cfe63da3666 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jul 11 10:19:56 2018 +1000 + + VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS logic was backwards :( + +commit 416287d45fcde0a8e66eee8b99aa73bd58607588 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 11 10:10:26 2018 +1000 + + Fix sshbuf_new error path in skey. + +commit 7aab109b8b90a353c1af780524f1ac0d3af47bab +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 11 10:06:18 2018 +1000 + + Supply missing third arg in skey. + + During the change to the new buffer api the third arg to + sshbuf_get_cstring was ommitted. Fixes build when configured with skey. + +commit 380320bb72cc353a901790ab04b6287fd335dc4a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 11 10:03:34 2018 +1000 + + Supply some more missing "int r" in skey + +commit d20720d373d8563ee737d1a45dc5e0804d622dbc +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jul 11 09:56:36 2018 +1000 + + disable valgrind memleak checking by default + + Add VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS knob to turn it back on. + +commit 79c9d35018f3a5e30ae437880b669aa8636cd3cd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jul 11 09:54:00 2018 +1000 + + Supply missing "int r" in skey code. + +commit 984bacfaacbbe31c35191b828fb5b5b2f0362c36 +Author: sf@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 10 09:36:58 2018 +0000 + + upstream: re-remove some pre-auth compression bits + + This time, make sure to not remove things that are necessary for + pre-auth compression on the client. Add a comment that pre-auth + compression is still supported in the client. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 282c6fec7201f18a5c333bbb68d9339734d2f784 + +commit 120a1ec74e8d9d29f4eb9a27972ddd22351ddef9 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Jul 10 19:39:52 2018 +1000 + + Adapt portable to legacy buffer API removal + +commit 0f3958c1e6ffb8ea4ba27e2a97a00326fce23246 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 10 09:13:30 2018 +0000 + + upstream: kerberos/gssapi fixes for buffer removal + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdf56fec95801e4563c47f21696f04cd8b60c4c + +commit c74ae8e7c45f325f3387abd48fa7dfef07a08069 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 10 06:45:29 2018 +0000 + + upstream: buffer.[ch] and bufaux.c are no more + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1a1852284e554f39525eb4d4891b207cfb3d3a0 + +commit a881e5a133d661eca923fb0633a03152ab2b70b2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 10 06:43:52 2018 +0000 + + upstream: one mention of Buffer that almost got away :) + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30d7c27a90b4544ad5dfacf654595710cd499f02 + +commit 49f47e656b60bcd1d1db98d88105295f4b4e600d +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:59:10 2018 +0000 + + upstream: replace cast with call to sshbuf_mutable_ptr(); ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dfe9d29fa93d9231645c89084f7217304f7ba29 + +commit cb30cd47041edb03476be1c8ef7bc1f4b69d1555 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:56:06 2018 +0000 + + upstream: remove legacy buffer API emulation layer; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2dd5dc17cbc23195be4299fa93be2707a0e08ad9 + +commit 235c7c4e3bf046982c2d8242f30aacffa01073d1 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:53:45 2018 +0000 + + upstream: sshd: switch monitor to sshbuf API; lots of help & ok + + djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d89bd02d33974fd35ca0b8940d88572227b34a48 + +commit b8d9214d969775e409e1408ecdf0d58fad99b344 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:37:55 2018 +0000 + + upstream: sshd: switch GSSAPI to sshbuf API; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e48449ab4be3f006f7ba33c66241b7d652973e30 + +commit c7d39ac8dc3587c5f05bdd5bcd098eb5c201c0c8 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:35:50 2018 +0000 + + upstream: sshd: switch authentication to sshbuf API; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 880aa06bce4b140781e836bb56bec34873290641 + +commit c3cb7790e9efb14ba74b2d9f543ad593b3d55b31 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:29:36 2018 +0000 + + upstream: sshd: switch config to sshbuf API; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72b02017bac7feac48c9dceff8355056bea300bd + +commit 2808d18ca47ad3d251836c555f0e22aaca03d15c +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:26:02 2018 +0000 + + upstream: sshd: switch loginmsg to sshbuf API; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3cb4e54bff15c593602d95cc43e32ee1a4bac42 + +commit 89dd615b8b531979be63f05f9d5624367c9b28e6 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:20:26 2018 +0000 + + upstream: ttymodes: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5df340c5965e822c9da21e19579d08dea3cbe429 + +commit f4608a7065480516ab46214f554e5f853fb7870f +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:18:10 2018 +0000 + + upstream: client: switch mux to sshbuf API; with & ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5948fb98d704f9c4e075b92edda64e0290b5feb2 + +commit cecee2d607099a7bba0a84803e2325d15be4277b +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 21:03:30 2018 +0000 + + upstream: client: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60cb0356114acc7625ab85105f6f6a7cd44a8d05 + +commit ff55f4ad898137d4703e7a2bcc81167dfe8e9324 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 20:39:28 2018 +0000 + + upstream: pkcs11: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98cc4e800f1617c51caf59a6cb3006f14492db79 + +commit 168b46f405d6736960ba7930389eecb9b6710b7e +Author: sf@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 9 13:37:10 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Revert previous two commits + + It turns out we still support pre-auth compression on the client. + Therefore revert the previous two commits: + + date: 2018/07/06 09:06:14; author: sf; commitid: yZVYKIRtUZWD9CmE; + Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB + + Only delayed compression is supported nowadays. + + ok markus@ + + date: 2018/07/06 09:05:01; author: sf; commitid: rEGuT5UgI9f6kddP; + Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression + + Support for this has been removed in 2016. + COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdfef526357e4e1483c86cf599491b2dafb77772 + +commit ab39267fa1243d02b6c330615539fc4b21e17dc4 +Author: sf@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 6 09:06:14 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB + + Only delayed compression is supported nowadays. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b1dbaf3d9a4085aaa10fec0b7a4364396561821 + +commit 95db395d2e56a6f868193aead6cadb2493f036c6 +Author: sf@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 6 09:05:01 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression + + Support for this has been removed in 2016. + COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a99616c832627157113fcb0cf5a752daf2e6b58 + +commit f28a4d5cd24c4aa177e96b4f96957991e552cb70 +Author: sf@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 6 09:03:02 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Remove unused ssh_packet_start_compression() + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d34cf2f59aca5422021ae2857190578187dc2b4 + +commit 872517ddbb72deaff31d4760f28f2b0a1c16358f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jul 6 13:32:02 2018 +1000 + + Defer setting bufsiz in getdelim. + + Do not write to bufsiz until we are sure the malloc has succeeded, + in case any callers rely on it (which they shouldn't). ok djm@ + +commit 3deb56f7190a414dc264e21e087a934fa1847283 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jul 5 13:32:01 2018 +1000 + + Fix other callers of read_environment_file. + + read_environment_file recently gained an extra argument Some platform + specific code also calls it so add the argument to those too. Fixes + build on Solaris and AIX. + +commit 314908f451e6b2d4ccf6212ad246fa4619c721d3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:45 2018 +0000 + + upstream: deal with API rename: match_filter_list() => + + match_filter_blacklist() + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2da342be913efeb51806351af906fab01ba4367f + +commit 89f54cdf6b9cf1cf5528fd33897f1443913ddfb4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:12 2018 +0000 + + upstream: exercise new expansion behaviour of + + PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and, by proxy, test kex_assemble_names() + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 292978902e14d5729aa87e492dd166c842f72736 + +commit 187633f24c71564e970681c8906df5a6017dcccf +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 3 13:53:26 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add a comment that could have saved me 45 minutes of wild + + goose chasing + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d469b29ffadd3402c090e21b792d627d46fa5297 + +commit 312d2f2861a2598ed08587cb6c45c0e98a85408f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 4 13:49:31 2018 +0000 + + upstream: repair PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes (and friends) after RSA + + signature work - returns ability to add/remove/specify algorithms by + wildcard. + + Algorithm lists are now fully expanded when the server/client configs + are finalised, so errors are reported early and the config dumps + (e.g. "ssh -G ...") now list the actual algorithms selected. + + Clarify that, while wildcards are accepted in algorithm lists, they + aren't full pattern-lists that support negation. + + (lots of) feedback, ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8894c5c81f399a002f02ff4fe6b4fa46b1f3207 + +commit 303af5803bd74bf05d375c04e1a83b40c30b2be5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 3 11:43:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream: some magic for RSA-SHA2 checks + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e5a9b11368ff6d86e7b25ad10ebe43359b471cd4 + +commit 7d68e262944c1fff1574600fe0e5e92ec8b398f5 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Jul 3 23:27:11 2018 +1000 + + depend + +commit b4d4eda633af433d20232cbf7e855ceac8b83fe5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 3 13:20:25 2018 +0000 + + upstream: some finesse to fix RSA-SHA2 certificate authentication + + for certs hosted in ssh-agent + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5fd5edd726137dda2d020e1cdebc464110a010f + +commit d78b75df4a57e0f92295f24298e5f2930e71c172 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 3 13:07:58 2018 +0000 + + upstream: check correct variable; unbreak agent keys + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c36981fdf1f3ce04966d3310826a3e1e6233d93e + +commit 2f30300c5e15929d0e34013f38d73e857f445e12 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 3 11:42:12 2018 +0000 + + upstream: crank version number to 7.8; needed for new compat flag + + for prior version; part of RSA-SHA2 strictification, ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 84a11fc0efd2674c050712336b5093f5d408e32b + +commit 4ba0d54794814ec0de1ec87987d0c3b89379b436 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 3 11:39:54 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signature + + In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when + requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to + ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH + matches the one in the signature itself. + + In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the + SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature. + + Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and + HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms + (previously they selected supported key types). This allows these + options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2. + + Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and + "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures + with certificate keys. + + feedback and ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde + +commit 95344c257412b51199ead18d54eaed5bafb75617 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 3 10:59:35 2018 +0000 + + upstream: allow sshd_config PermitUserEnvironment to accept a + + pattern-list of whitelisted environment variable names in addition to yes|no. + + bz#1800, feedback and ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77dc2b468e0bf04b53f333434ba257008a1fdf24 + +commit 6f56fe4b9578b0627667f8bce69d4d938a88324c +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 26 11:23:59 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Fix "WARNING: line 6 disappeared in /etc/moduli, giving up" + + when choosing a prime. An extra increment of linenum snuck in as part of the + conversion to getline(). OK djm@ markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0019225cb52ed621b71cd9f19ee2e78e57e3dd38 + +commit 1eee79a11c1b3594f055b01e387c49c9a6e80005 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 2 14:13:30 2018 +0000 + + upstream: One ampersand is enough to backgroud an process. OpenBSD + + doesn't seem to mind, but some platforms in -portable object to the second. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6c3e404871764343761dc25c3bbe29c2621ff74 + +commit 6301e6c787d4e26bfae1119ab4f747bbcaa94e44 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jul 2 21:16:58 2018 +1000 + + Add implementation of getline. + + Add getline for the benefit of platforms that don't have it. Sourced + from NetBSD (OpenBSD's implementation is a little too chummy with the + internals of FILE). + +commit 84623e0037628f9992839063151f7a9f5f13099a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 26 02:02:36 2018 +0000 + + upstream: whitespace + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9276951caf4daf555f6d262e95720e7f79244572 + +commit 90e51d672711c19a36573be1785caf35019ae7a8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 25 22:28:33 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix NULL dereference in open_listen_match_tcpip() + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c968c1d29e392352383c0f9681fcc1e93620c4a9 + +commit f535ff922a67d9fcc5ee69d060d1b21c8bb01d14 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 19 05:36:57 2018 +0000 + + upstream: spelling; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db542918185243bea17202383a581851736553cc + +commit 80e199d6175904152aafc5c297096c3e18297691 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 19 03:02:17 2018 +0000 + + upstream: test PermitListen with bare port numbers + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4b50a02dfb0ccaca08247f3877c444126ba901b3 + +commit 87ddd676da0f3abd08b778b12b53b91b670dc93c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 19 02:59:41 2018 +0000 + + upstream: allow bare port numbers to appear in PermitListen directives, + + e.g. + + PermitListen 2222 8080 + + is equivalent to: + + PermitListen *:2222 *:8080 + + Some bonus manpage improvements, mostly from markus@ + + "looks fine" markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6546b0cc5aab7f53d65ad0a348ca0ae591d6dd24 + +commit 26f96ca10ad0ec5da9b05b99de1e1ccea15a11be +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 15 07:01:11 2018 +0000 + + upstream: invalidate supplemental group cache used by + + temporarily_use_uid() when the target uid differs; could cause failure to + read authorized_keys under some configurations. patch by Jakub Jelen via + bz2873; ok dtucker, markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48a345f0ee90f6c465a078eb5e89566b23abd8a1 + +commit 89a85d724765b6b82e0135ee5a1181fdcccea9c6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jun 10 23:45:41 2018 +0000 + + upstream: unbreak SendEnv; patch from tb@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc808daced813242563b80976e1478de95940056 + +commit acf4260f0951f89c64e1ebbc4c92f451768871ad +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 9 06:36:31 2018 +0000 + + upstream: sort previous; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27d80d8b8ca99bc33971dee905e8ffd0053ec411 + +commit 1678d4236451060b735cb242d2e26e1ac99f0947 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 9 03:18:11 2018 +0000 + + upstream: slightly better wording re handing of $TERM, from Jakub + + Jelen via bz2386 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14bea3f069a93c8be66a7b97794255a91fece964 + +commit 28013759f09ed3ebf7e8335e83a62936bd7a7f47 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 9 03:03:10 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add a SetEnv directive for sshd_config to allow an + + administrator to explicitly specify environment variables set in sessions + started by sshd. These override the default environment and any variables set + by user configuration (PermitUserEnvironment, etc), but not the SSH_* + variables set by sshd itself. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6a96c0001ccd7dd211df6cae9e961c20fd718c0 + +commit 7082bb58a2eb878d23ec674587c742e5e9673c36 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 9 03:01:12 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add a SetEnv directive to ssh_config that allows setting + + environment variables for the remote session (subject to the server accepting + them) + + refactor SendEnv to remove the arbitrary limit of variable names. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfbb00d9b0e10c1ffff1d83424351fd961d1f2be + +commit 3b9798bda15bd3f598f5ef07595d64e23504da91 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 9 02:58:02 2018 +0000 + + upstream: reorder child environment preparation so that variables + + read from ~/.ssh/environment (if enabled) do not override SSH_* variables set + by the server. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59f9d4c213cdcef2ef21f4b4ae006594dcf2aa7a + +commit 0368889f82f63c82ff8db9f8c944d89e7c657db4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 8 03:35:36 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix incorrect expansion of %i in + + load_public_identity_files(); reported by Roumen Petrov + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a827289e77149b5e0850d72a350c8b0300e7ef25 + +commit 027607fc2db6a0475a3380f8d95c635482714cb0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 8 01:55:40 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix some over-long lines and __func__ up some debug + + messages + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c70a60b4c8207d9f242fc2351941ba50916bb267 + +commit 6ff6fda705bc204456a5fa12518dde6e8790bb02 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 7 11:26:14 2018 +0000 + + upstream: tweak previous; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f98f16af10b28e24bcecb806cb71ea994b648fd6 + +commit f2c06ab8dd90582030991f631a2715216bf45e5a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jun 8 17:43:36 2018 +1000 + + Remove ability to override $LD. + + Since autoconf always uses $CC to link C programs, allowing users to + override LD caused mismatches between what LD_LINK_IFELSE thought worked + and what ld thought worked. If you do need to do this kind of thing you + need to set a compiler flag such as gcc's -fuse-ld in LDFLAGS. + +commit e1542a80797b4ea40a91d2896efdcc76a57056d2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jun 8 13:55:59 2018 +1000 + + Better detection of unsupported compiler options. + + Should prevent "unsupported -Wl,-z,retpoline" warnings during linking. + ok djm@ + +commit 57379dbd013ad32ee3f9989bf5f5741065428360 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 7 14:29:43 2018 +0000 + + upstream: test the correct configuration option name + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 492279ea9f65657f97a970e0e7c7fd0b339fee23 + +commit 6d41815e202fbd6182c79780b6cc90e1ec1c9981 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 7 09:26:42 2018 +0000 + + upstream: some permitlisten fixes from markus@ that I missed in my + + insomnia-fueled commits last night + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26f23622e928996086e85b1419cc1c0f136e359c + +commit 4319f7a868d86d435fa07112fcb6153895d03a7f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 7 04:46:34 2018 +0000 + + upstream: permitlisten/PermitListen unit test from Markus + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ab12eb42f0e14926980441cf7c058a6d1d832ea5 + +commit fa09076410ffc2d34d454145af23c790d728921e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 7 04:31:51 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix regression caused by recent permitlisten option commit: + + authorized_keys lines that contained permitopen/permitlisten were being + treated as invalid. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef41d63a5a477b405d142dc925b67d9e7aaa31b + +commit 7f90635216851f6cb4bf3999e98b825f85d604f8 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 6 18:29:18 2018 +0000 + + upstream: switch config file parsing to getline(3) as this avoids + + static limits noted by gerhard@; ok dtucker@, djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6d702eabef0fa12e5a1d75c334a8c8b325298b5c + +commit 392db2bc83215986a91c0b65feb0e40e7619ce7e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 6 18:25:33 2018 +0000 + + upstream: regress test for PermitOpen + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce8b5f28fc039f09bb297fc4a92319e65982ddaf + +commit 803d896ef30758135e2f438bdd1a0be27989e018 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:15 2018 +0000 + + upstream: man bits for permitlisten authorized_keys option + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86910af8f781a4ac5980fea125442eb25466dd78 + +commit 04df43208b5b460d7360e1598f876b92a32f5922 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:00 2018 +0000 + + upstream: man bits for PermitListen + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35b200cba4e46a16a4db6a80ef11838ab0fad67c + +commit 93c06ab6b77514e0447fe4f1d822afcbb2a9be08 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 6 18:23:32 2018 +0000 + + upstream: permitlisten option for authorized_keys; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8650883018d7aa893173d703379e4456a222c672 + +commit 115063a6647007286cc8ca70abfd2a7585f26ccc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 6 18:22:41 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add a PermitListen directive to control which server-side + + addresses may be listened on when the client requests remote forwarding (ssh + -R). + + This is the converse of the existing PermitOpen directive and this + includes some refactoring to share much of its implementation. + + feedback and ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15a931238c61a3f2ac74ea18a98c933e358e277f + +commit 7703ae5f5d42eb302ded51705166ff6e19c92892 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Jun 6 16:04:29 2018 +1000 + + Use ssh-keygen -A to generate missing host keys. + + Instead of testing for each specific key type, use ssh-keygen -A to + generate any missing host key types. + +commit e8d59fef1098e24f408248dc64e5c8efa5d01f3c +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 06:23:10 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add missing punctuation after %i in ssh_config.5, and + + make the grammatical format in sshd_config.5 match that in ssh_config.5; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e325663b9342f3d556e223e5306e0d5fa1a74fa0 + +commit a1f737d6a99314e291a87856122cb4dbaf64c641 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 05:52:26 2018 +0000 + + upstream: oops - further adjustment to text neccessary; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23585576c807743112ab956be0fb3c786bdef025 + +commit 294028493471e0bd0c7ffe55dc0c0a67cba6ec41 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 05:50:18 2018 +0000 + + upstream: %U needs to be escaped; tweak text; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30887b73ece257273fb619ab6f4e86dc92ddc15e + +commit e5019da3c5a31e6e729a565f2b886a80c4be96cc +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 04:31:48 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Apply umask to all incoming files and directories not + + just files. This makes sure it gets applied to directories too, and prevents + a race where files get chmodded after creation. bz#2839, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3168ee6c7c39093adac4fd71039600cfa296203b + +commit a1dcafc41c376332493b9385ee39f9754dc145ec +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 03:52:37 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Adapt to extra default verboisity from ssh-keygen when + + searching for and hashing known_hosts entries in a single operation + (ssh-keygen -HF ...) Patch from Anton Kremenetsky + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 519585a4de35c4611285bd6a7272766c229b19dd + +commit 76f314c75dffd4a55839d50ee23622edad52c168 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 22 00:22:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL variable, to force all failures + + to instantly abort the test. Useful in capturing clean logs for individual + failure cases. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: feba18cf338c2328b9601bd4093cabdd9baa3af1 + +commit 065c8c055df8d83ae7c92e5e524a579d87668aab +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 11 03:51:06 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Clean up comment. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6adb35f384d447e7dcb9f170d4f0d546d3973e10 + +commit 01b048c8eba3b021701bd0ab26257fc82903cba8 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 04:21:29 2018 +0000 + + upstream: whitespace + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5edb5e843ddc9b73a8e46518899be41d5709add + +commit 854ae209f992465a276de0b5f10ef770510c2418 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 04:05:29 2018 +0000 + + upstream: make ssh_remote_ipaddr() capable of being called after + + the ssh->state has been torn down; bz#2773 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 167f12523613ca3d16d7716a690e7afa307dc7eb + +commit 3e088aaf236ef35beeef3c9be93fd53700df5861 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 03:51:34 2018 +0000 + + upstream: return correct exit code when searching for and hashing + + known_hosts entries in a single operation (ssh-keygen -HF hostname); bz2772 + Report and fix from Anton Kremenetsky + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac10ca13eb9bb0bc50fcd42ad11c56c317437b58 + +commit 9c935dd9bf05628826ad2495d3e8bdf3d3271c21 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 03:33:53 2018 +0000 + + upstream: make UID available as a %-expansion everywhere that the + + username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server + %U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used + for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95 + +commit d8748b91d1d6c108c0c260ed41fa55f37b9ef34b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 1 03:11:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream: prefer argv0 to "ssh" when re-executing ssh for ProxyJump + + directive; bz2831, feedback and ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cec709a131499fbb0c1ea8a0a9e0b0915ce769e + +commit fbb4b5fd4f8e0bb89732670a01954e18b69e15ba +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 25 07:11:01 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Do not ban PTY allocation when a sshd session is restricted + + because the user password is expired as it breaks password change dialog. + + regression in openssh-7.7 reported by Daniel Wagner + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc09c584c6f1964b00595e3abe7f83db4d90d73 + +commit f6a59a22b0c157c4c4e5fd7232f868138223be64 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 25 04:25:46 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Fix return value confusion in several functions (readdir, + + download and fsync). These should return -1 on error, not a sftp status code. + + patch from Petr Cerny in bz#2871 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 651aa0220ad23c9167d9297a436162d741f97a09 + +commit 1da5934b860ac0378d52d3035b22b6670f6a967e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 25 03:20:59 2018 +0000 + + upstream: If select() fails in ssh_packet_read_seqnr go directly to + + the error path instead of trying to read from the socket on the way out, + which resets errno and causes the true error to be misreported. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2614edaadbd05a957aa977728aa7a030af7c6f0a + +commit 4ef75926ef517d539f2c7aac3188b09f315c86a7 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri May 25 13:36:58 2018 +1000 + + Permit getuid()/geteuid() syscalls. + + Requested for Linux/s390; patch from Eduardo Barretto via bz#2752; + ok dtucker + +commit 4b22fd8ecefd059a66140be67f352eb6145a9d88 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 22 00:13:26 2018 +0000 + + upstream: support ProxyJump=none to disable ProxyJump + + functionality; bz#2869 ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c06ee08eb78451b5837fcfd8cbebc5ff3a67a01 + +commit f41bcd70f55b4f0fc4d8e1039cb361ac922b23fb +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 15 05:40:11 2018 +0000 + + upstream: correct keyowrd name (permitemptypasswords); from brendan + + macdonell + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef1bdbc936b2ea693ee37a4c20a94d4d43f5fda3 + +commit f18bc97151340127859634d20d79fd39ec8a7f39 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 11 04:01:11 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Emphasise that -w implicitly sets Tunnel=point-to-point + + and that users should specify an explicit Tunnel directive if they don't want + this. bz#2365. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a8d9c67ae213ead180481900dbbb3e04864560d + +commit 32e4e94e1511fe0020fbfbb62399d31b2d22a801 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon May 14 14:40:08 2018 +1000 + + sync fmt_scaled.c + + revision 1.17 + date: 2018/05/14 04:39:04; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +5 -2; + commitid: 53zY8GjViUBnWo8Z; + constrain fractional part to [0-9] (less confusing to static analysis); ok ian@ + +commit 54268d589e85ecc43d3eba8d83f327bdada9d696 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri May 11 14:04:40 2018 +1000 + + fix key-options.sh on platforms without openpty(3) + + Skip the pty tests if the platform lacks openpty(3) and has to chown(2) + the pty device explicitly. This typically requires root permissions that + this test lacks. + + bz#2856 ok dtucker@ + +commit b2140a739be4c3b43cc1dc08322dca39a1e39d20 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 11 03:38:51 2018 +0000 + + upstream: implement EMFILE mitigation for ssh-agent: remember the + + fd rlimit and stop accepting new connections when it is exceeded (with some + grace). Accept is resumed when enough connections are closed. + + bz#2576. feedback deraadt; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a85d9cec7b85741961e7116a49f8dae777911ea + +commit fdba503fdfc647ee8a244002f1581e869c1f3d90 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 11 03:22:55 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Explicit cast when snprintf'ing an uint64. Prevents + + warnings on platforms where int64 is long not long long. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c5359e2fbfce11dea2d93f7bc257e84419bd001 + +commit e7751aa4094d51a9bc00778aa8d07e22934c55ee +Author: bluhm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 26 14:47:03 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Since the previous commit, ssh regress test sftp-chroot was + + failing. The sftp program terminated with the wrong exit code as sftp called + fatal() instad of exit(0). So when the sigchld handler waits for the child, + remember that it was found. Then don't expect that main() can wait again. OK + dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfafd940c0de5297940c71ddf362053db0232266 + +commit 7c15301841e2e9d37cae732400de63ae9c0961d6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Apr 29 17:54:12 2018 +1000 + + Use includes.h instead of config.h. + + This ensures it picks up the definition of DEF_WEAK, the lack of which + can cause compile errors in some cases (eg modern AIX). From + michael at felt.demon.nl. + +commit cec338967a666b7c8ad8b88175f2faeddf268116 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Apr 19 09:53:14 2018 +1000 + + Omit 3des-cbc if OpenSSL built without DES. + + Patch from hongxu.jia at windriver.com, ok djm@ + +commit a575ddd58835759393d2dddd16ebe5abdb56485e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 16 22:50:44 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Disable SSH2_MSG_DEBUG messages for Twisted Conch clients + + without version numbers since they choke on them under some circumstances. + https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9422 via Colin Watson + + Newer Conch versions have a version number in their ident string and + handle debug messages okay. https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9424 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6cf7be262af0419c58ddae11324d9c0dc1577539 + +commit 390c7000a8946db565b66eab9e52fb11948711fa +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 14 21:50:41 2018 +0000 + + upstream: don't free the %C expansion, it's used later for + + LocalCommand + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 857b5cb37b2d856bfdfce61289a415257a487fb1 + +commit 3455f1e7c48e2e549192998d330214975b9b1dc7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 13 05:04:12 2018 +0000 + + upstream: notify user immediately when underlying ssh process dies; + + patch from Thomas Kuthan in bz2719; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78fac88c2f08054d1fc5162c43c24162b131cf78 + +commit 1c5b4bc827f4abc3e65888cda061ad5edf1b8c7c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 13 16:23:57 2018 +1000 + + Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child. + + The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth + codepath, allow in systrace andbox too. + +commit 0e73428038d5ecfa5d2a28cff26661502a7aff4e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 13 16:06:29 2018 +1000 + + Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child. + + The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth + codepath, allow in sandbox. + +commit e9d910b0289c820852f7afa67f584cef1c05fe95 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 13 03:57:26 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Defend against user enumeration timing attacks. This + + establishes a minimum time for each failed authentication attempt (5ms) and + adds a per-user constant derived from a host secret (0-4ms). Based on work + by joona.kannisto at tut.fi, ok markus@ djm@. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b7845b355bb7381703339c8fb0e57e81a20ae5ca + +commit d97874cbd909eb706886cd0cdd418f812c119ef9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 13 13:43:55 2018 +1000 + + Using "==" in shell tests is not portable. + + Patch from rsbecker at nexbridge.com. + +commit cfb1d9bc76734681e3dea532a1504fcd466fbe91 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Apr 13 13:38:06 2018 +1000 + + Fix tunnel forwarding broken in 7.7p1 + + bz2855, ok dtucker@ + +commit afa6e79b76fb52a0c09a29688b5c0d125eb08302 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Apr 13 13:31:42 2018 +1000 + + prefer to use getrandom() for PRNG seeding + + Only applies when built --without-openssl. Thanks Jann Horn for + reminder. + +commit 575fac34a97f69bc217b235f81de9f8f433eceed +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 13 13:13:33 2018 +1000 + + Revert $REGRESSTMP changes. + + Revert 3fd2d229 and subsequent changes as they turned out to be a + portability hassle. + +commit 10479cc2a4acd6faaf643eb305233b49d70c31c1 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Apr 10 10:19:02 2018 +1000 + + Many typo fixes from Karsten Weiss + + Spotted using https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell + +commit 907da2f88519b34189fd03fac96de0c52d448233 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 10 00:14:10 2018 +0000 + + upstream: more typos spotted by Karsten Weiss using codespell + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d906a2aea0663810a658b7d0bc61a1d2907d4d69 + +commit 37e5f4a7ab9a8026e5fc2f47dafb0f1b123d39e9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 10 00:13:27 2018 +0000 + + upstream: make this a bit more portable-friendly + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 62f7b9e055e8dfaab92b3825f158beeb4ca3f963 + +commit 001aa55484852370488786bd40e9fdad4b465811 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 10 00:10:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream: lots of typos in comments/docs. Patch from Karsten Weiss + + after checking with codespell tool + (https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell) + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373222f12d7ab606598a2d36840c60be93568528 + +commit 260ede2787fe80b18b8d5920455b4fb268519c7d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 9 23:54:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream: don't kill ssh-agent's listening socket entriely if we + + fail to accept a connection; bz#2837, patch from Lukas Kuster + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52413f5069179bebf30d38f524afe1a2133c738f + +commit ebc8b4656f9b0f834a642a9fb3c9fbca86a61838 +Author: tj@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 9 20:41:22 2018 +0000 + + upstream: the UseLogin option was removed, so remove it here too. + + ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7080be73a64d68e21f22f5408a67a0ba8b1b6b06 + +commit 3e36f281851fc8e9c996b33f108b2ae167314fbe +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 8 07:36:02 2018 +0000 + + upstream: tweak previous; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b9c23022ea7b9dddb62864de4e906000f9d7474 + +commit 8368571efd6693c5c57f850e23a2372acf3f865f +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 7 13:50:10 2018 +0000 + + upstream: tweak previous; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38e347b6f8e888f5e0700d01abb1eba7caa154f9 + +commit 555294a7279914ae6795b71bedf4e6011b7636df +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 6 13:02:39 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Allow "SendEnv -PATTERN" to clear environment variables + + previously labeled for sendind. bz#1285 ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f6fec9e3d0f366f15903094fbe1754cb359a0df9 + +commit 40f5f03544a07ebd2003b443d42e85cb51d94d59 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 6 04:15:45 2018 +0000 + + upstream: relax checking of authorized_keys environment="..." + + options to allow underscores in variable names (regression introduced in + 7.7). bz2851, ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69690ffe0c97ff393f2c76d25b4b3d2ed4e4ac9c + +commit 30fd7f9af0f553aaa2eeda5a1f53f26cfc222b5e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 6 03:51:27 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add a couple of missed options to the config dump; patch + + from Jakub Jelen via bz2835 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5970adadf6ef206bee0dddfc75d24c2019861446 + +commit 8d6829be324452d2acd282d5f8ceb0adaa89a4de +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 6 03:34:27 2018 +0000 + + upstream: ssh does not accept -oInclude=... on the commandline, the + + Include keyword is for configuration files only. bz#2840, patch from Jakub + Jelen + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 32d052b4a7a7f22df35fe3f71c368c02b02cacb0 + +commit 00c5222ddc0c8edcaa4ea45ac03befdc8013d137 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 5 22:54:28 2018 +0000 + + upstream: We don't offer CBC cipher by default any more. Spotted by + + Renaud Allard (via otto@) + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a559b1eef741557dd959ae378b665a2977d92dca + +commit 5ee8448ad7c306f05a9f56769f95336a8269f379 +Author: job@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 4 15:12:17 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Update default IPQoS in ssh(1), sshd(8) to DSCP AF21 for + + interactive and CS1 for bulk + + AF21 was selected as this is the highest priority within the low-latency + service class (and it is higher than what we have today). SSH is elastic + and time-sensitive data, where a user is waiting for a response via the + network in order to continue with a task at hand. As such, these flows + should be considered foreground traffic, with delays or drops to such + traffic directly impacting user-productivity. + + For bulk SSH traffic, the CS1 "Lower Effort" marker was chosen to enable + networks implementing a scavanger/lower-than-best effort class to + discriminate scp(1) below normal activities, such as web surfing. In + general this type of bulk SSH traffic is a background activity. + + An advantage of using "AF21" for interactive SSH and "CS1" for bulk SSH + is that they are recognisable values on all common platforms (IANA + https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xml), and + for AF21 specifically a definition of the intended behavior exists + https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4594#section-4.7 in addition to the definition + of the Assured Forwarding PHB group https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2597, and + for CS1 (Lower Effort) there is https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3662 + + The first three bits of "AF21" map to the equivalent IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE + 802.11e, MPLS EXP/CoS and IP Precedence value of 2 (also known as "Immediate", + or "AC_BE"), and CS1's first 3 bits map to IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE 802.11e, + MPLS/CoS and IP Precedence value 1 ("Background" or "AC_BK"). + + OK deraadt@, "no objection" djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d11d2a4484f461524ef0c20870523dfcdeb52181 + +commit 424b544fbda963f973da80f884717c3e0a513288 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 3 02:14:08 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Import regenerated moduli file. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e + +commit 323f66ce934df2da551f256f37d69822428e1ca1 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 6 04:18:35 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add test for username options parsing order, prompted by + + bz#2849. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6985cd32f38596882a3ac172ff8c510693b65283 + +commit e8f474554e3bda102a797a2fbab0594ccc66f097 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Apr 6 14:11:44 2018 +1000 + + Expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 to PAM auth modules + + bz#2408, patch from Radoslaw Ejsmont; ok dtucker@ + +commit 014ba209cf4c6a159baa30ecebbaddfa97da7100 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 3 12:18:00 2018 +1000 + + Import regenerated moduli file. + +commit a0349a1cc4a18967ad1dbff5389bcdf9da098814 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:28 2018 +1000 + + update versions in .spec files + +commit 816ad38f79792f5617e3913be306ddb27e91091c +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:20 2018 +1000 + + update version number + +commit 2c71ca1dd1efe458cb7dee3f8a1a566f913182c2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 30 18:23:07 2018 +1100 + + Disable native strndup and strnlen on AIX. + + On at least some revisions of AIX, strndup returns unterminated strings + under some conditions, apparently because strnlen returns incorrect + values in those cases. Disable both on AIX and use the replacements + from openbsd-compat. Fixes problem with ECDSA keys there, ok djm. + +commit 6b5a17bc14e896e3904dc58d889b58934cfacd24 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Mar 26 13:12:44 2018 +1100 + + Include ssh_api.h for struct ssh. + + struct ssh is needed by implementations of sys_auth_passwd() that were + converted in commit bba02a50. Needed to fix build on AIX, I assume for + the other platforms too (although it should be harmless if not needed). + +commit bc3f80e4d191b8e48650045dfa8a682cd3aabd4d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Mar 26 12:58:09 2018 +1100 + + Remove UNICOS code missed during removal. + + Fixes compile error on AIX. + +commit 9d57762c24882e2f000a21a0ffc8c5908a1fa738 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000 + + upstream: openssh-7.7 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41 + +commit 4b7d8acdbbceef247dc035e611e577174ed8a87e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 26 09:37:02 2018 +1100 + + Remove authinfo.sh test dependency on printenv + + Some platforms lack printenv in the default $PATH. + Reported by Tom G. Christensen + +commit 4afeaf3dcb7dc70efd98fcfcb0ed28a6b40b820e +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Sun Mar 25 10:00:21 2018 -0700 + + Use libiaf on all sysv5 systems + +commit bba02a5094b3db228ceac41cb4bfca165d0735f3 +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Sun Mar 25 09:17:33 2018 -0700 + + modified: auth-sia.c + modified: openbsd-compat/port-aix.c + modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c + + propogate changes to auth-passwd.c in commit + 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3 to other providers + of sys_auth_passwd() + +commit d7a7a39168bdfe273587bf85d779d60569100a3f +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000 + + upstream: openssh-7.7 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41 + +commit 9efcaaac314c611c6c0326e8bac5b486c424bbd2 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 24 19:28:43 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix bogus warning when signing cert keys using agent; + + from djm; ok deraadt dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12e50836ba2040042383a8b71e12d7ea06e9633d + +commit 393436024d2e4b4c7a01f9cfa5854e7437896d11 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Mar 25 09:40:46 2018 +1100 + + Replace /dev/stdin with "-". + + For some reason sftp -b doesn't work with /dev/stdin on Cygwin, as noted + and suggested by vinschen at redhat.com. + +commit b5974de1a1d419e316ffb6524b1b277dda2f3b49 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 23 13:21:14 2018 +1100 + + Provide $OBJ to paths in PuTTY interop tests. + +commit dc31e79454e9b9140b33ad380565fdb59b9c4f33 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 16 09:06:31 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Tell puttygen to use /dev/urandom instead of /dev/random. On + + OpenBSD they are both non-blocking, but on many other -portable platforms it + blocks, stalling tests. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 397d0d4c719c353f24d79f5b14775e0cfdf0e1cc + +commit cb1f94431ef319cd48618b8b771b58739a8210cf +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 22 07:06:11 2018 +0000 + + upstream: ssh/xmss: fix build; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9374ca41d4497f1c673ab681cc33f6e7c5dd186 + +commit 27979da9e4074322611355598f69175b9ff10d39 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 22 07:05:48 2018 +0000 + + upstream: ssh/xmss: fix deserialize for certs; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f44c41636c16ec83502039828beaf521c057dddc + +commit c6cb2565c9285eb54fa9dfbb3890f5464aff410f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Mar 22 17:00:28 2018 +1100 + + Save $? before case statement. + + In some shells (FreeBSD 9, ash) the case statement resets $?, so save + for later testing. + +commit 4c4e7f783b43b264c247233acb887ee10ed4ce4d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000 + + upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to + + "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509; + pointed out by jsing@ + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ac8b41dbfd90cffd525d58350c327195b0937793 + +commit 500396b204c58e78ad9d081516a365a9f28dc3fd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 12 00:56:03 2018 +0000 + + upstream: check valid-before option in authorized_keys + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7e1e4a84f7f099a290e5a4cbf4196f90ff2d7e11 + +commit a76b5d26c2a51d7dd7a5164e683ab3f4419be215 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 12 00:54:04 2018 +0000 + + upstream: explicitly specify RSA/SHA-2 keytype here too + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74d7b24e8c72c27af6b481198344eb077e993a62 + +commit 3a43297ce29d37c64e37c7e21282cb219e28d3d1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:57 2018 +0000 + + upstream: exlicitly include RSA/SHA-2 keytypes in + + PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes here + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 954d19e0032a74e31697fb1dc7e7d3d1b2d65fe9 + +commit 037fdc1dc2d68e1d43f9c9e2586c02cabc8f7cc8 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 14 06:56:20 2018 +0000 + + upstream: sort expiry-time; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c7d82ee1e63e26ceb2b3d3a16514019f984f6bf + +commit abc0fa38c9bc136871f28e452c3465c3051fc785 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000 + + upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to + + "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509; + pointed out by jsing@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 376939466a1f562f3950a22314bc6505733aaae6 + +commit bf0fbf2b11a44f06a64b620af7d01ff171c28e13 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:01 2018 +0000 + + upstream: add valid-before="[time]" authorized_keys option. A + + simple way of giving a key an expiry date. ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1793b4dd5184fa87f42ed33c7b0f4f02bc877947 + +commit fbd733ab7adc907118a6cf56c08ed90c7000043f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Mar 12 19:17:26 2018 +1100 + + Add AC_LANG_PROGRAM to AC_COMPILE_IFELSE. + + The recently added MIPS ABI tests need AC_LANG_PROGRAM to prevent + warnings from autoconf. Pointed out by klausz at haus-gisela.de. + +commit c7c458e8261b04d161763cd333d74e7a5842e917 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 7 23:53:08 2018 +0000 + + upstream: revert recent strdelim() change, it causes problems with + + some configs. + + revision 1.124 + date: 2018/03/02 03:02:11; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +19 -8; commitid: nNRsCijZiGG6SUTT; + Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and sshd_config quotes + option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c40b1b81206d713c06b49d8477402c86babda5 + +commit 0bcd871ccdf3baf2b642509ba4773d5be067cfa2 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 5 07:03:18 2018 +0000 + + upstream: move the input format details to -f; remove the output + + format details and point to sshd(8), where it is documented; + + ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95f17e47dae02a6ac7329708c8c893d4cad0004a + +commit 45011511a09e03493568506ce32f4891a174a3bd +Author: Vicente Olivert Riera +Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:28 2017 +0100 + + configure.ac: properly set seccomp_audit_arch for MIPS64 + + Currently seccomp_audit_arch is set to AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 or + AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 (depending on the endinness) when openssh is built + for MIPS64. However, that's only valid for n64 ABI. The right macros for + n32 ABI defined in seccomp.h are AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 and + AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, for big and little endian respectively. + + Because of that an sshd built for MIPS64 n32 rejects connection attempts + and the output of strace reveals that the problem is related to seccomp + audit: + + [pid 194] prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, {len=57, + filter=0x555d5da0}) = 0 + [pid 194] write(7, "\0\0\0]\0\0\0\5\0\0\0Ulist_hostkey_types: "..., 97) = ? + [pid 193] <... poll resumed> ) = 2 ([{fd=5, revents=POLLIN|POLLHUP}, + {fd=6, revents=POLLHUP}]) + [pid 194] +++ killed by SIGSYS +++ + + This patch fixes that problem by setting the right value to + seccomp_audit_arch taking into account the MIPS64 ABI. + + Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera + +commit 580086704c31de91dc7ba040a28e416bf1fefbca +Author: Vicente Olivert Riera +Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:11 2017 +0100 + + configure.ac: detect MIPS ABI + + Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera + +commit cd4e937aa701f70366cd5b5969af525dff6fdf15 +Author: Alan Yee +Date: Wed Mar 7 15:12:14 2018 -0800 + + Use https URLs for links that support it. + +commit c0a0c3fc4a76b682db22146b28ddc46566db1ce9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Mar 5 20:03:07 2018 +1100 + + Disable UTMPX on SunOS4. + +commit 58fd4c5c0140f6636227ca7acbb149ab0c2509b9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Mar 5 19:28:08 2018 +1100 + + Check for and work around buggy fflush(NULL). + + Some really old platforms (eg SunOS4) segfault on fflush(NULL) so check + for and work around. With klausz at haus-gisela.de. + +commit 71e48bc7945f867029e50e06c665c66aed6d3c64 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Mar 5 10:22:32 2018 +1100 + + Remove extra XMSS #endif + + Extra #endif breaks compile with -DWITH_XMSS. Pointed out by Jack + Schmidt via github. + +commit 055e09e2212ff52067786bf6d794ca9512ff7f0c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 3 06:37:53 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Update RSA minimum modulus size to 1024. sshkey.h rev 1.18 + + bumped the minimum from 768 to 1024, update man page accordingly. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27563ab4e866cd2aac40a5247876f6787c08a338 + +commit 7e4fadd3248d6bb7d39d6688c76a613d35d2efc1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Mar 4 01:46:48 2018 +0000 + + upstream: for the pty control tests, just check that the PTY path + + points to something in /dev (rather than checking the device node itself); + makes life easier for portable, where systems with dynamic ptys can delete + nodes before we get around to testing their existence. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b1e455b821e62572bccd98102f8dd9d09bb94994 + +commit 13ef4cf53f24753fe920832b990b25c9c9cd0530 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Mar 3 16:21:20 2018 +1100 + + Update PAM password change to new opts API. + +commit 33561e68e0b27366cb769295a077aabc6a49d2a1 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Mar 3 14:56:09 2018 +1100 + + Add strndup for platforms that need it. + + Some platforms don't have strndup, which includes Solaris 10, NetBSD 3 + and FreeBSD 6. + +commit e8a17feba95eef424303fb94441008f6c5347aaf +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Mar 3 14:49:07 2018 +1100 + + Flatten and alphabetize object file lists. + + This will make maintenance and changes easier. "no objection" tim@ + +commit de1920d743d295f50e6905e5957c4172c038e8eb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 3 03:16:17 2018 +0000 + + upstream: unit tests for new authorized_keys options API + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 820f9ec9c6301f6ca330ad4052d85f0e67d0bdc1 + +commit dc3e92df17556dc5b0ab19cee8dcb2a6ba348717 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 2 02:53:27 2018 +0000 + + upstream: fix testing of pty option, include positive test and + + testing of restrict keyword + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4268f27c2706a0a95e725d9518c5bcbec9814c6d + +commit 3d1edd1ebbc0aabea8bbe61903060f37137f7c61 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 2 02:51:55 2018 +0000 + + upstream: better testing for port-forwarding and restrict flags in + + authorized_keys + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ee771df8955f2735df54746872c6228aff381daa + +commit 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 3 03:15:51 2018 +0000 + + upstream: switch over to the new authorized_keys options API and + + remove the legacy one. + + Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state + between key file lines. + + feedback and ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df + +commit 90c4bec8b5f9ec4c003ae4abdf13fc7766f00c8b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 3 03:06:02 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Introduce a new API for handling authorized_keys options. + + This API parses options to a dedicated structure rather than the old API's + approach of setting global state. It also includes support for merging + options, e.g. from authorized_keys, authorized_principals and/or + certificates. + + feedback and ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98badda102cd575210d7802943e93a34232c80a2 + +commit 26074380767e639ef89321610e146ae11016b385 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 3 03:01:50 2018 +0000 + + upstream: warn when the agent returns a signature type that was + + different to what was requested. This might happen when an old/non-OpenSSH + agent is asked to make a rsa-sha2-256/512 signature but only supports + ssh-rsa. bz#2799 feedback and ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760c0f9438c5c58abc16b5f98008ff2d95cb13ce + +commit f493d2b0b66fb003ed29f31dd66ff1aeb64be1fc +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 2 21:40:15 2018 +0000 + + upstream: apply a lick of paint; tweaks/ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 518a6736338045e0037f503c21027d958d05e703 + +commit 713d9cb510e0e7759398716cbe6dcf43e574be71 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 2 03:02:11 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and + + sshd_config quotes option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd3a29fc2dc905e8780198e5a6a30b096de1a1cb + +commit 94b4e2d29afaaaef89a95289b16c18bf5627f7cd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 2 02:08:03 2018 +0000 + + upstream: refactor sshkey_read() to make it a little more, err, + + readable. ok markus + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e9247b5762fdac3b6335dc606d3822121714c28 + +commit 5886b92968b360623491699247caddfb77a74d80 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 1 20:32:16 2018 +0000 + + upstream: missing #ifdef for _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE; report by + + jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9039cb69a3f9886bfef096891a9e7fcbd620280b + +commit 3b36bed3d26f17f6a2b7e036e01777770fe1bcd4 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 26 12:14:53 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Remove unneeded (local) include. ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132812dd2296b1caa8cb07d2408afc28e4e60f93 + +commit 27b9f3950e0289e225b57b7b880a8f1859dcd70b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 26 03:56:44 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add $OpenBSD$ markers to xmss files to help keep synced + + with portable. ok djm@. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5233a27aafd1dfadad4b957225f95ae51eb365c1 + +commit afd830847a82ebbd5aeab05bad6d2c8ce74df1cd +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 26 03:03:05 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add newline at end of file to prevent compiler warnings. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52f247d4eafe840c7c14c8befa71a760a8eeb063 + +commit 941e0d3e9bb8d5e4eb70cc694441445faf037c84 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Feb 28 19:59:35 2018 +1100 + + Add WITH_XMSS, move to prevent conflicts. + + Add #ifdef WITH_XMSS to ssh-xmss.c, move it in the other files to after + includes.h so it's less likely to conflict and will pick up WITH_XMSS if + added to config.h. + +commit a10d8552d0d2438da4ed539275abcbf557d1e7a8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 27 14:45:17 2018 +1100 + + Conditionally compile XMSS code. + + The XMSS code is currently experimental and, unlike the rest of OpenSSH + cannot currently be compiled with a c89 compiler. + +commit 146c3bd28c8dbee9c4b06465d9c9facab96b1e9b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 26 12:51:29 2018 +1100 + + Check dlopen has RTLD_NOW before enabling pkcs11. + +commit 1323f120d06a26074c4d154fcbe7f49bcad3d741 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 27 08:41:25 2018 +1100 + + Check for attributes on prototype args. + + Some compilers (gcc 2.9.53, 3.0 and probably others, see gcc bug #3481) + do not accept __attribute__ on function pointer prototype args. Check for + this and hide them if they're not accepted. + +commit f0b245b0439e600fab782d19e97980e9f2c2533c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 26 11:43:48 2018 +1100 + + Check if HAVE_DECL_BZERO correctly. + +commit c7ef4a399155e1621a532cc5e08e6fa773658dd4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 26 17:42:56 2018 +1100 + + Wrap in #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. + +commit ac53ce46cf8165cbda7f57ee045f9f32e1e92b31 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 26 16:24:23 2018 +1100 + + Replace $(CURDIR) with $(PWD). + + The former doesn't work on Solaris or BSDs. + +commit 534b2680a15d14e7e60274d5b29b812d44cc5a44 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 26 14:51:59 2018 +1100 + + Comment out hexdump(). + + Nothing currently uses them but they cause conflicts on at least + FreeBSD, possibly others. ok djm@ + +commit 5aea4aa522f61bb2f34c3055a7de203909dfae77 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 26 14:39:14 2018 +1100 + + typo: missing ; + +commit cd3ab57f9b388f8b1abf601dc4d78ff82d83b75e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 26 14:37:06 2018 +1100 + + Hook up flock() compat code. + + Also a couple of minor changes: fail if we can't lock instead of + silently succeeding, and apply a couple of minor style fixes. + +commit b087998d1ba90dd1ddb6bfdb17873dc3e7392798 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 26 14:27:02 2018 +1100 + + Import flock() compat from NetBSD. + + From NetBSD's src/trunk/tools/compat/flock.c, no OpenSSH changes yet. + +commit 89212533dde6798324e835b1499084658df4579e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 26 12:32:14 2018 +1100 + + Fix breakage when REGRESSTMP not set. + + BUILDDIR is not set where used for REGRESSTMP, use make's CURDIR + instead. Pointed out by djm@. + +commit f885474137df4b89498c0b8834c2ac72c47aa4bd +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Feb 26 12:18:14 2018 +1100 + + XMSS-related files get includes.h + +commit 612faa34c72e421cdc9e63f624526bae62d557cc +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:55 2018 +1100 + + object files end with .o - not .c + +commit bda709b8e13d3eef19e69c2d1684139e3af728f5 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:22 2018 +1100 + + avoid inclusion of deprecated selinux/flask.h + + Use string_to_security_class() instead. + +commit 2e396439365c4ca352cac222717d09b14f8a0dfd +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Feb 26 11:48:27 2018 +1100 + + updatedepend + +commit 1b11ea7c58cd5c59838b5fa574cd456d6047b2d4 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 23 15:58:37 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add experimental support for PQC XMSS keys (Extended + + Hash-Based Signatures) The code is not compiled in by default (see WITH_XMSS + in Makefile.inc) Joint work with stefan-lukas_gazdag at genua.eu See + https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12 ok + djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef3eccb96762a5d6f135d7daeef608df7776a7ac + +commit 7d330a1ac02076de98cfc8fda05353d57b603755 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 23 07:38:09 2018 +0000 + + upstream: some cleanup for BindInterface and ssh-keyscan; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a719ebeae22a166adf05bea5009add7075acc8c + +commit c7b5a47e3b9db9a0f0198f9c90c705f6307afc2b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 25 23:55:41 2018 +1100 + + Invert sense of getpgrp test. + + AC_FUNC_GETPGRP tests if getpgrp(0) works, which it does if it's not + declared. Instead, test if the zero-arg version we want to use works. + +commit b39593a6de5290650a01adf8699c6460570403c2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 25 13:25:15 2018 +1100 + + Add no-op getsid implmentation. + +commit 11057564eb6ab8fd987de50c3d7f394c6f6632b7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 25 11:22:57 2018 +1100 + + bsd-statvfs: include sys/vfs.h, check for f_flags. + +commit e9dede06e5bc582a4aeb5b1cd5a7a640d7de3609 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 25 10:20:31 2018 +1100 + + Handle calloc(0,x) where different from malloc. + + Configure assumes that if malloc(0) returns null then calloc(0,n) + also does. On some old platforms (SunOS4) malloc behaves as expected + (as determined by AC_FUNC_MALLOC) but calloc doesn't. Test for this + at configure time and activate the replacement function if found, plus + handle this case in rpl_calloc. + +commit 2eb4041493fd2635ffdc64a852d02b38c4955e0b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 24 21:06:48 2018 +1100 + + Add prototype for readv if needed. + +commit 6c8c9a615b6d31db8a87bc25033f053d5b0a831e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 24 20:46:37 2018 +1100 + + Check for raise and supply if needed. + +commit a9004425a032d7a7141a5437cfabfd02431e2a74 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 24 20:25:22 2018 +1100 + + Check for bzero and supply if needed. + + Since explicit_bzero uses it via an indirect it needs to be a function + not just a macro. + +commit 1a348359e4d2876203b5255941bae348557f4f54 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 23 05:14:05 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add ssh-keyscan -D option to make it print its results in + + SSHFP format bz#2821, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 831446b582e0f298ca15c9d99c415c899e392221 + +commit 3e19fb976a47b44b3d7c4f8355269f7f2c5dd82c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 23 04:18:46 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add missing braces. + + Caught by the tinderbox's -Werror=misleading-indentation, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d44656af594c3b2366eb87d6abcef83e1c88a6ca + +commit b59162da99399d89bd57f71c170c0003c55b1583 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 23 15:20:42 2018 +1100 + + Check for ifaddrs.h for BindInterface. + + BindInterface required getifaddr and friends so disable if not available + (eg Solaris 10). We should be able to add support for some systems with + a bit more work but this gets the building again. + +commit a8dd6fe0aa10b6866830b4688a73ef966f0aed88 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Feb 23 14:19:11 2018 +1100 + + space before tab in previous + +commit b5e9263c7704247f9624c8f5c458e9181fcdbc09 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have + + $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b + +commit 3e9d3192ad43758ef761c5b0aa3ac5ccf8121ef2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 23 14:10:53 2018 +1100 + + Use portable syntax for REGRESSTMP. + +commit 73282b61187883a2b2bb48e087fdda1d751d6059 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 23 03:03:00 2018 +0000 + + upstream: unbreak interop test after SSHv1 purge; patch from Colin + + Watson via bz#2823 + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 807d30a597756ed6612bdf46dfebca74f49cb31a + +commit f8985dde5f46aedade0373365cbf86ed3f1aead2 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 9 03:42:57 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Skip sftp-chroot test when SUDO not set instead of + + fatal(). + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cd4b5f1109b0dc09af4e5ea7d4968c43fbcbde88 + +commit df88551c02d4e3445c44ff67ba8757cff718609a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have + + $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b + +commit 3b252c20b19f093e87363de197f1100b79705dd3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 8 08:46:20 2018 +0000 + + upstream: some helpers to check verbose/quiet mode + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e736aac39e563f5360a0935080a71d5fdcb976de + +commit ac2e3026bbee1367e4cda34765d1106099be3287 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 23 02:34:33 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Add BindInterface ssh_config directive and -B + + command-line argument to ssh(1) that directs it to bind its outgoing + connection to the address of the specified network interface. + + BindInterface prefers to use addresses that aren't loopback or link- + local, but will fall back to those if no other addresses of the + required family are available on that interface. + + Based on patch by Mike Manning in bz#2820, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5064d285c2851f773dd736a2c342aa384fbf713 + +commit fcdb9d777839a3fa034b3bc3067ba8c1f6886679 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 19 00:55:02 2018 +0000 + + upstream: emphasise that the hostkey rotation may send key types + + that the client may not support, and that the client should simply disregard + such keys (this is what ssh does already). + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f8ffbc32ac8d12be8f913d7c0ea55bef8622bf + +commit ce066f688dc166506c082dac41ca686066e3de5f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 22 20:45:09 2018 +1100 + + Add headers for sys/audit.h. + + On some older platforms (at least sunos4, probably others) sys/audit.h + requires some other headers. Patch from klausz at haus-gisela.de. + +commit 3fd2d2291a695c96a54269deae079bacce6e3fb9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Feb 19 18:37:40 2018 +1100 + + Add REGRESSTMP make var override. + + Defaults to original location ($srcdir/regress) but allows overriding + if desired, eg a directory in /tmp. + +commit f8338428588f3ecb5243c86336eccaa28809f97e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 18 15:53:15 2018 +1100 + + Remove now-unused check for getrusage. + + getrusage was used in ssh-rand-helper but that's now long gone. + Patch from klauszh at haus-gisela.de. + +commit 8570177195f6a4b3173c0a25484a83641ee3faa6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 16 04:43:11 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Don't send IUTF8 to servers that don't like them. + + Some SSH servers eg "ConfD" drop the connection if the client sends the + new IUTF8 (RFC8160) terminal mode even if it's not set. Add a bug bit + for such servers and avoid sending IUTF8 to them. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26425855402d870c3c0a90491e72e2a8a342ceda + +commit f6dc2ba3c9d12be53057b9371f5109ec553a399f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 16 17:32:28 2018 +1100 + + freezero should check for NULL. + +commit 680321f3eb46773883111e234b3c262142ff7c5b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 16 02:40:45 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Mention recent DH KEX methods: + + diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 + diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 + diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 + + From Jakub Jelen via bz#2826 + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51bf769f06e55447f4bfa7306949e62d2401907a + +commit 88c50a5ae20902715f0fca306bb9c38514f71679 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 16 02:32:40 2018 +0000 + + upstream: stop loading DSA keys by default, remove sshd_config + + stanza and manpage bits; from Colin Watson via bz#2662, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d33a849f481684ff655c140f5eb1b4acda8c5c09 + +commit d2b3db2860c962927def39a52f67f1c23f7b201a +Author: jsing@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 14 16:27:24 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Ensure that D mod (P-1) and D mod (Q-1) are calculated in + + constant time. + + This avoids a potential side channel timing leak. + + ok djm@ markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71ff3c16be03290e63d8edab8fac053d8a82968c + +commit 4270efad7048535b4f250f493d70f9acfb201593 +Author: jsing@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 14 16:03:32 2018 +0000 + + upstream: Some obvious freezero() conversions. + + This also zeros an ed25519_pk when it was not being zeroed previously. + + ok djm@ dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c196a3c85c23ac0bd9b11bcadaedd90b7a2ce82 + +commit affa6ba67ffccc30b85d6e98f36eb5afd9386882 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 15 22:32:04 2018 +1100 + + Remove execute bit from modpipe.c. + +commit 9879dca438526ae6dfd656fecb26b0558c29c731 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 15 22:26:16 2018 +1100 + + Update prngd link to point to sourceforge. + +commit b6973fa5152b1a0bafd2417b7c3ad96f6e87d014 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 15 22:22:38 2018 +1100 + + Remove references to UNICOS. + +commit f1ca487940449f0b64f38f1da575078257609966 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 15 22:18:37 2018 +1100 + + Remove extra newline. + +commit 6d4e980f3cf27f409489cf89cd46c21501b13731 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 15 22:16:54 2018 +1100 + + OpenSSH's builtin entropy gathering is long gone. + +commit 389125b25d1a1d7f22e907463b7e8eca74af79ea +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 15 21:43:01 2018 +1100 + + Replace remaining mysignal() with signal(). + + These seem to have been missed during the replacement of mysignal + with #define signal in commit 5ade9ab. Both include the requisite + headers to pick up the #define. + +commit 265d88d4e61e352de6791733c8b29fa3d7d0c26d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 15 20:06:19 2018 +1100 + + Remove remaining now-obsolete cvs $Ids. + +commit 015749e9b1d2f6e14733466d19ba72f014d0845c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 15 17:01:54 2018 +1100 + + Regenerate dependencies after UNICOS removal. + +commit ddc0f3814881ea279a6b6d4d98e03afc60ae1ed7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 13 09:10:46 2018 +1100 + + Remove UNICOS support. + + The code required to support it is quite invasive to the mainline + code that is synced with upstream and is an ongoing maintenance burden. + Both the hardware and software are literal museum pieces these days and + we could not find anyone still running OpenSSH on one. + +commit 174bed686968494723e6db881208cc4dac0d020f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 13 18:12:47 2018 +1100 + + Retpoline linker flag only needed for linking. + +commit 075e258c2cc41e1d7f3ea2d292c5342091728d40 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 13 17:36:43 2018 +1100 + + Default PidFile is sshd.pid not ssh.pid. + +commit 49f3c0ec47730ea264e2bd1e6ece11167d6384df +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 13 16:27:09 2018 +1100 + + Remove assigned-to-but-never-used variable. + + 'p' was removed in previous change but I neglected to remove the + otherwise-unused assignment to it. + +commit b8bbff3b3fc823bf80c5ab226c94f13cb887d5b1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 13 03:36:56 2018 +0000 + + upstream: remove space before tab + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 674edd214d0a7332dd4623c9cf8117301b012890 + +commit 05046d907c211cb9b4cd21b8eff9e7a46cd6c5ab +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Feb 11 21:16:56 2018 +0000 + + upstream Don't reset signal handlers inside handlers. + + The signal handlers from the original ssh1 code on which OpenSSH + is based assume unreliable signals and reinstall their handlers. + Since OpenBSD (and pretty much every current system) has reliable + signals this is not needed. In the unlikely even that -portable + is still being used on such systems we will deal with it in the + compat layer. ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f53a1015cb6908431b92116130d285d71589612c + +commit 3c51143c639ac686687c7acf9b373b8c08195ffb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 13 09:07:29 2018 +1100 + + Whitespace sync with upstream. + +commit 19edfd4af746bedf0df17f01953ba8c6d3186eb7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Feb 13 08:25:46 2018 +1100 + + Whitespace sync with upstream. + +commit fbfa6f980d7460b3e12b0ce88ed3b6018edf4711 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 11 21:25:11 2018 +1300 + + Move signal compat code into bsd-signal.{c,h} + +commit 24d2a33bd3bf5170700bfdd8675498aa09a79eab +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 11 21:20:39 2018 +1300 + + Include headers for linux/if.h. + + Prevents configure-time "present but cannot be compiled" warning. + +commit bc02181c24fc551aab85eb2cff0f90380928ef43 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 11 19:45:47 2018 +1300 + + Fix test for -z,retpolineplt linker flag. + +commit 3377df00ea3fece5293db85fe63baef33bf5152e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 11 09:32:37 2018 +1100 + + Add checks for Spectre v2 mitigation (retpoline) + + This adds checks for gcc and clang flags for mitigations for Spectre + variant 2, ie "retpoline". It'll automatically enabled if the compiler + supports it as part of toolchain hardening flag. ok djm@ + +commit d9e5cf078ea5380da6df767bb1773802ec557ef0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 10 09:25:34 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + constify some private key-related functions; based on + https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/56 by Vincent Brillault + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dcb94a41834a15f4d00275cb5051616fdc4c988c + +commit a7c38215d564bf98e8e9eb40c1079e3adf686f15 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 10 09:03:54 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Mention ServerAliveTimeout in context of TCPKeepAlives; + prompted by Christoph Anton Mitterer via github + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0cf1b5bd3f1fbf41d71c88d75d93afc1c880ca2 + +commit 62562ceae61e4f7cf896566592bb840216e71061 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 10 06:54:38 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + clarify IgnoreUserKnownHosts; based on github PR from + Christoph Anton Mitterer. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fff2c17620c342fb2f1f9c2d2e679aab3e589c3 + +commit 4f011daa4cada6450fa810f7563b8968639bb562 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 10 06:40:28 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Shorter, more accurate explanation of + NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost without the confusing example. Prompted by + Christoph Anton Mitterer via github and bz#2293. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19dc96bea25b80d78d416b581fb8506f1e7b76df + +commit 77e05394af21d3f5faa0c09ed3855e4505a5cf9f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 10 06:15:12 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Disable RemoteCommand and RequestTTY in the ssh session + started by scp. sftp is already doing this. From Camden Narzt via github; ok + dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59e2611141c0b2ee579c6866e8eb9d7d8217bc6b + +commit ca613249a00b64b2eea9f52d3834b55c28cf2862 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 10 05:48:46 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Refuse to create a certificate with an unusable number of + principals; Prompted by gdestuynder via github + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cfae2451e8f07810e3e2546dfdcce66984cbd29 + +commit b56ac069d46b6f800de34e1e935f98d050731d14 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Feb 10 05:43:26 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fatal if we're unable to write all the public key; previously + we would silently ignore errors writing the comment and terminating newline. + Prompted by github PR from WillerZ; ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18fbfcfd4e8c6adbc84820039b64d70906e49831 + +commit cdb10bd431f9f6833475c27e9a82ebb36fdb12db +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 10 11:18:38 2018 +1100 + + Add changelog entry for binary strip change. + +commit fbddd91897cfaf456bfc2081f39fb4a2208a0ebf +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 10 11:14:54 2018 +1100 + + Remove unused variables. + +commit 937d96587df99c16c611d828cded292fa474a32b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 10 11:12:45 2018 +1100 + + Don't strip binaries so debuginfo gets built. + + Tell install not to strip binaries during package creation so that the + debuginfo package can be built. + +commit eb0865f330f59c889ec92696b97bd397090e720c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 10 10:33:11 2018 +1100 + + Fix bogus dates in changelog. + +commit 7fbde1b34c1f6c9ca9e9d10805ba1e5e4538e165 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 10 10:25:15 2018 +1100 + + Remove SSH1 from description. + +commit 9c34a76f099c4e0634bf6ecc2f40ce93925402c4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 10 10:19:16 2018 +1100 + + Add support for compat-openssl10 build dep. + +commit 04f4e8193cb5a5a751fcc356bd6656291fec539e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 10 09:57:04 2018 +1100 + + Add leading zero so it'll work when rhel not set. + + When rhel is not set it will error out with "bad if". Add leading zero + as per https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Packaging:DistTag so it'll work + on non-RHEL. + +commit 12abd67a6af28476550807a443b38def2076bb92 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Feb 10 09:56:34 2018 +1100 + + Update openssl-devel dependency. + +commit b33e7645f8813719d7f9173fef24463c8833ebb3 +Author: nkadel +Date: Sun Nov 16 18:19:58 2014 -0500 + + Add mandir with-mandir' for RHEL 5 compatibility. + + Activate '--mandir' and '--with-mandir' settings in setup for RHEL + 5 compatibility. + +commit 94f8bf360eb0162e39ddf39d69925c2e93511e40 +Author: nkadel +Date: Sun Nov 16 18:18:51 2014 -0500 + + Discard 'K5DIR' reporting. + + It does not work inside 'mock' build environment. + +commit bb7e54dbaf34b70b3e57acf7982f3a2136c94ee5 +Author: nkadel +Date: Sun Nov 16 18:17:15 2014 -0500 + + Add 'dist' to 'rel' for OS specific RPM names. + +commit 87346f1f57f71150a9b8c7029d8c210e27027716 +Author: nkadel +Date: Sun Nov 16 14:17:38 2014 -0500 + + Add openssh-devel >= 0.9.8f for redhat spec file. + +commit bec1478d710866d3c1b119343a35567a8fc71ec3 +Author: nkadel +Date: Sun Nov 16 13:10:24 2014 -0500 + + Enhance BuildRequires for openssh-x11-askpass. + +commit 3104fcbdd3c70aefcb0cdc3ee24948907db8dc8f +Author: nkadel +Date: Sun Nov 16 13:04:14 2014 -0500 + + Always include x11-ssh-askpass SRPM. + + Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in redhat SRPM, even if unused. + +commit c61d0d038d58eebc365f31830be6e04ce373ad1b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Feb 10 09:43:12 2018 +1100 + + this is long unused; prompted by dtucker@ + +commit 745771fb788e41bb7cdad34e5555bf82da3af7ed +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 9 02:37:36 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove unused sKerberosTgtPassing from enum. From + calestyo via github pull req #11, ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1008f8870865a7c4968b7aed402a0a9e3e5b9540 + +commit 1f385f55332db830b0ae22a7663b98279ca2d657 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 8 04:12:32 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Rename struct umac_ctx to umac128_ctx too. In portable + some linkers complain about two symbols with the same name having differing + sizes. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cbebf8bdd3310a9795b4939a1e112cfe24061ca3 + +commit f1f047fb031c0081dbc8738f05bf5d4cc47acadf +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 7 22:52:45 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ssh_free checks for and handles NULL args, remove NULL + checks from remaining callers. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb926825c53724c069df68a93a2597f9192f7e7b + +commit aee49b2a89b6b323c80dd3b431bd486e51f94c8c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Feb 8 12:36:22 2018 +1100 + + Set SO_REUSEADDR in regression test netcat. + + Sometimes multiplex tests fail on Solaris with "netcat: local_listen: + Address already in use" which is likely due to previous invocations + leaving the port in TIME_WAIT. Set SO_REUSEADDR (in addition to + SO_REUSEPORT which is alread set on platforms that support it). ok djm@ + +commit 1749991c55bab716877b7c687cbfbf19189ac6f1 +Author: jsing@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 7 05:17:56 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Convert some explicit_bzero()/free() calls to freezero(). + + ok deraadt@ dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f566ab99149650ebe58b1d4b946ea726c3829609 + +commit 94ec2b69d403f4318b7a0d9b17f8bc3efbf4d0d2 +Author: jsing@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 7 05:15:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove some #ifdef notyet code from OpenSSL 0.9.8 days. + + These functions have never appeared in OpenSSL and are likely never to do + so. + + "kill it with fire" djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fee9560e283fd836efc2631ef381658cc673d23e + +commit 7cd31632e3a6607170ed0c9ed413a7ded5b9b377 +Author: jsing@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 7 02:06:50 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove all guards for calls to OpenSSL free functions - + all of these functions handle NULL, from at least OpenSSL 1.0.1g onwards. + + Prompted by dtucker@ asking about guards for RSA_free(), when looking at + openssh-portable pr#84 on github. + + ok deraadt@ dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 954f1c51b94297d0ae1f749271e184141e0cadae + +commit 3c000d57d46882eb736c6563edfc4995915c24a2 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Feb 7 09:19:38 2018 +1100 + + Remove obsolete "Smartcard support" message + + The configure checks that populated $SCARD_MSG were removed in commits + 7ea845e4 and d8f60022 when the smartcard support was replaced with + PKCS#11. + +commit 3e615090de0ce36a833d811e01c28aec531247c4 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 6 06:01:54 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Replace "trojan horse" with the correct term (MITM). + From maikel at predikkta.com via bz#2822, ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e86ac64c512057c89edfadb43302ac0aa81a6c53 + +commit 3484380110d437c50e17f87d18544286328c75cb +Author: tb@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 5 05:37:46 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add a couple of non-negativity checks to avoid close(-1). + + ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4701ce0b37161c891c838d0931305f1d37a50880 + +commit 5069320be93c8b2a6584b9f944c86f60c2b04e48 +Author: tb@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 5 05:36:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + The file descriptors for socket, stdin, stdout and stderr + aren't necessarily distinct, so check if they are the same to avoid closing + the same fd several times. + + ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60d71fd22e9a32f5639d4ba6e25a2f417fc36ac1 + +commit 2b428f90ea1b21d7a7c68ec1ee334253b3f9324d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 5 04:02:53 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + I accidentially a word + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4547ee713fa941da861e83ae7a3e6432f915e14a + +commit 130283d5c2545ff017c2162dc1258c5354e29399 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jan 25 03:34:43 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + certificate options are case-sensitive; fix case on one + that had it wrong. + + move a badly-place sentence to a less bad place + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 231e516bba860699a1eece6d48532d825f5f747b + +commit 89f09ee68730337015bf0c3f138504494a34e9a6 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jan 24 12:20:44 2018 +1100 + + crypto_api.h needs includes.h + +commit c9c1bba06ad1c7cad8548549a68c071bd807af60 +Author: stsp@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 23 20:00:58 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix a logic bug in sshd_exchange_identification which + prevented clients using major protocol version 2 from connecting to the + server. ok millert@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8668dec04586e27f1c0eb039ef1feb93d80a5ee9 + +commit a60c5dcfa2538ffc94dc5b5adb3db5b6ed905bdb +Author: stsp@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 23 18:33:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add missing braces; fixes 'write: Socket is not + connected' error in ssh. ok deraadt@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db73a3a9e147722d410866cac34d43ed52e1ad24 + +commit 20d53ac283e1c60245ea464bdedd015ed9b38f4a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Jan 23 16:49:43 2018 +1100 + + rebuild depends + +commit 552ea155be44f9c439c1f9f0c38f9e593428f838 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Jan 23 16:49:22 2018 +1100 + + one SSH_BUG_BANNER instance that got away + +commit 14b5c635d1190633b23ac3372379517fb645b0c2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 23 05:27:21 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Drop compatibility hacks for some ancient SSH + implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*. + + These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the + final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC- + compliant SSH implementations. + + ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4be81c67db57647f907f4e881fb9341448606138 + +commit 7c77991f5de5d8475cbeb7cbb06d0c7d1611d7bb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 23 05:17:04 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + try harder to preserve errno during + ssh_connect_direct() to make the final error message possibly accurate; + bz#2814, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57de882cb47381c319b04499fef845dd0c2b46ca + +commit 9e9c4a7e57b96ab29fe6d7545ed09d2e5bddbdec +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 23 05:12:12 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unbreak support for clients that advertise a protocol + version of "1.99" (indicating both v2 and v1 support). Busted by me during + SSHv1 purge in r1.358; bz2810, ok dtucker + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8f9c2bee11afc16c872bb79d6abe9c555bd0e4b + +commit fc21ea97968264ad9bb86b13fedaaec8fd3bf97d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 23 05:06:25 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't attempt to force hostnames that are addresses to + lowercase, but instead canonicalise them through getnameinfo/getaddrinfo to + remove ambiguities (e.g. ::0001 => ::1) before they are matched against + known_hosts; bz#2763, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba0863ff087e61e5c65efdbe53be3cb92c9aefa0 + +commit d6364f6fb1a3d753d7ca9bf15b2adce961324513 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 23 05:01:15 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + avoid modifying pw->pw_passwd; let endpwent() clean up + for us, but keep a scrubbed copy; bz2777, ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 715afc0f59c6b82c4929a73279199ed241ce0752 + +commit a69bbb07cd6fb4dfb9bdcacd370ab26d0a2b4215 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 13 00:24:09 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + clarify authorship; prodded by and ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1938eee58c89b064befdabe232835fa83bb378c + +commit 04214b30be3d3e73a01584db4e040d5ccbaaddd4 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 8 15:37:21 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + group shared source files (e.g. SRCS_KEX) and allow + compilation w/o OPENSSL ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62 + +commit 25cf9105b849932fc3b141590c009e704f2eeba6 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 8 15:21:49 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + move subprocess() so scp/sftp do not need uidswap.o; ok + djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6601b8360388542c2e5fef0f4085f8e54750bea8 + +commit b0d34132b3ca26fe94013f01d7b92101e70b68bb +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 8 15:18:46 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch ssh-pkcs11-helper to new API; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0c0ed2a568e25b1d2024f3e630f3fea837c2a42 + +commit ec4a9831184c0c6ed5f7f0cfff01ede5455465a3 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 8 15:15:36 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + split client/server kex; only ssh-keygen needs + uuencode.o; only scp/sftp use progressmeter.o; ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f2c9feb26963615c4fece921906cf72e248b61ee + +commit ec77efeea06ac62ee1d76fe0b3225f3000775a9e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 8 15:15:17 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + only ssh-keygen needs uuencode.o; only scp/sftp use + progressmeter.o + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a337e886a49f96701ccbc4832bed086a68abfa85 + +commit 25aae35d3d6ee86a8c4c0b1896acafc1eab30172 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 8 15:14:44 2018 +0000 + + upstream commit + + uuencode.h is not used + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 238eb4659f3c119904326b9e94a5e507a912796c + +commit 4f29309c4cb19bcb1774931db84cacc414f17d29 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jan 3 19:50:43 2018 +1100 + + unbreak fuzz harness + +commit f6b50bf84dc0b61f22c887c00423e0ea7644e844 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 21 05:46:35 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + another libssh casualty + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 839b970560246de23e7c50215095fb527a5a83ec + +commit 5fb4fb5a0158318fb8ed7dbb32f3869bbf221f13 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 21 03:01:49 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + missed one (unbreak after ssh/lib removal) + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cfdd132143131769e2d2455e7892b5d55854c322 + +commit e6c4134165d05447009437a96e7201276688807f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 21 00:41:22 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unbreak unit tests after removal of src/usr.bin/ssh/lib + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3a79760494147b20761cbd2bd5c20e86c63dc8f9 + +commit d45d69f2a937cea215c7f0424e5a4677b6d8c7fe +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 21 00:00:28 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + revert stricter key type / signature type checking in + userauth path; too much software generates inconsistent messages, so we need + a better plan. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a44ddc991c803c4ecc8f1ad40e0ab4d22e1c519 + +commit c5a6cbdb79752f7e761074abdb487953ea6db671 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 19 00:49:30 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + explicitly test all key types and their certificate + counterparts + + refactor a little + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e9ecd5580821b9ef8b7106919c6980d8e45ca8c4 + +commit f689adb7a370b5572612d88be9837ca9aea75447 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 11 11:41:56 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use cmp in a loop instead of diff -N to compare + directories. The former works on more platforms for Portable. + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c3aa72807f9c488e8829a26ae50fe5bcc5b57099 + +commit 748dd8e5de332b24c40f4b3bbedb902acb048c98 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Dec 19 16:17:59 2017 +1100 + + remove blocks.c from Makefile + +commit 278856320520e851063b06cef6ef1c60d4c5d652 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 19 00:24:34 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + include signature type and CA key (if applicable) in some + debug messages + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b71615cc20e78cec7105bb6e940c03ce9ae414a5 + +commit 7860731ef190b52119fa480f8064ab03c44a120a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 18 23:16:23 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unbreak hostkey rotation; attempting to sign with a + desired signature algorithm of kex->hostkey_alg is incorrect when the key + type isn't capable of making those signatures. ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35ae46864e1f5859831ec0d115ee5ea50953a906 + +commit 966ef478339ad5e631fb684d2a8effe846ce3fd4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 18 23:14:34 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + log mismatched RSA signature types; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 381bddfcc1e297a42292222f3bcb5ac2b7ea2418 + +commit 349ecd4da3a985359694a74635748009be6baca6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 18 23:13:42 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + pass kex->hostkey_alg and kex->hostkey_nid from pre-auth + to post-auth unpriviledged child processes; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a35bc7af0a5f8a232d1361f79f4ebc376137302 + +commit c9e37a8725c083441dd34a8a53768aa45c3c53fe +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 18 17:28:54 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add helper function for uri handing in scp where a + missing path simply means ".". Also fix exit code and add warnings when an + invalid uri is encountered. OK otto@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47dcf872380586dabf7fcc6e7baf5f8ad508ae1a + +commit 04c7e28f83062dc42f2380d1bb3a6bf0190852c0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 18 02:25:15 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + pass negotiated signing algorithm though to + sshkey_verify() and check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in + the signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 735fb15bf4adc060d3bee9d047a4bcaaa81b1af9 + +commit 931c78dfd7fe30669681a59e536bbe66535f3ee9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 18 02:22:29 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sshkey_sigtype() function to return the type of a + signature; ok markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d3772b065ad6eed97285589bfb544befed9032e8 + +commit 4cdc5956f2fcc9e9078938db833142dc07d8f523 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 14 21:07:39 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Replace ED25519's private SHA-512 implementation with a + call to the regular digest code. This speeds up compilation considerably. ok + markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fcce8c3bcfe7389462a28228f63c823e80ade41c + +commit 012e5cb839faf76549e3b6101b192fe1a74d367e +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 12 15:06:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Create a persistent umac128.c source file: #define the + output size and the name of the entry points for UMAC-128 before including + umac.c. Idea from FreeBSD. ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 463cfacfa07cb8060a4d4961e63dca307bf3f4b1 + +commit b35addfb4cd3b5cdb56a2a489d38e940ada926c7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Dec 11 16:23:28 2017 +1100 + + Update .depend with empty config.h + +commit 2d96f28246938e0ca474a939d8ac82ecd0de27e3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Dec 11 16:21:55 2017 +1100 + + Ensure config.h is always in dependencies. + + Put an empty config.h into the dependency list to ensure that it's + always listed and consistent. + +commit ac4987a55ee5d4dcc8e87f7ae7c1f87be7257d71 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 10 19:37:57 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ssh/lib hasn't worked towards our code-sharing goals for + a quit while, perhaps it is too verbose? Change each */Makefile to + specifying exactly what sources that program requires, compiling it seperate. + Maybe we'll iterate by sorting those into seperatable chunks, splitting up + files which contain common code + server/client specific code, or whatnot. + But this isn't one step, or we'd have done it a long time ago.. ok dtucker + markus djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5317f294d63a876bfc861e19773b1575f96f027d + +commit 48c23a39a8f1069a57264dd826f6c90aa12778d5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 10 05:55:29 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Put remote client info back into the ClientAlive + connection termination message. Based in part on diff from lars.nooden at + gmail, ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80a0f619a29bbf2f32eb5297a69978a0e05d0ee0 + +commit aabd75ec76575c1b17232e6526a644097cd798e5 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 8 03:45:52 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + time_t printing needs %lld and (long long) casts ok djm + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a93bc2b0d42a39b8f8de8bb74d07ad2e5e83ef7 + +commit fd4eeeec16537870bd40d04836c7906ec141c17d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 8 02:14:33 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix ordering in previous to ensure errno isn't clobbered + before logging. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e260bc1e145a9690dcb0d5aa9460c7b96a0c8ab2 + +commit 155072fdb0d938015df828836beb2f18a294ab8a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 8 02:13:02 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + for some reason unix_listener() logged most errors twice + with each message containing only some of the useful information; merge these + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1978a7594a9470c0dddcd719586066311b7c9a4a + +commit 79c0e1d29959304e5a49af1dbc58b144628c09f3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Dec 11 14:38:33 2017 +1100 + + Add autogenerated dependency info to Makefile. + + Adds a .depend file containing dependency information generated by + makedepend, which is appended to the generated Makefile by configure. + + You can regen the file with "make -f Makefile.in depend" if necessary, + but we'll be looking at some way to automatically keep this up to date. + + "no objection" djm@ + +commit f001de8fbf7f3faddddd8efd03df18e57601f7eb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Dec 11 13:42:51 2017 +1100 + + Fix pasto in ldns handling. + + When ldns-config is not found, configure would check the wrong variable. + ok djm@ + +commit c5bfe83f67cb64e71cf2fe0d1500f6904b0099ee +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Dec 9 10:12:23 2017 +1100 + + Portable switched to git so s/CVS/git/. + +commit bb82e61a40a4ee52e4eb904caaee2c27b763ab5b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sat Dec 9 08:06:00 2017 +1100 + + Remove now-used check for perl. + +commit e0ce54c0b9ca3a9388f9c50f4fa6cc25c28a3240 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Dec 6 05:06:21 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't accept junk after "yes" or "no" responses to + hostkey prompts. bz#2803 reported by Maksim Derbasov; ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1b159fb2253be973ce25eb7a7be26e6f967717c + +commit 609d96b3d58475a15b2eb6b3d463f2c5d8e510c0 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 5 23:59:47 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Replace atoi and strtol conversions for integer arguments + to config keywords with a checking wrapper around strtonum. This will + prevent and flag invalid and negative arguments to these keywords. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99ae3981f3d608a219ccb8d2fff635ae52c17998 + +commit 168ecec13f9d7cb80c07df3bf7d414f4e4165e84 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 5 23:56:07 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add missing break for rdomain. Prevents spurious + "Deprecated option" warnings. ok djm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba28a675d39bb04a974586241c3cba71a9c6099a + +commit 927f8514ceffb1af380a5f63ab4d3f7709b1b198 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 5 01:30:19 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + include the addr:port in bind/listen failure messages + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fdadb69fe1b38692608809cf0376b71c2c28e58e + +commit a8c89499543e2d889629c4e5e8dcf47a655cf889 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 29 05:49:54 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Import updated moduli. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 524d210f982af6007aa936ca7f4c977f4d32f38a + +commit 3dde09ab38c8e1cfc28252be473541a81bc57097 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 28 21:10:22 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Have sftp print a warning about shell cleanliness when + decoding the first packet fails, which is usually caused by shells polluting + stdout of non-interactive starups. bz#2800, ok markus@ deraadt@. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 88d6a9bf3470f9324b76ba1cbd53e50120f685b5 + +commit 6c8a246437f612ada8541076be2414846d767319 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Dec 1 17:11:47 2017 +1100 + + Replace mkinstalldirs with mkdir -p. + + Check for MIKDIR_P and use it instead of mkinstalldirs. Should fix "mkdir: + cannot create directory:... File exists" during "make install". + Patch from eb at emlix.com. + +commit 3058dd78d2e43ed0f82ad8eab8bb04b043a72023 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Dec 1 17:07:08 2017 +1100 + + Pull in newer install-sh from autoconf-2.69. + + Suggested by eb at emlix.com + +commit 79226e5413c5b0fda3511351a8511ff457e306d8 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Dec 1 16:55:35 2017 +1100 + + Remove RSA1 host key generation. + + SSH1 support is now gone, remove SSH1 key generation. + Patch from eb at emlix.com. + +commit 2937dd02c572a12f33d5c334d518f6cbe0b645eb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 28 06:09:38 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + more whitespace errors + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e11c125378327b648940b90145e0d98beb05abb + +commit 7f257bf3fd3a759f31098960cbbd1453fafc4164 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 28 06:04:51 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 76d3965202b22d59c2784a8df3a8bfa5ee67b96a + +commit 5db6fbf1438b108e5df3e79a1b4de544373bc2d4 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 25 06:46:22 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add monotime_ts and monotime_tv that return monotonic + timespec and timeval respectively. Replace calls to gettimeofday() in packet + timing with monotime_tv so that the callers will work over a clock step. + Should prevent integer overflow during clock steps reported by wangle6 at + huawei.com. "I like" markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74d684264814ff806f197948b87aa732cb1b0b8a + +commit 2d638e986085bdf1a40310ed6e2307463db96ea0 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Nov 25 05:58:47 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove get_current_time() and replace with calls to + monotime_double() which uses CLOCK_MONOTONIC and works over clock steps. "I + like" markus@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3ad2f7d2414e2cfcaef99877a7a5b0baf2242952 + +commit ba460acae48a36ef749cb23068f968f4d5d90a24 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Nov 24 16:24:31 2017 +1100 + + Include string.h for explicit_bzero. + +commit a65655fb1a12b77fb22f9e71559b9d73030ec8ff +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Nov 24 10:23:47 2017 +1100 + + fix incorrect range of OpenSSL versions supported + + Pointed out by Solar Designer + +commit 83a1e5dbec52d05775174f368e0c44b08619a308 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 15 02:10:16 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + downgrade a couple more request parsing errors from + process-fatal to just returning failure, making them consistent with the + others that were already like that. + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c111461f7a626690a2d53018ef26557b34652918 + +commit 93c68a8f3da8e5e6acdc3396f54d73919165e242 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 15 00:13:40 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix regression in 7.6: failure to parse a signature request + message shouldn't be fatal to the process, just the request. Reported by Ron + Frederick + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5d01b3819caa1a2ad51fc57d6ded43f48bbcc05 + +commit 548d3a66feb64c405733932a6b1abeaf7198fa71 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 14 00:45:29 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix problem in configuration parsing when in config dump mode + (sshd -T) without providing a full connection specification (sshd -T -C ...) + + spotted by bluhm@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7125faf5740eaa9d3a2f25400a0bc85e94e28b8f + +commit 33edb6ebdc2f81ebed1bceadacdfb8910b64fb88 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 3 05:18:44 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + reuse parse_multistate for parse_flag (yes/no arguments). + Saves a few lines of code and makes the parser more consistent wrt case- + sensitivity. bz#2664 ok dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b2ad1b6086858d5db71c7b11e5a74dba6d60efef + +commit d52131a98316e76c0caa348f09bf6f7b9b01a1b9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 3 05:14:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow certificate validity intervals that specify only a + start or stop time (we already support specifying both or neither) + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9be486545603c003030bdb5c467d1318b46b4e42 + +commit fbe8e7ac94c2fa380421a9205a8bc966549c2f91 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 3 03:46:52 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow "cd" and "lcd" commands with no explicit path + argument. lcd will change to the local user's home directory as usual. cd + will change to the starting directory for session (because the protocol + offers no way to obtain the remote user's home directory). bz#2760 ok + dtucker@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15333f5087cee8c1ed1330cac1bd0a3e6a767393 + +commit 0208a48517b5e8e8b091f32fa4addcd67c31ca9e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 3 03:18:53 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + When doing a config test with sshd -T, only require the + attributes that are actually used in Match criteria rather than (an + incomplete list of) all criteria. ok djm@, man page help jmc@ + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4e773c4212d3dea486d0259ae977551aab2c1fc + +commit c357eed5a52cd2f4ff358b17e30e3f9a800644da +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 3 02:32:19 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + typos in ECDSA certificate names; bz#2787 reported by + Mike Gerow + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 824938b6aba1b31321324ba1f56c05f84834b163 + +commit ecbf005b8fd80b81d0c61dfc1e96fe3da6099395 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 3 02:29:17 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Private keys in PEM format have been encrypted by AES-128 for + a while (not 3DES). bz#2788 reported by Calum Mackay + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd33da7acbbb3c882f0a0ee56007a35ce0d8a11a + +commit 81c9ccdbf6ddbf9bfbd6f1f775a5a7c13e47e185 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Nov 3 14:52:51 2017 +1100 + + Check for linux/if.h when enabling rdomain. + + musl libc doesn't seem to have linux/if.h, so check for its presence + before enabling rdomain support on Linux. + +commit fa1b834cce41a1ce3e6a8d57fb67ef18c9dd803f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Nov 3 14:09:45 2017 +1100 + + Add headers for sys/sysctl.h and net/route.h + + On at least older OpenBSDs, sys/sysctl.h and net/route.h require + sys/types and, in the case of sys/sysctl.h, sys/param.h for MAXLOGNAME. + +commit 41bff4da21fcd8a7c6a83a7e0f92b018f904f6fb +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 3 02:22:41 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + avoid unused variable warnings for !WITH_OPENSSL; patch from + Marcus Folkesson + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c01d27a3f907acdc3dd4ea48170fac3ba236d229 + +commit 6b373e4635a7470baa94253dd1dc8953663da9e8 +Author: Marcus Folkesson +Date: Sat Oct 28 19:48:39 2017 +0200 + + only enable functions in dh.c when openssl is used + + Signed-off-by: Marcus Folkesson + +commit 939b30ba23848b572e15bf92f0f1a3d9cf3acc2b +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 1 00:04:15 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix broken stdout in ControlPersist mode, introduced by me in + r1.467 and reported by Alf Schlichting + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3750a16e02108fc25f747e4ebcedb7123c1ef509 + +commit f21455a084f9cc3942cf1bde64055a4916849fed +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Oct 31 10:09:33 2017 +1100 + + Include includes.h for HAVE_GETPAGESIZE. + + The configure script checks for getpagesize() and sets HAVE_GETPAGESIZE in + config.h, but bsd-getpagesize.c forgot to include includes.h (which + indirectly includes config.h) so the checks always fails, causing linker + issues when linking statically on systems with getpagesize(). + + Patch from Peter Korsgaard + +commit f2ad63c0718b93ac1d1e85f53fee33b06eef86b5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 30 22:01:52 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f4b5df99b28c6f63478deb916c6ed0e794685f07 + +commit c6415b1f8f1d0c2735564371647fd6a177fb9a3e +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 30 21:59:43 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 19b1394393deee4c8a2114a3b7d18189f27a15cd + +commit e4d4ddbbba0e585ca3ec3a455430750b4622a6d3 +Author: millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 25 20:08:36 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use printenv to test whether an SSH_USER_AUTH is set + instead of using $SSH_USER_AUTH. The latter won't work with csh which treats + unknown variables as an error when expanding them. OK markus@ + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f601e878dd8b71aa40381573dde3a8f567e6f2d1 + +commit 116b1b439413a724ebb3320633a64dd0f3ee1fe7 +Author: millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 24 19:33:32 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add tests for URI parsing. OK markus@ + + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5d1df19874f3b916d1a2256a905526e17a98bd3b + +commit dbe0662e9cd482593a4a8bf58c6481bfe8a747a4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 27 01:57:06 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c95549cf5a07d56ea11aaff818415118720214f6 + +commit d2135474344335a7c6ee643b6ade6db400fa76ee +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 27 01:01:17 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL (lots) + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 757257dd44116794ee1b5a45c6724973de181747 + +commit b77c29a07f5a02c7c1998701c73d92bde7ae1608 +Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 27 00:18:41 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + improve printing of rdomain on accept() a little + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5da58db2243606899cedaa646c70201b2d12247a + +commit 68d3bbb2e6dfbf117c46e942142795b2cdd0274b +Author: jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 26 06:44:01 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mark up the rdomain keyword; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b597d0ad0ad20e94dbd61ca066057e6f6313b8a + +commit 0b2e2896b9d0d6cfb59e9ec8271085296bd4e99b +Author: jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 25 06:19:46 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + tweak the uri text, specifically removing some markup to + make it a bit more readable; + + issue reported by - and diff ok - millert + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b56a20208040b2d0633536fd926e992de37ef3f + +commit 7530e77bdc9415386d2a8ea3d086e8b611b2ba40 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 25 06:18:06 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + simplify macros in previous, and some minor tweaks; + + OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6efeca3d8b095b76e21b484607d9cc67ac9a11ca + +commit eb9c582b710dc48976b48eb2204218f6863bae9a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Oct 31 00:46:29 2017 +1100 + + Switch upstream git repository. + + Previously portable OpenSSH has synced against a conversion of OpenBSD's + CVS repository made using the git cvsimport tool, but this has become + increasingly unreliable. + + As of this commit, portable OpenSSH now tracks a conversion of the + OpenBSD CVS upstream made using the excellent cvs2gitdump tool from + YASUOKA Masahiko: https://github.com/yasuoka/cvs2gitdump + + cvs2gitdump is considerably more reliable than gitcvsimport and the old + version of cvsps that it uses under the hood, and is the same tool used + to export the entire OpenBSD repository to git (so we know it can cope + with future growth). + + These new conversions are mirrored at github, so interested parties can + match portable OpenSSH commits to their upstream counterparts. + + https://github.com/djmdjm/openbsd-openssh-src + https://github.com/djmdjm/openbsd-openssh-regress + + An unfortunate side effect of switching upstreams is that we must have + a flag day, across which the upstream commit IDs will be inconsistent. + The old commit IDs are recorded with the tags "Upstream-ID" for main + directory commits and "Upstream-Regress-ID" for regress commits. + + To make it clear that the commit IDs do not refer to the same + things, the new repository will instead use "OpenBSD-ID" and + "OpenBSD-Regress-ID" tags instead. + + Apart from being a longwinded explanation of what is going on, this + commit message also serves to synchronise our tools with the state of + the tree, which happens to be: + + OpenBSD-ID: 9c43a9968c7929613284ea18e9fb92e4e2a8e4c1 + OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b33b385719420bf3bc57d664feda6f699c147fef + +commit 2de5c6b53bf063ac698596ef4e23d8e3099656ea +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 27 08:42:33 2017 +1100 + + fix rdomain compilation errors + +commit 6bd5b569fd6dfd5e8c8af20bbc41e45c2d6462ab +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 25 14:15:42 2017 +1100 + + autoconf glue to enable Linux VRF + +commit 97c5aaf925d61641d599071abb56012cde265978 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 25 14:09:56 2017 +1100 + + basic valid_rdomain() implementation for Linux + +commit ce1cca39d7935dd394080ce2df62f5ce5b51f485 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 25 13:47:59 2017 +1100 + + implement get/set_rdomain() for Linux + + Not enabled, pending implementation of valid_rdomain() and autoconf glue + +commit 6eee79f9b8d4a3b113b698383948a119acb82415 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 25 13:22:29 2017 +1100 + + stubs for rdomain replacement functions + +commit f5594f939f844bbb688313697d6676238da355b3 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 25 13:13:57 2017 +1100 + + rename port-tun.[ch] => port-net.[ch] + + Ahead of adding rdomain support + +commit d685e5a31feea35fb99e1a31a70b3c60a7f2a0eb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 25 02:10:39 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + uninitialised variable in PermitTunnel printing code + + Upstream-ID: f04dc33e42855704e116b8da61095ecc71bc9e9a + +commit 43c29bb7cfd46bbbc61e0ffa61a11e74d49a712f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 25 13:10:59 2017 +1100 + + provide hooks and fallbacks for rdomain support + +commit 3235473bc8e075fad7216b7cd62fcd2b0320ea04 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Oct 25 11:25:43 2017 +1100 + + check for net/route.h and sys/sysctl.h + +commit 4d5456c7de108e17603a0920c4d15bca87244921 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 25 00:21:37 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + transfer ownership of stdout to the session channel by + dup2'ing /dev/null to fd 1. This allows propagation of remote stdout close to + the local side; reported by David Newall, ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 8d9ac18a11d89e6b0415f0cbf67b928ac67f0e79 + +commit 68af80e6fdeaeb79432209db614386ff0f37e75f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 25 00:19:47 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match + keyword to allow conditional configuration that depends on which rdomain(4) a + connection was recevied on. ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 27d8fd5a3f1bae18c9c6e533afdf99bff887a4fb + +commit 35eb33fb957979e3fcbe6ea0eaee8bf4a217421a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 25 00:17:08 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add sshd_config RDomain keyword to place sshd and the + subsequent user session (including the shell and any TCP/IP forwardings) into + the specified rdomain(4) + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: be2358e86346b5cacf20d90f59f980b87d1af0f5 + +commit acf559e1cffbd1d6167cc1742729fc381069f06b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 25 00:15:35 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add optional rdomain qualifier to sshd_config's + ListenAddress option to allow listening on a different rdomain(4), e.g. + + ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 rdomain 4 + + Upstream-ID: 24b6622c376feeed9e9be8b9605e593695ac9091 + +commit b9903ee8ee8671b447fc260c2bee3761e26c7227 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 24 19:41:45 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Kill dead store and some spaces vs. tabs indent in + parse_user_host_path(). Noticed by markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 114fec91dadf9af46c7c94fd40fc630ea2de8200 + +commit 0869627e00f4ee2a038cb62d7bd9ffad405e1800 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 24 06:27:42 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + tweak previous; ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 7d913981ab315296be1f759c67b6e17aea38fca9 + +commit e3fa20e2e58fdc88a0e842358778f2de448b771b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Oct 23 16:25:24 2017 +1100 + + avoid -Wsign-compare warning in argv copying + +commit b7548b12a6b2b4abf4d057192c353147e0abba08 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 23 05:08:00 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Expose devices allocated for tun/tap forwarding. + + At the client, the device may be obtained from a new %T expansion + for LocalCommand. + + At the server, the allocated devices will be listed in a + SSH_TUNNEL variable exposed to the environment of any user sessions + started after the tunnel forwarding was established. + + ok markus + + Upstream-ID: e61e53f8ae80566e9ddc0d67a5df5bdf2f3c9f9e + +commit 887669ef032d63cf07f53cada216fa8a0c9a7d72 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Oct 21 23:06:24 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add URI support to ssh, sftp and scp. For example + ssh://user@host or sftp://user@host/path. The connection parameters + described in draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04 are not implemented since + the ssh fingerprint format in the draft uses md5 with no way to specify the + hash function type. OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 4ba3768b662d6722de59e6ecb00abf2d4bf9cacc + +commit d27bff293cfeb2252f4c7a58babe5ad3262c6c98 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 20 13:22:00 2017 +1100 + + Fix missed RCSID merges + +commit d3b6aeb546242c9e61721225ac4387d416dd3d5e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 20 02:13:41 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + more RCSIDs + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 1aecbe3f8224793f0ec56741a86d619830eb33be + +commit b011edbb32e41aaab01386ce4c0efcc9ff681c4a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 20 01:56:39 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add RCSIDs to these; they make syncing portable a bit + easier + + Upstream-ID: 56cb7021faea599736dd7e7f09c2e714425b1e68 + +commit 6eb27597781dccaf0ec2b80107a9f0592a0cb464 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 20 12:54:15 2017 +1100 + + upstream commit + + Apply missing commit 1.11 to kexc25519s.c + + Upstream-ID: 5f020e23a1ee6c3597af1f91511e68552cdf15e8 + +commit 6f72280553cb6918859ebcacc717f2d2fafc1a27 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 20 12:52:50 2017 +1100 + + upstream commit + + Apply missing commit 1.127 to servconf.h + + Upstream-ID: f14c4bac74a2b7cf1e3cff6bea5c447f192a7d15 + +commit bb3e16ab25cb911238c2eb7455f9cf490cb143cc +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 18 05:36:59 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove unused Pp; + + Upstream-ID: 8ad26467f1f6a40be887234085a8e01a61a00550 + +commit 05b69e99570553c8e1eafb895b1fbf1d098d2e14 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 18 02:49:44 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + In the description of pattern-lists, clarify negated + matches by explicitly stating that a negated match will never yield a + positive result, and that at least one positive term in the pattern-list must + match. bz#1918 + + Upstream-ID: 652d2f9d993f158fc5f83cef4a95cd9d95ae6a14 + +commit eb80e26a15c10bc65fed8b8cdb476819a713c0fd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 13 21:13:54 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + log debug messages sent to peer; ok deraadt markus + + Upstream-ID: 3b4fdc0a06ea5083f61d96e20043000f477103d9 + +commit 071325f458d615d7740da5c1c1d5a8b68a0b4605 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 13 16:50:45 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + trim permitrootlogin description somewhat, to avoid + ambiguity; original diff from walter alejandro iglesias, tweaked by sthen and + myself + + ok sthen schwarze deraadt + + Upstream-ID: 1749418b2bc073f3fdd25fe21f8263c3637fe5d2 + +commit 10727487becb897a15f658e0cb2d05466236e622 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 13 06:45:18 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention SSH_USER_AUTH in the list of environment + variables + + Upstream-ID: 1083397c3ee54b4933121ab058c70a0fc6383691 + +commit 224f193d6a4b57e7a0cb2b9ecd3b6c54d721d8c2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 13 06:24:51 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + BIO_get_mem_data() is supposed to take a char* as pointer + argument, so don't pass it a const char* + + Upstream-ID: 1ccd91eb7f4dd4f0fa812d4f956987cd00b5f6ec + +commit cfa46825b5ef7097373ed8e31b01a4538a8db565 +Author: benno@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 9 20:12:51 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + clarify the order in which config statements are used. ok + jmc@ djm@ + + Upstream-ID: e37e27bb6bbac71315e22cb9690fd8a556a501ed + +commit dceabc7ad7ebc7769c8214a1647af64c9a1d92e5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 5 15:52:03 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + replace statically-sized arrays in ServerOptions with + dynamic ones managed by xrecallocarray, removing some arbitrary (though + large) limits and saving a bit of memory; "much nicer" markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 1732720b2f478fe929d6687ac7b0a97ff2efe9d2 + +commit 2b4f3ab050c2aaf6977604dd037041372615178d +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Oct 5 12:56:50 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + %C is hashed; from klemens nanni ok markus + + Upstream-ID: 6ebed7b2e1b6ee5402a67875d74f5e2859d8f998 + +commit a66714508b86d6814e9055fefe362d9fe4d49ab3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 4 18:50:23 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + exercise PermitOpen a little more thoroughly + + Upstream-Regress-ID: f41592334e227a4c1f9a983044522de4502d5eac + +commit 609ecc8e57eb88e2eac976bd3cae7f7889aaeff6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 26 22:39:25 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + UsePrivilegeSeparation is gone, stop trying to test it. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 796a5057cfd79456a20ea935cc53f6eb80ace191 + +commit 69bda0228861f3dacd4fb3d28b60ce9d103d254b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 4 18:49:30 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix (another) problem in PermitOpen introduced during the + channels.c refactor: the third and subsequent arguments to PermitOpen were + being silently ignored; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 067c89f1f53cbc381628012ba776d6861e6782fd + +commit 66bf74a92131b7effe49fb0eefe5225151869dc5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 2 19:33:20 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix PermitOpen crash; spotted by benno@, ok dtucker@ deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: c2cc84ffac070d2e1ff76182c70ca230a387983c + +commit d63b38160a59039708fd952adc75a0b3da141560 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Oct 1 10:32:25 2017 +1100 + + update URL again + + I spotted a typo in the draft so uploaded a new version... + +commit 6f64f596430cd3576c529f07acaaf2800aa17d58 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Oct 1 10:01:56 2017 +1100 + + sync release notes URL + +commit 35ff70a04dd71663a5ac1e73b90d16d270a06e0d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Oct 1 10:01:25 2017 +1100 + + sync contrib/ssh-copy-id with upstream + +commit 290843b8ede85f8b30bf29cd7dceb805c3ea5b66 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Oct 1 09:59:19 2017 +1100 + + update version in RPM spec files + +commit 4e4e0bb223c5be88d87d5798c75cc6b0d4fef31d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Oct 1 09:58:24 2017 +1100 + + update agent draft URL + +commit e4a798f001d2ecd8bf025c1d07658079f27cc604 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 30 22:26:33 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + openssh-7.6; ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: a39c3a5b63a1baae109ae1ae4c7c34c2a59acde0 + +commit 5fa1407e16e7e5fda9769d53b626ce39d5588d4d +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 27 06:45:53 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + tweak EposeAuthinfo; diff from lars nooden + + tweaked by sthen; ok djm dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 8f2ea5d2065184363e8be7a0ba24d98a3b259748 + +commit bba69c246f0331f657fd6ec97724df99fc1ad174 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Sep 28 16:06:21 2017 -0700 + + don't fatal ./configure for LibreSSL + +commit 04dc070e8b4507d9d829f910b29be7e3b2414913 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Sep 28 14:54:34 2017 -0700 + + abort in configure when only openssl-1.1.x found + + We don't support openssl-1.1.x yet (see multiple threads on the + openssh-unix-dev@ mailing list for the reason), but previously + ./configure would accept it and the compilation would subsequently + fail. This makes ./configure display an explicit error message and + abort. + + ok dtucker@ + +commit 74c1c3660acf996d9dc329e819179418dc115f2c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Sep 27 07:44:41 2017 +1000 + + Check for and handle calloc(p, 0) = NULL. + + On some platforms (AIX, maybe others) allocating zero bytes of memory + via the various *alloc functions returns NULL, which is permitted + by the standards. Autoconf has some macros for detecting this (with + the exception of calloc for some reason) so use these and if necessary + activate shims for them. ok djm@ + +commit 6a9481258a77b0b54b2a313d1761c87360c5f1f5 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 21 19:18:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + test reverse dynamic forwarding with SOCKS + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 95cf290470f7e5e2f691e4bc6ba19b91eced2f79 + +commit 1b9f321605733754df60fac8c1d3283c89b74455 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Sep 26 16:55:55 2017 +1000 + + sync missing changes in dynamic-forward.sh + +commit 44fc334c7a9ebdd08addb6d5fa005369897fddeb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Sep 25 09:48:10 2017 +1000 + + Add minimal strsignal for platforms without it. + +commit 218e6f98df566fb9bd363f6aa47018cb65ede196 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 24 13:45:34 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix inverted test on channel open failure path that + "upgraded" a transient failure into a fatal error; reported by sthen and also + seen by benno@; ok sthen@ + + Upstream-ID: b58b3fbb79ba224599c6cd6b60c934fc46c68472 + +commit c704f641f7b8777497dc82e81f2ac89afec7e401 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 24 09:50:01 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + write the correct buffer when tunnel forwarding; doesn't + matter on OpenBSD (they are the same) but does matter on portable where we + use an output filter to translate os-specific tun/tap headers + + Upstream-ID: f1ca94eff48404827b12e1d12f6139ee99a72284 + +commit 55486f5cef117354f0c64f991895835077b7c7f7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Sep 23 22:04:07 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix tunnel forwarding problem introduced in refactor; + reported by stsp@ ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 81a731cdae1122c8522134095d1a8b60fa9dcd04 + +commit 609d7a66ce578abf259da2d5f6f68795c2bda731 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 21 19:16:53 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add 'reverse' dynamic forwarding which combines dynamic + forwarding (-D) with remote forwarding (-R) where the remote-forwarded port + expects SOCKS-requests. + + The SSH server code is unchanged and the parsing happens at the SSH + clients side. Thus the full SOCKS-request is sent over the forwarded + channel and the client parses c->output. Parsing happens in + channel_before_prepare_select(), _before_ the select bitmask is + computed in the pre[] handlers, but after network input processing + in the post[] handlers. + + help and ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: aa25a6a3851064f34fe719e0bf15656ad5a64b89 + +commit 36945fa103176c00b39731e1fc1919a0d0808b81 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 20 05:19:00 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use strsignal in debug message instead of casting for the + benefit of portable where sig_atomic_t might not be int. "much nicer" + deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 2dac6c1e40511c700bd90664cd263ed2299dcf79 + +commit 3e8d185af326bf183b6f78597d5e3d2eeb2dc40e +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 19 12:10:30 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use explicit_bzero() instead of bzero() before free() to + prevent the compiler from optimizing away the bzero() call. OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: cdc6197e64c9684c7250e23d60863ee1b53cef1d + +commit 5b8da1f53854c0923ec6e927e86709e4d72737b6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 19 04:24:22 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix use-after-free in ~^Z escape handler path, introduced + in channels.c refactor; spotted by millert@ "makes sense" deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 8fa2cdc65c23ad6420c1e59444b0c955b0589b22 + +commit a3839d8d2b89ff1a80cadd4dd654336710de2c9e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 18 12:03:24 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Prevent type mismatch warning in debug on platforms where + sig_atomic_t != int. ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 306e2375eb0364a4c68e48f091739bea4f4892ed + +commit 30484e5e5f0b63d2c6ba32c6b85f06b6c6fa55fc +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 18 09:41:52 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add braces missing after channels refactor. ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 72ab325c84e010680dbc88f226e2aa96b11a3980 + +commit b79569190b9b76dfacc6d996faa482f16e8fc026 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Sep 19 12:29:23 2017 +1000 + + add freezero(3) replacement + + ok dtucker@ + +commit 161af8f5ec0961b10cc032efb5cc1b44ced5a92e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Sep 19 10:18:56 2017 +1000 + + move FORTIFY_SOURCE into hardening options group + + It's still on by default, but now it's possible to turn it off using + --without-hardening. This is useful since it's known to cause problems + with some -fsanitize options. ok dtucker@ + +commit 09eacf856e0fe1a6e3fe597ec8032b7046292914 +Author: bluhm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Sep 13 14:58:26 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Print SKIPPED if sudo and doas configuration is missing. + Prevents that running the regression test with wrong environment is reported + as failure. Keep the fatal there to avoid interfering with other setups for + portable ssh. OK dtucker@ + + Upstream-Regress-ID: f0dc60023caef496ded341ac5aade2a606fa234e + +commit cdede10899892f25f1ccdccd7a3fe5e5ef0aa49a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 7 03:52:55 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove obsolete privsep=no fallback test. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 7d6e1baa1678ac6be50c2a1555662eb1047638df + +commit ec218c105daa9f5b192f7aa890fdb2d4fdc4e9d8 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Aug 7 00:53:51 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove non-privsep test since disabling privsep is now + deprecated. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 77ad3f3d8d52e87f514a80f285c6c1229b108ce8 + +commit 239c57d5bc2253e27e3e6ad7ac52ec8c377ee24e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 28 10:32:08 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't call fatal from stop_sshd since it calls cleanup + which calls stop_sshd which will probably fail in the same way. Instead, + just bail. Differentiate between sshd dying without cleanup and not shutting + down. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: f97315f538618b349e2b0bea02d6b0c9196c6bc4 + +commit aea59a0d9f120f2a87c7f494a0d9c51eaa79b8ba +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 14 04:32:21 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Revert commitid: gJtIN6rRTS3CHy9b. + + ------------- + identify the case where SSHFP records are missing but other DNS RR + types are present and display a more useful error message for this + case; patch by Thordur Bjornsson; bz#2501; ok dtucker@ + ------------- + + This caused unexpected failures when VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes, SSHFP results + are missing but the user already has the key in known_hosts + + Spotted by dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 97e31742fddaf72046f6ffef091ec0d823299920 + +commit 871f1e4374420b07550041b329627c474abc3010 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Sep 12 18:01:35 2017 +1000 + + adapt portable to channels API changes + +commit 4ec0bb9f9ad7b4eb0af110fa8eddf8fa199e46bb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 12 07:55:48 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unused variable + + Upstream-ID: 2f9ba09f2708993d35eac5aa71df910dcc52bac1 + +commit 9145a73ce2ba30c82bbf91d7205bfd112529449f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 12 07:32:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix tun/tap forwarding case in previous + + Upstream-ID: 43ebe37a930320e24bca6900dccc39857840bc53 + +commit 9f53229c2ac97dbc6f5a03657de08a1150a9ac7e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 12 06:35:31 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Make remote channel ID a u_int + + Previously we tracked the remote channel IDs in an int, but this is + strictly incorrect: the wire protocol uses uint32 and there is nothing + in-principle stopping a SSH implementation from sending, say, 0xffff0000. + + In practice everyone numbers their channels sequentially, so this has + never been a problem. + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: b9f4cd3dc53155b4a5c995c0adba7da760d03e73 + +commit dbee4119b502e3f8b6cd3282c69c537fd01d8e16 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Sep 12 06:32:07 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + refactor channels.c + + Move static state to a "struct ssh_channels" that is allocated at + runtime and tracked as a member of struct ssh. + + Explicitly pass "struct ssh" to all channels functions. + + Replace use of the legacy packet APIs in channels.c. + + Rework sshd_config PermitOpen handling: previously the configuration + parser would call directly into the channels layer. After the refactor + this is not possible, as the channels structures are allocated at + connection time and aren't available when the configuration is parsed. + The server config parser now tracks PermitOpen itself and explicitly + configures the channels code later. + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 11828f161656b965cc306576422613614bea2d8f + +commit abd59663df37a42152e37980113ccaa405b9a282 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Sep 7 23:48:09 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + typo in comment + + Upstream-ID: a93b1e6f30f1f9b854b5b964b9fd092d0c422c47 + +commit 149a8cd24ce9dd47c36f571738681df5f31a326c +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Sep 4 06:34:43 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + tweak previous; + + Upstream-ID: bb8cc40b61b15f6a13d81da465ac5bfc65cbfc4b + +commit ec9d22cc251cc5acfe7b2bcef9cc7a1fe0e949d8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Sep 8 12:44:13 2017 +1000 + + Fuzzer harnesses for sig verify and pubkey parsing + + These are some basic clang libfuzzer harnesses for signature + verification and public key parsing. Some assembly (metaphorical) + required. + +commit de35c382894964a896a63ecd5607d3a3b93af75d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Sep 8 12:38:31 2017 +1000 + + Give configure ability to set CFLAGS/LDFLAGS later + + Some CFLAGS/LDFLAGS may disrupt the configure script's operation, + in particular santization and fuzzer options that break assumptions + about memory and file descriptor dispositions. + + This adds two flags to configure --with-cflags-after and + --with-ldflags-after that allow specifying additional compiler and + linker options that are added to the resultant Makefiles but not + used in the configure run itself. + + E.g. + + env CC=clang-3.9 ./configure \ + --with-cflags-after=-fsantize=address \ + --with-ldflags-after="-g -fsanitize=address" + +commit 22376d27a349f62c502fec3396dfe0fdcb2a40b7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Sep 3 23:33:13 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Expand ssh_config's StrictModes option with two new + settings: + + StrictModes=accept-new will automatically accept hitherto-unseen keys + but will refuse connections for changed or invalid hostkeys. + + StrictModes=off is the same as StrictModes=no + + Motivation: + + StrictModes=no combines two behaviours for host key processing: + automatically learning new hostkeys and continuing to connect to hosts + with invalid/changed hostkeys. The latter behaviour is quite dangerous + since it removes most of the protections the SSH protocol is supposed to + provide. + + Quite a few users want to automatically learn hostkeys however, so + this makes that feature available with less danger. + + At some point in the future, StrictModes=no will change to be a synonym + for accept-new, with its current behaviour remaining available via + StrictModes=off. + + bz#2400, suggested by Michael Samuel; ok markus + + Upstream-ID: 0f55502bf75fc93a74fb9853264a8276b9680b64 + +commit ff3c42384033514e248ba5d7376aa033f4a2b99a +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 1 15:41:26 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove blank line; + + Upstream-ID: 2f46b51a0ddb3730020791719e94d3e418e9f423 + +commit b828605d51f57851316d7ba402b4ae06cf37c55d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 1 05:53:56 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + identify the case where SSHFP records are missing but + other DNS RR types are present and display a more useful error message for + this case; patch by Thordur Bjornsson; bz#2501; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 8f7a5a8344f684823d8317a9708b63e75be2c244 + +commit 8042bad97e2789a50e8f742c3bcd665ebf0add32 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Sep 1 05:50:48 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + document available AuthenticationMethods; bz#2453 ok + dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 2c70576f237bb699aff59889dbf2acba4276d3d0 + +commit 71e5a536ec815d542b199f2ae6d646c0db9f1b58 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Aug 30 03:59:08 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + pass packet state down to some of the channels function + (more to come...); ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: d8ce7a94f4059d7ac1e01fb0eb01de0c4b36c81b + +commit 6227fe5b362239c872b91bbdee4bf63cf85aebc5 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 29 13:05:58 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sort options; + + Upstream-ID: cf21d68cf54e81968bca629aaeddc87f0c684f3c + +commit 530591a5795a02d01c78877d58604723918aac87 +Author: dlg@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Aug 29 09:42:29 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add a -q option to ssh-add to make it quiet on success. + + if you want to silence ssh-add without this you generally redirect + the output to /dev/null, but that can hide error output which you + should see. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 2f31b9b13f99dcf587e9a8ba443458e6c0d8997c + +commit a54eb27dd64b5eca3ba94e15cec3535124bd5029 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Aug 27 00:38:41 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Increase the buffer sizes for user prompts to ensure that + they won't be truncated by snprintf. Based on patch from cjwatson at + debian.org via bz#2768, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 6ffacf1abec8f40b469de5b94bfb29997d96af3e + +commit dd9d9b3381a4597b840d480b043823112039327e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Aug 28 16:48:27 2017 +1000 + + Switch Capsicum header to sys/capsicum.h. + + FreeBSD's was renamed to in 2014 to + avoid future conflicts with POSIX capabilities (the last release that + didn't have it was 9.3) so switch to that. Patch from des at des.no. + +commit f5e917ab105af5dd6429348d9bc463e52b263f92 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Aug 27 08:55:40 2017 +1000 + + Add missing includes for bsd-err.c. + + Patch from cjwatson at debian.org via bz#2767. + +commit 878e029797cfc9754771d6f6ea17f8c89e11d225 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Aug 25 13:25:01 2017 +1000 + + Split platform_sys_dir_uid into its own file + + platform.o is too heavy for libssh.a use; it calls into the server on + many platforms. Move just the function needed by misc.c into its own + file. + +commit 07949bfe9133234eddd01715592aa0dde67745f0 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Aug 23 20:13:18 2017 +1000 + + misc.c needs functions from platform.c now + +commit b074c3c3f820000a21953441cea7699c4b17d72f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 18 05:48:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add a "quiet" flag to exited_cleanly() that supresses + errors about exit status (failure due to signal is still reported) + + Upstream-ID: db85c39c3aa08e6ff67fc1fb4ffa89f807a9d2f0 + +commit de4ae07f12dabf8815ecede54235fce5d22e3f63 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 18 05:36:45 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Move several subprocess-related functions from various + locations to misc.c. Extend subprocess() to offer a little more control over + stdio disposition. + + feedback & ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 3573dd7109d13ef9bd3bed93a3deb170fbfce049 + +commit 643c2ad82910691b2240551ea8b14472f60b5078 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 12 06:46:01 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make "--" before the hostname terminate command-line + option processing completely; previous behaviour would not prevent further + options appearing after the hostname (ssh has a supported options after the + hostname for >20 years, so that's too late to change). + + ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: ef5ee50571b98ad94dcdf8282204e877ec88ad89 + +commit 0f3455356bc284d7c6f4d3c1614d31161bd5dcc2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Aug 12 06:42:52 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Switch from aes256-cbc to aes256-ctr for encrypting + new-style private keys. The latter having the advantage of being supported + for no-OpenSSL builds; bz#2754 ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 54179a2afd28f93470471030567ac40431e56909 + +commit c4972d0a9bd6f898462906b4827e09b7caea2d9b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 11 04:47:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + refuse to a private keys when its corresponding .pub key + does not match. bz#2737 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 54ff5e2db00037f9db8d61690f26ef8f16e0d913 + +commit 4b3ecbb663c919132dddb3758e17a23089413519 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 11 04:41:08 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't print verbose error message when ssh disconnects + under sftp; bz#2750; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 6d83708aed77b933c47cf155a87dc753ec01f370 + +commit 42a8f8bc288ef8cac504c5c73f09ed610bc74a34 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 11 04:16:35 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Tweak previous keepalive commit: if last_time + keepalive + <= now instead of just "<" so client_alive_check will fire if the select + happens to return on exact second of the timeout. ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: e02756bd6038d11bb8522bfd75a4761c3a684fcc + +commit b60ff20051ef96dfb207b6bfa45c0ad6c34a542a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Aug 11 03:58:36 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Keep track of the last time we actually heard from the + client and use this to also schedule a client_alive_check(). Prevents + activity on a forwarded port from indefinitely preventing the select timeout + so that client_alive_check() will eventually (although not optimally) be + called. + + Analysis by willchan at google com via bz#2756, feedback & ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c08721e0bbda55c6d18e2760f3fe1b17fb71169e + +commit 94bc1e7ffba3cbdea8c7dcdab8376bf29283128f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 28 14:50:59 2017 +1000 + + Expose list of completed auth methods to PAM + + bz#2408; ok dtucker@ + +commit c78e6eec78c88acf8d51db90ae05a3e39458603d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 21 14:38:16 2017 +1000 + + fix problems in tunnel forwarding portability code + + This fixes a few problems in the tun forwarding code, mostly to do + with host/network byte order confusion. + + Based on a report and patch by stepe AT centaurus.uberspace.de; + bz#2735; ok dtucker@ + +commit 2985d4062ebf4204bbd373456a810d558698f9f5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jul 25 09:22:25 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Make WinSCP patterns for SSH_OLD_DHGEX more specific to + exclude WinSCP 5.10.x and up. bz#2748, from martin at winscp.net, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 6fd7c32e99af3952db007aa180e73142ddbc741a + +commit 9f0e44e1a0439ff4646495d5735baa61138930a9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 24 04:34:28 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + g/c unused variable; make a little more portable + + Upstream-ID: 3f5980481551cb823c6fb2858900f93fa9217dea + +commit 51676ec61491ec6d7cbd06082034e29b377b3bf6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jul 23 23:37:02 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Allow IPQoS=none in ssh/sshd to not set an explicit + ToS/DSCP value and just use the operating system default; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 77906ff8c7b660b02ba7cb1e47b17d66f54f1f7e + +commit 6c1fbd5a50d8d2415f06c920dd3b1279b741072d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 21 14:24:26 2017 +1000 + + mention libedit + +commit dc2bd308768386b02c7337120203ca477e67ba62 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 19 08:30:41 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix support for unknown key types; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 53fb29394ed04d616d65b3748dee5aa06b07ab48 + +commit fd0e8fa5f89d21290b1fb5f9d110ca4f113d81d9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 19 01:15:02 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch from select() to poll() for the ssh-agent + mainloop; ok markus + + Upstream-ID: 4a94888ee67b3fd948fd10693973beb12f802448 + +commit b1e72df2b813ecc15bd0152167bf4af5f91c36d3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 14 03:18:21 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Make ""Killed by signal 1" LogLevel verbose so it's not + shown at the default level. Prevents it from appearing during ssh -J and + equivalent ProxyCommand configs. bz#1906, bz#2744, feedback&ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: debfaa7e859b272246c2f2633335d288d2e2ae28 + +commit 1f3d202770a08ee6752ed2a234b7ca6f180eb498 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jul 13 19:16:33 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + man pages with pseudo synopses which list filenames end + up creating very ugly output in man -k; after some discussion with ingo, we + feel the simplest fix is to remove such SYNOPSIS sections: the info is hardly + helpful at page top, is contained already in FILES, and there are + sufficiently few that just zapping them is simple; + + ok schwarze, who also helpfully ran things through a build to check + output; + + Upstream-ID: 3e211b99457e2f4c925c5927d608e6f97431336c + +commit 7f13a4827fb28957161de4249bd6d71954f1f2ed +Author: espie@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jul 10 14:09:59 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + zap redundant Makefile variables. okay djm@ + + Upstream-ID: e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604 + +commit dc44dd3a9e2c9795394e6a7e1e71c929cbc70ce0 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 8 18:32:54 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + slightly rework previous, to avoid an article issue; + + Upstream-ID: 15a315f0460ddd3d4e2ade1f16d6c640a8c41b30 + +commit 853edbe057a84ebd0024c8003e4da21bf2b469f7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jul 7 03:53:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + When generating all hostkeys (ssh-keygen -A), clobber + existing keys if they exist but are zero length. zero-length keys could + previously be made if ssh-keygen failed part way through generating them, so + avoid that case too. bz#2561 reported by Krzysztof Cieplucha; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: f662201c28ab8e1f086b5d43c59cddab5ade4044 + +commit 43616876ba68a2ffaece6a6c792def4b039f2d6e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 1 22:55:44 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + actually remove these files + + Upstream-ID: 1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac + +commit 83fa3a044891887369ce8b487ce88d713a04df48 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jul 1 13:50:45 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove post-SSHv1 removal dead code from rsa.c and merge + the remaining bit that it still used into ssh-rsa.c; ok markus + + Upstream-ID: ac8a048d24dcd89594b0052ea5e3404b473bfa2f + +commit 738c73dca2c99ee78c531b4cbeefc2008fe438f0 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 14 14:26:36 2017 +1000 + + make explicit_bzero/memset safe for sz=0 + +commit 8433d51e067e0829f5521c0c646b6fd3fe17e732 +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Tue Jul 11 18:47:56 2017 -0700 + + modified: configure.ac + UnixWare needs BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON like Solaris + Analysis by Robbie Zhang + +commit ff3507aea9c7d30cd098e7801e156c68faff7cc7 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jul 7 11:21:27 2017 +1000 + + typo + +commit d79bceb9311a9c137d268f5bc481705db4151810 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 30 04:17:23 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Only call close once in confree(). ssh_packet_close will + close the FD so only explicitly close non-SSH channels. bz#2734, from + bagajjal at microsoft.com, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: a81ce0c8b023527167739fccf1732b154718ab02 + +commit 197dc9728f062e23ce374f44c95a2b5f9ffa4075 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jun 29 15:40:25 2017 +1000 + + Update link for my patches. + +commit a98339edbc1fc21342a390f345179a9c3031bef7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 28 01:09:22 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Allow ssh-keygen to use a key held in ssh-agent as a CA when + signing certificates. bz#2377 ok markus + + Upstream-ID: fb42e920b592edcbb5b50465739a867c09329c8f + +commit c9cdef35524bd59007e17d5bd2502dade69e2dfb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:35:24 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + regress test for ExposeAuthInfo + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 190e5b6866376f4061c411ab157ca4d4e7ae86fd + +commit f17ee61cad25d210edab69d04ed447ad55fe80c1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 07:08:57 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correct env var name + + Upstream-ID: 721e761c2b1d6a4dcf700179f16fd53a1dadb313 + +commit 40962198e3b132cecdb32e9350acd4294e6a1082 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:57:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + spelling; + + Upstream-ID: 606f933c8e2d0be902ea663946bc15e3eee40b25 + +commit 33f86265d7e8a0e88d3a81745d746efbdd397370 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:38:11 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't pass pointer to struct sshcipher between privsep + processes, just redo the lookup in each using the already-passed cipher name. + bz#2704 based on patch from Brooks Davis; ok markus dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 2eab434c09bdf549dafd7da3e32a0d2d540adbe0 + +commit 8f574959272ac7fe9239c4f5d10fd913f8920ab0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:34:38 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + refactor authentication logging + + optionally record successful auth methods and public credentials + used in a file accessible to user sessions + + feedback and ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 090b93036967015717b9a54fd0467875ae9d32fb + +commit e2004d4bb7eb01c663dd3a3e7eb224f1ccdc9bba +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 06:28:50 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + word fix; + + Upstream-ID: 8539bdaf2366603a34a9b2f034527ca13bb795c5 + +commit 4540428cd0adf039bcf5a8a27f2d5cdf09191513 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 05:37:44 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch sshconnect.c from (slightly abused) select() to + poll(); ok deraadt@ a while back + + Upstream-ID: efc1937fc591bbe70ac9e9542bb984f354c8c175 + +commit 6f8ca3b92540fa1a9b91670edc98d15448e3d765 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 05:35:05 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use HostKeyAlias if specified instead of hostname for + matching host certificate principal names; bz#2728; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: dc2e11c83ae9201bbe74872a0c895ae9725536dd + +commit 8904ffce057b80a7472955f1ec00d7d5c250076c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 24 05:24:11 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + no need to call log_init to reinitialise logged PID in + child sessions, since we haven't called openlog() in log_init() since 1999; + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 0906e4002af5d83d3d544df75e1187c932a3cf2e + +commit e238645d789cd7eb47541b66aea2a887ea122c9b +Author: mestre@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 23 07:24:48 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + When using the escape sequence &~ the code path is + client_loop() -> client_simple_escape_filter() -> process_escapes() -> fork() + and the pledge for this path lacks the proc promise and therefore aborts the + process. The solution is to just add proc the promise to this specific + pledge. + + Reported by Gregoire Jadi gjadi ! omecha.info + Insight with tb@, OK jca@ + + Upstream-ID: 63c05e30c28209519f476023b65b0b1b0387a05b + +commit 5abbb31c4e7a6caa922cc1cbb14e87a77f9d19d3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 23 03:30:42 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Import regenerated moduli. + + Upstream-ID: b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95 + +commit 849c5468b6d9b4365784c5dd88e3f1fb568ba38f +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 23 03:25:53 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Run the screen twice so we end up with more candidate + groups. ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157 + +commit 4626e39c7053c6486c1c8b708ec757e464623f5f +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 14 00:31:38 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add user@host prefix to client's "Permisison denied" + messages, useful in particular when using "stacked" connections where it's + not clear which host is denying. bz#2720, ok djm@ markus@ + + Upstream-ID: de88e1e9dcb050c98e85377482d1287a9fe0d2be + +commit c948030d54911b2d3cddb96a7a8e9269e15d11cd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 13 12:13:59 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Do not require that unknown EXT_INFO extension values not + contain \0 characters. This would cause fatal connection errors if an + implementation sent e.g. string-encoded sub-values inside a value. + + Reported by Denis Bider; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 030e10fdc605563c040244c4b4f1d8ae75811a5c + +commit 6026f48dfca78b713e4a7f681ffa42a0afe0929e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 13 11:22:15 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + missing prototype. + + Upstream-ID: f443d2be9910fd2165a0667956d03343c46f66c9 + +commit bcd1485075aa72ba9418003f5cc27af2b049c51b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sat Jun 10 23:41:25 2017 +1000 + + portability for sftp globbed ls sort by mtime + + Include replacement timespeccmp() for systems that lack it. + Support time_t struct stat->st_mtime in addition to + timespec stat->st_mtim, as well as unsorted fallback. + +commit 072e172f1d302d2a2c6043ecbfb4004406717b96 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 10 06:36:46 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + print '?' instead of incorrect link count (that the + protocol doesn't provide) for remote listings. bz#2710 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: c611f98a66302cea452ef10f13fff8cf0385242e + +commit 72be5b2f8e7dc37235e8c4b8d0bc7b5ee1301505 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jun 10 06:33:34 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + implement sorting for globbed ls; bz#2649 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: ed3110f351cc9703411bf847ba864041fb7216a8 + +commit 5b2f34a74aa6a524cd57e856b23e1b7b25007721 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 9 06:47:13 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + return failure rather than fatal() for more cases during + mux negotiations. Causes the session to fall back to a non-mux connection if + they occur. bz#2707 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: d2a7892f464d434e1f615334a1c9d0cdb83b29ab + +commit 7f5637c4a67a49ef256cb4eedf14e8590ac30976 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 9 06:43:01 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + in description of public key authentication, mention that + the server will send debug messages to the client for some error conditions + after authentication has completed. bz#2709 ok dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 750127dbd58c5a2672c2d28bc35fe221fcc8d1dd + +commit 2076e4adb986512ce8c415dd194fd4e52136c4b4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 9 06:40:24 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + better translate libcrypto errors by looking deeper in + the accursed error stack for codes that indicate the wrong passphrase was + supplied for a PEM key. bz#2699 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 4da4286326d570f4f0489459bb71f6297e54b681 + +commit ad0531614cbe8ec424af3c0fa90c34a8e1ebee4c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 9 04:40:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add comments referring to the relevant RFC sections for + rekeying behaviour. + + Upstream-ID: 6fc8e82485757a27633f9175ad00468f49a07d40 + +commit ce9134260b9b1247e2385a1afed00c26112ba479 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Jun 9 14:43:47 2017 +1000 + + drop two more privileges in the Solaris sandbox + + Drop PRIV_DAX_ACCESS and PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO. + Patch from huieying.lee AT oracle.com via bz#2723 + +commit e0f609c8a2ab940374689ab8c854199c3c285a76 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jun 9 13:36:29 2017 +1000 + + Wrap stdint.h include in #ifdef. + +commit 1de5e47a85850526a4fdaf77185134046c050f75 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 7 01:48:15 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unbreak after sshv1 purge + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8ea01a92d5f571b9fba88c1463a4254a7552d51b + +commit 550c053168123fcc0791f9952abad684704b5760 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 6 09:12:17 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix compression output stats broken in rev 1.201. Patch + originally by Russell Coker via Debian bug #797964 and Christoph Biedl. ok + djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 83a1903b95ec2e4ed100703debb4b4a313b01016 + +commit 55d06c6e72a9abf1c06a7ac2749ba733134a1f39 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 2 06:06:10 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + rationalise the long list of manual CDIAGFLAGS that we + add; most of these were redundant to -Wall -Wextra + + Upstream-ID: ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c + +commit 1527d9f61e6d50f6c2b4a3fa5b45829034b1b0b1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 1 06:59:21 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + no need to bzero allocated space now that we use use + recallocarray; ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 53333c62ccf97de60b8cb570608c1ba5ca5803c8 + +commit cc812baf39b93d5355565da98648d8c31f955990 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 1 06:58:25 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unconditionally zero init size of buffer; ok markus@ + deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 218963e846d8f26763ba25afe79294547b99da29 + +commit 65eb8fae0d7ba45ef4483a3cf0ae7fd0dbc7c226 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jun 1 16:25:09 2017 +1000 + + avoid compiler warning + +commit 2d75d74272dc2a0521fce13cfe6388800c9a2406 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 1 06:16:43 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + some warnings spotted by clang; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 24381d68ca249c5cee4388ceb0f383fa5b43991b + +commit 151c6e433a5f5af761c78de87d7b5d30a453cf5e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jun 1 15:25:13 2017 +1000 + + add recallocarray replacement and dependency + + recallocarray() needs getpagesize() so add a tiny replacement for that. + +commit 01e6f78924da308447e71e9a32c8a6104ef4e888 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jun 1 15:16:24 2017 +1000 + + add *.0 manpage droppings + +commit 4b2e2d3fd9dccff357e1e26ce9a5f2e103837a36 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Jun 1 04:51:58 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix casts re constness + + Upstream-ID: e38f2bac162b37dbaf784d349c8327a6626fa266 + +commit 75b8af8de805c0694b37fcf80ce82783b2acc86f +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 10:54:00 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make sure we don't pass a NULL string to vfprintf + (triggered by the principals-command regress test); ok bluhm + + Upstream-ID: eb49854f274ab37a0b57056a6af379a0b7111990 + +commit 84008608c9ee944d9f72f5100f31ccff743b10f2 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 10:04:29 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use SO_ZEROIZE for privsep communication (if available) + + Upstream-ID: abcbb6d2f8039fc4367a6a78096e5d5c39de4a62 + +commit 9e509d4ec97cb3d71696f1a2f1fdad254cbbce11 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 09:15:42 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Switch to recallocarray() for a few operations. Both + growth and shrinkage are handled safely, and there also is no need for + preallocation dances. Future changes in this area will be less error prone. + Review and one bug found by markus + + Upstream-ID: 822d664d6a5a1d10eccb23acdd53578a679d5065 + +commit dc5dc45662773c0f7745c29cf77ae2d52723e55e +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 08:58:52 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + These shutdown() SHUT_RDWR are not needed before close() + ok djm markus claudio + + Upstream-ID: 36f13ae4ba10f5618cb9347933101eb4a98dbcb5 + +commit 1e0cdf8efb745d0d1116e1aa22bdc99ee731695e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 08:09:45 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + clear session keys from memory; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: ecd178819868975affd5fd6637458b7c712b6a0f + +commit 92e9fe633130376a95dd533df6e5e6a578c1e6b8 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 07:00:13 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove now obsolete ctx from ssh_dispatch_run; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 9870aabf7f4d71660c31fda91b942b19a8e68d29 + +commit 17ad5b346043c5bbc5befa864d0dbeb76be39390 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 05:34:14 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use the ssh_dispatch_run_fatal variant + + Upstream-ID: 28c5b364e37c755d1b22652b8cd6735a05c625d8 + +commit 39896b777320a6574dd06707aebac5fb98e666da +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 05:08:46 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + another ctx => ssh conversion (in GSSAPI code) + + Upstream-ID: 4d6574c3948075c60608d8e045af42fe5b5d8ae0 + +commit 6116bd4ed354a71a733c8fd0f0467ce612f12911 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed May 31 14:56:07 2017 +1000 + + fix conversion of kexc25519s.c to struct ssh too + + git cvsimport missed this commit for some reason + +commit d40dbdc85b6fb2fd78485ba02225511b8cbf20d7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 04:29:44 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + spell out that custom options/extensions should follow the + usual SSH naming rules, e.g. "extension@example.com" + + Upstream-ID: ab326666d2fad40769ec96b5a6de4015ffd97b8d + +commit 2a108277f976e8d0955c8b29d1dfde04dcbb3d5b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 04:17:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + one more void *ctx => struct ssh *ssh conversion + + Upstream-ID: d299d043471c10214cf52c03daa10f1c232759e2 + +commit c04e979503e97f52b750d3b98caa6fe004ab2ab9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 31 00:43:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix possible OOB strlen() in SOCKS4A hostname parsing; + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: c67297cbeb0e5a19d81752aa18ec44d31270cd11 + +commit a3bb250c93bfe556838c46ed965066afce61cffa +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 19:38:17 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + tweak previous; + + Upstream-ID: 66987651046c42d142f7318c9695fb81a6d14031 + +commit 1112b534a6a7a07190e497e6bf86b0d5c5fb02dc +Author: bluhm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 18:58:37 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add RemoteCommand option to specify a command in the + ssh config file instead of giving it on the client's command line. This + command will be executed on the remote host. The feature allows to automate + tasks using ssh config. OK markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 5d982fc17adea373a9c68cae1021ce0a0904a5ee + +commit eb272ea4099fd6157846f15c129ac5727933aa69 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:29:59 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch auth2 to ssh_dispatch API; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: a752ca19e2782900dd83060b5c6344008106215f + +commit 5a146bbd4fdf5c571f9fb438e5210d28cead76d9 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:27:22 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch auth2-none.c to modern APIs; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 07252b58e064d332214bcabbeae8e08c44b2001b + +commit 60306b2d2f029f91927c6aa7c8e08068519a0fa2 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:26:49 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch auth2-passwd.c to modern APIs; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: cba0a8b72b4f97adfb7e3b3fd2f8ba3159981fc7 + +commit eb76698b91338bd798c978d4db2d6af624d185e4 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:25:42 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch auth2-hostbased.c to modern APIs; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 146af25c36daeeb83d5dbbb8ca52b5d25de88f4e + +commit 2ae666a8fc20b3b871b2f1b90ad65cc027336ccd +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:23:52 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + protocol handlers all get struct ssh passed; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 0ca9ea2a5d01a6d2ded94c5024456a930c5bfb5d + +commit 94583beb24a6c5fd19cedb9104ab2d2d5cd052b6 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:19:15 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ssh: pass struct ssh to auth functions, too; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: d13c509cc782f8f19728fbea47ac7cf36f6e85dd + +commit 5f4082d886c6173b9e90b9768c9a38a3bfd92c2b +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:18:15 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sshd: pass struct ssh to auth functions; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: b00a80c3460884ebcdd14ef550154c761aebe488 + +commit 7da5df11ac788bc1133d8d598d298e33500524cc +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:16:41 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove unused wrapper functions from key.[ch]; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: ea0f4016666a6817fc11f439dd4be06bab69707e + +commit ff7371afd08ac0bbd957d90451d4dcd0da087ef5 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:15:17 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sshkey_new() might return NULL (pkcs#11 code only); ok + djm@ + + Upstream-ID: de9f2ad4a42c0b430caaa7d08dea7bac943075dd + +commit beb965bbc5a984fa69fb1e2b45ebe766ae09d1ef +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:13:40 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch sshconnect.c to modern APIs; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 27be17f84b950d5e139b7a9b281aa487187945ad + +commit 00ed75c92d1f95fe50032835106c368fa22f0f02 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 14:10:53 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch auth2-pubkey.c to modern APIs; with & ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 8f08d4316eb1b0c4ffe4a206c05cdd45ed1daf07 + +commit 54d90ace1d3535b44d92a8611952dc109a74a031 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 08:52:19 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + switch from Key typedef with struct sshkey; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 3067d33e04efbe5131ce8f70668c47a58e5b7a1f + +commit c221219b1fbee47028dcaf66613f4f8d6b7640e9 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 08:49:58 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove ssh1 references; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: fc23b7578e7b0a8daaec72946d7f5e58ffff5a3d + +commit afbfa68fa18081ef05a9cd294958509a5d3cda8b +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 30 08:49:32 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + revise sshkey_load_public(): remove ssh1 related + comments, remove extra open()/close() on keyfile, prevent leak of 'pub' if + 'keyp' is NULL, replace strlcpy+cat with asprintf; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 6175e47cab5b4794dcd99c1175549a483ec673ca + +commit 813f55336a24fdfc45e7ed655fccc7d792e8f859 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 26 20:34:49 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sshbuf_consume: reset empty buffer; ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 0d4583ba57f69e369d38bbd7843d85cac37fa821 + +commit 6cf711752cc2a7ffaad1fb4de18cae65715ed8bb +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 26 19:35:50 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove SSH_CHANNEL_XXX_DRAINING (ssh1 only); ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: e2e225b6ac67b84dd024f38819afff2554fafe42 + +commit 364f0d5edea27767fb0f915ea7fc61aded88d3e8 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 26 19:34:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove channel_input_close_confirmation (ssh1 only); ok + djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 8e7c8c38f322d255bb0294a5c0ebef53fdf576f1 + +commit 8ba0fd40082751dbbc23a830433488bbfb1abdca +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 26 01:40:07 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix references to obsolete v00 cert format; spotted by + Jakub Jelen + + Upstream-ID: 7600ce193ab8fd19451acfe24fc2eb39d46b2c4f + +commit dcc714c65cfb81eb6903095b4590719e8690f3da +Author: Mike Frysinger +Date: Wed May 24 23:21:19 2017 -0400 + + configure: actually set cache vars when cross-compiling + + The cross-compiling fallback message says it's assuming the test + passed, but it didn't actually set the cache var which causes + later tests to fail. + +commit 947a3e829a5b8832a4768fd764283709a4ca7955 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat May 20 02:35:47 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + there's no reason to artificially limit the key path + here, just check that it fits PATH_MAX; spotted by Matthew Patton + + Upstream-ID: 858addaf2009c9cf04d80164a41b2088edb30b58 + +commit 773224802d7cb250bb8b461546fcce10567b4b2e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 19 21:07:17 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Now that we no longer support SSHv1, replace the contents + of this file with a pointer to + https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-00 It's better edited, + doesn't need to document stuff we no longer implement and does document stuff + that we do implement (RSA SHA256/512 signature flags) + + Upstream-ID: da8cdc46bbcc266efabd565ddddd0d8e556f846e + +commit 54cd41a4663fad66406dd3c8fe0e4760ccd8a899 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 17 01:24:17 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow LogLevel in sshd_config Match blocks; ok dtucker + bz#2717 + + Upstream-ID: 662e303be63148f47db1aa78ab81c5c2e732baa8 + +commit 277abcda3f1b08d2376686f0ef20320160d4c8ab +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 16 16:56:15 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove duplicate check; spotted by Jakub Jelen + + Upstream-ID: 30c2996c1767616a8fdc49d4cee088efac69c3b0 + +commit adb47ce839c977fa197e770c1be8f852508d65aa +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 16 16:54:05 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention that Ed25519 keys are valid as CA keys; spotted + by Jakub Jelen + + Upstream-ID: d3f6db58b30418cb1c3058211b893a1ffed3dfd4 + +commit 6bdf70f01e700348bb4d8c064c31a0ab90896df6 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue May 9 14:35:03 2017 +1000 + + clean up regress files and add a .gitignore + +commit 7bdb2eeb1d3c26acdc409bd94532eefa252e440b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 8 22:57:38 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove hmac-ripemd160; ok dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 896e737ea0bad6e23327d1c127e02d5e9e9c654d + +commit 5f02bb1f99f70bb422be8a5c2b77ef853f1db554 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 8 06:11:06 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make requesting bad ECDSA bits yield the same error + (SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH) as the same mistake for RSA/DSA + + Upstream-ID: bf40d3fee567c271e33f05ef8e4e0fa0b6f0ece6 + +commit d757a4b633e8874629a1442c7c2e7b1b55d28c19 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 8 06:08:42 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix for new SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH error value + + Upstream-Regress-ID: c38a6e6174d4c3feca3518df150d4fbae0dca8dc + +commit 2e58a69508ac49c02d1bb6057300fa6a76db1045 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 8 06:03:39 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + helps if I commit the correct version of the file. fix + missing return statement. + + Upstream-ID: c86394a3beeb1ec6611e659bfa830254f325546c + +commit effaf526bfa57c0ac9056ca236becf52385ce8af +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 8 01:52:49 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove arcfour, blowfish and CAST here too + + Upstream-Regress-ID: c613b3bcbef75df1fe84ca4dc2d3ef253dc5e920 + +commit 7461a5bc571696273252df28a1f1578968cae506 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 8 00:21:36 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + I was too aggressive with the scalpel in the last commit; + unbreak sshd, spotted quickly by naddy@ + + Upstream-ID: fb7e75d2b2c7e6ca57dee00ca645e322dd49adbf + +commit bd636f40911094a39c2920bf87d2ec340533c152 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 7 23:15:59 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length. Improve reporting + for keys that do not meet this requirement. ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: b385e2a7b13b1484792ee681daaf79e1e203df6c + +commit 70c1218fc45757a030285051eb4d209403f54785 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 7 23:13:42 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't offer CBC ciphers by default in the client. ok + markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 94c9ce8d0d1a085052e11c7f3307950fdc0901ef + +commit acaf34fd823235d549c633c0146ee03ac5956e82 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 7 23:12:57 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + As promised in last release announcement: remove + support for Blowfish, RC4 and CAST ciphers. ok markus@ deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 21f8facdba3fd8da248df6417000867cec6ba222 + +commit 3e371bd2124427403971db853fb2e36ce789b6fd +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 5 10:42:49 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + more simplification and removal of SSHv1-related code; + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: d2f041aa0b79c0ebd98c68a01e5a0bfab2cf3b55 + +commit 2e9c324b3a7f15c092d118c2ac9490939f6228fd +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 5 10:41:58 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove superfluous protocol 2 mentions; ok jmc@ + + Upstream-ID: 0aaf7567c9f2e50fac5906b6a500a39c33c4664d + +commit 744bde79c3361e2153cb395a2ecdcee6c713585d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 4 06:10:57 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + since a couple of people have asked, leave a comment + explaining why we retain SSH v.1 support in the "delete all keys from agent" + path. + + Upstream-ID: 4b42dcfa339813c15fe9248a2c1b7ed41c21bbb4 + +commit 0c378ff6d98d80bc465a4a6a787670fb9cc701ee +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 4 01:33:21 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + another tentacle: cipher_set_key_string() was only ever + used for SSHv1 + + Upstream-ID: 7fd31eb6c48946f7e7cc12af0699fe8eb637e94a + +commit 9a82e24b986e3e0dc70849dbb2c19aa6c707b37f +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 3 21:49:18 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + restore mistakenly deleted description of the + ConnectionAttempts option ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 943002b1b7c470caea3253ba7b7348c359de0348 + +commit 768405fddf64ff83aa6ef701ebb3c1f82d98a2f3 +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 3 21:08:09 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove miscellaneous SSH1 leftovers; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: af23696022ae4d45a1abc2fb8b490d8d9dd63b7c + +commit 1a1b24f8229bf7a21f89df21987433283265527a +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 3 10:01:44 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + more protocol 1 bits removed; ok djm + + Upstream-ID: b5b977eaf756915acb56aef3604a650e27f7c2b9 + +commit 2b6f799e9b230cf13a7eefc05ecead7d8569d6b5 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 3 06:32:02 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + more protocol 1 stuff to go; ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 307a30441d2edda480fd1661d998d36665671e47 + +commit f10c0d32cde2084d2a0b19bc47d80cb93e85a093 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 17:04:09 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + rsa1 is no longer valid; + + Upstream-ID: 9953d09ed9841c44b7dcf7019fa874783a709d89 + +commit 42b690b4fd0faef78c4d68225948b6e5c46c5163 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 14:06:37 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add PubKeyAcceptedKeyTypes to the -o list: scp(1) has + it, so i guess this should too; + + Upstream-ID: 7fab32e869ca5831d09ab0c40d210b461d527a2c + +commit d852603214defd93e054de2877b20cc79c19d0c6 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 13:44:51 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove now obsolete protocol1 options from the -o + lists; + + Upstream-ID: 828e478a440bc5f9947672c392420510a362b3dd + +commit 8b60ce8d8111e604c711c4cdd9579ffe0edced74 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 09:05:58 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + more -O shuffle; ok djm + + Upstream-ID: c239991a3a025cdbb030b73e990188dd9bfbeceb + +commit 3575f0b12afe6b561681582fd3c34067d1196231 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 08:54:19 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove -1 / -2 options; pointed out by jmc@ + + Upstream-ID: 65d2a816000741a95df1c7cfdb5fa8469fcc7daa + +commit 4f1ca823bad12e4f9614895eefe0d0073b84a28f +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 08:06:33 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove options -12 from usage(); + + Upstream-ID: db7ceef25132e63b50ed05289bf447fece1d1270 + +commit 6b84897f7fd39956b849eac7810319d8a9958568 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 2 07:13:31 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + tidy up -O somewhat; ok djm + + Upstream-ID: 804405f716bf7ef15c1f36ab48581ca16aeb4d52 + +commit d1c6b7fdbdfe4a7a37ecd48a97f0796b061c2868 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 22:09:48 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + when freeing a bitmap, zero all it bytes; spotted by Ilya + Kaliman + + Upstream-ID: 834ac024f2c82389d6ea6b1c7d6701b3836e28e4 + +commit 0f163983016c2988a92e039d18a7569f9ea8e071 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 14:08:26 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + this one I did forget to "cvs rm" + + Upstream-ID: 5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913 + +commit 21ed00a8e26fe8a772bcca782175fafc2b0890ed +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 09:27:45 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't know why cvs didn't exterminate these the first + time around, I use rm -f and everuthing... + + pointed out by sobrado@ + + Upstream-ID: a6c44a0c2885330d322ee01fcfd7f6f209b1e15d + +commit d29ba6f45086703fdcb894532848ada3427dfde6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon May 1 13:53:07 2017 +1000 + + Define INT32_MAX and INT64_MAX if needed. + +commit 329037e389f02ec95c8e16bf93ffede94d3d44ce +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon May 1 13:19:41 2017 +1000 + + Wrap stdint.h in HAVE_STDINT_H + +commit f382362e8dfb6b277f16779ab1936399d7f2af78 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 02:27:11 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove unused variable + + Upstream-ID: 66011f00819d0e71b14700449a98414033284516 + +commit dd369320d2435b630a5974ab270d686dcd92d024 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:34:55 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + eliminate explicit specification of protocol in tests and + loops over protocol. We only support SSHv2 now. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 0082838a9b8a382b7ee9cbf0c1b9db727784fadd + +commit 557f921aad004be15805e09fd9572969eb3d9321 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:33:48 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove SSHv1 support from unit tests + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 395ca2aa48f1f7d23eefff6cb849ea733ca8bbfe + +commit e77e1562716fb3da413e4c2397811017b762f5e3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 1 00:03:18 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fixup setting ciphercontext->plaintext (lost in SSHv1 purge), + though it isn't really used for much anymore. + + Upstream-ID: 859b8bce84ff4865b32097db5430349d04b9b747 + +commit f7849e6c83a4e0f602dea6c834a24091c622d68e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon May 1 09:55:56 2017 +1000 + + remove configure --with-ssh1 + +commit f4a6a88ddb6dba6d2f7bfb9e2c9879fcc9633043 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:29:10 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + flense SSHv1 support from ssh-agent, considerably + simplifying it + + ok markus + + Upstream-ID: 71d772cdcefcb29f76e01252e8361e6fc2dfc365 + +commit 930e8d2827853bc2e196c20c3e000263cc87fb75 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:28:41 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + obliterate ssh1.h and some dead code that used it + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 1ca9159a9fb95618f9d51e069ac8e1131a087343 + +commit a3710d5d529a34b8f56aa62db798c70e85d576a0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:28:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + exterminate the -1 flag from scp + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 26d247f7065da15056b209cef5f594ff591b89db + +commit aebd0abfaa8a41e75d50f9f7934267b0a2d9acb4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:26:54 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + purge the last traces of SSHv1 from the TTY modes + handling code + + ok markus + + Upstream-ID: 963a19f1e06577377c38a3b7ce468f121b966195 + +commit dfa641f758d4b8b2608ab1b00abaf88df0a8e36a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:26:16 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove the (in)famous SSHv1 CRC compensation attack + detector. + + Despite your cameo in The Matrix movies, you will not be missed. + + ok markus + + Upstream-ID: 44261fce51a56d93cdb2af7b6e184be629f667e0 + +commit e5d3bd36ef67d82092861f39b5bf422cb12b31a6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:25:03 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + undo some local debugging stuff that I committed by + accident + + Upstream-ID: fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217 + +commit 3d6d09f2e90f4ad650ebda6520bf2da446f37f14 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:23:54 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove SSHv1 support from packet and buffer APIs + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: bfc290053d40b806ecac46317d300677d80e1dc9 + +commit 05164358577c82de18ed7373196bc7dbd8a3f79c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:21:54 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove SSHv1-related buffers from client code + + Upstream-ID: dca5d01108f891861ceaf7ba1c0f2eb274e0c7dd + +commit 873d3e7d9a4707d0934fb4c4299354418f91b541 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:18:44 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove KEY_RSA1 + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 7408517b077c892a86b581e19f82a163069bf133 + +commit 788ac799a6efa40517f2ac0d895a610394298ffc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:18:22 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove SSHv1 configuration options and man pages bits + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 84638c23546c056727b7a7d653c72574e0f19424 + +commit e6882463a8ae0594aacb6d6575a6318a41973d84 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:17:37 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove SSH1 make flag and associated files ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: ba9feacc5787337c413db7cf26ea3d53f854cfef + +commit cdccebdf85204bf7542b7fcc1aa2ea3f36661833 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:15:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove SSHv1 ciphers; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: e5ebc5e540d7f23a8c1266db1839794d4d177890 + +commit 97f4d3083b036ce3e68d6346a6140a22123d5864 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:13:25 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove compat20/compat13/compat15 variables + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 43802c035ceb3fef6c50c400e4ecabf12354691c + +commit 99f95ba82673d33215dce17bfa1512b57f54ec09 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:11:45 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove options.protocol and client Protocol + configuration knob + + ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 5a967f5d06e2d004b0235457b6de3a9a314e9366 + +commit 56912dea6ef63dae4eb1194e5d88973a7c6c5740 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 30 23:10:43 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unifdef WITH_SSH1 ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 9716e62a883ef8826c57f4d33b4a81a9cc7755c7 + +commit d4084cd230f7319056559b00db8b99296dad49d5 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 29 06:06:01 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + tweak previous; + + Upstream-ID: a3abc6857455299aa42a046d232b7984568bceb9 + +commit 249516e428e8461b46340a5df5d5ed1fbad2ccce +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Apr 29 04:12:25 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow ssh-keygen to include arbitrary string or flag + certificate extensions and critical options. ok markus@ dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 2cf28dd6c5489eb9fc136e0b667ac3ea10241646 + +commit 47a287bb6ac936c26b4f3ae63279c02902ded3b9 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 28 06:15:03 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sort; + + Upstream-ID: 7e6b56e52b039cf44d0418e9de9aca20a2d2d15a + +commit 36465a76a79ad5040800711b41cf5f32249d5120 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 28 14:44:28 2017 +1000 + + Typo. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 + +commit 9d18cb7bdeb00b20205fd13d412aae8c0e0457ed +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 28 14:41:17 2017 +1000 + + Add 2 regress commits I applied by hand. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c + Upstream-Regress-ID: 1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 + +commit 9504ea6b27f9f0ece64e88582ebb9235e664a100 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 28 14:33:43 2017 +1000 + + Merge integrity.sh rev 1.22. + + Merge missing bits from Colin Watson's patch in bz#2658 which make integrity + tests more robust against timeouts. ok djm@ + +commit 06ec837a34542627e2183a412d6a9d2236f22140 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 28 14:30:03 2017 +1000 + + Id sync for integrity.sh rev 1.21 which pulls in some shell portability fixes + +commit e0194b471efe7d3daedc9cc66686cb1ab69d3be8 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 17 11:02:31 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Change COMPILER_VERSION tests which limited additional + warnings to gcc4 to instead skip them on gcc3 as clang can handle + -Wpointer-sign and -Wold-style-definition. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: e48d7dc13e48d9334b8195ef884dfbc51316012f + +commit 6830be90e71f46bcd182a9202b151eaf2b299434 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 28 03:24:53 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + include key fingerprint in "Offering public key" debug + message + + Upstream-ID: 964749f820c2ed4cf6a866268b1a05e907315c52 + +commit 066437187e16dcafcbc19f9402ef0e6575899b1d +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 28 03:21:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Avoid relying on implementation-specific behavior when + detecting whether the timestamp or file size overflowed. If time_t and off_t + are not either 32-bit or 64-bit scp will exit with an error. OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: f31caae73ddab6df496b7bbbf7da431e267ad135 + +commit 68d3a2a059183ebd83b15e54984ffaced04d2742 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 28 03:20:27 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add SyslogFacility option to ssh(1) matching the + equivalent option in sshd(8). bz#2705, patch from erahn at arista.com, ok + djm@ + + Upstream-ID: d5115c2c0193ceb056ed857813b2a7222abda9ed + +commit e13aad66e73a14b062d13aee4e98f1e21a3f6a14 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 27 13:40:05 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove a static array unused since rev 1.306 spotted by + clang ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 249b3eed2446f6074ba2219ccc46919dd235a7b8 + +commit 91bd2181866659f00714903e78e1c3edd4c45f3d +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 27 11:53:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Avoid potential signed int overflow when parsing the file + size. Use strtoul() instead of parsing manually. OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 1f82640861c7d905bbb05e7d935d46b0419ced02 + +commit 17a54a03f5a1d35e33cc24e22cd7a9d0f6865dc4 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 25 08:32:27 2017 +1000 + + Fix typo in "socketcall". + + Pointed out by jjelen at redhat.com. + +commit 8b0eee148f7cf8b248c30d1bae57300f2cc5aafd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Apr 24 19:40:31 2017 +1000 + + Deny socketcall in seccomp filter on ppc64le. + + OpenSSL is using socket() calls (in FIPS mode) when handling ECDSA keys + in privsep child. The socket() syscall is already denied in the seccomp + filter, but in ppc64le kernel, it is implemented using socketcall() + syscall, which is not denied yet (only SYS_SHUTDOWN is allowed) and + therefore fails hard. + + Patch from jjelen at redhat.com. + +commit f8500b2be599053daa05248a86a743232ec6a536 +Author: schwarze@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 17 14:31:23 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Recognize nl_langinfo(CODESET) return values "646" and "" + as aliases for "US-ASCII", useful for different versions of NetBSD and + Solaris. Found by dtucker@ and by Tom G. Christensen . OK dtucker@ deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384 + +commit 7480dfedf8c5c93baaabef444b3def9331e86ad5 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 17 11:02:31 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Change COMPILER_VERSION tests which limited additional + warnings to gcc4 to instead skip them on gcc3 as clang can handle + -Wpointer-sign and -Wold-style-definition. + + Upstream-ID: 5cbe348aa76dc1adf55be6c0e388fafaa945439a + +commit 4d827f0d75a53d3952288ab882efbddea7ffadfe +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 4 00:24:56 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; + reported by Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 5d9c8f2fa8511d4ecf95322994ffe73e9283899b + +commit ef47843af0a904a21c920e619c5aec97b65dd9ac +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Mar 26 00:18:52 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + incorrect renditions of this quote bother me + + Upstream-ID: 1662be3ebb7a71d543da088119c31d4d463a9e49 + +commit d9048861bea842c4eba9c2dbbf97064cc2a5ef02 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 31 11:04:43 2017 +1100 + + Check for and use gcc's -pipe. + + Speeds up configure and build by a couple of percent. ok djm@ + +commit 282cad2240c4fbc104c2f2df86d688192cbbe4bb +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 16:34:44 2017 +1100 + + Import fmt_scaled.c rev 1.16 from OpenBSD. + + Fix overly-conservative overflow checks on mulitplications and add checks + on additions. This allows scan_scaled to work up to +/-LLONG_MAX (LLONG_MIN + will still be flagged as a range error). ok millert@ + +commit c73a229e4edf98920f395e19fd310684fc6bb951 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 16:34:02 2017 +1100 + + Import fmt_scaled.c rev 1.15 from OpenBSD. + + Collapse underflow and overflow checks into a single block. + ok djm@ millert@ + +commit d427b73bf5a564f663d16546dbcbd84ba8b9d4af +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 16:32:57 2017 +1100 + + Import fmt_scaled.c rev 1.14 from OpenBSD. + + Catch integer underflow in scan_scaled reported by Nicolas Iooss. + ok deraadt@ djm@ + +commit d13281f2964abc5f2e535e1613c77fc61b0c53e7 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 12:39:39 2017 +1100 + + Don't check privsep user or path when unprivileged + + If running with privsep (mandatory now) as a non-privileged user, we + don't chroot or change to an unprivileged user however we still checked + the existence of the user and directory. Don't do those checks if we're + not going to use them. Based in part on a patch from Lionel Fourquaux + via Corinna Vinschen, ok djm@ + +commit f2742a481fe151e493765a3fbdef200df2ea7037 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 10:50:31 2017 +1100 + + Remove SHA256 EVP wrapper implementation. + + All supported versions of OpenSSL should now have SHA256 so remove our + EVP wrapper implementaion. ok djm@ + +commit 5346f271fc76549caf4a8e65b5fba319be422fe9 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 10:23:58 2017 +1100 + + Remove check for OpenSSL < 0.9.8g. + + We no longer support OpenSSL < 1.0.1 so remove check for unreliable ECC + in OpenSSL < 0.9.8g. + +commit 8fed0a5fe7b4e78a6810b133d8e91be9742ee0a1 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 10:16:15 2017 +1100 + + Remove compat code for OpenSSL < 0.9.7. + + Resyncs that code with OpenBSD upstream. + +commit 608ec1f62ff22fdccc3952e51463d79c43cbd0d3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Mar 29 09:50:54 2017 +1100 + + Remove SSHv1 code path. + + Server-side support for Protocol 1 has been removed so remove !compat20 + PAM code path. + +commit 7af27bf538cbc493d609753f9a6d43168d438f1b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 24 09:44:56 2017 +1100 + + Enable ldns when using ldns-config. + + Actually enable ldns when attempting to use ldns-config. bz#2697, patch + from fredrik at fornwall.net. + +commit 58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Mar 22 12:43:02 2017 +1100 + + Missing header on Linux/s390 + + Patch from Jakub Jelen + +commit 096fb65084593f9f3c1fc91b6d9052759a272a00 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 20 22:08:06 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove /usr/bin/time calls around tests, makes diffing test + runs harder. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 81c1083b14dcf473b23d2817882f40b346ebc95c + +commit 6b853c6f8ba5eecc50f3b57af8e63f8184eb0fa6 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 21 08:47:55 2017 +1100 + + Fix syntax error on Linux/X32 + + Patch from Mike Frysinger + +commit d38f05dbdd291212bc95ea80648b72b7177e9f4e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Mar 20 13:38:27 2017 +1100 + + Add llabs() implementation. + +commit 72536316a219b7394996a74691a5d4ec197480f7 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 12:23:04 2017 +1100 + + crank version numbers + +commit 3be52bc36bdfd24ded7e0f46999e7db520fb4e3f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 20 01:18:59 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + openssh-7.5 + + Upstream-ID: b8b9a4a949427c393cd868215e1724ceb3467ee5 + +commit db84e52fe9cfad57f22e7e23c5fbf00092385129 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 12:07:20 2017 +1100 + + I'm a doofus. + + Unbreak obvious syntax error. + +commit 89f04852db27643717c9c3a2b0dde97ae50099ee +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 11:53:34 2017 +1100 + + on Cygwin, check paths from server for backslashes + + Pointed out by Jann Horn of Google Project Zero + +commit 7ef1f9bafc2cc8d97ff2fbd4f280002b6e8ea5d9 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 11:48:34 2017 +1100 + + Yet another synonym for ASCII: "646" + + Used by NetBSD; this unbreaks mprintf() and friends there for the C + locale (caught by dtucker@ and his menagerie of test systems). + +commit 9165abfea3f68a0c684a6ed2e575e59bc31a3a6b +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Mar 20 09:58:34 2017 +1100 + + create test mux socket in /tmp + + Creating the socket in $OBJ could blow past the (quite limited) + path limit for Unix domain sockets. As a bandaid for bz#2660, + reported by Colin Watson; ok dtucker@ + +commit 2adbe1e63bc313d03e8e84e652cc623af8ebb163 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 15 07:07:39 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + disallow KEXINIT before NEWKEYS; ok djm; report by + vegard.nossum at oracle.com + + Upstream-ID: 3668852d1f145050e62f1da08917de34cb0c5234 + +commit 2fbf91684d76d38b9cf06550b69c9e41bca5a71c +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Mar 16 14:05:46 2017 +1100 + + Include includes.h for compat bits. + +commit b55f634e96b9c5b0cd991e23a9ca181bec4bdbad +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Mar 16 13:45:17 2017 +1100 + + Wrap stdint.h in #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H + +commit 55a1117d7342a0bf8b793250cf314bab6b482b99 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Mar 16 11:22:42 2017 +1100 + + Adapt Cygwin config script to privsep knob removal + + Patch from Corinna Vinschen. + +commit 1a321bfdb91defe3c4d9cca5651724ae167e5436 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 15 03:52:30 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + accidents happen to the best of us; ok djm + + Upstream-ID: b7a9dbd71011ffde95e06f6945fe7197dedd1604 + +commit 25f837646be8c2017c914d34be71ca435dfc0e07 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 15 02:25:09 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix regression in 7.4: deletion of PKCS#11-hosted keys + would fail unless they were specified by full physical pathname. Report and + fix from Jakub Jelen via bz#2682; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 5b5bc20ca11cacb5d5eb29c3f93fd18425552268 + +commit a8c5eeacf032a7d3408957e45dd7603cc1baf55f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 15 02:19:09 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix segfault when sshd attempts to load RSA1 keys (can + only happen when protocol v.1 support is enabled for the client). Reported by + Jakub Jelen in bz#2686; ok dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 8fdaec2ba4b5f65db1d094f6714ce64b25d871d7 + +commit 66705948c0639a7061a0d0753266da7685badfec +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 07:19:07 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Mark the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option as + deprecated, effectively making privsep mandatory in sandboxing mode. ok + markus@ deraadt@ + + (note: this doesn't remove the !privsep code paths, though that will + happen eventually). + + Upstream-ID: b4c52666256c4dd865f8ce9431af5d6ce2d74a0a + +commit f86586b03fe6cd8f595289bde200a94bc2c191af +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 14 18:26:29 2017 +1100 + + Make seccomp-bpf sandbox work on Linux/X32 + + Allow clock_gettime syscall with X32 bit masked off. Apparently + this is required for at least some kernel versions. bz#2142 + Patch mostly by Colin Watson. ok dtucker@ + +commit 2429cf78dd2a9741ce27ba25ac41c535274a0af6 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 14 18:01:52 2017 +1100 + + require OpenSSL >=1.0.1 + +commit e3ea335abeab731c68f2b2141bee85a4b0bf680f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 14 17:48:43 2017 +1100 + + Remove macro trickery; no binary change + + This stops the SC_ALLOW(), SC_ALLOW_ARG() and SC_DENY() macros + prepending __NR_ to the syscall number parameter and just makes + them explicit in the macro invocations. + + No binary change in stripped object file before/after. + +commit 5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 14 13:15:18 2017 +1100 + + support ioctls for ICA crypto card on Linux/s390 + + Based on patch from Eduardo Barretto; ok dtucker@ + +commit b1b22dd0df2668b322dda174e501dccba2cf5c44 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Mar 14 14:19:36 2017 +1100 + + Plumb conversion test into makefile. + +commit f57783f1ddfb4cdfbd612c6beb5ec01cb5b9a6b9 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 01:20:29 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add unit test for convtime(). + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8717bc0ca4c21120f6dd3a1d3b7a363f707c31e1 + +commit 8884b7247d094cd11ff9e39c325ba928c5bdbc6c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 01:10:07 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add ASSERT_LONG_* helpers. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: fe15beaea8f5063c7f21b0660c722648e3d76431 + +commit c6774d21185220c0ba11e8fd204bf0ad1a432071 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 00:55:37 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix convtime() overflow test on boundary condition, + spotted by & ok djm. + + Upstream-ID: 51f14c507ea87a3022e63f574100613ab2ba5708 + +commit f5746b40cfe6d767c8e128fe50c43274b31cd594 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 14 00:25:03 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Check for integer overflow when parsing times in + convtime(). Reported by nicolas.iooss at m4x.org, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 35e6a4e98f6fa24df50bfb8ba1307cf70e966f13 + +commit f5907982f42a8d88a430b8a46752cbb7859ba979 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Mar 14 13:38:15 2017 +1100 + + Add a "unit" target to run only unit tests. + +commit 9e96b41682aed793fadbea5ccd472f862179fb02 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Mar 14 12:24:47 2017 +1100 + + Fix weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox arg inspection + + Syscall arguments are passed via an array of 64-bit values in struct + seccomp_data, but we were only inspecting the bottom 32 bits and not + even those correctly for BE systems. + + Fortunately, the only case argument inspection was used was in the + socketcall filtering so using this for sandbox escape seems + impossible. + + ok dtucker + +commit 8ff3fc3f2f7c13e8968717bc2b895ee32c441275 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 11 23:44:16 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + regress tests for loading certificates without public keys; + bz#2617 based on patch from Adam Eijdenberg; ok markus@ dtucker@ + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 0145d19328ed995b73fe2d9da33596b17429d0d0 + +commit 1e24552716194db8f2f620587b876158a9ef56ad +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 11 23:40:26 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow ssh to use certificates accompanied by a private + key file but no corresponding plain *.pub public key. bz#2617 based on patch + from Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@ markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 295668dca2c39505281577217583ddd2bd4b00b9 + +commit 0fb1a617a07b8df5de188dd5a0c8bf293d4bfc0e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Mar 11 13:07:35 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't count the initial block twice when computing how + many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode. + ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL + + Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2 + +commit ef653dd5bd5777132d9f9ee356225f9ee3379504 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 07:18:32 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + krl.c + + Upstream-ID: fc5e695d5d107d730182e2da7b23f00b489e0ee1 + +commit d94c1dfef2ea30ca67b1204ada7c3b537c54f4d0 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Sun Mar 12 10:48:14 2017 +1100 + + sync fmt_scaled.c with OpenBSD + + revision 1.13 + date: 2017/03/11 23:37:23; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +14 -1; commitid: jnFKyHkB3CEiEZ2R; + fix signed integer overflow in scan_scaled. Found by Nicolas Iooss + using AFL against ssh_config. ok deraadt@ millert@ + ---------------------------- + revision 1.12 + date: 2013/11/29 19:00:51; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +6 -5; + fairly simple unsigned char casts for ctype + ok krw + ---------------------------- + revision 1.11 + date: 2012/11/12 14:07:20; author: halex; state: Exp; lines: +4 -2; + make scan_scaled set errno to EINVAL rather than ERANGE if it encounters + an invalid multiplier, like the man page says it should + + "looks sensible" deraadt@, ok ian@ + ---------------------------- + revision 1.10 + date: 2009/06/20 15:00:04; author: martynas; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; + use llabs instead of the home-grown version; and some comment changes + ok ian@, millert@ + ---------------------------- + +commit 894221a63fa061e52e414ca58d47edc5fe645968 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 05:01:13 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + When updating hostkeys, accept RSA keys if + HostkeyAlgorithms contains any RSA keytype. Previously, ssh could ignore RSA + keys when any of the ssh-rsa-sha2-* methods was enabled in HostkeyAlgorithms + nit ssh-rsa (SHA1 signatures) was not. bz#2650 reported by Luis Ressel; ok + dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: c5e8cfee15c42f4a05d126158a0766ea06da79d2 + +commit dd3e2298663f4cc1a06bc69582d00dcfee27d73c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:24:55 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make hostname matching really insensitive to case; + bz#2685, reported by Petr Cerny; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: e467622ff154269e36ba8b6c9e3d105e1c4a9253 + +commit 77a9be9446697fe8b5499fe651f4a82a71a4b51f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:52:48 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + reword a comment to make it fit 80 columns + + Upstream-ID: 4ef509a66b96c7314bbcc87027c2af71fa9d0ba4 + +commit 61b8ef6a66efaec07e023342cb94a10bdc2254dc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:27:32 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + better match sshd config parser behaviour: fatal() if + line is overlong, increase line buffer to match sshd's; bz#2651 reported by + Don Fong; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: b175ae7e0ba403833f1ee566edf10f67443ccd18 + +commit db2597207e69912f2592cd86a1de8e948a9d7ffb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:26:06 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ensure hostname is lower-case before hashing it; + bz#2591 reported by Griff Miller II; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: c3b8b93804f376bd00d859b8bcd9fc0d86b4db17 + +commit df9936936c695f85c1038bd706d62edf752aca4b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:24:55 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make hostname matching really insensitive to case; + bz#2685, reported by Petr Cerny; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: e632b7a9bf0d0558d5ff56dab98b7cca6c3db549 + +commit 67eed24bfa7645d88fa0b883745fccb22a0e527e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:11:00 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove old null check from config dumper. Patch from + jjelen at redhat.com vi bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 824ab71467b78c4bab0dd1b3a38e8bc5f63dd528 + +commit 183ba55aaaecca0206184b854ad6155df237adbe +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 04:07:20 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix regression in 7.4 server-sig-algs, where we were + accidentally excluding SHA2 RSA signature methods. bz#2680, patch from Nuno + Goncalves; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 81ac8bfb30960447740b9b8f6a214dcf322f12e8 + +commit 66be4fe8c4435af5bbc82998501a142a831f1181 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:53:11 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Check for NULL return value from key_new. Patch from + jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 059e33cd43cba88dc8caf0b1936fd4dd88fd5b8e + +commit ec2892b5c7fea199914cb3a6afb3af38f84990bf +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:52:48 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + reword a comment to make it fit 80 columns + + Upstream-ID: b4b48b4487c0821d16e812c40c9b09f03b28e349 + +commit 7fadbb6da3f4122de689165651eb39985e1cba85 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:48:57 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Check for NULL argument to sshkey_read. Patch from + jjelen at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c2d00c2ea50c4861d271d0a586f925cc64a87e0e + +commit 5a06b9e019e2b0b0f65a223422935b66f3749de3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:45:40 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Plug some mem leaks mostly on error paths. From jjelen + at redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 3fb030149598957a51b7c8beb32bf92cf30c96f2 + +commit f6edbe9febff8121f26835996b1229b5064d31b7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:24:48 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Plug mem leak on GLOB_NOMATCH case. From jjelen at + redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 8016a7ae97719d3aa55fb723fc2ad3200058340d + +commit 566b3a46e89a2fda2db46f04f2639e92da64a120 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:22:40 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Plug descriptor leaks of auth_sock. From jjelen at + redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 248acb99a5ed2fdca37d1aa33c0fcee7be286d88 + +commit 8a2834454c73dfc1eb96453c0e97690595f3f4c2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:18:24 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correctly hash hosts with a port number. Reported by Josh + Powers in bz#2692; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 468e357ff143e00acc05bdd2803a696b3d4b6442 + +commit 9747b9c742de409633d4753bf1a752cbd211e2d3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 03:15:58 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't truncate off \r\n from long stderr lines; bz#2688, + reported by Brian Dyson; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: cdfdc4ba90639af807397ce996153c88af046ca4 + +commit 4a4b75adac862029a1064577eb5af299b1580cdd +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 10 02:59:51 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Validate digest arg in ssh_digest_final; from jjelen at + redhat.com via bz#2687, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: dbe5494dfddfe523fab341a3dab5a79e7338f878 + +commit bee0167be2340d8de4bdc1ab1064ec957c85a447 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 10 13:40:18 2017 +1100 + + Check for NULL from malloc. + + Part of bz#2687, from jjelen at redhat.com. + +commit da39b09d43b137a5a3d071b51589e3efb3701238 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Mar 10 13:22:32 2017 +1100 + + If OSX is using launchd, remove screen no. + + Check for socket with and without screen number. From Apple and Jakob + Schlyter via bz#2341, with contributions from Ron Frederick, ok djm@ + +commit 8fb15311a011517eb2394bb95a467c209b8b336c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 8 12:07:47 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + quote [host]:port in generated ProxyJump commandline; the + [ / ] characters can confuse some shells (e.g. zsh). Reported by Lauri + Tirkkonen via bugs@ + + Upstream-ID: 65cdd161460e1351c3d778e974c1c2a4fa4bc182 + +commit 18501151cf272a15b5f2c5e777f2e0933633c513 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 6 02:03:20 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Check l->hosts before dereferencing; fixes potential null + pointer deref. ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 81c0327c6ec361da794b5c680601195cc23d1301 + +commit d072370793f1a20f01ad827ba8fcd3b8f2c46165 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 6 00:44:51 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + linenum is unsigned long so use %lu in log formats. ok + deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: 9dc582d9bb887ebe0164e030d619fc20b1a4ea08 + +commit 12d3767ba4c84c32150cbe6ff6494498780f12c9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Mar 3 06:13:11 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix ssh-keygen -H accidentally corrupting known_hosts that + contained already-hashed entries. HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED is only set by + hostkeys_foreach() when hostname matching is in use, so we need to look for + the hash marker explicitly. + + Upstream-ID: da82ad653b93e8a753580d3cf5cd448bc2520528 + +commit d7abb771bd5a941b26144ba400a34563a1afa589 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 28 06:10:08 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + small memleak: free fd_set on connection timeout (though + we are heading to exit anyway). From Tom Rix in bz#2683 + + Upstream-ID: 10e3dadbb8199845b66581473711642d9e6741c4 + +commit 78142e3ab3887e53a968d6e199bcb18daaf2436e +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 27 14:30:33 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + errant dot; from klemens nanni + + Upstream-ID: 83d93366a5acf47047298c5d3ebc5e7426f37921 + +commit 8071a6924c12bb51406a9a64a4b2892675112c87 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 24 03:16:34 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + might as well set the listener socket CLOEXEC + + Upstream-ID: 9c538433d6a0ca79f5f21decc5620e46fb68ab57 + +commit d5499190559ebe374bcdfa8805408646ceffad64 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Feb 19 00:11:29 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add test cases for C locale; ok schwarze@ + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 783d75de35fbc923d46e2a5e6cee30f8f381ba87 + +commit 011c8ffbb0275281a0cf330054cf21be10c43e37 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Feb 19 00:10:57 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add a common nl_langinfo(CODESET) alias for US-ASCII + "ANSI_X3.4-1968" that is used by Linux. Fixes mprintf output truncation for + non-UTF-8 locales on Linux spotted by dtucker@; ok deraadt@ schwarze@ + + Upstream-ID: c6808956ebffd64066f9075d839f74ff0dd60719 + +commit 0c4430a19b73058a569573492f55e4c9eeaae67b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Feb 7 23:03:11 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove deprecated SSH1 options RSAAuthentication and + RhostsRSAAuthentication from regression test sshd_config. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8066b753d9dce7cf02ff87af5c727ff680d99491 + +commit 3baa4cdd197c95d972ec3d07f1c0d08f2d7d9199 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 17 02:32:05 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Do not show rsa1 key type in usage when compiled without + SSH1 support. + + Upstream-ID: 068b5c41357a02f319957746fa4e84ea73960f57 + +commit ecc35893715f969e98fee118481f404772de4132 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 17 02:31:14 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ifdef out "rsa1" from the list of supported keytypes when + compiled without SSH1 support. Found by kdunlop at guralp.com, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: cea93a26433d235bb1d64b1d990f19a9c160a70f + +commit 10577c6d96a55b877a960b2d0b75edef1b9945af +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 17 02:04:15 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + For ProxyJump/-J, surround host name with brackets to + allow literal IPv6 addresses. From Dick Visser; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 3a5d3b0171250daf6a5235e91bce09c1d5746bf1 + +commit b2afdaf1b52231aa23d2153f4a8c5a60a694dda4 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 15 23:38:31 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix memory leaks in match_filter_list() error paths. + + ok dtucker@ markus@ + + Upstream-ID: c7f96ac0877f6dc9188bbc908100a8d246cc7f0e + +commit 6d5a41b38b55258213ecfaae9df7a758caa752a1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 15 01:46:47 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix division by zero crash in "df" output when server + returns zero total filesystem blocks/inodes. Spotted by Guido Vranken; ok + dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 6fb6c2ae6b289aa07b6232dbc0be54682ef5419f + +commit bd5d7d239525d595ecea92765334af33a45d9d63 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Sun Feb 12 15:45:15 2017 +1100 + + ifdef out EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR + + EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0 so ifdef out + for the benefit of OpenSSL versions prior to that. + +commit 155d540d00ff55f063421ec182ec8ff2b7ab6cbe +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 10 04:34:50 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + bring back r1.34 that was backed out for problems loading + public keys: + + translate OpenSSL error codes to something more + meaninful; bz#2522 reported by Jakub Jelen, ok dtucker@ + + with additional fix from Jakub Jelen to solve the backout. + bz#2525 bz#2523 re-ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: a9d5bc0306f4473d9b4f4484f880e95f3c1cc031 + +commit a287c5ad1e0bf9811c7b9221979b969255076019 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 10 03:36:40 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Sanitise escape sequences in key comments sent to printf + but preserve valid UTF-8 when the locale supports it; bz#2520 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: e8eed28712ba7b22d49be534237eed019875bd1e + +commit e40269be388972848aafcca7060111c70aab5b87 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 8 20:32:43 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Avoid printf %s NULL. From semarie@, OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 06beef7344da0208efa9275d504d60d2a5b9266c + +commit 5b90709ab8704dafdb31e5651073b259d98352bc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Feb 6 09:22:51 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Restore \r\n newline sequence for server ident string. The CR + got lost in the flensing of SSHv1. Pointed out by Stef Bon + + Upstream-ID: 5333fd43ce5396bf5999496096fac5536e678fac + +commit 97c31c46ee2e6b46dfffdfc4f90bbbf188064cbc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 23:01:42 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unit test for match_filter_list() function; still want a + better name for this... + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 840ad6118552c35111f0a897af9c8d93ab8de92a + +commit f1a193464a7b77646f0d0cedc929068e4a413ab4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 23:05:57 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use ssh_packet_set_log_preamble() to include connection + username in packet log messages, e.g. + + Connection closed by invalid user foo 10.1.1.1 port 44056 [preauth] + + ok markus@ bz#113 + + Upstream-ID: 3591b88bdb5416d6066fb3d49d8fff2375bf1a15 + +commit 07edd7e9537ab32aa52abb5fb2a915c350fcf441 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 23:03:33 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add ssh_packet_set_log_preamble() to allow inclusion of a + preamble string in disconnect messages; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 34cb41182cd76d414c214ccb01c01707849afead + +commit 68bc8cfa7642d3ccbf2cd64281c16b8b9205be59 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 23:01:19 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + support =- for removing methods from algorithms lists, + e.g. Ciphers=-*cbc; suggested by Cristian Ionescu-Idbohrn in bz#2671 "I like + it" markus@ + + Upstream-ID: c78c38f9f81a963b33d0eade559f6048add24a6d + +commit c924b2ef941028a1f31e6e94f54dfeeeef462a4e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 05:05:56 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow form-feed characters at EOL; bz#2431 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 1f453afaba6da2ae69d6afdf1ae79a917552f1a2 + +commit 523db8540b720c4d21ab0ff6f928476c70c38aab +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Feb 3 16:01:22 2017 +1100 + + prefer to use ldns-config to find libldns + + Should fix bz#2603 - "Build with ldns and without kerberos support + fails if ldns compiled with kerberos support" by including correct + cflags/libs + + ok dtucker@ + +commit c998bf0afa1a01257a53793eba57941182e9e0b7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Feb 3 02:56:00 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Make ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits take u32 for the number of + seconds until rekeying (negative values are rejected at config parse time). + This allows the removal of some casts and a signed vs unsigned comparison + warning. + + rekey_time is cast to int64 for the comparison which is a no-op + on OpenBSD, but should also do the right thing in -portable on + anything still using 32bit time_t (until the system time actually + wraps, anyway). + + some early guidance deraadt@, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c9f18613afb994a07e7622eb326f49de3d123b6c + +commit 3ec5fa4ba97d4c4853620daea26a33b9f1fe3422 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Feb 2 10:54:25 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + In vasnmprintf() return an error if malloc fails and + don't set a function argument to the address of free'd memory. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 1efffffff2f51d53c9141f245b90ac23d33b9779 + +commit 858252fb1d451ebb0969cf9749116c8f0ee42753 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Feb 1 02:59:09 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Return true reason for port forwarding failures where + feasible rather than always "administratively prohibited". bz#2674, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: d901d9887951774e604ca970e1827afaaef9e419 + +commit 6ba9f893838489add6ec4213c7a997b425e4a9e0 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 23:27:39 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Small correction to the known_hosts section on when it is + updated. Patch from lkppo at free.fr some time ago, pointed out by smallm at + sdf.org + + Upstream-ID: 1834d7af179dea1a12ad2137f84566664af225d5 + +commit c61d5ec3c11e7ff9779b6127421d9f166cf10915 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Feb 3 14:10:34 2017 +1100 + + Remove _XOPEN_SOURCE from wide char detection. + + Having _XOPEN_SOURCE unconditionally causes problems on some platforms + and configurations, notably Solaris 64-bit binaries. It was there for + the benefit of Linux put the required bits in the *-*linux* section. + + Patch from yvoinov at gmail.com. + +commit f25ee13b3e81fd80efeb871dc150fe49d7fc8afd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 05:22:14 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fully unbreak: some $SSH invocations did not have -F + specified and could pick up the ~/.ssh/config of the user running the tests + + Upstream-Regress-ID: f362d1892c0d3e66212d5d3fc02d915c58ef6b89 + +commit 6956e21fb26652887475fe77ea40d2efcf25908b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 04:54:07 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + partially unbreak: was not specifying hostname on some + $SSH invocations + + Upstream-Regress-ID: bc8a5e98e57bad0a92ef4f34ed91c1d18294e2cc + +commit 52763dd3fe0a4678dafdf7aeb32286e514130afc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 01:03:00 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + revise keys/principals command hang fix (bz#2655) to + consume entire output, avoiding sending SIGPIPE to subprocesses early; ok + dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 7cb04b31a61f8c78c4e48ceededcd2fd5c4ee1bc + +commit 381a2615a154a82c4c53b787f4a564ef894fe9ac +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 00:38:50 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + small cleanup post SSHv1 removal: + + remove SSHv1-isms in commented examples + + reorder token table to group deprecated and compile-time conditional tokens + better + + fix config dumping code for some compile-time conditional options that + weren't being correctly skipped (SSHv1 and PKCS#11) + + Upstream-ID: f2e96b3cb3158d857c5a91ad2e15925df3060105 + +commit 4833d01591b7eb049489d9558b65f5553387ed43 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 00:34:01 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + some explicit NULL tests when dumping configured + forwardings; from Karsten Weiss + + Upstream-ID: 40957b8dea69672b0e50df6b4a91a94e3e37f72d + +commit 326e2fae9f2e3e067b5651365eba86b35ee5a6b2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 00:32:28 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + misplaced braces in test; from Karsten Weiss + + Upstream-ID: f7b794074d3aae8e35b69a91d211c599c94afaae + +commit 3e032a95e46bfaea9f9e857678ac8fa5f63997fb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jan 30 00:32:03 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't dereference authctxt before testing != NULL, it + causes compilers to make assumptions; from Karsten Weiss + + Upstream-ID: 794243aad1e976ebc717885b7a97a25e00c031b2 + +commit 01cfaa2b1cfb84f3cdd32d1bf82b120a8d30e057 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:51:16 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use correct ssh-add program; bz#2654, from Colin Watson + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 7042a36e1bdaec6562f6e57e9d047efe9c7a6030 + +commit e5c7ec67cdc42ae2584085e0fc5cc5ee91133cf5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:26:10 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Account for timeouts in the integrity tests as failures. + + If the first test in a series for a given MAC happens to modify the low + bytes of a packet length, then ssh will time out and this will be + interpreted as a test failure. Patch from cjwatson at debian.org via + bz#2658. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: e7467613b0badedaa300bc6fc7495ec2f44e2fb9 + +commit dbaf599b61bd6e0f8469363a8c8e7f633b334018 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:09:25 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Make forwarding test less racy by using unix domain + sockets instead of TCP ports where possible. Patch from cjwatson at + debian.org via bz#2659. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 4756375aac5916ef9d25452a1c1d5fa9e90299a9 + +commit 9390b0031ebd6eb5488d3bc4d4333c528dffc0a6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Jan 29 21:35:23 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix typo in ~C error message for bad port forward + cancellation. bz#2672, from Brad Marshall via Colin Watson and Ubuntu's + bugtracker. + + Upstream-ID: 0d4a7e5ead6cc59c9a44b4c1e5435ab3aada09af + +commit 4ba15462ca38883b8a61a1eccc093c79462d5414 +Author: guenther@openbsd.org +Date: Sat Jan 21 11:32:04 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + The POSIX APIs that that sockaddrs all ignore the s*_len + field in the incoming socket, so userspace doesn't need to set it unless it + has its own reasons for tracking the size along with the sockaddr. + + ok phessler@ deraadt@ florian@ + + Upstream-ID: ca6e49e2f22f2b9e81d6d924b90ecd7e422e7437 + +commit a1187bd3ef3e4940af849ca953a1b849dae78445 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 16:28:12 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + keep the tokens list sorted; + + Upstream-ID: b96239dae4fb3aa94146bb381afabcc7740a1638 + +commit b64077f9767634715402014f509e58decf1e140d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 09:27:52 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix previous + + Upstream-ID: c107d6a69bc22325d79fbf78a2a62e04bcac6895 + +commit 5e820e9ea2e949aeb93071fe31c80b0c42f2b2de +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 03:53:58 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + show a useful error message when included config files + can't be opened; bz#2653, ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: f598b73b5dfe497344cec9efc9386b4e5a3cb95b + +commit 13bd2e2d622d01dc85d22b94520a5b243d006049 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 03:45:41 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sshd_config is documented to set + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck=yes by default, so actually make it do this. + bz#2637 ok dtucker + + Upstream-ID: 99ef8ac51f17f0f7aec166cb2e34228d4d72a665 + +commit f89b928534c9e77f608806a217d39a2960cc7fd0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 03:41:58 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Avoid confusing error message when attempting to use + ssh-keyscan built without SSH protocol v.1 to scan for v.1 keys; bz#2583 + + Upstream-ID: 5d214abd3a21337d67c6dcc5aa6f313298d0d165 + +commit 0999533014784579aa6f01c2d3a06e3e8804b680 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jan 6 02:34:54 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Re-add '%k' token for AuthorizedKeysCommand which was + lost during the re-org in rev 1.235. bz#2656, from jboning at gmail.com. + + Upstream-ID: 2884e203c02764d7b3fe7472710d9c24bdc73e38 + +commit 51045869fa084cdd016fdd721ea760417c0a3bf3 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 4 05:37:40 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unbreak Unix domain socket forwarding for root; ok + markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 6649c76eb7a3fa15409373295ca71badf56920a2 + +commit 58fca12ba967ea5c768653535604e1522d177e44 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Jan 16 09:08:32 2017 +1100 + + Remove LOGIN_PROGRAM. + + UseLogin is gone, remove leftover. bz#2665, from cjwatson at debian.org + +commit b108ce92aae0ca0376dce9513d953be60e449ae1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jan 4 02:21:43 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + relax PKCS#11 whitelist a bit to allow libexec as well as + lib directories. + + Upstream-ID: cf5617958e2e2d39f8285fd3bc63b557da484702 + +commit c7995f296b9222df2846f56ecf61e5ae13d7a53d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jan 3 05:46:51 2017 +0000 + + upstream commit + + check number of entries in SSH2_FXP_NAME response; avoids + unreachable overflow later. Reported by Jann Horn + + Upstream-ID: b6b2b434a6d6035b1644ca44f24cd8104057420f + +commit ddd3d34e5c7979ca6f4a3a98a7d219a4ed3d98c2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 30 22:08:02 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix deadlock when keys/principals command produces a lot of + output and a key is matched early; bz#2655, patch from jboning AT gmail.com + + Upstream-ID: e19456429bf99087ea994432c16d00a642060afe + +commit 30eee7d1b2fec33c14870cc11910610be5d2aa6f +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 20 12:16:11 2016 +1100 + + Re-add missing "Prerequisites" header and fix typo + + Patch from HARUYAMA Seigo . + +commit c8c60f3663165edd6a52632c6ddbfabfce1ca865 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 19 22:35:23 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use standard /bin/sh equality test; from Mike Frysinger + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 7b6f0b63525f399844c8ac211003acb8e4b0bec2 + +commit 4a354fc231174901f2629437c2a6e924a2dd6772 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Dec 19 15:59:26 2016 +1100 + + crank version numbers for release + +commit 5f8d0bb8413d4d909cc7aa3c616fb0538224c3c9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 19 04:55:51 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + openssh-7.4 + + Upstream-ID: 1ee404adba6bbe10ae9277cbae3a94abe2867b79 + +commit 3a8213ea0ed843523e34e55ab9c852332bab4c7b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 19 04:55:18 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove testcase that depends on exact output and + behaviour of snprintf(..., "%s", NULL) + + Upstream-Regress-ID: cab4288531766bd9593cb556613b91a2eeefb56f + +commit eae735a82d759054f6ec7b4e887fb7a5692c66d7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Dec 19 03:32:57 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use LOGNAME to get current user and fall back to whoami if + not set. Mainly to benefit -portable since some platforms don't have whoami. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: e3a16b7836a3ae24dc8f8a4e43fdf8127a60bdfa + +commit 0d2f88428487518eea60602bd593989013831dcf +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 03:51:19 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add regression test for AllowUsers and DenyUsers. Patch from + Zev Weiss + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 8f1aac24d52728398871dac14ad26ea38b533fb9 + +commit 3bc8180a008929f6fe98af4a56fb37d04444b417 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Dec 16 15:02:24 2016 +1100 + + Add missing monitor.h include. + + Fixes warning pointed out by Zev Weiss + +commit 410681f9015d76cc7b137dd90dac897f673244a0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 02:48:55 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + revert to rev1.2; the new bits in this test depend on changes + to ssh that aren't yet committed + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 828ffc2c7afcf65d50ff2cf3dfc47a073ad39123 + +commit 2f2ffa4fbe4b671bbffa0611f15ba44cff64d58e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 01:06:27 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Move the "stop sshd" code into its own helper function. + Patch from Zev Weiss , ok djm@ + + Upstream-Regress-ID: a113dea77df5bd97fb4633ea31f3d72dbe356329 + +commit e15e7152331e3976b35475fd4e9c72897ad0f074 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 16 01:01:07 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + regression test for certificates along with private key + with no public half. bz#2617, mostly from Adam Eijdenberg + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 2e74dc2c726f4dc839609b3ce045466b69f01115 + +commit 9a70ec085faf6e55db311cd1a329f1a35ad2a500 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 15 23:50:37 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use $SUDO to read pidfile in case root's umask is + restricted. From portable. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: f6b1c7ffbc5a0dfb7d430adb2883344899174a98 + +commit fe06b68f824f8f55670442fb31f2c03526dd326c +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 15 21:29:05 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add missing braces in DenyUsers code. Patch from zev at + bewilderbeest.net, ok deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: d747ace338dcf943b077925f90f85f789714b54e + +commit dcc7d74242a574fd5c4afbb4224795b1644321e7 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Dec 15 21:20:41 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix text in error message. Patch from zev at + bewilderbeest.net. + + Upstream-ID: deb0486e175e7282f98f9a15035d76c55c84f7f6 + +commit b737e4d7433577403a31cff6614f6a1b0b5e22f4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Dec 14 00:36:34 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is + disabled + + Upstream-ID: ab61516ae0faadad407857808517efa900a0d6d0 + +commit 08a1e7014d65c5b59416a0e138c1f73f417496eb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Dec 9 03:04:29 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + log connections dropped in excess of MaxStartups at + verbose LogLevel; bz#2613 based on diff from Tomas Kuthan; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 703ae690dbf9b56620a6018f8a3b2389ce76d92b + +commit 10e290ec00964b2bf70faab15a10a5574bb80527 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 13 13:51:32 2016 +1100 + + Get default of TEST_SSH_UTF8 from environment. + +commit b9b8ba3f9ed92c6220b58d70d1e6d8aa3eea1104 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 13 12:56:40 2016 +1100 + + Remove commented-out includes. + + These commented-out includes have "Still needed?" comments. Since + they've been commented out for ~13 years I assert that they're not. + +commit 25275f1c9d5f01a0877d39444e8f90521a598ea0 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 13 12:54:23 2016 +1100 + + Add prototype for strcasestr in compat library. + +commit afec07732aa2985142f3e0b9a01eb6391f523dec +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Dec 13 10:23:03 2016 +1100 + + Add strcasestr to compat library. + + Fixes build on (at least) Solaris 10. + +commit dda78a03af32e7994f132d923c2046e98b7c56c8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Mon Dec 12 13:57:10 2016 +1100 + + Force Turkish locales back to C/POSIX; bz#2643 + + Turkish locales are unique in their handling of the letters 'i' and + 'I' (yes, they are different letters) and OpenSSH isn't remotely + prepared to deal with that. For now, the best we can do is to force + OpenSSH to use the C/POSIX locale and try to preserve the UTF-8 + encoding if possible. + + ok dtucker@ + +commit c35995048f41239fc8895aadc3374c5f75180554 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Dec 9 12:52:02 2016 +1100 + + exit is in stdlib.h not unistd.h (that's _exit). + +commit d399a8b914aace62418c0cfa20341aa37a192f98 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Dec 9 12:33:25 2016 +1100 + + Include for exit in utf8 locale test. + +commit 47b8c99ab3221188ad3926108dd9d36da3b528ec +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Dec 8 15:48:34 2016 +1100 + + Check for utf8 local support before testing it. + + Check for utf8 local support and if not found, do not attempt to run the + utf8 tests. Suggested by djm@ + +commit 4089fc1885b3a2822204effbb02b74e3da58240d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Dec 8 12:57:24 2016 +1100 + + Use AC_PATH_TOOL for krb5-config. + + This will use the host-prefixed version when cross compiling; patch from + david.michael at coreos.com. + +commit b4867e0712c89b93be905220c82f0a15e6865d1e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Dec 6 07:48:01 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make IdentityFile successfully load and use certificates that + have no corresponding bare public key. E.g. just a private id_rsa and + certificate id_rsa-cert.pub (and no id_rsa.pub). + + bz#2617 ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: c1e9699b8c0e3b63cc4189e6972e3522b6292604 + +commit c9792783a98881eb7ed295680013ca97a958f8ac +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Nov 25 14:04:21 2016 +1100 + + Add a gnome-ssh-askpass3 target for GTK+3 version + + Based on patch from Colin Watson via bz#2640 + +commit 7be85ae02b9de0993ce0a1d1e978e11329f6e763 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Nov 25 14:03:53 2016 +1100 + + Make gnome-ssh-askpass2.c GTK+3-friendly + + Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2640 + +commit b9844a45c7f0162fd1b5465683879793d4cc4aaa +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 4 23:54:02 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix public key authentication when multiple + authentication is in use. Instead of deleting and re-preparing the entire + keys list, just reset the 'used' flags; the keys list is already in a good + order (with already- tried keys at the back) + + Analysis and patch from Vincent Brillault on bz#2642; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 7123f12dc2f3bcaae715853035a97923d7300176 + +commit f2398eb774075c687b13af5bc22009eb08889abe +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Dec 4 22:27:25 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Unlink PidFile on SIGHUP and always recreate it when the + new sshd starts. Regression tests (and possibly other things) depend on the + pidfile being recreated after SIGHUP, and unlinking it means it won't contain + a stale pid if sshd fails to restart. ok djm@ markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 132dd6dda0c77dd49d2f15b2573b5794f6160870 + +commit 85aa2efeba51a96bf6834f9accf2935d96150296 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 30 03:01:33 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + test new behaviour of cert force-command restriction vs. + authorized_key/ principals + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 399efa7469d40c404c0b0a295064ce75d495387c + +commit 5d333131cd8519d022389cfd3236280818dae1bc +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 30 06:54:26 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + tweak previous; while here fix up FILES and AUTHORS; + + Upstream-ID: 93f6e54086145a75df8d8ec7d8689bdadbbac8fa + +commit 786d5994da79151180cb14a6cf157ebbba61c0cc +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 30 03:07:37 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load + (via ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: fe79769469d9cd6d26fe0dc15751b83ef2a06e8f + +commit 7844f357cdd90530eec81340847783f1f1da010b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 30 03:00:05 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add a sshd_config DisableForwaring option that disables + X11, agent, TCP, tunnel and Unix domain socket forwarding, as well as + anything else we might implement in the future. + + This, like the 'restrict' authorized_keys flag, is intended to be a + simple and future-proof way of restricting an account. Suggested as + a complement to 'restrict' by Jann Horn; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 203803f66e533a474086b38a59ceb4cf2410fcf7 + +commit fd6dcef2030d23c43f986d26979f84619c10589d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 30 02:57:40 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and + an authorized keys/principals command= restriction, refuse to accept the + certificate unless they are identical. + + The previous (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced- + command override the other could be a bit confused and more error-prone. + + Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 79d811b6eb6bbe1221bf146dde6928f92d2cd05f + +commit 7fc4766ac78abae81ee75b22b7550720bfa28a33 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 30 00:28:31 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + On startup, check to see if sshd is already daemonized + and if so, skip the call to daemon() and do not rewrite the PidFile. This + means that when sshd re-execs itself on SIGHUP the process ID will no longer + change. Should address bz#2641. ok djm@ markus@. + + Upstream-ID: 5ea0355580056fb3b25c1fd6364307d9638a37b9 + +commit c9f880c195c65f1dddcbc4ce9d6bfea7747debcc +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Nov 30 13:51:49 2016 +1100 + + factor out common PRNG reseed before privdrop + + Add a call to RAND_poll() to ensure than more than pid+time gets + stirred into child processes states. Prompted by analysis from Jann + Horn at Project Zero. ok dtucker@ + +commit 79e4829ec81dead1b30999e1626eca589319a47f +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 25 03:02:01 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Allow PuTTY interop tests to run unattended. bz#2639, + patch from cjwatson at debian.org. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 4345253558ac23b2082aebabccd48377433b6fe0 + +commit 504c3a9a1bf090f6b27260fc3e8ea7d984d163dc +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 25 02:56:49 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Reverse args to sshd-log-wrapper. Matches change in + portable, where it allows sshd do be optionally run under Valgrind. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: b438d1c6726dc5caa2a45153e6103a0393faa906 + +commit bd13017736ec2f8f9ca498fe109fb0035f322733 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 25 02:49:18 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix typo in trace message; from portable. + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 4c4a2ba0d37faf5fd230a91b4c7edb5699fbd73a + +commit 7da751d8b007c7f3e814fd5737c2351440d78b4c +Author: tb@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 1 13:43:27 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Clean up MALLOC_OPTIONS. For the unittests, move + MALLOC_OPTIONS and TEST_ENV to unittets/Makefile.inc. + + ok otto + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 890d497e0a38eeddfebb11cc429098d76cf29f12 + +commit 36f58e68221bced35e06d1cca8d97c48807a8b71 +Author: tb@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 31 23:45:08 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove the obsolete A and P flags from MALLOC_OPTIONS. + + ok dtucker + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 6cc25024c8174a87e5734a0dc830194be216dd59 + +commit b0899ee26a6630883c0f2350098b6a35e647f512 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 29 03:54:50 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Factor out code to disconnect from controlling terminal + into its own function. ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 39fd9e8ebd7222615a837312face5cc7ae962885 + +commit 54d022026aae4f53fa74cc636e4a032d9689b64d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 25 23:24:45 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for + loading keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which + might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This doesn't + appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but was observed for + novelty oversize ones. + + Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: d620e1d46a29fdea56aeadeda120879eddc60ab1 + +commit a9c746088787549bb5b1ae3add7d06a1b6d93d5e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Nov 25 23:22:04 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + split allocation out of sshbuf_reserve() into a separate + sshbuf_allocate() function; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 11b8a2795afeeb1418d508a2c8095b3355577ec2 + +commit f0ddedee460486fa0e32fefb2950548009e5026e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Nov 23 23:14:15 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow ClientAlive{Interval,CountMax} in Match; ok dtucker, + djm + + Upstream-ID: 8beb4c1eadd588f1080b58932281983864979f55 + +commit 1a6f9d2e2493d445cd9ee496e6e3c2a2f283f66a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Nov 8 22:04:34 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unbreak DenyUsers; reported by henning@ + + Upstream-ID: 1c67d4148f5e953c35acdb62e7c08ae8e33f7cb2 + +commit 010359b32659f455fddd2bd85fd7cc4d7a3b994a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Nov 6 05:46:37 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Validate address ranges for AllowUser/DenyUsers at + configuration load time and refuse to accept bad ones. It was previously + possible to specify invalid CIDR address ranges (e.g. djm@127.1.2.3/55) and + these would always match. + + Thanks to Laurence Parry for a detailed bug report. ok markus (for + a previous diff version) + + Upstream-ID: 9dfcdd9672b06e65233ea4434c38226680d40bfb + +commit efb494e81d1317209256b38b49f4280897c61e69 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Oct 28 03:33:52 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Improve pkcs11_add_provider() logging: demote some + excessively verbose error()s to debug()s, include PKCS#11 provider name and + slot in log messages where possible. bz#2610, based on patch from Jakub Jelen + + Upstream-ID: 3223ef693cfcbff9079edfc7e89f55bf63e1973d + +commit 5ee3fb5affd7646f141749483205ade5fc54adaf +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Nov 1 08:12:33 2016 +1100 + + Use ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, ..) on OS X. + +commit 315d2a4e674d0b7115574645cb51f968420ebb34 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Oct 28 14:34:07 2016 +1100 + + Unbreak AES-CTR ciphers on old (~0.9.8) OpenSSL + + ok dtucker@ + +commit a9ff3950b8e80ff971b4d44bbce96df27aed28af +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 28 14:26:58 2016 +1100 + + Move OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160 to compat. + + Move OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160 to compat and add ifdefs to mac.c around the + ripemd160 MACs. + +commit bce58885160e5db2adda3054c3b81fe770f7285a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 28 13:52:31 2016 +1100 + + Check if RIPEMD160 is disabled in OpenSSL. + +commit d924640d4c355d1b5eca1f4cc60146a9975dbbff +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 28 13:38:19 2016 +1100 + + Skip ssh1 specfic ciphers. + + cipher-3des1.c and cipher-bf1.c are specific to sshv1 so don't even try + to compile them when Protocol 1 is not enabled. + +commit 79d078e7a49caef746516d9710ec369ba45feab6 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Oct 25 04:08:13 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix logic in add_local_forward() that inverted a test + when code was refactored out into bind_permitted(). This broke ssh port + forwarding for non-priv ports as a non root user. + + ok dtucker@ 'looks good' deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: ddb8156ca03cc99997de284ce7777536ff9570c9 + +commit a903e315dee483e555c8a3a02c2946937f9b4e5d +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Oct 24 01:09:17 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove dead breaks, found via opencoverage.net. ok + deraadt@ + + Upstream-ID: ad9cc655829d67fad219762810770787ba913069 + +commit b4e96b4c9bea4182846e4942ba2048e6d708ee54 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Oct 26 08:43:25 2016 +1100 + + Use !=NULL instead of >0 for getdefaultproj. + + getdefaultproj() returns a pointer so test it for NULL inequality + instead of >0. Fixes compiler warning and is more correct. Patch from + David Binderman. + +commit 1c4ef0b808d3d38232aeeb1cebb7e9a43def42c5 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Oct 23 22:04:05 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Factor out "can bind to low ports" check into its own function. This will + make it easier for Portable to support platforms with permissions models + other than uid==0 (eg bz#2625). ok djm@, "doesn't offend me too much" + deraadt@. + + Upstream-ID: 86213df4183e92b8f189a6d2dac858c994bfface + +commit 0b9ee623d57e5de7e83e66fd61a7ba9a5be98894 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Oct 19 23:21:56 2016 +0000 + + upstream commit + + When tearing down ControlMaster connecctions, don't + pollute stderr when LogLevel=quiet. Patch from Tim Kuijsten via tech@. + + Upstream-ID: d9b3a68b2a7c2f2fc7f74678e29a4618d55ceced + +commit 09e6a7d8354224933febc08ddcbc2010f542284e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Mon Oct 24 09:06:18 2016 +1100 + + Wrap stdint.h include in ifdef. + +commit 08d9e9516e587b25127545c029e5464b2e7f2919 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 21 09:46:46 2016 +1100 + + Fix formatting. + +commit 461f50e7ab8751d3a55e9158c44c13031db7ba1d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 21 06:55:58 2016 +1100 + + Update links to https. + + www.openssh.com now supports https and ftp.openbsd.org no longer + supports ftp. Make all links to these https. + +commit dd4e7212a6141f37742de97795e79db51e4427ad +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 21 06:48:46 2016 +1100 + + Update host key generation examples. + + Remove ssh1 host key generation, add ssh-keygen -A + +commit 6d49ae82634c67e9a4d4af882bee20b40bb8c639 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Oct 21 05:22:55 2016 +1100 + + Update links. + + Make links to openssh.com HTTPS now that it's supported, point release + notes link to the HTML release notes page, and update a couple of other + links and bits of text. + +commit fe0d1ca6ace06376625084b004ee533f2c2ea9d6 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Oct 20 03:42:09 2016 +1100 + + Remote channels .orig and .rej files. + + These files were incorrectly added during an OpenBSD sync. diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3fd265d --- /dev/null +++ b/INSTALL @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +1. Prerequisites +---------------- + +A C compiler. Any C89 or better compiler should work. Where supported, +configure will attempt to enable the compiler's run-time integrity checking +options. Some notes about specific compilers: + - clang: -ftrapv and -sanitize=integer require the compiler-rt runtime + (CC=clang LDFLAGS=--rtlib=compiler-rt ./configure) + +You will need working installations of Zlib and libcrypto (LibreSSL / +OpenSSL) + +Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (earlier 1.2.x versions have problems): +http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ + +libcrypto (LibreSSL or OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 < 1.1.0) +LibreSSL http://www.libressl.org/ ; or +OpenSSL http://www.openssl.org/ + +LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library +(i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it. +If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need +to configure OpenSSH --without-pie. Note that because of API changes, +OpenSSL 1.1.x is not currently supported. + +The remaining items are optional. + +NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure +libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's +direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd + +PRNGD: + +If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz +Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended. + +http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ + +EGD: + +If the kernel lacks /dev/random the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is +supported only if libcrypto supports it. + +http://egd.sourceforge.net/ + +PAM: + +OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your +system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris, +HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD. + +Information about the various PAM implementations are available: + +Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/ +Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ +OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/ + +If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME +libraries and headers. + +GNOME: +http://www.gnome.org/ + +Alternatively, Jim Knoble has written an excellent X11 +passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at: + +http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/ + +LibEdit: + +sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit. If your platform +has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try +these multi-platform ports: + +http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/ +http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/ + +LDNS: + +LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC. + +http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/ + +Autoconf: + +If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked +the code out of git yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.69 to rebuild +the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier +versions may also work but this is not guaranteed. + +http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/ + +Basic Security Module (BSM): + +Native BSM support is known to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1, +FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM +implementation (http://www.openbsm.org). + +makedepend: + +https://www.x.org/archive/individual/util/ + +If you are making significant changes to the code you may need to rebuild +the dependency (.depend) file using "make depend", which requires the +"makedepend" tool from the X11 distribution. + +2. Building / Installation +-------------------------- + +To install OpenSSH with default options: + +./configure +make +make install + +This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files +in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different +installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure: + +./configure --prefix=/opt +make +make install + +Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override +specific paths, for example: + +./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh +make +make install + +This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the +configuration files in /etc/ssh. + +If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default) +then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by +sshd for privilege separation. See README.privsep for details. + +If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control +file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep +them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname, +which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name +for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd +executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified. + +A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic", +you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are +using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in +contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a +valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password +authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf +configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service +name). + +There are a few other options to the configure script: + +--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module. +Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm" +(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported. + +--with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must +also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive). + +--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD +support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks +/dev/random. + +--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support +and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks +/dev/random. + +--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file. +./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find +it if lastlog is installed in a different place. + +--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely. + +--with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security +Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable. + +--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this +if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does +not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the +resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords. + +--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for +some platforms. + +--without-shadow disables shadow password support. + +--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the +$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this. + +--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions +started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely. + +--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is +created. + +--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary + +--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL +libraries are installed. + +--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support + +--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to +real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux. + +If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you +can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure. +For example: + +CC="/usr/foo/cc" CFLAGS="-O" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" ./configure + +3. Configuration +---------------- + +The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or +whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default). + +The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should +review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements. + +To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so +manually using the following commands: + + ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N "" + +for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or + + ssh-keygen -A + +to generate keys for all supported types. + +Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory. +(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during +configuration) + +If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is +running and has collected some Entropy. + +For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages +for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent. + +4. (Optional) Send survey +------------------------- + +$ make survey +[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information +that you consider sensitive] +$ make send-survey + +This will send configuration information for the currently configured +host to a survey address. This will help determine which configurations +are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options +exist. The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however +summary data may be published. + +5. Problems? +------------ + +If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH. +Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at +https://www.openssh.com/ diff --git a/LICENCE b/LICENCE new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1524821 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENCE @@ -0,0 +1,319 @@ +This file is part of the OpenSSH software. + +The licences which components of this software fall under are as +follows. First, we will summarize and say that all components +are under a BSD licence, or a licence more free than that. + +OpenSSH contains no GPL code. + +1) + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + + [Tatu continues] + * However, I am not implying to give any licenses to any patents or + * copyrights held by third parties, and the software includes parts that + * are not under my direct control. As far as I know, all included + * source code is used in accordance with the relevant license agreements + * and can be used freely for any purpose (the GNU license being the most + * restrictive); see below for details. + + [However, none of that term is relevant at this point in time. All of + these restrictively licenced software components which he talks about + have been removed from OpenSSH, i.e., + + - RSA is no longer included, found in the OpenSSL library + - IDEA is no longer included, its use is deprecated + - DES is now external, in the OpenSSL library + - GMP is no longer used, and instead we call BN code from OpenSSL + - Zlib is now external, in a library + - The make-ssh-known-hosts script is no longer included + - TSS has been removed + - MD5 is now external, in the OpenSSL library + - RC4 support has been replaced with ARC4 support from OpenSSL + - Blowfish is now external, in the OpenSSL library + + [The licence continues] + + Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this + software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major + bookstore, scientific library, and patent office worldwide. More + information can be found e.g. at "http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto". + + The legal status of this program is some combination of all these + permissions and restrictions. Use only at your own responsibility. + You will be responsible for any legal consequences yourself; I am not + making any claims whether possessing or using this is legal or not in + your country, and I am not taking any responsibility on your behalf. + + + NO WARRANTY + + BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY + FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN + OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES + PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED + OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS + TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE + PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, + REPAIR OR CORRECTION. + + IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING + WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR + REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, + INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING + OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED + TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY + YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER + PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE + POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + +3) + ssh-keyscan was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style + license. + + * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . + * + * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is + * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the + * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. + +4) + The Rijndael implementation by Vincent Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers + and Paulo Barreto is in the public domain and distributed + with the following license: + + * @version 3.0 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen + * @author Antoon Bosselaers + * @author Paulo Barreto + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +5) + One component of the ssh source code is under a 3-clause BSD license, + held by the University of California, since we pulled these parts from + original Berkeley code. + + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + +6) + Remaining components of the software are provided under a standard + 2-term BSD licence with the following names as copyright holders: + + Markus Friedl + Theo de Raadt + Niels Provos + Dug Song + Aaron Campbell + Damien Miller + Kevin Steves + Daniel Kouril + Wesley Griffin + Per Allansson + Nils Nordman + Simon Wilkinson + + Portable OpenSSH additionally includes code from the following copyright + holders, also under the 2-term BSD license: + + Ben Lindstrom + Tim Rice + Andre Lucas + Chris Adams + Corinna Vinschen + Cray Inc. + Denis Parker + Gert Doering + Jakob Schlyter + Jason Downs + Juha Yrjölä + Michael Stone + Networks Associates Technology, Inc. + Solar Designer + Todd C. Miller + Wayne Schroeder + William Jones + Darren Tucker + Sun Microsystems + The SCO Group + Daniel Walsh + Red Hat, Inc + Simon Vallet / Genoscope + + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +8) Portable OpenSSH contains the following additional licenses: + + a) md5crypt.c, md5crypt.h + + * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42): + * wrote this file. As long as you retain this + * notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet + * some day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a + * beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp + + b) snprintf replacement + + * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995 + * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell + * (papowell@astart.com) It may be used for any purpose as long as this + * notice remains intact on all source code distributions + + c) Compatibility code (openbsd-compat) + + Apart from the previously mentioned licenses, various pieces of code + in the openbsd-compat/ subdirectory are licensed as follows: + + Some code is licensed under a 3-term BSD license, to the following + copyright holders: + + Todd C. Miller + Theo de Raadt + Damien Miller + Eric P. Allman + The Regents of the University of California + Constantin S. Svintsoff + + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + + Some code is licensed under an ISC-style license, to the following + copyright holders: + + Internet Software Consortium. + Todd C. Miller + Reyk Floeter + Chad Mynhier + + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND TODD C. MILLER DISCLAIMS ALL + * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL TODD C. MILLER BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION + * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN + * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + + Some code is licensed under a MIT-style license to the following + copyright holders: + + Free Software Foundation, Inc. + + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a * + * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the * + * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including * + * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, * + * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell * + * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is * + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: * + * * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included * + * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. * + * * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS * + * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF * + * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. * + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, * + * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR * + * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR * + * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. * + * * + * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright * + * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the * + * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written * + * authorization. * + ****************************************************************************/ + + +------ +$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.20 2017/04/30 23:26:16 djm Exp $ diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..126b2c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,658 @@ +# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatible shell. Ie. csh +#SHELL = @SH@ + +AUTORECONF=autoreconf + +prefix=@prefix@ +exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@ +bindir=@bindir@ +sbindir=@sbindir@ +libexecdir=@libexecdir@ +datadir=@datadir@ +datarootdir=@datarootdir@ +mandir=@mandir@ +mansubdir=@mansubdir@ +sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ +piddir=@piddir@ +srcdir=@srcdir@ +top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ + +DESTDIR= +VPATH=@srcdir@ +SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh +ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass +SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server +SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign +SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper +PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ +SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ +STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@ +TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@ + +PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ + -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \ + -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \ + -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \ + -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \ + -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \ + -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \ + -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\" + +CC=@CC@ +LD=@LD@ +CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ +CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ +LIBS=@LIBS@ +K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ +GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@ +SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@ +SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@ +LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@ +AR=@AR@ +AWK=@AWK@ +RANLIB=@RANLIB@ +INSTALL=@INSTALL@ +SED=@SED@ +ENT=@ENT@ +XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ +LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ +EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ +MANFMT=@MANFMT@ +MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ + +TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) + +XMSS_OBJS=\ + ssh-xmss.o \ + sshkey-xmss.o \ + xmss_commons.o \ + xmss_fast.o \ + xmss_hash.o \ + xmss_hash_address.o \ + xmss_wots.o + +LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\ + ssh_api.o \ + ssherr.o \ + sshbuf.o \ + sshkey.o \ + sshbuf-getput-basic.o \ + sshbuf-misc.o \ + sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \ + krl.o \ + bitmap.o \ + ${XMSS_OBJS} + +LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + authfd.o authfile.o \ + canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \ + cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \ + compat.o crc32.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ + log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o opacket.o \ + readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ + atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o uuencode.o misc.o utf8.o \ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ + msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ + ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ + poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ + ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \ + sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \ + kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ + kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \ + kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \ + platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o + +SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ + sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o + +SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \ + audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ + sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \ + auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \ + auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ + auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ + monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \ + auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ + sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ + sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ + sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \ + sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o + +MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out +MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 +MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ + +CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out +CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli + +PATHSUBS = \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \ + -e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \ + -e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \ + -e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \ + -e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \ + -e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g' + +FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS) +FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \ + @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@ + +all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) + +$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h +$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h +$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h + +.c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a +$(LIBCOMPAT): always + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE)) +always: + +libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) + $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS) + $(RANLIB) $@ + +ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) + $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) + +sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) + $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) + +scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o + $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o + $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o + $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT) + +# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default +logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o + $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + +$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) + if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \ + manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \ + else \ + manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \ + fi; \ + if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \ + $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \ + $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \ + else \ + $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \ + fi + +$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN) + conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \ + $(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@ + +# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o" +moduli: + echo + +clean: regressclean + rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log + rm -f *.out core survey + rm -f regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a + rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) + rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o + rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT) + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean) + +distclean: regressclean + rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log + rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml + rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status + rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~ + rm -rf autom4te.cache + rm -f regress/check-perm + rm -f regress/mkdtemp + rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a + rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf + rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey + rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap + rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion + rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys + rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex + rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 + rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o + rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT) + (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean) + if test -d pkg ; then \ + rm -fr pkg ; \ + fi + +veryclean: distclean + rm -f configure config.h.in *.0 + +cleandir: veryclean + +mrproper: veryclean + +realclean: veryclean + +catman-do: + @for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \ + base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \ + echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \ + $(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \ + >$$base.0 ; \ + done + +depend: depend-rebuild + rm -f .depend.bak + +depend-rebuild: + rm -f config.h + touch config.h + makedepend -w1000 -Y. -f .depend *.c 2>/dev/null + rm -f config.h + +depend-check: depend-rebuild + cmp .depend .depend.bak || (echo .depend stale && exit 1) + +distprep: catman-do depend-check + $(AUTORECONF) + -rm -rf autom4te.cache .depend.bak + +install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config +install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf +install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files + +check-config: + -$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config + +install-files: + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5 + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) + $(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 + +install-sysconf: + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) + @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \ + else \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ + fi + @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \ + else \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ + fi + @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \ + if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \ + echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ + mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ + else \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \ + fi ; \ + else \ + echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ + fi + +host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) + @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ + ./ssh-keygen -A; \ + fi + +host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT) + ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" + ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" + ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" + if ./ssh -Q key | grep ecdsa >/dev/null ; then \ + ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""; \ + fi + +uninstallall: uninstall + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir) + -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) + +uninstall: + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) + -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 + -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 + +regress-prep: + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/match + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8 + $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz + [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \ + ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile + +REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) + +regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \ + $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(REGRESSLIBS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c \ + $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \ + $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \ + $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c $(REGRESSLIBS) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c \ + $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o + +regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS} + $(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS) + $(RANLIB) $@ + +UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o + +regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o + +regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o + +regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o + +regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \ + ${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \ + regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o + +regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \ + regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o + +regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \ + ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/match/tests.o + +regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT): \ + ${UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/utf8/tests.o + +regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \ + ${UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS=\ + regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o + +regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT): ${MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS} libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS) \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT) + +tests interop-tests t-exec unit: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS) + BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \ + TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \ + TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \ + TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \ + TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \ + TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \ + TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \ + TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \ + TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \ + TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \ + TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \ + TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink"; \ + TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen"; \ + TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch"; \ + TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" ; \ + TEST_SSH_UTF8="@TEST_SSH_UTF8@" ; \ + TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" ; \ + cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \ + $(MAKE) \ + .OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \ + .CURDIR="`pwd`" \ + BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \ + OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \ + PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \ + TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \ + TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \ + TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \ + TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \ + TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \ + TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \ + TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \ + TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \ + TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \ + TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \ + TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \ + TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \ + TEST_SSH_PLINK="$${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" \ + TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" \ + TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \ + TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \ + TEST_SSH_UTF8="$${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" \ + TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \ + TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \ + EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \ + $@ && echo all tests passed + +compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT) + (cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE)) + +regressclean: + if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \ + (cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \ + fi + +survey: survey.sh ssh + @$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey + @echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the' + @echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with' + @echo '"make send-survey".' + +send-survey: survey + mail portable-survey@mindrot.org +Updated 17 Nov 1995. +Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2 +Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2 + +The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and +the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and +make-ssh-known-hosts. The main program for each of these is in a .c +file with the same name. + +There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of +these programs. + + Buffer manipulation routines + + - These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended. + Data can be consumed from either end. The code is used heavily + throughout ssh. The buffer manipulation functions are in + sshbuf*.c (header sshbuf.h). + + Compression Library + + - Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB). + + Encryption/Decryption + + - Ssh contains several encryption algorithms. These are all + accessed through the cipher.h interface. The interface code is + in cipher.c, and the implementations are in libc. + + Multiple Precision Integer Library + + - Uses the SSLeay BIGNUM sublibrary. + + Random Numbers + + - Uses arc4random() and such. + + RSA key generation, encryption, decryption + + - Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl. + + RSA key files + + - RSA keys are stored in files with a special format. The code to + read/write these files is in authfile.c. The files are normally + encrypted with a passphrase. The functions to read passphrases + are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords). + + Binary packet protocol + + - The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c. The + code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their + execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and + extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt + packets. + + - The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines + (buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (zlib), and the + encryption routines. + + X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding + + - Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c. + The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication + channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to + implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication + agent forwarding. + The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c + + Authentication agent + + - Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c. + + Authentication methods + + - Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c + (auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c). This + code is linked into the server. The routines also manipulate + known hosts files using code in hostfile.c. Code in canohost.c + is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host. + Code in match.c is used to match host names. + + - In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c. It + reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c. It reads + RSA key files with authfile.c. It communicates the + authentication agent using authfd.c. + + The ssh client + + - The client main program is in ssh.c. It first parses arguments + and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in + sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a + proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c). + It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests. It may call + code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes. Finally it + calls client_loop in clientloop.c. This does the real work for + the session. + + Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes + + - Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c. Code to + encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c. + + Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.) + + - The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in + login.c. This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp, + and lastlog files. Some of the code is in sshd.c. + + Writing to the system log and terminal + + - The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error() + in many places to write messages to system log or user's + terminal. The implementation that logs to system log is in + log-server.c; it is used in the server program. The other + programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it + is in log-client.c. The definitions are in ssh.h. + + The sshd server (daemon) + + - The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the + configuration file (servconf.c). It then reads the host key, + starts listening for connections, and generates the server key. + The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm. + + - When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the + regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client. + They first perform identification string exchange, then + negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory + operations, and finally the server enters the normal session + mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c. This does the real + work, calling functions in other modules. + + - The code for the server is in sshd.c. It contains a lot of + stuff, including: + - server main program + - waiting for connections + - processing new connection + - authentication + - preparatory operations + - building up the execution environment for the user program + - starting the user program. + + Auxiliary files + + - There are several other files in the distribution that contain + various auxiliary routines: + ssh.h the main header file for ssh (various definitions) + uidswap.c uid-swapping + xmalloc.c "safe" malloc routines + +$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.14 2018/07/27 03:55:22 dtucker Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f75c1c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/PROTOCOL @@ -0,0 +1,499 @@ +This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH +protocol. + +Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH +filexfer protocol described in: + +https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt + +Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features +are individually implemented as extensions described below. + +The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file +PROTOCOL.agent + +1. Transport protocol changes + +1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com" + +This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm +(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented +in: + +https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt + +1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com" + +This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression +algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the +start of compression until after authentication has completed. This +avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users. + +The method is documented in: + +https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt + +1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", + "ssh-dsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" + +OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate +authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented +in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys + +1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography + +OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as +specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 +and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic +curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or +generated. + +1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms + +OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that +perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC +4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering, +calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the +plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport +protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a +"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal +session plaintext. + +Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol +to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet +length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the +length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be +verified without decrypting unauthenticated data. + +As such, the MAC covers: + + mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet) + +where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet" +contains: + + byte padding_length + byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1 + byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length + +1.6 transport: AES-GCM + +OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647. +Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange +the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows: + +AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms +"aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as +an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher +the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be +a matching MAC. + +1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption + +OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305 +as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. + +1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm + +OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as +described at: +http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519 + +2. Connection protocol changes + +2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com" + +The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF +message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no +more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for +an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it +while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to +the peer. + +This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would +otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local +processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file +descriptor. + +OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this +signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by +an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or +experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows: + + byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST + uint32 recipient channel + string "eow@openssh.com" + boolean FALSE + +On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of +the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data +originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor). + +As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does +remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may +still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume +window space and may be sent even if no window space is available. + +NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt +of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this +message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner). +Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message +upon request. + +2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension + "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" + +Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a +attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open +additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global +request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack. + +When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session +(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it +will send the following global request: + + byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST + string "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" + char want-reply + +On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open +future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the +connection. + +Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients +(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack. + +NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt +of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH +servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be +whitelisted to receive this message upon request. + +2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com" + +OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com" +channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets +with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with +interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are +requested by the client with the following packet: + + byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN + string "tun@openssh.com" + uint32 sender channel + uint32 initial window size + uint32 maximum packet size + uint32 tunnel mode + uint32 remote unit number + +The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward +layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values: + + SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */ + SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */ + +The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may +be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A +server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse +the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful +open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS. + +Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames +over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings +and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries +are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal +SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets: + + byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA + uint32 recipient channel + string data + +The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is: + + uint32 packet length + uint32 address family + byte[packet length - 4] packet data + +The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message. +It may be one of: + + SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */ + SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */ + +The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself +without any link layer header. + +The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is: + + uint32 packet length + byte[packet length] frame + +The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including +header. + +2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding + +OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding +using the "streamlocal" extension. Forwarding is initiated as per +TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port. + +Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client +to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket. + + byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN + string "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com" + uint32 sender channel + uint32 initial window size + uint32 maximum packet size + string socket path + string reserved + uint32 reserved + +Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the +server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward +GLOBAL_REQUEST. + + byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN + string "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com" + uint32 sender channel + uint32 initial window size + uint32 maximum packet size + string socket path + string reserved for future use + +The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the +remote end. It is intended to be used in the future to pass +information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode. +The client currently sends the empty string for this field. + +Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client +to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket. + + byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST + string "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" + boolean TRUE + string socket path + +Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent +by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket. + + byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST + string "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" + boolean FALSE + string socket path + +2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com" +and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com" + +OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform +a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication +has completed. + + byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST + string "hostkeys-00@openssh.com" + string[] hostkeys + +Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the +supplied host keys are present in known_hosts. + +Note that the server may send key types that the client does not +support. The client should disgregard such keys if they are received. + +If the client identifies any keys that are not present for the host, +it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message to request the +server prove ownership of the private half of the key. + + byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST + string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com" + char 1 /* want-reply */ + string[] hostkeys + +When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature +using each requested key over the following: + + string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com" + string session identifier + string hostkey + +These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching +the hostkeys in the request: + + byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS + string[] signatures + +When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should +validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys +that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that +are no longer offered. + +These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously +encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker +key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation: +a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to +give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before +removing the deprecated key from those offered. + +2.6. connection: SIGINFO support for "signal" channel request + +The SSH channels protocol (RFC4254 section 6.9) supports sending a +signal to a session attached to a channel. OpenSSH supports one +extension signal "INFO@openssh.com" that allows sending SIGINFO on +BSD-derived systems. + +3. SFTP protocol changes + +3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK + +When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments +to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately, +the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since +fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the +current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send +SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows: + + uint32 id + string targetpath + string linkpath + +3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION + +OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the +standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server +hello packet: + + uint32 3 /* protocol version */ + string ext1-name + string ext1-version + string ext2-name + string ext2-version + ... + string extN-name + string extN-version + +Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded +string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is +ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same +extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST +check the version number before attempting to use the extension. + +3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com" + +This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which +are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in +draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a +SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format: + + uint32 id + string "posix-rename@openssh.com" + string oldpath + string newpath + +On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation +rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. +This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version +"1". + +3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and + "fstatvfs@openssh.com" + +These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system +interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit +pathname, and is formatted as follows: + + uint32 id + string "statvfs@openssh.com" + string path + +The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle: + + uint32 id + string "fstatvfs@openssh.com" + string handle + +These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they +return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply: + + uint32 id + uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */ + uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */ + uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */ + uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */ + uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */ + uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */ + uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */ + uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */ + uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */ + uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */ + uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */ + +The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows: + + #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */ + #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */ + +Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are +advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2". + +3.5. sftp: Extension request "hardlink@openssh.com" + +This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This +request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the +following format: + + uint32 id + string "hardlink@openssh.com" + string oldpath + string newpath + +On receiving this request the server will perform the operation +link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. +This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version +"1". + +3.6. sftp: Extension request "fsync@openssh.com" + +This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle. + + uint32 id + string "fsync@openssh.com" + string handle + +One receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will +respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. + +This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version +"1". + +4. Miscellaneous changes + +4.1 Public key format + +OpenSSH public keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) and appearing in +authorized_keys files, are formatted as a single line of text consisting +of the public key algorithm name followed by a base64-encoded key blob. +The public key blob (before base64 encoding) is the same format used for +the encoding of public keys sent on the wire: as described in RFC4253 +section 6.6 for RSA and DSA keys, RFC5656 section 3.1 for ECDSA keys +and the "New public key formats" section of PROTOCOL.certkeys for the +OpenSSH certificate formats. + +4.2 Private key format + +OpenSSH private keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) use the format +described in PROTOCOL.key by default. As a legacy option, PEM format +(RFC7468) private keys are also supported for RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys +and were the default format before OpenSSH 7.8. + +4.3 KRL format + +OpenSSH supports a compact format for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). This +format is described in the PROTOCOL.krl file. + +4.4 Connection multiplexing + +OpenSSH's connection multiplexing uses messages as described in +PROTOCOL.mux over a Unix domain socket for communications between a +master instance and later clients. + +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.36 2018/10/02 12:51:58 djm Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL.agent b/PROTOCOL.agent new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da33819 --- /dev/null +++ b/PROTOCOL.agent @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +This file used to contain a description of the SSH agent protocol +implemented by OpenSSH. It has since been superseded by an Internet- +draft that is available from: + +https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-02 diff --git a/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/PROTOCOL.certkeys new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11363fd --- /dev/null +++ b/PROTOCOL.certkeys @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +This document describes a simple public-key certificate authentication +system for use by SSH. + +Background +---------- + +The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication +mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the use +of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some benefits +relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation of attack +surface, but it does not support the important use-cases of centrally +managed, passwordless authentication and centrally certified host keys. + +These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication +system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. The +certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with numerous +options and complex encoding rules, but something rather more minimal: a +key, some identity information and usage options that have been signed +with some other trusted key. + +A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified +keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism to +allow specification of certification authority keys in addition to +raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of +acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to +specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts. + +All certificate types include certification information along with the +public key that is used to sign challenges. In OpenSSH, ssh-keygen +performs the CA signing operation. + +Certified keys are represented using new key types: + + ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com + ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com + +Two additional types exist for RSA certificates to force use of +SHA-2 signatures (SHA-256 and SHA-512 respectively): + + rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com + rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com + +These RSA/SHA-2 types should not appear in keys at rest or transmitted +on their wire, but do appear in a SSH_MSG_KEXINIT's host-key algorithms +field or in the "public key algorithm name" field of a "publickey" +SSH_USERAUTH_REQUEST to indicate that the signature will use the +specified algorithm. + +Protocol extensions +------------------- + +The SSH wire protocol includes several extensibility mechanisms. +These modifications shall take advantage of namespaced public key +algorithm names to add support for certificate authentication without +breaking the protocol - implementations that do not support the +extensions will simply ignore them. + +Authentication using the new key formats described below proceeds +using the existing SSH "publickey" authentication method described +in RFC4252 section 7. + +New public key formats +---------------------- + +The certificate key types take a similar high-level format (note: data +types and encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire +encoding of these certificates is also used for storing them on disk. + +#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER 1 +#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2 + +RSA certificate + + string "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" + string nonce + mpint e + mpint n + uint64 serial + uint32 type + string key id + string valid principals + uint64 valid after + uint64 valid before + string critical options + string extensions + string reserved + string signature key + string signature + +DSA certificate + + string "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" + string nonce + mpint p + mpint q + mpint g + mpint y + uint64 serial + uint32 type + string key id + string valid principals + uint64 valid after + uint64 valid before + string critical options + string extensions + string reserved + string signature key + string signature + +ECDSA certificate + + string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" | + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" | + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" + string nonce + string curve + string public_key + uint64 serial + uint32 type + string key id + string valid principals + uint64 valid after + uint64 valid before + string critical options + string extensions + string reserved + string signature key + string signature + +ED25519 certificate + + string "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" + string nonce + string pk + uint64 serial + uint32 type + string key id + string valid principals + uint64 valid after + uint64 valid before + string critical options + string extensions + string reserved + string signature key + string signature + +The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length +(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on +inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible. + +e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively. + +p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2. + +curve and public key are respectively the ECDSA "[identifier]" and "Q" +defined in section 3.1 of RFC5656. + +pk is the encoded Ed25519 public key as defined by +draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03. + +serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to +provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA. +If a CA does not wish to number its certificates it must set this +field to zero. + +type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user +or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value. + +key id is a free-form text field that is filled in by the CA at the time +of signing; the intention is that the contents of this field are used to +identify the identity principal in log messages. + +"valid principals" is a string containing zero or more principals as +strings packed inside it. These principals list the names for which this +certificate is valid; hostnames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST certificates and +usernames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER certificates. As a special case, a +zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for +any principal of the specified type. + +"valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the +certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01 +00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if: + + valid after <= current time < valid before + +critical options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as +below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation +must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option. + +extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions +are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does +not recognise may safely ignore it. + +Generally, critical options are used to control features that restrict +access where extensions are used to enable features that grant access. +This ensures that certificates containing unknown restrictions do not +inadvertently grant access while allowing new protocol features to be +enabled via extensions without breaking certificates' backwards +compatibility. + +The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of +the protocol. + +The signature key field contains the CA key used to sign the +certificate. The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa, +ssh-dss, ssh-ed25519 and the ECDSA types ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained" certificates, where +the signature key type is a certificate type itself are NOT supported. +Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to be signed by a +Ed25519 or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa. + +signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string +up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and +encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm +(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss, RFC5656 for the ECDSA +types), and draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03 for Ed25519. + +Critical options +---------------- + +The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more +options on the certificates validity. The format of this field +is a sequence of zero or more tuples: + + string name + string data + +Options must be lexically ordered by "name" if they appear in the +sequence. Each named option may only appear once in a certificate. + +The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes +option-specific information (see below). All options are +"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option +then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate. + +Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's +domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com". + +No critical options are defined for host certificates at present. The +supported user certificate options and the contents and structure of +their data fields are: + +Name Format Description +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +force-command string Specifies a command that is executed + (replacing any the user specified on the + ssh command-line) whenever this key is + used for authentication. + +source-address string Comma-separated list of source addresses + from which this certificate is accepted + for authentication. Addresses are + specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn + or hhhh::hhhh/nn). + If this option is not present then + certificates may be presented from any + source address. + +Extensions +---------- + +The extensions section of the certificate specifies zero or more +non-critical certificate extensions. The encoding and ordering of +extensions in this field is identical to that of the critical options, +as is the requirement that each name appear only once. + +If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should +ignore it. + +Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's +domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com". + +No extensions are defined for host certificates at present. The +supported user certificate extensions and the contents and structure of +their data fields are: + +Name Format Description +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- +permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding + should be permitted. X11 forwarding will + be refused if this option is absent. + +permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding + should be allowed. Agent forwarding + must not be permitted unless this + option is present. + +permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding + should be allowed. If this option is + not present then no port forwarding will + be allowed. + +permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation + should be permitted. In the absence of + this option PTY allocation will be + disabled. + +permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of + ~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution + of this script will not be permitted if + this option is not present. + +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.15 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 b/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ce2a1e --- /dev/null +++ b/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +This document describes the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated +encryption cipher supported by OpenSSH. + +Background +---------- + +ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein and described +in [1]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key, +a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output +is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded. + +Poly1305[2], also by Daniel Bernstein, is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC +that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use +256 bit secret key. + +The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com combines these two primitives into an +authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that +proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of +data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encryption of the packet +lengths. + +Negotiation +----------- + +The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com offers both encryption and +authentication. As such, no separate MAC is required. If the +chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher is selected in key exchange, +the offered MAC algorithms are ignored and no MAC is required to be +negotiated. + +Detailed Construction +--------------------- + +The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher requires 512 bits of key +material as output from the SSH key exchange. This forms two 256 bit +keys (K_1 and K_2), used by two separate instances of chacha20. +The first 256 bits consitute K_2 and the second 256 bits become +K_1. + +The instance keyed by K_1 is a stream cipher that is used only +to encrypt the 4 byte packet length field. The second instance, +keyed by K_2, is used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD +(Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) that is used to encrypt +and authenticate the entire packet. + +Two separate cipher instances are used here so as to keep the packet +lengths confidential but not create an oracle for the packet payload +cipher by decrypting and using the packet length prior to checking +the MAC. By using an independently-keyed cipher instance to encrypt the +length, an active attacker seeking to exploit the packet input handling +as a decryption oracle can learn nothing about the payload contents or +its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are secure). + +The AEAD is constructed as follows: for each packet, generate a Poly1305 +key by taking the first 256 bits of ChaCha20 stream output generated +using K_2, an IV consisting of the packet sequence number encoded as an +uint64 under the SSH wire encoding rules and a ChaCha20 block counter of +zero. The K_2 ChaCha20 block counter is then set to the little-endian +encoding of 1 (i.e. {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}) and this instance is used +for encryption of the packet payload. + +Packet Handling +--------------- + +When receiving a packet, the length must be decrypted first. When 4 +bytes of ciphertext length have been received, they may be decrypted +using the K_1 key, a nonce consisting of the packet sequence number +encoded as a uint64 under the usual SSH wire encoding and a zero block +counter to obtain the plaintext length. + +Once the entire packet has been received, the MAC MUST be checked +before decryption. A per-packet Poly1305 key is generated as described +above and the MAC tag calculated using Poly1305 with this key over the +ciphertext of the packet length and the payload together. The calculated +MAC is then compared in constant time with the one appended to the +packet and the packet decrypted using ChaCha20 as described above (with +K_2, the packet sequence number as nonce and a starting block counter of +1). + +To send a packet, first encode the 4 byte length and encrypt it using +K_1. Encrypt the packet payload (using K_2) and append it to the +encrypted length. Finally, calculate a MAC tag and append it. + +Rekeying +-------- + +ChaCha20 must never reuse a {key, nonce} for encryption nor may it be +used to encrypt more than 2^70 bytes under the same {key, nonce}. The +SSH Transport protocol (RFC4253) recommends a far more conservative +rekeying every 1GB of data sent or received. If this recommendation +is followed, then chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com requires no special +handling in this area. + +References +---------- + +[1] "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", Daniel Bernstein + http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf + +[2] "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code", Daniel Bernstein + http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf + +[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley + http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03 + +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.4 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ + diff --git a/PROTOCOL.key b/PROTOCOL.key new file mode 100644 index 0000000..959bd7a --- /dev/null +++ b/PROTOCOL.key @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +This document describes the private key format for OpenSSH. + +1. Overall format + +The key consists of a header, a list of public keys, and +an encrypted list of matching private keys. + +#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1" + + byte[] AUTH_MAGIC + string ciphername + string kdfname + string kdfoptions + int number of keys N + string publickey1 + string publickey2 + ... + string publickeyN + string encrypted, padded list of private keys + +2. KDF options for kdfname "bcrypt" + +The options: + + string salt + uint32 rounds + +are concatenated and represented as a string. + +3. Unencrypted list of N private keys + +The list of privatekey/comment pairs is padded with the +bytes 1, 2, 3, ... until the total length is a multiple +of the cipher block size. + + uint32 checkint + uint32 checkint + string privatekey1 + string comment1 + string privatekey2 + string comment2 + ... + string privatekeyN + string commentN + char 1 + char 2 + char 3 + ... + char padlen % 255 + +Before the key is encrypted, a random integer is assigned +to both checkint fields so successful decryption can be +quickly checked by verifying that both checkint fields +hold the same value. + +4. Encryption + +The KDF is used to derive a key, IV (and other values required by +the cipher) from the passphrase. These values are then used to +encrypt the unencrypted list of private keys. + +5. No encryption + +For unencrypted keys the cipher "none" and the KDF "none" +are used with empty passphrases. The options if the KDF "none" +are the empty string. + +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.key,v 1.1 2013/12/06 13:34:54 markus Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL.krl b/PROTOCOL.krl new file mode 100644 index 0000000..115f80e --- /dev/null +++ b/PROTOCOL.krl @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +This describes the key/certificate revocation list format for OpenSSH. + +1. Overall format + +The KRL consists of a header and zero or more sections. The header is: + +#define KRL_MAGIC 0x5353484b524c0a00ULL /* "SSHKRL\n\0" */ +#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1 + + uint64 KRL_MAGIC + uint32 KRL_FORMAT_VERSION + uint64 krl_version + uint64 generated_date + uint64 flags + string reserved + string comment + +Where "krl_version" is a version number that increases each time the KRL +is modified, "generated_date" is the time in seconds since 1970-01-01 +00:00:00 UTC that the KRL was generated, "comment" is an optional comment +and "reserved" an extension field whose contents are currently ignored. +No "flags" are currently defined. + +Following the header are zero or more sections, each consisting of: + + byte section_type + string section_data + +Where "section_type" indicates the type of the "section_data". An exception +to this is the KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section, that has a slightly different +format (see below). + +The available section types are: + +#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1 +#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2 +#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3 +#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4 +#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256 5 + +2. Certificate section + +These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by +serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the +certificates to be revoked and a reserved field whose contents is currently +ignored. + + string ca_key + string reserved + +Where "ca_key" is the standard SSH wire serialisation of the CA's +public key. Alternately, "ca_key" may be an empty string to indicate +the certificate section applies to all CAs (this is most useful when +revoking key IDs). + +Followed by one or more sections: + + byte cert_section_type + string cert_section_data + +The certificate section types are: + +#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20 +#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21 +#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22 +#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23 + +2.1 Certificate serial list section + +This section is identified as KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST. It revokes +certificates by listing their serial numbers. The cert_section_data in this +case contains: + + uint64 revoked_cert_serial + uint64 ... + +This section may appear multiple times. + +2.2. Certificate serial range section + +These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE and hold +a range of serial numbers of certificates: + + uint64 serial_min + uint64 serial_max + +All certificates in the range serial_min <= serial <= serial_max are +revoked. + +This section may appear multiple times. + +2.3. Certificate serial bitmap section + +Bitmap sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP and revoke keys +by listing their serial number in a bitmap. + + uint64 serial_offset + mpint revoked_keys_bitmap + +A bit set at index N in the bitmap corresponds to revocation of a keys with +serial number (serial_offset + N). + +This section may appear multiple times. + +2.4. Revoked key ID sections + +KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID sections revoke particular certificate "key +ID" strings. This may be useful in revoking all certificates +associated with a particular identity, e.g. a host or a user. + + string key_id[0] + ... + +This section must contain at least one "key_id". This section may appear +multiple times. + +3. Explicit key sections + +These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY, revoke keys +(not certificates). They are less space efficient than serial numbers, +but are able to revoke plain keys. + + string public_key_blob[0] + .... + +This section must contain at least one "public_key_blob". The blob +must be a raw key (i.e. not a certificate). + +This section may appear multiple times. + +4. SHA1/SHA256 fingerprint sections + +These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 and +KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256, revoke plain keys (i.e. not +certificates) by listing their hashes: + + string public_key_hash[0] + .... + +This section must contain at least one "public_key_hash". The hash blob +is obtained by taking the SHA1 or SHA256 hash of the public key blob. +Hashes in this section must appear in numeric order, treating each hash +as a big-endian integer. + +This section may appear multiple times. + +5. KRL signature sections + +The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the +preceding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that +is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection. +Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections: +in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body" +two string components instead of one. + + byte KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE + string signature_key + string signature + +The signature is calculated over the entire KRL from the KRL_MAGIC +to this subsection's "signature_key", including both and using the +signature generation rules appropriate for the type of "signature_key". + +This section must appear last in the KRL. If multiple signature sections +appear, they must appear consecutively at the end of the KRL file. + +Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify +signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by +trusted means. + +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.5 2018/09/12 01:21:34 djm Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL.mux b/PROTOCOL.mux new file mode 100644 index 0000000..77a0780 --- /dev/null +++ b/PROTOCOL.mux @@ -0,0 +1,298 @@ +This document describes the multiplexing protocol used by ssh(1)'s +ControlMaster connection-sharing. + +Multiplexing starts with a ssh(1) configured to act as a multiplexing +master. This will cause ssh(1) to listen on a Unix domain socket for +requests from clients. Clients communicate over this socket using a +simple packetised protocol, where each message is proceeded with +a length and message type in SSH uint32 wire format: + + uint32 packet length + uint32 packet type + ... packet body + +Most messages from the client to the server contain a "request id" +field. This field is returned in replies as "client request id" to +facilitate matching of responses to requests. + +Many muliplexing (mux) client requests yield immediate responses from +the mux process; requesting a forwarding, performing an alive check or +requesting the master terminate itself fall in to this category. + +The most common use of multiplexing however is to maintain multiple +concurrent sessions. These are supported via two separate modes: + +"Passenger" clients start by requesting a new session with a +MUX_C_NEW_SESSION message and passing stdio file descriptors over the +Unix domain control socket. The passenger client then waits until it is +signaled or the mux server closes the session. This mode is so named as +the client waits around while the mux server does all the driving. + +Stdio forwarding (requested using MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD) is another +example of passenger mode; the client passes the stdio file descriptors +and passively waits for something to happen. + +"Proxy" clients, requested using MUX_C_PROXY, work quite differently. In +this mode, the mux client/server connection socket will stop speaking +the multiplexing protocol and start proxying SSH connection protocol +messages between the client and server. The client therefore must +speak a significant subset of the SSH protocol, but in return is able +to access basically the full suite of connection protocol features. +Moreover, as no file descriptor passing is required, the connection +supporting a proxy client may iteself be forwarded or relayed to another +host if necessary. + +1. Connection setup + +When a multiplexing connection is made to a ssh(1) operating as a +ControlMaster from a client ssh(1), the first action of each is send +a hello messages to its peer: + + uint32 MUX_MSG_HELLO + uint32 protocol version + string extension name [optional] + string extension value [optional] + ... + +The current version of the mux protocol is 4. A client should refuse +to connect to a master that speaks an unsupported protocol version. + +Following the version identifier are zero or more extensions represented +as a name/value pair. No extensions are currently defined. + +2. Opening a passenger mode session + +To open a new multiplexed session in passenger mode, a client sends the +following request: + + uint32 MUX_C_NEW_SESSION + uint32 request id + string reserved + bool want tty flag + bool want X11 forwarding flag + bool want agent flag + bool subsystem flag + uint32 escape char + string terminal type + string command + string environment string 0 [optional] + ... + +To disable the use of an escape character, "escape char" may be set +to 0xffffffff. "terminal type" is generally set to the value of +$TERM. zero or more environment strings may follow the command. + +The client then sends its standard input, output and error file +descriptors (in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages. + +The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored. + +If successful, the server will reply with MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED + + uint32 MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED + uint32 client request id + uint32 session id + +Otherwise it will reply with an error: MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or +MUX_S_FAILURE. + +Once the server has received the fds, it will respond with MUX_S_OK +indicating that the session is up. The client now waits for the +session to end. When it does, the server will send an exit status +message: + + uint32 MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE + uint32 session id + uint32 exit value + +The client should exit with this value to mimic the behaviour of a +non-multiplexed ssh(1) connection. Two additional cases that the +client must cope with are it receiving a signal itself and the +server disconnecting without sending an exit message. + +A master may also send a MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL before MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE +if remote TTY allocation was unsuccessful. The client may use this to +return its local tty to "cooked" mode. + + uint32 MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL + uint32 session id + +3. Requesting passenger-mode stdio forwarding + +A client may request the master to establish a stdio forwarding: + + uint32 MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD + uint32 request id + string reserved + string connect host + string connect port + +The client then sends its standard input and output file descriptors +(in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages. + +The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored. + +A server may reply with a MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED +or a MUX_S_FAILURE. + +4. Health checks + +The client may request a health check/PID report from a server: + + uint32 MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK + uint32 request id + +The server replies with: + + uint32 MUX_S_ALIVE + uint32 client request id + uint32 server pid + +5. Remotely terminating a master + +A client may request that a master terminate immediately: + + uint32 MUX_C_TERMINATE + uint32 request id + +The server will reply with one of MUX_S_OK or MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED. + +6. Requesting establishment of port forwards + +A client may request the master to establish a port forward: + + uint32 MUX_C_OPEN_FWD + uint32 request id + uint32 forwarding type + string listen host + uint32 listen port + string connect host + uint32 connect port + +forwarding type may be MUX_FWD_LOCAL, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC. + +If listen port is (unsigned int) -2, then the listen host is treated as +a unix socket path name. + +If connect port is (unsigned int) -2, then the connect host is treated +as a unix socket path name. + +A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT, a +MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE. + +For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with + + uint32 MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT + uint32 client request id + uint32 allocated remote listen port + +7. Requesting closure of port forwards + +Note: currently unimplemented (server will always reply with MUX_S_FAILURE). + +A client may request the master to close a port forward: + + uint32 MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD + uint32 request id + uint32 forwarding type + string listen host + uint32 listen port + string connect host + uint32 connect port + +A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a +MUX_S_FAILURE. + +8. Requesting shutdown of mux listener + +A client may request the master to stop accepting new multiplexing requests +and remove its listener socket. + + uint32 MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING + uint32 request id + +A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a +MUX_S_FAILURE. + +9. Requesting proxy mode + +A client may request that the the control connection be placed in proxy +mode: + + uint32 MUX_C_PROXY + uint32 request id + +When a mux master receives this message, it will reply with a +confirmation: + + uint32 MUX_S_PROXY + uint32 request id + +And go into proxy mode. All subsequent data over the connection will +be formatted as unencrypted, unpadded, SSH transport messages: + + uint32 packet length + byte 0 (padding length) + byte packet type + byte[packet length - 2] ... + +The mux master will accept most connection messages and global requests, +and will translate channel identifiers to ensure that the proxy client has +globally unique channel numbers (i.e. a proxy client need not worry about +collisions with other clients). + +10. Status messages + +The MUX_S_OK message is empty: + + uint32 MUX_S_OK + uint32 client request id + +The MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED and MUX_S_FAILURE include a reason: + + uint32 MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED + uint32 client request id + string reason + + uint32 MUX_S_FAILURE + uint32 client request id + string reason + +11. Protocol numbers + +#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001 +#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002 +#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004 +#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005 +#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006 +#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007 +#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008 +#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009 +#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001 +#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002 +#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003 +#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004 +#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005 +#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006 +#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007 +#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008 + +#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1 +#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2 +#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3 + +XXX TODO +XXX extended status (e.g. report open channels / forwards) +XXX lock (maybe) +XXX watch in/out traffic (pre/post crypto) +XXX inject packet (what about replies) +XXX server->client error/warning notifications +XXX send signals via mux +XXX ^Z support in passengers +XXX extensions for multi-agent +XXX extensions for multi-X11 +XXX session inspection via master +XXX signals via mux request +XXX list active connections via mux + +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.11 2018/09/26 07:30:05 djm Exp $ diff --git a/README b/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0591645 --- /dev/null +++ b/README @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#7.9p1 for the release notes. + +Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting +instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or +patch/pull-request management. + +This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other +Unices. + +OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample +implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to +external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features +reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, +and Dug Song. It has a homepage at https://www.openssh.com/ + +This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM +support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library +functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port +has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X, +FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris and UnixWare. + +This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository. + +The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of +commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for +all logins, not just when using password authentication. + +OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4], and optionally PAM[5] and +libedit[6] + +There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please +refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join. + +Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list +openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by unsubscribed +users. Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD +style guidelines[7]. + +Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install +OpenSSH on your system. + +Damien Miller + +Miscellania - + +This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD +CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample +implementation released by Tatu Ylonen. + +References - + +[0] https://www.openssh.com/ +[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ +[2] http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ +[3] https://www.zlib.net/ +[4] https://www.openssl.org/ +[5] https://www.openpam.org + https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ + (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11) +[6] https://thrysoee.dk/editline/ (portable version) +[7] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9 diff --git a/README.dns b/README.dns new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9787918 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.dns @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +How to verify host keys using OpenSSH and DNS +--------------------------------------------- + +OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described in +draft-ietf-secsh-dns-05.txt. The document contains very brief instructions +on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the scope of this +document. + + +(1) Server: Generate and publish the DNS RR + +To create a DNS resource record (RR) containing a fingerprint of the +public host key, use the following command: + + ssh-keygen -r hostname -f keyfile -g + +where "hostname" is your fully qualified hostname and "keyfile" is the +file containing the public host key file. If you have multiple keys, +you should generate one RR for each key. + +In the example above, ssh-keygen will print the fingerprint in a +generic DNS RR format parsable by most modern name server +implementations. If your nameserver has support for the SSHFP RR +you can omit the -g flag and ssh-keygen will print a standard SSHFP RR. + +To publish the fingerprint using the DNS you must add the generated RR +to your DNS zone file and sign your zone. + + +(2) Client: Enable ssh to verify host keys using DNS + +To enable the ssh client to verify host keys using DNS, you have to +add the following option to the ssh configuration file +($HOME/.ssh/config or /etc/ssh/ssh_config): + + VerifyHostKeyDNS yes + +Upon connection the client will try to look up the fingerprint RR +using DNS. If the fingerprint received from the DNS server matches +the remote host key, the user will be notified. + + + Jakob Schlyter + Wesley Griffin + + +$OpenBSD: README.dns,v 1.2 2003/10/14 19:43:23 jakob Exp $ diff --git a/README.platform b/README.platform new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9210e07 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.platform @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms. + +AIX +--- +As of OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will now honour an accounts password expiry +settings, where previously it did not. Because of this, it's possible for +sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to have accounts which +have passwords expired longer than the inactive time (ie the "Weeks between +password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT or the maxexpired +chuser attribute). + +Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the +administrator. As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative +passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8. + +As of OpenSSH 4.0, configure will attempt to detect if your version +and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it +if found. This will enable IPv6 support. If for some reason configure +gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs +than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS +to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour. + +IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5 +IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4 + +If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system +locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to +define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg + +blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \ + --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware + +If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled +by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the +loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the +"rlogin" attribute set. This check is not done for the root account, +instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used. + +If you are using the IBM compiler you probably want to use CC=xlc rather +than the default of cc. + + +Cygwin +------ +To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages: +gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl, +openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel. + + +Darwin and MacOS X +------------------ +Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based +virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver +has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X. + +Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and +MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode +using a third party driver. More information is available at: + http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/ + + +Linux +----- + +Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include +headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main +binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a +missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent +development packages. On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel, +zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be +libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev. + + +Solaris +------- +If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4) +for praudit(1m) to give sensible output. The following line needs to be +added to /etc/security/audit_event: + + 32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo + +The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is +32768 - 65535. Event number 32800 has been chosen for AUE_openssh. +There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this +number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time +by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding. + + +Platforms using PAM +------------------- +As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when +PAM is enabled. To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be +added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell +sessions. Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or +account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still +return the output from pam_nologin to the client. diff --git a/README.privsep b/README.privsep new file mode 100644 index 0000000..460e905 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.privsep @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +Privilege separation, or privsep, is method in OpenSSH by which +operations that require root privilege are performed by a separate +privileged monitor process. Its purpose is to prevent privilege +escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process. +More information is available at: + http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html + +Privilege separation is now enabled by default; see the +UsePrivilegeSeparation option in sshd_config(5). + +When privsep is enabled, during the pre-authentication phase sshd will +chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the "sshd" user +and its primary group. sshd is a pseudo-account that should not be +used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a +"nologin" or invalid shell. + +You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep +preauth environment: + + # mkdir /var/empty + # chown root:sys /var/empty + # chmod 755 /var/empty + # groupadd sshd + # useradd -g sshd -c 'sshd privsep' -d /var/empty -s /bin/false sshd + +/var/empty should not contain any files. + +configure supports the following options to change the default +privsep user and chroot directory: + + --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot + --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation + +PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, FreeBSD, +HP-UX (including Trusted Mode), Linux, NetBSD and Solaris. + +On Cygwin, Tru64 Unix and OpenServer only the pre-authentication part +of privsep is supported. Post-authentication privsep is disabled +automatically (so you won't see the additional process mentioned below). + +Note that for a normal interactive login with a shell, enabling privsep +will require 1 additional process per login session. + +Given the following process listing (from HP-UX): + + UID PID PPID C STIME TTY TIME COMMAND + root 1005 1 0 10:45:17 ? 0:08 /opt/openssh/sbin/sshd -u0 + root 6917 1005 0 15:19:16 ? 0:00 sshd: stevesk [priv] + stevesk 6919 6917 0 15:19:17 ? 0:03 sshd: stevesk@2 + stevesk 6921 6919 0 15:19:17 pts/2 0:00 -bash + +process 1005 is the sshd process listening for new connections. +process 6917 is the privileged monitor process, 6919 is the user owned +sshd process and 6921 is the shell process. diff --git a/README.tun b/README.tun new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e1cb07 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.tun @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +How to use OpenSSH-based virtual private networks +------------------------------------------------- + +OpenSSH contains support for VPN tunneling using the tun(4) network +tunnel pseudo-device which is available on most platforms, either for +layer 2 or 3 traffic. + +The following brief instructions on how to use this feature use +a network configuration specific to the OpenBSD operating system. + +(1) Server: Enable support for SSH tunneling + +To enable the ssh server to accept tunnel requests from the client, you +have to add the following option to the ssh server configuration file +(/etc/ssh/sshd_config): + + PermitTunnel yes + +Restart the server or send the hangup signal (SIGHUP) to let the server +reread it's configuration. + +(2) Server: Restrict client access and assign the tunnel + +The OpenSSH server simply uses the file /root/.ssh/authorized_keys to +restrict the client to connect to a specified tunnel and to +automatically start the related interface configuration command. These +settings are optional but recommended: + + tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... reyk@openbsd.org + +(3) Client: Configure the local network tunnel interface + +Use the hostname.if(5) interface-specific configuration file to set up +the network tunnel configuration with OpenBSD. For example, use the +following configuration in /etc/hostname.tun0 to set up the layer 3 +tunnel on the client: + + inet 192.168.5.1 255.255.255.252 192.168.5.2 + +OpenBSD also supports layer 2 tunneling over the tun device by adding +the link0 flag: + + inet 192.168.1.78 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.255 link0 + +Layer 2 tunnels can be used in combination with an Ethernet bridge(4) +interface, like the following example for /etc/bridgename.bridge0: + + add tun0 + add sis0 + up + +(4) Client: Configure the OpenSSH client + +To establish tunnel forwarding for connections to a specified +remote host by default, use the following ssh client configuration for +the privileged user (in /root/.ssh/config): + + Host sshgateway + Tunnel yes + TunnelDevice 0:any + PermitLocalCommand yes + LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0 + +A more complicated configuration is possible to establish a tunnel to +a remote host which is not directly accessible by the client. +The following example describes a client configuration to connect to +the remote host over two ssh hops in between. It uses the OpenSSH +ProxyCommand in combination with the nc(1) program to forward the final +ssh tunnel destination over multiple ssh sessions. + + Host access.somewhere.net + User puffy + Host dmzgw + User puffy + ProxyCommand ssh access.somewhere.net nc dmzgw 22 + Host sshgateway + Tunnel Ethernet + TunnelDevice 0:any + PermitLocalCommand yes + LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0 + ProxyCommand ssh dmzgw nc sshgateway 22 + +The following network plan illustrates the previous configuration in +combination with layer 2 tunneling and Ethernet bridging. + ++--------+ ( ) +----------------------+ +| Client |------( Internet )-----| access.somewhere.net | ++--------+ ( ) +----------------------+ + : 192.168.1.78 | + :............................. +-------+ + Forwarded ssh connection : | dmzgw | + Layer 2 tunnel : +-------+ + : | + : | + : +------------+ + :......| sshgateway | + | +------------+ +--- real connection Bridge -> | +----------+ +... "virtual connection" [ X ]--------| somehost | +[X] switch +----------+ + 192.168.1.25 + +(5) Client: Connect to the server and establish the tunnel + +Finally connect to the OpenSSH server to establish the tunnel by using +the following command: + + ssh sshgateway + +It is also possible to tell the client to fork into the background after +the connection has been successfully established: + + ssh -f sshgateway true + +Without the ssh configuration done in step (4), it is also possible +to use the following command lines: + + ssh -fw 0:1 sshgateway true + ifconfig tun0 192.168.5.1 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 + +Using OpenSSH tunnel forwarding is a simple way to establish secure +and ad hoc virtual private networks. Possible fields of application +could be wireless networks or administrative VPN tunnels. + +Nevertheless, ssh tunneling requires some packet header overhead and +runs on top of TCP. It is still suggested to use the IP Security +Protocol (IPSec) for robust and permanent VPN connections and to +interconnect corporate networks. + + Reyk Floeter + +$OpenBSD: README.tun,v 1.4 2006/03/28 00:12:31 deraadt Exp $ diff --git a/TODO b/TODO new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b76529c --- /dev/null +++ b/TODO @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +Documentation: + +- Update the docs + - Update README + - Update INSTALL + - Merge INSTALL & README.privsep + +- Install FAQ? + +- General FAQ on S/Key, TIS, RSA, RSA2, DSA, etc and suggestions on when it + would be best to use them. + +- Create a Documentation/ directory? + +Programming: + +- Grep for 'XXX' comments and fix + +- Link order is incorrect for some systems using Kerberos 4 and AFS. Result + is multiple inclusion of DES symbols. Holger Trapp + reports that changing the configure + generated link order from: + -lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lkafs -lkrb -ldes -lcrypto + to: + -lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl -lutil -lcrypto -lkafs -lkrb -ldes + fixing the problem. + +- Write a test program that calls stat() to search for EGD/PRNGd socket + rather than use the (non-portable) "test -S". + +- More platforms for for setproctitle() emulation (testing needed) + +- Improve PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication + - Informational messages + - Use different PAM service name for kbdint vs regular auth (suggest from + Solar Designer) + - Ability to select which ChallengeResponseAuthentications may be used + and order to try them in e.g. "ChallengeResponseAuthentication pam" + +- Complete Tru64 SIA support + - It looks like we could merge it into the password auth code to cut down + on diff size. Maybe PAM password auth too? + +- Finish integrating kernel-level auditing code for IRIX and SOLARIS + (Gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com) + +- 64-bit builds on HP-UX 11.X (stevesk@pobox.com): + - utmp/wtmp get corrupted (something in loginrec?) + - can't build with PAM (no 64-bit libpam yet) + +Clean up configure/makefiles: +- Clean up configure.ac - There are a few double #defined variables + left to do. HAVE_LOGIN is one of them. Consider NOT looking for + information in wtmpx or utmpx or any of that stuff if it's not detected + from the start + +- Replace the whole u_intXX_t evilness in acconfig.h with something better??? + - Do it in configure.ac + +- Consider splitting the u_intXX_t test for sys/bitype.h into separate test + to allow people to (right/wrongfully) link against Bind directly. + +- Consider splitting configure.ac into separate files which do logically + similar tests. E.g move all the type detection stuff into one file, + entropy related stuff into another. + +Packaging: +- HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts. + (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com) + +PrivSep Issues: +- PAM + + See above PAM notes +- AIX + + usrinfo() does not set TTY, but only required for legacy systems. Works + with PrivSep. +- OSF + + SIA is broken +- Cygwin + + Privsep for Pre-auth only (no fd passing) diff --git a/aclocal.m4 b/aclocal.m4 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25ecc49 --- /dev/null +++ b/aclocal.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros +dnl + +dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE(check_flag[, define_flag]) +dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append +dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append +dnl 'check_flag'. +AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE], [{ + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1]) + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1" + _define_flag="$2" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1" + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + ]])], + [ +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] + ) +}]) + +dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag]) +dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append +dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append +dnl 'check_flag'. +AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK], [{ + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1 and linking succeeds]) + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1" + _define_flag="$2" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1" + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + long long int p = n * o; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); + exit(0); +} + ]])], + [ +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] + ) +}]) + +dnl OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag]) +dnl Check that $LD accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append +dnl 'define_flag' to $LDFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append +dnl 'check_flag'. +AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK], [{ + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $LD supports link flag $1]) + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR $1" + _define_flag="$2" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1" + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + long long p = n * o; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); + exit(0); +} + ]])], + [ +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" +else + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" ] + ) +}]) + +dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol) +dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field' +dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result. +dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there +AC_DEFUN(OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD, [ +# look for field '$1' in header '$2' + dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename + ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + dnl + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1 + AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2) + AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [ + AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl + ], [ dnl + eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl + ]) dnl + ]) + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result) + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + AC_DEFINE($3, 1, [Define if you have $1 in $2]) + fi + else + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + fi +]) + +dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in +dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different +dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc. So we +dnl have to test to find something that will work. +AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T], +[ + AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[ + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent]) + AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv], + [ + # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or + # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername + curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv= + for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do + for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do + AC_TRY_COMPILE([ + #include + #include + + int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *); + ],[ + $t len; + getpeername(0,0,&len); + ],[ + curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t" + break + ]) + done + done + + if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t]) + fi + ]) + AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv, + [type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])], + [#include +#include ]) +]) + diff --git a/addrmatch.c b/addrmatch.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a402d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/addrmatch.c @@ -0,0 +1,498 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.14 2018/07/31 03:07:24 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "match.h" +#include "log.h" + +struct xaddr { + sa_family_t af; + union { + struct in_addr v4; + struct in6_addr v6; + u_int8_t addr8[16]; + u_int32_t addr32[4]; + } xa; /* 128-bit address */ + u_int32_t scope_id; /* iface scope id for v6 */ +#define v4 xa.v4 +#define v6 xa.v6 +#define addr8 xa.addr8 +#define addr32 xa.addr32 +}; + +static int +addr_unicast_masklen(int af) +{ + switch (af) { + case AF_INET: + return 32; + case AF_INET6: + return 128; + default: + return -1; + } +} + +static inline int +masklen_valid(int af, u_int masklen) +{ + switch (af) { + case AF_INET: + return masklen <= 32 ? 0 : -1; + case AF_INET6: + return masklen <= 128 ? 0 : -1; + default: + return -1; + } +} + +/* + * Convert struct sockaddr to struct xaddr + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +static int +addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + + memset(xa, '\0', sizeof(*xa)); + + switch (sa->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in4)) + return -1; + xa->af = AF_INET; + memcpy(&xa->v4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(xa->v4)); + break; + case AF_INET6: + if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in6)) + return -1; + xa->af = AF_INET6; + memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6)); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID + xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id; +#endif + break; + default: + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and + * store it in 'n'. + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +static int +addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n) +{ + int i; + + if (masklen_valid(af, l) != 0 || n == NULL) + return -1; + + memset(n, '\0', sizeof(*n)); + switch (af) { + case AF_INET: + n->af = AF_INET; + if (l == 0) + return 0; + n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff); + return 0; + case AF_INET6: + n->af = AF_INET6; + for (i = 0; i < 4 && l >= 32; i++, l -= 32) + n->addr32[i] = 0xffffffffU; + if (i < 4 && l != 0) + n->addr32[i] = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & + 0xffffffff); + return 0; + default: + return -1; + } +} + +/* + * Perform logical AND of addresses 'a' and 'b', storing result in 'dst'. + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +static int +addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b) +{ + int i; + + if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af) + return -1; + + memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst)); + switch (a->af) { + case AF_INET: + dst->v4.s_addr &= b->v4.s_addr; + return 0; + case AF_INET6: + dst->scope_id = a->scope_id; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + dst->addr32[i] &= b->addr32[i]; + return 0; + default: + return -1; + } +} + +/* + * Compare addresses 'a' and 'b' + * Return 0 if addresses are identical, -1 if (a < b) or 1 if (a > b) + */ +static int +addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b) +{ + int i; + + if (a->af != b->af) + return a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1; + + switch (a->af) { + case AF_INET: + if (a->v4.s_addr == b->v4.s_addr) + return 0; + return ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1; + case AF_INET6: + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + if (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i] != 0) + return a->addr8[i] > b->addr8[i] ? 1 : -1; + if (a->scope_id == b->scope_id) + return 0; + return a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1; + default: + return -1; + } +} + +/* + * Parse string address 'p' into 'n' + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +static int +addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n) +{ + struct addrinfo hints, *ai = NULL; + int ret = -1; + + memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; + + if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0) + goto out; + if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) + goto out; + if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, n) == -1) + goto out; + /* success */ + ret = 0; + out: + if (ai != NULL) + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Perform bitwise negation of address + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +static int +addr_invert(struct xaddr *n) +{ + int i; + + if (n == NULL) + return (-1); + + switch (n->af) { + case AF_INET: + n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr; + return (0); + case AF_INET6: + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i]; + return (0); + default: + return (-1); + } +} + +/* + * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and + * store it in 'n'. + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +static int +addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n) +{ + if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1) + return (-1); + return (0); +} + +/* + * Test whether address 'a' is all zeros (i.e. 0.0.0.0 or ::) + * Returns 0 on if address is all-zeros, -1 if not all zeros or on failure. + */ +static int +addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a) +{ + int i; + + switch (a->af) { + case AF_INET: + return (a->v4.s_addr == 0 ? 0 : -1); + case AF_INET6:; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + if (a->addr32[i] != 0) + return (-1); + return (0); + default: + return (-1); + } +} + +/* + * Test whether host portion of address 'a', as determined by 'masklen' + * is all zeros. + * Returns 0 on if host portion of address is all-zeros, + * -1 if not all zeros or on failure. + */ +static int +addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen) +{ + struct xaddr tmp_addr, tmp_mask, tmp_result; + + memcpy(&tmp_addr, a, sizeof(tmp_addr)); + if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1) + return (-1); + if (addr_and(&tmp_result, &tmp_addr, &tmp_mask) == -1) + return (-1); + return (addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result)); +} + +/* + * Parse a CIDR address (x.x.x.x/y or xxxx:yyyy::/z). + * Return -1 on parse error, -2 on inconsistency or 0 on success. + */ +static int +addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l) +{ + struct xaddr tmp; + long unsigned int masklen = 999; + char addrbuf[64], *mp, *cp; + + /* Don't modify argument */ + if (p == NULL || strlcpy(addrbuf, p, sizeof(addrbuf)) >= sizeof(addrbuf)) + return -1; + + if ((mp = strchr(addrbuf, '/')) != NULL) { + *mp = '\0'; + mp++; + masklen = strtoul(mp, &cp, 10); + if (*mp == '\0' || *cp != '\0' || masklen > 128) + return -1; + } + + if (addr_pton(addrbuf, &tmp) == -1) + return -1; + + if (mp == NULL) + masklen = addr_unicast_masklen(tmp.af); + if (masklen_valid(tmp.af, masklen) == -1) + return -2; + if (addr_host_is_all0s(&tmp, masklen) != 0) + return -2; + + if (n != NULL) + memcpy(n, &tmp, sizeof(*n)); + if (l != NULL) + *l = masklen; + + return 0; +} + +static int +addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net, u_int masklen) +{ + struct xaddr tmp_mask, tmp_result; + + if (host->af != net->af) + return -1; + + if (addr_netmask(host->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1) + return -1; + if (addr_and(&tmp_result, host, &tmp_mask) == -1) + return -1; + return addr_cmp(&tmp_result, net); +} + +/* + * Match "addr" against list pattern list "_list", which may contain a + * mix of CIDR addresses and old-school wildcards. + * + * If addr is NULL, then no matching is performed, but _list is parsed + * and checked for well-formedness. + * + * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL). + * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL. + * Returns -1 on negated match found (never returned when addr == NULL). + * Returns -2 on invalid list entry. + */ +int +addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list) +{ + char *list, *cp, *o; + struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr; + u_int masklen, neg; + int ret = 0, r; + + if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) { + debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr); + return 0; + } + if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL) + return -1; + while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) { + neg = *cp == '!'; + if (neg) + cp++; + if (*cp == '\0') { + ret = -2; + break; + } + /* Prefer CIDR address matching */ + r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen); + if (r == -2) { + debug2("%s: inconsistent mask length for " + "match network \"%.100s\"", __func__, cp); + ret = -2; + break; + } else if (r == 0) { + if (addr != NULL && addr_netmatch(&try_addr, + &match_addr, masklen) == 0) { + foundit: + if (neg) { + ret = -1; + break; + } + ret = 1; + } + continue; + } else { + /* If CIDR parse failed, try wildcard string match */ + if (addr != NULL && match_pattern(addr, cp) == 1) + goto foundit; + } + } + free(o); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Match "addr" against list CIDR list "_list". Lexical wildcards and + * negation are not supported. If "addr" == NULL, will verify structure + * of "_list". + * + * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL). + * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL. + * Returns -1 on error + */ +int +addr_match_cidr_list(const char *addr, const char *_list) +{ + char *list, *cp, *o; + struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr; + u_int masklen; + int ret = 0, r; + + if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) { + debug2("%s: couldn't parse address %.100s", __func__, addr); + return 0; + } + if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL) + return -1; + while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) { + if (*cp == '\0') { + error("%s: empty entry in list \"%.100s\"", + __func__, o); + ret = -1; + break; + } + + /* + * NB. This function is called in pre-auth with untrusted data, + * so be extra paranoid about junk reaching getaddrino (via + * addr_pton_cidr). + */ + + /* Stop junk from reaching getaddrinfo. +3 is for masklen */ + if (strlen(cp) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 3) { + error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" too long", + __func__, cp); + ret = -1; + break; + } +#define VALID_CIDR_CHARS "0123456789abcdefABCDEF.:/" + if (strspn(cp, VALID_CIDR_CHARS) != strlen(cp)) { + error("%s: list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid " + "characters", __func__, cp); + ret = -1; + } + + /* Prefer CIDR address matching */ + r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen); + if (r == -1) { + error("Invalid network entry \"%.100s\"", cp); + ret = -1; + break; + } else if (r == -2) { + error("Inconsistent mask length for " + "network \"%.100s\"", cp); + ret = -1; + break; + } else if (r == 0 && addr != NULL) { + if (addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr, + masklen) == 0) + ret = 1; + continue; + } + } + free(o); + + return ret; +} diff --git a/atomicio.c b/atomicio.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f854a06 --- /dev/null +++ b/atomicio.c @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.28 2016/07/27 23:18:12 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +#include +#else +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H +# include +# endif +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include "atomicio.h" + +/* + * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite + */ +size_t +atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n, + int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg) +{ + char *s = _s; + size_t pos = 0; + ssize_t res; + struct pollfd pfd; + +#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON + pfd.fd = fd; + pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT; +#endif + while (n > pos) { + res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos); + switch (res) { + case -1: + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) { +#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON + (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); +#endif + continue; + } + return 0; + case 0: + errno = EPIPE; + return pos; + default: + pos += (size_t)res; + if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) { + errno = EINTR; + return pos; + } + } + } + return pos; +} + +size_t +atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n) +{ + return atomicio6(f, fd, _s, n, NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev + */ +size_t +atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd, + const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt, + int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg) +{ + size_t pos = 0, rem; + ssize_t res; + struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array; + struct pollfd pfd; + + if (iovcnt < 0 || iovcnt > IOV_MAX) { + errno = EINVAL; + return 0; + } + /* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */ + memcpy(iov, _iov, (size_t)iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov)); + +#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON + pfd.fd = fd; + pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT; +#endif + for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) { + res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt); + switch (res) { + case -1: + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) { +#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON + (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); +#endif + continue; + } + return 0; + case 0: + errno = EPIPE; + return pos; + default: + rem = (size_t)res; + pos += rem; + /* skip completed iov entries */ + while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) { + rem -= iov[0].iov_len; + iov++; + iovcnt--; + } + /* This shouldn't happen... */ + if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) { + errno = EFAULT; + return 0; + } + if (iovcnt == 0) + break; + /* update pointer in partially complete iov */ + iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem; + iov[0].iov_len -= rem; + } + if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) { + errno = EINTR; + return pos; + } + } + return pos; +} + +size_t +atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd, + const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt) +{ + return atomiciov6(f, fd, _iov, iovcnt, NULL, NULL); +} diff --git a/atomicio.h b/atomicio.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d728ac --- /dev/null +++ b/atomicio.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.11 2010/09/22 22:58:51 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _ATOMICIO_H +#define _ATOMICIO_H + +/* + * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite + */ +size_t +atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n, + int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *); +size_t atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t); + +#define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write + +/* + * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev + */ +size_t +atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd, + const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt, int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *); +size_t atomiciov(ssize_t (*)(int, const struct iovec *, int), + int, const struct iovec *, int); + +#endif /* _ATOMICIO_H */ diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1409f69 --- /dev/null +++ b/audit-bsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,454 @@ +/* + * TODO + * + * - deal with overlap between this and sys_auth_allowed_user + * sys_auth_record_login and record_failed_login. + */ + +/* + * Copyright 1988-2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ +/* #pragma ident "@(#)bsmaudit.c 1.1 01/09/17 SMI" */ + +#include "includes.h" +#if defined(USE_BSM_AUDIT) + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API +#include +#endif + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +#ifndef AUE_openssh +# define AUE_openssh 32800 +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR) +#define AuditInfoStruct auditinfo_addr +#define AuditInfoTermID au_tid_addr_t +#define SetAuditFunc(a,b) setaudit_addr((a),(b)) +#define SetAuditFuncText "setaudit_addr" +#define AUToSubjectFunc au_to_subject_ex +#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b) au_to_return32((a), (int32_t)(b)) +#else +#define AuditInfoStruct auditinfo +#define AuditInfoTermID au_tid_t +#define SetAuditFunc(a,b) setaudit(a) +#define SetAuditFuncText "setaudit" +#define AUToSubjectFunc au_to_subject +#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b) au_to_return((a), (u_int)(b)) +#endif + +#ifndef cannot_audit +extern int cannot_audit(int); +#endif +extern void aug_init(void); +extern void aug_save_auid(au_id_t); +extern void aug_save_uid(uid_t); +extern void aug_save_euid(uid_t); +extern void aug_save_gid(gid_t); +extern void aug_save_egid(gid_t); +extern void aug_save_pid(pid_t); +extern void aug_save_asid(au_asid_t); +extern void aug_save_tid(dev_t, unsigned int); +extern void aug_save_tid_ex(dev_t, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t); +extern int aug_save_me(void); +extern int aug_save_namask(void); +extern void aug_save_event(au_event_t); +extern void aug_save_sorf(int); +extern void aug_save_text(char *); +extern void aug_save_text1(char *); +extern void aug_save_text2(char *); +extern void aug_save_na(int); +extern void aug_save_user(char *); +extern void aug_save_path(char *); +extern int aug_save_policy(void); +extern void aug_save_afunc(int (*)(int)); +extern int aug_audit(void); +extern int aug_na_selected(void); +extern int aug_selected(void); +extern int aug_daemon_session(void); + +#ifndef HAVE_GETTEXT +# define gettext(a) (a) +#endif + +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +static AuditInfoTermID ssh_bsm_tid; + +#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API +/* For some reason this constant is no longer defined + in Solaris 11. */ +#define BSM_TEXTBUFSZ 256 +#endif + +/* Below is the low-level BSM interface code */ + +/* + * aug_get_machine is only required on IPv6 capable machines, we use a + * different mechanism in audit_connection_from() for IPv4-only machines. + * getaudit_addr() is only present on IPv6 capable machines. + */ +#if defined(HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR) +extern int aug_get_machine(char *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *); +#else +static int +aug_get_machine(char *host, u_int32_t *addr, u_int32_t *type) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai; + struct sockaddr_in *in4; + struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; + int ret = 0, r; + + if ((r = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, NULL, &ai)) != 0) { + error("BSM audit: getaddrinfo failed for %.100s: %.100s", host, + r == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(r)); + return -1; + } + + switch (ai->ai_family) { + case AF_INET: + in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr; + *type = AU_IPv4; + memcpy(addr, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr)); + break; +#ifdef AU_IPv6 + case AF_INET6: + in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr; + *type = AU_IPv6; + memcpy(addr, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr)); + break; +#endif + default: + error("BSM audit: unknown address family for %.100s: %d", + host, ai->ai_family); + ret = -1; + } + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return ret; +} +#endif + +#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API +/* + In Solaris 11 the audit daemon has been moved to SMF. In the process + they simply dropped getacna() from the API, since it read from a now + non-existent config file. This function re-implements getacna() to + read from the SMF repository instead. + */ +int +getacna(char *auditstring, int len) +{ + scf_handle_t *handle = NULL; + scf_property_t *property = NULL; + scf_value_t *value = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + handle = scf_handle_create(SCF_VERSION); + if (handle == NULL) + return -2; /* The man page for getacna on Solaris 10 states + we should return -2 in case of error and set + errno to indicate the error. We don't bother + with errno here, though, since the only use + of this function below doesn't check for errors + anyway. + */ + + ret = scf_handle_bind(handle); + if (ret == -1) + return -2; + + property = scf_property_create(handle); + if (property == NULL) + return -2; + + ret = scf_handle_decode_fmri(handle, + "svc:/system/auditd:default/:properties/preselection/naflags", + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, property, 0); + if (ret == -1) + return -2; + + value = scf_value_create(handle); + if (value == NULL) + return -2; + + ret = scf_property_get_value(property, value); + if (ret == -1) + return -2; + + ret = scf_value_get_astring(value, auditstring, len); + if (ret == -1) + return -2; + + scf_value_destroy(value); + scf_property_destroy(property); + scf_handle_destroy(handle); + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* + * Check if the specified event is selected (enabled) for auditing. + * Returns 1 if the event is selected, 0 if not and -1 on failure. + */ +static int +selected(char *username, uid_t uid, au_event_t event, int sf) +{ + int rc, sorf; + char naflags[512]; + struct au_mask mask; + + mask.am_success = mask.am_failure = 0; + if (uid < 0) { + /* get flags for non-attributable (to a real user) events */ + rc = getacna(naflags, sizeof(naflags)); + if (rc == 0) + (void) getauditflagsbin(naflags, &mask); + } else + rc = au_user_mask(username, &mask); + + sorf = (sf == 0) ? AU_PRS_SUCCESS : AU_PRS_FAILURE; + return(au_preselect(event, &mask, sorf, AU_PRS_REREAD)); +} + +static void +bsm_audit_record(int typ, char *string, au_event_t event_no) +{ + int ad, rc, sel; + uid_t uid = -1; + gid_t gid = -1; + pid_t pid = getpid(); + AuditInfoTermID tid = ssh_bsm_tid; + + if (the_authctxt != NULL && the_authctxt->valid) { + uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid; + gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid; + } + + rc = (typ == 0) ? 0 : -1; + sel = selected(the_authctxt->user, uid, event_no, rc); + debug3("BSM audit: typ %d rc %d \"%s\"", typ, rc, string); + if (!sel) + return; /* audit event does not match mask, do not write */ + + debug3("BSM audit: writing audit new record"); + ad = au_open(); + + (void) au_write(ad, AUToSubjectFunc(uid, uid, gid, uid, gid, + pid, pid, &tid)); + (void) au_write(ad, au_to_text(string)); + (void) au_write(ad, AUToReturnFunc(typ, rc)); + +#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API + /* The last argument is the event modifier flags. For + some seemingly undocumented reason it was added in + Solaris 11. */ + rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no, 0); +#else + rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no); +#endif + + if (rc < 0) + error("BSM audit: %s failed to write \"%s\" record: %s", + __func__, string, strerror(errno)); +} + +static void +bsm_audit_session_setup(void) +{ + int rc; + struct AuditInfoStruct info; + au_mask_t mask; + + if (the_authctxt == NULL) { + error("BSM audit: session setup internal error (NULL ctxt)"); + return; + } + + if (the_authctxt->valid) + info.ai_auid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid; + else + info.ai_auid = -1; + info.ai_asid = getpid(); + mask.am_success = 0; + mask.am_failure = 0; + + (void) au_user_mask(the_authctxt->user, &mask); + + info.ai_mask.am_success = mask.am_success; + info.ai_mask.am_failure = mask.am_failure; + + info.ai_termid = ssh_bsm_tid; + + rc = SetAuditFunc(&info, sizeof(info)); + if (rc < 0) + error("BSM audit: %s: %s failed: %s", __func__, + SetAuditFuncText, strerror(errno)); +} + +static void +bsm_audit_bad_login(const char *what) +{ + char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ]; + + if (the_authctxt->valid) { + (void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf), + gettext("invalid %s for user %s"), + what, the_authctxt->user); + bsm_audit_record(4, textbuf, AUE_openssh); + } else { + (void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf), + gettext("invalid user name \"%s\""), + the_authctxt->user); + bsm_audit_record(3, textbuf, AUE_openssh); + } +} + +/* Below is the sshd audit API code */ + +void +audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) +{ + AuditInfoTermID *tid = &ssh_bsm_tid; + char buf[1024]; + + if (cannot_audit(0)) + return; + debug3("BSM audit: connection from %.100s port %d", host, port); + + /* populate our terminal id structure */ +#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR) + tid->at_port = (dev_t)port; + aug_get_machine((char *)host, &(tid->at_addr[0]), &(tid->at_type)); + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x %08x %08x %08x", tid->at_addr[0], + tid->at_addr[1], tid->at_addr[2], tid->at_addr[3]); + debug3("BSM audit: iptype %d machine ID %s", (int)tid->at_type, buf); +#else + /* this is used on IPv4-only machines */ + tid->port = (dev_t)port; + tid->machine = inet_addr(host); + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine); + debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf); +#endif +} + +void +audit_run_command(const char *command) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) +{ + char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ]; + static int logged_in = 0; + const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)"; + + if (cannot_audit(0)) + return; + + switch(event) { + case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: + logged_in = 1; + bsm_audit_session_setup(); + snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf), + gettext("successful login %s"), user); + bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_openssh); + break; + + case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: + /* + * We can also get a close event if the user attempted auth + * but never succeeded. + */ + if (logged_in) { + snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf), + gettext("sshd logout %s"), the_authctxt->user); + bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_logout); + } else { + debug("%s: connection closed without authentication", + __func__); + } + break; + + case SSH_NOLOGIN: + bsm_audit_record(1, + gettext("logins disabled by /etc/nologin"), AUE_openssh); + break; + + case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: + snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf), + gettext("too many tries for user %s"), the_authctxt->user); + bsm_audit_record(1, textbuf, AUE_openssh); + break; + + case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: + bsm_audit_record(2, gettext("not_console"), AUE_openssh); + break; + + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: + bsm_audit_bad_login("password"); + break; + + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: + bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry"); + break; + + default: + debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); + } +} +#endif /* BSM */ diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..136ed76 --- /dev/null +++ b/audit-linux.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT) +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "audit.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "packet.h" + +const char *audit_username(void); + +int +linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname, + const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) +{ + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + + if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + return 0; /* Must prevent login */ + } + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, + NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", + username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); + saved_errno = errno; + close(audit_fd); + + /* + * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non + * root user. + */ + if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) + rc = 0; + errno = saved_errno; + + return rc >= 0; +} + +/* Below is the sshd audit API code */ + +void +audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_run_command(const char *command) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) +{ + if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL, + li->line, 1) == 0) + fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); +} + +void +audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + + switch(event) { + case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: + case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: + case SSH_NOLOGIN: + case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: + case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: + break; + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: + case SSH_INVALID_USER: + linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0); + break; + default: + debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); + break; + } +} +#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33a0437 --- /dev/null +++ b/audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + +#include "audit.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" + +/* + * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when + * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when + * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. + */ +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + +/* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ +ssh_audit_event_t +audit_classify_auth(const char *method) +{ + if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0) + return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE; + else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0) + return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD; + else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0) + return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY; + else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || + strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0) + return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT; + else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0) + return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED; + else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) + return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI; + else + return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; +} + +/* helper to return supplied username */ +const char * +audit_username(void) +{ + static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; + static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; + + if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) + return (unknownuser); + if (!the_authctxt->valid) + return (invaliduser); + return (the_authctxt->user); +} + +const char * +audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) +{ + int i; + static struct event_lookup_struct { + ssh_audit_event_t event; + const char *name; + } event_lookup[] = { + {SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, "LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"}, + {SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED, "LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"}, + {SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS, "AUTH_SUCCESS"}, + {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE, "AUTH_FAIL_NONE"}, + {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD, "AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"}, + {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, "AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"}, + {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY, "AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"}, + {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED, "AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"}, + {SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI, "AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"}, + {SSH_INVALID_USER, "INVALID_USER"}, + {SSH_NOLOGIN, "NOLOGIN"}, + {SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, "CONNECTION_CLOSE"}, + {SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, "CONNECTION_ABANDON"}, + {SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN, "AUDIT_UNKNOWN"} + }; + + for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++) + if (event_lookup[i].event == ev) + break; + return(event_lookup[i].name); +} + +# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +/* + * Null implementations of audit functions. + * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled. + */ + +/* + * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication + * has been attempted. + */ +void +audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) +{ + debug("audit connection from %s port %d euid %d", host, port, + (int)geteuid()); +} + +/* + * Called when various events occur (see audit.h for a list of possible + * events and what they mean). + */ +void +audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) +{ + debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(), + audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event)); +} + +/* + * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to + * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. + * + * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used + * within a single connection. + */ +void +audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) +{ + const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)"; + + debug("audit session open euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(), + audit_username(), t); +} + +/* + * Called when a user session is closed. Argument is the tty allocated to + * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. + * + * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used + * within a single connection. + */ +void +audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) +{ + const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)"; + + debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(), + audit_username(), t); +} + +/* + * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that + * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows + * multiple sessions within a single connection. + */ +void +audit_run_command(const char *command) +{ + debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), + audit_username(), command); +} +# endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b59366 --- /dev/null +++ b/audit.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H +# define _SSH_AUDIT_H + +#include "loginrec.h" + +enum ssh_audit_event_type { + SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, + SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED, + SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS, + SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE, + SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD, + SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT, /* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */ + SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY, /* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */ + SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED, /* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */ + SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI, + SSH_INVALID_USER, + SSH_NOLOGIN, /* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */ + SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE, /* closed after attempting auth or session */ + SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */ + SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN +}; +typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; + +void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); +void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); +void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); +void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); +void audit_run_command(const char *); +ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); + +#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ diff --git a/auth-bsdauth.c b/auth-bsdauth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4dc5045 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-bsdauth.c @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.15 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifdef BSD_AUTH +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "log.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" + +static void * +bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + return authctxt; +} + +int +bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, + u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + char *challenge = NULL; + + *infotxt = NULL; + *numprompts = 0; + *prompts = NULL; + *echo_on = NULL; + + if (authctxt->as != NULL) { + debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session"); + challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE); + if (challenge == NULL) { + auth_close(authctxt->as); + authctxt->as = NULL; + } + } + + if (challenge == NULL) { + debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session"); + debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); + authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user, + authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge); + if (authctxt->as == NULL) + challenge = NULL; + debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty"); + } + + if (challenge == NULL) + return -1; + + *name = xstrdup(""); + *infotxt = xstrdup(""); + *numprompts = 1; + *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); + *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); + (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge); + + return 0; +} + +int +bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + int authok; + + if (!authctxt->valid) + return -1; + + if (authctxt->as == NULL) + error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session"); + + if (numresponses != 1) + return -1; + + authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0); + authctxt->as = NULL; + debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok); + + return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0; +} + +static void +bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + + if (authctxt && authctxt->as) { + auth_close(authctxt->as); + authctxt->as = NULL; + } +} + +KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = { + "bsdauth", + bsdauth_init_ctx, + bsdauth_query, + bsdauth_respond, + bsdauth_free_ctx +}; + +KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = { + "bsdauth", + bsdauth_init_ctx, + mm_bsdauth_query, + mm_bsdauth_respond, + bsdauth_free_ctx +}; +#endif diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3096f1c --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-krb5.c @@ -0,0 +1,272 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.23 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines. + * + * From: FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" + +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern ServerOptions options; + +static int +krb5_init(void *context) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context; + krb5_error_code problem; + + if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) { + problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx); + if (problem) + return (problem); + } + return (0); +} + +int +auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) +{ +#ifndef HEIMDAL + krb5_creds creds; + krb5_principal server; +#endif + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + int len; + char *client, *platform_client; + const char *errmsg; + + /* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */ + platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name); + client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name; + + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + + problem = krb5_init(authctxt); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client, + &authctxt->krb5_user); + if (problem) + goto out; + +#ifdef HEIMDAL +# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE + problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, + krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache); +# else + problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); +# endif + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, + authctxt->krb5_user); + if (problem) + goto out; + + restore_uid(); + + problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, + ccache, password, 1, NULL); + + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + + if (problem) + goto out; + +# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE + problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, + krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); +# else + problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops, + &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); +# endif + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, + authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache); + ccache = NULL; + if (problem) + goto out; + +#else + problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, + authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL, + KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); + if (problem) + goto out; + + restore_uid(); + problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server, + NULL, NULL, NULL); + krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server); + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + if (problem) + goto out; + + if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, + authctxt->pw->pw_name)) { + problem = -1; + goto out; + } + + problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, + authctxt->krb5_user); + if (problem) + goto out; + + problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, + &creds); + if (problem) + goto out; +#endif + + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + + len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; + authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); + snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) + do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname); +#endif + + out: + restore_uid(); + + free(platform_client); + + if (problem) { + if (ccache) + krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache); + + if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) { + errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, + problem); + debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s", + errmsg); + krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg); + } else + debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d", + problem); + + krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); + + if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) + return (-1); + else + return (0); + } + return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0); +} + +void +krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called"); + if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) { + krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL; + } + if (authctxt->krb5_user) { + krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user); + authctxt->krb5_user = NULL; + } + if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) { + krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx); + authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL; + } +} + +#ifndef HEIMDAL +krb5_error_code +ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { + int tmpfd, ret, oerrno; + char ccname[40]; + mode_t old_umask; + + ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), + "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) + return ENOMEM; + + old_umask = umask(0177); + tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); + oerrno = errno; + umask(old_umask); + if (tmpfd == -1) { + logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); + return oerrno; + } + + if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { + oerrno = errno; + logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); + close(tmpfd); + return oerrno; + } + close(tmpfd); + + return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); +} +#endif /* !HEIMDAL */ +#endif /* KRB5 */ diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b05d6d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-options.c @@ -0,0 +1,935 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.84 2018/10/03 06:38:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "auth-options.h" + +/* + * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match + * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0 + * if negated option matches. + * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to + * point to the first character after the option. + */ +static int +opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp) +{ + size_t opt_len = strlen(opt); + const char *opts = *optsp; + int negate = 0; + + if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) { + opts += 3; + negate = 1; + } + if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) { + *optsp = opts + opt_len; + return negate ? 0 : 1; + } + return -1; +} + +static char * +opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp) +{ + const char *s = *sp; + char *ret; + size_t i; + + *errstrp = NULL; + if (*s != '"') { + *errstrp = "missing start quote"; + return NULL; + } + s++; + if ((ret = malloc(strlen((s)) + 1)) == NULL) { + *errstrp = "memory allocation failed"; + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; *s != '\0' && *s != '"';) { + if (s[0] == '\\' && s[1] == '"') + s++; + ret[i++] = *s++; + } + if (*s == '\0') { + *errstrp = "missing end quote"; + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret[i] = '\0'; + s++; + *sp = s; + return ret; +} + +static int +opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term) +{ + if (strncasecmp((*opts), term, strlen(term)) == 0 && + (*opts)[strlen(term)] == '=') { + *opts += strlen(term) + 1; + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +dup_strings(char ***dstp, size_t *ndstp, char **src, size_t nsrc) +{ + char **dst; + size_t i, j; + + *dstp = NULL; + *ndstp = 0; + if (nsrc == 0) + return 0; + + if ((dst = calloc(nsrc, sizeof(*src))) == NULL) + return -1; + for (i = 0; i < nsrc; i++) { + if ((dst[i] = strdup(src[i])) == NULL) { + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + free(dst[j]); + free(dst); + return -1; + } + } + /* success */ + *dstp = dst; + *ndstp = nsrc; + return 0; +} + +#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 +#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 +static int +cert_option_list(struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *oblob, + u_int which, int crit) +{ + char *command, *allowed; + char *name = NULL; + struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL; + int r, ret = -1, found; + + if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__); + goto out; + } + + while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) { + sshbuf_free(data); + data = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) { + error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s", + ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu", + name, sshbuf_len(data)); + found = 0; + if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) { + if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) { + opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; + found = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, + "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) { + opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; + found = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, + "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) { + opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1; + found = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) { + opts->permit_pty_flag = 1; + found = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) { + opts->permit_user_rc = 1; + found = 1; + } + } + if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) { + if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command, + NULL)) != 0) { + error("Unable to parse \"%s\" " + "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if (opts->force_command != NULL) { + error("Certificate has multiple " + "force-command options"); + free(command); + goto out; + } + opts->force_command = command; + found = 1; + } + if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed, + NULL)) != 0) { + error("Unable to parse \"%s\" " + "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) { + error("Certificate has multiple " + "source-address options"); + free(allowed); + goto out; + } + /* Check syntax */ + if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, allowed) == -1) { + error("Certificate source-address " + "contents invalid"); + goto out; + } + opts->required_from_host_cert = allowed; + found = 1; + } + } + + if (!found) { + if (crit) { + error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" " + "is not supported", name); + goto out; + } else { + logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" " + "is not supported", name); + } + } else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) { + error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt " + "(extra data)", name); + goto out; + } + free(name); + name = NULL; + } + /* successfully parsed all options */ + ret = 0; + + out: + free(name); + sshbuf_free(data); + sshbuf_free(c); + return ret; +} + +struct sshauthopt * +sshauthopt_new(void) +{ + struct sshauthopt *ret; + + if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) + return NULL; + ret->force_tun_device = -1; + return ret; +} + +void +sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts) +{ + size_t i; + + if (opts == NULL) + return; + + free(opts->cert_principals); + free(opts->force_command); + free(opts->required_from_host_cert); + free(opts->required_from_host_keys); + + for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) + free(opts->env[i]); + free(opts->env); + + for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) + free(opts->permitopen[i]); + free(opts->permitopen); + + for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) + free(opts->permitlisten[i]); + free(opts->permitlisten); + + explicit_bzero(opts, sizeof(*opts)); + free(opts); +} + +struct sshauthopt * +sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void) +{ + struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL; + + if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* Defaults for authorized_keys flags */ + ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1; + ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; + ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; + ret->permit_pty_flag = 1; + ret->permit_user_rc = 1; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse and record a permitopen/permitlisten directive. + * Return 0 on success. Return -1 on failure and sets *errstrp to error reason. + */ +static int +handle_permit(const char **optsp, int allow_bare_port, + char ***permitsp, size_t *npermitsp, const char **errstrp) +{ + char *opt, *tmp, *cp, *host, **permits = *permitsp; + size_t npermits = *npermitsp; + const char *errstr = "unknown error"; + + if (npermits > INT_MAX) { + *errstrp = "too many permission directives"; + return -1; + } + if ((opt = opt_dequote(optsp, &errstr)) == NULL) { + return -1; + } + if (allow_bare_port && strchr(opt, ':') == NULL) { + /* + * Allow a bare port number in permitlisten to indicate a + * listen_host wildcard. + */ + if (asprintf(&tmp, "*:%s", opt) < 0) { + *errstrp = "memory allocation failed"; + return -1; + } + free(opt); + opt = tmp; + } + if ((tmp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) { + free(opt); + *errstrp = "memory allocation failed"; + return -1; + } + cp = tmp; + /* validate syntax before recording it. */ + host = hpdelim(&cp); + if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { + free(tmp); + free(opt); + *errstrp = "invalid permission hostname"; + return -1; + } + /* + * don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid + * dependency on channels.[ch] here. + */ + if (cp == NULL || + (strcmp(cp, "*") != 0 && a2port(cp) <= 0)) { + free(tmp); + free(opt); + *errstrp = "invalid permission port"; + return -1; + } + /* XXX - add streamlocal support */ + free(tmp); + /* Record it */ + if ((permits = recallocarray(permits, npermits, npermits + 1, + sizeof(*permits))) == NULL) { + free(opt); + /* NB. don't update *permitsp if alloc fails */ + *errstrp = "memory allocation failed"; + return -1; + } + permits[npermits++] = opt; + *permitsp = permits; + *npermitsp = npermits; + return 0; +} + +struct sshauthopt * +sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const char **errstrp) +{ + char **oarray, *opt, *cp, *tmp; + int r; + struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL; + const char *errstr = "unknown error"; + uint64_t valid_before; + + if (errstrp != NULL) + *errstrp = NULL; + if ((ret = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL) + goto alloc_fail; + + if (opts == NULL) + return ret; + + while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') { + /* flag options */ + if ((r = opt_flag("restrict", 0, &opts)) != -1) { + ret->restricted = 1; + ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0; + ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; + ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; + ret->permit_pty_flag = 0; + ret->permit_user_rc = 0; + } else if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) { + ret->cert_authority = r; + } else if ((r = opt_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) { + ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = r == 1; + } else if ((r = opt_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) { + ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = r == 1; + } else if ((r = opt_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) { + ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = r == 1; + } else if ((r = opt_flag("pty", 1, &opts)) != -1) { + ret->permit_pty_flag = r == 1; + } else if ((r = opt_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts)) != -1) { + ret->permit_user_rc = r == 1; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "command")) { + if (ret->force_command != NULL) { + errstr = "multiple \"command\" clauses"; + goto fail; + } + ret->force_command = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr); + if (ret->force_command == NULL) + goto fail; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "principals")) { + if (ret->cert_principals != NULL) { + errstr = "multiple \"principals\" clauses"; + goto fail; + } + ret->cert_principals = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr); + if (ret->cert_principals == NULL) + goto fail; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "from")) { + if (ret->required_from_host_keys != NULL) { + errstr = "multiple \"from\" clauses"; + goto fail; + } + ret->required_from_host_keys = opt_dequote(&opts, + &errstr); + if (ret->required_from_host_keys == NULL) + goto fail; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "expiry-time")) { + if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL) + goto fail; + if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &valid_before) != 0 || + valid_before == 0) { + free(opt); + errstr = "invalid expires time"; + goto fail; + } + free(opt); + if (ret->valid_before == 0 || + valid_before < ret->valid_before) + ret->valid_before = valid_before; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "environment")) { + if (ret->nenv > INT_MAX) { + errstr = "too many environment strings"; + goto fail; + } + if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL) + goto fail; + /* env name must be alphanumeric and followed by '=' */ + if ((tmp = strchr(opt, '=')) == NULL) { + free(opt); + errstr = "invalid environment string"; + goto fail; + } + if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) + goto alloc_fail; + cp[tmp - opt] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */ + if (!valid_env_name(cp)) { + free(cp); + free(opt); + errstr = "invalid environment string"; + goto fail; + } + free(cp); + /* Append it. */ + oarray = ret->env; + if ((ret->env = recallocarray(ret->env, ret->nenv, + ret->nenv + 1, sizeof(*ret->env))) == NULL) { + free(opt); + ret->env = oarray; /* put it back for cleanup */ + goto alloc_fail; + } + ret->env[ret->nenv++] = opt; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitopen")) { + if (handle_permit(&opts, 0, &ret->permitopen, + &ret->npermitopen, &errstr) != 0) + goto fail; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitlisten")) { + if (handle_permit(&opts, 1, &ret->permitlisten, + &ret->npermitlisten, &errstr) != 0) + goto fail; + } else if (opt_match(&opts, "tunnel")) { + if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL) + goto fail; + ret->force_tun_device = a2tun(opt, NULL); + free(opt); + if (ret->force_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { + errstr = "invalid tun device"; + goto fail; + } + } + /* + * Skip the comma, and move to the next option + * (or break out if there are no more). + */ + if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t') + break; /* End of options. */ + /* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */ + if (*opts != ',') { + errstr = "unknown key option"; + goto fail; + } + opts++; + if (*opts == '\0') { + errstr = "unexpected end-of-options"; + goto fail; + } + } + + /* success */ + if (errstrp != NULL) + *errstrp = NULL; + return ret; + +alloc_fail: + errstr = "memory allocation failed"; +fail: + sshauthopt_free(ret); + if (errstrp != NULL) + *errstrp = errstr; + return NULL; +} + +struct sshauthopt * +sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k) +{ + struct sshauthopt *ret; + + if (k == NULL || !sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type) || k->cert == NULL || + k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) + return NULL; + + if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* Handle options and critical extensions separately */ + if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->critical, + OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1) == -1) { + sshauthopt_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->extensions, + OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0) == -1) { + sshauthopt_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + /* success */ + return ret; +} + +/* + * Merges "additional" options to "primary" and returns the result. + * NB. Some options from primary have primacy. + */ +struct sshauthopt * +sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary, + const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp) +{ + struct sshauthopt *ret; + const char *errstr = "internal error"; + const char *tmp; + + if (errstrp != NULL) + *errstrp = NULL; + + if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL) + goto alloc_fail; + + /* cert_authority and cert_principals are cleared in result */ + + /* Prefer access lists from primary. */ + /* XXX err is both set and mismatch? */ + tmp = primary->required_from_host_cert; + if (tmp == NULL) + tmp = additional->required_from_host_cert; + if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_cert = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) + goto alloc_fail; + tmp = primary->required_from_host_keys; + if (tmp == NULL) + tmp = additional->required_from_host_keys; + if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_keys = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) + goto alloc_fail; + + /* + * force_tun_device, permitopen/permitlisten and environment all + * prefer the primary. + */ + ret->force_tun_device = primary->force_tun_device; + if (ret->force_tun_device == -1) + ret->force_tun_device = additional->force_tun_device; + if (primary->nenv > 0) { + if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, + primary->env, primary->nenv) != 0) + goto alloc_fail; + } else if (additional->nenv) { + if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, + additional->env, additional->nenv) != 0) + goto alloc_fail; + } + if (primary->npermitopen > 0) { + if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen, + primary->permitopen, primary->npermitopen) != 0) + goto alloc_fail; + } else if (additional->npermitopen > 0) { + if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen, + additional->permitopen, additional->npermitopen) != 0) + goto alloc_fail; + } + + if (primary->npermitlisten > 0) { + if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten, + primary->permitlisten, primary->npermitlisten) != 0) + goto alloc_fail; + } else if (additional->npermitlisten > 0) { + if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten, + additional->permitlisten, additional->npermitlisten) != 0) + goto alloc_fail; + } + + /* Flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both for permission) */ +#define OPTFLAG(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1) + OPTFLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag); + OPTFLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag); + OPTFLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag); + OPTFLAG(permit_pty_flag); + OPTFLAG(permit_user_rc); +#undef OPTFLAG + + /* Earliest expiry time should win */ + if (primary->valid_before != 0) + ret->valid_before = primary->valid_before; + if (additional->valid_before != 0 && + additional->valid_before < ret->valid_before) + ret->valid_before = additional->valid_before; + + /* + * When both multiple forced-command are specified, only + * proceed if they are identical, otherwise fail. + */ + if (primary->force_command != NULL && + additional->force_command != NULL) { + if (strcmp(primary->force_command, + additional->force_command) == 0) { + /* ok */ + ret->force_command = strdup(primary->force_command); + if (ret->force_command == NULL) + goto alloc_fail; + } else { + errstr = "forced command options do not match"; + goto fail; + } + } else if (primary->force_command != NULL) { + if ((ret->force_command = strdup( + primary->force_command)) == NULL) + goto alloc_fail; + } else if (additional->force_command != NULL) { + if ((ret->force_command = strdup( + additional->force_command)) == NULL) + goto alloc_fail; + } + /* success */ + if (errstrp != NULL) + *errstrp = NULL; + return ret; + + alloc_fail: + errstr = "memory allocation failed"; + fail: + if (errstrp != NULL) + *errstrp = errstr; + sshauthopt_free(ret); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Copy options + */ +struct sshauthopt * +sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig) +{ + struct sshauthopt *ret; + + if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + +#define OPTSCALAR(x) ret->x = orig->x + OPTSCALAR(permit_port_forwarding_flag); + OPTSCALAR(permit_agent_forwarding_flag); + OPTSCALAR(permit_x11_forwarding_flag); + OPTSCALAR(permit_pty_flag); + OPTSCALAR(permit_user_rc); + OPTSCALAR(restricted); + OPTSCALAR(cert_authority); + OPTSCALAR(force_tun_device); + OPTSCALAR(valid_before); +#undef OPTSCALAR +#define OPTSTRING(x) \ + do { \ + if (orig->x != NULL && (ret->x = strdup(orig->x)) == NULL) { \ + sshauthopt_free(ret); \ + return NULL; \ + } \ + } while (0) + OPTSTRING(cert_principals); + OPTSTRING(force_command); + OPTSTRING(required_from_host_cert); + OPTSTRING(required_from_host_keys); +#undef OPTSTRING + + if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, orig->env, orig->nenv) != 0 || + dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen, + orig->permitopen, orig->npermitopen) != 0 || + dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten, + orig->permitlisten, orig->npermitlisten) != 0) { + sshauthopt_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +static int +serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char **a, size_t n) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + size_t i; + int r; + + if (n > INT_MAX) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, a[i])) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; + } + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, n)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; + } + /* success */ + return 0; +} + +static int +deserialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char ***ap, size_t *np) +{ + char **a = NULL; + size_t i, n = 0; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + u_int tmp; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) + goto out; + if (tmp > INT_MAX) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + n = tmp; + if (n > 0 && (a = calloc(n, sizeof(*a))) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &a[i], NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + } + /* success */ + r = 0; + *ap = a; + a = NULL; + *np = n; + n = 0; + out: + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + free(a[i]); + free(a); + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +static int +serialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, const char *s) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, s == NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +static int +deserialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, char **sp) +{ + int r; + u_char flag; + + *sp = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flag)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, flag ? NULL : sp, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +int +sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m, + int untrusted) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* Flag and simple integer options */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_pty_flag)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_user_rc)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->restricted)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->cert_authority)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0) + return r; + + /* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->force_tun_device == -1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, (opts->force_tun_device < 0) ? + 0 : (u_int)opts->force_tun_device)) != 0) + return r; + + /* String options; these may be NULL */ + if ((r = serialise_nullable_string(m, + untrusted ? "yes" : opts->cert_principals)) != 0 || + (r = serialise_nullable_string(m, + untrusted ? "true" : opts->force_command)) != 0 || + (r = serialise_nullable_string(m, + untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 || + (r = serialise_nullable_string(m, + untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0) + return r; + + /* Array options */ + if ((r = serialise_array(m, opts->env, + untrusted ? 0 : opts->nenv)) != 0 || + (r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitopen, + untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitopen)) != 0 || + (r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitlisten, + untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitlisten)) != 0) + return r; + + /* success */ + return 0; +} + +int +sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp) +{ + struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + u_char f; + u_int tmp; + + if ((opts = calloc(1, sizeof(*opts))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + +#define OPT_FLAG(x) \ + do { \ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0) \ + goto out; \ + opts->x = f; \ + } while (0) + OPT_FLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag); + OPT_FLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag); + OPT_FLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag); + OPT_FLAG(permit_pty_flag); + OPT_FLAG(permit_user_rc); + OPT_FLAG(restricted); + OPT_FLAG(cert_authority); +#undef OPT_FLAG + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &opts->valid_before)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0) + goto out; + opts->force_tun_device = f ? -1 : (int)tmp; + + /* String options may be NULL */ + if ((r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->cert_principals)) != 0 || + (r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->force_command)) != 0 || + (r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, + &opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 || + (r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, + &opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Array options */ + if ((r = deserialise_array(m, &opts->env, &opts->nenv)) != 0 || + (r = deserialise_array(m, + &opts->permitopen, &opts->npermitopen)) != 0 || + (r = deserialise_array(m, + &opts->permitlisten, &opts->npermitlisten)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* success */ + r = 0; + *optsp = opts; + opts = NULL; + out: + sshauthopt_free(opts); + return r; +} diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0462983 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-options.h @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.27 2018/06/06 18:23:32 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H +#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H + +struct passwd; +struct sshkey; + +/* + * sshauthopt represents key options parsed from authorized_keys or + * from certificate extensions/options. + */ +struct sshauthopt { + /* Feature flags */ + int permit_port_forwarding_flag; + int permit_agent_forwarding_flag; + int permit_x11_forwarding_flag; + int permit_pty_flag; + int permit_user_rc; + + /* "restrict" keyword was invoked */ + int restricted; + + /* key/principal expiry date */ + uint64_t valid_before; + + /* Certificate-related options */ + int cert_authority; + char *cert_principals; + + int force_tun_device; + char *force_command; + + /* Custom environment */ + size_t nenv; + char **env; + + /* Permitted port forwardings */ + size_t npermitopen; + char **permitopen; + + /* Permitted listens (remote forwarding) */ + size_t npermitlisten; + char **permitlisten; + + /* + * Permitted host/addresses (comma-separated) + * Caller must check source address matches both lists (if present). + */ + char *required_from_host_cert; + char *required_from_host_keys; +}; + +struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new(void); +struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void); +void sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts); +struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig); +int sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m, int); +int sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **opts); + +/* + * Parse authorized_keys options. Returns an options structure on success + * or NULL on failure. Will set errstr on failure. + */ +struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_parse(const char *s, const char **errstr); + +/* + * Parse certification options to a struct sshauthopt. + * Returns options on success or NULL on failure. + */ +struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k); + +/* + * Merge key options. + */ +struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary, + const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp); + +#endif diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1dec53e --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-pam.c @@ -0,0 +1,1349 @@ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and + * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. + * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the + * DARPA CHATS research program. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller + * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef USE_PAM +#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) +#include +#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) +#include +#endif + +#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE) +extern char *__progname; +# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname +#endif + +/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */ +#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE +# define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */ +#else +# define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */ +#endif + +/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */ +#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE +# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member) +#else +# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member) +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-pam.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "msg.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; +extern u_int utmp_len; + +/* so we don't silently change behaviour */ +#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS +# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK" +#endif + +/* + * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported + * and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if + * this breaks. + */ +#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK +#include +/* + * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with* + * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h + * (e.g. Linux) + */ +typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t; +#else +typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t; +#define pthread_exit fake_pthread_exit +#define pthread_create fake_pthread_create +#define pthread_cancel fake_pthread_cancel +#define pthread_join fake_pthread_join +#endif + +struct pam_ctxt { + sp_pthread_t pam_thread; + int pam_psock; + int pam_csock; + int pam_done; +}; + +static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *); +static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt; + +#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK +/* + * Simulate threads with processes. + */ + +static int sshpam_thread_status = -1; +static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig; + +static void +sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig) +{ + signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL) + return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */ + if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG) + <= 0) { + /* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */ + kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM); + while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, + &sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + return; + } + } + if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) && + WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM) + return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */ + if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status)) + sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly"); + if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0) + sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly"); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void +pthread_exit(void *value) +{ + _exit(0); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr, + void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg) +{ + pid_t pid; + struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg; + + sshpam_thread_status = -1; + switch ((pid = fork())) { + case -1: + error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + case 0: + close(ctx->pam_psock); + ctx->pam_psock = -1; + thread_start(arg); + _exit(1); + default: + *thread = pid; + close(ctx->pam_csock); + ctx->pam_csock = -1; + sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler); + return (0); + } +} + +static int +pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread) +{ + signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); + return (kill(thread, SIGTERM)); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value) +{ + int status; + + if (sshpam_thread_status != -1) + return (sshpam_thread_status); + signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); + while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + return (status); +} +#endif + + +static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL; +static int sshpam_err = 0; +static int sshpam_authenticated = 0; +static int sshpam_session_open = 0; +static int sshpam_cred_established = 0; +static int sshpam_account_status = -1; +static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0; +static char **sshpam_env = NULL; +static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL; +static const char *sshpam_password = NULL; + +/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */ +#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST +static char ** +pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh) +{ + /* + * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing + * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known + * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment. + */ + return NULL; +} +#endif + +/* + * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity + * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process + * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root. + * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do + * the right thing. + */ +#ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID +static int +sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) +{ + int result; + + if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) + fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized"); + if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1) + fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags); + if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1) + fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return result; +} +# define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b))) +#endif + +void +sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd) +{ + extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; + static int saved_port, saved_agent, saved_x11; + + debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd); + if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) + fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); + sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd; + if (reqd) { + saved_port = auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag; + saved_agent = auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag; + saved_x11 = auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag; + auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0; + auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; + auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; + } else { + if (saved_port) + auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = saved_port; + if (saved_agent) + auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = saved_agent; + if (saved_x11) + auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = saved_x11; + } +} + +/* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */ +static void +import_environments(struct sshbuf *b) +{ + char *env; + u_int n, i, num_env; + int r; + + debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); + +#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK + /* Import variables set by do_pam_account */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (n > INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: invalid PAM account status %u", __func__, n); + sshpam_account_status = (int)n; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0); + + /* Import environment from subprocess */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (num_env > 1024) + fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024", + __func__, num_env); + sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env)); + debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env); + for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(sshpam_env[i]), NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL; + + /* Import PAM environment from subprocess */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env); + for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV + /* Errors are not fatal here */ + if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) { + error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s", + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r)); + } +#endif + /* XXX leak env? */ + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Conversation function for authentication thread. + */ +static int +sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *data) +{ + struct sshbuf *buffer; + struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; + struct pam_response *reply; + int r, i; + u_char status; + + debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); + *resp = NULL; + + if (data == NULL) { + error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context"); + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); + } + ctxt = data; + if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); + + if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) + return PAM_CONV_ERR; + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + free(reply); + return PAM_CONV_ERR; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, + PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, + PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1) + goto fail; + + if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, buffer) == -1) + goto fail; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (status != PAM_AUTHTOK) + goto fail; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, + &reply[i].resp, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + break; + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, + PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, + PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1) + goto fail; + break; + default: + goto fail; + } + sshbuf_reset(buffer); + } + sshbuf_free(buffer); + *resp = reply; + return (PAM_SUCCESS); + + fail: + for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { + free(reply[i].resp); + } + free(reply); + sshbuf_free(buffer); + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); +} + +/* + * Authentication thread. + */ +static void * +sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) +{ + struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; + struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; + struct pam_conv sshpam_conv; + int r, flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? + PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); +#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK + extern char **environ; + char **env_from_pam; + u_int i; + const char *pam_user; + const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; + char *tz = getenv("TZ"); + + sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, + (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto auth_fail; + + environ[0] = NULL; + if (tz != NULL) + if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1) + error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s", + strerror(errno)); + + if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) { + setproctitle("%s [pam]", + sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown"); + } +#endif + + sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv; + sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt; + + if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) + fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); + + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, + (const void *)&sshpam_conv); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto auth_fail; + sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); + if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES) + sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto auth_fail; + + if (!do_pam_account()) { + sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; + goto auth_fail; + } + if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { + sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, + PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto auth_fail; + sshpam_password_change_required(0); + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, "OK")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + +#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK + /* Export variables set by do_pam_account */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* Export any environment strings set in child */ + for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { + /* Count */ + if (i > INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: too many enviornment strings", __func__); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, environ[i])) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + /* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */ + env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle); + for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) { + /* Count */ + if (i > INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: too many PAM enviornment strings", __func__); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, env_from_pam[i])) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } +#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */ + + /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ + ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer); + sshbuf_free(buffer); + pthread_exit(NULL); + + auth_fail: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ + if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) + ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer); + else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached) + ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer); + else + ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, buffer); + sshbuf_free(buffer); + pthread_exit(NULL); + + return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */ +} + +void +sshpam_thread_cleanup(void) +{ + struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt; + + debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); + if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) { + pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread); + pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL); + close(ctxt->pam_psock); + close(ctxt->pam_csock); + memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt)); + cleanup_ctxt = NULL; + } +} + +static int +sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *data) +{ + debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); +} + +static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL }; + +static int +sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *data) +{ + struct pam_response *reply; + int r, i; + + debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); + *resp = NULL; + + if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); + + if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n", + PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + default: + goto fail; + } + } + *resp = reply; + return (PAM_SUCCESS); + + fail: + for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { + free(reply[i].resp); + } + free(reply); + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); +} + +static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL }; + +void +sshpam_cleanup(void) +{ + if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor())) + return; + debug("PAM: cleanup"); + pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv); + if (sshpam_session_open) { + debug("PAM: closing session"); + pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT); + sshpam_session_open = 0; + } + if (sshpam_cred_established) { + debug("PAM: deleting credentials"); + pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED); + sshpam_cred_established = 0; + } + sshpam_authenticated = 0; + pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); + sshpam_handle = NULL; +} + +static int +sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user; + const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + + if (sshpam_handle != NULL) { + /* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */ + sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, + PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); + if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0) + return (0); + pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); + sshpam_handle = NULL; + } + debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user); + sshpam_err = + pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle); + sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; + + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { + pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); + sshpam_handle = NULL; + return (-1); + } + pam_rhost = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); + debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost); + sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { + pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); + sshpam_handle = NULL; + return (-1); + } +#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE + /* + * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate. + * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and + * may not even set one (for tty-less connections) + */ + debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\""); + sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh"); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { + pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); + sshpam_handle = NULL; + return (-1); + } +#endif + return (0); +} + +static void +expose_authinfo(const char *caller) +{ + char *auth_info; + + /* + * Expose authentication information to PAM. + * The environment variable is versioned. Please increment the + * version suffix if the format of session_info changes. + */ + if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL) + auth_info = xstrdup(""); + else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string( + sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); + + debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller); + do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info); + free(auth_info); +} + +static void * +sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; + int socks[2]; + + debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); + /* + * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account + * has previously failed. + */ + if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0) + return NULL; + + /* Initialize PAM */ + if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) { + error("PAM: initialization failed"); + return (NULL); + } + + expose_authinfo(__func__); + ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt); + + /* Start the authentication thread */ + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) { + error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno)); + free(ctxt); + return (NULL); + } + ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0]; + ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1]; + if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) { + error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s", + strerror(errno)); + close(socks[0]); + close(socks[1]); + free(ctxt); + return (NULL); + } + cleanup_ctxt = ctxt; + return (ctxt); +} + +static int +sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, + u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct sshbuf *buffer; + struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; + size_t plen; + u_char type; + char *msg; + size_t len, mlen; + int r; + + debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + *name = xstrdup(""); + *info = xstrdup(""); + *prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); + **prompts = NULL; + plen = 0; + *echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int)); + while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, buffer) == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &msg, &mlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + switch (type) { + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: + *num = 1; + len = plen + mlen + 1; + **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); + strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); + plen += mlen; + **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON); + free(msg); + return (0); + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + /* accumulate messages */ + len = plen + mlen + 2; + **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); + strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); + plen += mlen; + strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen); + plen++; + free(msg); + break; + case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED: + case PAM_MAXTRIES: + if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) + sshpam_account_status = 0; + if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES) + sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case PAM_AUTH_ERR: + debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type)); + if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) { + *info = **prompts; + **prompts = NULL; + *num = 0; + **echo_on = 0; + ctxt->pam_done = -1; + free(msg); + return 0; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case PAM_SUCCESS: + if (**prompts != NULL) { + /* drain any accumulated messages */ + debug("PAM: %s", **prompts); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, **prompts, + strlen(**prompts))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(**prompts); + **prompts = NULL; + } + if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) { + if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid || + (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && + options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) + fatal("Internal error: PAM auth " + "succeeded when it should have " + "failed"); + import_environments(buffer); + *num = 0; + **echo_on = 0; + ctxt->pam_done = 1; + free(msg); + return (0); + } + error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg, + sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", + sshpam_authctxt->user, + auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns)); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + *num = 0; + **echo_on = 0; + free(msg); + ctxt->pam_done = -1; + return (-1); + } + } + return (-1); +} + +/* + * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied. + * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that + * vary processing time in proportion to password length. + */ +static char * +fake_password(const char *wire_password) +{ + const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT"; + char *ret = NULL; + size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0; + + if (l >= INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l); + + ret = malloc(l + 1); + if (ret == NULL) + return NULL; + for (i = 0; i < l; i++) + ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)]; + ret[i] = '\0'; + return ret; +} + +/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */ +static int +sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) +{ + struct sshbuf *buffer; + struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; + char *fake; + int r; + + debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num); + switch (ctxt->pam_done) { + case 1: + sshpam_authenticated = 1; + return (0); + case 0: + break; + default: + return (-1); + } + if (num != 1) { + error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num); + return (-1); + } + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if (sshpam_authctxt->valid && + (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 || + options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, *resp)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + fake = fake_password(*resp); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, fake)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(fake); + } + if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, buffer) == -1) { + sshbuf_free(buffer); + return (-1); + } + sshbuf_free(buffer); + return (1); +} + +static void +sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) +{ + struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; + + debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); + sshpam_thread_cleanup(); + free(ctxt); + /* + * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM + * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's + * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before + * the server process terminates. + */ +} + +KbdintDevice sshpam_device = { + "pam", + sshpam_init_ctx, + sshpam_query, + sshpam_respond, + sshpam_free_ctx +}; + +KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = { + "pam", + mm_sshpam_init_ctx, + mm_sshpam_query, + mm_sshpam_respond, + mm_sshpam_free_ctx +}; + +/* + * This replaces auth-pam.c + */ +void +start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + if (!options.use_pam) + fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no"); + + if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) + fatal("PAM: initialisation failed"); +} + +void +finish_pam(void) +{ + sshpam_cleanup(); +} + + +u_int +do_pam_account(void) +{ + debug("%s: called", __func__); + if (sshpam_account_status != -1) + return (sshpam_account_status); + + expose_authinfo(__func__); + + sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0); + debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err, + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); + + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { + sshpam_account_status = 0; + return (sshpam_account_status); + } + + if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) + sshpam_password_change_required(1); + + sshpam_account_status = 1; + return (sshpam_account_status); +} + +void +do_pam_setcred(int init) +{ + sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, + (const void *)&store_conv); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); + if (init) { + debug("PAM: establishing credentials"); + sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); + } else { + debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials"); + sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); + } + if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) { + sshpam_cred_established = 1; + return; + } + if (sshpam_authenticated) + fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); + else + debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); +} + +static int +sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *data) +{ + char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; + struct pam_response *reply; + int i; + + debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); + + *resp = NULL; + + if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); + + if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: + reply[i].resp = + read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); + if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL) + input[0] = '\0'; + if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL) + goto fail; + reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); + reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + default: + goto fail; + } + } + *resp = reply; + return (PAM_SUCCESS); + + fail: + for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { + free(reply[i].resp); + } + free(reply); + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); +} + +static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL }; + +/* + * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't + * support that + */ +void +do_pam_chauthtok(void) +{ + if (use_privsep) + fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)"); + sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, + (const void *)&tty_conv); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); + debug("PAM: changing password"); + sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s", + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); +} + +void +do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + debug3("PAM: opening session"); + + expose_authinfo(__func__); + + sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, + (const void *)&store_conv); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); + sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0); + if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) + sshpam_session_open = 1; + else { + sshpam_session_open = 0; + auth_restrict_session(ssh); + error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s", + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); + } + +} + +int +is_pam_session_open(void) +{ + return sshpam_session_open; +} + +/* + * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session + * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear + * during the ssh authentication process. + */ +int +do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) +{ + int ret = 1; +#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV + char *compound; + size_t len; + + len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2; + compound = xmalloc(len); + + snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value); + ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound); + free(compound); +#endif + + return (ret); +} + +char ** +fetch_pam_child_environment(void) +{ + return sshpam_env; +} + +char ** +fetch_pam_environment(void) +{ + return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle)); +} + +void +free_pam_environment(char **env) +{ + char **envp; + + if (env == NULL) + return; + + for (envp = env; *envp; envp++) + free(*envp); + free(env); +} + +/* + * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that + * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later + * display. + */ +static int +sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, void *data) +{ + struct pam_response *reply; + int r, i; + size_t len; + + debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); + + *resp = NULL; + + if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); + + if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); + + for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { + switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { + case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: + if (sshpam_password == NULL) + goto fail; + if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL) + goto fail; + reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + case PAM_ERROR_MSG: + case PAM_TEXT_INFO: + len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); + if (len > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n", + PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL) + goto fail; + reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; + break; + default: + goto fail; + } + } + *resp = reply; + return (PAM_SUCCESS); + + fail: + for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { + free(reply[i].resp); + } + free(reply); + return (PAM_CONV_ERR); +} + +static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL }; + +/* + * Attempt password authentication via PAM + */ +int +sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) +{ + int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? + PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); + char *fake = NULL; + + if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL) + fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to " + "initialise.", __func__); + + sshpam_password = password; + sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; + + /* + * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted + * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking + * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail). + */ + if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && + options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) + sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password); + + sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, + (const void *)&passwd_conv); + if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) + fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__, + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); + + sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); + sshpam_password = NULL; + free(fake); + if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES) + sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1); + if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) { + debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s", + authctxt->user); + return 1; + } else { + debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s", + authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user", + pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); + return 0; + } +} + +int +sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void) +{ + return sshpam_maxtries_reached; +} + +void +sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached) +{ + if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached) + return; + sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1; + options.password_authentication = 0; + options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; + options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; +} +#endif /* USE_PAM */ diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4198607 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-pam.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef USE_PAM + +struct ssh; + +void start_pam(Authctxt *); +void finish_pam(void); +u_int do_pam_account(void); +void do_pam_session(struct ssh *); +void do_pam_setcred(int ); +void do_pam_chauthtok(void); +int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); +char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); +char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); +void free_pam_environment(char **); +void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void); +void sshpam_cleanup(void); +int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *); +int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void); +void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int); +int is_pam_session_open(void); + +#endif /* USE_PAM */ diff --git a/auth-passwd.c b/auth-passwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24fcb67 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-passwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.47 2018/07/09 21:26:02 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Password authentication. This file contains the functions to check whether + * the password is valid for the user. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "packet.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-options.h" + +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; +extern ServerOptions options; + +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +extern login_cap_t *lc; +#endif + + +#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */ +#define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */ + +#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024 + +/* + * Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if + * authentication succeeds. + */ +int +auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; + int result, ok = authctxt->valid; +#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) + static int expire_checked = 0; +#endif + + if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN) + return 0; + +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES) + ok = 0; +#endif + if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0) + return 0; + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) { + int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password); + if (ret == 1 || ret == 0) + return ret && ok; + /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */ + } +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + { + HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password); + + if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + return 0; + cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken); + return ok; + } +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) + return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok); +#endif +#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) + if (!expire_checked) { + expire_checked = 1; + if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt)) + authctxt->force_pwchange = 1; + } +#endif + result = sys_auth_passwd(ssh, password); + if (authctxt->force_pwchange) + auth_restrict_session(ssh); + return (result && ok); +} + +#ifdef BSD_AUTH +static void +warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as) +{ + int r; + quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime; + + pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS; + + pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as); + actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (authctxt->valid) { + pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS, + TWO_WEEKS); + acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS, + TWO_WEEKS); + } +#endif + if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) { + daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1; + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, + "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n", + daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) { + daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1; + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, + "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n", + daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } +} + +int +sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + auth_session_t *as; + static int expire_checked = 0; + + as = auth_usercheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", + (char *)password); + if (as == NULL) + return (0); + if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) { + auth_close(as); + auth_restrict_session(ssh); + authctxt->force_pwchange = 1; + return (1); + } else { + if (!expire_checked) { + expire_checked = 1; + warn_expiry(authctxt, as); + } + return (auth_close(as)); + } +} +#elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD) +int +sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; + char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL; + + /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */ + char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd; + + if (pw_password == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Check for users with no password. */ + if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0) + return (1); + + /* + * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a + * NULL and let xcrypt pick one. + */ + if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) + salt = pw_password; + encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt); + + /* + * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords + * are identical. + */ + return encrypted_password != NULL && + strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57296e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-rhosts.c @@ -0,0 +1,324 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.49 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit + * the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes + * /etc/hosts.equiv. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "packet.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern int use_privsep; + +/* + * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or + * /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted + * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise. + */ + +static int +check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname, + const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user, + const char *server_user) +{ + FILE *f; +#define RBUFLN 1024 + char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */ + int fd; + struct stat st; + + /* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */ + if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) + return 0; + if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { + close(fd); + return 0; + } + if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { + logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file", + server_user, filename); + close(fd); + return 0; + } + unset_nonblock(fd); + if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { + close(fd); + return 0; + } + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { + /* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */ + char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN]; + char *host, *user, *cp; + int negated; + + for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp) + continue; + + /* + * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we + * don't ever support the plus syntax). + */ + if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0) + continue; + + /* + * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the + * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten. + */ + switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf, + dummy)) { + case 0: + auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename); + continue; + case 1: + /* Host name only. */ + strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf)); + break; + case 2: + /* Got both host and user name. */ + break; + case 3: + auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename); + continue; + default: + /* Weird... */ + continue; + } + + host = hostbuf; + user = userbuf; + negated = 0; + + /* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */ + if (host[0] == '-') { + negated = 1; + host++; + } else if (host[0] == '+') + host++; + + if (user[0] == '-') { + negated = 1; + user++; + } else if (user[0] == '+') + user++; + + /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */ + if (!host[0] || !user[0]) { + /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */ + auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names " + "in %.100s.", filename); + continue; + } + /* Verify that host name matches. */ + if (host[0] == '@') { + if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) && + !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL)) + continue; + } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && + strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0) + continue; /* Different hostname. */ + + /* Verify that user name matches. */ + if (user[0] == '@') { + if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL)) + continue; + } else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0) + continue; /* Different username. */ + + /* Found the user and host. */ + fclose(f); + + /* If the entry was negated, deny access. */ + if (negated) { + auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.", + filename); + return 0; + } + /* Accept authentication. */ + return 1; + } + + /* Authentication using this file denied. */ + fclose(f); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns + * true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only + * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored). + */ +int +auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname, + const char *ipaddr) +{ + char buf[1024]; + struct stat st; + static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL}; + u_int rhosts_file_index; + + debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s", + client_user, hostname, ipaddr); + + /* Switch to the user's uid. */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + /* + * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and + * no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return + * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name + * servers. + */ + for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]; + rhosts_file_index++) { + /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s", + pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); + if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) + break; + } + /* Switch back to privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + + /* + * Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there + * are no system-wide files. + */ + if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] && + stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 && + stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) { + debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__); + return 0; + } + + /* + * If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and + * shosts.equiv. + */ + if (pw->pw_uid == 0) + debug3("%s: root user, ignoring system hosts files", __func__); + else { + if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, + client_user, pw->pw_name)) { + auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by " + "/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr); + return 1; + } + if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, + client_user, pw->pw_name)) { + auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by " + "%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV); + return 1; + } + } + + /* + * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is + * not group or world writable. + */ + if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) { + logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " + "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); + auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " + "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); + return 0; + } + if (options.strict_modes && + ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " + "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name); + auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " + "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name); + return 0; + } + /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + /* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */ + for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]; + rhosts_file_index++) { + /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s", + pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0) + continue; + + /* + * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by + * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the + * owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally + * allowing access to their account by anyone. + */ + if (options.strict_modes && + ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s", + pw->pw_name, buf); + auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf); + continue; + } + /* + * Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts + * and .shosts files. + */ + if (options.ignore_rhosts) { + auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to " + "ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); + continue; + } + /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */ + if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, + client_user, pw->pw_name)) { + auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.", + rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user " + "%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr, + client_user, pw->pw_name); + return 1; + } + } + + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + return 0; +} diff --git a/auth-shadow.c b/auth-shadow.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c77ee8d --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-shadow.c @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "log.h" + +#ifdef DAY +# undef DAY +#endif +#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */ + +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + +/* + * For the account and password expiration functions, we assume the expiry + * occurs the day after the day specified. + */ + +/* + * Check if specified account is expired. Returns 1 if account is expired, + * 0 otherwise. + */ +int +auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *spw) +{ + time_t today; + int daysleft; + int r; + + today = time(NULL) / DAY; + daysleft = spw->sp_expire - today; + debug3("%s: today %d sp_expire %d days left %d", __func__, (int)today, + (int)spw->sp_expire, daysleft); + + if (spw->sp_expire == -1) { + debug3("account expiration disabled"); + } else if (daysleft < 0) { + logit("Account %.100s has expired", spw->sp_namp); + return 1; + } else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) { + debug3("account will expire in %d days", daysleft); + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, + "Your account will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft, + daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Checks password expiry for platforms that use shadow passwd files. + * Returns: 1 = password expired, 0 = password not expired + */ +int +auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *ctxt) +{ + struct spwd *spw = NULL; + const char *user = ctxt->pw->pw_name; + time_t today; + int r, daysleft, disabled = 0; + + if ((spw = getspnam((char *)user)) == NULL) { + error("Could not get shadow information for %.100s", user); + return 0; + } + + today = time(NULL) / DAY; + debug3("%s: today %d sp_lstchg %d sp_max %d", __func__, (int)today, + (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max); + +#if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) + if (iscomsec()) { + struct pr_passwd *pr; + + pr = getprpwnam((char *)user); + + /* Test for Trusted Mode expiry disabled */ + if (pr != NULL && pr->ufld.fd_min == 0 && + pr->ufld.fd_lifetime == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_expire == 0 && + pr->ufld.fd_pw_expire_warning == 0 && + pr->ufld.fd_schange != 0) + disabled = 1; + } +#endif + + /* TODO: check sp_inact */ + daysleft = spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max - today; + if (disabled) { + debug3("password expiration disabled"); + } else if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) { + logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)", user); + return 1; + } else if (spw->sp_max == -1) { + debug3("password expiration disabled"); + } else if (daysleft < 0) { + logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)", user); + return 1; + } else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) { + debug3("password will expire in %d days", daysleft); + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, + "Your password will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft, + daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* USE_SHADOW && HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ diff --git a/auth-sia.c b/auth-sia.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ebe9d8d --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-sia.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh_api.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-sia.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "uidswap.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; +extern int saved_argc; +extern char **saved_argv; + +int +sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *pass) +{ + int ret; + SIAENTITY *ent = NULL; + const char *host; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + + host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); + + if (!authctxt->user || pass == NULL || pass[0] == '\0') + return (0); + + if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, authctxt->user, + NULL, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS) + return (0); + + if ((ret = sia_ses_authent(NULL, pass, ent)) != SIASUCCESS) { + error("Couldn't authenticate %s from %s", + authctxt->user, host); + if (ret & SIASTOP) + sia_ses_release(&ent); + + return (0); + } + + sia_ses_release(&ent); + + return (1); +} + +void +session_setup_sia(struct passwd *pw, char *tty) +{ + SIAENTITY *ent = NULL; + const char *host; + + host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); + + if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, pw->pw_name, + tty, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS) + fatal("sia_ses_init failed"); + + if (sia_make_entity_pwd(pw, ent) != SIASUCCESS) { + sia_ses_release(&ent); + fatal("sia_make_entity_pwd failed"); + } + + ent->authtype = SIA_A_NONE; + if (sia_ses_estab(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS) + fatal("Couldn't establish session for %s from %s", + pw->pw_name, host); + + if (sia_ses_launch(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS) + fatal("Couldn't launch session for %s from %s", + pw->pw_name, host); + + sia_ses_release(&ent); + + setuid(0); + permanently_set_uid(pw); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ diff --git a/auth-sia.h b/auth-sia.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..27cbb93 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-sia.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA + +void session_setup_sia(struct passwd *, char *); + +#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ diff --git a/auth-skey.c b/auth-skey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b347527 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth-skey.c @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.27 2007/01/21 01:41:54 stevesk Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SKEY + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" + +static void * +skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + return authctxt; +} + +int +skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, + u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + char challenge[1024]; + struct skey skey; + + if (_compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge, + sizeof(challenge)) == -1) + return -1; + + *name = xstrdup(""); + *infotxt = xstrdup(""); + *numprompts = 1; + *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); + *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); + + xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT); + + return 0; +} + +int +skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; + + if (authctxt->valid && + numresponses == 1 && + skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 && + skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, responses[0]) != -1) + return 0; + return -1; +} + +static void +skey_free_ctx(void *ctx) +{ + /* we don't have a special context */ +} + +KbdintDevice skey_device = { + "skey", + skey_init_ctx, + skey_query, + skey_respond, + skey_free_ctx +}; + +KbdintDevice mm_skey_device = { + "skey", + skey_init_ctx, + mm_skey_query, + mm_skey_respond, + skey_free_ctx +}; +#endif /* SKEY */ diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ca3762 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth.c @@ -0,0 +1,1202 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.133 2018/09/12 01:19:12 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef USE_SHADOW +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "groupaccess.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "loginrec.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "authfile.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "channels.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern int use_privsep; +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; +extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; +extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; + +/* Debugging messages */ +static struct sshbuf *auth_debug; + +/* + * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed + * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false + * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed + * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't + * listed there, false will be returned. + * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. + * Otherwise true is returned. + */ +int +allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct stat st; + const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL; + u_int i; + int r; +#ifdef USE_SHADOW + struct spwd *spw = NULL; +#endif + + /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ + if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) + return 0; + +#ifdef USE_SHADOW + if (!options.use_pam) + spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); +#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE + if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw)) + return 0; +#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ +#endif /* USE_SHADOW */ + + /* grab passwd field for locked account check */ + passwd = pw->pw_passwd; +#ifdef USE_SHADOW + if (spw != NULL) +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF + passwd = get_iaf_password(pw); +#else + passwd = spw->sp_pwdp; +#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ +#endif + + /* check for locked account */ + if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) { + int locked = 0; + +#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING + if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) + locked = 1; +#endif +#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX + if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, + strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0) + locked = 1; +#endif +#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR + if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR)) + locked = 1; +#endif +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF + free((void *) passwd); +#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ + if (locked) { + logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", + pw->pw_name); + return 0; + } + } + + /* + * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we + * are chrooting. + */ + if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || + strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) { + char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? + _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */ + + if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) { + logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " + "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell); + free(shell); + return 0; + } + if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || + (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { + logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " + "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell); + free(shell); + return 0; + } + free(shell); + } + + if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || + options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { + hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); + ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + } + + /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ + if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) { + r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, + options.deny_users[i]); + if (r < 0) { + fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"", + options.deny_users[i]); + } else if (r != 0) { + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " + "because listed in DenyUsers", + pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + } + } + /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ + if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) { + r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, + options.allow_users[i]); + if (r < 0) { + fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"", + options.allow_users[i]); + } else if (r == 1) + break; + } + /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ + if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " + "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + } + if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { + /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ + if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " + "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + + /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ + if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) + if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, + options.num_deny_groups)) { + ga_free(); + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " + "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", + pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + /* + * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups + * isn't listed there + */ + if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) + if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, + options.num_allow_groups)) { + ga_free(); + logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " + "because none of user's groups are listed " + "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); + return 0; + } + ga_free(); + } + +#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER + if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg)) + return 0; +#endif + + /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ + return 1; +} + +/* + * Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in + * auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present. + */ +static char * +format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key; + const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info; + char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL; + + if (key == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", + sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, + key->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), + cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp, + methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", + methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); + free(fp); + free(cafp); + } else { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key), + fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, + methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ", + methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo); + free(fp); + } + return ret; +} + +void +auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial, + const char *method, const char *submethod) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; + const char *authmsg; + char *extra = NULL; + + if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) + return; + + /* Raise logging level */ + if (authenticated == 1 || + !authctxt->valid || + authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || + strcmp(method, "password") == 0) + level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + + if (authctxt->postponed) + authmsg = "Postponed"; + else if (partial) + authmsg = "Partial"; + else + authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; + + if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) { + if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) + extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info); + } + + do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s", + authmsg, + method, + submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, + authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", + authctxt->user, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), + extra != NULL ? ": " : "", + extra != NULL ? extra : ""); + + free(extra); + +#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN + if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && + (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || + strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || + strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)) + record_failed_login(authctxt->user, + auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); +# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + if (authenticated) + sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, + auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh", + &loginmsg); +# endif +#endif +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) + audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method)); +#endif +} + + +void +auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + + error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for " + "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2", + authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", + authctxt->user, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures"); + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * Check whether root logins are disallowed. + */ +int +auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method) +{ + switch (options.permit_root_login) { + case PERMIT_YES: + return 1; + case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: + if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 || + strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0) + return 1; + break; + case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: + if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) { + logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); + return 1; + } + break; + } + logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename + * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', + * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. + * + * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. + */ +char * +expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX]; + int i; + + snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", + (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); + file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, + "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); + + /* + * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward + * compatible and prepend the '%h/' + */ + if (*file == '/') + return (file); + + i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); + if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) + fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); + free(file); + return (xstrdup(ret)); +} + +char * +authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) +{ + if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL) + return NULL; + return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw); +} + +/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ +HostStatus +check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host, + const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) +{ + char *user_hostfile; + struct stat st; + HostStatus host_status; + struct hostkeys *hostkeys; + const struct hostkey_entry *found; + + hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile); + if (userfile != NULL) { + user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); + if (options.strict_modes && + (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && + ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { + logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " + "bad owner or modes for %.200s", + pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); + auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes", + user_hostfile); + } else { + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile); + restore_uid(); + } + free(user_hostfile); + } + host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found); + if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED) + error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication", + found->host); + else if (host_status == HOST_OK) + debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__, + found->host, found->file, found->line); + else + debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host); + + free_hostkeys(hostkeys); + + return host_status; +} + +static FILE * +auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, + int log_missing, char *file_type) +{ + char line[1024]; + struct stat st; + int fd; + FILE *f; + + if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) { + if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT) + debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file, + strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { + close(fd); + return NULL; + } + if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { + logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file", + pw->pw_name, file_type, file); + close(fd); + return NULL; + } + unset_nonblock(fd); + if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { + close(fd); + return NULL; + } + if (strict_modes && + safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { + fclose(f); + logit("Authentication refused: %s", line); + auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line); + return NULL; + } + + return f; +} + + +FILE * +auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) +{ + return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys"); +} + +FILE * +auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) +{ + return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0, + "authorized principals"); +} + +struct passwd * +getpwnamallow(const char *user) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + extern login_cap_t *lc; +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + auth_session_t *as; +#endif +#endif + struct passwd *pw; + struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns); + + ci->user = user; + parse_server_match_config(&options, ci); + log_change_level(options.log_level); + process_permitopen(ssh, &options); + +#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) + aix_setauthdb(user); +#endif + + pw = getpwnam(user); + +#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) + aix_restoreauthdb(); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* + * Windows usernames are case-insensitive. To avoid later problems + * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to + * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the + * user database. + */ + if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) { + logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s", + user, pw->pw_name); + pw = NULL; + } +#endif + if (pw == NULL) { + logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d", + user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); +#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN + record_failed_login(user, + auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh"); +#endif +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + return (NULL); + } + if (!allowed_user(pw)) + return (NULL); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { + debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); + return (NULL); + } +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || + auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { + debug("Approval failure for %s", user); + pw = NULL; + } + if (as != NULL) + auth_close(as); +#endif +#endif + if (pw != NULL) + return (pwcopy(pw)); + return (NULL); +} + +/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ +int +auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key) +{ + char *fp = NULL; + int r; + + if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) + return 0; + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + + r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file); + switch (r) { + case 0: + break; /* not revoked */ + case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: + error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s", + sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file); + goto out; + default: + error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in " + "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp, + options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + + /* Success */ + r = 0; + + out: + free(fp); + return r == 0 ? 0 : 1; +} + +void +auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) +{ + char buf[1024]; + va_list args; + int r; + + if (auth_debug == NULL) + return; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_cstring: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +void +auth_debug_send(void) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + char *msg; + int r; + + if (auth_debug == NULL) + return; + while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_get_cstring: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg); + free(msg); + } +} + +void +auth_debug_reset(void) +{ + if (auth_debug != NULL) + sshbuf_reset(auth_debug); + else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); +} + +struct passwd * +fakepw(void) +{ + static struct passwd fake; + + memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); + fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; + fake.pw_passwd = + "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS + fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; +#endif + fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid; + fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS + fake.pw_class = ""; +#endif + fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; + fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; + + return (&fake); +} + +/* + * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not + * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is + * called. + * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some + * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication. + * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these? + * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?) + */ + +static char * +remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage from; + socklen_t fromlen; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; + const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + + /* Get IP address of client. */ + fromlen = sizeof(from); + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return strdup(ntop); + } + + ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); + if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) + fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + + debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); + /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ + if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), + NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { + /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ + return strdup(ntop); + } + + /* + * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, + * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: + * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 + */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; + if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { + logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", + name, ntop); + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return strdup(ntop); + } + + /* Names are stored in lowercase. */ + lowercase(name); + + /* + * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given + * address actually is an address of this host. This is + * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can + * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from + * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be + * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of + * the domain). + */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { + logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " + "[%s] failed.", name, ntop); + return strdup(ntop); + } + /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, + sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && + (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) + break; + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ + if (ai == NULL) { + /* Address not found for the host name. */ + logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " + "map back to the address.", ntop, name); + return strdup(ntop); + } + return strdup(name); +} + +/* + * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current + * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this + * several times. + */ + +const char * +auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns) +{ + static char *dnsname; + + if (!use_dns) + return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + else if (dnsname != NULL) + return dnsname; + else { + dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh); + return dnsname; + } +} + +/* + * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment. + * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure. + * The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to + * /dev/null depending on the contents of flags. + * "tag" is prepended to log messages. + * NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is + * av[0]. + */ +pid_t +subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command, + int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags) +{ + FILE *f = NULL; + struct stat st; + int fd, devnull, p[2], i; + pid_t pid; + char *cp, errmsg[512]; + u_int envsize; + char **child_env; + + if (child != NULL) + *child = NULL; + + debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)", __func__, + tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags); + + /* Check consistency */ + if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 && + (flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) { + error("%s: inconsistent flags", __func__); + return 0; + } + if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) { + error("%s: inconsistent flags/output", __func__); + return 0; + } + + /* + * If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists + * and appears safe-ish to execute + */ + if (*av[0] != '/') { + error("%s path is not absolute", tag); + return 0; + } + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) { + error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag, + av[0], strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + if (safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { + error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + /* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */ + if (pipe(p) != 0) { + error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + restore_uid(); + + switch ((pid = fork())) { + case -1: /* error */ + error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + close(p[1]); + return 0; + case 0: /* child */ + /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */ + envsize = 5; + child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); + if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL) + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp); + + for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) + signal(i, SIG_DFL); + + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + + /* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */ + fd = -1; + if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) + fd = p[1]; + else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0) + fd = devnull; + if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + + /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ + if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { + error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { + error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ + if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 && + dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + + execve(av[0], av, child_env); + error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno)); + _exit(127); + default: /* parent */ + break; + } + + close(p[1]); + if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) + close(p[0]); + else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { + error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + /* Don't leave zombie child */ + kill(pid, SIGTERM); + while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) + ; + return 0; + } + /* Success */ + debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid); + if (child != NULL) + *child = f; + return pid; +} + +/* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */ + +/* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */ +void +auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote) +{ + int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0; + int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 && + (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0; + int do_permitlisten = opts->npermitlisten > 0 && + (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0; + size_t i; + char msg[1024], buf[64]; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device); + /* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */ + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", + opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "", + opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command", + do_env ? " environment" : "", + opts->valid_before == 0 ? "" : "expires", + do_permitopen ? " permitopen" : "", + do_permitlisten ? " permitlisten" : "", + opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "", + opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals", + opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "", + opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=", + opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf, + opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "", + opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : ""); + + debug("%s: %s", loc, msg); + if (do_remote) + auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg); + + if (options.permit_user_env) { + for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) { + debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]); + if (do_remote) { + auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s", + loc, opts->env[i]); + } + } + } + + /* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */ + if (opts->valid_before != 0) { + format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf)); + debug("%s: expires at %s", loc, buf); + } + if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) { + debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"", + loc, opts->cert_principals); + } + if (opts->force_command != NULL) + debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command); + if (do_permitopen) { + for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) { + debug("%s: permitted open: %s", + loc, opts->permitopen[i]); + } + } + if (do_permitlisten) { + for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) { + debug("%s: permitted listen: %s", + loc, opts->permitlisten[i]); + } + } +} + +/* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */ +int +auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts) +{ + struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts; + const char *emsg = NULL; + + debug("%s: setting new authentication options", __func__); + if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) { + error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */ +void +auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sshauthopt *restricted; + + debug("%s: restricting session", __func__); + + /* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */ + restricted = sshauthopt_new(); + restricted->permit_pty_flag = 1; + restricted->restricted = 1; + + if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0) + fatal("%s: failed to restrict session", __func__); + sshauthopt_free(restricted); +} + +int +auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, + struct sshauthopt *opts, int allow_cert_authority, const char *loc) +{ + const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, + options.use_dns); + time_t now = time(NULL); + char buf[64]; + + /* + * Check keys/principals file expiry time. + * NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere. + */ + if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 && + opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) { + format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf)); + debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf); + auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf); + return -1; + } + /* Consistency checks */ + if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) { + debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc); + auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc); + /* deny access */ + return -1; + } + /* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */ + if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) { + debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc); + auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc); + /* deny access */ + return -1; + } + + /* Perform from= checks */ + if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) { + switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip, + opts->required_from_host_keys )) { + case 1: + /* Host name matches. */ + break; + case -1: + default: + debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc); + auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 0: + logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with " + "correct key but not from a permitted " + "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).", + loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip, + opts->required_from_host_keys); + auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not " + "permitted to use this key for login.", + loc, remote_host); + /* deny access */ + return -1; + } + } + /* Check source-address restriction from certificate */ + if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) { + switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip, + opts->required_from_host_cert)) { + case 1: + /* accepted */ + break; + case -1: + default: + /* invalid */ + error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid", + loc); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 0: + logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid " + "certificate but not from a permitted source " + "address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip); + auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not " + "permitted to use this certificate for login.", + loc, remote_ip); + return -1; + } + } + /* + * + * XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys + * that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK + * tests. + */ + auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..977562f --- /dev/null +++ b/auth.h @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.96 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifndef AUTH_H +#define AUTH_H + +#include + +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +#include +#endif +#ifdef BSD_AUTH +#include +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 +#include +#endif + +struct passwd; +struct ssh; +struct sshbuf; +struct sshkey; +struct sshauthopt; + +typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; +typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod; +typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice; + +struct Authctxt { + sig_atomic_t success; + int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */ + int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */ + int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */ + int attempt; + int failures; + int server_caused_failure; + int force_pwchange; + char *user; /* username sent by the client */ + char *service; + struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ + char *style; + + /* Method lists for multiple authentication */ + char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ + u_int num_auth_methods; + + /* Authentication method-specific data */ + void *methoddata; + void *kbdintctxt; +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + auth_session_t *as; +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + krb5_context krb5_ctx; + krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache; + krb5_principal krb5_user; + char *krb5_ticket_file; + char *krb5_ccname; +#endif + struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + + /* Authentication keys already used; these will be refused henceforth */ + struct sshkey **prev_keys; + u_int nprev_keys; + + /* Last used key and ancillary information from active auth method */ + struct sshkey *auth_method_key; + char *auth_method_info; + + /* Information exposed to session */ + struct sshbuf *session_info; /* Auth info for environment */ +}; + +/* + * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for + * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this + * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by + * the client. + */ + +struct Authmethod { + char *name; + int (*userauth)(struct ssh *); + int *enabled; +}; + +/* + * Keyboard interactive device: + * init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success + * query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure + * respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction, + * otherwise - failure + */ +struct KbdintDevice +{ + const char *name; + void* (*init_ctx)(Authctxt*); + int (*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, + u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on); + int (*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses); + void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx); +}; + +int +auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *); + +int auth_password(struct ssh *, const char *); + +int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, + struct sshkey *); +int user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int, + struct sshauthopt **); +int auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *, const struct sshkey *); + +/* + * Handling auth method-specific information for logging and prevention + * of key reuse during multiple authentication. + */ +void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *); +void auth2_record_key(Authctxt *, int, const struct sshkey *); +void auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...) + __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) + __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); +void auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); + +#ifdef KRB5 +int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *); +int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt); +int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password); +void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt); +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) +#include +int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *); +int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *); +#endif + +#include "auth-pam.h" +#include "audit.h" +void remove_kbdint_device(const char *); + +void do_authentication2(Authctxt *); + +void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *); +void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn)); +void userauth_finish(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *); +int auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *, const char *); + +void userauth_send_banner(const char *); + +char *auth2_read_banner(void); +int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int); +int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); +int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *); +int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); + +void privsep_challenge_enable(void); + +int auth2_challenge(struct ssh *, char *); +void auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *); +int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); +int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); + +int allowed_user(struct passwd *); +struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user); + +char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); +char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); + +FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); +FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); +int auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *); + +const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int); + +HostStatus +check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, const char *, + const char *, const char *); + +/* hostkey handling */ +struct sshkey *get_hostkey_by_index(int); +struct sshkey *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *); +struct sshkey *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); +struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); +int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); +int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, + size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); + +/* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */ +const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *); +int auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *); +void auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *); +int auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *, struct passwd *pw, + struct sshauthopt *, int, const char *); +void auth_log_authopts(const char *, const struct sshauthopt *, int); + +/* debug messages during authentication */ +void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void auth_debug_send(void); +void auth_debug_reset(void); + +struct passwd *fakepw(void); + +#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD (1) /* Discard stdout */ +#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */ +#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */ +pid_t subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *, + const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags); + +int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *); + +#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) +#include +krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *); +#endif +#endif diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d5cff4 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth2-chall.c @@ -0,0 +1,383 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.50 2018/07/11 18:55:11 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; + +static int auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *); +static int send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +#ifdef BSD_AUTH +extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device; +#else +#ifdef USE_PAM +extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device; +#endif +#endif + +KbdintDevice *devices[] = { +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + &bsdauth_device, +#else +#ifdef USE_PAM + &sshpam_device, +#endif +#endif + NULL +}; + +typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt; +struct KbdintAuthctxt +{ + char *devices; + void *ctxt; + KbdintDevice *device; + u_int nreq; + u_int devices_done; +}; + +#ifdef USE_PAM +void +remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname) +{ + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++) + if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) { + for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++) + devices[j] = devices[j+1]; + i--; + } +} +#endif + +static KbdintAuthctxt * +kbdint_alloc(const char *devs) +{ + KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; + struct sshbuf *b; + int i, r; + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (!options.use_pam) + remove_kbdint_device("pam"); +#endif + + kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt)); + if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) { + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", + sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", devices[i]->name)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((kbdintctxt->devices = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); + sshbuf_free(b); + } else { + kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs); + } + debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices); + kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL; + kbdintctxt->device = NULL; + kbdintctxt->nreq = 0; + + return kbdintctxt; +} +static void +kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) +{ + if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) { + kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt); + kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL; + } + kbdintctxt->device = NULL; +} +static void +kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) +{ + if (kbdintctxt->device) + kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt); + free(kbdintctxt->devices); + explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt)); + free(kbdintctxt); +} +/* get next device */ +static int +kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) +{ + size_t len; + char *t; + int i; + + if (kbdintctxt->device) + kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt); + do { + len = kbdintctxt->devices ? + strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0; + + if (len == 0) + break; + for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) { + if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 || + !auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, + "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name)) + continue; + if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, + len) == 0) { + kbdintctxt->device = devices[i]; + kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i; + } + } + t = kbdintctxt->devices; + kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL; + free(t); + debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ? + kbdintctxt->devices : ""); + } while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device); + + return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0; +} + +/* + * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to + * wait for the response. + */ +int +auth2_challenge(struct ssh *ssh, char *devs) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s", + authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "", + devs ? devs : ""); + + if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs) + return 0; + if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL) + authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs); + return auth2_challenge_start(ssh); +} + +/* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */ +void +auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + /* unregister callback */ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL); + if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) { + kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt); + authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; + } +} + +/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/ +static int +auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; + + debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s", + kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : ""); + + if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) { + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); + return 0; + } + debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'", + kbdintctxt->device->name); + + if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) { + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); + return 0; + } + if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 0) { + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); + return 0; + } + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, + &input_userauth_info_response); + + authctxt->postponed = 1; + return 0; +} + +static int +send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; + char *name, *instr, **prompts; + u_int r, i, *echo_on; + + kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; + if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt, + &name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on)) + return 0; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, instr)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language not used */ + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kbdintctxt->nreq)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) { + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, prompts[i])) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, echo_on[i])) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) + free(prompts[i]); + free(prompts); + free(echo_on); + free(name); + free(instr); + return 1; +} + +static int +input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; + int authenticated = 0, res; + int r; + u_int i, nresp; + const char *devicename = NULL; + char **response = NULL; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt"); + kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; + if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt"); + if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device"); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nresp)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq) + fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies"); + if (nresp > 100) + fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies"); + if (nresp > 0) { + response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *)); + for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &response[i], + NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response); + + for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) { + explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i])); + free(response[i]); + } + free(response); + + switch (res) { + case 0: + /* Success! */ + authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0; + break; + case 1: + /* Authentication needs further interaction */ + if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 1) + authctxt->postponed = 1; + break; + default: + /* Failure! */ + break; + } + devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name; + if (!authctxt->postponed) { + if (authenticated) { + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); + } else { + /* start next device */ + /* may set authctxt->postponed */ + auth2_challenge_start(ssh); + } + } + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive", + devicename); + return 0; +} + +void +privsep_challenge_enable(void) +{ +#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM) + int n = 0; +#endif +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device; +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device; +#endif + +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device; +#else +#ifdef USE_PAM + devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device; +#endif +#endif +} diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9351e04 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth2-gss.c @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.29 2018/07/31 03:10:27 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef GSSAPI + +#include + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; + +static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); +static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); +static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh); +static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +/* + * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know + * how to check local user kuserok and the like) + */ +static int +userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL}; + Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; + int r, present; + u_int mechs; + OM_uint32 ms; + size_t len; + u_char *doid = NULL; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mechs)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (mechs == 0) { + debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported"); + return (0); + } + + do { + mechs--; + + free(doid); + + present = 0; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &doid, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE && + doid[1] == len - 2) { + goid.elements = doid + 2; + goid.length = len - 2; + ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present); + } else { + logit("Badly formed OID received"); + } + } while (mechs > 0 && !present); + + if (!present) { + free(doid); + authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; + return (0); + } + + if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { + debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); + free(doid); + return (0); + } + + if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) { + if (ctxt != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); + free(doid); + authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; + return (0); + } + + authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt; + + /* Return the OID that we received */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, doid, len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + free(doid); + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); + authctxt->postponed = 1; + + return (0); +} + +static int +input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags; + u_char *p; + size_t len; + int r; + + if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) + fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); + + gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + recv_tok.value = p; + recv_tok.length = len; + maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok, + &send_tok, &flags)); + + free(p); + + if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + authctxt->postponed = 0; + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + } else { + if (send_tok.length != 0) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, + &input_gssapi_mic); + else + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, + &input_gssapi_exchange_complete); + } + } + + gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); + return 0; +} + +static int +input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; + OM_uint32 maj_status; + int r; + u_char *p; + size_t len; + + if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) + fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); + + gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + recv_tok.value = p; + recv_tok.length = len; + + /* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */ + maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok, + &send_tok, NULL)); + + free(recv_tok.value); + + /* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); + + /* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */ + + gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok); + return 0; +} + +/* + * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication. + * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above, + * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete. + */ + +static int +input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + int r, authenticated; + const char *displayname; + + if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) + fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); + + /* + * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in + * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete + */ + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); + + if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && + (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + return 0; +} + +static int +input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; + int r, authenticated = 0; + struct sshbuf *b; + gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; + const char *displayname; + u_char *p; + size_t len; + + if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) + fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); + + gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mic.value = p; + mic.length = len; + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, + "gssapi-with-mic"); + + if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__); + gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) + authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); + else + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + + sshbuf_free(b); + free(mic.value); + + if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) && + (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + return 0; +} + +Authmethod method_gssapi = { + "gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, + &options.gss_authentication +}; + +#endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..764ceff --- /dev/null +++ b/auth2-hostbased.c @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.38 2018/09/20 03:28:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "match.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern u_char *session_id2; +extern u_int session_id2_len; + +static int +userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost; + u_char *pkblob, *sig; + size_t alen, blen, slen; + int r, pktype, authenticated = 0; + + /* XXX use sshkey_froms() */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: packet parsing: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug("%s: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu", __func__, + cuser, chost, pkalg, slen); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + debug("signature:"); + sshbuf_dump_data(sig, slen, stderr); +#endif + pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); + if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { + /* this is perfectly legal */ + logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", + __func__, pkalg); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: key_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto done; + } + if (key == NULL) { + error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg); + goto done; + } + if (key->type != pktype) { + error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key " + "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype); + goto done; + } + if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && + (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { + error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe " + "signature format"); + goto done; + } + if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) { + logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes", + __func__, sshkey_type(key)); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, + options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) { + logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__, + (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ? + "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r)); + goto done; + } + + if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { + debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__); + goto done; + } + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + /* reconstruct packet */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + + auth2_record_info(authctxt, + "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); + + /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ + authenticated = 0; + if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && + PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat)) == 0) + authenticated = 1; + + auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key); + sshbuf_free(b); +done: + debug2("%s: authenticated %d", __func__, authenticated); + sshkey_free(key); + free(pkalg); + free(pkblob); + free(cuser); + free(chost); + free(sig); + return authenticated; +} + +/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ +int +hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, + struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason; + HostStatus host_status; + int len; + char *fp; + + if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) + return 0; + + resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns); + ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + + debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__, + chost, resolvedname, ipaddr); + + if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') { + debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost); + chost[len - 1] = '\0'; + } + + if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) { + if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) { + debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused " + "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)", + __func__, cuser, chost); + return 0; + } + lookup = chost; + } else { + if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0) + logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: " + "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s", + chost, ipaddr, resolvedname); + if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) { + debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused " + "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"", + __func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr); + return 0; + } + lookup = resolvedname; + } + debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__); + + if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && + sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) { + error("%s", reason); + auth_debug_add("%s", reason); + return 0; + } + + host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, + _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, + options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); + + /* backward compat if no key has been found. */ + if (host_status == HOST_NEW) { + host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, + _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2, + options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : + _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); + } + + if (host_status == HOST_OK) { + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); + verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by " + "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, + cuser, lookup); + } else { + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); + verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s", + sshkey_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); + } + free(fp); + } + + return (host_status == HOST_OK); +} + +Authmethod method_hostbased = { + "hostbased", + userauth_hostbased, + &options.hostbased_authentication +}; diff --git a/auth2-kbdint.c b/auth2-kbdint.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a813b8f --- /dev/null +++ b/auth2-kbdint.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; + +static int +userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r, authenticated = 0; + char *lang, *devs; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &devs, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs); + + if (options.challenge_response_authentication) + authenticated = auth2_challenge(ssh, devs); + + free(devs); + free(lang); + return authenticated; +} + +Authmethod method_kbdint = { + "keyboard-interactive", + userauth_kbdint, + &options.kbd_interactive_authentication +}; diff --git a/auth2-none.c b/auth2-none.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dacb5fb --- /dev/null +++ b/auth2-none.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.22 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* "none" is allowed only one time */ +static int none_enabled = 1; + +static int +userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r; + + none_enabled = 0; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication) + return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, ""))); + return (0); +} + +Authmethod method_none = { + "none", + userauth_none, + &none_enabled +}; diff --git a/auth2-passwd.c b/auth2-passwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0395a69 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth2-passwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.16 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "packet.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; + +static int +userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + char *password; + int authenticated = 0, r; + u_char change; + size_t len; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &change)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &password, &len)) != 0 || + (change && (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (change) + logit("password change not supported"); + else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, password)) == 1) + authenticated = 1; + explicit_bzero(password, len); + free(password); + return authenticated; +} + +Authmethod method_passwd = { + "password", + userauth_passwd, + &options.password_authentication +}; diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2fb5950 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,1045 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.86 2018/09/20 03:28:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */ +#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */ + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern u_char *session_id2; +extern u_int session_id2_len; + +static char * +format_key(const struct sshkey *key) +{ + char *ret, *fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + + xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp); + free(fp); + return ret; +} + +static int +userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL; + u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig; + size_t blen, slen; + int r, pktype; + int authenticated = 0; + struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: parse request failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); + if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { + /* this is perfectly legal */ + verbose("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", + __func__, pkalg); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto done; + } + if (key == NULL) { + error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg); + goto done; + } + if (key->type != pktype) { + error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key " + "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype); + goto done; + } + if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && + (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { + logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe " + "signature scheme"); + goto done; + } + if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) { + logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key)); + goto done; + } + if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { + logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", + __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, + options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) { + logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__, + (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ? + "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r)); + goto done; + } + key_s = format_key(key); + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) + ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key); + + if (have_sig) { + debug3("%s: have %s signature for %s%s%s", + __func__, pkalg, key_s, + ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", + ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { + debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", + __func__); + goto done; + } + /* reconstruct packet */ + xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + /* test for correct signature */ + authenticated = 0; + if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) && + PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), + (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL, + ssh->compat)) == 0) { + authenticated = 1; + } + auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key); + } else { + debug("%s: test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s", + __func__, pkalg, key_s, + ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", + ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s); + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { + debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", + __func__); + goto done; + } + /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ + /* + * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed + * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this + * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all + * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an + * issue? -markus + */ + if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK)) + != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + authctxt->postponed = 1; + } + } +done: + if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) { + debug("%s: key options inconsistent with existing", __func__); + authenticated = 0; + } + debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg); + + sshbuf_free(b); + sshauthopt_free(authopts); + sshkey_free(key); + free(userstyle); + free(pkalg); + free(pkblob); + free(key_s); + free(ca_s); + free(sig); + return authenticated; +} + +static int +match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) +{ + char *result; + u_int i; + + /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */ + + for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { + if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i], + principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) { + debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"", + result); + free(result); + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets + * authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a + * log preamble for file/line information. + */ +static int +check_principals_line(struct ssh *ssh, char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, + const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + u_int i, found = 0; + char *ep, *line_opts; + const char *reason = NULL; + struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; + + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + + /* Trim trailing whitespace. */ + ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1; + while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t')) + *ep-- = '\0'; + + /* + * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has + * key options. + */ + line_opts = NULL; + if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL || + (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) { + for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++) + ; + line_opts = cp; + cp = ep; + } + if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) { + debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason); + auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason); + return -1; + } + /* Check principals in cert against those on line */ + for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { + if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0) + continue; + debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"", + loc, cert->principals[i]); + found = 1; + } + if (found && authoptsp != NULL) { + *authoptsp = opts; + opts = NULL; + } + sshauthopt_free(opts); + return found ? 0 : -1; +} + +static int +process_principals(struct ssh *ssh, FILE *f, const char *file, + const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep; + size_t linesize = 0; + u_long linenum = 0; + u_int found_principal = 0; + + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + linenum++; + /* Always consume entire input */ + if (found_principal) + continue; + + /* Skip leading whitespace. */ + for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + /* Skip blank and comment lines. */ + if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL) + *ep = '\0'; + if (!*cp || *cp == '\n') + continue; + + snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum); + if (check_principals_line(ssh, cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0) + found_principal = 1; + } + free(line); + return found_principal; +} + +/* XXX remove pw args here and elsewhere once ssh->authctxt is guaranteed */ + +static int +match_principals_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, char *file, + struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + FILE *f; + int success; + + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); + if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + success = process_principals(ssh, f, file, cert, authoptsp); + fclose(f); + restore_uid(); + return success; +} + +/* + * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command. + * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw, + const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL; + const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert; + FILE *f = NULL; + int r, ok, found_principal = 0; + int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0; + pid_t pid; + char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; + char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL; + char serial_s[16], uidstr[32]; + void (*osigchld)(int); + + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL) + return 0; + if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) { + error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, " + "skipping"); + return 0; + } + + /* + * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to + * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. + */ + osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + + /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ + username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user, + "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); + runas_pw = getpwnam(username); + if (runas_pw == NULL) { + error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", + username, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ + if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { + error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains " + "invalid quotes", command); + goto out; + } + if (ac == 0) { + error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", + command); + goto out; + } + if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + goto out; + } + if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu", + (unsigned long long)cert->serial); + snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", + (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid); + for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { + tmp = percent_expand(av[i], + "U", uidstr, + "u", user_pw->pw_name, + "h", user_pw->pw_dir, + "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), + "T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key), + "f", key_fp, + "F", ca_fp, + "k", keytext, + "K", catext, + "i", cert->key_id, + "s", serial_s, + (char *)NULL); + if (tmp == NULL) + fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); + free(av[i]); + av[i] = tmp; + } + /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ + command = argv_assemble(ac, av); + + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command, + ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; + temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw); + + ok = process_principals(ssh, f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp); + + fclose(f); + f = NULL; + + if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Read completed successfully */ + found_principal = ok; + out: + if (f != NULL) + fclose(f); + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) + free(av[i]); + free(av); + if (uid_swapped) + restore_uid(); + free(command); + free(username); + free(ca_fp); + free(key_fp); + free(catext); + free(keytext); + return found_principal; +} + +static void +skip_space(char **cpp) +{ + char *cp; + + for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + *cpp = cp; +} + +/* + * Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted + * whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g. + * unterminated quotes). + */ +static int +advance_past_options(char **cpp) +{ + char *cp = *cpp; + int quoted = 0; + + for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { + if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') + cp++; /* Skip both */ + else if (*cp == '"') + quoted = !quoted; + } + *cpp = cp; + /* return failure for unterminated quotes */ + return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0; +} + +/* + * Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key + * matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp + * on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages. + */ +static int +check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, + char *cp, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type; + struct sshkey *found = NULL; + struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL; + char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL; + const char *reason = NULL; + int ret = -1; + + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + + if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) { + debug3("%s: keytype %d failed", __func__, want_keytype); + goto out; + } + + /* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */ + + if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { + /* no key? check for options */ + debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp); + key_options = cp; + if (advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) { + reason = "invalid key option string"; + goto fail_reason; + } + skip_space(&cp); + if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { + /* still no key? advance to next line*/ + debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp); + goto out; + } + } + /* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */ + if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) { + debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason); + auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason); + goto out; + } + /* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */ + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + /* Certificate; check signature key against CA */ + if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) || + !keyopts->cert_authority) + goto out; + } else { + /* Plain key: check it against key found in file */ + if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority) + goto out; + } + + /* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */ + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__); + + debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc, + sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp); + + if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, keyopts, + sshkey_is_cert(key), loc) != 0) { + reason = "Refused by key options"; + goto fail_reason; + } + /* That's all we need for plain keys. */ + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s", + sshkey_type(found), fp, loc); + finalopts = keyopts; + keyopts = NULL; + goto success; + } + + /* + * Additional authorisation for certificates. + */ + + /* Parse and check options present in certificate */ + if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) { + reason = "Invalid certificate options"; + goto fail_reason; + } + if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, certopts, 0, loc) != 0) { + reason = "Refused by certificate options"; + goto fail_reason; + } + if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL) + goto fail_reason; + + /* + * If the user has specified a list of principals as + * a key option, then prefer that list to matching + * their username in the certificate principals list. + */ + if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL && + !match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) { + reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; + goto fail_reason; + } + if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, + keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) + goto fail_reason; + + verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) " + "signed by CA %s %s found at %s", + key->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, + sshkey_type(found), fp, loc); + + success: + if (finalopts == NULL) + fatal("%s: internal error: missing options", __func__); + if (authoptsp != NULL) { + *authoptsp = finalopts; + finalopts = NULL; + } + /* success */ + ret = 0; + goto out; + + fail_reason: + error("%s", reason); + auth_debug_add("%s", reason); + out: + free(fp); + sshauthopt_free(keyopts); + sshauthopt_free(certopts); + sshauthopt_free(finalopts); + sshkey_free(found); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, + * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f, + char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256]; + size_t linesize = 0; + int found_key = 0; + u_long linenum = 0; + + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + linenum++; + /* Always consume entire file */ + if (found_key) + continue; + + /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ + cp = line; + skip_space(&cp); + if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') + continue; + snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum); + if (check_authkey_line(ssh, pw, key, cp, loc, authoptsp) == 0) + found_key = 1; + } + free(line); + return found_key; +} + +/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ +static int +user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, + struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; + const char *reason; + struct sshauthopt *principals_opts = NULL, *cert_opts = NULL; + struct sshauthopt *final_opts = NULL; + int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; + + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) + return 0; + + if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + return 0; + + if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) { + debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s: %s", __func__, + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + /* + * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate + * principals against the names in that file rather than matching + * against the username. + */ + if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) { + if (match_principals_file(ssh, pw, principals_file, + key->cert, &principals_opts)) + found_principal = 1; + } + /* Try querying command if specified */ + if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(ssh, pw, key, + &principals_opts)) + found_principal = 1; + /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */ + use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL || + options.authorized_principals_command != NULL; + if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) { + reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; + goto fail_reason; + } + if (use_authorized_principals && principals_opts == NULL) + fatal("%s: internal error: missing principals_opts", __func__); + if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, + use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) + goto fail_reason; + + /* Check authority from options in key and from principals file/cmd */ + if ((cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) { + reason = "Invalid certificate options"; + goto fail_reason; + } + if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, cert_opts, 0, "cert") != 0) { + reason = "Refused by certificate options"; + goto fail_reason; + } + if (principals_opts == NULL) { + final_opts = cert_opts; + cert_opts = NULL; + } else { + if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, principals_opts, 0, + "principals") != 0) { + reason = "Refused by certificate principals options"; + goto fail_reason; + } + if ((final_opts = sshauthopt_merge(principals_opts, + cert_opts, &reason)) == NULL) { + fail_reason: + error("%s", reason); + auth_debug_add("%s", reason); + goto out; + } + } + + /* Success */ + verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by " + "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, + options.trusted_user_ca_keys); + if (authoptsp != NULL) { + *authoptsp = final_opts; + final_opts = NULL; + } + ret = 1; + out: + sshauthopt_free(principals_opts); + sshauthopt_free(cert_opts); + sshauthopt_free(final_opts); + free(principals_file); + free(ca_fp); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Checks whether key is allowed in file. + * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +user_key_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, + char *file, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + FILE *f; + int found_key = 0; + + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + + /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + debug("trying public key file %s", file); + if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) { + found_key = check_authkeys_file(ssh, pw, f, file, + key, authoptsp); + fclose(f); + } + + restore_uid(); + return found_key; +} + +/* + * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command. + * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw, + struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL; + FILE *f = NULL; + int r, ok, found_key = 0; + int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0; + pid_t pid; + char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL; + char uidstr[32], *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; + void (*osigchld)(int); + + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL) + return 0; + if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) { + error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping"); + return 0; + } + + /* + * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to + * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. + */ + osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + + /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ + username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user, + "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); + runas_pw = getpwnam(username); + if (runas_pw == NULL) { + error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", + username, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */ + if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + + /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ + if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", + command); + goto out; + } + if (ac == 0) { + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", + command); + goto out; + } + snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", + (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid); + for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { + tmp = percent_expand(av[i], + "U", uidstr, + "u", user_pw->pw_name, + "h", user_pw->pw_dir, + "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), + "f", key_fp, + "k", keytext, + (char *)NULL); + if (tmp == NULL) + fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); + free(av[i]); + av[i] = tmp; + } + /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ + command = argv_assemble(ac, av); + + /* + * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments + * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the + * target username as a single argument. + */ + if (ac == 1) { + av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av)); + av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name); + av[2] = NULL; + /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */ + free(command); + xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]); + } + + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command, + ac, av, &f, + SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; + temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw); + + ok = check_authkeys_file(ssh, user_pw, f, + options.authorized_keys_command, key, authoptsp); + + fclose(f); + f = NULL; + + if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Read completed successfully */ + found_key = ok; + out: + if (f != NULL) + fclose(f); + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) + free(av[i]); + free(av); + if (uid_swapped) + restore_uid(); + free(command); + free(username); + free(key_fp); + free(keytext); + return found_key; +} + +/* + * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. + */ +int +user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, + int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp) +{ + u_int success, i; + char *file; + struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; + if (authoptsp != NULL) + *authoptsp = NULL; + + if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) + return 0; + if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && + auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) + return 0; + + if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0) + goto out; + sshauthopt_free(opts); + opts = NULL; + + if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0) + goto out; + sshauthopt_free(opts); + opts = NULL; + + for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { + if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) + continue; + file = expand_authorized_keys( + options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); + success = user_key_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, file, &opts); + free(file); + } + + out: + if (success && authoptsp != NULL) { + *authoptsp = opts; + opts = NULL; + } + sshauthopt_free(opts); + return success; +} + +Authmethod method_pubkey = { + "publickey", + userauth_pubkey, + &options.pubkey_authentication +}; diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d19957 --- /dev/null +++ b/auth2.c @@ -0,0 +1,794 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.149 2018/07/11 18:53:29 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "digest.h" + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern u_char *session_id2; +extern u_int session_id2_len; +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + +/* methods */ + +extern Authmethod method_none; +extern Authmethod method_pubkey; +extern Authmethod method_passwd; +extern Authmethod method_kbdint; +extern Authmethod method_hostbased; +#ifdef GSSAPI +extern Authmethod method_gssapi; +#endif + +Authmethod *authmethods[] = { + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, +#ifdef GSSAPI + &method_gssapi, +#endif + &method_passwd, + &method_kbdint, + &method_hostbased, + NULL +}; + +/* protocol */ + +static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +/* helper */ +static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *); +static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt); + +#define MATCH_NONE 0 /* method or submethod mismatch */ +#define MATCH_METHOD 1 /* method matches (no submethod specified) */ +#define MATCH_BOTH 2 /* method and submethod match */ +#define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */ +static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *); + +char * +auth2_read_banner(void) +{ + struct stat st; + char *banner = NULL; + size_t len, n; + int fd; + + if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1) + return (NULL); + if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { + close(fd); + return (NULL); + } + if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) { + close(fd); + return (NULL); + } + + len = (size_t)st.st_size; /* truncate */ + banner = xmalloc(len + 1); + n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len); + close(fd); + + if (n != len) { + free(banner); + return (NULL); + } + banner[n] = '\0'; + + return (banner); +} + +void +userauth_send_banner(const char *msg) +{ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER); + packet_put_cstring(msg); + packet_put_cstring(""); /* language, unused */ + packet_send(); + debug("%s: sent", __func__); +} + +static void +userauth_banner(void) +{ + char *banner = NULL; + + if (options.banner == NULL) + return; + + if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL) + goto done; + userauth_send_banner(banner); + +done: + free(banner); +} + +/* + * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE + */ +void +do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + ssh->authctxt = authctxt; /* XXX move to caller */ + ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success); + ssh->authctxt = NULL; +} + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static int +input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + u_int len; + int acceptit = 0; + char *service = packet_get_cstring(&len); + packet_check_eom(); + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt"); + + if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) { + if (!authctxt->success) { + acceptit = 1; + /* now we can handle user-auth requests */ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request); + } + } + /* XXX all other service requests are denied */ + + if (acceptit) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT); + packet_put_cstring(service); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } else { + debug("bad service request %s", service); + packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service); + } + free(service); + return 0; +} + +#define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005 +static double +user_specific_delay(const char *user) +{ + char b[512]; + size_t len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512); + u_char *hash = xmalloc(len); + double delay; + + (void)snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%llu%s", + (unsigned long long)options.timing_secret, user); + if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, b, strlen(b), hash, len) != 0) + fatal("%s: ssh_digest_memory", __func__); + /* 0-4.2 ms of delay */ + delay = (double)PEEK_U32(hash) / 1000 / 1000 / 1000 / 1000; + freezero(hash, len); + debug3("%s: user specific delay %0.3lfms", __func__, delay/1000); + return MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS + delay; +} + +static void +ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds) +{ + struct timespec ts; + double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain; + + /* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */ + while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0) + seconds *= 2; + + ts.tv_sec = remain; + ts.tv_nsec = (remain - ts.tv_sec) * 1000000000; + debug3("%s: elapsed %0.3lfms, delaying %0.3lfms (requested %0.3lfms)", + __func__, elapsed*1000, remain*1000, req*1000); + nanosleep(&ts, NULL); +} + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static int +input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Authmethod *m = NULL; + char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; + int authenticated = 0; + double tstart = monotime_double(); + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt"); + + user = packet_get_cstring(NULL); + service = packet_get_cstring(NULL); + method = packet_get_cstring(NULL); + debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); + debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); + + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = 0; + + if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) { + /* setup auth context */ + authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user)); + authctxt->user = xstrdup(user); + if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) { + authctxt->valid = 1; + debug2("%s: setting up authctxt for %s", + __func__, user); + } else { + /* Invalid user, fake password information */ + authctxt->pw = fakepw(); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); +#endif + } +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) + PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt)); +#endif + ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", + authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user); + setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown", + use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); + authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); + authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; + if (use_privsep) + mm_inform_authserv(service, style); + userauth_banner(); + if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) + packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled"); + } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 || + strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) { + packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: " + "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)", + authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service); + } + /* reset state */ + auth2_challenge_stop(ssh); + +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); +#endif + + auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt); + authctxt->postponed = 0; + authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0; + + /* try to authenticate user */ + m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method); + if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) { + debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method); + authenticated = m->userauth(ssh); + } + if (!authctxt->authenticated) + ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart, + user_specific_delay(authctxt->user)); + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL); + + free(service); + free(user); + free(method); + return 0; +} + +void +userauth_finish(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, const char *method, + const char *submethod) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + char *methods; + int partial = 0; + + if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated) + fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s", + authctxt->user); + if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed) + fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed"); + + /* Special handling for root */ + if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && + !auth_root_allowed(ssh, method)) { + authenticated = 0; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED)); +#endif + } + + if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) { + if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) { + authenticated = 0; + partial = 1; + } + } + + /* Log before sending the reply */ + auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod); + + /* Update information exposed to session */ + if (authenticated || partial) + auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, method, submethod); + + if (authctxt->postponed) + return; + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { + int r; + + if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) { + /* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */ + if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, "\0", 1)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + userauth_send_banner(sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg)); + packet_write_wait(); + } + fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account " + "configuration", authctxt->user); + } + } +#endif + + if (authenticated == 1) { + /* turn off userauth */ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + /* now we can break out */ + authctxt->success = 1; + ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user); + } else { + /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */ + if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure && + (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)) + authctxt->failures++; + if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES)); +#endif + auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt); + } + methods = authmethods_get(authctxt); + debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__, + partial, methods); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE); + packet_put_cstring(methods); + packet_put_char(partial); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + free(methods); + } +} + +/* + * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods + * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured. + * 0 otherwise. + */ +int +auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, + const char *submethod) +{ + u_int i; + + /* + * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of + * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration. + */ + if (options.num_auth_methods == 0) + return 1; + for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) { + if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method, + submethod) != MATCH_NONE) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static char * +authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + char *list; + int i, r; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) { + if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0) + continue; + if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL || + *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) + continue; + if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name, + NULL)) + continue; + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", + authmethods[i]->name)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); + sshbuf_free(b); + return list; +} + +static Authmethod * +authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name) +{ + int i; + + if (name != NULL) + for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) + if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL && + *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 && + strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 && + auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, + authmethods[i]->name, NULL)) + return authmethods[i]; + debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", + name ? name : "NULL"); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is + * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled. + * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid. + */ +int +auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable) +{ + char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p; + u_int i, found; + int ret = -1; + + if (*_methods == '\0') { + error("empty authentication method list"); + return -1; + } + omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods); + while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) { + for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) { + if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL) + *p = '\0'; + if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0) + continue; + if (need_enable) { + if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL || + *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) { + error("Disabled method \"%s\" in " + "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"", + method, _methods); + goto out; + } + } + found = 1; + break; + } + if (!found) { + error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list", + method); + goto out; + } + } + ret = 0; + out: + free(omethods); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing + * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might + * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth + * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is + * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly. + */ +int +auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + u_int i; + + if (options.num_auth_methods == 0) + return 0; + debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__); + authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods, + sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods)); + authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0; + for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) { + if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) { + logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains " + "disabled method, skipping", + options.auth_methods[i]); + continue; + } + debug("authentication methods list %d: %s", + authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]); + authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] = + xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]); + } + if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) { + error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating " + "disabled methods"); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method, + const char *submethod) +{ + size_t l = strlen(method); + int match; + const char *p; + + if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0) + return MATCH_NONE; + p = methods + l; + match = MATCH_METHOD; + if (*p == ':') { + if (!submethod) + return MATCH_PARTIAL; + l = strlen(submethod); + p += 1; + if (strncmp(submethod, p, l)) + return MATCH_NONE; + p += l; + match = MATCH_BOTH; + } + if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0') + return MATCH_NONE; + return match; +} + +/* + * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods. + * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1 + * if it did. + */ +static int +remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod) +{ + char *omethods = *methods, *p; + size_t l = strlen(method); + int match; + + match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod); + if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH) + return 0; + p = omethods + l; + if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH) + p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */ + if (*p == ',') + p++; + *methods = xstrdup(p); + free(omethods); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method + * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method + * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful. + * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise. + */ +int +auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, + const char *submethod) +{ + u_int i, found = 0; + + debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method); + for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) { + if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method, + submethod)) + continue; + found = 1; + if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') { + debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i); + return 1; + } + debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"", + i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]); + } + /* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */ + if (!found) + fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__); + return 0; +} + +/* Reset method-specific information */ +void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key); + free(authctxt->auth_method_info); + authctxt->auth_method_key = NULL; + authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL; +} + +/* Record auth method-specific information for logs */ +void +auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int i; + + free(authctxt->auth_method_info); + authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + i = vasprintf(&authctxt->auth_method_info, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (i < 0 || authctxt->auth_method_info == NULL) + fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__); +} + +/* + * Records a public key used in authentication. This is used for logging + * and to ensure that the same key is not subsequently accepted again for + * multiple authentication. + */ +void +auth2_record_key(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, + const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct sshkey **tmp, *dup; + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0) + fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key); + authctxt->auth_method_key = dup; + + if (!authenticated) + return; + + /* If authenticated, make sure we don't accept this key again */ + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0) + fatal("%s: copy key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (authctxt->nprev_keys >= INT_MAX || + (tmp = recallocarray(authctxt->prev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys, + authctxt->nprev_keys + 1, sizeof(*authctxt->prev_keys))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__); + authctxt->prev_keys = tmp; + authctxt->prev_keys[authctxt->nprev_keys] = dup; + authctxt->nprev_keys++; + +} + +/* Checks whether a key has already been previously used for authentication */ +int +auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + u_int i; + char *fp; + + for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_keys; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_keys[i])) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(authctxt->prev_keys[i], + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + debug3("%s: key already used: %s %s", __func__, + sshkey_type(authctxt->prev_keys[i]), + fp == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : fp); + free(fp); + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Updates authctxt->session_info with details of authentication. Should be + * whenever an authentication method succeeds. + */ +void +auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, + const char *submethod) +{ + int r; + + if (authctxt->session_info == NULL) { + if ((authctxt->session_info = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + } + + /* Append method[/submethod] */ + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s%s%s", + method, submethod == NULL ? "" : "/", + submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod)) != 0) + fatal("%s: append method: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* Append key if present */ + if (authctxt->auth_method_key != NULL) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_format_text(authctxt->auth_method_key, + authctxt->session_info)) != 0) + fatal("%s: append key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) { + /* Ensure no ambiguity here */ + if (strchr(authctxt->auth_method_info, '\n') != NULL) + fatal("%s: auth_method_info contains \\n", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s", + authctxt->auth_method_info)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: append method info: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, '\n')) != 0) + fatal("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ecdd869 --- /dev/null +++ b/authfd.c @@ -0,0 +1,580 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.111 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 implementation, + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +#define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */ +#define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */ + +/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */ +#define agent_failed(x) \ + ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \ + (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \ + (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) + +/* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */ +static int +decode_reply(u_char type) +{ + if (agent_failed(type)) + return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; + else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) + return 0; + else + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; +} + +/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */ +int +ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp) +{ + const char *authsocket; + int sock, oerrno; + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + + if (fdp != NULL) + *fdp = -1; + + authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + if (!authsocket) + return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT; + + memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); + sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); + + if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + + /* close on exec */ + if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 || + connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { + oerrno = errno; + close(sock); + errno = oerrno; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + } + if (fdp != NULL) + *fdp = sock; + else + close(sock); + return 0; +} + +/* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */ +static int +ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + int r; + size_t l, len; + char buf[1024]; + + /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */ + len = sshbuf_len(request); + POKE_U32(buf, len); + + /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */ + if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 || + atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(request), + sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request)) + return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; + /* + * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the + * response packet. + */ + if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4) + return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; + + /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */ + len = PEEK_U32(buf); + if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + + /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */ + sshbuf_reset(reply); + while (len > 0) { + l = len; + if (l > sizeof(buf)) + l = sizeof(buf); + if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l) + return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; + if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0) + return r; + len -= l; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was + * obtained). The argument must have been returned by + * ssh_get_authentication_socket(). + */ +void +ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock) +{ + if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) + close(sock); +} + +/* Lock/unlock agent */ +int +ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password) +{ + int r; + u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK; + struct sshbuf *msg; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) + goto out; + r = decode_reply(type); + out: + sshbuf_free(msg); + return r; +} + + +static int +deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + int r; + char *comment = NULL; + const u_char *blob; + size_t blen; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0) + goto out; + if (commentp != NULL) { + *commentp = comment; + comment = NULL; + } + r = 0; + out: + free(comment); + return r; +} + +/* + * Fetch list of identities held by the agent. + */ +int +ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp) +{ + u_char type; + u_int32_t num, i; + struct sshbuf *msg; + struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL; + int r; + + /* + * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the + * identities it can represent. + */ + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) + goto out; + if (agent_failed(type)) { + r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; + goto out; + } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0) + goto out; + if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (num == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES; + goto out; + } + + /* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */ + if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL || + (idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL || + (idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + for (i = 0; i < num;) { + if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]), + &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) { + if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) { + /* Gracefully skip unknown key types */ + num--; + continue; + } else + goto out; + } + i++; + } + idl->nkeys = num; + *idlp = idl; + idl = NULL; + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(msg); + if (idl != NULL) + ssh_free_identitylist(idl); + return r; +} + +void +ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl) +{ + size_t i; + + if (idl == NULL) + return; + for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) { + if (idl->keys != NULL) + sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]); + if (idl->comments != NULL) + free(idl->comments[i]); + } + free(idl); +} + +/* + * Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent, + * and waits for a response from the agent. + * Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero + * otherwise. + */ + + +/* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */ +static u_int +agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg) +{ + if (alg != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA) { + if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0) + return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256; + else if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0) + return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512; + } + return 0; +} + +/* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */ +int +ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, + u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_char *sig = NULL, type = 0; + size_t len = 0; + u_int flags = 0; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + *sigp = NULL; + *lenp = 0; + + if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) + goto out; + if (agent_failed(type)) { + r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; + goto out; + } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &sig, &len)) != 0) + goto out; + /* Check what we actually got back from the agent. */ + if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(sig, len, alg)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + *sigp = sig; + *lenp = len; + sig = NULL; + len = 0; + r = 0; + out: + freezero(sig, len); + sshbuf_free(msg); + return r; +} + +/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ + + +static int +encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign) +{ + int r; + + if (life != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (confirm != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (maxsign != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, maxsign)) != 0) + goto out; + } + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +/* + * Adds an identity to the authentication server. + * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. + */ +int +ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, + const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r, constrained = (life || confirm || maxsign); + u_char type; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: +#endif + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + type = constrained ? + SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED : + SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(key, msg, maxsign, + NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, comment)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if (constrained && + (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, maxsign)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) + goto out; + r = decode_reply(type); + out: + sshbuf_free(msg); + return r; +} + +/* + * Removes an identity from the authentication server. + * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. + */ +int +ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + u_char type, *blob = NULL; + size_t blen; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) { + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, + SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0) + goto out; + } else { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) + goto out; + r = decode_reply(type); + out: + if (blob != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(blob, blen); + free(blob); + } + sshbuf_free(msg); + return r; +} + +/* + * Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server. + * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. + */ +int +ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin, + u_int life, u_int confirm) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r, constrained = (life || confirm); + u_char type; + + if (add) { + type = constrained ? + SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED : + SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY; + } else + type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0) + goto out; + if (constrained && + (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) + goto out; + r = decode_reply(type); + out: + sshbuf_free(msg); + return r; +} + +/* + * Removes all identities from the agent. + * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. + * + * This supports the SSH protocol 1 message to because, when clearing all + * keys from an agent, we generally want to clear both protocol v1 and v2 + * keys. + */ +int +ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_char type = (version == 1) ? + SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : + SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) + goto out; + r = decode_reply(type); + out: + sshbuf_free(msg); + return r; +} diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a032fd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/authfd.h @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.44 2018/07/12 04:35:25 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef AUTHFD_H +#define AUTHFD_H + +/* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */ +struct ssh_identitylist { + size_t nkeys; + struct sshkey **keys; + char **comments; +}; + +int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp); +void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock); + +int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password); +int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp); +void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl); +int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, + const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign); +int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key); +int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, + const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm); +int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version); + +int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, + u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat); + +/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */ +#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1 +#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2 +#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3 +#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4 +#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5 +#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6 +#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7 +#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8 +#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9 + +/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */ +#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11 +#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 +#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13 +#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 +#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17 +#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 +#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 + +/* smartcard */ +#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20 +#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21 + +/* lock/unlock the agent */ +#define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22 +#define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23 + +/* add key with constraints */ +#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24 +#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 +#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26 + +#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 +#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 +#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN 3 + +/* extended failure messages */ +#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30 + +/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */ +#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102 + +#define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01 +#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 0x02 +#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 0x04 + +#endif /* AUTHFD_H */ diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1c92f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/authfile.c @@ -0,0 +1,538 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.131 2018/09/21 12:20:12 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "cipher.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "krl.h" + +#define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024) + +/* Save a key blob to a file */ +static int +sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename) +{ + int fd, oerrno; + + if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(keybuf), + sshbuf_len(keybuf)) != sshbuf_len(keybuf)) { + oerrno = errno; + close(fd); + unlink(filename); + errno = oerrno; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + } + close(fd); + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, + const char *passphrase, const char *comment, + int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) +{ + struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL; + int r; + + if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment, + force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(keyblob); + return r; +} + +/* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */ +int +sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob) +{ + u_char buf[1024]; + size_t len; + struct stat st; + int r; + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && + st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + for (;;) { + if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) { + if (errno == EPIPE) + break; + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0) + goto out; + if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && + st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) { + r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED; + goto out; + } + r = 0; + + out: + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (r != 0) + sshbuf_reset(blob); + return r; +} + + +/* XXX remove error() calls from here? */ +int +sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) +{ + struct stat st; + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + /* + * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the + * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user, + * then we don't care. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_ntsec(filename)) +#endif + if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.", + (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename); + error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); + error("This private key will be ignored."); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; + } + return 0; +} + +/* XXX kill perm_ok now that we have SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS? */ +int +sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp, int *perm_ok) +{ + int fd, r; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + if (perm_ok != NULL) + *perm_ok = 0; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + } + if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { + if (perm_ok != NULL) + *perm_ok = 0; + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; + goto out; + } + if (perm_ok != NULL) + *perm_ok = 1; + + r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp); + if (r == 0 && keyp && *keyp) + r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename); + out: + close(fd); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; + int r; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type, + passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(buffer); + return r; +} + +/* XXX this is almost identical to sshkey_load_private_type() */ +int +sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; + int r, fd; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; + goto out; + } + + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, keyp, + commentp)) != 0) + goto out; + if (keyp && *keyp && + (r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: + close(fd); + sshbuf_free(buffer); + return r; +} + +static int +sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp) +{ + FILE *f; + char *line = NULL, *cp; + size_t linesize = 0; + int r; + + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + cp = line; + switch (*cp) { + case '#': + case '\n': + case '\0': + continue; + } + /* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */ + if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 || + strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0) + break; + /* Skip leading whitespace. */ + for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) + ; + if (*cp) { + if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) { + cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + if (commentp) { + *commentp = strdup(*cp ? + cp : filename); + if (*commentp == NULL) + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + free(line); + fclose(f); + return r; + } + } + } + free(line); + fclose(f); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; +} + +/* load public key from any pubkey file */ +int +sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + struct sshkey *pub = NULL; + char *file = NULL; + int r; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { + if (keyp != NULL) { + *keyp = pub; + pub = NULL; + } + r = 0; + goto out; + } + sshkey_free(pub); + + /* try .pub suffix */ + if (asprintf(&file, "%s.pub", filename) == -1) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) { + if (keyp != NULL) { + *keyp = pub; + pub = NULL; + } + r = 0; + } + out: + free(file); + sshkey_free(pub); + return r; +} + +/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */ +int +sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp) +{ + struct sshkey *pub = NULL; + char *file = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + + if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + if (keyp != NULL) { + *keyp = pub; + pub = NULL; + } + r = 0; + out: + free(file); + sshkey_free(pub); + return r; +} + +/* Load private key and certificate */ +int +sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, int *perm_ok) +{ + struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL; + int r; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_UNSPEC: + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } + + if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename, + passphrase, &key, NULL, perm_ok)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */ + if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + if (keyp != NULL) { + *keyp = key; + key = NULL; + } + out: + sshkey_free(key); + sshkey_free(cert); + return r; +} + +/* + * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename", + * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error. + * If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly, + * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed. + * If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is + * also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found. + */ +int +sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type, + int check_ca) +{ + FILE *f; + char *line = NULL, *cp; + size_t linesize = 0; + int r = 0; + struct sshkey *pub = NULL; + + int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) = + strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public; + + if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + sshkey_free(pub); + pub = NULL; + cp = line; + + /* Skip leading whitespace. */ + for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) + ; + + /* Skip comments and empty lines */ + switch (*cp) { + case '#': + case '\n': + case '\0': + continue; + } + + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) { + case 0: + break; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH: + continue; + default: + goto out; + } + if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) || + (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) && + sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) { + r = 0; + goto out; + } + } + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + out: + free(line); + sshkey_free(pub); + fclose(f); + return r; +} + +/* + * Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not, + * SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something + * unexpected happened. + * This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too. + * "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. + */ +int +sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file) +{ + int r; + + r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key); + /* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */ + if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC) + return r; + + /* + * If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to + * parse the file as a flat list of keys. + */ + switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) { + case 0: + /* Key found => revoked */ + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: + /* Key not found => not revoked */ + return 0; + default: + /* Some other error occurred */ + return r; + } +} + diff --git a/authfile.h b/authfile.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..624d269 --- /dev/null +++ b/authfile.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.21 2015/01/08 10:14:08 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef AUTHFILE_H +#define AUTHFILE_H + +struct sshbuf; +struct sshkey; + +/* XXX document these */ +/* XXX some of these could probably be merged/retired */ + +int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *, + const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int); +int sshkey_load_file(int, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **); +int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **); +int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **); +int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, + struct sshkey **, int *); +int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, + struct sshkey **, char **, int *); +int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); +int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *); +int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int, int); +int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file); + +#endif diff --git a/bitmap.c b/bitmap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ecfe68 --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmap.c @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: bitmap.c,v 1.9 2017/10/20 01:56:39 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "bitmap.h" + +#define BITMAP_WTYPE u_int +#define BITMAP_MAX (1<<24) +#define BITMAP_BYTES (sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE)) +#define BITMAP_BITS (sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE) * 8) +#define BITMAP_WMASK ((BITMAP_WTYPE)BITMAP_BITS - 1) +struct bitmap { + BITMAP_WTYPE *d; + size_t len; /* number of words allocated */ + size_t top; /* index of top word allocated */ +}; + +struct bitmap * +bitmap_new(void) +{ + struct bitmap *ret; + + if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((ret->d = calloc(1, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret->len = 1; + ret->top = 0; + return ret; +} + +void +bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b) +{ + if (b != NULL && b->d != NULL) { + bitmap_zero(b); + free(b->d); + b->d = NULL; + } + free(b); +} + +void +bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b) +{ + memset(b->d, 0, b->len * BITMAP_BYTES); + b->top = 0; +} + +int +bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n) +{ + if (b->top >= b->len) + return 0; /* invalid */ + if (b->len == 0 || (n / BITMAP_BITS) > b->top) + return 0; + return (b->d[n / BITMAP_BITS] >> (n & BITMAP_WMASK)) & 1; +} + +static int +reserve(struct bitmap *b, u_int n) +{ + BITMAP_WTYPE *tmp; + size_t nlen; + + if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX) + return -1; /* invalid */ + nlen = (n / BITMAP_BITS) + 1; + if (b->len < nlen) { + if ((tmp = recallocarray(b->d, b->len, + nlen, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) + return -1; + b->d = tmp; + b->len = nlen; + } + return 0; +} + +int +bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n) +{ + int r; + size_t offset; + + if ((r = reserve(b, n)) != 0) + return r; + offset = n / BITMAP_BITS; + if (offset > b->top) + b->top = offset; + b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK); + return 0; +} + +/* Resets b->top to point to the most significant bit set in b->d */ +static void +retop(struct bitmap *b) +{ + if (b->top >= b->len) + return; + while (b->top > 0 && b->d[b->top] == 0) + b->top--; +} + +void +bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n) +{ + size_t offset; + + if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX) + return; /* invalid */ + offset = n / BITMAP_BITS; + if (offset > b->top) + return; + b->d[offset] &= ~((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK)); + /* The top may have changed as a result of the clear */ + retop(b); +} + +size_t +bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b) +{ + size_t bits; + BITMAP_WTYPE w; + + retop(b); + if (b->top >= b->len) + return 0; /* invalid */ + if (b->len == 0 || (b->top == 0 && b->d[0] == 0)) + return 0; + /* Find MSB set */ + w = b->d[b->top]; + bits = (b->top + 1) * BITMAP_BITS; + while (!(w & ((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (BITMAP_BITS - 1)))) { + w <<= 1; + bits--; + } + return bits; +} + +size_t +bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b) +{ + return (bitmap_nbits(b) + 7) / 8; +} + +int +bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l) +{ + u_char *s = (u_char *)p; + size_t i, j, k, need = bitmap_nbytes(b); + + if (l < need || b->top >= b->len) + return -1; + if (l > need) + l = need; + /* Put the bytes from LSB backwards */ + for (i = k = 0; i < b->top + 1; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < BITMAP_BYTES; j++) { + if (k >= l) + break; + s[need - 1 - k++] = (b->d[i] >> (j * 8)) & 0xff; + } + } + return 0; +} + +int +bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l) +{ + int r; + size_t i, offset, shift; + const u_char *s = (const u_char *)p; + + if (l > BITMAP_MAX / 8) + return -1; + if ((r = reserve(b, l * 8)) != 0) + return r; + bitmap_zero(b); + if (l == 0) + return 0; + b->top = offset = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) / BITMAP_BYTES) - 1; + shift = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) % BITMAP_BYTES) * 8; + for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { + b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)s[i] << shift; + if (shift == 0) { + offset--; + shift = BITMAP_BITS - 8; + } else + shift -= 8; + } + retop(b); + return 0; +} diff --git a/bitmap.h b/bitmap.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..336e90b --- /dev/null +++ b/bitmap.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: bitmap.h,v 1.2 2017/10/20 01:56:39 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _BITMAP_H +#define _BITMAP_H + +#include + +/* Simple bit vector routines */ + +struct bitmap; + +/* Allocate a new bitmap. Returns NULL on allocation failure. */ +struct bitmap *bitmap_new(void); + +/* Free a bitmap */ +void bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b); + +/* Zero an existing bitmap */ +void bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b); + +/* Test whether a bit is set in a bitmap. */ +int bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n); + +/* Set a bit in a bitmap. Returns 0 on success or -1 on error */ +int bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n); + +/* Clear a bit in a bitmap */ +void bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n); + +/* Return the number of bits in a bitmap (i.e. the position of the MSB) */ +size_t bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b); + +/* Return the number of bytes needed to represent a bitmap */ +size_t bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b); + +/* Convert a bitmap to a big endian byte string */ +int bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l); + +/* Convert a big endian byte string to a bitmap */ +int bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l); + +#endif /* _BITMAP_H */ diff --git a/buildpkg.sh.in b/buildpkg.sh.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ccc5f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/buildpkg.sh.in @@ -0,0 +1,677 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Fake Root Solaris/SVR4/SVR5 Build System - Prototype +# +# The following code has been provide under Public Domain License. I really +# don't care what you use it for. Just as long as you don't complain to me +# nor my employer if you break it. - Ben Lindstrom (mouring@eviladmin.org) +# +umask 022 +# +# Options for building the package +# You can create a openssh-config.local with your customized options +# +REMOVE_FAKE_ROOT_WHEN_DONE=yes +# +# uncommenting TEST_DIR and using +# configure --prefix=/var/tmp --with-privsep-path=/var/tmp/empty +# and +# PKGNAME=tOpenSSH should allow testing a package without interfering +# with a real OpenSSH package on a system. This is not needed on systems +# that support the -R option to pkgadd. +#TEST_DIR=/var/tmp # leave commented out for production build +PKGNAME=OpenSSH +# revisions within the same version (REV=a) +#REV= +SYSVINIT_NAME=opensshd +AWK=${AWK:="nawk"} +MAKE=${MAKE:="make"} +SSHDUID=67 # Default privsep uid +SSHDGID=67 # Default privsep gid +# uncomment these next three as needed +#PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no +#X11_FORWARDING=yes +#USR_LOCAL_IS_SYMLINK=yes +# System V init run levels +SYSVINITSTART=S98 +SYSVINITSTOPT=K30 +# We will source these if they exist +POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES=./pkg-post-make-install-fixes.sh +POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS=./pkg-post-prototype-edit.sh +# We'll be one level deeper looking for these +PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL=../pkg-preinstall.local +PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL=../pkg-postinstall.local +PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL=../pkg-preremove.local +PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL=../pkg-postremove.local +PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL=../pkg-request.local +# end of sourced files +# +OPENSSHD=opensshd.init +OPENSSH_MANIFEST=openssh.xml +OPENSSH_FMRI=svc:/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}:default +SMF_METHOD_DIR=/lib/svc/method/site +SMF_MANIFEST_DIR=/var/svc/manifest/site + +PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=@PATH_GROUPADD_PROG@ +PATH_USERADD_PROG=@PATH_USERADD_PROG@ +PATH_PASSWD_PROG=@PATH_PASSWD_PROG@ +# +# list of system directories we do NOT want to change owner/group/perms +# when installing our package +SYSTEM_DIR="/etc \ +/etc/init.d \ +/etc/rcS.d \ +/etc/rc0.d \ +/etc/rc1.d \ +/etc/rc2.d \ +/etc/opt \ +/lib \ +/lib/svc \ +/lib/svc/method \ +/lib/svc/method/site \ +/opt \ +/opt/bin \ +/usr \ +/usr/bin \ +/usr/lib \ +/usr/sbin \ +/usr/share \ +/usr/share/man \ +/usr/share/man/man1 \ +/usr/share/man/man8 \ +/usr/local \ +/usr/local/bin \ +/usr/local/etc \ +/usr/local/libexec \ +/usr/local/man \ +/usr/local/man/man1 \ +/usr/local/man/man8 \ +/usr/local/sbin \ +/usr/local/share \ +/var \ +/var/opt \ +/var/run \ +/var/svc \ +/var/svc/manifest \ +/var/svc/manifest/site \ +/var/tmp \ +/tmp" + +# We may need to build as root so we make sure PATH is set up +# only set the path if it's not set already +[ -d /opt/bin ] && { + echo $PATH | grep ":/opt/bin" > /dev/null 2>&1 + [ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/opt/bin +} +[ -d /usr/local/bin ] && { + echo $PATH | grep ":/usr/local/bin" > /dev/null 2>&1 + [ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin +} +[ -d /usr/ccs/bin ] && { + echo $PATH | grep ":/usr/ccs/bin" > /dev/null 2>&1 + [ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/usr/ccs/bin +} +export PATH +# + +[ -f Makefile ] || { + echo "Please run this script from your build directory" + exit 1 +} + +# we will look for openssh-config.local to override the above options +[ -s ./openssh-config.local ] && . ./openssh-config.local + +START=`pwd` +FAKE_ROOT=$START/pkg + +## Fill in some details, like prefix and sysconfdir +for confvar in prefix exec_prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datadir mandir sysconfdir piddir srcdir +do + eval $confvar=`grep "^$confvar=" Makefile | cut -d = -f 2` +done + +## Are we using Solaris' SMF? +DO_SMF=0 +if egrep "^#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS" config.h > /dev/null 2>&1 +then + DO_SMF=1 +fi + +## Collect value of privsep user +for confvar in SSH_PRIVSEP_USER +do + eval $confvar=`awk '/#define[ \t]'$confvar'/{print $3}' config.h` +done + +## Set privsep defaults if not defined +if [ -z "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ] +then + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd +fi + +## Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package. +VERSION=`./ssh -V 2>&1 | sed -e 's/,.*//'` + +ARCH=`uname -m` +DEF_MSG="\n" +OS_VER=`uname -v` +SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh +UNAME_R=`uname -r` +UNAME_S=`uname -s` +case ${UNAME_S} in + SunOS) UNAME_S=Solaris + OS_VER=${UNAME_R} + ARCH=`uname -p` + RCS_D=yes + DEF_MSG="(default: n)" + ;; + SCO_SV) case ${UNAME_R} in + 3.2) UNAME_S=OpenServer5 + OS_VER=`uname -X | grep Release | sed -e 's/^Rel.*3.2v//'` + ;; + 5) UNAME_S=OpenServer6 + ;; + esac + SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh + RC1_D=no + DEF_MSG="(default: n)" + ;; +esac + +case `basename $0` in + buildpkg.sh) +## Start by faking root install +echo "Faking root install..." +[ -d $FAKE_ROOT ] && rm -fr $FAKE_ROOT +mkdir $FAKE_ROOT +${MAKE} install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT +if [ $? -gt 0 ] +then + echo "Fake root install failed, stopping." + exit 1 +fi + +## Setup our run level stuff while we are at it. +if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] +then + # For Solaris' SMF, /lib/svc/method/site is the preferred place + # for start/stop scripts that aren't supplied with the OS, and + # similarly /var/svc/manifest/site for manifests. + mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR} + mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR} + + cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME} + chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME} + + cat ${OPENSSH_MANIFEST} | \ + sed -e "s|__SYSVINIT_NAME__|${SYSVINIT_NAME}|" \ + -e "s|__SMF_METHOD_DIR__|${SMF_METHOD_DIR}|" \ + > $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml + chmod 644 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml +else + mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d + + cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} + chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} +fi + +[ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ] && \ + perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \ + $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config +[ "${X11_FORWARDING}" = yes ] && \ + perl -p -i -e "s/#X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/" \ + $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config +# fix PrintMotd +perl -p -i -e "s/#PrintMotd yes/PrintMotd no/" \ + $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config + +# We don't want to overwrite config files on multiple installs +mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default +mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default + +# local tweeks here +[ -s "${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES}" ] && . ${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES} + +cd $FAKE_ROOT + +## Ok, this is outright wrong, but it will work. I'm tired of pkgmk +## whining. +for i in *; do + PROTO_ARGS="$PROTO_ARGS $i=/$i"; +done + +## Build info file +echo "Building pkginfo file..." +cat > pkginfo << _EOF +PKG=$PKGNAME +NAME="OpenSSH Portable for ${UNAME_S}" +DESC="Secure Shell remote access utility; replaces telnet and rlogin/rsh." +VENDOR="OpenSSH Portable Team - https://www.openssh.com/portable.html" +ARCH=$ARCH +VERSION=$VERSION$REV +CATEGORY="Security,application" +BASEDIR=/ +CLASSES="none" +PSTAMP="${UNAME_S} ${OS_VER} ${ARCH} `date '+%d%b%Y %H:%M'`" +_EOF + +## Build empty depend file that may get updated by $POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS +echo "Building depend file..." +touch depend + +## Build space file +echo "Building space file..." +if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] +then + # XXX Is this necessary? If not, remove space line from mk-proto.awk. + touch space +else + cat > space << _EOF +# extra space required by start/stop links added by installf +# in postinstall +$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1 +$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1 +_EOF + [ "$RC1_D" = no ] || \ + echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space + [ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && \ + echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space +fi + +## Build preinstall file +echo "Building preinstall file..." +cat > preinstall << _EOF +#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL} +# +_EOF + +# local preinstall changes here +[ -s "${PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL} + +cat >> preinstall << _EOF +# +if [ "\${PRE_INS_STOP}" = "yes" ] +then + if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] + then + svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI + else + ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop + fi +fi + +exit 0 +_EOF + +## Build postinstall file +echo "Building postinstall file..." +cat > postinstall << _EOF +#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL} +# +[ -f \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config ] || \\ + cp -p \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default \\ + \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config +[ -f \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config ] || \\ + cp -p \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default \\ + \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config + +# make rc?.d dirs only if we are doing a test install +[ -n "${TEST_DIR}" ] && [ $DO_SMF -ne 1 ] && { + [ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rcS.d + mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc0.d + [ "$RC1_D" = no ] || mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc1.d + mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc2.d +} + +if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] +then + # Delete the existing service, if it exists, then import the + # new one. + if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1 + then + svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI + fi + # NOTE, The manifest disables sshd by default. + svccfg import ${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml +else + if [ "\${USE_SYM_LINKS}" = yes ] + then + [ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && \\ + installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s + installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s + [ "$RC1_D" = no ] || \\ + installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s + installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s + else + [ "$RCS_D" = yes ] && \\ + installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l + installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l + [ "$RC1_D" = no ] || \\ + installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l + installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l + fi +fi + +# If piddir doesn't exist we add it. (Ie. --with-pid-dir=/var/opt/ssh) +[ -d $piddir ] || installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR$piddir d 0755 root sys + +_EOF + +# local postinstall changes here +[ -s "${PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL} + +cat >> postinstall << _EOF +installf -f ${PKGNAME} + +# Use chroot to handle PKG_INSTALL_ROOT +if [ ! -z "\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}" ] +then + chroot="chroot \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}" +fi +# If this is a test build, we will skip the groupadd/useradd/passwd commands +if [ ! -z "${TEST_DIR}" ] +then + chroot=echo +fi + + echo "PrivilegeSeparation user always required." + if cut -f1 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null + then + echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists." + SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=\`grep "^$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER:" \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | awk -F: '{print \$4}'\` + SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=\`grep ":\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP:" \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | awk -F: '{print \$1}'\` + else + DO_PASSWD=yes + fi + [ -z "\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP" ] && SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER + + # group required? + if cut -f1 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | egrep '^'\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP'\$' >/dev/null + then + echo "PrivSep group \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP already exists." + else + DO_GROUP=yes + fi + + # create group if required + [ "\$DO_GROUP" = yes ] && { + # Use gid of 67 if possible + if cut -f3 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | egrep '^'$SSHDGID'\$' >/dev/null + then + : + else + sshdgid="-g $SSHDGID" + fi + echo "Creating PrivSep group \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP." + \$chroot ${PATH_GROUPADD_PROG} \$sshdgid \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP + } + + # Create user if required + [ "\$DO_PASSWD" = yes ] && { + # Use uid of 67 if possible + if cut -f3 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | egrep '^'$SSHDUID'\$' >/dev/null + then + : + else + sshduid="-u $SSHDUID" + fi + echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER." + \$chroot ${PATH_USERADD_PROG} -c 'SSHD PrivSep User' -s /bin/false -g $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER \$sshduid $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER + \$chroot ${PATH_PASSWD_PROG} -l $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER + } + +if [ "\${POST_INS_START}" = "yes" ] +then + if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] + then + svcadm enable $OPENSSH_FMRI + else + ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} start + fi +fi +exit 0 +_EOF + +## Build preremove file +echo "Building preremove file..." +cat > preremove << _EOF +#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL} +# +if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] +then + svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI +else + ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop +fi +_EOF + +# local preremove changes here +[ -s "${PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL} + +cat >> preremove << _EOF +exit 0 +_EOF + +## Build postremove file +echo "Building postremove file..." +cat > postremove << _EOF +#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL} +# +if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] +then + if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1 + then + svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI + fi +fi +_EOF + +# local postremove changes here +[ -s "${PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL}" ] && . ${PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL} + +cat >> postremove << _EOF +exit 0 +_EOF + +## Build request file +echo "Building request file..." +cat > request << _EOF +trap 'exit 3' 15 + +_EOF + +[ -x /usr/bin/ckyorn ] || cat >> request << _EOF + +ckyorn() { +# for some strange reason OpenServer5 has no ckyorn +# We build a striped down version here + +DEFAULT=n +PROMPT="Yes or No [yes,no,?,quit]" +HELP_PROMPT=" Enter y or yes if your answer is yes; n or no if your answer is no." +USAGE="usage: ckyorn [options] +where options may include: + -d default + -h help + -p prompt +" + +if [ \$# != 0 ] +then + while getopts d:p:h: c + do + case \$c in + h) HELP_PROMPT="\$OPTARG" ;; + d) DEFAULT=\$OPTARG ;; + p) PROMPT=\$OPTARG ;; + \\?) echo "\$USAGE" 1>&2 + exit 1 ;; + esac + done + shift \`expr \$OPTIND - 1\` +fi + +while true +do + echo "\${PROMPT}\\c " 1>&2 + read key + [ -z "\$key" ] && key=\$DEFAULT + case \$key in + [n,N]|[n,N][o,O]|[y,Y]|[y,Y][e,E][s,S]) echo "\${key}\\c" + exit 0 ;; + \\?) echo \$HELP_PROMPT 1>&2 ;; + q|quit) echo "q\\c" 1>&2 + exit 3 ;; + esac +done + +} + +_EOF + +if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ] +then + # This could get hairy, as the running sshd may not be under SMF. + # We'll assume an earlier version of OpenSSH started via SMF. + cat >> request << _EOF +PRE_INS_STOP=no +POST_INS_START=no +# determine if should restart the daemon +if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid ] && \\ + /usr/bin/svcs -H $OPENSSH_FMRI 2>&1 | egrep "^online" > /dev/null 2>&1 +then + ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ +-p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? + case \$ans in + [y,Y]*) PRE_INS_STOP=yes + POST_INS_START=yes + ;; + esac + +else + +# determine if we should start sshd + ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ +-p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? + case \$ans in + [y,Y]*) POST_INS_START=yes ;; + esac +fi + +# make parameters available to installation service, +# and so to any other packaging scripts +cat >\$1 <> request << _EOF +USE_SYM_LINKS=no +PRE_INS_STOP=no +POST_INS_START=no +# Use symbolic links? +ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ +-p "Do you want symbolic links for the start/stop scripts? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? +case \$ans in + [y,Y]*) USE_SYM_LINKS=yes ;; +esac + +# determine if should restart the daemon +if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid -a -f ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} ] +then + ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ +-p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? + case \$ans in + [y,Y]*) PRE_INS_STOP=yes + POST_INS_START=yes + ;; + esac + +else + +# determine if we should start sshd + ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\ +-p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$? + case \$ans in + [y,Y]*) POST_INS_START=yes ;; + esac +fi + +# make parameters available to installation service, +# and so to any other packaging scripts +cat >\$1 <> request << _EOF +exit 0 + +_EOF + +## Next Build our prototype +echo "Building prototype file..." +cat >mk-proto.awk << _EOF + BEGIN { print "i pkginfo"; print "i depend"; \\ + print "i preinstall"; print "i postinstall"; \\ + print "i preremove"; print "i postremove"; \\ + print "i request"; print "i space"; \\ + split("$SYSTEM_DIR",sys_files); } + { + for (dir in sys_files) { if ( \$3 != sys_files[dir] ) + { if ( \$1 == "s" ) + { \$5=""; \$6=""; } + else + { \$5="root"; \$6="sys"; } + } + else + { \$4="?"; \$5="?"; \$6="?"; break;} + } } + { print; } +_EOF + +find . | egrep -v "prototype|pkginfo|mk-proto.awk" | sort | \ + pkgproto $PROTO_ARGS | ${AWK} -f mk-proto.awk > prototype + +# /usr/local is a symlink on some systems +[ "${USR_LOCAL_IS_SYMLINK}" = yes ] && { + grep -v "^d none /usr/local ? ? ?$" prototype > prototype.new + mv prototype.new prototype +} + +## Step back a directory and now build the package. +cd .. +# local prototype tweeks here +[ -s "${POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS}" ] && . ${POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS} + +echo "Building package.." +pkgmk -d ${FAKE_ROOT} -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o +echo | pkgtrans -os ${FAKE_ROOT} ${START}/$PKGNAME-$VERSION$REV-$UNAME_S-$ARCH.pkg + ;; + + justpkg.sh) +rm -fr ${FAKE_ROOT}/${PKGNAME} +grep -v "^PSTAMP=" $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo > $$tmp +mv $$tmp $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo +cat >> $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo << _EOF +PSTAMP="${UNAME_S} ${OS_VER} ${ARCH} `date '+%d%b%Y %H:%M'`" +_EOF +pkgmk -d ${FAKE_ROOT} -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o +echo | pkgtrans -os ${FAKE_ROOT} ${START}/$PKGNAME-$VERSION$REV-$UNAME_S-$ARCH.pkg + ;; + +esac + +[ "${REMOVE_FAKE_ROOT_WHEN_DONE}" = yes ] && rm -rf $FAKE_ROOT +exit 0 + diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f71a085 --- /dev/null +++ b/canohost.c @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.73 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "misc.h" + +void +ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr; + struct sockaddr_in *a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr; + struct in_addr inaddr; + u_int16_t port; + + if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 || + !IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr)) + return; + + debug3("Normalising mapped IPv4 in IPv6 address"); + + memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr)); + port = a6->sin6_port; + + memset(a4, 0, sizeof(*a4)); + + a4->sin_family = AF_INET; + *len = sizeof(*a4); + memcpy(&a4->sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr)); + a4->sin_port = port; +} + +/* + * Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string. + * The returned string must be freed. + */ +static char * +get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + socklen_t addrlen; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; + int r; + + /* Get IP address of client. */ + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + + if (remote) { + if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0) + return NULL; + } else { + if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0) + return NULL; + } + + /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */ + if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) { + addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen); + } + + switch (addr.ss_family) { + case AF_INET: + case AF_INET6: + /* Get the address in ascii. */ + if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop, + sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) { + error("%s: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", __func__, + flags, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); + return NULL; + } + return xstrdup(ntop); + case AF_UNIX: + /* Get the Unix domain socket path. */ + return xstrdup(((struct sockaddr_un *)&addr)->sun_path); + default: + /* We can't look up remote Unix domain sockets. */ + return NULL; + } +} + +char * +get_peer_ipaddr(int sock) +{ + char *p; + + if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) + return p; + return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); +} + +char * +get_local_ipaddr(int sock) +{ + char *p; + + if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) + return p; + return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); +} + +char * +get_local_name(int fd) +{ + char *host, myname[NI_MAXHOST]; + + /* Assume we were passed a socket */ + if ((host = get_socket_address(fd, 0, NI_NAMEREQD)) != NULL) + return host; + + /* Handle the case where we were passed a pipe */ + if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) { + verbose("%s: gethostname: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + host = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); + } else { + host = xstrdup(myname); + } + + return host; +} + +/* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */ + +static int +get_sock_port(int sock, int local) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage from; + socklen_t fromlen; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int r; + + /* Get IP address of client. */ + fromlen = sizeof(from); + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (local) { + if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { + error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + } else { + if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + + /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */ + if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) + fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + + /* Non-inet sockets don't have a port number. */ + if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) + return 0; + + /* Return port number. */ + if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0, + strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) + fatal("%s: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s", __func__, + ssh_gai_strerror(r)); + return atoi(strport); +} + +int +get_peer_port(int sock) +{ + return get_sock_port(sock, 0); +} + +int +get_local_port(int sock) +{ + return get_sock_port(sock, 1); +} diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26d6285 --- /dev/null +++ b/canohost.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.12 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef _CANOHOST_H +#define _CANOHOST_H + +char *get_peer_ipaddr(int); +int get_peer_port(int); +char *get_local_ipaddr(int); +char *get_local_name(int); +int get_local_port(int); + +#endif /* _CANOHOST_H */ + +void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *); diff --git a/chacha.c b/chacha.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a84c25e --- /dev/null +++ b/chacha.c @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +/* +chacha-merged.c version 20080118 +D. J. Bernstein +Public domain. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "chacha.h" + +/* $OpenBSD: chacha.c,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */ + +typedef unsigned char u8; +typedef unsigned int u32; + +typedef struct chacha_ctx chacha_ctx; + +#define U8C(v) (v##U) +#define U32C(v) (v##U) + +#define U8V(v) ((u8)(v) & U8C(0xFF)) +#define U32V(v) ((u32)(v) & U32C(0xFFFFFFFF)) + +#define ROTL32(v, n) \ + (U32V((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n)))) + +#define U8TO32_LITTLE(p) \ + (((u32)((p)[0]) ) | \ + ((u32)((p)[1]) << 8) | \ + ((u32)((p)[2]) << 16) | \ + ((u32)((p)[3]) << 24)) + +#define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) \ + do { \ + (p)[0] = U8V((v) ); \ + (p)[1] = U8V((v) >> 8); \ + (p)[2] = U8V((v) >> 16); \ + (p)[3] = U8V((v) >> 24); \ + } while (0) + +#define ROTATE(v,c) (ROTL32(v,c)) +#define XOR(v,w) ((v) ^ (w)) +#define PLUS(v,w) (U32V((v) + (w))) +#define PLUSONE(v) (PLUS((v),1)) + +#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \ + a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a),16); \ + c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c),12); \ + a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a), 8); \ + c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c), 7); + +static const char sigma[16] = "expand 32-byte k"; +static const char tau[16] = "expand 16-byte k"; + +void +chacha_keysetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits) +{ + const char *constants; + + x->input[4] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); + x->input[5] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); + x->input[6] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); + x->input[7] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); + if (kbits == 256) { /* recommended */ + k += 16; + constants = sigma; + } else { /* kbits == 128 */ + constants = tau; + } + x->input[8] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); + x->input[9] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); + x->input[10] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); + x->input[11] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); + x->input[0] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 0); + x->input[1] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 4); + x->input[2] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 8); + x->input[3] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 12); +} + +void +chacha_ivsetup(chacha_ctx *x, const u8 *iv, const u8 *counter) +{ + x->input[12] = counter == NULL ? 0 : U8TO32_LITTLE(counter + 0); + x->input[13] = counter == NULL ? 0 : U8TO32_LITTLE(counter + 4); + x->input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 0); + x->input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 4); +} + +void +chacha_encrypt_bytes(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes) +{ + u32 x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; + u32 j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7, j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15; + u8 *ctarget = NULL; + u8 tmp[64]; + u_int i; + + if (!bytes) return; + + j0 = x->input[0]; + j1 = x->input[1]; + j2 = x->input[2]; + j3 = x->input[3]; + j4 = x->input[4]; + j5 = x->input[5]; + j6 = x->input[6]; + j7 = x->input[7]; + j8 = x->input[8]; + j9 = x->input[9]; + j10 = x->input[10]; + j11 = x->input[11]; + j12 = x->input[12]; + j13 = x->input[13]; + j14 = x->input[14]; + j15 = x->input[15]; + + for (;;) { + if (bytes < 64) { + for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) tmp[i] = m[i]; + m = tmp; + ctarget = c; + c = tmp; + } + x0 = j0; + x1 = j1; + x2 = j2; + x3 = j3; + x4 = j4; + x5 = j5; + x6 = j6; + x7 = j7; + x8 = j8; + x9 = j9; + x10 = j10; + x11 = j11; + x12 = j12; + x13 = j13; + x14 = j14; + x15 = j15; + for (i = 20;i > 0;i -= 2) { + QUARTERROUND( x0, x4, x8,x12) + QUARTERROUND( x1, x5, x9,x13) + QUARTERROUND( x2, x6,x10,x14) + QUARTERROUND( x3, x7,x11,x15) + QUARTERROUND( x0, x5,x10,x15) + QUARTERROUND( x1, x6,x11,x12) + QUARTERROUND( x2, x7, x8,x13) + QUARTERROUND( x3, x4, x9,x14) + } + x0 = PLUS(x0,j0); + x1 = PLUS(x1,j1); + x2 = PLUS(x2,j2); + x3 = PLUS(x3,j3); + x4 = PLUS(x4,j4); + x5 = PLUS(x5,j5); + x6 = PLUS(x6,j6); + x7 = PLUS(x7,j7); + x8 = PLUS(x8,j8); + x9 = PLUS(x9,j9); + x10 = PLUS(x10,j10); + x11 = PLUS(x11,j11); + x12 = PLUS(x12,j12); + x13 = PLUS(x13,j13); + x14 = PLUS(x14,j14); + x15 = PLUS(x15,j15); + + x0 = XOR(x0,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 0)); + x1 = XOR(x1,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 4)); + x2 = XOR(x2,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 8)); + x3 = XOR(x3,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 12)); + x4 = XOR(x4,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 16)); + x5 = XOR(x5,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 20)); + x6 = XOR(x6,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 24)); + x7 = XOR(x7,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 28)); + x8 = XOR(x8,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 32)); + x9 = XOR(x9,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 36)); + x10 = XOR(x10,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 40)); + x11 = XOR(x11,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 44)); + x12 = XOR(x12,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 48)); + x13 = XOR(x13,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 52)); + x14 = XOR(x14,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 56)); + x15 = XOR(x15,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 60)); + + j12 = PLUSONE(j12); + if (!j12) { + j13 = PLUSONE(j13); + /* stopping at 2^70 bytes per nonce is user's responsibility */ + } + + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 0,x0); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 4,x1); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 8,x2); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 12,x3); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 16,x4); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 20,x5); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 24,x6); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 28,x7); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 32,x8); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 36,x9); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 40,x10); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 44,x11); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 48,x12); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 52,x13); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 56,x14); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 60,x15); + + if (bytes <= 64) { + if (bytes < 64) { + for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) ctarget[i] = c[i]; + } + x->input[12] = j12; + x->input[13] = j13; + return; + } + bytes -= 64; + c += 64; + m += 64; + } +} diff --git a/chacha.h b/chacha.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7620525 --- /dev/null +++ b/chacha.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.4 2016/08/27 04:04:56 guenther Exp $ */ + +/* +chacha-merged.c version 20080118 +D. J. Bernstein +Public domain. +*/ + +#ifndef CHACHA_H +#define CHACHA_H + +#include +#include + +struct chacha_ctx { + u_int input[16]; +}; + +#define CHACHA_MINKEYLEN 16 +#define CHACHA_NONCELEN 8 +#define CHACHA_CTRLEN 8 +#define CHACHA_STATELEN (CHACHA_NONCELEN+CHACHA_CTRLEN) +#define CHACHA_BLOCKLEN 64 + +void chacha_keysetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *k, u_int kbits) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_MINKEYLEN))); +void chacha_ivsetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *iv, const u_char *ctr) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_NONCELEN))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CHACHA_CTRLEN))); +void chacha_encrypt_bytes(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *m, + u_char *c, u_int bytes) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 4))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4))); + +#endif /* CHACHA_H */ + diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c85d46a --- /dev/null +++ b/channels.c @@ -0,0 +1,4876 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.386 2018/10/04 01:04:52 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding. + * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections, + * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H + #include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "match.h" + +/* -- agent forwarding */ +#define NUM_SOCKS 10 + +/* -- tcp forwarding */ +/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */ +#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0 + +/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */ +#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*" + +/* -- X11 forwarding */ +/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ +#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 + +/* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */ +typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset); + +/* + * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests. + * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent + * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local + * network (which might be behind a firewall). + */ +/* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */ +/* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */ +/* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */ +struct permission { + char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */ + int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */ + char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */ + char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */ + int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */ + Channel *downstream; /* Downstream mux*/ +}; + +/* + * Stores the forwarding permission state for a single direction (local or + * remote). + */ +struct permission_set { + /* + * List of all local permitted host/port pairs to allow for the + * user. + */ + u_int num_permitted_user; + struct permission *permitted_user; + + /* + * List of all permitted host/port pairs to allow for the admin. + */ + u_int num_permitted_admin; + struct permission *permitted_admin; + + /* + * If this is true, all opens/listens are permitted. This is the + * case on the server on which we have to trust the client anyway, + * and the user could do anything after logging in. + */ + int all_permitted; +}; + +/* Master structure for channels state */ +struct ssh_channels { + /* + * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array + * is dynamically extended as needed. + */ + Channel **channels; + + /* + * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be + * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL + */ + u_int channels_alloc; + + /* + * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is + * updated in channel_new. + */ + int channel_max_fd; + + /* + * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits + * relevant to channels in the select bitmasks. + * + * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for + * channels which have events pending. + */ + chan_fn **channel_pre; + chan_fn **channel_post; + + /* -- tcp forwarding */ + struct permission_set local_perms; + struct permission_set remote_perms; + + /* -- X11 forwarding */ + + /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */ + char *x11_saved_display; + + /* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ + char *x11_saved_proto; + + /* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ + char *x11_saved_data; + u_int x11_saved_data_len; + + /* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */ + u_int x11_refuse_time; + + /* + * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be + * sending us; we should replace any occurrences of this by the + * real data. + */ + u_char *x11_fake_data; + u_int x11_fake_data_len; + + /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ + int IPv4or6; +}; + +/* helper */ +static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype); +static const char *channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host); + +/* non-blocking connect helpers */ +static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *); +static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *); +static Channel *rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *, char *, char *); +static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Channel *); + +/* Setup helper */ +static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc); + +/* -- channel core */ + +void +channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc; + + if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL || + (sc->channel_pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, + sizeof(*sc->channel_pre))) == NULL || + (sc->channel_post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, + sizeof(*sc->channel_post))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__); + sc->channels_alloc = 10; + sc->channels = xcalloc(sc->channels_alloc, sizeof(*sc->channels)); + sc->IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; + channel_handler_init(sc); + + ssh->chanctxt = sc; +} + +Channel * +channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id) +{ + Channel *c; + + if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc) { + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); + return NULL; + } + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[id]; + if (c == NULL) { + logit("%s: %d: bad id: channel free", __func__, id); + return NULL; + } + return c; +} + +Channel * +channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *ssh, u_int remote_id) +{ + Channel *c; + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c != NULL && c->have_remote_id && c->remote_id == remote_id) + return c; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages. + * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages. + */ +Channel * +channel_lookup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) +{ + Channel *c; + + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) + return NULL; + + switch (c->type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: + return c; + } + logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or + * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd + */ +static void +channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, + int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + + /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */ + sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, rfd); + sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, wfd); + sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, efd); + + if (rfd != -1) + fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) + fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) + fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + + c->rfd = rfd; + c->wfd = wfd; + c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1; + c->efd = efd; + c->extended_usage = extusage; + + if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0) + debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd); +#ifdef _AIX + /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ + c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd); +#endif + + /* enable nonblocking mode */ + if (nonblock) { + if (rfd != -1) + set_nonblock(rfd); + if (wfd != -1) + set_nonblock(wfd); + if (efd != -1) + set_nonblock(efd); + } +} + +/* + * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause + * remote_name to be freed. + */ +Channel * +channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, + u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + u_int i, found; + Channel *c; + + /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */ + for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) { + /* Found a free slot. */ + found = i; + break; + } + } + if (i >= sc->channels_alloc) { + /* + * There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand + * the array. + */ + found = sc->channels_alloc; + if (sc->channels_alloc > CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS) + fatal("%s: internal error: channels_alloc %d too big", + __func__, sc->channels_alloc); + sc->channels = xrecallocarray(sc->channels, sc->channels_alloc, + sc->channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(*sc->channels)); + sc->channels_alloc += 10; + debug2("channel: expanding %d", sc->channels_alloc); + } + /* Initialize and return new channel. */ + c = sc->channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel)); + if ((c->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN; + channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0); + c->self = found; + c->type = type; + c->ctype = ctype; + c->local_window = window; + c->local_window_max = window; + c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; + c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); + c->ctl_chan = -1; + c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ + TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms); + debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); + return c; +} + +static void +channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *sc) +{ + u_int i; + int max = 0; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = sc->channels[i]; + if (c != NULL) { + max = MAXIMUM(max, c->rfd); + max = MAXIMUM(max, c->wfd); + max = MAXIMUM(max, c->efd); + } + } + sc->channel_max_fd = max; +} + +int +channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + int ret = 0, fd = *fdp; + + if (fd != -1) { + ret = close(fd); + *fdp = -1; + if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd) + channel_find_maxfd(sc); + } + return ret; +} + +/* Close all channel fd/socket. */ +static void +channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd; + + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); + if (rfd != sock) + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd); + if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd) + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd); + if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); +} + +static void +fwd_perm_clear(struct permission *perm) +{ + free(perm->host_to_connect); + free(perm->listen_host); + free(perm->listen_path); + bzero(perm, sizeof(*perm)); +} + +/* Returns an printable name for the specified forwarding permission list */ +static const char * +fwd_ident(int who, int where) +{ + if (who == FORWARD_ADM) { + if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL) + return "admin local"; + else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE) + return "admin remote"; + } else if (who == FORWARD_USER) { + if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL) + return "user local"; + else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE) + return "user remote"; + } + fatal("Unknown forward permission list %d/%d", who, where); +} + +/* Returns the forwarding permission list for the specified direction */ +static struct permission_set * +permission_set_get(struct ssh *ssh, int where) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + + switch (where) { + case FORWARD_LOCAL: + return &sc->local_perms; + break; + case FORWARD_REMOTE: + return &sc->remote_perms; + break; + default: + fatal("%s: invalid forwarding direction %d", __func__, where); + } +} + +/* Reutrns pointers to the specified forwarding list and its element count */ +static void +permission_set_get_array(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, + struct permission ***permpp, u_int **npermpp) +{ + struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); + + switch (who) { + case FORWARD_USER: + *permpp = &pset->permitted_user; + *npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_user; + break; + case FORWARD_ADM: + *permpp = &pset->permitted_admin; + *npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_admin; + break; + default: + fatal("%s: invalid forwarding client %d", __func__, who); + } +} + +/* Adds an entry to the spcified forwarding list */ +static int +permission_set_add(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, + const char *host_to_connect, int port_to_connect, + const char *listen_host, const char *listen_path, int listen_port, + Channel *downstream) +{ + struct permission **permp; + u_int n, *npermp; + + permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp); + + if (*npermp >= INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: %s overflow", __func__, fwd_ident(who, where)); + + *permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, *npermp + 1, sizeof(**permp)); + n = (*npermp)++; +#define MAYBE_DUP(s) ((s == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(s)) + (*permp)[n].host_to_connect = MAYBE_DUP(host_to_connect); + (*permp)[n].port_to_connect = port_to_connect; + (*permp)[n].listen_host = MAYBE_DUP(listen_host); + (*permp)[n].listen_path = MAYBE_DUP(listen_path); + (*permp)[n].listen_port = listen_port; + (*permp)[n].downstream = downstream; +#undef MAYBE_DUP + return (int)n; +} + +static void +mux_remove_remote_forwardings(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; + struct permission *perm; + int r; + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; + if (perm->downstream != c) + continue; + + /* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */ + debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u", + c->self, perm->listen_host, perm->listen_port); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + channel_rfwd_bind_host(perm->listen_host))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, perm->listen_port)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ + } +} + +/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */ +void +channel_free(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + char *s; + u_int i, n; + Channel *other; + struct channel_confirm *cc; + + for (n = 0, i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + if ((other = sc->channels[i]) == NULL) + continue; + n++; + /* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */ + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT && + other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY && + other->mux_ctx == c) { + other->mux_ctx = NULL; + other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; + other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED; + } + } + debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self, + c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n); + + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) + mux_remove_remote_forwardings(ssh, c); + + if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { + s = channel_open_message(ssh); + debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s); + free(s); + } + + channel_close_fds(ssh, c); + sshbuf_free(c->input); + sshbuf_free(c->output); + sshbuf_free(c->extended); + c->input = c->output = c->extended = NULL; + free(c->remote_name); + c->remote_name = NULL; + free(c->path); + c->path = NULL; + free(c->listening_addr); + c->listening_addr = NULL; + while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) { + if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL) + cc->abandon_cb(ssh, c, cc->ctx); + TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); + explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); + free(cc); + } + if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL) + c->filter_cleanup(ssh, c->self, c->filter_ctx); + sc->channels[c->self] = NULL; + explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c)); + free(c); +} + +void +channel_free_all(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) + if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL) + channel_free(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]); +} + +/* + * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file + * descriptors after a fork. + */ +void +channel_close_all(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) + if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL) + channel_close_fds(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]); +} + +/* + * Stop listening to channels. + */ +void +channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c != NULL) { + switch (c->type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: + case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); + channel_free(ssh, c); + break; + } + } + } +} + +/* + * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or + * more channel is overfull. + */ +int +channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + u_int maxsize = ssh_packet_get_maxsize(ssh); + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) + continue; + if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > maxsize) { + debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %zu > %u", + c->self, sshbuf_len(c->output), maxsize); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */ +int +channel_still_open(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + switch (c->type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: + case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: + continue; + case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: + continue; + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: + return 1; + default: + fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */ +int +channel_find_open(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + Channel *c; + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || !c->have_remote_id) + continue; + switch (c->type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: + continue; + case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: + case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: + return i; + default: + fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + return -1; +} + +/* Returns the state of the channel's extended usage flag */ +const char * +channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *c) +{ + if (c->efd == -1) + return "closed"; + + switch (c->extended_usage) { + case CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE: + return "write"; + case CHAN_EXTENDED_READ: + return "read"; + case CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE: + return "ignore"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN"; + } +} + +static char * +channel_format_status(const Channel *c) +{ + char *ret = NULL; + + xasprintf(&ret, "t%d %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu " + "fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d", + c->type, + c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id, + c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input), + c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output), + channel_format_extended_usage(c), sshbuf_len(c->extended), + c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->ctl_chan); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections, + * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for + * newlines. + */ +char * +channel_open_message(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sshbuf *buf; + Channel *c; + u_int i; + int r; + char *cp, *ret; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, + "The following connections are open:\r\n")) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + switch (c->type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: + case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: + continue; + case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: + case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH: + case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY: + case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: + cp = channel_format_status(c); + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, " #%d %.300s (%s)\r\n", + c->self, c->remote_name, cp)) != 0) { + free(cp); + fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + free(cp); + continue; + default: + fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string", __func__); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return ret; +} + +static void +open_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, Channel *c, const char *type) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: open: %s", where, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } +} + +void +channel_send_open(struct ssh *ssh, int id) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + int r; + + if (c == NULL) { + logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); + return; + } + debug2("channel %d: send open", id); + open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, c->ctype); + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); +} + +void +channel_request_start(struct ssh *ssh, int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + int r; + + if (c == NULL) { + logit("%s: %d: unknown channel id", __func__, id); + return; + } + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + + debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, wantconfirm)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } +} + +void +channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, + channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx) +{ + struct channel_confirm *cc; + Channel *c; + + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); + + cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc)); + cc->cb = cb; + cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb; + cc->ctx = ctx; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); +} + +void +channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, + channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + + if (c == NULL) { + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); + return; + } + c->open_confirm = fn; + c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx; +} + +void +channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, + channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) +{ + Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); + + if (c == NULL) { + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); + return; + } + c->detach_user = fn; + c->detach_close = do_close; +} + +void +channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id) +{ + Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id); + + if (c == NULL) { + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); + return; + } + c->detach_user = NULL; + c->detach_close = 0; +} + +void +channel_register_filter(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, + channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + + if (c == NULL) { + logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id); + return; + } + c->input_filter = ifn; + c->output_filter = ofn; + c->filter_ctx = ctx; + c->filter_cleanup = cfn; +} + +void +channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, + int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + int r; + + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) + fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + + channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty); + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static void +channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + FD_SET(c->sock, readset); +} + +static void +channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self); + FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); +} + +static void +channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && + c->remote_window > 0 && + sshbuf_len(c->input) < c->remote_window && + sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) + FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || + c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) { + FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); + } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) + debug2("channel %d: " + "obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self, + c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); + else + chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); + } + } + /** XXX check close conditions, too */ + if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && + c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) { + if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && + sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) + FD_SET(c->efd, writeset); + else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && + (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || + c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && + sshbuf_len(c->extended) < c->remote_window) + FD_SET(c->efd, readset); + } + /* XXX: What about efd? races? */ +} + +/* + * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11 + * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this + * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication + * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the + * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode. + * XXX All this happens at the client side. + * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok + */ +static int +x11_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + u_char *ucp; + u_int proto_len, data_len; + + /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */ + if (sc->x11_refuse_time != 0 && + (u_int)monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) { + verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " + "expired"); + return -1; + } + + /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ + if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12) + return 0; + + /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */ + ucp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b); + if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */ + proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7]; + data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9]; + } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */ + proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7]; + data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9]; + } else { + debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x", + ucp[0]); + return -1; + } + + /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */ + if (sshbuf_len(b) < + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3)) + return 0; + + /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */ + if (proto_len != strlen(sc->x11_saved_proto) || + memcmp(ucp + 12, sc->x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { + debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol."); + return -1; + } + /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ + if (data_len != sc->x11_fake_data_len || + timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), + sc->x11_fake_data, sc->x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { + debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); + return -1; + } + /* Check fake data length */ + if (sc->x11_fake_data_len != sc->x11_saved_data_len) { + error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d", + sc->x11_fake_data_len, sc->x11_saved_data_len); + return -1; + } + /* + * Received authentication protocol and data match + * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real + * data. + */ + memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), + sc->x11_saved_data, sc->x11_saved_data_len); + return 1; +} + +static void +channel_pre_x11_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + int ret = x11_open_helper(ssh, c->output); + + /* c->force_drain = 1; */ + + if (ret == 1) { + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + channel_pre_open(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + } else if (ret == -1) { + logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); + debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", + c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + sshbuf_reset(c->input); + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + sshbuf_reset(c->output); + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); + debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); + } +} + +static void +channel_pre_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, + Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause && + sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0) + FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */ + sshbuf_reset(c->input); + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */ + chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); + } + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || + c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) + FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); + else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) + chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); + } +} + +/* try to decode a socks4 header */ +static int +channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) +{ + const u_char *p; + char *host; + u_int len, have, i, found, need; + char username[256]; + struct { + u_int8_t version; + u_int8_t command; + u_int16_t dest_port; + struct in_addr dest_addr; + } s4_req, s4_rsp; + int r; + + debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self); + + have = sshbuf_len(input); + len = sizeof(s4_req); + if (have < len) + return 0; + p = sshbuf_ptr(input); + + need = 1; + /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */ + if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) { + debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self); + /* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */ + need = 2; + } + /* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */ + for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) { + if (p[i] == '\0') { + found++; + if (found == need) + break; + } + if (i > 1024) { + /* the peer is probably sending garbage */ + debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long", + c->self); + return -1; + } + } + if (found < need) + return 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.version, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.command, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_port, 2)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_addr, 4)) != 0) { + debug("channels %d: decode socks4: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + have = sshbuf_len(input); + p = sshbuf_ptr(input); + if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { + error("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated", + c->self); + return -1; + } + len = strlen(p); + debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len); + len++; /* trailing '\0' */ + strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username)); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + free(c->path); + c->path = NULL; + if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */ + host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr); + c->path = xstrdup(host); + } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */ + have = sshbuf_len(input); + p = sshbuf_ptr(input); + if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) { + error("channel %d: decode socks4a: host not nul " + "terminated", c->self); + return -1; + } + len = strlen(p); + debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d", + c->self, p, len); + len++; /* trailing '\0' */ + if (len > NI_MAXHOST) { + error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long", + c->self, p); + return -1; + } + c->path = xstrdup(p); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port); + + debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u", + c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command); + + if (s4_req.command != 1) { + debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d", + c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command); + return -1; + } + s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */ + s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */ + s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ + s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + return 1; +} + +/* try to decode a socks5 header */ +#define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000 +#define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00 +#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01 +#define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03 +#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04 +#define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01 +#define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00 + +static int +channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output) +{ + /* XXX use get/put_u8 instead of trusting struct padding */ + struct { + u_int8_t version; + u_int8_t command; + u_int8_t reserved; + u_int8_t atyp; + } s5_req, s5_rsp; + u_int16_t dest_port; + char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; + const u_char *p; + u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af; + int r; + + debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self); + p = sshbuf_ptr(input); + if (p[0] != 0x05) + return -1; + have = sshbuf_len(input); + if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) { + /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */ + if (have < 2) + return 0; + nmethods = p[1]; + if (have < nmethods + 2) + return 0; + /* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */ + for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) { + if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found", + c->self); + return -1; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + /* version, method */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, 0x05)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE; + debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self); + return 0; /* need more */ + } + debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self); + if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1) + return 0; /* need more */ + memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req)); + if (s5_req.version != 0x05 || + s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT || + s5_req.reserved != 0x00) { + debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self); + return -1; + } + switch (s5_req.atyp){ + case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4: + addrlen = 4; + af = AF_INET; + break; + case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN: + addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)]; + af = -1; + break; + case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6: + addrlen = 16; + af = AF_INET6; + break; + default: + debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp); + return -1; + } + need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2; + if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) + need++; + if (have < need) + return 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { + /* host string length */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_addr, addrlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_port, 2)) != 0) { + debug("channel %d: parse addr/port: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0'; + free(c->path); + c->path = NULL; + if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { + if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) { + error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname " + "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr); + return -1; + } + c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr); + } else { + if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL) + return -1; + c->path = xstrdup(ntop); + } + c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port); + + debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u", + c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command); + + s5_rsp.version = 0x05; + s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS; + s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */ + s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4; + dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port))) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + return 1; +} + +Channel * +channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out) +{ + Channel *c; + + debug("%s %s:%d", __func__, host_to_connect, port_to_connect); + + c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, + -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0); + + c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect); + c->host_port = port_to_connect; + c->listening_port = 0; + c->force_drain = 1; + + channel_register_fds(ssh, c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0); + port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); + + return c; +} + +/* dynamic port forwarding */ +static void +channel_pre_dynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + const u_char *p; + u_int have; + int ret; + + have = sshbuf_len(c->input); + debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have); + /* sshbuf_dump(c->input, stderr); */ + /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ + if (have < 3) { + /* need more */ + FD_SET(c->sock, readset); + return; + } + /* try to guess the protocol */ + p = sshbuf_ptr(c->input); + /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u8? */ + switch (p[0]) { + case 0x04: + ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->input, c->output); + break; + case 0x05: + ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->input, c->output); + break; + default: + ret = -1; + break; + } + if (ret < 0) { + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + } else if (ret == 0) { + debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self); + /* need more */ + FD_SET(c->sock, readset); + if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) + FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); + } else { + /* switch to the next state */ + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip"); + } +} + +/* simulate read-error */ +static void +rdynamic_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + sshbuf_reset(c->input); + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + sshbuf_reset(c->output); + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); +} + +/* reverse dynamic port forwarding */ +static void +channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + const u_char *p; + u_int have, len; + int r, ret; + + have = sshbuf_len(c->output); + debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: have %d", c->self, have); + /* sshbuf_dump(c->output, stderr); */ + /* EOF received */ + if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + rdynamic_close(ssh, c); + return; + } + /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ + if (have < 3) + return; + /* try to guess the protocol */ + p = sshbuf_ptr(c->output); + switch (p[0]) { + case 0x04: + /* switch input/output for reverse forwarding */ + ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->output, c->input); + break; + case 0x05: + ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->output, c->input); + break; + default: + ret = -1; + break; + } + if (ret < 0) { + rdynamic_close(ssh, c); + } else if (ret == 0) { + debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: need more", c->self); + /* send socks request to peer */ + len = sshbuf_len(c->input); + if (len > 0 && len < c->remote_window) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, c->input)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: rdynamic: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + c->remote_window -= len; + } + } else if (rdynamic_connect_finish(ssh, c) < 0) { + /* the connect failed */ + rdynamic_close(ssh, c); + } +} + +/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */ +static void +channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + Channel *nc; + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + int r, newsock, oerrno, remote_port; + socklen_t addrlen; + char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr; + + if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) + return; + + debug("X11 connection requested."); + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); + if (c->single_connection) { + oerrno = errno; + debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + errno = oerrno; + } + if (newsock < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && + errno != ECONNABORTED) + error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) + c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; + return; + } + set_nodelay(newsock); + remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); + remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", + remote_ipaddr, remote_port); + + nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted x11 socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, + c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1); + open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "x11"); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_port)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + free(remote_ipaddr); +} + +static void +port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype) +{ + char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock); + int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock); + char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock); + int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock); + int r; + + if (remote_port == -1) { + /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */ + free(remote_ipaddr); + remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1"); + remote_port = 65535; + } + + free(c->remote_name); + xasprintf(&c->remote_name, + "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, " + "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d", + rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port, + remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port); + + open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, rtype); + if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { + /* target host, port */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + /* target path */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + /* listen path */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else { + /* listen address, port */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + /* reserved for future owner/mode info */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else { + /* originator host and port */ + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + free(remote_ipaddr); + free(local_ipaddr); +} + +void +channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, u_int refuse_time) +{ + ssh->chanctxt->x11_refuse_time = refuse_time; +} + +/* + * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. + */ +static void +channel_post_port_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + Channel *nc; + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + int newsock, nextstate; + socklen_t addrlen; + char *rtype; + + if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) + return; + + debug("Connection to port %d forwarding to %.100s port %d requested.", + c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); + + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; + } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"; + } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"; + } else if (c->host_port == 0) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; + rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; + } else { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "direct-tcpip"; + } + + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); + if (newsock < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && + errno != ECONNABORTED) + error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) + c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; + return; + } + if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + set_nodelay(newsock); + nc = channel_new(ssh, rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, + c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1); + nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; + nc->host_port = c->host_port; + if (c->path != NULL) + nc->path = xstrdup(c->path); + + if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) + port_open_helper(ssh, nc, rtype); +} + +/* + * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from + * clients. + */ +static void +channel_post_auth_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + Channel *nc; + int r, newsock; + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + socklen_t addrlen; + + if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) + return; + + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); + if (newsock < 0) { + error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) + c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; + return; + } + nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted auth socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, + c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, + 0, "accepted auth socket", 1); + open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "auth-agent@openssh.com"); + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static void +channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + int err = 0, sock, isopen, r; + socklen_t sz = sizeof(err); + + if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) + return; + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + /* for rdynamic the OPEN_CONFIRMATION has been sent already */ + isopen = (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH); + if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) { + err = errno; + error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); + } + if (err == 0) { + debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d", + c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); + channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + if (isopen) { + /* no message necessary */ + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) + != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, + ssh_err(r)); + } + } else { + debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", + c->self, strerror(err)); + /* Try next address, if any */ + if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { + close(c->sock); + c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; + channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt); + return; + } + /* Exhausted all addresses */ + error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", + c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); + channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); + if (isopen) { + rdynamic_close(ssh, c); + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, + SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, strerror(err))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: failure: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, + ssh_err(r)); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + } + } +} + +static int +channel_handle_rfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; + ssize_t len; + int r, force; + + force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; + + if (c->rfd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) + return 1; + + errno = 0; + len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || + ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) + return 1; +#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD + if (len <= 0) { +#else + if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) || + (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { +#endif + debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %zd", + c->self, c->rfd, len); + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + return -1; + } else { + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + } + return -1; + } + if (c->input_filter != NULL) { + if (c->input_filter(ssh, c, buf, len) == -1) { + debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + } + } else if (c->datagram) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: put datagram: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: put data: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + return 1; +} + +static int +channel_handle_wfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + struct termios tio; + u_char *data = NULL, *buf; /* XXX const; need filter API change */ + size_t dlen, olen = 0; + int r, len; + + if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) || + sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) + return 1; + + /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ + olen = sshbuf_len(c->output); + if (c->output_filter != NULL) { + if ((buf = c->output_filter(ssh, c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) { + debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + else + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); + return -1; + } + } else if (c->datagram) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, &data, &dlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + buf = data; + } else { + buf = data = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(c->output); + dlen = sshbuf_len(c->output); + } + + if (c->datagram) { + /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */ + len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); + free(data); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || + errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) + goto write_fail; + goto out; + } + +#ifdef _AIX + /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ + if (c->wfd_isatty) + dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024); +#endif + + len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); + if (len < 0 && + (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + write_fail: + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + return -1; + } else { + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); + } + return -1; + } +#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON + if (c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') { + if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && + !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { + /* + * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of + * traffic analysis. We need to match the + * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message + * (4 byte channel id + buf) + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_msg_ignore(ssh, 4+len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: ignore: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } +#endif /* BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + out: + c->local_consumed += olen - sshbuf_len(c->output); + + return 1; +} + +static int +channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + int r; + ssize_t len; + + if (!FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->extended) == 0) + return 1; + + len = write(c->efd, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), + sshbuf_len(c->extended)); + debug2("channel %d: written %zd to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || + errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + c->local_consumed += len; + } + return 1; +} + +static int +channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; + int r; + ssize_t len; + + if (!c->detach_close && !FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset)) + return 1; + + len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + debug2("channel %d: read %zd from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || + errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close))) + return 1; + if (len <= 0) { + debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", + c->self, c->efd); + channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd); + } else { + if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) { + debug3("channel %d: discard efd", + c->self); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + return 1; +} + +static int +channel_handle_efd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + if (c->efd == -1) + return 1; + + /** XXX handle drain efd, too */ + + if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) + return channel_handle_efd_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || + c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) + return channel_handle_efd_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + + return 1; +} + +static int +channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + int r; + + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && + !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) && + ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window > + c->local_maxpacket*3) || + c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && + c->local_consumed > 0) { + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", + __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", + c->self, c->local_window, + c->local_consumed); + c->local_window += c->local_consumed; + c->local_consumed = 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static void +channel_post_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + channel_handle_rfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + channel_handle_wfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + channel_handle_efd(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + channel_check_window(ssh, c); +} + +static u_int +read_mux(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, u_int need) +{ + char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; + ssize_t len; + u_int rlen; + int r; + + if (sshbuf_len(c->input) < need) { + rlen = need - sshbuf_len(c->input); + len = read(c->rfd, buf, MINIMUM(rlen, CHAN_RBUF)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) + return sshbuf_len(c->input); + if (len <= 0) { + debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %zd", + c->self, c->rfd, len); + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + return 0; + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + return sshbuf_len(c->input); +} + +static void +channel_post_mux_client_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + u_int need; + + if (c->rfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)) + return; + if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) + return; + if (c->mux_pause) + return; + + /* + * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to + * avoid disrupting fd passing. + */ + if (read_mux(ssh, c, 4) < 4) /* read header */ + return; + /* XXX sshbuf_peek_u32 */ + need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(c->input)); +#define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024) + if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) { + debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u", + c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need); + chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); + return; + } + if (read_mux(ssh, c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */ + return; + if (c->mux_rcb(ssh, c) != 0) { + debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + return; + } +} + +static void +channel_post_mux_client_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + ssize_t len; + int r; + + if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) || + sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0) + return; + + len = write(c->wfd, sshbuf_ptr(c->output), sshbuf_len(c->output)); + if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) + return; + if (len <= 0) { + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + return; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static void +channel_post_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + channel_post_mux_client_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + channel_post_mux_client_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset); +} + +static void +channel_post_mux_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + Channel *nc; + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + socklen_t addrlen; + int newsock; + uid_t euid; + gid_t egid; + + if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) + return; + + debug("multiplexing control connection"); + + /* + * Accept connection on control socket + */ + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addrlen = sizeof(addr); + if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, + &addrlen)) == -1) { + error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) + c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; + return; + } + + if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) < 0) { + error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + close(newsock); + return; + } + if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { + error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", + (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid()); + close(newsock); + return; + } + nc = channel_new(ssh, "multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT, + newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, + c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1); + nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb; + debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->sock); + /* establish state */ + nc->mux_rcb(ssh, nc); + /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */ + nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL; +} + +static void +channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc) +{ + chan_fn **pre, **post; + + if ((pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*pre))) == NULL || + (post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__); + + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_pre_connecting; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client; + + post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_post_connecting; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener; + post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client; + + sc->channel_pre = pre; + sc->channel_post = post; +} + +/* gc dead channels */ +static void +channel_garbage_collect(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + if (c == NULL) + return; + if (c->detach_user != NULL) { + if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, c->detach_close)) + return; + + debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self); + c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, NULL); + /* if we still have a callback */ + if (c->detach_user != NULL) + return; + debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self); + } + if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, 1)) + return; + debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self); + channel_free(ssh, c); +} + +enum channel_table { CHAN_PRE, CHAN_POST }; + +static void +channel_handler(struct ssh *ssh, int table, + fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + chan_fn **ftab = table == CHAN_PRE ? sc->channel_pre : sc->channel_post; + u_int i, oalloc; + Channel *c; + time_t now; + + now = monotime(); + if (unpause_secs != NULL) + *unpause_secs = 0; + for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { + c = sc->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + if (c->delayed) { + if (table == CHAN_PRE) + c->delayed = 0; + else + continue; + } + if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) { + /* + * Run handlers that are not paused. + */ + if (c->notbefore <= now) + (*ftab[c->type])(ssh, c, readset, writeset); + else if (unpause_secs != NULL) { + /* + * Collect the time that the earliest + * channel comes off pause. + */ + debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds", + __func__, c->self, + (int)(c->notbefore - now)); + if (*unpause_secs == 0 || + (c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs) + *unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now; + } + } + channel_garbage_collect(ssh, c); + } + if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0) + debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds", + __func__, (int)*unpause_secs); +} + +/* + * Create sockets before allocating the select bitmasks. + * This is necessary for things that need to happen after reading + * the network-input but before channel_prepare_select(). + */ +static void +channel_before_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + Channel *c; + u_int i, oalloc; + + for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { + c = sc->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN) + channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(ssh, c); + } +} + +/* + * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in + * select bitmasks. + */ +void +channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, + int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs) +{ + u_int n, sz, nfdset; + + channel_before_prepare_select(ssh); /* might update channel_max_fd */ + + n = MAXIMUM(*maxfdp, ssh->chanctxt->channel_max_fd); + + nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS); + /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */ + if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask)) + fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n); + sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask); + + /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */ + if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { + *readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + *writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + *nallocp = sz; + } + *maxfdp = n; + memset(*readsetp, 0, sz); + memset(*writesetp, 0, sz); + + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_PRE, *readsetp, *writesetp, + minwait_secs); +} + +/* + * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have + * events pending. + */ +void +channel_after_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) +{ + channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_POST, readset, writeset, NULL); +} + +/* + * Enqueue data for channels with open or draining c->input. + */ +static void +channel_output_poll_input_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + size_t len, plen; + const u_char *pkt; + int r; + + if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->input)) == 0) { + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { + /* + * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: + * tell peer, that we will not send more data: + * send IEOF. + * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still + * in use. + */ + if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) + debug2("channel %d: " + "ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", + c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); + else + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + } + return; + } + + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + + if (c->datagram) { + /* Check datagram will fit; drop if not */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(c->input, &pkt, &plen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + /* + * XXX this does tail-drop on the datagram queue which is + * usually suboptimal compared to head-drop. Better to have + * backpressure at read time? (i.e. read + discard) + */ + if (plen > c->remote_window || plen > c->remote_maxpacket) { + debug("channel %d: datagram too big", c->self); + return; + } + /* Enqueue it */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkt, plen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: datagram: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + c->remote_window -= plen; + return; + } + + /* Enqueue packet for buffered data. */ + if (len > c->remote_window) + len = c->remote_window; + if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) + len = c->remote_maxpacket; + if (len == 0) + return; + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->input), len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + c->remote_window -= len; +} + +/* + * Enqueue data for channels with open c->extended in read mode. + */ +static void +channel_output_poll_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + size_t len; + int r; + + if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->extended)) == 0) + return; + + debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %zu euse %d", c->self, + c->remote_window, sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->extended_usage); + if (len > c->remote_window) + len = c->remote_window; + if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) + len = c->remote_maxpacket; + if (len == 0) + return; + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + c->remote_window -= len; + debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %zu", c->self, len); +} + +/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */ +void +channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + Channel *c; + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + c = sc->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL) + continue; + + /* + * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered + * incoming data. + */ + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) + continue; + if ((c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { + /* XXX is this true? */ + debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", + c->self); + continue; + } + + /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */ + if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || + c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) + channel_output_poll_input_open(ssh, c); + /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */ + if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && + c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) + channel_output_poll_extended_read(ssh, c); + } +} + +/* -- mux proxy support */ + +/* + * When multiplexing channel messages for mux clients we have to deal + * with downstream messages from the mux client and upstream messages + * from the ssh server: + * 1) Handling downstream messages is straightforward and happens + * in channel_proxy_downstream(): + * - We forward all messages (mostly) unmodified to the server. + * - However, in order to route messages from upstream to the correct + * downstream client, we have to replace the channel IDs used by the + * mux clients with a unique channel ID because the mux clients might + * use conflicting channel IDs. + * - so we inspect and change both SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and + * SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION messages, create a local + * SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID + * with the newly allocated channel ID. + * 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY + * channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID + * is then translated back to the original mux client ID. + * 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE + * messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels. + * 4) The SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels also need to closed when the + * downstream mux client are removed. + * 5) Handling SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages from the upstream server + * requires more work, because they are not addressed to a specific + * channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure + * out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a + * specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port. + * 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently + * not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified + * easily. + */ + +/* + * receive packets from downstream mux clients: + * channel callback fired on read from mux client, creates + * SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels and translates channel IDs + * on channel creation. + */ +int +channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + struct sshbuf *original = NULL, *modified = NULL; + const u_char *cp; + char *ctype = NULL, *listen_host = NULL; + u_char type; + size_t have; + int ret = -1, r; + u_int id, remote_id, listen_port; + + /* sshbuf_dump(downstream->input, stderr); */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(downstream->input, &cp, &have)) + != 0) { + error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + if (have < 2) { + error("%s: short message", __func__); + return -1; + } + type = cp[1]; + /* skip padlen + type */ + cp += 2; + have -= 2; + if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) + debug3("%s: channel %u: down->up: type %u", __func__, + downstream->self, type); + + switch (type) { + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN: + if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL || + (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + error("%s: alloc", __func__); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, + -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1); + c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ + c->mux_downstream_id = id; /* original downstream id */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(modified, ctype)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { + error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + channel_free(ssh, c); + goto out; + } + break; + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: + /* + * Almost the same as SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, except then we + * need to parse 'remote_id' instead of 'ctype'. + */ + if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL || + (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + error("%s: alloc", __func__); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY, + -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1); + c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */ + c->mux_downstream_id = id; + c->remote_id = remote_id; + c->have_remote_id = 1; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) { + error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + channel_free(ssh, c); + goto out; + } + break; + case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST: + if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL) { + error("%s: alloc", __func__); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(ctype, "tcpip-forward") != 0) { + error("%s: unsupported request %s", __func__, ctype); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(original, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &listen_host, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &listen_port)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if (listen_port > 65535) { + error("%s: tcpip-forward for %s: bad port %u", + __func__, listen_host, listen_port); + goto out; + } + /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ + permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "", -1, + listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream); + listen_host = NULL; + break; + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: + if (have < 4) + break; + remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); + if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(ssh, remote_id)) != NULL) { + if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) + channel_free(ssh, c); + else + c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; + } + break; + } + if (modified) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, modified)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, cp, have)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + } + ret = 0; + out: + free(ctype); + free(listen_host); + sshbuf_free(original); + sshbuf_free(modified); + return ret; +} + +/* + * receive packets from upstream server and de-multiplex packets + * to correct downstream: + * implemented as a helper for channel input handlers, + * replaces local (proxy) channel ID with downstream channel ID. + */ +int +channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + Channel *downstream; + const u_char *cp = NULL; + size_t len; + int r; + + /* + * When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we + * need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we + * restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages, + * so we can cleanup the channel. + */ + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY) + return 0; + if ((downstream = c->mux_ctx) == NULL) + return 0; + switch (type) { + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST: + break; + default: + debug2("%s: channel %u: unsupported type %u", __func__, + c->self, type); + return 0; + } + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + error("%s: alloc reply", __func__); + goto out; + } + /* get remaining payload (after id) */ + cp = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &len); + if (cp == NULL) { + error("%s: no packet", __func__); + goto out; + } + /* translate id and send to muxclient */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */ + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, c->mux_downstream_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, cp, len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(downstream->output, b)) != 0) { + error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + /* sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); */ + if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) + debug3("%s: channel %u: up->down: type %u", __func__, c->self, + type); + out: + /* update state */ + switch (type) { + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION: + /* record remote_id for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE */ + if (cp && len > 4) { + c->remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp); + c->have_remote_id = 1; + } + break; + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: + if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) + channel_free(ssh, c); + else + c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD; + break; + } + sshbuf_free(b); + return 1; +} + +/* -- protocol input */ + +/* Parse a channel ID from the current packet */ +static int +channel_parse_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) +{ + u_int32_t id; + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse id: %s", where, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s message", what); + } + if (id > INT_MAX) { + error("%s: bad channel id %u: %s", where, id, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s channel id", what); + } + return (int)id; +} + +/* Lookup a channel from an ID in the current packet */ +static Channel * +channel_from_packet_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what) +{ + int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, where, what); + Channel *c; + + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, + "%s packet referred to nonexistent channel %d", what, id); + } + return c; +} + +int +channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + const u_char *data; + size_t data_len, win_len; + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "data"); + int r; + + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) + return 0; + + /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */ + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && + c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN && + c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH && + c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN) + return 0; + + /* Get the data. */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: get data: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + + win_len = data_len; + if (c->datagram) + win_len += 4; /* string length header */ + + /* + * The sending side reduces its window as it sends data, so we + * must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure that window + * updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might deadlock. + */ + if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { + c->local_window -= win_len; + c->local_consumed += win_len; + return 0; + } + + if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) { + logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %zu, maxpack %u", + c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket); + return 0; + } + if (win_len > c->local_window) { + logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %zu, win %u", + c->self, win_len, c->local_window); + return 0; + } + c->local_window -= win_len; + + if (c->datagram) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: append datagram: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %d: append data: %s", + __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r)); + + return 0; +} + +int +channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + const u_char *data; + size_t data_len; + u_int32_t tcode; + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "extended data"); + int r; + + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) + return 0; + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { + logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", c->self); + return 0; + } + if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) + debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", + c->self); + else + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received extended_data " + "after EOF on channel %d.", c->self); + } + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tcode)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse tcode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); + } + if (c->efd == -1 || + c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE || + tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) { + logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self); + return 0; + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message"); + } + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + + if (data_len > c->local_window) { + logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %zu, win %u", + c->self, data_len, c->local_window); + return 0; + } + debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %zu", c->self, data_len); + /* XXX sshpkt_getb? */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, data, data_len)) != 0) + error("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + c->local_window -= data_len; + return 0; +} + +int +channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "ieof"); + + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) + return 0; + chan_rcvd_ieof(ssh, c); + + /* XXX force input close */ + if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) { + debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self); + c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; + if (sshbuf_len(c->input) == 0) + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + } + return 0; +} + +int +channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "oclose"); + + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) + return 0; + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c); + return 0; +} + +int +channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open confirmation"); + u_int32_t remote_window, remote_maxpacket; + int r; + + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) + return 0; + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) + packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for " + "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); + /* + * Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel + * is now open. + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0) { + error("%s: window/maxpacket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + packet_disconnect("Invalid open confirmation message"); + } + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + + c->have_remote_id = 1; + c->remote_window = remote_window; + c->remote_maxpacket = remote_maxpacket; + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; + if (c->open_confirm) { + debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self); + c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx); + debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self); + } + debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self, + c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); + return 0; +} + +static char * +reason2txt(int reason) +{ + switch (reason) { + case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED: + return "administratively prohibited"; + case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED: + return "connect failed"; + case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE: + return "unknown channel type"; + case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: + return "resource shortage"; + } + return "unknown reason"; +} + +int +channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open failure"); + u_int32_t reason; + char *msg = NULL; + int r; + + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) + return 0; + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) + packet_disconnect("Received open failure for " + "non-opening channel %d.", c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0) { + error("%s: reason: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + packet_disconnect("Invalid open failure message"); + } + /* skip language */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + error("%s: message/lang: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + packet_disconnect("Invalid open failure message"); + } + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", c->self, + reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); + free(msg); + if (c->open_confirm) { + debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self); + c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx); + debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self); + } + /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */ + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + return 0; +} + +int +channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "window adjust"); + Channel *c; + u_int32_t adjust; + u_int new_rwin; + int r; + + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { + logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id); + return 0; + } + + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) + return 0; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0) { + error("%s: adjust: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + packet_disconnect("Invalid window adjust message"); + } + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust); + if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) { + fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u", + c->self, adjust, c->remote_window); + } + c->remote_window = new_rwin; + return 0; +} + +int +channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "status confirm"); + Channel *c; + struct channel_confirm *cc; + + /* Reset keepalive timeout */ + packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); + + debug2("%s: type %d id %d", __func__, type, id); + + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) { + logit("%s: %d: unknown", __func__, id); + return 0; + } + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) + return 0; + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL) + return 0; + cc->cb(ssh, type, c, cc->ctx); + TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); + explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); + free(cc); + return 0; +} + +/* -- tcp forwarding */ + +void +channel_set_af(struct ssh *ssh, int af) +{ + ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6 = af; +} + + +/* + * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the + * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind + * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a + * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification + * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'') + * will bind to whatever address the client asked for. + * + * Special-case listen_addrs are: + * + * "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR + * "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6 + * "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6 + * "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set + */ +static const char * +channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp, + int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +{ + const char *addr = NULL; + int wildcard = 0; + + if (listen_addr == NULL) { + /* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */ + if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports) + wildcard = 1; + } else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) { + if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) && + strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) || + *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 || + (!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) { + wildcard = 1; + /* + * Notify client if they requested a specific listen + * address and it was overridden. + */ + if (*listen_addr != '\0' && + strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 && + strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) { + packet_send_debug("Forwarding listen address " + "\"%s\" overridden by server " + "GatewayPorts", listen_addr); + } + } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 || + strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || + strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { + /* Accept localhost address when GatewayPorts=yes */ + addr = listen_addr; + } + } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || + strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { + /* + * If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been + * requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in + * effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6. + */ + addr = listen_addr; + } + if (wildcardp != NULL) + *wildcardp = wildcard; + return addr; +} + +static int +channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type, + struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, + struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +{ + Channel *c; + int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + const char *host, *addr; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + in_port_t *lport_p; + + is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER); + + if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) { + host = fwd->connect_path; + } else { + host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? + fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; + if (host == NULL) { + error("No forward host name."); + return 0; + } + if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { + error("Forward host name too long."); + return 0; + } + } + + /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */ + addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(fwd->listen_host, &wildcard, + is_client, fwd_opts); + debug3("%s: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", __func__, + type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr); + + /* + * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is + * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE + */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; + hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port); + if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { + if (addr == NULL) { + /* This really shouldn't happen */ + packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s", + ssh_gai_strerror(r)); + } else { + error("%s: getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", __func__, addr, + ssh_gai_strerror(r)); + } + return 0; + } + if (allocated_listen_port != NULL) + *allocated_listen_port = 0; + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + switch (ai->ai_family) { + case AF_INET: + lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)-> + sin_port; + break; + case AF_INET6: + lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)-> + sin6_port; + break; + default: + continue; + } + /* + * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the + * same port for all address families. + */ + if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && + fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && + *allocated_listen_port > 0) + *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port); + + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), + strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); + continue; + } + /* Create a port to listen for the host. */ + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); + if (sock < 0) { + /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */ + verbose("socket [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, + strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + + set_reuseaddr(sock); + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) + sock_set_v6only(sock); + + debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", + ntop, strport); + + /* Bind the socket to the address. */ + if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + /* + * address can be in if use ipv6 address is + * already bound + */ + if (!ai->ai_next) + error("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s", + ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); + else + verbose("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s", + ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); + + close(sock); + continue; + } + /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ + if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { + error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + error("listen [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, + strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + continue; + } + + /* + * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port - + * record what we got. + */ + if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && + fwd->listen_port == 0 && + allocated_listen_port != NULL && + *allocated_listen_port == 0) { + *allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock); + debug("Allocated listen port %d", + *allocated_listen_port); + } + + /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ + c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "port listener", 1); + c->path = xstrdup(host); + c->host_port = fwd->connect_port; + c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr); + if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && + !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT)) + c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port; + else + c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port; + success = 1; + } + if (success == 0) + error("%s: cannot listen to port: %d", __func__, + fwd->listen_port); + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + return success; +} + +static int +channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, int type, + struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +{ + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + const char *path; + Channel *c; + int port, sock; + mode_t omask; + + switch (type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { + if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { + error("Local connecting path too long: %s", + fwd->connect_path); + return 0; + } + path = fwd->connect_path; + port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) { + error("No forward host name."); + return 0; + } + if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { + error("Forward host name too long."); + return 0; + } + path = fwd->connect_host; + port = fwd->connect_port; + } + break; + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: + path = fwd->listen_path; + port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + break; + default: + error("%s: unexpected channel type %d", __func__, type); + return 0; + } + + if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { + error("No forward path name."); + return 0; + } + if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { + error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path); + return 0; + } + + debug3("%s: type %d path %s", __func__, type, fwd->listen_path); + + /* Start a Unix domain listener. */ + omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask); + sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, + fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink); + umask(omask); + if (sock < 0) + return 0; + + debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path); + + /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ + c = channel_new(ssh, "unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "unix listener", 1); + c->path = xstrdup(path); + c->host_port = port; + c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); + return 1; +} + +static int +channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *host, u_short port) +{ + u_int i; + int found = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) + continue; + if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) { + debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); + channel_free(ssh, c); + found = 1; + } + } + + return found; +} + +static int +channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) +{ + u_int i; + int found = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) + continue; + if (c->path == NULL) + continue; + if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) { + debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); + channel_free(ssh, c); + found = 1; + } + } + + return found; +} + +int +channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) +{ + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, + fwd->listen_path); + } else { + return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(ssh, + fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); + } +} + +static int +channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport, + struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +{ + u_int i; + int found = 0; + const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts); + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER) + continue; + if (c->listening_port != lport) + continue; + if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) { + /* skip dynamic forwardings */ + if (c->host_port == 0) + continue; + } else { + if (c->host_port != cport) + continue; + } + if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) || + (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL)) + continue; + if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) { + debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); + channel_free(ssh, c); + found = 1; + } + } + + return found; +} + +static int +channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) +{ + u_int i; + int found = 0; + + if (path == NULL) { + error("%s: no path specified.", __func__); + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER) + continue; + if (c->listening_addr == NULL) + continue; + if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) { + debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); + channel_free(ssh, c); + found = 1; + } + } + + return found; +} + +int +channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, + struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +{ + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(ssh, + fwd->listen_path); + } else { + return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(ssh, + fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts); + } +} + +/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh */ +int +channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, + struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +{ + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, + SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); + } else { + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, + SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts); + } +} + +/* Matches a remote forwarding permission against a requested forwarding */ +static int +remote_open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, struct Forward *fwd) +{ + int ret; + char *lhost; + + /* XXX add ACLs for streamlocal */ + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) + return 1; + + if (fwd->listen_host == NULL || allowed_open->listen_host == NULL) + return 0; + + if (allowed_open->listen_port != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && + allowed_open->listen_port != fwd->listen_port) + return 0; + + /* Match hostnames case-insensitively */ + lhost = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host); + lowercase(lhost); + ret = match_pattern(lhost, allowed_open->listen_host); + free(lhost); + + return ret; +} + +/* Checks whether a requested remote forwarding is permitted */ +static int +check_rfwd_permission(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct permission_set *pset = &sc->remote_perms; + u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; + struct permission *perm; + + /* XXX apply GatewayPorts override before checking? */ + + permit = pset->all_permitted; + if (!permit) { + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; + if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) { + permit = 1; + break; + } + } + } + + if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { + permit_adm = 0; + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; + if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) { + permit_adm = 1; + break; + } + } + } + + return permit && permit_adm; +} + +/* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */ +int +channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd, + int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +{ + if (!check_rfwd_permission(ssh, fwd)) { + packet_send_debug("port forwarding refused"); + return 0; + } + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh, + SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); + } else { + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh, + SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port, + fwd_opts); + } +} + +/* + * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for + * this server. + */ +static const char * +channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host) +{ + if (listen_host == NULL) { + return "localhost"; + } else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) { + return ""; + } else + return listen_host; +} + +/* + * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through + * the secure channel to host:port from local side. + * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with + * channel_update_permission(). + */ +int +channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) +{ + int r, success = 0, idx = -1; + char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path; + int port_to_connect, listen_port; + + /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, fwd->listen_path)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request streamlocal: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tcpip-forward")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request tcpip-forward: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + /* Assume that server accepts the request */ + success = 1; + if (success) { + /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ + host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL; + port_to_connect = listen_port = 0; + if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { + host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path); + port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_host); + port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port; + } + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + listen_path = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); + listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + if (fwd->listen_host != NULL) + listen_host = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host); + listen_port = fwd->listen_port; + } + idx = permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, + host_to_connect, port_to_connect, + listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL); + } + return idx; +} + +static int +open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, + int requestedport) +{ + if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) + return 0; + if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && + allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport) + return 0; + if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 && + strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Note that in the listen host/port case + * we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and + * need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host) + * and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host) + */ +static int +open_listen_match_tcpip(struct permission *allowed_open, + const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate) +{ + const char *allowed_host; + + if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) + return 0; + if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport) + return 0; + if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL && + requestedhost == NULL) + return 1; + allowed_host = translate ? + channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) : + allowed_open->listen_host; + if (allowed_host == NULL || requestedhost == NULL || + strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static int +open_listen_match_streamlocal(struct permission *allowed_open, + const char *requestedpath) +{ + if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) + return 0; + if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + return 0; + if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL || + strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from + * local side. + */ +static int +channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *host, u_short port) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; + int r; + u_int i; + struct permission *perm; + + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; + if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, host, port, 0)) + break; + perm = NULL; + } + if (perm == NULL) { + debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); + return -1; + } + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(host))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, port)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket + * path from local side. + */ +static int +channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; + int r; + u_int i; + struct permission *perm; + + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; + if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) + break; + perm = NULL; + } + if (perm == NULL) { + debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); + return -1; + } + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, path)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side. + */ +int +channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd) +{ + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(ssh, + fwd->listen_path); + } else { + return channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(ssh, + fwd->listen_host, + fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port); + } +} + +/* + * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_user[] is empty. This is + * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port + * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway. + */ +void +channel_permit_all(struct ssh *ssh, int where) +{ + struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); + + if (pset->num_permitted_user == 0) + pset->all_permitted = 1; +} + +/* + * Permit the specified host/port for forwarding. + */ +void +channel_add_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where, + char *host, int port) +{ + int local = where == FORWARD_LOCAL; + struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where); + + debug("allow %s forwarding to host %s port %d", + fwd_ident(who, where), host, port); + /* + * Remote forwards set listen_host/port, local forwards set + * host/port_to_connect. + */ + permission_set_add(ssh, who, where, + local ? host : 0, local ? port : 0, + local ? NULL : host, NULL, local ? 0 : port, NULL); + pset->all_permitted = 0; +} + +/* + * Administratively disable forwarding. + */ +void +channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *ssh, int where) +{ + channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); + permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where, + NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); +} + +/* + * Clear a list of permitted opens. + */ +void +channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where) +{ + struct permission **permp; + u_int *npermp; + + permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp); + *permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, 0, sizeof(**permp)); + *npermp = 0; +} + +/* + * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after + * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is + * passed then they entry will be invalidated. + */ +void +channel_update_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int idx, int newport) +{ + struct permission_set *pset = &ssh->chanctxt->local_perms; + + if (idx < 0 || (u_int)idx >= pset->num_permitted_user) { + debug("%s: index out of range: %d num_permitted_user %d", + __func__, idx, pset->num_permitted_user); + return; + } + debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d", + newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing", + newport, + pset->permitted_user[idx].host_to_connect, + pset->permitted_user[idx].port_to_connect); + if (newport <= 0) + fwd_perm_clear(&pset->permitted_user[idx]); + else { + pset->permitted_user[idx].listen_port = + (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport; + } +} + +/* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */ +int +permitopen_port(const char *p) +{ + int port; + + if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0) + return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT; + if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0) + return port; + return -1; +} + +/* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */ +static int +connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx) +{ + int sock, saved_errno; + struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; + char strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))]; + + for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) { + switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) { + case AF_UNIX: + /* unix:pathname instead of host:port */ + sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr; + strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop)); + strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport)); + break; + case AF_INET: + case AF_INET6: + if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed"); + continue; + } + break; + default: + continue; + } + if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype, + cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) { + if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL) + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + else + verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1) + fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock); + if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr, + cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) { + debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): " + "%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport, + strerror(errno)); + saved_errno = errno; + close(sock); + errno = saved_errno; + continue; /* fail -- try next */ + } + if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX) + set_nodelay(sock); + debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) " + "in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock); + cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next; + return sock; + } + return -1; +} + +static void +channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx) +{ + free(cctx->host); + if (cctx->aitop) { + if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX) + free(cctx->aitop); + else + freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop); + } + memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx)); +} + +/* + * Return connecting socket to remote host:port or local socket path, + * passing back the failure reason if appropriate. + */ +static int +connect_to_helper(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name, int port, int socktype, + char *ctype, char *rname, struct channel_connect *cctx, + int *reason, const char **errmsg) +{ + struct addrinfo hints; + int gaierr; + int sock = -1; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + + if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { + struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; + struct addrinfo *ai; + + if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) { + error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG)); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections. + * channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family + * and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX. + */ + ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); + memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); + ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); + ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr); + ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX; + ai->ai_socktype = socktype; + ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC; + sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr; + sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)); + cctx->aitop = ai; + } else { + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = socktype; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx->aitop)) + != 0) { + if (errmsg != NULL) + *errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr); + if (reason != NULL) + *reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; + error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name, + ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return -1; + } + } + + cctx->host = xstrdup(name); + cctx->port = port; + cctx->ai = cctx->aitop; + + if ((sock = connect_next(cctx)) == -1) { + error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s", + name, port, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + return sock; +} + +/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ +static Channel * +connect_to(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, int port, + char *ctype, char *rname) +{ + struct channel_connect cctx; + Channel *c; + int sock; + + memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); + sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, + &cctx, NULL, NULL); + if (sock == -1) { + channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); + return NULL; + } + c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); + c->host_port = port; + c->path = xstrdup(host); + c->connect_ctx = cctx; + + return c; +} + +/* + * returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel + * that needs to deal with this connection. + */ +Channel * +channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_host, + u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; + u_int i; + struct permission *perm; + + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; + if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, + listen_host, listen_port, 1)) { + if (perm->downstream) + return perm->downstream; + if (perm->port_to_connect == 0) + return rdynamic_connect_prepare(ssh, + ctype, rname); + return connect_to(ssh, + perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect, + ctype, rname); + } + } + error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d", + listen_port); + return NULL; +} + +Channel * +channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, + char *ctype, char *rname) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; + u_int i; + struct permission *perm; + + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; + if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) { + return connect_to(ssh, + perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect, + ctype, rname); + } + } + error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s", + path); + return NULL; +} + +/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ +Channel * +channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, + char *ctype, char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; + struct channel_connect cctx; + Channel *c; + u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; + int sock; + struct permission *perm; + + permit = pset->all_permitted; + if (!permit) { + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; + if (open_match(perm, host, port)) { + permit = 1; + break; + } + } + } + + if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { + permit_adm = 0; + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; + if (open_match(perm, host, port)) { + permit_adm = 1; + break; + } + } + } + + if (!permit || !permit_adm) { + logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, " + "but the request was denied.", host, port); + if (reason != NULL) + *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; + return NULL; + } + + memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); + sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname, + &cctx, reason, errmsg); + if (sock == -1) { + channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); + return NULL; + } + + c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); + c->host_port = port; + c->path = xstrdup(host); + c->connect_ctx = cctx; + + return c; +} + +/* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */ +Channel * +channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path, + char *ctype, char *rname) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms; + u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; + struct permission *perm; + + permit = pset->all_permitted; + if (!permit) { + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_user[i]; + if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { + permit = 1; + break; + } + } + } + + if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) { + permit_adm = 0; + for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) { + perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i]; + if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { + permit_adm = 1; + break; + } + } + } + + if (!permit || !permit_adm) { + logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, " + "but the request was denied.", path); + return NULL; + } + return connect_to(ssh, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname); +} + +void +channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + struct winsize ws; + int r; + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) { + if (sc->channels[i] == NULL || !sc->channels[i]->client_tty || + sc->channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) + continue; + if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) + continue; + channel_request_start(ssh, i, "window-change", 0); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: channel %u: send window-change: %s", + __func__, i, ssh_err(r)); + } +} + +/* Return RDYNAMIC_OPEN channel: channel allows SOCKS, but is not connected */ +static Channel * +rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, char *rname) +{ + Channel *c; + int r; + + c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN, -1, -1, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); + c->host_port = 0; + c->path = NULL; + + /* + * We need to open the channel before we have a FD, + * so that we can get SOCKS header from peer. + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__, + c->self, ssh_err(r)); + } + return c; +} + +/* Return CONNECTING socket to remote host:port or local socket path */ +static int +rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + struct channel_connect cctx; + int sock; + + memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); + sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, c->path, c->host_port, SOCK_STREAM, NULL, + NULL, &cctx, NULL, NULL); + if (sock == -1) + channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); + else { + /* similar to SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING but we've already sent the open */ + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH; + c->connect_ctx = cctx; + channel_register_fds(ssh, c, sock, sock, -1, 0, 1, 0); + } + return sock; +} + +/* -- X11 forwarding */ + +/* + * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections. + * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable + * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs. + */ +int +x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset, + int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection, + u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) +{ + Channel *nc = NULL; + int display_number, sock; + u_short port; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS]; + + if (chanids == NULL) + return -1; + + for (display_number = x11_display_offset; + display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; + display_number++) { + port = 6000 + display_number; + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; + hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, + &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { + error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return -1; + } + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && + ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, + ai->ai_protocol); + if (sock < 0) { + if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) +#ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT + && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT) +#endif + ) { + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + return -1; + } else { + debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported", + ai->ai_family); + continue; + } + } + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) + sock_set_v6only(sock); + if (x11_use_localhost) + set_reuseaddr(sock); + if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__, + port, strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) + close(socks[n]); + num_socks = 0; + break; + } + socks[num_socks++] = sock; + if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) + break; + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + if (num_socks > 0) + break; + } + if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { + error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); + return -1; + } + /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ + for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { + sock = socks[n]; + if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { + error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + return -1; + } + } + + /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */ + *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids)); + for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { + sock = socks[n]; + nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener", + SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "X11 inet listener", 1); + nc->single_connection = single_connection; + (*chanids)[n] = nc->self; + } + (*chanids)[n] = -1; + + /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */ + *display_numberp = display_number; + return 0; +} + +static int +connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) +{ + int sock; + struct sockaddr_un addr; + + sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); + if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) + return sock; + close(sock); + error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); + return -1; +} + +static int +connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) +{ + char buf[1024]; + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); + return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); +} + +#ifdef __APPLE__ +static int +is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen) +{ + struct stat sbuf; + + if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) { + error("%s: display path too long", __func__); + return 0; + } + if (display[0] != '/') + return 0; + if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) { + return 1; + } else { + char *dot = strrchr(path, '.'); + if (dot != NULL) { + *dot = '\0'; + if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) { + return 1; + } + } + } + return 0; +} +#endif + +int +x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int display_number; + const char *display; + char buf[1024], *cp; + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int gaierr, sock = 0; + + /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */ + display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (!display) { + error("DISPLAY not set."); + return -1; + } + /* + * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a + * connection to the real X server. + */ + +#ifdef __APPLE__ + /* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */ + { + char path[PATH_MAX]; + + if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) { + debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd"); + + /* Create a socket. */ + sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path); + if (sock < 0) + return -1; + + /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ + return sock; + } + } +#endif + /* + * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in + * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s] + */ + if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 || + display[0] == ':') { + /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */ + if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", + &display_number) != 1) { + error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: " + "%.100s", display); + return -1; + } + /* Create a socket. */ + sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number); + if (sock < 0) + return -1; + + /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ + return sock; + } + /* + * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly + * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address. + */ + strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf)); + cp = strchr(buf, ':'); + if (!cp) { + error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display); + return -1; + } + *cp = 0; + /* + * buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the + * display number. + */ + if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { + error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", + display); + return -1; + } + + /* Look up the host address */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { + error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, + ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return -1; + } + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + /* Create a socket. */ + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); + if (sock < 0) { + debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + /* Connect it to the display. */ + if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, + 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + continue; + } + /* Success */ + break; + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + if (!ai) { + error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, + 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + set_nodelay(sock); + return sock; +} + +/* + * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication + * data, and enables authentication spoofing. + * This should be called in the client only. + */ +void +x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *ssh, int client_session_id, + const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply) +{ + struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt; + u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2; + u_int i, value; + const char *cp; + char *new_data; + int r, screen_number; + + if (sc->x11_saved_display == NULL) + sc->x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp); + else if (strcmp(disp, sc->x11_saved_display) != 0) { + error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different " + "$DISPLAY already forwarded"); + return; + } + + cp = strchr(disp, ':'); + if (cp) + cp = strchr(cp, '.'); + if (cp) + screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL); + else + screen_number = 0; + + if (sc->x11_saved_proto == NULL) { + /* Save protocol name. */ + sc->x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); + + /* Extract real authentication data. */ + sc->x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); + for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { + if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) + fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad " + "authentication data: %.100s", data); + sc->x11_saved_data[i] = value; + } + sc->x11_saved_data_len = data_len; + + /* Generate fake data of the same length. */ + sc->x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); + arc4random_buf(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); + sc->x11_fake_data_len = data_len; + } + + /* Convert the fake data into hex. */ + new_data = tohex(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len); + + /* Send the request packet. */ + channel_request_start(ssh, client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* bool: single connection */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, proto)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, new_data)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, screen_number)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send x11-req: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(new_data); +} diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa2a87c --- /dev/null +++ b/channels.h @@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.132 2018/10/04 00:10:11 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef CHANNEL_H +#define CHANNEL_H + +/* Definitions for channel types. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12 +#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13 +#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY 20 /* proxy channel for mux-slave */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN 21 /* reverse SOCKS, parsing request */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH 22 /* reverse SOCKS, finishing connect */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 23 + +#define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1 + +/* TCP forwarding */ +#define FORWARD_DENY 0 +#define FORWARD_REMOTE (1) +#define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1) +#define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL) + +#define FORWARD_ADM 0x100 +#define FORWARD_USER 0x101 + +struct ssh; +struct Channel; +typedef struct Channel Channel; +struct fwd_perm_list; + +typedef void channel_open_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); +typedef void channel_callback_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *); +typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int); +typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *); +typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, + u_char **, size_t *); + +/* Channel success/failure callbacks */ +typedef void channel_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, struct Channel *, void *); +typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, void *); +struct channel_confirm { + TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry; + channel_confirm_cb *cb; + channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb; + void *ctx; +}; +TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm); + +/* Context for non-blocking connects */ +struct channel_connect { + char *host; + int port; + struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop; +}; + +/* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */ +typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *); + +struct Channel { + int type; /* channel type/state */ + int self; /* my own channel identifier */ + uint32_t remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ + int have_remote_id; /* non-zero if remote_id is valid */ + + u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */ + u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */ + int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */ + int rfd; /* read fd */ + int wfd; /* write fd */ + int efd; /* extended fd */ + int sock; /* sock fd */ + int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */ + int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */ +#ifdef _AIX + int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */ +#endif + int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */ + int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */ + time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */ + int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created + * channels are delayed until the first call + * to a matching pre-select handler. + * this way post-select handlers are not + * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */ + struct sshbuf *input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over + * encrypted connection */ + struct sshbuf *output; /* data received over encrypted connection for + * send on socket */ + struct sshbuf *extended; + + char *path; + /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */ + int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */ + char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */ + int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */ + char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */ + + u_int remote_window; + u_int remote_maxpacket; + u_int local_window; + u_int local_window_max; + u_int local_consumed; + u_int local_maxpacket; + int extended_usage; + int single_connection; + + char *ctype; /* type */ + + /* callback */ + channel_open_fn *open_confirm; + void *open_confirm_ctx; + channel_callback_fn *detach_user; + int detach_close; + struct channel_confirms status_confirms; + + /* filter */ + channel_infilter_fn *input_filter; + channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter; + void *filter_ctx; + channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup; + + /* keep boundaries */ + int datagram; + + /* non-blocking connect */ + /* XXX make this a pointer so the structure can be opaque */ + struct channel_connect connect_ctx; + + /* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */ + mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb; + void *mux_ctx; + int mux_pause; + int mux_downstream_id; +}; + +#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0 +#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1 +#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2 + +/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */ +#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) +#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT) +#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) +#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT) +#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024) +#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT) + +/* possible input states */ +#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0 +#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 +#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2 +#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3 + +/* possible output states */ +#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0 +#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 +#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2 +#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3 + +#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01 +#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02 +#define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04 +#define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08 +#define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10 + +/* Read buffer size */ +#define CHAN_RBUF (16*1024) + +/* Hard limit on number of channels */ +#define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS (16*1024) + +/* check whether 'efd' is still in use */ +#define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ + (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \ + (c->efd != -1 || \ + sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)) +#define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ + (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \ + c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \ + sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)) + +/* Add channel management structures to SSH transport instance */ +void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh); + +/* channel management */ + +Channel *channel_by_id(struct ssh *, int); +Channel *channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *, u_int); +Channel *channel_lookup(struct ssh *, int); +Channel *channel_new(struct ssh *, char *, int, int, int, int, + u_int, u_int, int, char *, int); +void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, int, + int, int, u_int); +void channel_free(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void channel_free_all(struct ssh *); +void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *); + +void channel_send_open(struct ssh *, int); +void channel_request_start(struct ssh *, int, char *, int); +void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, + channel_callback_fn *, int); +void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *, int, + channel_open_fn *, void *); +void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *, + channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *); +void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int, + channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *); +void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int); +int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *); +void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *); + +/* mux proxy support */ + +int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *, Channel *mc); +int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *, int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +/* protocol handler */ + +int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */ + +void channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *, fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, + u_int*, time_t*); +void channel_after_select(struct ssh *, fd_set *, fd_set *); +void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *); + +int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *); +void channel_close_all(struct ssh *); +int channel_still_open(struct ssh *); +const char *channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *); +char *channel_open_message(struct ssh *); +int channel_find_open(struct ssh *); + +/* tcp forwarding */ +struct Forward; +struct ForwardOptions; +void channel_set_af(struct ssh *, int af); +void channel_permit_all(struct ssh *, int); +void channel_add_permission(struct ssh *, int, int, char *, int); +void channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *, int, int); +void channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *, int); +void channel_update_permission(struct ssh *, int, int); +Channel *channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short, + char *, char *, int *, const char **); +Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *); +Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*, + u_short, int, int); +Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *, + u_short, char *, char *); +Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *, + char *, char *); +int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); +int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, + struct ForwardOptions *); +int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); +int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, + int *, struct ForwardOptions *); +int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *); +int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *, + int, struct ForwardOptions *); +int permitopen_port(const char *); + +/* x11 forwarding */ + +void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int); +int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *); +int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **); +void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int, + const char *, const char *, const char *, int); + +/* channel close */ + +int chan_is_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *, int); +void chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *); + +/* channel events */ + +void chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_read_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *); +void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *); + +#endif diff --git a/cipher-aes.c b/cipher-aes.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b10172 --- /dev/null +++ b/cipher-aes.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL +#include + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "rijndael.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" + +#define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16 +struct ssh_rijndael_ctx +{ + rijndael_ctx r_ctx; + u_char r_iv[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE]; +}; + +static int +ssh_rijndael_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv, + int enc) +{ + struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c; + + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { + c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c)); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); + } + if (key != NULL) { + if (enc == -1) + enc = ctx->encrypt; + rijndael_set_key(&c->r_ctx, (u_char *)key, + 8*EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), enc); + } + if (iv != NULL) + memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); + return (1); +} + +static int +ssh_rijndael_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len) +{ + struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c; + u_char buf[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE]; + u_char *cprev, *cnow, *plain, *ivp; + int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; + + if (len == 0) + return (1); + if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) + fatal("ssh_rijndael_cbc: bad len %d", len); + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { + error("ssh_rijndael_cbc: no context"); + return (0); + } + if (ctx->encrypt) { + cnow = dest; + plain = (u_char *)src; + cprev = c->r_iv; + for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++, plain+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE, + cnow+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) { + for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++) + buf[j] = plain[j] ^ cprev[j]; + rijndael_encrypt(&c->r_ctx, buf, cnow); + cprev = cnow; + } + memcpy(c->r_iv, cprev, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); + } else { + cnow = (u_char *) (src+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); + plain = dest+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; + + memcpy(buf, cnow, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); + for (i = blocks; i > 0; i--, cnow-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE, + plain-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) { + rijndael_decrypt(&c->r_ctx, cnow, plain); + ivp = (i == 1) ? c->r_iv : cnow-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; + for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++) + plain[j] ^= ivp[j]; + } + memcpy(c->r_iv, buf, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE); + } + return (1); +} + +static int +ssh_rijndael_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) +{ + struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c; + + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + free(c); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); + } + return (1); +} + +void +ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, u_int len) +{ + struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c; + + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL) + fatal("ssh_rijndael_iv: no context"); + if (doset) + memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, len); + else + memcpy(iv, c->r_iv, len); +} + +const EVP_CIPHER * +evp_rijndael(void) +{ + static EVP_CIPHER rijndal_cbc; + + memset(&rijndal_cbc, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); + rijndal_cbc.nid = NID_undef; + rijndal_cbc.block_size = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; + rijndal_cbc.iv_len = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; + rijndal_cbc.key_len = 16; + rijndal_cbc.init = ssh_rijndael_init; + rijndal_cbc.cleanup = ssh_rijndael_cleanup; + rijndal_cbc.do_cipher = ssh_rijndael_cbc; +#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP + rijndal_cbc.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | + EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; +#endif + return (&rijndal_cbc); +} +#endif /* USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL */ diff --git a/cipher-aesctr.c b/cipher-aesctr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eed95c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/cipher-aesctr.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.c,v 1.2 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include "cipher-aesctr.h" + +/* + * increment counter 'ctr', + * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order. + * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0]) + */ +static inline void +aesctr_inc(u8 *ctr, u32 len) +{ + ssize_t i; + +#ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_INCREMENT + for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) + if (++ctr[i]) /* continue on overflow */ + return; +#else + u8 x, add = 1; + + for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + ctr[i] += add; + /* constant time for: x = ctr[i] ? 1 : 0 */ + x = ctr[i]; + x = (x | (x >> 4)) & 0xf; + x = (x | (x >> 2)) & 0x3; + x = (x | (x >> 1)) & 0x1; + add *= (x^1); + } +#endif +} + +void +aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits) +{ + x->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(x->ek, k, kbits); +} + +void +aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv) +{ + memcpy(x->ctr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +void +aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes) +{ + u32 n = 0; + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + while ((bytes--) > 0) { + if (n == 0) { + rijndaelEncrypt(x->ek, x->rounds, x->ctr, buf); + aesctr_inc(x->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + *(c++) = *(m++) ^ buf[n]; + n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } +} +#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/cipher-aesctr.h b/cipher-aesctr.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85d55bb --- /dev/null +++ b/cipher-aesctr.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.h,v 1.1 2014/04/29 15:39:33 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSH_AESCTR_H +#define OPENSSH_AESCTR_H + +#include "rijndael.h" + +#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 + +typedef struct aesctr_ctx { + int rounds; /* keylen-dependent #rounds */ + u32 ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */ + u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* counter */ +} aesctr_ctx; + +void aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits); +void aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv); +void aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes); + +#endif diff --git a/cipher-chachapoly.c b/cipher-chachapoly.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0899c5a --- /dev/null +++ b/cipher-chachapoly.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.8 2016/08/03 05:41:57 djm Exp $ */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include /* needed for log.h */ +#include +#include /* needed for misc.h */ + +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "cipher-chachapoly.h" + +int +chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, + const u_char *key, u_int keylen) +{ + if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */ + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + chacha_keysetup(&ctx->main_ctx, key, 256); + chacha_keysetup(&ctx->header_ctx, key + 32, 256); + return 0; +} + +/* + * chachapoly_crypt() operates as following: + * En/decrypt with header key 'aadlen' bytes from 'src', storing result + * to 'dest'. The ciphertext here is treated as additional authenticated + * data for MAC calculation. + * En/decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. Use + * POLY1305_TAGLEN bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication + * tag. This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption. + */ +int +chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, + const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt) +{ + u_char seqbuf[8]; + const u_char one[8] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* NB little-endian */ + u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* + * Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the + * packet sequence number. + */ + memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key)); + POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr); + chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL); + chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, + poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)); + + /* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */ + if (!do_encrypt) { + const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len; + + poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; + goto out; + } + } + + /* Crypt additional data */ + if (aadlen) { + chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL); + chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, src, dest, aadlen); + } + + /* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */ + chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one); + chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, src + aadlen, + dest + aadlen, len); + + /* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */ + if (do_encrypt) { + poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len, + poly_key); + } + r = 0; + out: + explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag)); + explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf)); + explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)); + return r; +} + +/* Decrypt and extract the encrypted packet length */ +int +chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, + u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) +{ + u_char buf[4], seqbuf[8]; + + if (len < 4) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr); + chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL); + chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, cp, buf, 4); + *plenp = PEEK_U32(buf); + return 0; +} diff --git a/cipher-chachapoly.h b/cipher-chachapoly.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7072be --- /dev/null +++ b/cipher-chachapoly.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.4 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) Damien Miller 2013 + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ +#ifndef CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H +#define CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H + +#include +#include "chacha.h" +#include "poly1305.h" + +#define CHACHA_KEYLEN 32 /* Only 256 bit keys used here */ + +struct chachapoly_ctx { + struct chacha_ctx main_ctx, header_ctx; +}; + +int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, + const u_char *key, u_int keylen) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); +int chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int seqnr, + u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, + int do_encrypt); +int chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, + u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5))); + +#endif /* CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H */ diff --git a/cipher-ctr.c b/cipher-ctr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..32771f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/cipher-ctr.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-ctr.c,v 1.11 2010/10/01 23:05:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR) +#include + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" + +/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL +#include +#endif + +struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx +{ + AES_KEY aes_ctx; + u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; +}; + +/* + * increment counter 'ctr', + * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order. + * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0]) + */ +static void +ssh_ctr_inc(u_char *ctr, size_t len) +{ + int i; + + for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) + if (++ctr[i]) /* continue on overflow */ + return; +} + +static int +ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, + LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len) +{ + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; + size_t n = 0; + u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if (len == 0) + return (1); + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) + return (0); + + while ((len--) > 0) { + if (n == 0) { + AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx); + ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + *(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n]; + n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + return (1); +} + +static int +ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv, + int enc) +{ + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; + + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { + c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c)); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); + } + if (key != NULL) + AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8, + &c->aes_ctx); + if (iv != NULL) + memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + return (1); +} + +static int +ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) +{ + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; + + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { + memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); + free(c); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); + } + return (1); +} + +void +ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, size_t len) +{ + struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c; + + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL) + fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_iv: no context"); + if (doset) + memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, len); + else + memcpy(iv, c->aes_counter, len); +} + +const EVP_CIPHER * +evp_aes_128_ctr(void) +{ + static EVP_CIPHER aes_ctr; + + memset(&aes_ctr, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); + aes_ctr.nid = NID_undef; + aes_ctr.block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + aes_ctr.iv_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + aes_ctr.key_len = 16; + aes_ctr.init = ssh_aes_ctr_init; + aes_ctr.cleanup = ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup; + aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; +#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP + aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | + EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; +#endif + return (&aes_ctr); +} + +#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR) */ diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..12c5988 --- /dev/null +++ b/cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,527 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.111 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "cipher.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "digest.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + + +struct sshcipher_ctx { + int plaintext; + int encrypt; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp; + struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ + struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ + const struct sshcipher *cipher; +}; + +struct sshcipher { + char *name; + u_int block_size; + u_int key_len; + u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ + u_int auth_len; + u_int flags; +#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) +#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) +#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) +#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) +#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); +#else + void *ignored; +#endif +}; + +static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES + { "3des-cbc", 8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, +#endif + { "aes128-cbc", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, + { "aes192-cbc", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, + { "aes256-cbc", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, + { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", + 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, + { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, + { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, + { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM + { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", + 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, + { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", + 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */ +#else + { "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, +#endif + { "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com", + 8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL }, + { "none", 8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, + + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } +}; + +/*--*/ + +/* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */ +char * +cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only) +{ + char *tmp, *ret = NULL; + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct sshcipher *c; + + for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { + if ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) + continue; + if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0) + continue; + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = sep; + nlen = strlen(c->name); + if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret = tmp; + memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1); + rlen += nlen; + } + return ret; +} + +u_int +cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c) +{ + return (c->block_size); +} + +u_int +cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c) +{ + return (c->key_len); +} + +u_int +cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c) +{ + if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0) + return 14; + return cipher_keylen(c); +} + +u_int +cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c) +{ + return (c->auth_len); +} + +u_int +cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c) +{ + /* + * Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that + * needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default? + */ + return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ? + c->iv_len : c->block_size; +} + +u_int +cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c) +{ + return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0; +} + +u_int +cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) +{ + return cc->plaintext; +} + +const struct sshcipher * +cipher_by_name(const char *name) +{ + const struct sshcipher *c; + for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) + return c; + return NULL; +} + +#define CIPHER_SEP "," +int +ciphers_valid(const char *names) +{ + const struct sshcipher *c; + char *cipher_list, *cp; + char *p; + + if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) + return 0; + if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) + return 0; + for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) { + c = cipher_by_name(p); + if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) { + free(cipher_list); + return 0; + } + } + free(cipher_list); + return 1; +} + +const char * +cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) +{ + if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) + return NULL; + /* XXX repurpose for CBC warning */ + return NULL; +} + +int +cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher, + const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen, + int do_encrypt) +{ + struct sshcipher_ctx *cc = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const EVP_CIPHER *type; + int klen; +#endif + + *ccp = NULL; + if ((cc = calloc(sizeof(*cc), 1)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + cc->plaintext = (cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0; + cc->encrypt = do_encrypt; + + if (keylen < cipher->key_len || + (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + + cc->cipher = cipher; + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { + ret = chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen); + goto out; + } + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { + ret = 0; + goto out; + } +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { + aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen); + aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv); + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + type = (*cipher->evptype)(); + if ((cc->evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv, + (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (cipher_authlen(cipher) && + !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, + -1, (u_char *)iv)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(cc->evp); + if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(cc->evp, keylen) == 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + } + if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + ret = 0; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + out: + if (ret == 0) { + /* success */ + *ccp = cc; + } else { + if (cc != NULL) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); + free(cc); + } + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * cipher_crypt() operates as following: + * Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'. + * Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for + * authenticated encryption modes. + * En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. + * Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag. + * This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption. + * Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0. + */ +int +cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, + const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen) +{ + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { + return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src, + len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt); + } + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { + memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len); + return 0; + } +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { + if (aadlen) + memcpy(dest, src, aadlen); + aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen, + dest + aadlen, len); + return 0; + } + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#else + if (authlen) { + u_char lastiv[1]; + + if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + /* increment IV */ + if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, + 1, lastiv)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + /* set tag on decyption */ + if (!cc->encrypt && + !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, + authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + if (aadlen) { + if (authlen && + EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + memcpy(dest, src, aadlen); + } + if (len % cc->cipher->block_size) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen, + len) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + if (authlen) { + /* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */ + if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0) + return cc->encrypt ? + SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; + if (cc->encrypt && + !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, + authlen, dest + aadlen + len)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + return 0; +#endif +} + +/* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */ +int +cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, + const u_char *cp, u_int len) +{ + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) + return chachapoly_get_length(&cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr, + cp, len); + if (len < 4) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + *plenp = PEEK_U32(cp); + return 0; +} + +void +cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) +{ + if (cc == NULL) + return; + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) + explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx)); + else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) + explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx)); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp); + cc->evp = NULL; +#endif + explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); + free(cc); +} + +/* + * Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key + * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent + * process. + */ +int +cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) +{ + const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; + + if ((c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) + return 0; + else if ((c->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) + return sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + +int +cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, size_t len) +{ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; + int evplen; +#endif + + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { + if (len != 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return 0; + } + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { + if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len); + return 0; + } + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) + return 0; + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); + if (evplen == 0) + return 0; + else if (evplen < 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + if ((size_t)evplen != len) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR + if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) + ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 0, iv, len); + else +#endif + if (cipher_authlen(c)) { + if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, + len, iv)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(cc->evp, iv, len)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv, size_t len) +{ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; + int evplen = 0; +#endif + + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) + return 0; + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) + return 0; + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp); + if (evplen <= 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + if ((size_t)evplen != len) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR + /* XXX iv arg is const, but ssh_aes_ctr_iv isn't */ + if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) + ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, evplen); + else +#endif + if (cipher_authlen(c)) { + /* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */ + if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, + EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(cc->evp, iv, evplen)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +#endif + return 0; +} diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc1571d --- /dev/null +++ b/cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.52 2017/05/07 23:12:57 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef CIPHER_H +#define CIPHER_H + +#include +#include +#include "cipher-chachapoly.h" +#include "cipher-aesctr.h" + +#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 +#define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 + +struct sshcipher; +struct sshcipher_ctx; + +const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); +const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); +int ciphers_valid(const char *); +char *cipher_alg_list(char, int); +int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **, const struct sshcipher *, + const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int); +int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *, + u_int, u_int, u_int); +int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int, + const u_char *, u_int); +void cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *); +u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *); + +u_int cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *); + +int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *, size_t); +int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *, size_t); +int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); + +#endif /* CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/cleanup.c b/cleanup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..238f965 --- /dev/null +++ b/cleanup.c @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: cleanup.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" + +/* default implementation */ +void +cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + _exit(i); +} diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d312cd --- /dev/null +++ b/clientloop.c @@ -0,0 +1,2358 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.318 2018/09/21 12:46:22 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * The main loop for the interactive session (client side). + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * + * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "clientloop.h" +#include "sshconnect.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "msg.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "hostfile.h" + +/* import options */ +extern Options options; + +/* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */ +extern int stdin_null_flag; + +/* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */ +extern int no_shell_flag; + +/* Flag indicating that ssh should daemonise after authentication is complete */ +extern int fork_after_authentication_flag; + +/* Control socket */ +extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */ + +/* + * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the + * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a + * configuration file. + */ +extern char *host; + +/* + * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has + * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new + * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile + * because this is updated in a signal handler. + */ +static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0; +static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0; + +/* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */ +static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0; + +/* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */ +static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0; + +/* Common data for the client loop code. */ +volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */ +static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ +static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */ +static struct sshbuf *stderr_buffer; /* Used for final exit message. */ +static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ +static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ +static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ +static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */ +static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ + +static void client_init_dispatch(void); +int session_ident = -1; + +/* Track escape per proto2 channel */ +struct escape_filter_ctx { + int escape_pending; + int escape_char; +}; + +/* Context for channel confirmation replies */ +struct channel_reply_ctx { + const char *request_type; + int id; + enum confirm_action action; +}; + +/* Global request success/failure callbacks */ +/* XXX move to struct ssh? */ +struct global_confirm { + TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry; + global_confirm_cb *cb; + void *ctx; + int ref_count; +}; +TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm); +static struct global_confirms global_confirms = + TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms); + +void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, struct sshbuf *); + +/* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */ + +static void +leave_non_blocking(void) +{ + if (in_non_blocking_mode) { + unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); + in_non_blocking_mode = 0; + } +} + +/* + * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a + * flag indicating that the window has changed. + */ +/*ARGSUSED */ +static void +window_change_handler(int sig) +{ + received_window_change_signal = 1; +} + +/* + * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These + * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes. + */ +/*ARGSUSED */ +static void +signal_handler(int sig) +{ + received_signal = sig; + quit_pending = 1; +} + +/* + * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the + * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the + * ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded + * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout. + */ +static void +set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist + || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) { + /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */ + control_persist_exit_time = 0; + } else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) { + /* some client connections are still open */ + if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) + debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__); + control_persist_exit_time = 0; + } else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) { + /* a client connection has recently closed */ + control_persist_exit_time = monotime() + + (time_t)options.control_persist_timeout; + debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__, + options.control_persist_timeout); + } + /* else we are already counting down to the timeout */ +} + +#define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_" +static int +client_x11_display_valid(const char *display) +{ + size_t i, dlen; + + if (display == NULL) + return 0; + + dlen = strlen(display); + for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) { + if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) && + strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) { + debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" +#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 +int +client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display, + const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout, + char **_proto, char **_data) +{ + char *cmd, line[512], xdisplay[512]; + char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX]; + static char proto[512], data[512]; + FILE *f; + int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, r; + struct stat st; + u_int now, x11_timeout_real; + + *_proto = proto; + *_data = data; + proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0'; + + if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { + if (display != NULL) + logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding", + display); + return -1; + } + if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) { + debug("No xauth program."); + xauth_path = NULL; + } + + if (xauth_path != NULL) { + /* + * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does + * not match an authorization entry. For this we + * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum". + * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal + * is not perfect. + */ + if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) { + if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", + display + 10)) < 0 || + (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) { + error("%s: display name too long", __func__); + return -1; + } + display = xdisplay; + } + if (trusted == 0) { + /* + * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie. + * + * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive + * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to + * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server. + */ + mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir)); + if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) { + error("%s: mkdtemp: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + do_unlink = 1; + if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile), + "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 || + (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) { + error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__); + unlink(xauthfile); + rmdir(xauthdir); + return -1; + } + + if (timeout == 0) { + /* auth doesn't time out */ + xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s " + "untrusted 2>%s", + xauth_path, xauthfile, display, + SSH_X11_PROTO, _PATH_DEVNULL); + } else { + /* Add some slack to requested expiry */ + if (timeout < UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK) + x11_timeout_real = timeout + + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK; + else { + /* Don't overflow on long timeouts */ + x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX; + } + xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s " + "untrusted timeout %u 2>%s", + xauth_path, xauthfile, display, + SSH_X11_PROTO, x11_timeout_real, + _PATH_DEVNULL); + } + debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd); + + if (timeout != 0 && x11_refuse_time == 0) { + now = monotime() + 1; + if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) + x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; + else + x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; + channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh, + x11_refuse_time); + } + if (system(cmd) == 0) + generated = 1; + free(cmd); + } + + /* + * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was + * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step + * above. + */ + if (trusted || generated) { + xasprintf(&cmd, + "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, + xauth_path, + generated ? "-f " : "" , + generated ? xauthfile : "", + display); + debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); + f = popen(cmd, "r"); + if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) && + sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2) + got_data = 1; + if (f) + pclose(f); + free(cmd); + } + } + + if (do_unlink) { + unlink(xauthfile); + rmdir(xauthdir); + } + + /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */ + if (!trusted && !got_data) { + error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " + "xauth key data not generated"); + return -1; + } + + /* + * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some + * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the + * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11 + * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use + * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise + * for the local connection. + */ + if (!got_data) { + u_int8_t rnd[16]; + u_int i; + + logit("Warning: No xauth data; " + "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding."); + strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto); + arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rnd); i++) { + snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", + rnd[i]); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to + * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software + * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if + * appropriate. + */ + +static void +client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (!received_window_change_signal) + return; + /** XXX race */ + received_window_change_signal = 0; + + debug2("%s: changed", __func__); + + channel_send_window_changes(ssh); +} + +static int +client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct global_confirm *gc; + + if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL) + return 0; + if (gc->cb != NULL) + gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx); + if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry); + explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc)); + free(gc); + } + + packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); + return 0; +} + +static void +server_alive_check(void) +{ + if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) { + logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com"); + packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ + packet_send(); + /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */ + client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on + * one of the file descriptors). + */ +static void +client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, + fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, + int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying) +{ + struct timeval tv, *tvp; + int timeout_secs; + time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime(); + int r, ret; + + /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */ + channel_prepare_select(active_state, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, + nallocp, &minwait_secs); + + /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */ + if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) && + !packet_have_data_to_write()) { + /* clear mask since we did not call select() */ + memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); + memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); + return; + } + + FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); + + /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */ + if (packet_have_data_to_write()) + FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); + + /* + * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until + * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other + * event pending, or a timeout expires. + */ + + timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */ + if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) { + timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval; + server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval; + } + if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying) + timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, packet_get_rekey_timeout()); + set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh); + if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { + timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, + control_persist_exit_time - now); + if (timeout_secs < 0) + timeout_secs = 0; + } + if (minwait_secs != 0) + timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs); + if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX) + tvp = NULL; + else { + tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + tvp = &tv; + } + + ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); + if (ret < 0) { + /* + * We have to clear the select masks, because we return. + * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags + * set by the signal handlers. + */ + memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); + memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); + + if (errno == EINTR) + return; + /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, + "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + quit_pending = 1; + } else if (ret == 0) { + /* + * Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying. + * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop. + */ + if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime()) + server_alive_check(); + } + +} + +static void +client_suspend_self(struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr) +{ + /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */ + if (sshbuf_len(bout) > 0) + atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(bout), + sshbuf_len(bout)); + if (sshbuf_len(berr) > 0) + atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(berr), + sshbuf_len(berr)); + + leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + + sshbuf_reset(bin); + sshbuf_reset(bout); + sshbuf_reset(berr); + + /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */ + kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); + + /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */ + received_window_change_signal = 1; + + enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); +} + +static void +client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset) +{ + char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; + int r, len; + + /* + * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of + * the packet subsystem. + */ + if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { + /* Read as much as possible. */ + len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == 0) { + /* + * Received EOF. The remote host has closed the + * connection. + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, + "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n", + host)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + quit_pending = 1; + return; + } + /* + * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to + * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available. + */ + if (len < 0 && + (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) + len = 0; + + if (len < 0) { + /* + * An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a + * network problem. + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, + "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n", + host, strerror(errno))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + quit_pending = 1; + return; + } + packet_process_incoming(buf, len); + } +} + +static void +client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) +{ + struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx; + char errmsg[256]; + int r, tochan; + + /* + * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate + * one is fatal. + */ + if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY && + (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE || + options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)) + cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE; + + /* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */ + tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR && + c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE; + + if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) { + debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d", + cr->request_type, c->self); + } else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) { + if (tochan) { + snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), + "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type); + } else { + snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), + "%s request failed on channel %d", + cr->request_type, c->self); + } + /* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */ + if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident) + fatal("%s", errmsg); + /* + * If error occurred on mux client, append to + * their stderr. + */ + if (tochan) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, errmsg, + strlen(errmsg))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + } else + error("%s", errmsg); + if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) { + /* + * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange + * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode. + */ + if (c->self == session_ident) + leave_raw_mode(0); + else + mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c); + } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) { + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); + } + } + free(cr); +} + +static void +client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx) +{ + free(ctx); +} + +void +client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request, + enum confirm_action action) +{ + struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr)); + + cr->request_type = request; + cr->action = action; + + channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm, + client_abandon_status_confirm, cr); +} + +void +client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx) +{ + struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc; + + /* Coalesce identical callbacks */ + last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms); + if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) { + if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d", + __func__, last_gc->ref_count); + return; + } + + gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc)); + gc->cb = cb; + gc->ctx = ctx; + gc->ref_count = 1; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry); +} + +static void +process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + void (*handler)(int); + char *s, *cmd; + int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0; + struct Forward fwd; + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + + leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO); + if (s == NULL) + goto out; + while (isspace((u_char)*s)) + s++; + if (*s == '-') + s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */ + if (*s == '\0') + goto out; + + if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') { + logit("Commands:"); + logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " + "Request local forward"); + logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " + "Request remote forward"); + logit(" -D[bind_address:]port " + "Request dynamic forward"); + logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port " + "Cancel local forward"); + logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port " + "Cancel remote forward"); + logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port " + "Cancel dynamic forward"); + if (!options.permit_local_command) + goto out; + logit(" !args " + "Execute local command"); + goto out; + } + + if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) { + s++; + ssh_local_cmd(s); + goto out; + } + + if (*s == 'K') { + delete = 1; + s++; + } + if (*s == 'L') + local = 1; + else if (*s == 'R') + remote = 1; + else if (*s == 'D') + dynamic = 1; + else { + logit("Invalid command."); + goto out; + } + + while (isspace((u_char)*++s)) + ; + + /* XXX update list of forwards in options */ + if (delete) { + /* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */ + if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) { + logit("Bad forwarding close specification."); + goto out; + } + if (remote) + ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0; + else if (dynamic) + ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, + 0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; + else + ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, + CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, + &options.fwd_opts) > 0; + if (!ok) { + logit("Unknown port forwarding."); + goto out; + } + logit("Canceled forwarding."); + } else { + if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) { + logit("Bad forwarding specification."); + goto out; + } + if (local || dynamic) { + if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, + &options.fwd_opts)) { + logit("Port forwarding failed."); + goto out; + } + } else { + if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) { + logit("Port forwarding failed."); + goto out; + } + } + logit("Forwarding port."); + } + +out: + signal(SIGINT, handler); + enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + free(cmd); + free(fwd.listen_host); + free(fwd.listen_path); + free(fwd.connect_host); + free(fwd.connect_path); +} + +/* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */ +#define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */ +#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 1 /* don't show in mux client sessions */ +#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 2 /* don't show in mux master sessions */ +#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 4 /* don't show when logging to syslog */ +struct escape_help_text { + const char *cmd; + const char *text; + unsigned int flags; +}; +static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = { + {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER}, + {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)", + SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, + {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, + {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, + {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, + {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, + {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, + {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, + {"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)", + SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, + {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, +}; + +static void +print_escape_help(struct sshbuf *b, int escape_char, int mux_client, + int using_stderr) +{ + unsigned int i, suppress_flags; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, + "%c?\r\nSupported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + suppress_flags = + (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) | + (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) | + (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG); + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) { + if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags) + continue; + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n", + escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, + " %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n" + "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after " + "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +/* + * Process the characters one by one. + */ +static int +process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, + struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr, + char *buf, int len) +{ + pid_t pid; + int r, bytes = 0; + u_int i; + u_char ch; + char *s; + struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ? + NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx; + + if (c->filter_ctx == NULL) + return 0; + + if (len <= 0) + return (0); + + for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) { + /* Get one character at a time. */ + ch = buf[i]; + + if (efc->escape_pending) { + /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ + /* Clear the flag now. */ + efc->escape_pending = 0; + + /* Process the escaped character. */ + switch (ch) { + case '.': + /* Terminate the connection. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c.\r\n", + efc->escape_char)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { + chan_read_failed(ssh, c); + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); + if (c->detach_user) { + c->detach_user(ssh, + c->self, NULL); + } + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED; + sshbuf_reset(c->input); + chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c); + return 0; + } else + quit_pending = 1; + return -1; + + case 'Z' - 64: + /* XXX support this for mux clients */ + if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { + char b[16]; + noescape: + if (ch == 'Z' - 64) + snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z"); + else + snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch); + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, + "%c%s escape not available to " + "multiplexed sessions\r\n", + efc->escape_char, b)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + continue; + } + /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */ + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, + "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", + efc->escape_char)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ + client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr); + + /* We have been continued. */ + continue; + + case 'B': + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, + "%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1000)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + continue; + + case 'R': + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) + logit("Server does not " + "support re-keying"); + else + need_rekeying = 1; + continue; + + case 'V': + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 'v': + if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) + goto noescape; + if (!log_is_on_stderr()) { + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, + "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n", + efc->escape_char, ch)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + continue; + } + if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level > + SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) + log_change_level(--options.log_level); + if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level < + SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) + log_change_level(++options.log_level); + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, + "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", + efc->escape_char, ch, + log_level_name(options.log_level))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + continue; + + case '&': + if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) + goto noescape; + /* + * Detach the program (continue to serve + * connections, but put in background and no + * more new connections). + */ + /* Restore tty modes. */ + leave_raw_mode( + options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + + /* Stop listening for new connections. */ + channel_stop_listening(ssh); + + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, + "%c& [backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char)) + != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* Fork into background. */ + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) { + error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ + /* The parent just exits. */ + exit(0); + } + /* The child continues serving connections. */ + /* fake EOF on stdin */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, 4)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + case '?': + print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char, + (c && c->ctl_chan != -1), + log_is_on_stderr()); + continue; + + case '#': + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c#\r\n", + efc->escape_char)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + s = channel_open_message(ssh); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(berr, s, strlen(s))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(s); + continue; + + case 'C': + if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) + goto noescape; + process_cmdline(ssh); + continue; + + default: + if (ch != efc->escape_char) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, + efc->escape_char)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + bytes++; + } + /* Escaped characters fall through here */ + break; + } + } else { + /* + * The previous character was not an escape char. + * Check if this is an escape. + */ + if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) { + /* + * It is. Set the flag and continue to + * next character. + */ + efc->escape_pending = 1; + continue; + } + } + + /* + * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, + * and append it to the buffer. + */ + last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, ch)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + bytes++; + } + return bytes; +} + +/* + * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as + * there are packets available. + * + * Any unknown packets received during the actual + * session cause the session to terminate. This is + * intended to make debugging easier since no + * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol + * extensions must be negotiated during the + * preparatory phase. + */ + +static void +client_process_buffered_input_packets(void) +{ + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending); +} + +/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ + +/* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */ +void * +client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char) +{ + struct escape_filter_ctx *ret; + + ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); + ret->escape_pending = 0; + ret->escape_char = escape_char; + return (void *)ret; +} + +/* Free the escape filter context on channel free */ +void +client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx) +{ + free(ctx); +} + +int +client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *buf, int len) +{ + if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) + return 0; + + return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended, + buf, len); +} + +static void +client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) +{ + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); + session_closed = 1; + leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); +} + +/* + * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after + * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the + * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character + * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session. + */ +int +client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, + int ssh2_chan_id) +{ + fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; + double start_time, total_time; + int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len; + u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; + u_int nalloc = 0; + char buf[100]; + + debug("Entering interactive session."); + + if (options.control_master && + !option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) { + debug("pledge: id"); + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd proc exec id tty", + NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + } else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) { + debug("pledge: exec"); + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty", + NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + } else if (options.update_hostkeys) { + debug("pledge: filesystem full"); + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty", + NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + } else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) || + fork_after_authentication_flag) { + debug("pledge: proc"); + if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + } else { + debug("pledge: network"); + if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + + start_time = monotime_double(); + + /* Initialize variables. */ + last_was_cr = 1; + exit_status = -1; + connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); + connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); + max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out); + + quit_pending = 0; + + /* Initialize buffer. */ + if ((stderr_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + client_init_dispatch(); + + /* + * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode) + * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1) + */ + if (signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) + signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler); + if (signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) + signal(SIGINT, signal_handler); + if (signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) + signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler); + if (signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) + signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler); + signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); + + if (have_pty) + enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + + session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; + if (session_ident != -1) { + if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { + channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident, + client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, + client_filter_cleanup, + client_new_escape_filter_ctx( + escape_char_arg)); + } + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident, + client_channel_closed, 0); + } + + /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ + while (!quit_pending) { + + /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ + client_process_buffered_input_packets(); + + if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh)) + break; + + if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) { + debug("rekeying in progress"); + } else if (need_rekeying) { + /* manual rekey request */ + debug("need rekeying"); + if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: kex_start_rekex: %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + need_rekeying = 0; + } else { + /* + * Make packets from buffered channel data, and + * enqueue them for sending to the server. + */ + if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) + channel_output_poll(ssh); + + /* + * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a + * message about it to the server if so. + */ + client_check_window_change(ssh); + + if (quit_pending) + break; + } + /* + * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes + * available on one of the descriptors). + */ + max_fd2 = max_fd; + client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &readset, &writeset, + &max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)); + + if (quit_pending) + break; + + /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); + + /* Buffer input from the connection. */ + client_process_net_input(readset); + + if (quit_pending) + break; + + /* + * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the + * sender. + */ + if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) + packet_write_poll(); + + /* + * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the + * timeout has expired without any active client + * connections, then quit. + */ + if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { + if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) { + debug("ControlPersist timeout expired"); + break; + } + } + } + free(readset); + free(writeset); + + /* Terminate the session. */ + + /* Stop watching for window change. */ + signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); + + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT); + packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION); + packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user"); + packet_put_cstring(""); /* language tag */ + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + + channel_free_all(ssh); + + if (have_pty) + leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + + /* restore blocking io */ + if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) + unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); + if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) + unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); + if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) + unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); + + /* + * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote + * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the + * connection was deliberately terminated at this end. + */ + if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) { + received_signal = 0; + exit_status = 0; + } + + if (received_signal) { + verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal); + cleanup_exit(0); + } + + /* + * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating + * that the connection has been closed. + */ + if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) { + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, + "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */ + if (sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer) > 0) { + len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), + (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(stderr_buffer), + sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer)); + if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer)) + error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer."); + else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(stderr_buffer, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + /* Clear and free any buffers. */ + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + sshbuf_free(stderr_buffer); + + /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */ + total_time = monotime_double() - start_time; + packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); + verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds", + (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time); + if (total_time > 0) + verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f", + obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time); + /* Return the exit status of the program. */ + debug("Exit status %d", exit_status); + return exit_status; +} + +/*********/ + +static Channel * +client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, + int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *listen_address, *originator_address; + u_short listen_port, originator_port; + int r; + + /* Get rest of the packet */ + listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL); + listen_port = packet_get_int(); + originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL); + originator_port = packet_get_int(); + packet_check_eom(); + + debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__, + listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port); + + c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh, listen_address, listen_port, + "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address); + + if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + error("%s: alloc reply", __func__); + goto out; + } + /* reconstruct and send to muxclient */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */ + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, request_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rchan)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rwindow)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rmaxpack)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, listen_address)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) { + error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + } + + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + free(originator_address); + free(listen_address); + return c; +} + +static Channel * +client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, + const char *request_type, int rchan) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *listen_path; + + /* Get the remote path. */ + listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); + /* XXX: Skip reserved field for now. */ + if (packet_get_string_ptr(NULL) == NULL) + fatal("%s: packet_get_string_ptr failed", __func__); + packet_check_eom(); + + debug("%s: %s", __func__, listen_path); + + c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path, + "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal"); + free(listen_path); + return c; +} + +static Channel * +client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *originator; + u_short originator_port; + int sock; + + if (!options.forward_x11) { + error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); + error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " + "malicious server."); + return NULL; + } + if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { + verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " + "expired"); + return NULL; + } + originator = packet_get_string(NULL); + originator_port = packet_get_int(); + packet_check_eom(); + /* XXX check permission */ + debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator, + originator_port); + free(originator); + sock = x11_connect_display(ssh); + if (sock < 0) + return NULL; + c = channel_new(ssh, "x11", + SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); + c->force_drain = 1; + return c; +} + +static Channel * +client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + int r, sock; + + if (!options.forward_agent) { + error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); + error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " + "malicious server."); + return NULL; + } + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) + debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return NULL; + } + c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection", + SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, + "authentication agent connection", 1); + c->force_drain = 1; + return c; +} + +char * +client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode, + int local_tun, int remote_tun) +{ + Channel *c; + int fd; + char *ifname = NULL; + + if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO) + return 0; + + debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode); + + /* Open local tunnel device */ + if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode, &ifname)) == -1) { + error("Tunnel device open failed."); + return NULL; + } + debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname); + + c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); + c->datagram = 1; + +#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) + if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) + channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter, + sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); +#endif + + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); + packet_put_cstring("tun@openssh.com"); + packet_put_int(c->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + packet_put_int(tun_mode); + packet_put_int(remote_tun); + packet_send(); + + return ifname; +} + +/* XXXX move to generic input handler */ +static int +client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *ctype; + int rchan; + u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len; + + ctype = packet_get_string(&len); + rchan = packet_get_int(); + rwindow = packet_get_int(); + rmaxpack = packet_get_int(); + + debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", + ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); + + if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) { + c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow, + rmaxpack); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) { + c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) { + c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan); + } + if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) { + debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype); + } else if (c != NULL) { + debug("confirm %s", ctype); + c->remote_id = rchan; + c->have_remote_id = 1; + c->remote_window = rwindow; + c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + packet_send(); + } + } else { + debug("failure %s", ctype); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(rchan); + packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED); + packet_put_cstring("open failed"); + packet_put_cstring(""); + packet_send(); + } + free(ctype); + return 0; +} + +static int +client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + int exitval, id, reply, success = 0; + char *rtype; + + id = packet_get_int(); + c = channel_lookup(ssh, id); + if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh)) + return 0; + rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); + reply = packet_get_char(); + + debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d", + id, rtype, reply); + + if (id == -1) { + error("client_input_channel_req: request for channel -1"); + } else if (c == NULL) { + error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: " + "unknown channel", id); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) { + packet_check_eom(); + chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) { + exitval = packet_get_int(); + if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { + mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval); + success = 1; + } else if (id == session_ident) { + /* Record exit value of local session */ + success = 1; + exit_status = exitval; + } else { + /* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */ + debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d", + __func__, id); + } + packet_check_eom(); + } + if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", + __func__, c->self); + packet_start(success ? + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + } + free(rtype); + return 0; +} + +struct hostkeys_update_ctx { + /* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */ + char *host_str, *ip_str; + + /* + * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating + * whether they already exist in known_hosts. + * keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new + * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(). + */ + struct sshkey **keys; + int *keys_seen; + size_t nkeys, nnew; + + /* + * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update + * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted). + * Filled in by hostkeys_find(). + */ + struct sshkey **old_keys; + size_t nold; +}; + +static void +hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) +{ + size_t i; + + if (ctx == NULL) + return; + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) + sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]); + free(ctx->keys); + free(ctx->keys_seen); + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) + sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]); + free(ctx->old_keys); + free(ctx->host_str); + free(ctx->ip_str); + free(ctx); +} + +static int +hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) +{ + struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; + size_t i; + struct sshkey **tmp; + + if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) { + debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, + sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum); + ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1; + return 0; + } + } + /* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */ + debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, + sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); + if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1, + sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nold = %zu", + __func__, ctx->nold); + ctx->old_keys = tmp; + ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key; + l->key = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static void +update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) +{ + int r, was_raw = 0; + int loglevel = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; + char *fp, *response; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2) + continue; + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i], + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s", + sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp); + free(fp); + } + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) { + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i], + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s", + sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp); + free(fp); + } + if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { + if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) { + leave_raw_mode(1); + was_raw = 1; + } + response = NULL; + for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) { + free(response); + response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? " + "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO); + if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0) + break; + else if (quit_pending || response == NULL || + strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) { + options.update_hostkeys = 0; + break; + } else { + do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter " + "\"yes\" or \"no\""); + } + } + if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL) + options.update_hostkeys = 0; + free(response); + if (was_raw) + enter_raw_mode(1); + } + + /* + * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace + * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't + * cancel the operation). + */ + if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 && + (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0], + ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, + options.hash_known_hosts, 0, + options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) + error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static void +client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, + u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) +{ + struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; + size_t i, ndone; + struct sshbuf *signdata; + int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype; + const u_char *sig; + size_t siglen; + + if (ctx->nnew == 0) + fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */ + if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { + error("Server failed to confirm ownership of " + "private host keys"); + hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); + return; + } + kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain( + sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)); + + if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + /* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */ + if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0) + fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__); + /* + * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we + * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the + * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0. + */ + for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) + continue; + /* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */ + sshbuf_reset(signdata); + if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata, + "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id, + ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0) + fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + /* Extract and verify signature */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + /* + * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated + * during KEX to the default (SHA1). + */ + use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA && + sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA; + if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen, + sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata), + use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0)) != 0) { + error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu", + __func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i); + goto out; + } + /* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */ + ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2; + ndone++; + } + if (ndone != ctx->nnew) + fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__, + ndone, ctx->nnew); /* Shouldn't happen */ + ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); + + /* Make the edits to known_hosts */ + update_known_hosts(ctx); + out: + hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); +} + +/* + * Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms. + * Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names. + */ +static int +key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key) +{ + const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key); + const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ? + options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG; + + if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC) + return 0; + if (key->type == KEY_RSA && + (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 || + match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1)) + return 1; + return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1; +} + +/* + * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all + * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's + * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted. + */ +static int +client_input_hostkeys(void) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + const u_char *blob = NULL; + size_t i, len = 0; + struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp; + int r; + char *fp; + static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */ + extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */ + struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL; + + if (hostkeys_seen) + fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__); + if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK && + options.batch_mode) + return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */ + if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0) + return 1; + + ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx)); + while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { + sshkey_free(key); + key = NULL; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__, + sshkey_type(key), fp); + free(fp); + + if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) { + debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", + __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + continue; + } + /* Skip certs */ + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping", + __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + continue; + } + /* Ensure keys are unique */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) { + error("%s: received duplicated %s host key", + __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + goto out; + } + } + /* Key is good, record it */ + if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1, + sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu", + __func__, ctx->nkeys); + ctx->keys = tmp; + ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key; + key = NULL; + } + + if (ctx->nkeys == 0) { + debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__); + goto out; + } + + if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys, + sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__); + + get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, + options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL, + options.port, &ctx->host_str, + options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL); + + /* Find which keys we already know about. */ + if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[0], hostkeys_find, + ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, + HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) { + error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + + /* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */ + ctx->nnew = 0; + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (!ctx->keys_seen[i]) + ctx->nnew++; + } + + debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove", + __func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold); + + if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) { + /* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */ + update_known_hosts(ctx); + } else if (ctx->nnew != 0) { + /* + * We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server. + * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves. + */ + debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys", + __func__, ctx->nnew); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, + "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */ + fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) + continue; + sshbuf_reset(buf); + if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + client_register_global_confirm( + client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx); + ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */ + } + + /* Success */ + out: + hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); + sshkey_free(key); + sshbuf_free(buf); + /* + * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know + * what the client does with its hosts file. + */ + return 1; +} + +static int +client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + char *rtype; + int want_reply; + int success = 0; + + rtype = packet_get_cstring(NULL); + want_reply = packet_get_char(); + debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", + rtype, want_reply); + if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0) + success = client_input_hostkeys(); + if (want_reply) { + packet_start(success ? + SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } + free(rtype); + return 0; +} + +void +client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, + const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, struct sshbuf *cmd, + char **env) +{ + int i, j, matched, len; + char *name, *val; + Channel *c = NULL; + + debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id); + + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d: unknown channel", __func__, id); + + packet_set_interactive(want_tty, + options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); + + if (want_tty) { + struct winsize ws; + + /* Store window size in the packet. */ + if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) + memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); + + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY); + packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : ""); + packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); + packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); + packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); + packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); + if (tiop == NULL) + tiop = get_saved_tio(); + ssh_tty_make_modes(ssh, -1, tiop); + packet_send(); + /* XXX wait for reply */ + c->client_tty = 1; + } + + /* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */ + if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) { + debug("Sending environment."); + for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) { + /* Split */ + name = xstrdup(env[i]); + if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { + free(name); + continue; + } + *val++ = '\0'; + + matched = 0; + for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) { + if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) { + matched = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!matched) { + debug3("Ignored env %s", name); + free(name); + continue; + } + + debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0); + packet_put_cstring(name); + packet_put_cstring(val); + packet_send(); + free(name); + } + } + for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { + /* Split */ + name = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]); + if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { + free(name); + continue; + } + *val++ = '\0'; + + debug("Setting env %s = %s", name, val); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0); + packet_put_cstring(name); + packet_put_cstring(val); + packet_send(); + free(name); + } + + len = sshbuf_len(cmd); + if (len > 0) { + if (len > 900) + len = 900; + if (want_subsystem) { + debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", + len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem", + CONFIRM_CLOSE); + } else { + debug("Sending command: %.*s", + len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd)); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE); + } + packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(cmd), sshbuf_len(cmd)); + packet_send(); + } else { + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE); + packet_send(); + } +} + +static void +client_init_dispatch(void) +{ + dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); + + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request); + + /* rekeying */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); + + /* global request reply messages */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply); +} + +void +client_stop_mux(void) +{ + if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) + unlink(options.control_path); + /* + * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we + * should close when all active channels are closed. + */ + if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) { + session_closed = 1; + setproctitle("[stopped mux]"); + } +} + +/* client specific fatal cleanup */ +void +cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + leave_non_blocking(); + if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) + unlink(options.control_path); + ssh_kill_proxy_command(); + _exit(i); +} diff --git a/clientloop.h b/clientloop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf79c87 --- /dev/null +++ b/clientloop.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.36 2018/07/09 21:03:30 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +struct ssh; + +/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */ +int client_loop(struct ssh *, int, int, int); +int client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *, + u_int, u_int, char **, char **); +void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *); +void client_session2_setup(struct ssh *, int, int, int, + const char *, struct termios *, int, struct sshbuf *, char **); +char *client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *, int, int, int); +void client_stop_mux(void); + +/* Escape filter for protocol 2 sessions */ +void *client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int); +void client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, void *); +int client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *, Channel *, char *, int); + +/* Global request confirmation callbacks */ +typedef void global_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, u_int32_t, void *); +void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *); + +/* Channel request confirmation callbacks */ +enum confirm_action { CONFIRM_WARN = 0, CONFIRM_CLOSE, CONFIRM_TTY }; +void client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *, int, const char *, + enum confirm_action); + +/* Multiplexing protocol version */ +#define SSHMUX_VER 4 + +/* Multiplexing control protocol flags */ +#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN 1 /* Open new connection */ +#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK 2 /* Check master is alive */ +#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE 3 /* Ask master to exit */ +#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD 4 /* Open stdio fwd (ssh -W) */ +#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD 5 /* Forward only, no command */ +#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP 6 /* Disable mux but not conn */ +#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD 7 /* Cancel forwarding(s) */ +#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY 8 /* Open new connection */ + +void muxserver_listen(struct ssh *); +int muxclient(const char *); +void mux_exit_message(struct ssh *, Channel *, int); +void mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *); + diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0624dc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/compat.c @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.113 2018/08/13 02:41:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "kex.h" + +int datafellows = 0; + +/* datafellows bug compatibility */ +u_int +compat_datafellows(const char *version) +{ + int i; + static struct { + char *pat; + int bugs; + } check[] = { + { "OpenSSH_2.*," + "OpenSSH_3.0*," + "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR| + SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, + { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, + { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| + SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, + { "OpenSSH_2*," + "OpenSSH_3*," + "OpenSSH_4*", SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, + { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT| + SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, + { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, + { "OpenSSH_6.5*," + "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD| + SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, + { "OpenSSH_7.0*," + "OpenSSH_7.1*," + "OpenSSH_7.2*," + "OpenSSH_7.3*," + "OpenSSH_7.4*," + "OpenSSH_7.5*," + "OpenSSH_7.6*," + "OpenSSH_7.7*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, + { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH }, + { "*MindTerm*", 0 }, + { "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, + { "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, + { "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, + { "1.2.18*," + "1.2.19*," + "1.2.20*," + "1.2.21*," + "1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, + { "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */ + SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, + { "Cisco-1.*", SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE| + SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, + { "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */ + SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, + { "*OSU_0*," + "OSU_1.0*," + "OSU_1.1*," + "OSU_1.2*," + "OSU_1.3*," + "OSU_1.4*," + "OSU_1.5alpha1*," + "OSU_1.5alpha2*," + "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, + { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*", + SSH_BUG_SCANNER }, + { "PuTTY_Local:*," /* dev versions < Sep 2014 */ + "PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */ + "PuTTY_Release_0.5*," /* 0.58-0.59 */ + "PuTTY_Release_0.60*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.61*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.62*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.63*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.64*", + SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, + { "FuTTY*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, /* Putty Fork */ + { "Probe-*", + SSH_BUG_PROBE }, + { "TeraTerm SSH*," + "TTSSH/1.5.*," + "TTSSH/2.1*," + "TTSSH/2.2*," + "TTSSH/2.3*," + "TTSSH/2.4*," + "TTSSH/2.5*," + "TTSSH/2.6*," + "TTSSH/2.70*," + "TTSSH/2.71*," + "TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, + { "WinSCP_release_4*," + "WinSCP_release_5.0*," + "WinSCP_release_5.1," + "WinSCP_release_5.1.*," + "WinSCP_release_5.5," + "WinSCP_release_5.5.*," + "WinSCP_release_5.6," + "WinSCP_release_5.6.*," + "WinSCP_release_5.7," + "WinSCP_release_5.7.1," + "WinSCP_release_5.7.2," + "WinSCP_release_5.7.3," + "WinSCP_release_5.7.4", + SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, + { "ConfD-*", + SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE }, + { "Twisted_*", 0 }, + { "Twisted*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, + { NULL, 0 } + }; + + /* process table, return first match */ + for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) { + if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) { + debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x", + version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs); + datafellows = check[i].bugs; /* XXX for now */ + return check[i].bugs; + } + } + debug("no match: %s", version); + return 0; +} + +#define SEP "," +int +proto_spec(const char *spec) +{ + char *s, *p, *q; + int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; + + if (spec == NULL) + return ret; + q = s = strdup(spec); + if (s == NULL) + return ret; + for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) { + switch (atoi(p)) { + case 2: + ret |= SSH_PROTO_2; + break; + default: + logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p); + break; + } + } + free(s); + return ret; +} + +char * +compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop) +{ + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES)) + return cipher_prop; + debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); + if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_blacklist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL) + fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed"); + debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); + if (*cipher_prop == '\0') + fatal("No supported ciphers found"); + return cipher_prop; +} + +char * +compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) +{ + if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5)) + return pkalg_prop; + debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); + if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_blacklist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL) + fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed"); + debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); + if (*pkalg_prop == '\0') + fatal("No supported PK algorithms found"); + return pkalg_prop; +} + +char * +compat_kex_proposal(char *p) +{ + if ((datafellows & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0) + return p; + debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); + if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0) + if ((p = match_filter_blacklist(p, + "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL) + fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed"); + if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) { + if ((p = match_filter_blacklist(p, + "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," + "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL) + fatal("match_filter_blacklist failed"); + } + debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); + if (*p == '\0') + fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found"); + return p; +} + diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d611d33 --- /dev/null +++ b/compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.54 2018/08/13 02:41:05 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef COMPAT_H +#define COMPAT_H + +#define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00 +#define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01 +#define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02 +#define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04 + +#define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE 0x00000001 +#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE 0x00000002 +/* #define unused 0x00000004 */ +/* #define unused 0x00000008 */ +#define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010 +/* #define unused 0x00000020 */ +#define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040 +/* #define unused 0x00000080 */ +#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100 +/* #define unused 0x00000200 */ +#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400 +#define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800 +#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000 +#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000 +#define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000 +#define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000 +/* #define unused 0x00010000 */ +/* #define unused 0x00020000 */ +/* #define unused 0x00040000 */ +/* #define unused 0x00100000 */ +#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000 +#define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000 +/* #define unused 0x00800000 */ +#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000 +/* #define unused 0x02000000 */ +#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000 +#define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000 +#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000 +#define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000 +#define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000 + +u_int compat_datafellows(const char *); +int proto_spec(const char *); +char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *); +char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *); +char *compat_kex_proposal(char *); + +extern int datafellows; +#endif diff --git a/config.guess b/config.guess new file mode 100755 index 0000000..c4bd827 --- /dev/null +++ b/config.guess @@ -0,0 +1,1456 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Attempt to guess a canonical system name. +# Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +timestamp='2016-05-15' + +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, see . +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that +# program. This Exception is an additional permission under section 7 +# of the GNU General Public License, version 3 ("GPLv3"). +# +# Originally written by Per Bothner; maintained since 2000 by Ben Elliston. +# +# You can get the latest version of this script from: +# http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess +# +# Please send patches to . + + +me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'` + +usage="\ +Usage: $0 [OPTION] + +Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on. + +Operation modes: + -h, --help print this help, then exit + -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit + -v, --version print version number, then exit + +Report bugs and patches to ." + +version="\ +GNU config.guess ($timestamp) + +Originally written by Per Bothner. +Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO +warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +help=" +Try \`$me --help' for more information." + +# Parse command line +while test $# -gt 0 ; do + case $1 in + --time-stamp | --time* | -t ) + echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;; + --version | -v ) + echo "$version" ; exit ;; + --help | --h* | -h ) + echo "$usage"; exit ;; + -- ) # Stop option processing + shift; break ;; + - ) # Use stdin as input. + break ;; + -* ) + echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2 + exit 1 ;; + * ) + break ;; + esac +done + +if test $# != 0; then + echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +trap 'exit 1' 1 2 15 + +# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. Note that the use of a +# compiler to aid in system detection is discouraged as it requires +# temporary files to be created and, as you can see below, it is a +# headache to deal with in a portable fashion. + +# Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still +# use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated. + +# Portable tmp directory creation inspired by the Autoconf team. + +set_cc_for_build=' +trap "exitcode=\$?; (rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null) && exit \$exitcode" 0 ; +trap "rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null; exit 1" 1 2 13 15 ; +: ${TMPDIR=/tmp} ; + { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } || + { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) ; } || + { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } || + { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; } ; +dummy=$tmp/dummy ; +tmpfiles="$dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy" ; +case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in + ,,) echo "int x;" > $dummy.c ; + for c in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do + if ($c -c -o $dummy.o $dummy.c) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break ; + fi ; + done ; + if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then + CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found ; + fi + ;; + ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;; + ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;; +esac ; set_cc_for_build= ;' + +# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe. +# (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24) +if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH +fi + +UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown +UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown +UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown +UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown + +case "${UNAME_SYSTEM}" in +Linux|GNU|GNU/*) + # If the system lacks a compiler, then just pick glibc. + # We could probably try harder. + LIBC=gnu + + eval $set_cc_for_build + cat <<-EOF > $dummy.c + #include + #if defined(__UCLIBC__) + LIBC=uclibc + #elif defined(__dietlibc__) + LIBC=dietlibc + #else + LIBC=gnu + #endif + EOF + eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^LIBC' | sed 's, ,,g'` + ;; +esac + +# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive. + +case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in + *:NetBSD:*:*) + # NetBSD (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or + # more of the tuples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*, + # *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*. For targets that recently + # switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old + # object file format. This provides both forward + # compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the + # object file format. + # + # Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor + # portion of the name. We always set it to "unknown". + sysctl="sysctl -n hw.machine_arch" + UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(uname -p 2>/dev/null || \ + /sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \ + /usr/sbin/$sysctl 2>/dev/null || \ + echo unknown)` + case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in + armeb) machine=armeb-unknown ;; + arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;; + sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;; + sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;; + sh5el) machine=sh5le-unknown ;; + earmv*) + arch=`echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH} | sed -e 's,^e\(armv[0-9]\).*$,\1,'` + endian=`echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH} | sed -ne 's,^.*\(eb\)$,\1,p'` + machine=${arch}${endian}-unknown + ;; + *) machine=${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown ;; + esac + # The Operating System including object format, if it has switched + # to ELF recently (or will in the future) and ABI. + case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in + earm*) + os=netbsdelf + ;; + arm*|i386|m68k|ns32k|sh3*|sparc|vax) + eval $set_cc_for_build + if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ + | grep -q __ELF__ + then + # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout). + # Return netbsd for either. FIX? + os=netbsd + else + os=netbsdelf + fi + ;; + *) + os=netbsd + ;; + esac + # Determine ABI tags. + case "${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}" in + earm*) + expr='s/^earmv[0-9]/-eabi/;s/eb$//' + abi=`echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH} | sed -e "$expr"` + ;; + esac + # The OS release + # Debian GNU/NetBSD machines have a different userland, and + # thus, need a distinct triplet. However, they do not need + # kernel version information, so it can be replaced with a + # suitable tag, in the style of linux-gnu. + case "${UNAME_VERSION}" in + Debian*) + release='-gnu' + ;; + *) + release=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/[-_].*//' | cut -d. -f1,2` + ;; + esac + # Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM: + # contains redundant information, the shorter form: + # CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used. + echo "${machine}-${os}${release}${abi}" + exit ;; + *:Bitrig:*:*) + UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/Bitrig.//'` + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-bitrig${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:OpenBSD:*:*) + UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/OpenBSD.//'` + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:LibertyBSD:*:*) + UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/^.*BSD\.//'` + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-libertybsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:ekkoBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-ekkobsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:SolidBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-solidbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + macppc:MirBSD:*:*) + echo powerpc-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:MirBSD:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:Sortix:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-sortix + exit ;; + alpha:OSF1:*:*) + case $UNAME_RELEASE in + *4.0) + UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'` + ;; + *5.*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $4}'` + ;; + esac + # According to Compaq, /usr/sbin/psrinfo has been available on + # OSF/1 and Tru64 systems produced since 1995. I hope that + # covers most systems running today. This code pipes the CPU + # types through head -n 1, so we only detect the type of CPU 0. + ALPHA_CPU_TYPE=`/usr/sbin/psrinfo -v | sed -n -e 's/^ The alpha \(.*\) processor.*$/\1/p' | head -n 1` + case "$ALPHA_CPU_TYPE" in + "EV4 (21064)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;; + "EV4.5 (21064)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;; + "LCA4 (21066/21068)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;; + "EV5 (21164)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;; + "EV5.6 (21164A)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;; + "EV5.6 (21164PC)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; + "EV5.7 (21164PC)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca57 ;; + "EV6 (21264)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;; + "EV6.7 (21264A)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;; + "EV6.8CB (21264C)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; + "EV6.8AL (21264B)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; + "EV6.8CX (21264D)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; + "EV6.9A (21264/EV69A)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev69 ;; + "EV7 (21364)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev7 ;; + "EV7.9 (21364A)") + UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev79 ;; + esac + # A Pn.n version is a patched version. + # A Vn.n version is a released version. + # A Tn.n version is a released field test version. + # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel. + # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz` + # Reset EXIT trap before exiting to avoid spurious non-zero exit code. + exitcode=$? + trap '' 0 + exit $exitcode ;; + Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*) + # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? + # Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead + # of the specific Alpha model? + echo alpha-pc-interix + exit ;; + 21064:Windows_NT:50:3) + echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5 + exit ;; + Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*) + echo m68k-unknown-sysv4 + exit ;; + *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos + exit ;; + *:[Mm]orph[Oo][Ss]:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-morphos + exit ;; + *:OS/390:*:*) + echo i370-ibm-openedition + exit ;; + *:z/VM:*:*) + echo s390-ibm-zvmoe + exit ;; + *:OS400:*:*) + echo powerpc-ibm-os400 + exit ;; + arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*) + echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + arm*:riscos:*:*|arm*:RISCOS:*:*) + echo arm-unknown-riscos + exit ;; + SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*) + echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp + exit ;; + Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*) + # akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE. + if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then + echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3 + else + echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd + fi + exit ;; + NILE*:*:*:dcosx) + echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4 + exit ;; + DRS?6000:unix:4.0:6*) + echo sparc-icl-nx6 + exit ;; + DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7* | DRS?6000:isis:4.2*:7*) + case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in + sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7; exit ;; + esac ;; + s390x:SunOS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit ;; + sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit ;; + sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit ;; + i86pc:AuroraUX:5.*:* | i86xen:AuroraUX:5.*:*) + echo i386-pc-auroraux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*) + eval $set_cc_for_build + SUN_ARCH=i386 + # If there is a compiler, see if it is configured for 64-bit objects. + # Note that the Sun cc does not turn __LP64__ into 1 like gcc does. + # This test works for both compilers. + if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found ]; then + if (echo '#ifdef __amd64'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \ + (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \ + grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null + then + SUN_ARCH=x86_64 + fi + fi + echo ${SUN_ARCH}-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit ;; + sun4*:SunOS:6*:*) + # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize + # SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but + # it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4. + echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit ;; + sun4*:SunOS:*:*) + case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in + Series*|S4*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v` + ;; + esac + # Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'. + echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'` + exit ;; + sun3*:SunOS:*:*) + echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + sun*:*:4.2BSD:*) + UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null` + test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = x && UNAME_RELEASE=3 + case "`/bin/arch`" in + sun3) + echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + ;; + sun4) + echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + ;; + esac + exit ;; + aushp:SunOS:*:*) + echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing. The machine name + # can be virtually everything (everything which is not + # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor + # > m68000). The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT" + # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint"). Finally + # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not + # MiNT. But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should + # be no problem. + atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + m68k:machten:*:*) + echo m68k-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + powerpc:machten:*:*) + echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + RISC*:Mach:*:*) + echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3 + exit ;; + RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*) + echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*) + echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + 2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*) + echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos) + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c +#ifdef __cplusplus +#include /* for printf() prototype */ + int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { +#else + int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { +#endif + #if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB) + #if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD) + printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0); + #endif + #endif + exit (-1); + } +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && + dummyarg=`echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` && + SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy $dummyarg` && + { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; } + echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) + echo powerpc-motorola-powermax + exit ;; + Motorola:*:4.3:PL8-*) + echo powerpc-harris-powermax + exit ;; + Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS | Synergy:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) + echo powerpc-harris-powermax + exit ;; + Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*) + echo powerpc-harris-powerunix + exit ;; + m88k:CX/UX:7*:*) + echo m88k-harris-cxux7 + exit ;; + m88k:*:4*:R4*) + echo m88k-motorola-sysv4 + exit ;; + m88k:*:3*:R3*) + echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 + exit ;; + AViiON:dgux:*:*) + # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures + UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p` + if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ] + then + if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \ + [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ] + then + echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} + else + echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + else + echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit ;; + M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3) + echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3 + exit ;; + M88*:*:R3*:*) + # Delta 88k system running SVR3 + echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 + exit ;; + XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3) + echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3 + exit ;; + Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD) + echo m68k-tektronix-bsd + exit ;; + *:IRIX*:*:*) + echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'` + exit ;; + ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX. + echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id + exit ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX ' + i*86:AIX:*:*) + echo i386-ibm-aix + exit ;; + ia64:AIX:*:*) + if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then + IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel` + else + IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} + exit ;; + *:AIX:2:3) + if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + + main() + { + if (!__power_pc()) + exit(1); + puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5"); + exit(0); + } +EOF + if $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` + then + echo "$SYSTEM_NAME" + else + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5 + fi + elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4 + else + echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2 + fi + exit ;; + *:AIX:*:[4567]) + IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'` + if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then + IBM_ARCH=rs6000 + else + IBM_ARCH=powerpc + fi + if [ -x /usr/bin/lslpp ] ; then + IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/lslpp -Lqc bos.rte.libc | + awk -F: '{ print $3 }' | sed s/[0-9]*$/0/` + else + IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} + exit ;; + *:AIX:*:*) + echo rs6000-ibm-aix + exit ;; + ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) + echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4 + exit ;; + ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC BSD and + echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to + exit ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3 + *:BOSX:*:*) + echo rs6000-bull-bosx + exit ;; + DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*) + echo m68k-bull-sysv3 + exit ;; + 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*) + echo m68k-hp-bsd + exit ;; + hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*) + echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4 + exit ;; + 9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*) + HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` + case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in + 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;; + 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;; + 9000/[678][0-9][0-9]) + if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then + sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null` + sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null` + case "${sc_cpu_version}" in + 523) HP_ARCH=hppa1.0 ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0 + 528) HP_ARCH=hppa1.1 ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1 + 532) # CPU_PA_RISC2_0 + case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in + 32) HP_ARCH=hppa2.0n ;; + 64) HP_ARCH=hppa2.0w ;; + '') HP_ARCH=hppa2.0 ;; # HP-UX 10.20 + esac ;; + esac + fi + if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + + #define _HPUX_SOURCE + #include + #include + + int main () + { + #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) + long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS); + #endif + long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); + + switch (cpu) + { + case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: + #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) + switch (bits) + { + case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break; + case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break; + default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break; + } break; + #else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */ + puts ("hppa2.0"); break; + #endif + default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; + } + exit (0); + } +EOF + (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`$dummy` + test -z "$HP_ARCH" && HP_ARCH=hppa + fi ;; + esac + if [ ${HP_ARCH} = hppa2.0w ] + then + eval $set_cc_for_build + + # hppa2.0w-hp-hpux* has a 64-bit kernel and a compiler generating + # 32-bit code. hppa64-hp-hpux* has the same kernel and a compiler + # generating 64-bit code. GNU and HP use different nomenclature: + # + # $ CC_FOR_BUILD=cc ./config.guess + # => hppa2.0w-hp-hpux11.23 + # $ CC_FOR_BUILD="cc +DA2.0w" ./config.guess + # => hppa64-hp-hpux11.23 + + if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | + grep -q __LP64__ + then + HP_ARCH=hppa2.0w + else + HP_ARCH=hppa64 + fi + fi + echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} + exit ;; + ia64:HP-UX:*:*) + HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` + echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} + exit ;; + 3050*:HI-UX:*:*) + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #include + int + main () + { + long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); + /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns + true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct + results, however. */ + if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu)) + { + switch (cpu) + { + case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; + } + } + else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu)) + puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); + else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); + exit (0); + } +EOF + $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` && + { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; } + echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2 + exit ;; + 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* ) + echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd + exit ;; + 9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd + exit ;; + *9??*:MPE/iX:*:* | *3000*:MPE/iX:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix + exit ;; + hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* ) + echo hppa1.1-hp-osf + exit ;; + hp8??:OSF1:*:*) + echo hppa1.0-hp-osf + exit ;; + i*86:OSF1:*:*) + if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1 + fi + exit ;; + parisc*:Lites*:*:*) + echo hppa1.1-hp-lites + exit ;; + C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*) + echo c1-convex-bsd + exit ;; + C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*) + if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc + then echo c32-convex-bsd + else echo c2-convex-bsd + fi + exit ;; + C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*) + echo c34-convex-bsd + exit ;; + C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*) + echo c38-convex-bsd + exit ;; + C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*) + echo c4-convex-bsd + exit ;; + CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*) + echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit ;; + CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \ + | sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \ + -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ \ + -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit ;; + CRAY*TS:*:*:*) + echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit ;; + CRAY*T3E:*:*:*) + echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit ;; + CRAY*SV1:*:*:*) + echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit ;; + *:UNICOS/mp:*:*) + echo craynv-cray-unicosmp${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' + exit ;; + F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*) + FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz` + FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/\///'` + FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'` + echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" + exit ;; + 5000:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) + FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/\///'` + FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/ /_/'` + echo "sparc-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" + exit ;; + i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*) + echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:BSD/OS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:FreeBSD:*:*) + UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p` + case ${UNAME_PROCESSOR} in + amd64) + echo x86_64-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;; + *) + echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;; + esac + exit ;; + i*:CYGWIN*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin + exit ;; + *:MINGW64*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw64 + exit ;; + *:MINGW*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32 + exit ;; + *:MSYS*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msys + exit ;; + i*:windows32*:*) + # uname -m includes "-pc" on this system. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-mingw32 + exit ;; + i*:PW*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32 + exit ;; + *:Interix*:*) + case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in + x86) + echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + authenticamd | genuineintel | EM64T) + echo x86_64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + IA64) + echo ia64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + esac ;; + [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*) + echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks + exit ;; + 8664:Windows_NT:*) + echo x86_64-pc-mks + exit ;; + i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*) + # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? + # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we + # UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386? + echo i586-pc-interix + exit ;; + i*:UWIN*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin + exit ;; + amd64:CYGWIN*:*:* | x86_64:CYGWIN*:*:*) + echo x86_64-unknown-cygwin + exit ;; + p*:CYGWIN*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin + exit ;; + prep*:SunOS:5.*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` + exit ;; + *:GNU:*:*) + # the GNU system + echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-${LIBC}`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'` + exit ;; + *:GNU/*:*:*) + # other systems with GNU libc and userland + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-`echo ${UNAME_SYSTEM} | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr "[:upper:]" "[:lower:]"``echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`-${LIBC} + exit ;; + i*86:Minix:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix + exit ;; + aarch64:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + aarch64_be:Linux:*:*) + UNAME_MACHINE=aarch64_be + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + alpha:Linux:*:*) + case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' < /proc/cpuinfo` in + EV5) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;; + EV56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;; + PCA56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; + PCA57) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; + EV6) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;; + EV67) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;; + EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; + esac + objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep -q ld.so.1 + if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC=gnulibc1 ; fi + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + arc:Linux:*:* | arceb:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + arm*:Linux:*:*) + eval $set_cc_for_build + if echo __ARM_EABI__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ + | grep -q __ARM_EABI__ + then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + else + if echo __ARM_PCS_VFP | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ + | grep -q __ARM_PCS_VFP + then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}eabi + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}eabihf + fi + fi + exit ;; + avr32*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + cris:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + crisv32:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + e2k:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + frv:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + hexagon:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + i*86:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + ia64:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + k1om:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + m32r*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + m68*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + mips:Linux:*:* | mips64:Linux:*:*) + eval $set_cc_for_build + sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c + #undef CPU + #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE} + #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}el + #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL) + CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}el + #else + #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB) + CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE} + #else + CPU= + #endif + #endif +EOF + eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^CPU'` + test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-${LIBC}"; exit; } + ;; + openrisc*:Linux:*:*) + echo or1k-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + or32:Linux:*:* | or1k*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + padre:Linux:*:*) + echo sparc-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + parisc64:Linux:*:* | hppa64:Linux:*:*) + echo hppa64-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*) + # Look for CPU level + case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in + PA7*) echo hppa1.1-unknown-linux-${LIBC} ;; + PA8*) echo hppa2.0-unknown-linux-${LIBC} ;; + *) echo hppa-unknown-linux-${LIBC} ;; + esac + exit ;; + ppc64:Linux:*:*) + echo powerpc64-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + ppc:Linux:*:*) + echo powerpc-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + ppc64le:Linux:*:*) + echo powerpc64le-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + ppcle:Linux:*:*) + echo powerpcle-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + sh64*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + sh*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + tile*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + vax:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + x86_64:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + xtensa*:Linux:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-${LIBC} + exit ;; + i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*) + # ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there. + # earlier versions are messed up and put the nodename in both + # sysname and nodename. + echo i386-sequent-sysv4 + exit ;; + i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*) + # Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version + # number series starting with 2... + # I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this, + # I just have to hope. -- rms. + # Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION} + exit ;; + i*86:OS/2:*:*) + # If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility + # is probably installed. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-os2-emx + exit ;; + i*86:XTS-300:*:STOP) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-stop + exit ;; + i*86:atheos:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-atheos + exit ;; + i*86:syllable:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-syllable + exit ;; + i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*) + echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + i*86:*DOS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msdosdjgpp + exit ;; + i*86:*:4.*:* | i*86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*) + UNAME_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed 's/\/MP$//'` + if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_REL} + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_REL} + fi + exit ;; + i*86:*:5:[678]*) + # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX and OpenServer 6. + case `/bin/uname -X | grep "^Machine"` in + *486*) UNAME_MACHINE=i486 ;; + *Pentium) UNAME_MACHINE=i586 ;; + *Pent*|*Celeron) UNAME_MACHINE=i686 ;; + esac + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}${UNAME_SYSTEM}${UNAME_VERSION} + exit ;; + i*86:*:3.2:*) + if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then + UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' /dev/null >/dev/null ; then + UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|grep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')` + (/bin/uname -X|grep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486 + (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i586 + (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pent *II' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 + (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \ + && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL + else + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32 + fi + exit ;; + pc:*:*:*) + # Left here for compatibility: + # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about + # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i586. + # Note: whatever this is, it MUST be the same as what config.sub + # prints for the "djgpp" host, or else GDB configure will decide that + # this is a cross-build. + echo i586-pc-msdosdjgpp + exit ;; + Intel:Mach:3*:*) + echo i386-pc-mach3 + exit ;; + paragon:*:*:*) + echo i860-intel-osf1 + exit ;; + i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4 + if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4 + else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered. + echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Unknown i860-SVR4 + fi + exit ;; + mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*) + # "miniframe" + echo m68010-convergent-sysv + exit ;; + mc68k:UNIX:SYSTEM5:3.51m) + echo m68k-convergent-sysv + exit ;; + M680?0:D-NIX:5.3:*) + echo m68k-diab-dnix + exit ;; + M68*:*:R3V[5678]*:*) + test -r /sysV68 && { echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv'; exit; } ;; + 3[345]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4400:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0 | SDS2:*:4.0:3.0 | SHG2:*:4.0:3.0 | S7501*:*:4.0:3.0) + OS_REL='' + test -r /etc/.relid \ + && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid` + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ + && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \ + && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;; + 3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*) + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ + && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4; exit; } ;; + NCR*:*:4.2:* | MPRAS*:*:4.2:*) + OS_REL='.3' + test -r /etc/.relid \ + && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid` + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ + && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \ + && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } + /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep pteron >/dev/null \ + && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;; + m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*) + echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) + echo m68k-atari-sysv4 + exit ;; + TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*) + echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*) + echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*) + echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*) + echo mips-sni-sysv4 + exit ;; + RM*:SINIX-*:*:*) + echo mips-sni-sysv4 + exit ;; + *:SINIX-*:*:*) + if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then + UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null` + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4 + else + echo ns32k-sni-sysv + fi + exit ;; + PENTIUM:*:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort + # says + echo i586-unisys-sysv4 + exit ;; + *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*) + # From Gerald Hewes . + # How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm + echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4 + exit ;; + *:*:*:FTX*) + # From seanf@swdc.stratus.com. + echo i860-stratus-sysv4 + exit ;; + i*86:VOS:*:*) + # From Paul.Green@stratus.com. + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-stratus-vos + exit ;; + *:VOS:*:*) + # From Paul.Green@stratus.com. + echo hppa1.1-stratus-vos + exit ;; + mc68*:A/UX:*:*) + echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*) + echo mips-sony-newsos6 + exit ;; + R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*) + if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then + echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + else + echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} + fi + exit ;; + BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only. + echo powerpc-be-beos + exit ;; + BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only. + echo powerpc-apple-beos + exit ;; + BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible. + echo i586-pc-beos + exit ;; + BePC:Haiku:*:*) # Haiku running on Intel PC compatible. + echo i586-pc-haiku + exit ;; + x86_64:Haiku:*:*) + echo x86_64-unknown-haiku + exit ;; + SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx6-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + SX-7:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx7-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + SX-8:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx8-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + SX-8R:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sx8r-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + SX-ACE:SUPER-UX:*:*) + echo sxace-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + Power*:Rhapsody:*:*) + echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:Rhapsody:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:Darwin:*:*) + UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` || UNAME_PROCESSOR=unknown + eval $set_cc_for_build + if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = unknown ; then + UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc + fi + if test `echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\..*//'` -le 10 ; then + if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found ]; then + if (echo '#ifdef __LP64__'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \ + (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \ + grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null + then + case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in + i386) UNAME_PROCESSOR=x86_64 ;; + powerpc) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc64 ;; + esac + fi + fi + elif test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = i386 ; then + # Avoid executing cc on OS X 10.9, as it ships with a stub + # that puts up a graphical alert prompting to install + # developer tools. Any system running Mac OS X 10.7 or + # later (Darwin 11 and later) is required to have a 64-bit + # processor. This is not true of the ARM version of Darwin + # that Apple uses in portable devices. + UNAME_PROCESSOR=x86_64 + fi + echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*) + UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` + if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = x86; then + UNAME_PROCESSOR=i386 + UNAME_MACHINE=pc + fi + echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:QNX:*:4*) + echo i386-pc-qnx + exit ;; + NEO-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*) + echo neo-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + NSE-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*) + echo nse-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + NSR-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*) + echo nsr-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:NonStop-UX:*:*) + echo mips-compaq-nonstopux + exit ;; + BS2000:POSIX*:*:*) + echo bs2000-siemens-sysv + exit ;; + DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-${UNAME_SYSTEM}-${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:Plan9:*:*) + # "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386 + # is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86 + # operating systems. + if test "$cputype" = 386; then + UNAME_MACHINE=i386 + else + UNAME_MACHINE="$cputype" + fi + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-plan9 + exit ;; + *:TOPS-10:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-tops10 + exit ;; + *:TENEX:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-tenex + exit ;; + KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*) + echo pdp10-dec-tops20 + exit ;; + XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*) + echo pdp10-xkl-tops20 + exit ;; + *:TOPS-20:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-tops20 + exit ;; + *:ITS:*:*) + echo pdp10-unknown-its + exit ;; + SEI:*:*:SEIUX) + echo mips-sei-seiux${UNAME_RELEASE} + exit ;; + *:DragonFly:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-dragonfly`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` + exit ;; + *:*VMS:*:*) + UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null` + case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in + A*) echo alpha-dec-vms ; exit ;; + I*) echo ia64-dec-vms ; exit ;; + V*) echo vax-dec-vms ; exit ;; + esac ;; + *:XENIX:*:SysV) + echo i386-pc-xenix + exit ;; + i*86:skyos:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-skyos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ .*$//'` + exit ;; + i*86:rdos:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-rdos + exit ;; + i*86:AROS:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-aros + exit ;; + x86_64:VMkernel:*:*) + echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-esx + exit ;; + amd64:Isilon\ OneFS:*:*) + echo x86_64-unknown-onefs + exit ;; +esac + +cat >&2 </dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` + +/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null` +/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null` + +hostinfo = `(hostinfo) 2>/dev/null` +/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null` +/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null` +/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null` +/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null` +/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null` + +UNAME_MACHINE = ${UNAME_MACHINE} +UNAME_RELEASE = ${UNAME_RELEASE} +UNAME_SYSTEM = ${UNAME_SYSTEM} +UNAME_VERSION = ${UNAME_VERSION} +EOF + +exit 1 + +# Local variables: +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d" +# time-stamp-end: "'" +# End: diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91b65db --- /dev/null +++ b/config.h.in @@ -0,0 +1,1951 @@ +/* config.h.in. Generated from configure.ac by autoheader. */ + +/* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */ +#undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD + +/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address + */ +#undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK + +/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */ +#undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG + +/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */ +#undef AU_IPv4 + +/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */ +#undef BIND_8_COMPAT + +/* The system has incomplete BSM API */ +#undef BROKEN_BSM_API + +/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */ +#undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE + +/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */ +#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO + +/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */ +#undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS + +/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */ +#undef BROKEN_GLOB + +/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */ +#undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA + +/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name + */ +#undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME + +/* Can't do comparisons on readv */ +#undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON + +/* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons + against it */ +#undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON + +/* realpath does not work with nonexistent files */ +#undef BROKEN_REALPATH + +/* Needed for NeXT */ +#undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS + +/* Define if your setregid() is broken */ +#undef BROKEN_SETREGID + +/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */ +#undef BROKEN_SETRESGID + +/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */ +#undef BROKEN_SETRESUID + +/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */ +#undef BROKEN_SETREUID + +/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */ +#undef BROKEN_SETVBUF + +/* QNX shadow support is broken */ +#undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE + +/* Define if your snprintf is busted */ +#undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF + +/* strndup broken, see APAR IY61211 */ +#undef BROKEN_STRNDUP + +/* strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551 */ +#undef BROKEN_STRNLEN + +/* strnvis detected broken */ +#undef BROKEN_STRNVIS + +/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */ +#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON + +/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */ +#undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX + +/* Define if you have BSD auth support */ +#undef BSD_AUTH + +/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */ +#undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE + +/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */ +#undef CONF_UTMP_FILE + +/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */ +#undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE + +/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */ +#undef CONF_WTMP_FILE + +/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */ +#undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING + +/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */ +#undef DISABLE_LASTLOG + +/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */ +#undef DISABLE_LOGIN + +/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */ +#undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE + +/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */ +#undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE + +/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */ +#undef DISABLE_SHADOW + +/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */ +#undef DISABLE_UTMP + +/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */ +#undef DISABLE_UTMPX + +/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */ +#undef DISABLE_WTMP + +/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */ +#undef DISABLE_WTMPX + +/* Enable for PKCS#11 support */ +#undef ENABLE_PKCS11 + +/* define if fflush(NULL) does not work */ +#undef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG + +/* File names may not contain backslash characters */ +#undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH + +/* fsid_t has member val */ +#undef FSID_HAS_VAL + +/* fsid_t has member __val */ +#undef FSID_HAS___VAL + +/* getpgrp takes one arg */ +#undef GETPGRP_VOID + +/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */ +#undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS + +/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */ +#undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC + +/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */ +#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC + +/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */ +#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV + +/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */ +#undef GSSAPI + +/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */ +#undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE + +/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */ +#undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR + +/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */ +#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP + +/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */ +#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX + +/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */ +#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP + +/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */ +#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ASPRINTF + +/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */ +#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ + +/* Have attribute nonnull */ +#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ + +/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */ +#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */ +#undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */ +#undef HAVE_B64_NTOP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */ +#undef HAVE_B64_PTON + +/* Define if you have the basename function. */ +#undef HAVE_BASENAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BCOPY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BLF_ENC + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_BLF_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_BSTRING_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `bzero' function. */ +#undef HAVE_BZERO + +/* calloc(0, x) returns NULL */ +#undef HAVE_CALLOC + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */ +#undef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */ +#undef HAVE_CLOCK + +/* Have clock_gettime */ +#undef HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME + +/* define if you have clock_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_CLOCK_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */ +#undef HAVE_CLOSEFROM + +/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */ +#undef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO + +/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */ +#undef HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */ +#undef HAVE_CRYPT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H + +/* Define if you are on Cygwin */ +#undef HAVE_CYGWIN + +/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */ +#undef HAVE_DAEMON + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if + you don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `bzero', and to 0 if you don't. + */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_BZERO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE', + and to 0 if you don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if + you don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `readv', and to 0 if you don't. + */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_READV + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't. + */ +#undef HAVE_DECL_WRITEV + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL__GETLONG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you + don't. */ +#undef HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */ +#undef HAVE_DES_CRYPT + +/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */ +#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX + +/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */ +#undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC + +/* Define if libcrypto has DH_get0_key */ +#undef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY + +/* Define if libcrypto has DH_get0_pqg */ +#undef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG + +/* Define if libcrypto has DH_set0_key */ +#undef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY + +/* Define if libcrypto has DH_set0_pqg */ +#undef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG + +/* Define if libcrypto has DH_set_length */ +#undef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_DIRENT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */ +#undef HAVE_DIRFD + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_DIRNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */ +#undef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX + +/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_get0_key */ +#undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY + +/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_get0_pqg */ +#undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG + +/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_set0_key */ +#undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY + +/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_set0_pqg */ +#undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG + +/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_SIG_get0 */ +#undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 + +/* Define if libcrypto has DSA_SIG_set0 */ +#undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 + +/* Define if libcrypto has ECDSA_SIG_get0 */ +#undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 + +/* Define if libcrypto has ECDSA_SIG_set0 */ +#undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ELF_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ENDGRENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ENDUTENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `err' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ERR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `errx' function. */ +#undef HAVE_ERRX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_ERR_H + +/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */ +#undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN + +/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL + +/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV + +/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV + +/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX + +/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_MD_CTX_free */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT + +/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_MD_CTX_new */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW + +/* Define if libcrypto has EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_ripemd160' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 + +/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */ +#undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FCHMOD + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FCHOWN + +/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */ +#undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */ +#undef HAVE_FD_MASK + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_FEATURES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `flock' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FLOCK + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `freezero' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FREEZERO + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FSTATFS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FSTATVFS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */ +#undef HAVE_FUTIMES + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETCWD + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETGRSET + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getline' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETLINE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETLUID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETOPT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GETOPT_H + +/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */ +#undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET + +/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */ +#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETPEEREID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETPGID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETPGRP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETPWANAM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrandom' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETRANDOM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT + +/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */ +#undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getsid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETSID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETTTYENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUTENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUTID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUTLINE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUTXENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUTXID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GETUTXUSER + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GLOB + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GLOB_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H + +/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */ +#undef HAVE_HEADER_AD + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */ +#undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT + +/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */ +#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP + +/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */ +#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_IAF_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_IA_H + +/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */ +#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP + +/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */ +#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_IFADDRS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */ +#undef HAVE_INET_ATON + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */ +#undef HAVE_INET_NTOA + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */ +#undef HAVE_INET_NTOP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */ +#undef HAVE_INNETGR + +/* define if you have int64_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_INT64_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_INTMAX_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H + +/* define if you have intxx_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_INTXX_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T + +/* Define if you have isblank(3C). */ +#undef HAVE_ISBLANK + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */ +#undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H + +/* Define if you want ldns support */ +#undef HAVE_LDNS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBBSM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBDL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LIBGEN_H + +/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */ +#undef HAVE_LIBIAF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBPAM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBXNET + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */ +#undef HAVE_LIBZ + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */ +#undef HAVE_LLABS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LOCALE_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */ +#undef HAVE_LOGIN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */ +#undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_LOGIN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */ +#undef HAVE_LOGOUT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */ +#undef HAVE_LOGWTMP + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */ +#undef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */ +#undef HAVE_LONG_LONG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H + +/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `malloc' function, and + to 0 otherwise. */ +#undef HAVE_MALLOC + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */ +#undef HAVE_MBLEN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `mbtowc' function. */ +#undef HAVE_MBTOWC + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */ +#undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT + +/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */ +#undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */ +#undef HAVE_MEMMOVE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_MEMORY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */ +#undef HAVE_MEMSET_S + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */ +#undef HAVE_MKDTEMP + +/* define if you have mode_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_MODE_T + +/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */ +#undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NDIR_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETDB_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H + +/* Define if you are on NeXT */ +#undef HAVE_NEXT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */ +#undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `nl_langinfo' function. */ +#undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */ +#undef HAVE_NSLEEP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */ +#undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO + +/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to + pam_strerror */ +#undef HAVE_OLD_PAM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */ +#undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */ +#undef HAVE_OPENPTY + +/* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include */ +#undef HAVE_OPENSSL + +/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */ +#undef HAVE_OSF_SIA + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PATHS_H + +/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */ +#undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP + +/* define if you have pid_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_PID_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `pledge' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PLEDGE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */ +#undef HAVE_POLL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_POLL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PRCTL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `priv_basicset' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PRIV_H + +/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */ +#undef HAVE_PROC_PID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PSTAT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_PTY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */ +#undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `raise' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RAISE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */ +#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H + +/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `realloc' function, + and to 0 otherwise. */ +#undef HAVE_REALLOC + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */ +#undef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */ +#undef HAVE_REALPATH + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `recallocarray' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RECVMSG + +/* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */ +#undef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_crt_params */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_factors */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_key */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_dup */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_free */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_get_finish */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set1_name */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_finish */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_priv_dec */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_priv_enc */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_srt_params */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_set0_factors */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS + +/* Define if libcrypto has RSA_set0_key */ +#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT + +/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED + +/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */ +#undef HAVE_SECUREWARE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SENDMSG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETEGID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETENV + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETEUID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETGROUPENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETGROUPS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETLINEBUF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETLOGIN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETLUID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPASSENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPCRED + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpflags' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPFLAGS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setppriv' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPPRIV + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETREGID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETRESGID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETRESUID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETREUID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETRLIMIT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETSID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETUTENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETUTXDB + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETUTXENT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SETVBUF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SET_ID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256_Update' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SHA2_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SHADOW_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SIGACTION + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SIGVEC + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T + +/* define if you have size_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_SIZE_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR + +/* Have PEERCRED socket option */ +#undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED + +/* define if you have ssize_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T + +/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ +#undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STATFS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STATVFS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STDDEF_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STDINT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STDLIB_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strcasestr' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRCASESTR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRDUP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRERROR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRFTIME + +/* Silly mkstemp() */ +#undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STRINGS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_STRING_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRLCAT + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRLCPY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRMODE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strndup' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRNDUP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRNLEN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRNVIS + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRPTIME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRSEP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsignal' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRSIGNAL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRTOLL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRTONUM + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRTOUL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */ +#undef HAVE_STRTOULL + +/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO + +/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR + +/* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE + +/* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS + +/* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE + +/* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS + +/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 + +/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID + +/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE + +/* Define to 1 if `f_flags' is a member of `struct statfs'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS + +/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE + +/* Define to 1 if `st_mtim' is a member of `struct stat'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM + +/* Define to 1 if `st_mtime' is a member of `struct stat'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC + +/* define if you have struct timeval */ +#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SWAP32 + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_SYSCONF + +/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */ +#undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H + +/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H + +/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_NERR + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H + +/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */ +#undef HAVE_TCGETPGRP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */ +#undef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */ +#undef HAVE_TIME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TIME_H + +/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */ +#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP + +/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */ +#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */ +#undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */ +#undef HAVE_TRUNCATE + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_TTYENT_H + +/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */ +#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP + +/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */ +#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX + +/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */ +#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP + +/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */ +#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UCRED_H + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */ +#undef HAVE_UINTMAX_T + +/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_UINTXX_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UNSETENV + +/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */ +#undef HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UPDWTMP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_USERSEC_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */ +#undef HAVE_USLEEP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTIL_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UTIMES + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTIME_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UTMPNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */ +#undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_UTMP_H + +/* define if you have u_char data type */ +#undef HAVE_U_CHAR + +/* define if you have u_int data type */ +#undef HAVE_U_INT + +/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T + +/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */ +#undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_VASPRINTF + +/* Define if va_copy exists */ +#undef HAVE_VA_COPY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_VIS_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */ +#undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */ +#undef HAVE_WAITPID + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `warn' function. */ +#undef HAVE_WARN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ +#undef HAVE_WCHAR_H + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `wcwidth' function. */ +#undef HAVE_WCWIDTH + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */ +#undef HAVE__GETLONG + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */ +#undef HAVE__GETPTY + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */ +#undef HAVE__GETSHORT + +/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */ +#undef HAVE__RES_EXTERN + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */ +#undef HAVE___B64_NTOP + +/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */ +#undef HAVE___B64_PTON + +/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */ +#undef HAVE___FUNCTION__ + +/* Define if libc defines __progname */ +#undef HAVE___PROGNAME + +/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ +#undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS + +/* Define if __va_copy exists */ +#undef HAVE___VA_COPY + +/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */ +#undef HAVE___func__ + +/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */ +#undef HEIMDAL + +/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */ +#undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY + +/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */ +#undef IPV4_IN_IPV6 + +/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */ +#undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN + +/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */ +#undef KRB5 + +/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */ +#undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE + +/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return + EOPNOTSUPP. */ +#undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO + +/* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */ +#undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST + +/* max value of long long calculated by configure */ +#undef LLONG_MAX + +/* min value of long long calculated by configure */ +#undef LLONG_MIN + +/* Account locked with pw(1) */ +#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX + +/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ +#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING + +/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ +#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR + +/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */ +#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX + +/* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */ +#undef MAIL_DIRECTORY + +/* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */ +#undef NEED_SETPGRP + +/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args */ +#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS + +/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */ +#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE + +/* Define to disable UID restoration test */ +#undef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST + +/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */ +#undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS + +/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */ +#undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID + +/* OpenSSL has ECC */ +#undef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + +/* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */ +#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 + +/* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */ +#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 + +/* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */ +#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + +/* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */ +#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR + +/* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */ +#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM + +/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */ +#undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES + +/* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */ +#undef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY + +/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */ +#undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT + +/* Define to the full name of this package. */ +#undef PACKAGE_NAME + +/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */ +#undef PACKAGE_STRING + +/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */ +#undef PACKAGE_TARNAME + +/* Define to the home page for this package. */ +#undef PACKAGE_URL + +/* Define to the version of this package. */ +#undef PACKAGE_VERSION + +/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to + the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */ +#undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE + +/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */ +#undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE + +/* must supply username to passwd */ +#undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME + +/* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */ +#undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID + +/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ +#undef PRNGD_PORT + +/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */ +#undef PRNGD_SOCKET + +/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */ +#undef PTY_ZEROREAD + +/* Sandbox using capsicum */ +#undef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM + +/* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */ +#undef SANDBOX_DARWIN + +/* no privsep sandboxing */ +#undef SANDBOX_NULL + +/* Sandbox using pledge(2) */ +#undef SANDBOX_PLEDGE + +/* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */ +#undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT + +/* Sandbox using seccomp filter */ +#undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER + +/* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */ +#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE + +/* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */ +#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE + +/* Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges */ +#undef SANDBOX_SOLARIS + +/* Sandbox using systrace(4) */ +#undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE + +/* Specify the system call convention in use */ +#undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH + +/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */ +#undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID + +/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */ +#undef SIZEOF_INT + +/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */ +#undef SIZEOF_LONG_INT + +/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */ +#undef SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT + +/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */ +#undef SIZEOF_SHORT_INT + +/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */ +#undef SNPRINTF_CONST + +/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by + bsd-setproctitle.c */ +#undef SPT_TYPE + +/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */ +#undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY + +/* sshd PAM service name */ +#undef SSHD_PAM_SERVICE + +/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */ +#undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID + +/* Use audit debugging module */ +#undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + +/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */ +#undef SSH_IOBUFSZ + +/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */ +#undef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER + +/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */ +#undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF + +/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */ +#undef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD + +/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */ +#undef SSH_TUN_LINUX + +/* No layer 2 tunnel support */ +#undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2 + +/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */ +#undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD + +/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */ +#undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF + +/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */ +#undef STDC_HEADERS + +/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */ +#undef SUPERUSER_PATH + +/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */ +#undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND + +/* Support routing domains using Linux VRF */ +#undef SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX + +/* Support passwords > 8 chars */ +#undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS + +/* Specify default $PATH */ +#undef USER_PATH + +/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */ +#undef USE_AFS + +/* Use BSM audit module */ +#undef USE_BSM_AUDIT + +/* Use btmp to log bad logins */ +#undef USE_BTMP + +/* Use libedit for sftp */ +#undef USE_LIBEDIT + +/* Use Linux audit module */ +#undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT + +/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */ +#undef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE + +/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */ +#undef USE_PAM + +/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */ +#undef USE_PIPES + +/* Define if you have Solaris privileges */ +#undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS + +/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */ +#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS + +/* Define if you have Solaris projects */ +#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS + +/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */ +#undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY + +/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */ +#undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE + +/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session management, not C + arrays) */ +#undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY + +/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */ +#undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT + +/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */ +#undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS + +/* Define if you want IRIX project management */ +#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT + +/* use libcrypto for cryptography */ +#undef WITH_OPENSSL + +/* Define if you want SELinux support. */ +#undef WITH_SELINUX + +/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most + significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */ +#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD +# if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__ +# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1 +# endif +#else +# ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN +# undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN +# endif +#endif + +/* Define if xauth is found in your path */ +#undef XAUTH_PATH + +/* Enable large inode numbers on Mac OS X 10.5. */ +#ifndef _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE +# define _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE 1 +#endif + +/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */ +#undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS + +/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */ +#undef _LARGE_FILES + +/* log for bad login attempts */ +#undef _PATH_BTMP + +/* Full path of your "passwd" program */ +#undef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG + +/* Specify location of ssh.pid */ +#undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR + +/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */ +#undef __res_state + +/* Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used. */ +#undef calloc + +/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler + calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */ +#ifndef __cplusplus +#undef inline +#endif + +/* Define to rpl_malloc if the replacement function should be used. */ +#undef malloc + +/* Define to rpl_realloc if the replacement function should be used. */ +#undef realloc + +/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */ +#undef socklen_t diff --git a/config.sub b/config.sub new file mode 100755 index 0000000..9feb73b --- /dev/null +++ b/config.sub @@ -0,0 +1,1823 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Configuration validation subroutine script. +# Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +timestamp='2016-06-20' + +# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it +# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +# the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or +# (at your option) any later version. +# +# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but +# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU +# General Public License for more details. +# +# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +# along with this program; if not, see . +# +# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you +# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a +# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under +# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that +# program. This Exception is an additional permission under section 7 +# of the GNU General Public License, version 3 ("GPLv3"). + + +# Please send patches to . +# +# Configuration subroutine to validate and canonicalize a configuration type. +# Supply the specified configuration type as an argument. +# If it is invalid, we print an error message on stderr and exit with code 1. +# Otherwise, we print the canonical config type on stdout and succeed. + +# You can get the latest version of this script from: +# http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.sub + +# This file is supposed to be the same for all GNU packages +# and recognize all the CPU types, system types and aliases +# that are meaningful with *any* GNU software. +# Each package is responsible for reporting which valid configurations +# it does not support. The user should be able to distinguish +# a failure to support a valid configuration from a meaningless +# configuration. + +# The goal of this file is to map all the various variations of a given +# machine specification into a single specification in the form: +# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM +# or in some cases, the newer four-part form: +# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM +# It is wrong to echo any other type of specification. + +me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'` + +usage="\ +Usage: $0 [OPTION] CPU-MFR-OPSYS or ALIAS + +Canonicalize a configuration name. + +Operation modes: + -h, --help print this help, then exit + -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit + -v, --version print version number, then exit + +Report bugs and patches to ." + +version="\ +GNU config.sub ($timestamp) + +Copyright 1992-2016 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + +This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO +warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." + +help=" +Try \`$me --help' for more information." + +# Parse command line +while test $# -gt 0 ; do + case $1 in + --time-stamp | --time* | -t ) + echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;; + --version | -v ) + echo "$version" ; exit ;; + --help | --h* | -h ) + echo "$usage"; exit ;; + -- ) # Stop option processing + shift; break ;; + - ) # Use stdin as input. + break ;; + -* ) + echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" + exit 1 ;; + + *local*) + # First pass through any local machine types. + echo $1 + exit ;; + + * ) + break ;; + esac +done + +case $# in + 0) echo "$me: missing argument$help" >&2 + exit 1;; + 1) ;; + *) echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2 + exit 1;; +esac + +# Separate what the user gave into CPU-COMPANY and OS or KERNEL-OS (if any). +# Here we must recognize all the valid KERNEL-OS combinations. +maybe_os=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\2/'` +case $maybe_os in + nto-qnx* | linux-gnu* | linux-android* | linux-dietlibc | linux-newlib* | \ + linux-musl* | linux-uclibc* | uclinux-uclibc* | uclinux-gnu* | kfreebsd*-gnu* | \ + knetbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-eabi* | \ + kopensolaris*-gnu* | \ + storm-chaos* | os2-emx* | rtmk-nova*) + os=-$maybe_os + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'` + ;; + android-linux) + os=-linux-android + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/^\(.*\)-\([^-]*-[^-]*\)$/\1/'`-unknown + ;; + *) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed 's/-[^-]*$//'` + if [ $basic_machine != $1 ] + then os=`echo $1 | sed 's/.*-/-/'` + else os=; fi + ;; +esac + +### Let's recognize common machines as not being operating systems so +### that things like config.sub decstation-3100 work. We also +### recognize some manufacturers as not being operating systems, so we +### can provide default operating systems below. +case $os in + -sun*os*) + # Prevent following clause from handling this invalid input. + ;; + -dec* | -mips* | -sequent* | -encore* | -pc532* | -sgi* | -sony* | \ + -att* | -7300* | -3300* | -delta* | -motorola* | -sun[234]* | \ + -unicom* | -ibm* | -next | -hp | -isi* | -apollo | -altos* | \ + -convergent* | -ncr* | -news | -32* | -3600* | -3100* | -hitachi* |\ + -c[123]* | -convex* | -sun | -crds | -omron* | -dg | -ultra | -tti* | \ + -harris | -dolphin | -highlevel | -gould | -cbm | -ns | -masscomp | \ + -apple | -axis | -knuth | -cray | -microblaze*) + os= + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -bluegene*) + os=-cnk + ;; + -sim | -cisco | -oki | -wec | -winbond) + os= + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -scout) + ;; + -wrs) + os=-vxworks + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -chorusos*) + os=-chorusos + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -chorusrdb) + os=-chorusrdb + basic_machine=$1 + ;; + -hiux*) + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + -sco6) + os=-sco5v6 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco5) + os=-sco3.2v5 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco4) + os=-sco3.2v4 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco3.2.[4-9]*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/sco3.2./sco3.2v/'` + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco3.2v[4-9]*) + # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer. + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco5v6*) + # Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer. + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -sco*) + os=-sco3.2v2 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -udk*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -isc) + os=-isc2.2 + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -clix*) + basic_machine=clipper-intergraph + ;; + -isc*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-pc/'` + ;; + -lynx*178) + os=-lynxos178 + ;; + -lynx*5) + os=-lynxos5 + ;; + -lynx*) + os=-lynxos + ;; + -ptx*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86-.*/86-sequent/'` + ;; + -windowsnt*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's/windowsnt/winnt/'` + ;; + -psos*) + os=-psos + ;; + -mint | -mint[0-9]*) + basic_machine=m68k-atari + os=-mint + ;; +esac + +# Decode aliases for certain CPU-COMPANY combinations. +case $basic_machine in + # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name. + # Some are omitted here because they have special meanings below. + 1750a | 580 \ + | a29k \ + | aarch64 | aarch64_be \ + | alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphaev6[78] | alphapca5[67] \ + | alpha64 | alpha64ev[4-8] | alpha64ev56 | alpha64ev6[78] | alpha64pca5[67] \ + | am33_2.0 \ + | arc | arceb \ + | arm | arm[bl]e | arme[lb] | armv[2-8] | armv[3-8][lb] | armv7[arm] \ + | avr | avr32 \ + | ba \ + | be32 | be64 \ + | bfin \ + | c4x | c8051 | clipper \ + | d10v | d30v | dlx | dsp16xx \ + | e2k | epiphany \ + | fido | fr30 | frv | ft32 \ + | h8300 | h8500 | hppa | hppa1.[01] | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0[nw] | hppa64 \ + | hexagon \ + | i370 | i860 | i960 | ia64 \ + | ip2k | iq2000 \ + | k1om \ + | le32 | le64 \ + | lm32 \ + | m32c | m32r | m32rle | m68000 | m68k | m88k \ + | maxq | mb | microblaze | microblazeel | mcore | mep | metag \ + | mips | mipsbe | mipseb | mipsel | mipsle \ + | mips16 \ + | mips64 | mips64el \ + | mips64octeon | mips64octeonel \ + | mips64orion | mips64orionel \ + | mips64r5900 | mips64r5900el \ + | mips64vr | mips64vrel \ + | mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \ + | mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el \ + | mips64vr5000 | mips64vr5000el \ + | mips64vr5900 | mips64vr5900el \ + | mipsisa32 | mipsisa32el \ + | mipsisa32r2 | mipsisa32r2el \ + | mipsisa32r6 | mipsisa32r6el \ + | mipsisa64 | mipsisa64el \ + | mipsisa64r2 | mipsisa64r2el \ + | mipsisa64r6 | mipsisa64r6el \ + | mipsisa64sb1 | mipsisa64sb1el \ + | mipsisa64sr71k | mipsisa64sr71kel \ + | mipsr5900 | mipsr5900el \ + | mipstx39 | mipstx39el \ + | mn10200 | mn10300 \ + | moxie \ + | mt \ + | msp430 \ + | nds32 | nds32le | nds32be \ + | nios | nios2 | nios2eb | nios2el \ + | ns16k | ns32k \ + | open8 | or1k | or1knd | or32 \ + | pdp10 | pdp11 | pj | pjl \ + | powerpc | powerpc64 | powerpc64le | powerpcle \ + | pyramid \ + | riscv32 | riscv64 \ + | rl78 | rx \ + | score \ + | sh | sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]aeb | sh[23]e | sh[234]eb | sheb | shbe | shle | sh[1234]le | sh3ele \ + | sh64 | sh64le \ + | sparc | sparc64 | sparc64b | sparc64v | sparc86x | sparclet | sparclite \ + | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v \ + | spu \ + | tahoe | tic4x | tic54x | tic55x | tic6x | tic80 | tron \ + | ubicom32 \ + | v850 | v850e | v850e1 | v850e2 | v850es | v850e2v3 \ + | visium \ + | we32k \ + | x86 | xc16x | xstormy16 | xtensa \ + | z8k | z80) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + ;; + c54x) + basic_machine=tic54x-unknown + ;; + c55x) + basic_machine=tic55x-unknown + ;; + c6x) + basic_machine=tic6x-unknown + ;; + leon|leon[3-9]) + basic_machine=sparc-$basic_machine + ;; + m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12 | m68hcs12x | nvptx | picochip) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + os=-none + ;; + m88110 | m680[12346]0 | m683?2 | m68360 | m5200 | v70 | w65 | z8k) + ;; + ms1) + basic_machine=mt-unknown + ;; + + strongarm | thumb | xscale) + basic_machine=arm-unknown + ;; + xgate) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + os=-none + ;; + xscaleeb) + basic_machine=armeb-unknown + ;; + + xscaleel) + basic_machine=armel-unknown + ;; + + # We use `pc' rather than `unknown' + # because (1) that's what they normally are, and + # (2) the word "unknown" tends to confuse beginning users. + i*86 | x86_64) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-pc + ;; + # Object if more than one company name word. + *-*-*) + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; + # Recognize the basic CPU types with company name. + 580-* \ + | a29k-* \ + | aarch64-* | aarch64_be-* \ + | alpha-* | alphaev[4-8]-* | alphaev56-* | alphaev6[78]-* \ + | alpha64-* | alpha64ev[4-8]-* | alpha64ev56-* | alpha64ev6[78]-* \ + | alphapca5[67]-* | alpha64pca5[67]-* | arc-* | arceb-* \ + | arm-* | armbe-* | armle-* | armeb-* | armv*-* \ + | avr-* | avr32-* \ + | ba-* \ + | be32-* | be64-* \ + | bfin-* | bs2000-* \ + | c[123]* | c30-* | [cjt]90-* | c4x-* \ + | c8051-* | clipper-* | craynv-* | cydra-* \ + | d10v-* | d30v-* | dlx-* \ + | e2k-* | elxsi-* \ + | f30[01]-* | f700-* | fido-* | fr30-* | frv-* | fx80-* \ + | h8300-* | h8500-* \ + | hppa-* | hppa1.[01]-* | hppa2.0-* | hppa2.0[nw]-* | hppa64-* \ + | hexagon-* \ + | i*86-* | i860-* | i960-* | ia64-* \ + | ip2k-* | iq2000-* \ + | k1om-* \ + | le32-* | le64-* \ + | lm32-* \ + | m32c-* | m32r-* | m32rle-* \ + | m68000-* | m680[012346]0-* | m68360-* | m683?2-* | m68k-* \ + | m88110-* | m88k-* | maxq-* | mcore-* | metag-* \ + | microblaze-* | microblazeel-* \ + | mips-* | mipsbe-* | mipseb-* | mipsel-* | mipsle-* \ + | mips16-* \ + | mips64-* | mips64el-* \ + | mips64octeon-* | mips64octeonel-* \ + | mips64orion-* | mips64orionel-* \ + | mips64r5900-* | mips64r5900el-* \ + | mips64vr-* | mips64vrel-* \ + | mips64vr4100-* | mips64vr4100el-* \ + | mips64vr4300-* | mips64vr4300el-* \ + | mips64vr5000-* | mips64vr5000el-* \ + | mips64vr5900-* | mips64vr5900el-* \ + | mipsisa32-* | mipsisa32el-* \ + | mipsisa32r2-* | mipsisa32r2el-* \ + | mipsisa32r6-* | mipsisa32r6el-* \ + | mipsisa64-* | mipsisa64el-* \ + | mipsisa64r2-* | mipsisa64r2el-* \ + | mipsisa64r6-* | mipsisa64r6el-* \ + | mipsisa64sb1-* | mipsisa64sb1el-* \ + | mipsisa64sr71k-* | mipsisa64sr71kel-* \ + | mipsr5900-* | mipsr5900el-* \ + | mipstx39-* | mipstx39el-* \ + | mmix-* \ + | mt-* \ + | msp430-* \ + | nds32-* | nds32le-* | nds32be-* \ + | nios-* | nios2-* | nios2eb-* | nios2el-* \ + | none-* | np1-* | ns16k-* | ns32k-* \ + | open8-* \ + | or1k*-* \ + | orion-* \ + | pdp10-* | pdp11-* | pj-* | pjl-* | pn-* | power-* \ + | powerpc-* | powerpc64-* | powerpc64le-* | powerpcle-* \ + | pyramid-* \ + | riscv32-* | riscv64-* \ + | rl78-* | romp-* | rs6000-* | rx-* \ + | sh-* | sh[1234]-* | sh[24]a-* | sh[24]aeb-* | sh[23]e-* | sh[34]eb-* | sheb-* | shbe-* \ + | shle-* | sh[1234]le-* | sh3ele-* | sh64-* | sh64le-* \ + | sparc-* | sparc64-* | sparc64b-* | sparc64v-* | sparc86x-* | sparclet-* \ + | sparclite-* \ + | sparcv8-* | sparcv9-* | sparcv9b-* | sparcv9v-* | sv1-* | sx*-* \ + | tahoe-* \ + | tic30-* | tic4x-* | tic54x-* | tic55x-* | tic6x-* | tic80-* \ + | tile*-* \ + | tron-* \ + | ubicom32-* \ + | v850-* | v850e-* | v850e1-* | v850es-* | v850e2-* | v850e2v3-* \ + | vax-* \ + | visium-* \ + | we32k-* \ + | x86-* | x86_64-* | xc16x-* | xps100-* \ + | xstormy16-* | xtensa*-* \ + | ymp-* \ + | z8k-* | z80-*) + ;; + # Recognize the basic CPU types without company name, with glob match. + xtensa*) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + ;; + # Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand + # for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS. + 386bsd) + basic_machine=i386-unknown + os=-bsd + ;; + 3b1 | 7300 | 7300-att | att-7300 | pc7300 | safari | unixpc) + basic_machine=m68000-att + ;; + 3b*) + basic_machine=we32k-att + ;; + a29khif) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + abacus) + basic_machine=abacus-unknown + ;; + adobe68k) + basic_machine=m68010-adobe + os=-scout + ;; + alliant | fx80) + basic_machine=fx80-alliant + ;; + altos | altos3068) + basic_machine=m68k-altos + ;; + am29k) + basic_machine=a29k-none + os=-bsd + ;; + amd64) + basic_machine=x86_64-pc + ;; + amd64-*) + basic_machine=x86_64-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + amdahl) + basic_machine=580-amdahl + os=-sysv + ;; + amiga | amiga-*) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + ;; + amigaos | amigados) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + os=-amigaos + ;; + amigaunix | amix) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + os=-sysv4 + ;; + apollo68) + basic_machine=m68k-apollo + os=-sysv + ;; + apollo68bsd) + basic_machine=m68k-apollo + os=-bsd + ;; + aros) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-aros + ;; + asmjs) + basic_machine=asmjs-unknown + ;; + aux) + basic_machine=m68k-apple + os=-aux + ;; + balance) + basic_machine=ns32k-sequent + os=-dynix + ;; + blackfin) + basic_machine=bfin-unknown + os=-linux + ;; + blackfin-*) + basic_machine=bfin-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + os=-linux + ;; + bluegene*) + basic_machine=powerpc-ibm + os=-cnk + ;; + c54x-*) + basic_machine=tic54x-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + c55x-*) + basic_machine=tic55x-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + c6x-*) + basic_machine=tic6x-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + c90) + basic_machine=c90-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + cegcc) + basic_machine=arm-unknown + os=-cegcc + ;; + convex-c1) + basic_machine=c1-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c2) + basic_machine=c2-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c32) + basic_machine=c32-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c34) + basic_machine=c34-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + convex-c38) + basic_machine=c38-convex + os=-bsd + ;; + cray | j90) + basic_machine=j90-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + craynv) + basic_machine=craynv-cray + os=-unicosmp + ;; + cr16 | cr16-*) + basic_machine=cr16-unknown + os=-elf + ;; + crds | unos) + basic_machine=m68k-crds + ;; + crisv32 | crisv32-* | etraxfs*) + basic_machine=crisv32-axis + ;; + cris | cris-* | etrax*) + basic_machine=cris-axis + ;; + crx) + basic_machine=crx-unknown + os=-elf + ;; + da30 | da30-*) + basic_machine=m68k-da30 + ;; + decstation | decstation-3100 | pmax | pmax-* | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn) + basic_machine=mips-dec + ;; + decsystem10* | dec10*) + basic_machine=pdp10-dec + os=-tops10 + ;; + decsystem20* | dec20*) + basic_machine=pdp10-dec + os=-tops20 + ;; + delta | 3300 | motorola-3300 | motorola-delta \ + | 3300-motorola | delta-motorola) + basic_machine=m68k-motorola + ;; + delta88) + basic_machine=m88k-motorola + os=-sysv3 + ;; + dicos) + basic_machine=i686-pc + os=-dicos + ;; + djgpp) + basic_machine=i586-pc + os=-msdosdjgpp + ;; + dpx20 | dpx20-*) + basic_machine=rs6000-bull + os=-bosx + ;; + dpx2* | dpx2*-bull) + basic_machine=m68k-bull + os=-sysv3 + ;; + e500v[12]) + basic_machine=powerpc-unknown + os=$os"spe" + ;; + e500v[12]-*) + basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + os=$os"spe" + ;; + ebmon29k) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-ebmon + ;; + elxsi) + basic_machine=elxsi-elxsi + os=-bsd + ;; + encore | umax | mmax) + basic_machine=ns32k-encore + ;; + es1800 | OSE68k | ose68k | ose | OSE) + basic_machine=m68k-ericsson + os=-ose + ;; + fx2800) + basic_machine=i860-alliant + ;; + genix) + basic_machine=ns32k-ns + ;; + gmicro) + basic_machine=tron-gmicro + os=-sysv + ;; + go32) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-go32 + ;; + h3050r* | hiux*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + h8300hms) + basic_machine=h8300-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + h8300xray) + basic_machine=h8300-hitachi + os=-xray + ;; + h8500hms) + basic_machine=h8500-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + harris) + basic_machine=m88k-harris + os=-sysv3 + ;; + hp300-*) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + ;; + hp300bsd) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + os=-bsd + ;; + hp300hpux) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + os=-hpux + ;; + hp3k9[0-9][0-9] | hp9[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hp9k2[0-9][0-9] | hp9k31[0-9]) + basic_machine=m68000-hp + ;; + hp9k3[2-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=m68k-hp + ;; + hp9k6[0-9][0-9] | hp6[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hp9k7[0-79][0-9] | hp7[0-79][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k78[0-9] | hp78[0-9]) + # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[67]1 | hp8[67]1 | hp9k80[24] | hp80[24] | hp9k8[78]9 | hp8[78]9 | hp9k893 | hp893) + # FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[0-9][13679] | hp8[0-9][13679]) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + ;; + hp9k8[0-9][0-9] | hp8[0-9][0-9]) + basic_machine=hppa1.0-hp + ;; + hppa-next) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + hppaosf) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + os=-osf + ;; + hppro) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp + os=-proelf + ;; + i370-ibm* | ibm*) + basic_machine=i370-ibm + ;; + i*86v32) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv32 + ;; + i*86v4*) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv4 + ;; + i*86v) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-sysv + ;; + i*86sol2) + basic_machine=`echo $1 | sed -e 's/86.*/86-pc/'` + os=-solaris2 + ;; + i386mach) + basic_machine=i386-mach + os=-mach + ;; + i386-vsta | vsta) + basic_machine=i386-unknown + os=-vsta + ;; + iris | iris4d) + basic_machine=mips-sgi + case $os in + -irix*) + ;; + *) + os=-irix4 + ;; + esac + ;; + isi68 | isi) + basic_machine=m68k-isi + os=-sysv + ;; + leon-*|leon[3-9]-*) + basic_machine=sparc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/-.*//'` + ;; + m68knommu) + basic_machine=m68k-unknown + os=-linux + ;; + m68knommu-*) + basic_machine=m68k-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + os=-linux + ;; + m88k-omron*) + basic_machine=m88k-omron + ;; + magnum | m3230) + basic_machine=mips-mips + os=-sysv + ;; + merlin) + basic_machine=ns32k-utek + os=-sysv + ;; + microblaze*) + basic_machine=microblaze-xilinx + ;; + mingw64) + basic_machine=x86_64-pc + os=-mingw64 + ;; + mingw32) + basic_machine=i686-pc + os=-mingw32 + ;; + mingw32ce) + basic_machine=arm-unknown + os=-mingw32ce + ;; + miniframe) + basic_machine=m68000-convergent + ;; + *mint | -mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | *MiNT[0-9]*) + basic_machine=m68k-atari + os=-mint + ;; + mips3*-*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'` + ;; + mips3*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/mips3/mips64/'`-unknown + ;; + monitor) + basic_machine=m68k-rom68k + os=-coff + ;; + morphos) + basic_machine=powerpc-unknown + os=-morphos + ;; + moxiebox) + basic_machine=moxie-unknown + os=-moxiebox + ;; + msdos) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-msdos + ;; + ms1-*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed -e 's/ms1-/mt-/'` + ;; + msys) + basic_machine=i686-pc + os=-msys + ;; + mvs) + basic_machine=i370-ibm + os=-mvs + ;; + nacl) + basic_machine=le32-unknown + os=-nacl + ;; + ncr3000) + basic_machine=i486-ncr + os=-sysv4 + ;; + netbsd386) + basic_machine=i386-unknown + os=-netbsd + ;; + netwinder) + basic_machine=armv4l-rebel + os=-linux + ;; + news | news700 | news800 | news900) + basic_machine=m68k-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + news1000) + basic_machine=m68030-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + news-3600 | risc-news) + basic_machine=mips-sony + os=-newsos + ;; + necv70) + basic_machine=v70-nec + os=-sysv + ;; + next | m*-next ) + basic_machine=m68k-next + case $os in + -nextstep* ) + ;; + -ns2*) + os=-nextstep2 + ;; + *) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + esac + ;; + nh3000) + basic_machine=m68k-harris + os=-cxux + ;; + nh[45]000) + basic_machine=m88k-harris + os=-cxux + ;; + nindy960) + basic_machine=i960-intel + os=-nindy + ;; + mon960) + basic_machine=i960-intel + os=-mon960 + ;; + nonstopux) + basic_machine=mips-compaq + os=-nonstopux + ;; + np1) + basic_machine=np1-gould + ;; + neo-tandem) + basic_machine=neo-tandem + ;; + nse-tandem) + basic_machine=nse-tandem + ;; + nsr-tandem) + basic_machine=nsr-tandem + ;; + op50n-* | op60c-*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki + os=-proelf + ;; + openrisc | openrisc-*) + basic_machine=or32-unknown + ;; + os400) + basic_machine=powerpc-ibm + os=-os400 + ;; + OSE68000 | ose68000) + basic_machine=m68000-ericsson + os=-ose + ;; + os68k) + basic_machine=m68k-none + os=-os68k + ;; + pa-hitachi) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-hitachi + os=-hiuxwe2 + ;; + paragon) + basic_machine=i860-intel + os=-osf + ;; + parisc) + basic_machine=hppa-unknown + os=-linux + ;; + parisc-*) + basic_machine=hppa-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + os=-linux + ;; + pbd) + basic_machine=sparc-tti + ;; + pbb) + basic_machine=m68k-tti + ;; + pc532 | pc532-*) + basic_machine=ns32k-pc532 + ;; + pc98) + basic_machine=i386-pc + ;; + pc98-*) + basic_machine=i386-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentium | p5 | k5 | k6 | nexgen | viac3) + basic_machine=i586-pc + ;; + pentiumpro | p6 | 6x86 | athlon | athlon_*) + basic_machine=i686-pc + ;; + pentiumii | pentium2 | pentiumiii | pentium3) + basic_machine=i686-pc + ;; + pentium4) + basic_machine=i786-pc + ;; + pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-* | viac3-*) + basic_machine=i586-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentiumpro-* | p6-* | 6x86-* | athlon-*) + basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentiumii-* | pentium2-* | pentiumiii-* | pentium3-*) + basic_machine=i686-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pentium4-*) + basic_machine=i786-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + pn) + basic_machine=pn-gould + ;; + power) basic_machine=power-ibm + ;; + ppc | ppcbe) basic_machine=powerpc-unknown + ;; + ppc-* | ppcbe-*) + basic_machine=powerpc-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ppcle | powerpclittle | ppc-le | powerpc-little) + basic_machine=powerpcle-unknown + ;; + ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*) + basic_machine=powerpcle-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ppc64) basic_machine=powerpc64-unknown + ;; + ppc64-*) basic_machine=powerpc64-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ppc64le | powerpc64little | ppc64-le | powerpc64-little) + basic_machine=powerpc64le-unknown + ;; + ppc64le-* | powerpc64little-*) + basic_machine=powerpc64le-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + ps2) + basic_machine=i386-ibm + ;; + pw32) + basic_machine=i586-unknown + os=-pw32 + ;; + rdos | rdos64) + basic_machine=x86_64-pc + os=-rdos + ;; + rdos32) + basic_machine=i386-pc + os=-rdos + ;; + rom68k) + basic_machine=m68k-rom68k + os=-coff + ;; + rm[46]00) + basic_machine=mips-siemens + ;; + rtpc | rtpc-*) + basic_machine=romp-ibm + ;; + s390 | s390-*) + basic_machine=s390-ibm + ;; + s390x | s390x-*) + basic_machine=s390x-ibm + ;; + sa29200) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + sb1) + basic_machine=mipsisa64sb1-unknown + ;; + sb1el) + basic_machine=mipsisa64sb1el-unknown + ;; + sde) + basic_machine=mipsisa32-sde + os=-elf + ;; + sei) + basic_machine=mips-sei + os=-seiux + ;; + sequent) + basic_machine=i386-sequent + ;; + sh) + basic_machine=sh-hitachi + os=-hms + ;; + sh5el) + basic_machine=sh5le-unknown + ;; + sh64) + basic_machine=sh64-unknown + ;; + sparclite-wrs | simso-wrs) + basic_machine=sparclite-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + sps7) + basic_machine=m68k-bull + os=-sysv2 + ;; + spur) + basic_machine=spur-unknown + ;; + st2000) + basic_machine=m68k-tandem + ;; + stratus) + basic_machine=i860-stratus + os=-sysv4 + ;; + strongarm-* | thumb-*) + basic_machine=arm-`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^[^-]*-//'` + ;; + sun2) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + ;; + sun2os3) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun2os4) + basic_machine=m68000-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun3os3) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun3os4) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun4os3) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-sunos3 + ;; + sun4os4) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-sunos4 + ;; + sun4sol2) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + os=-solaris2 + ;; + sun3 | sun3-*) + basic_machine=m68k-sun + ;; + sun4) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + ;; + sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner) + basic_machine=i386-sun + ;; + sv1) + basic_machine=sv1-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + symmetry) + basic_machine=i386-sequent + os=-dynix + ;; + t3e) + basic_machine=alphaev5-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + t90) + basic_machine=t90-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + tile*) + basic_machine=$basic_machine-unknown + os=-linux-gnu + ;; + tx39) + basic_machine=mipstx39-unknown + ;; + tx39el) + basic_machine=mipstx39el-unknown + ;; + toad1) + basic_machine=pdp10-xkl + os=-tops20 + ;; + tower | tower-32) + basic_machine=m68k-ncr + ;; + tpf) + basic_machine=s390x-ibm + os=-tpf + ;; + udi29k) + basic_machine=a29k-amd + os=-udi + ;; + ultra3) + basic_machine=a29k-nyu + os=-sym1 + ;; + v810 | necv810) + basic_machine=v810-nec + os=-none + ;; + vaxv) + basic_machine=vax-dec + os=-sysv + ;; + vms) + basic_machine=vax-dec + os=-vms + ;; + vpp*|vx|vx-*) + basic_machine=f301-fujitsu + ;; + vxworks960) + basic_machine=i960-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + vxworks68) + basic_machine=m68k-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + vxworks29k) + basic_machine=a29k-wrs + os=-vxworks + ;; + w65*) + basic_machine=w65-wdc + os=-none + ;; + w89k-*) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond + os=-proelf + ;; + xbox) + basic_machine=i686-pc + os=-mingw32 + ;; + xps | xps100) + basic_machine=xps100-honeywell + ;; + xscale-* | xscalee[bl]-*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/^xscale/arm/'` + ;; + ymp) + basic_machine=ymp-cray + os=-unicos + ;; + z8k-*-coff) + basic_machine=z8k-unknown + os=-sim + ;; + z80-*-coff) + basic_machine=z80-unknown + os=-sim + ;; + none) + basic_machine=none-none + os=-none + ;; + +# Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types. It is in +# some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular. + w89k) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-winbond + ;; + op50n) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki + ;; + op60c) + basic_machine=hppa1.1-oki + ;; + romp) + basic_machine=romp-ibm + ;; + mmix) + basic_machine=mmix-knuth + ;; + rs6000) + basic_machine=rs6000-ibm + ;; + vax) + basic_machine=vax-dec + ;; + pdp10) + # there are many clones, so DEC is not a safe bet + basic_machine=pdp10-unknown + ;; + pdp11) + basic_machine=pdp11-dec + ;; + we32k) + basic_machine=we32k-att + ;; + sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]aeb | sh[34]eb | sh[1234]le | sh[23]ele) + basic_machine=sh-unknown + ;; + sparc | sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v) + basic_machine=sparc-sun + ;; + cydra) + basic_machine=cydra-cydrome + ;; + orion) + basic_machine=orion-highlevel + ;; + orion105) + basic_machine=clipper-highlevel + ;; + mac | mpw | mac-mpw) + basic_machine=m68k-apple + ;; + pmac | pmac-mpw) + basic_machine=powerpc-apple + ;; + *-unknown) + # Make sure to match an already-canonicalized machine name. + ;; + *) + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': machine \`$basic_machine\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +# Here we canonicalize certain aliases for manufacturers. +case $basic_machine in + *-digital*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/digital.*/dec/'` + ;; + *-commodore*) + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed 's/commodore.*/cbm/'` + ;; + *) + ;; +esac + +# Decode manufacturer-specific aliases for certain operating systems. + +if [ x"$os" != x"" ] +then +case $os in + # First match some system type aliases + # that might get confused with valid system types. + # -solaris* is a basic system type, with this one exception. + -auroraux) + os=-auroraux + ;; + -solaris1 | -solaris1.*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|solaris1|sunos4|'` + ;; + -solaris) + os=-solaris2 + ;; + -svr4*) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -unixware*) + os=-sysv4.2uw + ;; + -gnu/linux*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|gnu/linux|linux-gnu|'` + ;; + # First accept the basic system types. + # The portable systems comes first. + # Each alternative MUST END IN A *, to match a version number. + # -sysv* is not here because it comes later, after sysvr4. + -gnu* | -bsd* | -mach* | -minix* | -genix* | -ultrix* | -irix* \ + | -*vms* | -sco* | -esix* | -isc* | -aix* | -cnk* | -sunos | -sunos[34]*\ + | -hpux* | -unos* | -osf* | -luna* | -dgux* | -auroraux* | -solaris* \ + | -sym* | -kopensolaris* | -plan9* \ + | -amigaos* | -amigados* | -msdos* | -newsos* | -unicos* | -aof* \ + | -aos* | -aros* | -cloudabi* | -sortix* \ + | -nindy* | -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -ebmon* | -hms* | -mvs* \ + | -clix* | -riscos* | -uniplus* | -iris* | -rtu* | -xenix* \ + | -hiux* | -386bsd* | -knetbsd* | -mirbsd* | -netbsd* \ + | -bitrig* | -openbsd* | -solidbsd* | -libertybsd* \ + | -ekkobsd* | -kfreebsd* | -freebsd* | -riscix* | -lynxos* \ + | -bosx* | -nextstep* | -cxux* | -aout* | -elf* | -oabi* \ + | -ptx* | -coff* | -ecoff* | -winnt* | -domain* | -vsta* \ + | -udi* | -eabi* | -lites* | -ieee* | -go32* | -aux* \ + | -chorusos* | -chorusrdb* | -cegcc* \ + | -cygwin* | -msys* | -pe* | -psos* | -moss* | -proelf* | -rtems* \ + | -midipix* | -mingw32* | -mingw64* | -linux-gnu* | -linux-android* \ + | -linux-newlib* | -linux-musl* | -linux-uclibc* \ + | -uxpv* | -beos* | -mpeix* | -udk* | -moxiebox* \ + | -interix* | -uwin* | -mks* | -rhapsody* | -darwin* | -opened* \ + | -openstep* | -oskit* | -conix* | -pw32* | -nonstopux* \ + | -storm-chaos* | -tops10* | -tenex* | -tops20* | -its* \ + | -os2* | -vos* | -palmos* | -uclinux* | -nucleus* \ + | -morphos* | -superux* | -rtmk* | -rtmk-nova* | -windiss* \ + | -powermax* | -dnix* | -nx6 | -nx7 | -sei* | -dragonfly* \ + | -skyos* | -haiku* | -rdos* | -toppers* | -drops* | -es* \ + | -onefs* | -tirtos* | -phoenix*) + # Remember, each alternative MUST END IN *, to match a version number. + ;; + -qnx*) + case $basic_machine in + x86-* | i*86-*) + ;; + *) + os=-nto$os + ;; + esac + ;; + -nto-qnx*) + ;; + -nto*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|nto|nto-qnx|'` + ;; + -sim | -es1800* | -hms* | -xray | -os68k* | -none* | -v88r* \ + | -windows* | -osx | -abug | -netware* | -os9* | -beos* | -haiku* \ + | -macos* | -mpw* | -magic* | -mmixware* | -mon960* | -lnews*) + ;; + -mac*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|mac|macos|'` + ;; + -linux-dietlibc) + os=-linux-dietlibc + ;; + -linux*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|linux|linux-gnu|'` + ;; + -sunos5*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos5|solaris2|'` + ;; + -sunos6*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sunos6|solaris3|'` + ;; + -opened*) + os=-openedition + ;; + -os400*) + os=-os400 + ;; + -wince*) + os=-wince + ;; + -osfrose*) + os=-osfrose + ;; + -osf*) + os=-osf + ;; + -utek*) + os=-bsd + ;; + -dynix*) + os=-bsd + ;; + -acis*) + os=-aos + ;; + -atheos*) + os=-atheos + ;; + -syllable*) + os=-syllable + ;; + -386bsd) + os=-bsd + ;; + -ctix* | -uts*) + os=-sysv + ;; + -nova*) + os=-rtmk-nova + ;; + -ns2 ) + os=-nextstep2 + ;; + -nsk*) + os=-nsk + ;; + # Preserve the version number of sinix5. + -sinix5.*) + os=`echo $os | sed -e 's|sinix|sysv|'` + ;; + -sinix*) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -tpf*) + os=-tpf + ;; + -triton*) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -oss*) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -svr4) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + -svr3) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + -sysvr4) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + # This must come after -sysvr4. + -sysv*) + ;; + -ose*) + os=-ose + ;; + -es1800*) + os=-ose + ;; + -xenix) + os=-xenix + ;; + -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*) + os=-mint + ;; + -aros*) + os=-aros + ;; + -zvmoe) + os=-zvmoe + ;; + -dicos*) + os=-dicos + ;; + -nacl*) + ;; + -ios) + ;; + -none) + ;; + *) + # Get rid of the `-' at the beginning of $os. + os=`echo $os | sed 's/[^-]*-//'` + echo Invalid configuration \`$1\': system \`$os\' not recognized 1>&2 + exit 1 + ;; +esac +else + +# Here we handle the default operating systems that come with various machines. +# The value should be what the vendor currently ships out the door with their +# machine or put another way, the most popular os provided with the machine. + +# Note that if you're going to try to match "-MANUFACTURER" here (say, +# "-sun"), then you have to tell the case statement up towards the top +# that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating system. Otherwise, code above +# will signal an error saying that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating +# system, and we'll never get to this point. + +case $basic_machine in + score-*) + os=-elf + ;; + spu-*) + os=-elf + ;; + *-acorn) + os=-riscix1.2 + ;; + arm*-rebel) + os=-linux + ;; + arm*-semi) + os=-aout + ;; + c4x-* | tic4x-*) + os=-coff + ;; + c8051-*) + os=-elf + ;; + hexagon-*) + os=-elf + ;; + tic54x-*) + os=-coff + ;; + tic55x-*) + os=-coff + ;; + tic6x-*) + os=-coff + ;; + # This must come before the *-dec entry. + pdp10-*) + os=-tops20 + ;; + pdp11-*) + os=-none + ;; + *-dec | vax-*) + os=-ultrix4.2 + ;; + m68*-apollo) + os=-domain + ;; + i386-sun) + os=-sunos4.0.2 + ;; + m68000-sun) + os=-sunos3 + ;; + m68*-cisco) + os=-aout + ;; + mep-*) + os=-elf + ;; + mips*-cisco) + os=-elf + ;; + mips*-*) + os=-elf + ;; + or32-*) + os=-coff + ;; + *-tti) # must be before sparc entry or we get the wrong os. + os=-sysv3 + ;; + sparc-* | *-sun) + os=-sunos4.1.1 + ;; + *-be) + os=-beos + ;; + *-haiku) + os=-haiku + ;; + *-ibm) + os=-aix + ;; + *-knuth) + os=-mmixware + ;; + *-wec) + os=-proelf + ;; + *-winbond) + os=-proelf + ;; + *-oki) + os=-proelf + ;; + *-hp) + os=-hpux + ;; + *-hitachi) + os=-hiux + ;; + i860-* | *-att | *-ncr | *-altos | *-motorola | *-convergent) + os=-sysv + ;; + *-cbm) + os=-amigaos + ;; + *-dg) + os=-dgux + ;; + *-dolphin) + os=-sysv3 + ;; + m68k-ccur) + os=-rtu + ;; + m88k-omron*) + os=-luna + ;; + *-next ) + os=-nextstep + ;; + *-sequent) + os=-ptx + ;; + *-crds) + os=-unos + ;; + *-ns) + os=-genix + ;; + i370-*) + os=-mvs + ;; + *-next) + os=-nextstep3 + ;; + *-gould) + os=-sysv + ;; + *-highlevel) + os=-bsd + ;; + *-encore) + os=-bsd + ;; + *-sgi) + os=-irix + ;; + *-siemens) + os=-sysv4 + ;; + *-masscomp) + os=-rtu + ;; + f30[01]-fujitsu | f700-fujitsu) + os=-uxpv + ;; + *-rom68k) + os=-coff + ;; + *-*bug) + os=-coff + ;; + *-apple) + os=-macos + ;; + *-atari*) + os=-mint + ;; + *) + os=-none + ;; +esac +fi + +# Here we handle the case where we know the os, and the CPU type, but not the +# manufacturer. We pick the logical manufacturer. +vendor=unknown +case $basic_machine in + *-unknown) + case $os in + -riscix*) + vendor=acorn + ;; + -sunos*) + vendor=sun + ;; + -cnk*|-aix*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -beos*) + vendor=be + ;; + -hpux*) + vendor=hp + ;; + -mpeix*) + vendor=hp + ;; + -hiux*) + vendor=hitachi + ;; + -unos*) + vendor=crds + ;; + -dgux*) + vendor=dg + ;; + -luna*) + vendor=omron + ;; + -genix*) + vendor=ns + ;; + -mvs* | -opened*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -os400*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -ptx*) + vendor=sequent + ;; + -tpf*) + vendor=ibm + ;; + -vxsim* | -vxworks* | -windiss*) + vendor=wrs + ;; + -aux*) + vendor=apple + ;; + -hms*) + vendor=hitachi + ;; + -mpw* | -macos*) + vendor=apple + ;; + -*mint | -mint[0-9]* | -*MiNT | -MiNT[0-9]*) + vendor=atari + ;; + -vos*) + vendor=stratus + ;; + esac + basic_machine=`echo $basic_machine | sed "s/unknown/$vendor/"` + ;; +esac + +echo $basic_machine$os +exit + +# Local variables: +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d" +# time-stamp-end: "'" +# End: diff --git a/configure b/configure new file mode 100755 index 0000000..21a4110 --- /dev/null +++ b/configure @@ -0,0 +1,22926 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# From configure.ac Revision: 1.583 . +# Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles. +# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69 for OpenSSH Portable. +# +# Report bugs to . +# +# +# Copyright (C) 1992-1996, 1998-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +# +# +# This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation +# gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it. +## -------------------- ## +## M4sh Initialization. ## +## -------------------- ## + +# Be more Bourne compatible +DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh +if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + emulate sh + NULLCMD=: + # Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which + # is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature. + alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"' + setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST +else + case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in #( + *posix*) : + set -o posix ;; #( + *) : + ;; +esac +fi + + +as_nl=' +' +export as_nl +# Printing a long string crashes Solaris 7 /usr/bin/printf. +as_echo='\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\' +as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo +as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo +# Prefer a ksh shell builtin over an external printf program on Solaris, +# but without wasting forks for bash or zsh. +if test -z "$BASH_VERSION$ZSH_VERSION" \ + && (test "X`print -r -- $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then + as_echo='print -r --' + as_echo_n='print -rn --' +elif (test "X`printf %s $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then + as_echo='printf %s\n' + as_echo_n='printf %s' +else + if test "X`(/usr/ucb/echo -n -n $as_echo) 2>/dev/null`" = "X-n $as_echo"; then + as_echo_body='eval /usr/ucb/echo -n "$1$as_nl"' + as_echo_n='/usr/ucb/echo -n' + else + as_echo_body='eval expr "X$1" : "X\\(.*\\)"' + as_echo_n_body='eval + arg=$1; + case $arg in #( + *"$as_nl"*) + expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)$as_nl"; + arg=`expr "X$arg" : ".*$as_nl\\(.*\\)"`;; + esac; + expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)" | tr -d "$as_nl" + ' + export as_echo_n_body + as_echo_n='sh -c $as_echo_n_body as_echo' + fi + export as_echo_body + as_echo='sh -c $as_echo_body as_echo' +fi + +# The user is always right. +if test "${PATH_SEPARATOR+set}" != set; then + PATH_SEPARATOR=: + (PATH='/bin;/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 && { + (PATH='/bin:/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 || + PATH_SEPARATOR=';' + } +fi + + +# IFS +# We need space, tab and new line, in precisely that order. Quoting is +# there to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab. +# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would disable word +# splitting by setting IFS to empty value.) +IFS=" "" $as_nl" + +# Find who we are. Look in the path if we contain no directory separator. +as_myself= +case $0 in #(( + *[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;; + *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + test -r "$as_dir/$0" && as_myself=$as_dir/$0 && break + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +# We did not find ourselves, most probably we were run as `sh COMMAND' +# in which case we are not to be found in the path. +if test "x$as_myself" = x; then + as_myself=$0 +fi +if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then + $as_echo "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# Unset variables that we do not need and which cause bugs (e.g. in +# pre-3.0 UWIN ksh). But do not cause bugs in bash 2.01; the "|| exit 1" +# suppresses any "Segmentation fault" message there. '((' could +# trigger a bug in pdksh 5.2.14. +for as_var in BASH_ENV ENV MAIL MAILPATH +do eval test x\${$as_var+set} = xset \ + && ( (unset $as_var) || exit 1) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset $as_var || : +done +PS1='$ ' +PS2='> ' +PS4='+ ' + +# NLS nuisances. +LC_ALL=C +export LC_ALL +LANGUAGE=C +export LANGUAGE + +# CDPATH. +(unset CDPATH) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset CDPATH + +# Use a proper internal environment variable to ensure we don't fall + # into an infinite loop, continuously re-executing ourselves. + if test x"${_as_can_reexec}" != xno && test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" != x; then + _as_can_reexec=no; export _as_can_reexec; + # We cannot yet assume a decent shell, so we have to provide a +# neutralization value for shells without unset; and this also +# works around shells that cannot unset nonexistent variables. +# Preserve -v and -x to the replacement shell. +BASH_ENV=/dev/null +ENV=/dev/null +(unset BASH_ENV) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset BASH_ENV ENV +case $- in # (((( + *v*x* | *x*v* ) as_opts=-vx ;; + *v* ) as_opts=-v ;; + *x* ) as_opts=-x ;; + * ) as_opts= ;; +esac +exec $CONFIG_SHELL $as_opts "$as_myself" ${1+"$@"} +# Admittedly, this is quite paranoid, since all the known shells bail +# out after a failed `exec'. +$as_echo "$0: could not re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL" >&2 +as_fn_exit 255 + fi + # We don't want this to propagate to other subprocesses. + { _as_can_reexec=; unset _as_can_reexec;} +if test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" = x; then + as_bourne_compatible="if test -n \"\${ZSH_VERSION+set}\" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + emulate sh + NULLCMD=: + # Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on \${1+\"\$@\"}, which + # is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature. + alias -g '\${1+\"\$@\"}'='\"\$@\"' + setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST +else + case \`(set -o) 2>/dev/null\` in #( + *posix*) : + set -o posix ;; #( + *) : + ;; +esac +fi +" + as_required="as_fn_return () { (exit \$1); } +as_fn_success () { as_fn_return 0; } +as_fn_failure () { as_fn_return 1; } +as_fn_ret_success () { return 0; } +as_fn_ret_failure () { return 1; } + +exitcode=0 +as_fn_success || { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_success failed.; } +as_fn_failure && { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_failure succeeded.; } +as_fn_ret_success || { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_ret_success failed.; } +as_fn_ret_failure && { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_ret_failure succeeded.; } +if ( set x; as_fn_ret_success y && test x = \"\$1\" ); then : + +else + exitcode=1; echo positional parameters were not saved. +fi +test x\$exitcode = x0 || exit 1 +test -x / || exit 1" + as_suggested=" as_lineno_1=";as_suggested=$as_suggested$LINENO;as_suggested=$as_suggested" as_lineno_1a=\$LINENO + as_lineno_2=";as_suggested=$as_suggested$LINENO;as_suggested=$as_suggested" as_lineno_2a=\$LINENO + eval 'test \"x\$as_lineno_1'\$as_run'\" != \"x\$as_lineno_2'\$as_run'\" && + test \"x\`expr \$as_lineno_1'\$as_run' + 1\`\" = \"x\$as_lineno_2'\$as_run'\"' || exit 1 +test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2 || exit 1" + if (eval "$as_required") 2>/dev/null; then : + as_have_required=yes +else + as_have_required=no +fi + if test x$as_have_required = xyes && (eval "$as_suggested") 2>/dev/null; then : + +else + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +as_found=false +for as_dir in /bin$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/bin$PATH_SEPARATOR$PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + as_found=: + case $as_dir in #( + /*) + for as_base in sh bash ksh sh5; do + # Try only shells that exist, to save several forks. + as_shell=$as_dir/$as_base + if { test -f "$as_shell" || test -f "$as_shell.exe"; } && + { $as_echo "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_required" | as_run=a "$as_shell"; } 2>/dev/null; then : + CONFIG_SHELL=$as_shell as_have_required=yes + if { $as_echo "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_suggested" | as_run=a "$as_shell"; } 2>/dev/null; then : + break 2 +fi +fi + done;; + esac + as_found=false +done +$as_found || { if { test -f "$SHELL" || test -f "$SHELL.exe"; } && + { $as_echo "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_required" | as_run=a "$SHELL"; } 2>/dev/null; then : + CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL as_have_required=yes +fi; } +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + + if test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" != x; then : + export CONFIG_SHELL + # We cannot yet assume a decent shell, so we have to provide a +# neutralization value for shells without unset; and this also +# works around shells that cannot unset nonexistent variables. +# Preserve -v and -x to the replacement shell. +BASH_ENV=/dev/null +ENV=/dev/null +(unset BASH_ENV) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset BASH_ENV ENV +case $- in # (((( + *v*x* | *x*v* ) as_opts=-vx ;; + *v* ) as_opts=-v ;; + *x* ) as_opts=-x ;; + * ) as_opts= ;; +esac +exec $CONFIG_SHELL $as_opts "$as_myself" ${1+"$@"} +# Admittedly, this is quite paranoid, since all the known shells bail +# out after a failed `exec'. +$as_echo "$0: could not re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL" >&2 +exit 255 +fi + + if test x$as_have_required = xno; then : + $as_echo "$0: This script requires a shell more modern than all" + $as_echo "$0: the shells that I found on your system." + if test x${ZSH_VERSION+set} = xset ; then + $as_echo "$0: In particular, zsh $ZSH_VERSION has bugs and should" + $as_echo "$0: be upgraded to zsh 4.3.4 or later." + else + $as_echo "$0: Please tell bug-autoconf@gnu.org and +$0: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org about your system, +$0: including any error possibly output before this +$0: message. Then install a modern shell, or manually run +$0: the script under such a shell if you do have one." + fi + exit 1 +fi +fi +fi +SHELL=${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh} +export SHELL +# Unset more variables known to interfere with behavior of common tools. +CLICOLOR_FORCE= GREP_OPTIONS= +unset CLICOLOR_FORCE GREP_OPTIONS + +## --------------------- ## +## M4sh Shell Functions. ## +## --------------------- ## +# as_fn_unset VAR +# --------------- +# Portably unset VAR. +as_fn_unset () +{ + { eval $1=; unset $1;} +} +as_unset=as_fn_unset + +# as_fn_set_status STATUS +# ----------------------- +# Set $? to STATUS, without forking. +as_fn_set_status () +{ + return $1 +} # as_fn_set_status + +# as_fn_exit STATUS +# ----------------- +# Exit the shell with STATUS, even in a "trap 0" or "set -e" context. +as_fn_exit () +{ + set +e + as_fn_set_status $1 + exit $1 +} # as_fn_exit + +# as_fn_mkdir_p +# ------------- +# Create "$as_dir" as a directory, including parents if necessary. +as_fn_mkdir_p () +{ + + case $as_dir in #( + -*) as_dir=./$as_dir;; + esac + test -d "$as_dir" || eval $as_mkdir_p || { + as_dirs= + while :; do + case $as_dir in #( + *\'*) as_qdir=`$as_echo "$as_dir" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; #'( + *) as_qdir=$as_dir;; + esac + as_dirs="'$as_qdir' $as_dirs" + as_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_dir" || +$as_expr X"$as_dir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \ + X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \ + X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \ + X"$as_dir" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null || +$as_echo X"$as_dir" | + sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\(\/\/\)$/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\(\/\).*/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + s/.*/./; q'` + test -d "$as_dir" && break + done + test -z "$as_dirs" || eval "mkdir $as_dirs" + } || test -d "$as_dir" || as_fn_error $? "cannot create directory $as_dir" + + +} # as_fn_mkdir_p + +# as_fn_executable_p FILE +# ----------------------- +# Test if FILE is an executable regular file. +as_fn_executable_p () +{ + test -f "$1" && test -x "$1" +} # as_fn_executable_p +# as_fn_append VAR VALUE +# ---------------------- +# Append the text in VALUE to the end of the definition contained in VAR. Take +# advantage of any shell optimizations that allow amortized linear growth over +# repeated appends, instead of the typical quadratic growth present in naive +# implementations. +if (eval "as_var=1; as_var+=2; test x\$as_var = x12") 2>/dev/null; then : + eval 'as_fn_append () + { + eval $1+=\$2 + }' +else + as_fn_append () + { + eval $1=\$$1\$2 + } +fi # as_fn_append + +# as_fn_arith ARG... +# ------------------ +# Perform arithmetic evaluation on the ARGs, and store the result in the +# global $as_val. Take advantage of shells that can avoid forks. The arguments +# must be portable across $(()) and expr. +if (eval "test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2") 2>/dev/null; then : + eval 'as_fn_arith () + { + as_val=$(( $* )) + }' +else + as_fn_arith () + { + as_val=`expr "$@" || test $? -eq 1` + } +fi # as_fn_arith + + +# as_fn_error STATUS ERROR [LINENO LOG_FD] +# ---------------------------------------- +# Output "`basename $0`: error: ERROR" to stderr. If LINENO and LOG_FD are +# provided, also output the error to LOG_FD, referencing LINENO. Then exit the +# script with STATUS, using 1 if that was 0. +as_fn_error () +{ + as_status=$1; test $as_status -eq 0 && as_status=1 + if test "$4"; then + as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$3"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: $2" >&$4 + fi + $as_echo "$as_me: error: $2" >&2 + as_fn_exit $as_status +} # as_fn_error + +if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 && + test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then + as_expr=expr +else + as_expr=false +fi + +if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then + as_basename=basename +else + as_basename=false +fi + +if (as_dir=`dirname -- /` && test "X$as_dir" = X/) >/dev/null 2>&1; then + as_dirname=dirname +else + as_dirname=false +fi + +as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" || +$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \ + X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \ + X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null || +$as_echo X/"$0" | + sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\/\(\/\).*/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + s/.*/./; q'` + +# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges. +as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' +as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' +as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS +as_cr_digits='0123456789' +as_cr_alnum=$as_cr_Letters$as_cr_digits + + + as_lineno_1=$LINENO as_lineno_1a=$LINENO + as_lineno_2=$LINENO as_lineno_2a=$LINENO + eval 'test "x$as_lineno_1'$as_run'" != "x$as_lineno_2'$as_run'" && + test "x`expr $as_lineno_1'$as_run' + 1`" = "x$as_lineno_2'$as_run'"' || { + # Blame Lee E. McMahon (1931-1989) for sed's syntax. :-) + sed -n ' + p + /[$]LINENO/= + ' <$as_myself | + sed ' + s/[$]LINENO.*/&-/ + t lineno + b + :lineno + N + :loop + s/[$]LINENO\([^'$as_cr_alnum'_].*\n\)\(.*\)/\2\1\2/ + t loop + s/-\n.*// + ' >$as_me.lineno && + chmod +x "$as_me.lineno" || + { $as_echo "$as_me: error: cannot create $as_me.lineno; rerun with a POSIX shell" >&2; as_fn_exit 1; } + + # If we had to re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL, we're ensured to have + # already done that, so ensure we don't try to do so again and fall + # in an infinite loop. This has already happened in practice. + _as_can_reexec=no; export _as_can_reexec + # Don't try to exec as it changes $[0], causing all sort of problems + # (the dirname of $[0] is not the place where we might find the + # original and so on. Autoconf is especially sensitive to this). + . "./$as_me.lineno" + # Exit status is that of the last command. + exit +} + +ECHO_C= ECHO_N= ECHO_T= +case `echo -n x` in #((((( +-n*) + case `echo 'xy\c'` in + *c*) ECHO_T=' ';; # ECHO_T is single tab character. + xy) ECHO_C='\c';; + *) echo `echo ksh88 bug on AIX 6.1` > /dev/null + ECHO_T=' ';; + esac;; +*) + ECHO_N='-n';; +esac + +rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.file +if test -d conf$$.dir; then + rm -f conf$$.dir/conf$$.file +else + rm -f conf$$.dir + mkdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null +fi +if (echo >conf$$.file) 2>/dev/null; then + if ln -s conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then + as_ln_s='ln -s' + # ... but there are two gotchas: + # 1) On MSYS, both `ln -s file dir' and `ln file dir' fail. + # 2) DJGPP < 2.04 has no symlinks; `ln -s' creates a wrapper executable. + # In both cases, we have to default to `cp -pR'. + ln -s conf$$.file conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null && test ! -f conf$$.exe || + as_ln_s='cp -pR' + elif ln conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then + as_ln_s=ln + else + as_ln_s='cp -pR' + 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[VAR=VALUE]... + +To assign environment variables (e.g., CC, CFLAGS...), specify them as +VAR=VALUE. See below for descriptions of some of the useful variables. + +Defaults for the options are specified in brackets. + +Configuration: + -h, --help display this help and exit + --help=short display options specific to this package + --help=recursive display the short help of all the included packages + -V, --version display version information and exit + -q, --quiet, --silent do not print \`checking ...' messages + --cache-file=FILE cache test results in FILE [disabled] + -C, --config-cache alias for \`--cache-file=config.cache' + -n, --no-create do not create output files + --srcdir=DIR find the sources in DIR [configure dir or \`..'] + +Installation directories: + --prefix=PREFIX install architecture-independent files in PREFIX + [$ac_default_prefix] + --exec-prefix=EPREFIX install architecture-dependent files in EPREFIX + [PREFIX] + +By default, \`make install' will install all the files in +\`$ac_default_prefix/bin', \`$ac_default_prefix/lib' etc. You can specify +an installation prefix other than \`$ac_default_prefix' using \`--prefix', +for instance \`--prefix=\$HOME'. + +For better control, use the options below. + +Fine tuning of the installation directories: + --bindir=DIR user executables [EPREFIX/bin] + --sbindir=DIR system admin executables [EPREFIX/sbin] + --libexecdir=DIR program executables [EPREFIX/libexec] + --sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc] + --sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com] + --localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var] + --libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib] + --includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include] + --oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include] + --datarootdir=DIR read-only arch.-independent data root [PREFIX/share] + --datadir=DIR read-only architecture-independent data [DATAROOTDIR] + --infodir=DIR info documentation [DATAROOTDIR/info] + --localedir=DIR locale-dependent data [DATAROOTDIR/locale] + --mandir=DIR man documentation [DATAROOTDIR/man] + --docdir=DIR documentation root [DATAROOTDIR/doc/openssh] + --htmldir=DIR html documentation [DOCDIR] + --dvidir=DIR dvi documentation [DOCDIR] + --pdfdir=DIR pdf documentation [DOCDIR] + --psdir=DIR ps documentation [DOCDIR] +_ACEOF + + cat <<\_ACEOF + +System types: + --build=BUILD configure for building on BUILD [guessed] + --host=HOST cross-compile to build programs to run on HOST [BUILD] +_ACEOF +fi + +if test -n "$ac_init_help"; then + case $ac_init_help in + short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of OpenSSH Portable:";; + esac + cat <<\_ACEOF + +Optional Features: + --disable-option-checking ignore unrecognized --enable/--with options + --disable-FEATURE do not include FEATURE (same as --enable-FEATURE=no) + --enable-FEATURE[=ARG] include FEATURE [ARG=yes] + --disable-largefile omit support for large files + --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no] + --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install + --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login no + --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected no + --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected no + --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected no + --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected no + --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected no + --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) no + --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. (uwtmp) no + --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. (uwtmpx) no + +Optional Packages: + --with-PACKAGE[=ARG] use PACKAGE [ARG=yes] + --without-PACKAGE do not use PACKAGE (same as --with-PACKAGE=no) + --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; 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" >&6; } +if eval \${$3+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + eval "$3=no" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$4 +int +main () +{ +if (sizeof ($2)) + return 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$4 +int +main () +{ +if (sizeof (($2))) + return 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +else + eval "$3=yes" +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +eval ac_res=\$$3 + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; } + eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno + +} # ac_fn_c_check_type + +# ac_fn_c_compute_int LINENO EXPR VAR INCLUDES +# -------------------------------------------- +# Tries to find the compile-time value of EXPR in a program that includes +# INCLUDES, setting VAR accordingly. Returns whether the value could be +# computed +ac_fn_c_compute_int () +{ + as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then + # Depending upon the size, compute the lo and hi bounds. +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$4 +int +main () +{ +static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) >= 0)]; +test_array [0] = 0; +return test_array [0]; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_lo=0 ac_mid=0 + while :; do + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$4 +int +main () +{ +static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) <= $ac_mid)]; +test_array [0] = 0; +return test_array [0]; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_hi=$ac_mid; break +else + as_fn_arith $ac_mid + 1 && ac_lo=$as_val + if test $ac_lo -le $ac_mid; then + ac_lo= ac_hi= + break + fi + as_fn_arith 2 '*' $ac_mid + 1 && ac_mid=$as_val +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + done +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$4 +int +main () +{ +static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) < 0)]; +test_array [0] = 0; +return test_array [0]; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_hi=-1 ac_mid=-1 + while :; do + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$4 +int +main () +{ +static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) >= $ac_mid)]; +test_array [0] = 0; +return test_array [0]; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_lo=$ac_mid; break +else + as_fn_arith '(' $ac_mid ')' - 1 && ac_hi=$as_val + if test $ac_mid -le $ac_hi; then + ac_lo= ac_hi= + break + fi + as_fn_arith 2 '*' $ac_mid && ac_mid=$as_val +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + done +else + ac_lo= ac_hi= +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +# Binary search between lo and hi bounds. +while test "x$ac_lo" != "x$ac_hi"; do + as_fn_arith '(' $ac_hi - $ac_lo ')' / 2 + $ac_lo && ac_mid=$as_val + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$4 +int +main () +{ +static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) <= $ac_mid)]; +test_array [0] = 0; +return test_array [0]; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_hi=$ac_mid +else + as_fn_arith '(' $ac_mid ')' + 1 && ac_lo=$as_val +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +done +case $ac_lo in #(( +?*) eval "$3=\$ac_lo"; ac_retval=0 ;; +'') ac_retval=1 ;; +esac + else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$4 +static long int longval () { return $2; } +static unsigned long int ulongval () { return $2; } +#include +#include +int +main () +{ + + FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.val", "w"); + if (! f) + return 1; + if (($2) < 0) + { + long int i = longval (); + if (i != ($2)) + return 1; + fprintf (f, "%ld", i); + } + else + { + unsigned long int i = ulongval (); + if (i != ($2)) + return 1; + fprintf (f, "%lu", i); + } + /* Do not output a trailing newline, as this causes \r\n confusion + on some platforms. */ + return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + echo >>conftest.val; read $3 &5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $2.$3... " >&6; } +if eval \${$4+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$5 +int +main () +{ +static $2 ac_aggr; +if (ac_aggr.$3) +return 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + eval "$4=yes" +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$5 +int +main () +{ +static $2 ac_aggr; +if (sizeof ac_aggr.$3) +return 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + eval "$4=yes" +else + eval "$4=no" +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +eval ac_res=\$$4 + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; } + eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno + +} # ac_fn_c_check_member +cat >config.log <<_ACEOF +This file contains any messages produced by compilers while +running configure, to aid debugging if configure makes a mistake. + +It was created by OpenSSH $as_me Portable, which was +generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69. Invocation command line was + + $ $0 $@ + +_ACEOF +exec 5>>config.log +{ +cat <<_ASUNAME +## --------- ## +## Platform. ## +## --------- ## + +hostname = `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q` +uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` + +/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` + +/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +/usr/bin/hostinfo = `(/usr/bin/hostinfo) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +/bin/machine = `(/bin/machine) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` +/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown` + +_ASUNAME + +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + $as_echo "PATH: $as_dir" + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +} >&5 + +cat >&5 <<_ACEOF + + +## ----------- ## +## Core tests. ## +## ----------- ## + +_ACEOF + + +# Keep a trace of the command line. +# Strip out --no-create and --no-recursion so they do not pile up. +# Strip out --silent because we don't want to record it for future runs. +# Also quote any args containing shell meta-characters. +# Make two passes to allow for proper duplicate-argument suppression. +ac_configure_args= +ac_configure_args0= +ac_configure_args1= +ac_must_keep_next=false +for ac_pass in 1 2 +do + for ac_arg + do + case $ac_arg in + -no-create | --no-c* | -n | -no-recursion | --no-r*) continue ;; + -q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \ + | -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil) + continue ;; + *\'*) + ac_arg=`$as_echo "$ac_arg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;; + esac + case $ac_pass in + 1) as_fn_append ac_configure_args0 " '$ac_arg'" ;; + 2) + as_fn_append ac_configure_args1 " '$ac_arg'" + if test $ac_must_keep_next = true; then + ac_must_keep_next=false # Got value, back to normal. + else + case $ac_arg in + *=* | --config-cache | -C | -disable-* | --disable-* \ + | -enable-* | --enable-* | -gas | --g* | -nfp | --nf* \ + | -q | -quiet | --q* | -silent | --sil* | -v | -verb* \ + | -with-* | --with-* | -without-* | --without-* | --x) + case "$ac_configure_args0 " in + "$ac_configure_args1"*" '$ac_arg' "* ) continue ;; + esac + ;; + -* ) ac_must_keep_next=true ;; + esac + fi + as_fn_append ac_configure_args " '$ac_arg'" + ;; + esac + done +done +{ ac_configure_args0=; unset ac_configure_args0;} +{ ac_configure_args1=; unset ac_configure_args1;} + +# When interrupted or exit'd, cleanup temporary files, and complete +# config.log. We remove comments because anyway the quotes in there +# would cause problems or look ugly. +# WARNING: Use '\'' to represent an apostrophe within the trap. +# WARNING: Do not start the trap code with a newline, due to a FreeBSD 4.0 bug. +trap 'exit_status=$? + # Save into config.log some information that might help in debugging. + { + echo + + $as_echo "## ---------------- ## +## Cache variables. ## +## ---------------- ##" + echo + # The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values, +( + for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n '\''s/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'\''`; do + eval ac_val=\$$ac_var + case $ac_val in #( + *${as_nl}*) + case $ac_var in #( + *_cv_*) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&2;} ;; + esac + case $ac_var in #( + _ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #( + BASH_ARGV | BASH_SOURCE) eval $ac_var= ;; #( + *) { eval $ac_var=; unset $ac_var;} ;; + esac ;; + esac + done + (set) 2>&1 | + case $as_nl`(ac_space='\'' '\''; set) 2>&1` in #( + *${as_nl}ac_space=\ *) + sed -n \ + "s/'\''/'\''\\\\'\'''\''/g; + s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\''\\2'\''/p" + ;; #( + *) + sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p" + ;; + esac | + sort +) + echo + + $as_echo "## ----------------- ## +## Output variables. ## +## ----------------- ##" + echo + for ac_var in $ac_subst_vars + do + eval ac_val=\$$ac_var + case $ac_val in + *\'\''*) ac_val=`$as_echo "$ac_val" | sed "s/'\''/'\''\\\\\\\\'\'''\''/g"`;; + esac + $as_echo "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''" + done | sort + echo + + if test -n "$ac_subst_files"; then + $as_echo "## ------------------- ## +## File substitutions. ## +## ------------------- ##" + echo + for ac_var in $ac_subst_files + do + eval ac_val=\$$ac_var + case $ac_val in + *\'\''*) ac_val=`$as_echo "$ac_val" | sed "s/'\''/'\''\\\\\\\\'\'''\''/g"`;; + esac + $as_echo "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''" + done | sort + echo + fi + + if test -s confdefs.h; then + $as_echo "## ----------- ## +## confdefs.h. ## +## ----------- ##" + echo + cat confdefs.h + echo + fi + test "$ac_signal" != 0 && + $as_echo "$as_me: caught signal $ac_signal" + $as_echo "$as_me: exit $exit_status" + } >&5 + rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* && + rm -f -r conftest* confdefs* conf$$* $ac_clean_files && + exit $exit_status +' 0 +for ac_signal in 1 2 13 15; do + trap 'ac_signal='$ac_signal'; as_fn_exit 1' $ac_signal +done +ac_signal=0 + +# confdefs.h avoids OS command line length limits that DEFS can exceed. +rm -f -r conftest* confdefs.h + +$as_echo "/* confdefs.h */" > confdefs.h + +# Predefined preprocessor variables. + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define PACKAGE_NAME "$PACKAGE_NAME" +_ACEOF + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define PACKAGE_TARNAME "$PACKAGE_TARNAME" +_ACEOF + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define PACKAGE_VERSION "$PACKAGE_VERSION" +_ACEOF + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define PACKAGE_STRING "$PACKAGE_STRING" +_ACEOF + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "$PACKAGE_BUGREPORT" +_ACEOF + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define PACKAGE_URL "$PACKAGE_URL" +_ACEOF + + +# Let the site file select an alternate cache file if it wants to. +# Prefer an explicitly selected file to automatically selected ones. +ac_site_file1=NONE +ac_site_file2=NONE +if test -n "$CONFIG_SITE"; then + # We do not want a PATH search for config.site. + case $CONFIG_SITE in #(( + -*) ac_site_file1=./$CONFIG_SITE;; + */*) ac_site_file1=$CONFIG_SITE;; + *) ac_site_file1=./$CONFIG_SITE;; + esac +elif test "x$prefix" != xNONE; then + ac_site_file1=$prefix/share/config.site + ac_site_file2=$prefix/etc/config.site +else + ac_site_file1=$ac_default_prefix/share/config.site + ac_site_file2=$ac_default_prefix/etc/config.site +fi +for ac_site_file in "$ac_site_file1" "$ac_site_file2" +do + test "x$ac_site_file" = xNONE && continue + if test /dev/null != "$ac_site_file" && test -r "$ac_site_file"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: loading site script $ac_site_file" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: loading site script $ac_site_file" >&6;} + sed 's/^/| /' "$ac_site_file" >&5 + . "$ac_site_file" \ + || { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error $? "failed to load site script $ac_site_file +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } + fi +done + +if test -r "$cache_file"; then + # Some versions of bash will fail to source /dev/null (special files + # actually), so we avoid doing that. DJGPP emulates it as a regular file. + if test /dev/null != "$cache_file" && test -f "$cache_file"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: loading cache $cache_file" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: loading cache $cache_file" >&6;} + case $cache_file in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) . "$cache_file";; + *) . "./$cache_file";; + esac + fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating cache $cache_file" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: creating cache $cache_file" >&6;} + >$cache_file +fi + +# Check that the precious variables saved in the cache have kept the same +# value. +ac_cache_corrupted=false +for ac_var in $ac_precious_vars; do + eval ac_old_set=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_set + eval ac_new_set=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_set + eval ac_old_val=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_value + eval ac_new_val=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_value + case $ac_old_set,$ac_new_set in + set,) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&2;} + ac_cache_corrupted=: ;; + ,set) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&2;} + ac_cache_corrupted=: ;; + ,);; + *) + if test "x$ac_old_val" != "x$ac_new_val"; then + # differences in whitespace do not lead to failure. + ac_old_val_w=`echo x $ac_old_val` + ac_new_val_w=`echo x $ac_new_val` + if test "$ac_old_val_w" != "$ac_new_val_w"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&2;} + ac_cache_corrupted=: + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: warning: ignoring whitespace changes in \`$ac_var' since the previous run:" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: warning: ignoring whitespace changes in \`$ac_var' since the previous run:" >&2;} + eval $ac_var=\$ac_old_val + fi + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: former value: \`$ac_old_val'" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: former value: \`$ac_old_val'" >&2;} + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: current value: \`$ac_new_val'" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: current value: \`$ac_new_val'" >&2;} + fi;; + esac + # Pass precious variables to config.status. + if test "$ac_new_set" = set; then + case $ac_new_val in + *\'*) ac_arg=$ac_var=`$as_echo "$ac_new_val" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;; + *) ac_arg=$ac_var=$ac_new_val ;; + esac + case " $ac_configure_args " in + *" '$ac_arg' "*) ;; # Avoid dups. Use of quotes ensures accuracy. + *) as_fn_append ac_configure_args " '$ac_arg'" ;; + esac + fi +done +if $ac_cache_corrupted; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&2;} + as_fn_error $? "run \`make distclean' and/or \`rm $cache_file' and start over" "$LINENO" 5 +fi +## -------------------- ## +## Main body of script. ## +## -------------------- ## + +ac_ext=c +ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' +ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5' +ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5' +ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu + + + + +ac_ext=c +ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' +ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5' +ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5' +ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu + + +ac_config_headers="$ac_config_headers config.h" + +ac_ext=c +ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' +ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5' +ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5' +ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu +if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}gcc", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}gcc; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_CC+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$CC"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="${ac_tool_prefix}gcc" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC +if test -n "$CC"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CC" >&5 +$as_echo "$CC" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +fi +if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_CC"; then + ac_ct_CC=$CC + # Extract the first word of "gcc", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy gcc; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_ct_CC" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="gcc" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +ac_ct_CC=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC +if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_CC" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_ct_CC" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + if test "x$ac_ct_CC" = x; then + CC="" + else + case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in +yes:) +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} +ac_tool_warned=yes ;; +esac + CC=$ac_ct_CC + fi +else + CC="$ac_cv_prog_CC" +fi + +if test -z "$CC"; then + if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}cc", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}cc; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_CC+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$CC"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="${ac_tool_prefix}cc" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC +if test -n "$CC"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CC" >&5 +$as_echo "$CC" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + fi +fi +if test -z "$CC"; then + # Extract the first word of "cc", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy cc; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_CC+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$CC"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test. +else + ac_prog_rejected=no +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + if test "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" = "/usr/ucb/cc"; then + ac_prog_rejected=yes + continue + fi + ac_cv_prog_CC="cc" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +if test $ac_prog_rejected = yes; then + # We found a bogon in the path, so make sure we never use it. + set dummy $ac_cv_prog_CC + shift + if test $# != 0; then + # We chose a different compiler from the bogus one. + # However, it has the same basename, so the bogon will be chosen + # first if we set CC to just the basename; use the full file name. + shift + ac_cv_prog_CC="$as_dir/$ac_word${1+' '}$@" + fi +fi +fi +fi +CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC +if test -n "$CC"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CC" >&5 +$as_echo "$CC" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +fi +if test -z "$CC"; then + if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + for ac_prog in cl.exe + do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_CC+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$CC"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_CC="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC +if test -n "$CC"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CC" >&5 +$as_echo "$CC" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + test -n "$CC" && break + done +fi +if test -z "$CC"; then + ac_ct_CC=$CC + for ac_prog in cl.exe +do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_ct_CC" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_prog" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +ac_ct_CC=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC +if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_CC" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_ct_CC" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + test -n "$ac_ct_CC" && break +done + + if test "x$ac_ct_CC" = x; then + CC="" + else + case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in +yes:) +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} +ac_tool_warned=yes ;; +esac + CC=$ac_ct_CC + fi +fi + +fi + + +test -z "$CC" && { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error $? "no acceptable C compiler found in \$PATH +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } + +# Provide some information about the compiler. +$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for C compiler version" >&5 +set X $ac_compile +ac_compiler=$2 +for ac_option in --version -v -V -qversion; do + { { ac_try="$ac_compiler $ac_option >&5" +case "(($ac_try" in + *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;; + *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;; +esac +eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\"" +$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5 + (eval "$ac_compiler $ac_option >&5") 2>conftest.err + ac_status=$? + if test -s conftest.err; then + sed '10a\ +... rest of stderr output deleted ... + 10q' conftest.err >conftest.er1 + cat conftest.er1 >&5 + fi + rm -f conftest.er1 conftest.err + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5 + test $ac_status = 0; } +done + +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files +ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files a.out a.out.dSYM a.exe b.out" +# Try to create an executable without -o first, disregard a.out. +# It will help us diagnose broken compilers, and finding out an intuition +# of exeext. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether the C compiler works" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether the C compiler works... " >&6; } +ac_link_default=`$as_echo "$ac_link" | sed 's/ -o *conftest[^ ]*//'` + +# The possible output files: +ac_files="a.out conftest.exe conftest a.exe a_out.exe b.out conftest.*" + +ac_rmfiles= +for ac_file in $ac_files +do + case $ac_file in + *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj ) ;; + * ) ac_rmfiles="$ac_rmfiles $ac_file";; + esac +done +rm -f $ac_rmfiles + +if { { ac_try="$ac_link_default" +case "(($ac_try" in + *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;; + *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;; +esac +eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\"" +$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5 + (eval "$ac_link_default") 2>&5 + ac_status=$? + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5 + test $ac_status = 0; }; then : + # Autoconf-2.13 could set the ac_cv_exeext variable to `no'. +# So ignore a value of `no', otherwise this would lead to `EXEEXT = no' +# in a Makefile. We should not override ac_cv_exeext if it was cached, +# so that the user can short-circuit this test for compilers unknown to +# Autoconf. +for ac_file in $ac_files '' +do + test -f "$ac_file" || continue + case $ac_file in + *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj ) + ;; + [ab].out ) + # We found the default executable, but exeext='' is most + # certainly right. + break;; + *.* ) + if test "${ac_cv_exeext+set}" = set && test "$ac_cv_exeext" != no; + then :; else + ac_cv_exeext=`expr "$ac_file" : '[^.]*\(\..*\)'` + fi + # We set ac_cv_exeext here because the later test for it is not + # safe: cross compilers may not add the suffix if given an `-o' + # argument, so we may need to know it at that point already. + # Even if this section looks crufty: it has the advantage of + # actually working. + break;; + * ) + break;; + esac +done +test "$ac_cv_exeext" = no && ac_cv_exeext= + +else + ac_file='' +fi +if test -z "$ac_file"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +$as_echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5 +sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + +{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error 77 "C compiler cannot create executables +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for C compiler default output file name" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for C compiler default output file name... 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For instance with Cygwin, `ls conftest' will +# work properly (i.e., refer to `conftest.exe'), while it won't with +# `rm'. +for ac_file in conftest.exe conftest conftest.*; do + test -f "$ac_file" || continue + case $ac_file in + *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj ) ;; + *.* ) ac_cv_exeext=`expr "$ac_file" : '[^.]*\(\..*\)'` + break;; + * ) break;; + esac +done +else + { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error $? "cannot compute suffix of executables: cannot compile and link +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } +fi +rm -f conftest conftest$ac_cv_exeext +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_exeext" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_exeext" >&6; } + +rm -f conftest.$ac_ext +EXEEXT=$ac_cv_exeext +ac_exeext=$EXEEXT +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include +int +main () +{ +FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.out", "w"); + return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files conftest.out" +# Check that the compiler produces executables we can run. If not, either +# the compiler is broken, or we cross compile. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are cross compiling" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether we are cross compiling... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" != yes; then + { { ac_try="$ac_link" +case "(($ac_try" in + *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;; + *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;; +esac +eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\"" +$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5 + (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5 + ac_status=$? + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5 + test $ac_status = 0; } + if { ac_try='./conftest$ac_cv_exeext' + { { case "(($ac_try" in + *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;; + *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;; +esac +eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\"" +$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5 + (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5 + ac_status=$? + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5 + test $ac_status = 0; }; }; then + cross_compiling=no + else + if test "$cross_compiling" = maybe; then + cross_compiling=yes + else + { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error $? "cannot run C compiled programs. +If you meant to cross compile, use \`--host'. +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } + fi + fi +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $cross_compiling" >&5 +$as_echo "$cross_compiling" >&6; } + +rm -f conftest.$ac_ext conftest$ac_cv_exeext conftest.out +ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for suffix of object files" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for suffix of object files... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_objext+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +rm -f conftest.o conftest.obj +if { { ac_try="$ac_compile" +case "(($ac_try" in + *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;; + *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;; +esac +eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\"" +$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5 + (eval "$ac_compile") 2>&5 + ac_status=$? + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5 + test $ac_status = 0; }; then : + for ac_file in conftest.o conftest.obj conftest.*; do + test -f "$ac_file" || continue; + case $ac_file in + *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM ) ;; + *) ac_cv_objext=`expr "$ac_file" : '.*\.\(.*\)'` + break;; + esac +done +else + $as_echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5 +sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5 + +{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error $? "cannot compute suffix of object files: cannot compile +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } +fi +rm -f conftest.$ac_cv_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_objext" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_objext" >&6; } +OBJEXT=$ac_cv_objext +ac_objext=$OBJEXT +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +int +main () +{ +#ifndef __GNUC__ + choke me +#endif + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_compiler_gnu=yes +else + ac_compiler_gnu=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu=$ac_compiler_gnu + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&6; } +if test $ac_compiler_gnu = yes; then + GCC=yes +else + GCC= +fi +ac_test_CFLAGS=${CFLAGS+set} +ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC accepts -g" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC accepts -g... 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It's necessary to write '\x00'==0 to get something + that's true only with -std. */ +int osf4_cc_array ['\x00' == 0 ? 1 : -1]; + +/* IBM C 6 for AIX is almost-ANSI by default, but it replaces macro parameters + inside strings and character constants. */ +#define FOO(x) 'x' +int xlc6_cc_array[FOO(a) == 'x' ? 1 : -1]; + +int test (int i, double x); +struct s1 {int (*f) (int a);}; +struct s2 {int (*f) (double a);}; +int pairnames (int, char **, FILE *(*)(struct buf *, struct stat *, int), int, int); +int argc; +char **argv; +int +main () +{ +return f (e, argv, 0) != argv[0] || f (e, argv, 1) != argv[1]; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_arg in '' -qlanglvl=extc89 -qlanglvl=ansi -std \ + -Ae "-Aa -D_HPUX_SOURCE" "-Xc -D__EXTENSIONS__" +do + CC="$ac_save_CC $ac_arg" + if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_prog_cc_c89=$ac_arg +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext + test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" != "xno" && break +done +rm -f conftest.$ac_ext +CC=$ac_save_CC + +fi +# AC_CACHE_VAL +case "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" in + x) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: none needed" >&5 +$as_echo "none needed" >&6; } ;; + xno) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: unsupported" >&5 +$as_echo "unsupported" >&6; } ;; + *) + CC="$CC $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&6; } ;; +esac +if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" != xno; then : + +fi + +ac_ext=c +ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' +ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5' +ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5' +ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu + +ac_aux_dir= +for ac_dir in "$srcdir" "$srcdir/.." 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Now check whether nonexistent headers + # can be detected and how. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : + # Broken: success on invalid input. +continue +else + # Passes both tests. +ac_preproc_ok=: +break +fi +rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext + +done +# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped. +rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext +if $ac_preproc_ok; then : + break +fi + + done + ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP + +fi + CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP +else + ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5 +$as_echo "$CPP" >&6; } +ac_preproc_ok=false +for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes +do + # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc + # with a fresh cross-compiler works. + # Prefer to if __STDC__ is defined, since + # exists even on freestanding compilers. + # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser, + # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#ifdef __STDC__ +# include +#else +# include +#endif + Syntax error +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : + +else + # Broken: fails on valid input. +continue +fi +rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext + + # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers + # can be detected and how. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : + # Broken: success on invalid input. +continue +else + # Passes both tests. +ac_preproc_ok=: +break +fi +rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext + +done +# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped. +rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext +if $ac_preproc_ok; then : + +else + { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error $? 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" >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1 + then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E" + else + if test -z "$EGREP"; then + ac_path_EGREP_found=false + # Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_prog in egrep; do + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" + as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_EGREP" || continue +# Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found. + # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP +case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in +*GNU*) + ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;; +*) + ac_count=0 + $as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in" + while : + do + cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp" + mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in" + cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl" + $as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl" + "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break + diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break + as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val + if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then + # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one + ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" + ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count + fi + # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough + test $ac_count -gt 10 && break + done + rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;; +esac + + $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3 + done + done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then + as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5 + fi +else + ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP +fi + + fi +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; } + EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP" + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ANSI C header files" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ANSI C header files... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_header_stdc+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_header_stdc=yes +else + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + # SunOS 4.x string.h does not declare mem*, contrary to ANSI. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "memchr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + +else + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + # ISC 2.0.2 stdlib.h does not declare free, contrary to ANSI. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "free" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + +else + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + # /bin/cc in Irix-4.0.5 gets non-ANSI ctype macros unless using -ansi. + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + : +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include +#include +#if ((' ' & 0x0FF) == 0x020) +# define ISLOWER(c) ('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z') +# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? 'A' + ((c) - 'a') : (c)) +#else +# define ISLOWER(c) \ + (('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'i') \ + || ('j' <= (c) && (c) <= 'r') \ + || ('s' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z')) +# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? ((c) | 0x40) : (c)) +#endif + +#define XOR(e, f) (((e) && !(f)) || (!(e) && (f))) +int +main () +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) + if (XOR (islower (i), ISLOWER (i)) + || toupper (i) != TOUPPER (i)) + return 2; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + +else + ac_cv_header_stdc=no +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_header_stdc" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_header_stdc" >&6; } +if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then + +$as_echo "#define STDC_HEADERS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +# On IRIX 5.3, sys/types and inttypes.h are conflicting. +for ac_header in sys/types.h sys/stat.h stdlib.h string.h memory.h strings.h \ + inttypes.h stdint.h unistd.h +do : + as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default +" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether byte ordering is bigendian" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether byte ordering is bigendian... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_c_bigendian+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown + # See if we're dealing with a universal compiler. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#ifndef __APPLE_CC__ + not a universal capable compiler + #endif + typedef int dummy; + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + # Check for potential -arch flags. It is not universal unless + # there are at least two -arch flags with different values. + ac_arch= + ac_prev= + for ac_word in $CC $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS; do + if test -n "$ac_prev"; then + case $ac_word in + i?86 | x86_64 | ppc | ppc64) + if test -z "$ac_arch" || test "$ac_arch" = "$ac_word"; then + ac_arch=$ac_word + else + ac_cv_c_bigendian=universal + break + fi + ;; + esac + ac_prev= + elif test "x$ac_word" = "x-arch"; then + ac_prev=arch + fi + done +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then + # See if sys/param.h defines the BYTE_ORDER macro. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + #include + +int +main () +{ +#if ! (defined BYTE_ORDER && defined BIG_ENDIAN \ + && defined LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER && BIG_ENDIAN \ + && LITTLE_ENDIAN) + bogus endian macros + #endif + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + # It does; now see whether it defined to BIG_ENDIAN or not. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + #include + +int +main () +{ +#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN + not big endian + #endif + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes +else + ac_cv_c_bigendian=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + fi + if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then + # See if defines _LITTLE_ENDIAN or _BIG_ENDIAN (e.g., Solaris). + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +int +main () +{ +#if ! (defined _LITTLE_ENDIAN || defined _BIG_ENDIAN) + bogus endian macros + #endif + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + # It does; now see whether it defined to _BIG_ENDIAN or not. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +int +main () +{ +#ifndef _BIG_ENDIAN + not big endian + #endif + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes +else + ac_cv_c_bigendian=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + fi + if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then + # Compile a test program. + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + # Try to guess by grepping values from an object file. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +short int ascii_mm[] = + { 0x4249, 0x4765, 0x6E44, 0x6961, 0x6E53, 0x7953, 0 }; + short int ascii_ii[] = + { 0x694C, 0x5454, 0x656C, 0x6E45, 0x6944, 0x6E61, 0 }; + int use_ascii (int i) { + return ascii_mm[i] + ascii_ii[i]; + } + short int ebcdic_ii[] = + { 0x89D3, 0xE3E3, 0x8593, 0x95C5, 0x89C4, 0x9581, 0 }; + short int ebcdic_mm[] = + { 0xC2C9, 0xC785, 0x95C4, 0x8981, 0x95E2, 0xA8E2, 0 }; + int use_ebcdic (int i) { + return ebcdic_mm[i] + ebcdic_ii[i]; + } + extern int foo; + +int +main () +{ +return use_ascii (foo) == use_ebcdic (foo); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + if grep BIGenDianSyS conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null; then + ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes + fi + if grep LiTTleEnDian conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null ; then + if test "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" = unknown; then + ac_cv_c_bigendian=no + else + # finding both strings is unlikely to happen, but who knows? + ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown + fi + fi +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$ac_includes_default +int +main () +{ + + /* Are we little or big endian? From Harbison&Steele. */ + union + { + long int l; + char c[sizeof (long int)]; + } u; + u.l = 1; + return u.c[sizeof (long int) - 1] == 1; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_c_bigendian=no +else + ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + fi +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&6; } + case $ac_cv_c_bigendian in #( + yes) + $as_echo "#define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1" >>confdefs.h +;; #( + no) + ;; #( + universal) + +$as_echo "#define AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; #( + *) + as_fn_error $? "unknown endianness + presetting ac_cv_c_bigendian=no (or yes) will help" "$LINENO" 5 ;; + esac + + +# Checks for programs. +for ac_prog in gawk mawk nawk awk +do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_AWK+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$AWK"; then + ac_cv_prog_AWK="$AWK" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_AWK="$ac_prog" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +AWK=$ac_cv_prog_AWK +if test -n "$AWK"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AWK" >&5 +$as_echo "$AWK" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + test -n "$AWK" && break +done + +ac_ext=c +ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' +ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5' +ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5' +ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking how to run the C preprocessor... " >&6; } +# On Suns, sometimes $CPP names a directory. +if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then + CPP= +fi +if test -z "$CPP"; then + if ${ac_cv_prog_CPP+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + # Double quotes because CPP needs to be expanded + for CPP in "$CC -E" "$CC -E -traditional-cpp" "/lib/cpp" + do + ac_preproc_ok=false +for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes +do + # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc + # with a fresh cross-compiler works. + # Prefer to if __STDC__ is defined, since + # exists even on freestanding compilers. + # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser, + # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#ifdef __STDC__ +# include +#else +# include +#endif + Syntax error +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : + +else + # Broken: fails on valid input. +continue +fi +rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext + + # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers + # can be detected and how. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : + # Broken: success on invalid input. +continue +else + # Passes both tests. +ac_preproc_ok=: +break +fi +rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext + +done +# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped. +rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext +if $ac_preproc_ok; then : + break +fi + + done + ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP + +fi + CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP +else + ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5 +$as_echo "$CPP" >&6; } +ac_preproc_ok=false +for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes +do + # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc + # with a fresh cross-compiler works. + # Prefer to if __STDC__ is defined, since + # exists even on freestanding compilers. + # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser, + # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#ifdef __STDC__ +# include +#else +# include +#endif + Syntax error +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : + +else + # Broken: fails on valid input. +continue +fi +rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext + + # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers + # can be detected and how. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : + # Broken: success on invalid input. +continue +else + # Passes both tests. +ac_preproc_ok=: +break +fi +rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext + +done +# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped. +rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext +if $ac_preproc_ok; then : + +else + { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } +fi + +ac_ext=c +ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' +ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5' +ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5' +ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu + +if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_RANLIB+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="$RANLIB" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB +if test -n "$RANLIB"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $RANLIB" >&5 +$as_echo "$RANLIB" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +fi +if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"; then + ac_ct_RANLIB=$RANLIB + # Extract the first word of "ranlib", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ranlib; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="$ac_ct_RANLIB" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="ranlib" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +ac_ct_RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB +if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_RANLIB" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_ct_RANLIB" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + if test "x$ac_ct_RANLIB" = x; then + RANLIB=":" + else + case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in +yes:) +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} +ac_tool_warned=yes ;; +esac + RANLIB=$ac_ct_RANLIB + fi +else + RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB" +fi + +# Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster), +# so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or +# incompatible versions: +# SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install +# SunOS /usr/etc/install +# IRIX /sbin/install +# AIX /bin/install +# AmigaOS /C/install, which installs bootblocks on floppy discs +# AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag +# AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args +# SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff" +# OS/2's system install, which has a completely different semantic +# ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh. +# Reject install programs that cannot install multiple files. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a BSD-compatible install" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for a BSD-compatible install... " >&6; } +if test -z "$INSTALL"; then +if ${ac_cv_path_install+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + # Account for people who put trailing slashes in PATH elements. +case $as_dir/ in #(( + ./ | .// | /[cC]/* | \ + /etc/* | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/etc/* | /sbin/* | /usr/afsws/bin/* | \ + ?:[\\/]os2[\\/]install[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]OS2[\\/]INSTALL[\\/]* | \ + /usr/ucb/* ) ;; + *) + # OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install. + # Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root + # by default. + for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"; then + if test $ac_prog = install && + grep dspmsg "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # AIX install. It has an incompatible calling convention. + : + elif test $ac_prog = install && + grep pwplus "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # program-specific install script used by HP pwplus--don't use. + : + else + rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir + echo one > conftest.one + echo two > conftest.two + mkdir conftest.dir + if "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" -c conftest.one conftest.two "`pwd`/conftest.dir" && + test -s conftest.one && test -s conftest.two && + test -s conftest.dir/conftest.one && + test -s conftest.dir/conftest.two + then + ac_cv_path_install="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext -c" + break 3 + fi + fi + fi + done + done + ;; +esac + + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir + +fi + if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then + INSTALL=$ac_cv_path_install + else + # As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a + # value for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will + # break other packages using the cache if that directory is + # removed, or if the value is a relative name. + INSTALL=$ac_install_sh + fi +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $INSTALL" >&5 +$as_echo "$INSTALL" >&6; } + +# Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}. +# It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution. +test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}' + +test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL}' + +test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644' + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1 + then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E" + else + if test -z "$EGREP"; then + ac_path_EGREP_found=false + # Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_prog in egrep; do + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" + as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_EGREP" || continue +# Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found. + # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP +case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in +*GNU*) + ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;; +*) + ac_count=0 + $as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in" + while : + do + cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp" + mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in" + cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl" + $as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl" + "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break + diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break + as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val + if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then + # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one + ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" + ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count + fi + # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough + test $ac_count -gt 10 && break + done + rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;; +esac + + $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3 + done + done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then + as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5 + fi +else + ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP +fi + + fi +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; } + EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP" + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a thread-safe mkdir -p" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for a thread-safe mkdir -p... " >&6; } +if test -z "$MKDIR_P"; then + if ${ac_cv_path_mkdir+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/opt/sfw/bin +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_prog in mkdir gmkdir; do + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" || continue + case `"$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" --version 2>&1` in #( + 'mkdir (GNU coreutils) '* | \ + 'mkdir (coreutils) '* | \ + 'mkdir (fileutils) '4.1*) + ac_cv_path_mkdir=$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext + break 3;; + esac + done + done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi + + test -d ./--version && rmdir ./--version + if test "${ac_cv_path_mkdir+set}" = set; then + MKDIR_P="$ac_cv_path_mkdir -p" + else + # As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a + # value for MKDIR_P within a source directory, because that will + # break other packages using the cache if that directory is + # removed, or if the value is a relative name. + MKDIR_P="$ac_install_sh -d" + fi +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MKDIR_P" >&5 +$as_echo "$MKDIR_P" >&6; } + +if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + for ac_prog in ar + do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_AR+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$AR"; then + ac_cv_prog_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_AR="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +AR=$ac_cv_prog_AR +if test -n "$AR"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5 +$as_echo "$AR" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + test -n "$AR" && break + done +fi +if test -z "$AR"; then + ac_ct_AR=$AR + for ac_prog in ar +do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_ct_AR" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_prog" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +ac_ct_AR=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR +if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_AR" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_ct_AR" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + test -n "$ac_ct_AR" && break +done + + if test "x$ac_ct_AR" = x; then + AR="" + else + case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in +yes:) +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} +ac_tool_warned=yes ;; +esac + AR=$ac_ct_AR + fi +fi + +# Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy cat; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_CAT+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $CAT in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_CAT="$CAT" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_CAT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +CAT=$ac_cv_path_CAT +if test -n "$CAT"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CAT" >&5 +$as_echo "$CAT" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "kill", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy kill; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_KILL+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $KILL in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_KILL="$KILL" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_KILL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +KILL=$ac_cv_path_KILL +if test -n "$KILL"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KILL" >&5 +$as_echo "$KILL" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "sed", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy sed; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_SED+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $SED in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_SED="$SED" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_SED="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +SED=$ac_cv_path_SED +if test -n "$SED"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SED" >&5 +$as_echo "$SED" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "ent", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ent; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_ENT+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $ENT in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_ENT="$ENT" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_ENT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +ENT=$ac_cv_path_ENT +if test -n "$ENT"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ENT" >&5 +$as_echo "$ENT" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + +# Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy bash; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH +if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 +$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH +if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 +$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy sh; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH +if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 +$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy sh; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_SH+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $SH in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +SH=$ac_cv_path_SH +if test -n "$SH"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5 +$as_echo "$SH" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy groff; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_GROFF+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $GROFF in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_GROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +GROFF=$ac_cv_path_GROFF +if test -n "$GROFF"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GROFF" >&5 +$as_echo "$GROFF" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "nroff", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy nroff; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $NROFF in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF +if test -n "$NROFF"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5 +$as_echo "$NROFF" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "mandoc", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy mandoc; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_MANDOC+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $MANDOC in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$MANDOC" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +MANDOC=$ac_cv_path_MANDOC +if test -n "$MANDOC"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MANDOC" >&5 +$as_echo "$MANDOC" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +TEST_SHELL=sh + + +if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then + MANFMT="$MANDOC" +elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then + MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" +elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then + MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&2;} + MANFMT="false" +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "groupadd", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy groupadd; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="groupadd" + ;; +esac +fi +PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG +if test -n "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&5 +$as_echo "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "useradd", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy useradd; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $PATH_USERADD_PROG in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$PATH_USERADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="useradd" + ;; +esac +fi +PATH_USERADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG +if test -n "$PATH_USERADD_PROG"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&5 +$as_echo "$PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +# Extract the first word of "pkgmk", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy pkgmk; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then + ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="yes" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + test -z "$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" && ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="no" +fi +fi +MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED=$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED +if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&5 +$as_echo "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +if test -x /sbin/sh; then + STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh + +else + STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh + +fi + +# System features +# Check whether --enable-largefile was given. +if test "${enable_largefile+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_largefile; +fi + +if test "$enable_largefile" != no; then + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for special C compiler options needed for large files" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for special C compiler options needed for large files... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=no + if test "$GCC" != yes; then + ac_save_CC=$CC + while :; do + # IRIX 6.2 and later do not support large files by default, + # so use the C compiler's -n32 option if that helps. + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. + We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, + since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers + incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ +#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) + int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 + && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) + ? 1 : -1]; +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF + if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + break +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext + CC="$CC -n32" + if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=' -n32'; break +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext + break + done + CC=$ac_save_CC + rm -f conftest.$ac_ext + fi +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&6; } + if test "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" != no; then + CC=$CC$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC + fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + while :; do + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. + We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, + since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers + incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ +#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) + int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 + && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) + ? 1 : -1]; +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=no; break +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64 +#include + /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. + We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, + since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers + incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ +#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) + int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 + && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) + ? 1 : -1]; +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=64; break +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=unknown + break +done +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&6; } +case $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits in #( + no | unknown) ;; + *) +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits +_ACEOF +;; +esac +rm -rf conftest* + if test $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits = unknown; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_sys_large_files+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + while :; do + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. + We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, + since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers + incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ +#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) + int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 + && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) + ? 1 : -1]; +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_sys_large_files=no; break +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#define _LARGE_FILES 1 +#include + /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. + We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, + since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers + incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ +#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) + int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 + && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) + ? 1 : -1]; +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_sys_large_files=1; break +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + ac_cv_sys_large_files=unknown + break +done +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&6; } +case $ac_cv_sys_large_files in #( + no | unknown) ;; + *) +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define _LARGE_FILES $ac_cv_sys_large_files +_ACEOF +;; +esac +rm -rf conftest* + fi + + +fi + + +if test -z "$AR" ; then + as_fn_error $? "*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + +# Extract the first word of "passwd", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy passwd; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $PATH_PASSWD_PROG in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +PATH_PASSWD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG +if test -n "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&5 +$as_echo "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" +_ACEOF + +fi + +LD="$CC" + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for inline" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for inline... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_c_inline+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_cv_c_inline=no +for ac_kw in inline __inline__ __inline; do + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#ifndef __cplusplus +typedef int foo_t; +static $ac_kw foo_t static_foo () {return 0; } +$ac_kw foo_t foo () {return 0; } +#endif + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_c_inline=$ac_kw +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + test "$ac_cv_c_inline" != no && break +done + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_inline" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_inline" >&6; } + +case $ac_cv_c_inline in + inline | yes) ;; + *) + case $ac_cv_c_inline in + no) ac_val=;; + *) ac_val=$ac_cv_c_inline;; + esac + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#ifndef __cplusplus +#define inline $ac_val +#endif +_ACEOF + ;; +esac + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes; then : + have_llong_max=1 +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" " + #include + #include + #include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" = xyes; then : + have_systr_policy_kill=1 +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "RLIMIT_NPROC" "ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" " + #include + #include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /**/" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" " + #include + #include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" = xyes; then : + have_linux_no_new_privs=1 +fi + + +openssl=yes + +# Check whether --with-openssl was given. +if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_openssl; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + openssl=no + fi + + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography... " >&6; } +if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define WITH_OPENSSL 1 +_ACEOF + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + +use_stack_protector=1 +use_toolchain_hardening=1 + +# Check whether --with-stackprotect was given. +if test "${with_stackprotect+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_stackprotect; + if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then + use_stack_protector=0 + fi +fi + + +# Check whether --with-hardening was given. +if test "${with_hardening+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_hardening; + if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then + use_toolchain_hardening=0 + fi +fi + + +# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is +# on by default" for things like -fPIE. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports -Werror" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports -Werror... " >&6; } +saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +int main(void) { return 0; } +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + WERROR="-Werror" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + WERROR="" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -pipe" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pipe" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Qunused-arguments" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Qunused-arguments" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunknown-warning-option" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunknown-warning-option" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wall" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wall" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-arith" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-arith" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wuninitialized" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wuninitialized" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsign-compare" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsign-compare" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wformat-security" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wformat-security" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-sign" + _define_flag="-Wno-pointer-sign" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-sign" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunused-result" + _define_flag="-Wno-unused-result" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunused-result" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fno-strict-aliasing" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fno-strict-aliasing" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -mretpoline" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -mretpoline... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -mretpoline" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-mretpoline" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} # clang + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,retpolineplt" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,retpolineplt... " >&6; } + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,retpolineplt" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,retpolineplt" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + long long p = n * o; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro... " >&6; } + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,relro" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,relro" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + long long p = n * o; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now... " >&6; } + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,now" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,now" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + long long p = n * o; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack... " >&6; } + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,noexecstack" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,noexecstack" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + long long p = n * o; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +} + # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in + # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations + # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it + # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number + # of integer operations that should exercise this. + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -ftrapv" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-ftrapv" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + long long int p = n * o; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +} + fi + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking gcc version" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking gcc version... " >&6; } + GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'` + case $GCC_VER in + 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; + 2.8* | 2.9*) + no_attrib_nonnull=1 + ;; + 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; + *) ;; + esac + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GCC_VER" >&5 +$as_echo "$GCC_VER" >&6; } + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions + # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported + # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror. + if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then + for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \ + -fstack-protector; do + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports $t" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports $t... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + + char x[256]; + snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t" + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $t works" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $t works... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&2;} + break + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + + char x[256]; + snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + break +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + done + fi + + if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then + # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes + unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99" + ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes; then : + have_llong_max=1 +else + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +fi + + fi +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;} +int +main () +{ + exit(0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +int +main () +{ + exit(0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +# Check whether --with-rpath was given. +if test "${with_rpath+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_rpath; + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + need_dash_r="" + fi + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + need_dash_r=1 + fi + + +fi + + +# Allow user to specify flags + +# Check whether --with-cflags was given. +if test "${with_cflags+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_cflags; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval" + fi + + +fi + + + +# Check whether --with-cflags-after was given. +if test "${with_cflags_after+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_cflags_after; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" + fi + + +fi + + +# Check whether --with-cppflags was given. +if test "${with_cppflags+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_cppflags; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval" + fi + + +fi + + +# Check whether --with-ldflags was given. +if test "${with_ldflags+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_ldflags; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval" + fi + + +fi + + +# Check whether --with-ldflags-after was given. +if test "${with_ldflags_after+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_ldflags_after; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" + fi + + +fi + + +# Check whether --with-libs was given. +if test "${with_libs+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_libs; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + LIBS="$LIBS $withval" + fi + + +fi + + +# Check whether --with-Werror was given. +if test "${with_Werror+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_Werror; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then + werror_flags="-Werror" + if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + werror_flags="$withval" + fi + fi + + +fi + + +for ac_header in \ + blf.h \ + bstring.h \ + crypt.h \ + crypto/sha2.h \ + dirent.h \ + endian.h \ + elf.h \ + err.h \ + features.h \ + fcntl.h \ + floatingpoint.h \ + getopt.h \ + glob.h \ + ia.h \ + iaf.h \ + ifaddrs.h \ + inttypes.h \ + langinfo.h \ + limits.h \ + locale.h \ + login.h \ + maillock.h \ + ndir.h \ + net/if_tun.h \ + netdb.h \ + netgroup.h \ + pam/pam_appl.h \ + paths.h \ + poll.h \ + pty.h \ + readpassphrase.h \ + rpc/types.h \ + security/pam_appl.h \ + sha2.h \ + shadow.h \ + stddef.h \ + stdint.h \ + string.h \ + strings.h \ + sys/bitypes.h \ + sys/bsdtty.h \ + sys/cdefs.h \ + sys/dir.h \ + sys/file.h \ + sys/mman.h \ + sys/label.h \ + sys/ndir.h \ + sys/poll.h \ + sys/prctl.h \ + sys/pstat.h \ + sys/ptrace.h \ + sys/random.h \ + sys/select.h \ + sys/stat.h \ + sys/stream.h \ + sys/stropts.h \ + sys/strtio.h \ + sys/statvfs.h \ + sys/sysmacros.h \ + sys/time.h \ + sys/timers.h \ + sys/vfs.h \ + time.h \ + tmpdir.h \ + ttyent.h \ + ucred.h \ + unistd.h \ + usersec.h \ + util.h \ + utime.h \ + utmp.h \ + utmpx.h \ + vis.h \ + wchar.h \ + +do : + as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h] +# to be included first. +for ac_header in sys/audit.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H +# include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h +for ac_header in sys/capsicum.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/capsicum.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h. +# sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h +for ac_header in net/route.h sys/sysctl.h +do : + as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris +for ac_header in lastlog.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "lastlog.h" "ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LASTLOG_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris +for ac_header in sys/ptms.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/ptms.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H +# include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD +for ac_header in login_cap.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "login_cap.h" "ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" " +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h +for ac_header in sys/mount.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/mount.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" " +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h +for ac_header in sys/un.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/un.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" " +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section +SIA_MSG="no" +SPC_MSG="no" +SP_MSG="no" +SPP_MSG="no" + +# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both +# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris). +SOLARIS_PRIVS="no" + +# Check for some target-specific stuff +case "$host" in +*-*-aix*) + # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at + # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that + # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc. + # It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are + # not fatal. + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#define testmacro foo +#define testmacro bar +int +main () +{ + exit(0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" + CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" + CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)... " >&6; } + if (test -z "$blibpath"); then + blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib" + fi + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then + flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:" + else + flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath," + fi + for tryflags in $flags ;do + if (test -z "$blibflags"); then + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + blibflags=$tryflags +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + fi + done + if (test -z "$blibflags"); then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5 +$as_echo "not found" >&6; } + as_fn_error $? "*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log" "$LINENO" 5 + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $blibflags" >&5 +$as_echo "$blibflags" >&6; } + fi + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_func_authenticate" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_authenticate" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for authenticate in -ls" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for authenticate in -ls... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-ls $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char authenticate (); +int +main () +{ +return authenticate (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" = xyes; then : + $as_echo "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h + + LIBS="$LIBS -ls" + +fi + + +fi + + ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginrestrictions" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginsuccess" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "passwdexpired" "ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "setauthdb" "ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginfailed" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" "#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF +if test $ac_have_decl = 1; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + for ac_func in getgrset setauthdb +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "F_CLOSEM" "ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" " #include + #include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1 + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define PTY_ZEROREAD 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNDUP 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNLEN 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-*-android*) + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-*-cygwin*) + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_CYGWIN 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SSH_IOBUFSZ 65535" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH 1" >>confdefs.h + + # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical + # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings. + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-attributes" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-attributes" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + ;; +*-*-dgux*) + +$as_echo "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-*-darwin*) + use_pie=auto + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we have working getaddrinfo" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if we have working getaddrinfo... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: assume it is working" >&5 +$as_echo "assume it is working" >&6; } +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) + exit(0); + else + exit(1); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: working" >&5 +$as_echo "working" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: buggy" >&5 +$as_echo "buggy" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h + + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define BIND_8_COMPAT 1 +_ACEOF + + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h + + + ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "AU_IPv4" "ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" = xyes; then : + +else + +$as_echo "#define AU_IPv4 0" >>confdefs.h + + #include + +$as_echo "#define LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi + + +$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h + + for ac_func in sandbox_init +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "sandbox_init" "ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + for ac_header in sandbox.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "sandbox.h" "ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SANDBOX_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lsandbox $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char sandbox_apply (); +int +main () +{ +return sandbox_apply (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" = xyes; then : + + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox" + +fi + + ;; +*-*-dragonfly*) + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt" + TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" + ;; +*-*-haiku*) + LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd " + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socket in -lnetwork" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for socket in -lnetwork... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_network_socket+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char socket (); +int +main () +{ +return socket (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_network_socket=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_network_socket=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBNETWORK 1 +_ACEOF + + LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS" + +fi + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + MANTYPE=man + ;; +*-*-hpux*) + # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" + IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes + $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*\"" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_PSTAT" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h + + maildir="/var/mail" + LIBS="$LIBS -lsec" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for t_error in -lxnet" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for t_error in -lxnet... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char t_error (); +int +main () +{ +return t_error (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBXNET 1 +_ACEOF + + LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS" + +else + as_fn_error $? "*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + + + # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases + case "$host" in + *-*-hpux10*) + if test -z "$GCC"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" + fi + ;; + *-*-hpux11*) + +$as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1 + check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1 + ;; + esac + + # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases + case "$host" in + *-*-hpux10.26) + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h + + disable_ptmx_check=yes + LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw" + ;; + esac + ;; +*-*-irix5*) + PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-*-irix6*) + PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" + +$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_ARRAY 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_PROJECT 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h + + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "jlimit_startjob" "ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_JOBS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu) + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + $as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-*-linux*) + no_dev_ptmx=1 + use_pie=auto + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE" + +$as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO EPERM" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define LINUX_OOM_ADJUST 1" >>confdefs.h + + inet6_default_4in6=yes + case `uname -r` in + 1.*|2.0.*) + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; + esac + # tun(4) forwarding compat code + for ac_header in linux/if_tun.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "linux/if_tun.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "linux/if.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_h" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_h" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + for ac_header in linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h +do : + as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "#include +" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + # Obtain MIPS ABI + case "$host" in + mips*) + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32 +#error +#endif + +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + mips_abi="o32" +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32 +#error +#endif + +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + mips_abi="n32" +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64 +#error +#endif + +int +main () +{ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + mips_abi="n64" +else + as_fn_error $? "unknown MIPS ABI" "$LINENO" 5 + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + ;; + esac + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for seccomp architecture" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for seccomp architecture... " >&6; } + seccomp_audit_arch= + case "$host" in + x86_64-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 + ;; + i*86-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 + ;; + arm*-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM + ;; + aarch64*-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 + ;; + s390x-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X + ;; + s390-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390 + ;; + powerpc64-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64 + ;; + powerpc64le-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE + ;; + mips-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS + ;; + mipsel-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL + ;; + mips64-*) + case "$mips_abi" in + "n32") + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 + ;; + "n64") + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 + ;; + esac + ;; + mips64el-*) + case "$mips_abi" in + "n32") + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 + ;; + "n64") + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 + ;; + esac + ;; + esac + if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: \"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&5 +$as_echo "\"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&6; } + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH $seccomp_audit_arch +_ACEOF + + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: architecture not supported" >&5 +$as_echo "architecture not supported" >&6; } + fi + ;; +mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) + +$as_echo "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h + + SONY=1 + ;; +*-*-netbsd*) + check_for_libcrypt_before=1 + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + need_dash_r=1 + fi + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE" + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h + + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes; then : + +else + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h + + TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-*-freebsd*) + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + +$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"*LOCKED*\"" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h + + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes; then : + +else + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h + + TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" + # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload + # and will crash if they cannot be opened. + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-*-bsdi*) + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-next-*) + conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog" + conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp + conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp + maildir=/usr/spool/mail + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_NEXT 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-*-openbsd*) + use_pie=auto + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_OPENBSD 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND 1" >>confdefs.h + + TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" + ;; +*-*-solaris*) + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + need_dash_r=1 + fi + $as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h + + # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty. + +$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h + + external_path_file=/etc/default/login + # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions) + conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x... " >&6; } + sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[0-9]\.//'` + if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + for ac_func in setpflags +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setpflags" "ac_cv_func_setpflags" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_setpflags" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SETPFLAGS 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + for ac_func in setppriv +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setppriv" "ac_cv_func_setppriv" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SETPPRIV 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + for ac_func in priv_basicset +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "priv_basicset" "ac_cv_func_priv_basicset" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_priv_basicset" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + for ac_header in priv.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "priv.h" "ac_cv_header_priv_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_PRIV_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + +# Check whether --with-solaris-contracts was given. +if test "${with_solaris_contracts+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_solaris_contracts; + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lcontract $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char ct_tmpl_activate (); +int +main () +{ +return ct_tmpl_activate (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS 1" >>confdefs.h + + LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract" + SPC_MSG="yes" +fi + + +fi + + +# Check whether --with-solaris-projects was given. +if test "${with_solaris_projects+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_solaris_projects; + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setproject in -lproject" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for setproject in -lproject... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_project_setproject+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lproject $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char setproject (); +int +main () +{ +return setproject (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS 1" >>confdefs.h + + LIBS="$LIBS -lproject" + SP_MSG="yes" +fi + + +fi + + +# Check whether --with-solaris-privs was given. +if test "${with_solaris_privs+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_solaris_privs; + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support... " >&6; } + if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \ + "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then + SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: found" >&5 +$as_echo "found" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS 1" >>confdefs.h + + SPP_MSG="yes" + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5 +$as_echo "not found" >&6; } + as_fn_error $? "*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs" "$LINENO" 5 + fi + +fi + + TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell + ;; +*-*-sunos4*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4" + for ac_func in getpwanam +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpwanam" "ac_cv_func_getpwanam" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpwanam" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_GETPWANAM 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + $as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h + + conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp + conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp + conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog + $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-ncr-sysv*) + LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" + $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +*-sni-sysv*) + # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlsym in -ldl" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for dlsym in -ldl... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-ldl $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char dlsym (); +int +main () +{ +return dlsym (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBDL 1 +_ACEOF + + LIBS="-ldl $LIBS" + +fi + + # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char res_query (); +int +main () +{ +return res_query (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" = xyes; then : + LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" +fi + + IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes + $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h + + external_path_file=/etc/default/login + # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX + # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc, + # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog + ;; +# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel. +*-*-sysv4.2*) + $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h + + TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell + ;; +# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8 +*-*-sysv5*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf" + +$as_echo "#define UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h + + TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + case "$host" in + *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x + maildir=/var/spool/mail + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getluid in -lprot" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for getluid in -lprot... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lprot $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char getluid (); +int +main () +{ +return getluid (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" = xyes; then : + LIBS="$LIBS -lprot" + for ac_func in getluid setluid +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + +fi + + ;; + *) $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h + + ;; + esac + ;; +*-*-sysv*) + ;; +# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX +*-*-sco3.2v4*) + as_fn_error $? "\"This Platform is no longer supported.\"" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; +# SCO OpenServer 5.x +*-*-sco3.2v5*) + if test -z "$GCC"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" + fi + LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm" + no_dev_ptmx=1 + $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h + + for ac_func in getluid setluid +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + MANTYPE=man + TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell + SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes + ;; +*-dec-osf*) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for Digital Unix SIA" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for Digital Unix SIA... " >&6; } + no_osfsia="" + +# Check whether --with-osfsia was given. +if test "${with_osfsia+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_osfsia; + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: disabled" >&5 +$as_echo "disabled" >&6; } + no_osfsia=1 + fi + +fi + + if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then + if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_OSF_SIA 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h + + LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud" + SIA_MSG="yes" + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR \"Nologin\"" >>confdefs.h + + fi + fi + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; + +*-*-nto-qnx*) + $as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h + + enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login + case "$host" in + *-*-nto-qnx6*) + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; + esac + ;; + +*-*-ultrix*) + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETGROUPS 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; + +*-*-lynxos) + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__" + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETVBUF 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; +esac + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking compiler and flags for sanity" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking compiler and flags for sanity... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + exit(0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + as_fn_error $? "*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5 + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +# Checks for libraries. +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setsockopt" "ac_cv_func_setsockopt" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_setsockopt" = xyes; then : + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setsockopt in -lsocket" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for setsockopt in -lsocket... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char setsockopt (); +int +main () +{ +return setsockopt (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBSOCKET 1 +_ACEOF + + LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS" + +fi + +fi + + +for ac_func in dirname +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "dirname" "ac_cv_func_dirname" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_dirname" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1 +_ACEOF + for ac_header in libgen.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dirname in -lgen" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for dirname in -lgen... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lgen $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char dirname (); +int +main () +{ +return dirname (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" = xyes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for broken dirname" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for broken dirname... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_broken_dirname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + char *s, buf[32]; + + strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32); + s = dirname(buf); + if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) { + exit(1); + } else { + exit(0); + } +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" +else + ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&6; } + if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" + $as_echo "#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1" >>confdefs.h + + for ac_header in libgen.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + fi + +fi + + +fi +done + + +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getspnam" "ac_cv_func_getspnam" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getspnam" = xyes; then : + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getspnam in -lgen" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for getspnam in -lgen... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lgen $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char getspnam (); +int +main () +{ +return getspnam (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" = xyes; then : + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" +fi + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing basename" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing basename... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char basename (); +int +main () +{ +return basename (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' gen; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_basename=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_basename=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_basename" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_basename" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_basename +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_BASENAME 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + +# Check whether --with-zlib was given. +if test "${with_zlib+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_zlib; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + as_fn_error $? "*** zlib is required ***" "$LINENO" 5 + elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then + if test -d "$withval/lib"; then + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + else + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + fi + if test -d "$withval/include"; then + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" + else + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" + fi + fi + +fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "zlib.h" "ac_cv_header_zlib_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_zlib_h" = xyes; then : + +else + as_fn_error $? "*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for deflate in -lz" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for deflate in -lz... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_z_deflate+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lz $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char deflate (); +int +main () +{ +return deflate (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBZ 1 +_ACEOF + + LIBS="-lz $LIBS" + +else + + saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" + fi + CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" + LIBS="$LIBS -lz" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char deflate (); +int +main () +{ +return deflate (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + $as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBZ 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + + as_fn_error $? "*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5 + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + +fi + + + +# Check whether --with-zlib-version-check was given. +if test "${with_zlib_version_check+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_zlib_version_check; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + zlib_check_nonfatal=1 + fi + + +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for possibly buggy zlib" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for possibly buggy zlib... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v; + n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d); + if (n != 3 && n != 4) + exit(1); + v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d; + fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v); + + /* 1.1.4 is OK */ + if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4) + exit(0); + + /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */ + if (v >= 1020300) + exit(0); + + exit(2); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then + as_fn_error $? "*** zlib too old - check config.log *** +Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your +vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you +are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running +\"./configure --without-zlib-version-check\". +If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater. +See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details." "$LINENO" 5 + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&2;} + fi + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strcasecmp" "ac_cv_func_strcasecmp" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_strcasecmp" = xyes; then : + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char strcasecmp (); +int +main () +{ +return strcasecmp (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" = xyes; then : + LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" +fi + + +fi + +for ac_func in utimes +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utimes" "ac_cv_func_utimes" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_utimes" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_UTIMES 1 +_ACEOF + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utimes in -lc89" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for utimes in -lc89... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lc89 $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char utimes (); +int +main () +{ +return utimes (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" = xyes; then : + $as_echo "#define HAVE_UTIMES 1" >>confdefs.h + + LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" +fi + + +fi +done + + +for ac_header in bsd/libutil.h libutil.h +do : + as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing fmt_scaled" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing fmt_scaled... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char fmt_scaled (); +int +main () +{ +return fmt_scaled (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing scan_scaled" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing scan_scaled... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char scan_scaled (); +int +main () +{ +return scan_scaled (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing login" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing login... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char login (); +int +main () +{ +return login (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_login=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_login=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_login" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_login" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_login +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logout" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing logout... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char logout (); +int +main () +{ +return logout (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_logout=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_logout=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logout" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logout" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logout +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logwtmp" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing logwtmp... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char logwtmp (); +int +main () +{ +return logwtmp (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_logwtmp=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_logwtmp=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logwtmp +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing openpty" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing openpty... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char openpty (); +int +main () +{ +return openpty (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_openpty=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_openpty=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_openpty" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_openpty" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_openpty +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing updwtmp" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing updwtmp... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char updwtmp (); +int +main () +{ +return updwtmp (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_updwtmp=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_updwtmp=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_updwtmp +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + +for ac_func in fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + +# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv +# or libnsl. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing inet_ntop" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing inet_ntop... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char inet_ntop (); +int +main () +{ +return inet_ntop (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing gethostbyname" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing gethostbyname... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char gethostbyname (); +int +main () +{ +return gethostbyname (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + + +# "Particular Function Checks" +# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html +for ac_func in strftime +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strftime" "ac_cv_func_strftime" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_strftime" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1 +_ACEOF + +else + # strftime is in -lintl on SCO UNIX. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strftime in -lintl" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for strftime in -lintl... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lintl $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char strftime (); +int +main () +{ +return strftime (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" = xyes; then : + $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1" >>confdefs.h + +LIBS="-lintl $LIBS" +fi + +fi +done + +for ac_header in stdlib.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "stdlib.h" "ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible malloc" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for GNU libc compatible malloc... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#if defined STDC_HEADERS || defined HAVE_STDLIB_H +# include +#else +char *malloc (); +#endif + +int +main () +{ +return ! malloc (0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=yes +else + ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&6; } +if test $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull = yes; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_MALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + $as_echo "#define HAVE_MALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h + + case " $LIBOBJS " in + *" malloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;; + *) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS malloc.$ac_objext" + ;; +esac + + +$as_echo "#define malloc rpl_malloc" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +for ac_header in stdlib.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "stdlib.h" "ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible realloc" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for GNU libc compatible realloc... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#if defined STDC_HEADERS || defined HAVE_STDLIB_H +# include +#else +char *realloc (); +#endif + +int +main () +{ +return ! realloc (0, 0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=yes +else + ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&6; } +if test $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull = yes; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_REALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + $as_echo "#define HAVE_REALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h + + case " $LIBOBJS " in + *" realloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;; + *) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS realloc.$ac_objext" + ;; +esac + + +$as_echo "#define realloc rpl_realloc" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL; +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if calloc(0, N) returns non-null" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if calloc(0, N) returns non-null... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming same as malloc" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming same as malloc" >&2;} + func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes +else + func_calloc_0_nonnull=no +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $func_calloc_0_nonnull" >&5 +$as_echo "$func_calloc_0_nonnull" >&6; } + +if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_CALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_CALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h + + +$as_echo "#define calloc rpl_calloc" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC + FOUNDIT + #endif + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "FOUNDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + + +$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + + +fi +rm -f conftest* + + +# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + +$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + +#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT +#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension" +#endif +glob_t g; +g.gl_statv = NULL; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + +$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "GLOB_NOMATCH" "ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "VIS_ALL" "ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" = xyes; then : + +else + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&2;} + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h + + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int +main () +{ + + struct dirent d; + exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char)); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /proc/pid/fd directory" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for /proc/pid/fd directory... " >&6; } +if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_PROC_PID 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + +# Check whether user wants to use ldns +LDNS_MSG="no" + +# Check whether --with-ldns was given. +if test "${with_ldns+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_ldns; + ldns="" + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $LDNSCONFIG in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG +if test -n "$LDNSCONFIG"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $LDNSCONFIG" >&5 +$as_echo "$LDNSCONFIG" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +fi +if test -z "$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG"; then + ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$LDNSCONFIG + # Extract the first word of "ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ldns-config; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG +if test -n "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + if test "x$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" = x; then + LDNSCONFIG="no" + else + case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in +yes:) +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} +ac_tool_warned=yes ;; +esac + LDNSCONFIG=$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG + fi +else + LDNSCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG" +fi + + if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" + LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" + ldns=yes + else + LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`" + ldns=yes + fi + elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" + LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" + ldns=yes + fi + + # Verify that it works. + if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_LDNS 1" >>confdefs.h + + LDNS_MSG="yes" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ldns support" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ldns support... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); } + + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + as_fn_error $? "** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries." "$LINENO" 5 + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + fi + +fi + + +# Check whether user wants libedit support +LIBEDIT_MSG="no" + +# Check whether --with-libedit was given. +if test "${with_libedit+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_libedit; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $PKGCONFIG in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG +if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5 +$as_echo "$PKGCONFIG" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +fi +if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then + ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG + # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG +if test -n "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + if test "x$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" = x; then + PKGCONFIG="no" + else + case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in +yes:) +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} +ac_tool_warned=yes ;; +esac + PKGCONFIG=$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG + fi +else + PKGCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG" +fi + + if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit... " >&6; } + if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + fi + else + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + fi + if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then + LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit` + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`" + else + LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses" + fi + OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'` + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for el_init in -ledit" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for el_init in -ledit... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-ledit $OTHERLIBS + $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char el_init (); +int +main () +{ +return el_init (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define USE_LIBEDIT 1" >>confdefs.h + + LIBEDIT_MSG="yes" + + +else + as_fn_error $? "libedit not found" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libedit version is compatible" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if libedit version is compatible... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + + int i = H_SETSIZE; + el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL); + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + as_fn_error $? "libedit version is not compatible" "$LINENO" 5 + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + fi + +fi + + +AUDIT_MODULE=none + +# Check whether --with-audit was given. +if test "${with_audit+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_audit; + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for supported audit module" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for supported audit module... " >&6; } + case "$withval" in + bsm) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: bsm" >&5 +$as_echo "bsm" >&6; } + AUDIT_MODULE=bsm + for ac_header in bsm/audit.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "bsm/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" " +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H +# include +#endif + + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H 1 +_ACEOF + +else + as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + +done + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getaudit in -lbsm" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for getaudit in -lbsm... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char getaudit (); +int +main () +{ +return getaudit (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBBSM 1 +_ACEOF + + LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS" + +else + as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required library not found" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + + for ac_func in getaudit +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getaudit" "ac_cv_func_getaudit" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaudit" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_GETAUDIT 1 +_ACEOF + +else + as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required function not found" "$LINENO" 5 +fi +done + + # These are optional + for ac_func in getaudit_addr aug_get_machine +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + +$as_echo "#define USE_BSM_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h + + if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_BSM_API 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + ;; + linux) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: linux" >&5 +$as_echo "linux" >&6; } + AUDIT_MODULE=linux + for ac_header in libaudit.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libaudit.h" "ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" + +$as_echo "#define USE_LINUX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; + debug) + AUDIT_MODULE=debug + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: debug" >&5 +$as_echo "debug" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 1" >>confdefs.h + + ;; + no) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + ;; + *) + as_fn_error $? "Unknown audit module $withval" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; + esac + +fi + + + +# Check whether --with-pie was given. +if test "${with_pie+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_pie; + if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then + use_pie=no + fi + if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then + use_pie=yes + fi + + +fi + +if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then + use_pie=no +fi +if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then + # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. + use_pie=no +fi +if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then + # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gcc >= 4.x" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for gcc >= 4.x... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4 +#error gcc is too old +#endif + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + use_pie=no + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then + SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE... " >&6; } + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fPIE" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fPIE" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +} + { + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -pie" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -pie... " >&6; } + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -pie" + _define_flag="" + test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pie" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ + int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; + float l = i * 2.1; + double m = l / 0.5; + long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + long long p = n * o; + printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p); + exit(0); +} + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + +if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag" +fi +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +} + # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither. + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported... " >&6; } + if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ + echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS" + fi +fi + +for ac_func in \ + Blowfish_initstate \ + Blowfish_expandstate \ + Blowfish_expand0state \ + Blowfish_stream2word \ + asprintf \ + b64_ntop \ + __b64_ntop \ + b64_pton \ + __b64_pton \ + bcopy \ + bcrypt_pbkdf \ + bindresvport_sa \ + blf_enc \ + bzero \ + cap_rights_limit \ + clock \ + closefrom \ + dirfd \ + endgrent \ + err \ + errx \ + explicit_bzero \ + fchmod \ + fchown \ + flock \ + freeaddrinfo \ + freezero \ + fstatfs \ + fstatvfs \ + futimes \ + getaddrinfo \ + getcwd \ + getgrouplist \ + getline \ + getnameinfo \ + getopt \ + getpagesize \ + getpeereid \ + getpeerucred \ + getpgid \ + _getpty \ + getrlimit \ + getrandom \ + getsid \ + getttyent \ + glob \ + group_from_gid \ + inet_aton \ + inet_ntoa \ + inet_ntop \ + innetgr \ + llabs \ + login_getcapbool \ + md5_crypt \ + memmove \ + memset_s \ + mkdtemp \ + ngetaddrinfo \ + nsleep \ + ogetaddrinfo \ + openlog_r \ + pledge \ + poll \ + prctl \ + pstat \ + raise \ + readpassphrase \ + reallocarray \ + recvmsg \ + recallocarray \ + rresvport_af \ + sendmsg \ + setdtablesize \ + setegid \ + setenv \ + seteuid \ + setgroupent \ + setgroups \ + setlinebuf \ + setlogin \ + setpassent\ + setpcred \ + setproctitle \ + setregid \ + setreuid \ + setrlimit \ + setsid \ + setvbuf \ + sigaction \ + sigvec \ + snprintf \ + socketpair \ + statfs \ + statvfs \ + strcasestr \ + strdup \ + strerror \ + strlcat \ + strlcpy \ + strmode \ + strndup \ + strnlen \ + strnvis \ + strptime \ + strsignal \ + strtonum \ + strtoll \ + strtoul \ + strtoull \ + swap32 \ + sysconf \ + tcgetpgrp \ + timingsafe_bcmp \ + truncate \ + unsetenv \ + updwtmpx \ + user_from_uid \ + usleep \ + vasprintf \ + vsnprintf \ + waitpid \ + warn \ + +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "bzero" "ac_cv_have_decl_bzero" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_bzero" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_BZERO $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + +for ac_func in mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + +TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes} +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utf8 locale support" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for utf8 locale support... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8"); + if (loc != NULL) + exit(0); + exit(1); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + TEST_SSH_UTF8=no +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + return (isblank('a')); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ISBLANK 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +disable_pkcs11= +# Check whether --enable-pkcs11 was given. +if test "${enable_pkcs11+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_pkcs11; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + disable_pkcs11=1 + fi + + +fi + + +# PKCS11 depends on OpenSSL. +if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then + # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dlopen" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dlopen... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char dlopen (); +int +main () +{ +return dlopen (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' dl; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_dlopen=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_dlopen=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dlopen +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "RTLD_NOW" "ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" "#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +fi + +fi + +# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() +for ac_func in gai_strerror +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "gai_strerror" "ac_cv_func_gai_strerror" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_gai_strerror" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1 +_ACEOF + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1" >>confdefs.h + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include + +const char *gai_strerror(int); + +int +main () +{ + + char *str; + str = gai_strerror(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi +done + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing nanosleep" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing nanosleep... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char nanosleep (); +int +main () +{ +return nanosleep (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' rt posix4; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_nanosleep=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_nanosleep=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_nanosleep +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing clock_gettime" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing clock_gettime... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char clock_gettime (); +int +main () +{ +return clock_gettime (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' rt; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" " +#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H +# include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" = xyes; then : + for ac_func in strsep +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_func_strsep" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_strsep" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRSEP 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + +fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" "#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then : + $as_echo "#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + for ac_func in tcsendbreak +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + +fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "h_errno" "ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SHUT_RD" "ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" " +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "O_NONBLOCK" "ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" " +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +# include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "readv" "ac_cv_have_decl_readv" " +#include +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_readv" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_READV $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "writev" "ac_cv_have_decl_writev" " +#include +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_writev" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "MAXSYMLINKS" "ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" " +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "offsetof" "ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" " +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + +# extra bits for select(2) +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "howmany" "ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" " +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "NFDBITS" "ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" " +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fd_mask" "ac_cv_type_fd_mask" " +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_fd_mask" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_FD_MASK 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + + +for ac_func in setresuid +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresuid" "ac_cv_func_setresuid" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresuid" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SETRESUID 1 +_ACEOF + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresuid seems to work" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if setresuid seems to work... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + errno=0; + setresuid(0,0,0); + if (errno==ENOSYS) + exit(1); + else + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETRESUID 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5 +$as_echo "not implemented" >&6; } +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +fi +done + + +for ac_func in setresgid +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresgid" "ac_cv_func_setresgid" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresgid" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SETRESGID 1 +_ACEOF + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresgid seems to work" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if setresgid seems to work... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + errno=0; + setresgid(0,0,0); + if (errno==ENOSYS) + exit(1); + else + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETRESGID 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5 +$as_echo "not implemented" >&6; } +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +fi +done + + +for ac_func in realpath +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "realpath" "ac_cv_func_realpath" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_realpath" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_REALPATH 1 +_ACEOF + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if realpath works with non-existent files" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if realpath works with non-existent files... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + char buf[PATH_MAX]; + if (realpath("/opensshnonexistentfilename1234", buf) == NULL) + if (errno == ENOENT) + exit(1); + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_REALPATH 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +fi +done + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for working fflush(NULL)" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for working fflush(NULL)... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include +int +main () +{ +fflush(NULL); exit(0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define FFLUSH_NULL_BUG 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +for ac_func in gettimeofday time +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + +for ac_func in endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + +for ac_func in utmpname +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utmpname" "ac_cv_func_utmpname" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_utmpname" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_UTMPNAME 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + +for ac_func in endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + +for ac_func in setutxdb setutxent utmpxname +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + +for ac_func in getlastlogxbyname +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getlastlogxbyname" "ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "daemon" "ac_cv_func_daemon" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_daemon" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for daemon in -lbsd" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for daemon in -lbsd... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lbsd $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char daemon (); +int +main () +{ +return daemon (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" = xyes; then : + LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; $as_echo "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpagesize" "ac_cv_func_getpagesize" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpagesize" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getpagesize in -lucb" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for getpagesize in -lucb... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lucb $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char getpagesize (); +int +main () +{ +return getpagesize (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" = xyes; then : + LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; $as_echo "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +fi + + +# Check for broken snprintf +if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + + char b[5]; + snprintf(b,5,"123456789"); + exit(b[4]!='\0'); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;} + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf understands %zu" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf understands %zu... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + size_t a = 1, b = 2; + char z[128]; + snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b); + exit(strcmp(z, "12")); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + +# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the +# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3) +if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include + +int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + size_t ret; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +main () +{ + +char x[1]; +if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) + return 1; +if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) + return 1; +return 0; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;} + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + +# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio, +# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *. +# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; } + +int +main () +{ + + snprintf(0, 0, 0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define SNPRINTF_CONST const" >>confdefs.h + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + $as_echo "#define SNPRINTF_CONST /* not const */" >>confdefs.h + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support +NO_PEERCHECK="" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +int +main () +{ +int i = SO_PEERCRED; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SO_PEERCRED 1" >>confdefs.h + + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + NO_PEERCHECK=1 + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for (overly) strict mkstemp" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for (overly) strict mkstemp... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include + +int +main () +{ + + char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test"; + if (mkstemp(template) == -1) + exit(1); + unlink(template); + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + +if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5 +$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; } + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + pid_t pid; + int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) { /* failed */ + exit(1); + } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */ + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + if (WIFEXITED(status)) + exit(WEXITSTATUS(status)); + else + exit(2); + } else { /* child */ + close(0); close(1); close(2); + setsid(); + openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); + fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (fd >= 0) + exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */ + else + exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */ + } + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + $as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5 +$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; } + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define TEST_PORT "2222" + +int +main () +{ + + int err, sock; + struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + + err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); + if (err != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); + exit(1); + } + + for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + + err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, + sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); + + if (err != 0) { + if (err == EAI_SYSTEM) + perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM"); + else + fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n", + gai_strerror(err)); + exit(2); + } + + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); + if (sock < 0) + perror("socket"); + if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + if (errno == EBADF) + exit(3); + } + } + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming no" >&5 +$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming no" >&6; } + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define TEST_PORT "2222" + +int +main () +{ + + int err, sock; + struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + + err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); + if (err != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); + exit(1); + } + + for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + + err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, + sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); + + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) { + perror("getnameinfo"); + exit(2); + } + } + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK 1" >>confdefs.h + + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then + ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "AI_NUMERICSERV" "ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" "#include + #include + #include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + +fi + +if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + exit(0); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS 1" >>confdefs.h + + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for working strnvis" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for working strnvis... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming broken" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming broken" >&2;} + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); } + +int +main () +{ + + char dst[16]; + + signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler); + if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0) + exit(0); + exit(1) + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + +for ac_func in getpgrp +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpgrp" "ac_cv_func_getpgrp" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpgrp" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_GETPGRP 1 +_ACEOF + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getpgrp accepts zero args" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if getpgrp accepts zero args... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +$ac_includes_default +int +main () +{ + getpgrp(); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define GETPGRP_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define GETPGRP_VOID 0" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +done + + +# Search for OpenSSL +saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" +saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + +# Check whether --with-ssl-dir was given. +if test "${with_ssl_dir+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_ssl_dir; + if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + as_fn_error $? "cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5 + fi + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + case "$withval" in + # Relative paths + ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval" + esac + if test -d "$withval/lib"; then + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + else + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + fi + if test -d "$withval/include"; then + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" + else + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" + fi + fi + + +fi + + + +# Check whether --with-openssl-header-check was given. +if test "${with_openssl_header_check+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_openssl_header_check; + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + openssl_check_nonfatal=1 + fi + + +fi + + +openssl_engine=no + +# Check whether --with-ssl-engine was given. +if test "${with_ssl_engine+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_ssl_engine; + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + as_fn_error $? "cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5 + fi + openssl_engine=yes + fi + + +fi + + +if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then + LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS" + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RAND_add (); +int +main () +{ +return RAND_add (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" + fi + CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/opensslv.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" = xyes; then : + +else + as_fn_error $? "*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RAND_add (); +int +main () +{ +return RAND_add (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + $as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + + as_fn_error $? "*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***" "$LINENO" 5 + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + # Determine OpenSSL header version + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL header version" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking OpenSSL header version... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;} + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + #include + #include + #define DATA "conftest.sslincver" + +int +main () +{ + + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + + if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", + (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, + OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0) + exit(1); + + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver` + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_header_ver" >&5 +$as_echo "$ssl_header_ver" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5 +$as_echo "not found" >&6; } + as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL version header not found." "$LINENO" 5 + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + + # Determine OpenSSL library version + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL library version" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking OpenSSL library version... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;} + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + #include + #include + #define DATA "conftest.ssllibver" + +int +main () +{ + + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + + if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", (unsigned long)SSLeay(), + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) < 0) + exit(1); + + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver` + # Check version is supported. + case "$ssl_library_ver" in + 10000*|0*) + as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; + 100*) ;; # 1.0.x + 1010000123456*) + # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613 + as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; + 101*) ;; # 1.1.x + 200*) ;; # LibreSSL + *) + as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL > 1.1.x is not yet supported (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; + esac + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_library_ver" >&5 +$as_echo "$ssl_library_ver" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5 +$as_echo "not found" >&6; } + as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL library not found." "$LINENO" 5 + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + + # Sanity check OpenSSL headers + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;} + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then + as_fn_error $? "Your OpenSSL headers do not match your + library. Check config.log for details. + If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check + by running \"./configure --without-openssl-header-check\". + Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches. + " "$LINENO" 5 + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your + library. Check config.log for details. + Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your + library. Check config.log for details. + Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&2;} + fi + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS -ldl" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + for ac_func in \ + BN_is_prime_ex \ + DSA_generate_parameters_ex \ + EVP_DigestInit_ex \ + EVP_DigestFinal_ex \ + EVP_MD_CTX_init \ + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \ + EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \ + HMAC_CTX_init \ + RSA_generate_key_ex \ + RSA_get_default_method \ + +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + + if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + +int +main () +{ + + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); + ENGINE_register_all_complete(); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1" >>confdefs.h + + +else + as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL ENGINE support not found" "$LINENO" 5 + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + fi + + # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES 1" >>confdefs.h + + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL || + EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || + EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1" >>confdefs.h + + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || + EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || + EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || + EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || + EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || + EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1" >>confdefs.h + + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ + aes128-gcm@openssh.com \ + aes256-gcm@openssh.com" + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl (); +int +main () +{ +return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + # LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DH_get0_key" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DH_get0_key... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_get0_key+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DH_get0_key (); +int +main () +{ +return DH_get0_key (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DH_get0_key=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DH_get0_key+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_get0_key+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DH_get0_key=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DH_get0_key" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DH_get0_key" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DH_get0_key +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DH_get0_pqg" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DH_get0_pqg... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_get0_pqg+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DH_get0_pqg (); +int +main () +{ +return DH_get0_pqg (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DH_get0_pqg=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DH_get0_pqg+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_get0_pqg+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DH_get0_pqg=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DH_get0_pqg" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DH_get0_pqg" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DH_get0_pqg +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DH_set0_key" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DH_set0_key... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_set0_key+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DH_set0_key (); +int +main () +{ +return DH_set0_key (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DH_set0_key=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DH_set0_key+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_set0_key+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DH_set0_key=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DH_set0_key" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DH_set0_key" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DH_set0_key +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DH_set_length" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DH_set_length... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_set_length+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DH_set_length (); +int +main () +{ +return DH_set_length (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DH_set_length=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DH_set_length+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_set_length+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DH_set_length=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DH_set_length" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DH_set_length" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DH_set_length +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DH_set0_pqg" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DH_set0_pqg... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_set0_pqg+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DH_set0_pqg (); +int +main () +{ +return DH_set0_pqg (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DH_set0_pqg=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DH_set0_pqg+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DH_set0_pqg+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DH_set0_pqg=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DH_set0_pqg" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DH_set0_pqg" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DH_set0_pqg +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DSA_get0_key" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DSA_get0_key... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_key+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DSA_get0_key (); +int +main () +{ +return DSA_get0_key (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_key=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_key+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_key+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_key=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_key" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_key" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_key +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DSA_get0_pqg" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DSA_get0_pqg... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_pqg+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DSA_get0_pqg (); +int +main () +{ +return DSA_get0_pqg (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_pqg=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_pqg+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_pqg+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_pqg=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_pqg" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_pqg" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DSA_get0_pqg +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DSA_set0_key" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DSA_set0_key... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_key+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DSA_set0_key (); +int +main () +{ +return DSA_set0_key (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_key=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_key+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_key+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_key=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_key" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_key" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_key +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DSA_set0_pqg" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DSA_set0_pqg... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_pqg+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DSA_set0_pqg (); +int +main () +{ +return DSA_set0_pqg (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_pqg=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_pqg+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_pqg+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_pqg=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_pqg" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_pqg" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DSA_set0_pqg +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DSA_SIG_get0" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DSA_SIG_get0... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_get0+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DSA_SIG_get0 (); +int +main () +{ +return DSA_SIG_get0 (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_get0=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_get0+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_get0+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_get0=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_get0" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_get0" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_get0 +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing DSA_SIG_set0" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing DSA_SIG_set0... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_set0+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char DSA_SIG_set0 (); +int +main () +{ +return DSA_SIG_set0 (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_set0=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_set0+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_set0+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_set0=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_set0" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_set0" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_DSA_SIG_set0 +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing ECDSA_SIG_get0" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing ECDSA_SIG_get0... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_get0+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char ECDSA_SIG_get0 (); +int +main () +{ +return ECDSA_SIG_get0 (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_get0=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_get0+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_get0+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_get0=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_get0" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_get0" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_get0 +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing ECDSA_SIG_set0" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing ECDSA_SIG_set0... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_set0+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char ECDSA_SIG_set0 (); +int +main () +{ +return ECDSA_SIG_set0 (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_set0=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_set0+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_set0+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_set0=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_set0" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_set0" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_ECDSA_SIG_set0 +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv (); +int +main () +{ +return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst (); +int +main () +{ +return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv (); +int +main () +{ +return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv (); +int +main () +{ +return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_get0_crt_params" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_get0_crt_params... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_crt_params+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_get0_crt_params (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_get0_crt_params (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_crt_params=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_crt_params+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_crt_params+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_crt_params=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_crt_params" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_crt_params" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_crt_params +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_get0_factors" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_get0_factors... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_factors+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_get0_factors (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_get0_factors (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_factors=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_factors+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_factors+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_factors=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_factors" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_factors" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_factors +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_get0_key" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_get0_key... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_key+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_get0_key (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_get0_key (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_key=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_key+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_key+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_key=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_key" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_key" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_get0_key +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_set0_crt_params" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_set0_crt_params... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_crt_params+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_set0_crt_params (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_set0_crt_params (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_crt_params=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_crt_params+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_crt_params+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_crt_params=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_crt_params" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_crt_params" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_crt_params +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_set0_factors" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_set0_factors... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_factors+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_set0_factors (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_set0_factors (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_factors=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_factors+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_factors+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_factors=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_factors" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_factors" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_factors +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_set0_key" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_set0_key... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_key+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_set0_key (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_set0_key (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_key=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_key+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_key+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_key=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_key" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_key" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_set0_key +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_meth_free" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_meth_free... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_free+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_meth_free (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_meth_free (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_free=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_free+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_free+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_free=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_free" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_free" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_free +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_meth_dup" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_meth_dup... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_dup+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_meth_dup (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_meth_dup (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_dup=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_dup+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_dup+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_dup=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_dup" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_dup" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_dup +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_meth_set1_name" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_meth_set1_name... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set1_name+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_meth_set1_name (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_meth_set1_name (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set1_name=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set1_name+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set1_name+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set1_name=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set1_name" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set1_name" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set1_name +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_meth_get_finish" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_meth_get_finish... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_get_finish+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_meth_get_finish (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_meth_get_finish (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_get_finish=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_get_finish+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_get_finish+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_get_finish=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_get_finish" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_get_finish" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_get_finish +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_meth_set_priv_enc" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_meth_set_priv_enc... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_meth_set_priv_enc (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_meth_set_priv_enc (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_meth_set_priv_dec" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_meth_set_priv_dec... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_meth_set_priv_dec (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_meth_set_priv_dec (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing RSA_meth_set_finish" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing RSA_meth_set_finish... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_finish+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char RSA_meth_set_finish (); +int +main () +{ +return RSA_meth_set_finish (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_finish=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_finish+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_finish+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_finish=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_finish" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_finish" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_RSA_meth_set_finish +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA (); +int +main () +{ +return EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_MD_CTX_new" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_MD_CTX_new... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_new+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char EVP_MD_CTX_new (); +int +main () +{ +return EVP_MD_CTX_new (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_new=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_new+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_new+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_new=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_new" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_new" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_new +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_MD_CTX_free" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_MD_CTX_free... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_free+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char EVP_MD_CTX_free (); +int +main () +{ +return EVP_MD_CTX_free (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' crypto; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_free=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_free+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_free+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_free=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_free" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_free" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_MD_CTX_free +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h + + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, + # because the system crypt() is more featureful. + if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char crypt (); +int +main () +{ +return crypt (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBCRYPT 1 +_ACEOF + + LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" + +fi + + fi + + # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the + # version in OpenSSL. + if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char crypt (); +int +main () +{ +return crypt (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : + LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt" +fi + + fi + for ac_func in crypt DES_crypt +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + + # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL + for ac_func in SHA256_Update EVP_sha256 +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +else + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + hmac-sha2-256 \ + hmac-sha2-512 \ + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \ + hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com \ + hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" + + +fi +done + + # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL + for ac_func in EVP_ripemd160 +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_ripemd160" "ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 1 +_ACEOF + +else + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + hmac-ripemd160 \ + hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com \ + hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com" + + +fi +done + + + # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + enable_nistp256=1 +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); + const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + enable_nistp384=1 +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); + const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} + enable_nistp521=1 + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); + const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ + exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + enable_nistp521=1 +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + + COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" + TEST_SSH_ECC=no + + if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ + test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then + +$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then + +$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1" >>confdefs.h + + TEST_SSH_ECC=yes + COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" + else + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ + ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" + fi + if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then + +$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1" >>confdefs.h + + TEST_SSH_ECC=yes + COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" + else + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ + ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" + fi + if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then + +$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1" >>confdefs.h + + TEST_SSH_ECC=yes + COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" + else + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" + fi + + + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char crypt (); +int +main () +{ +return crypt (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : + LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt" +fi + + for ac_func in crypt +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "crypt" "ac_cv_func_crypt" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_crypt" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_CRYPT 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + +fi + +for ac_func in \ + arc4random \ + arc4random_buf \ + arc4random_stir \ + arc4random_uniform \ + +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + +saved_LIBS="$LIBS" +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-liaf $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char ia_openinfo (); +int +main () +{ +return ia_openinfo (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" = xyes; then : + + LIBS="$LIBS -liaf" + for ac_func in set_id +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "set_id" "ac_cv_func_set_id" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_set_id" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SET_ID 1 +_ACEOF + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBIAF 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi +done + + +fi + +LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + +### Configure cryptographic random number support + +# Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself +if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} + # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if + # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly. + OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + + exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + +# PRNGD TCP socket + +# Check whether --with-prngd-port was given. +if test "${with_prngd_port+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_prngd_port; + case "$withval" in + no) + withval="" + ;; + [0-9]*) + ;; + *) + as_fn_error $? "You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; + esac + if test ! -z "$withval" ; then + PRNGD_PORT="$withval" + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define PRNGD_PORT $PRNGD_PORT +_ACEOF + + fi + + +fi + + +# PRNGD Unix domain socket + +# Check whether --with-prngd-socket was given. +if test "${with_prngd_socket+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_prngd_socket; + case "$withval" in + yes) + withval="/var/run/egd-pool" + ;; + no) + withval="" + ;; + /*) + ;; + *) + as_fn_error $? "You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; + esac + + if test ! -z "$withval" ; then + if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then + as_fn_error $? "You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket" "$LINENO" 5 + fi + if test ! -r "$withval" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&2;} + fi + PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET" +_ACEOF + + fi + +else + + # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already + if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PRNGD/EGD socket" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for PRNGD/EGD socket... " >&6; } + # Insert other locations here + for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do + if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then + PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock" + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET" +_ACEOF + + break; + fi + done + if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PRNGD_SOCKET" >&5 +$as_echo "$PRNGD_SOCKET" >&6; } + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5 +$as_echo "not found" >&6; } + fi + fi + + +fi + + +# Which randomness source do we use? +if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then + RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT" +elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then + RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET" +elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then + +$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1" >>confdefs.h + + RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY" +elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&2;} +else + as_fn_error $? "OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + +# Check for PAM libs +PAM_MSG="no" + +# Check whether --with-pam was given. +if test "${with_pam+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_pam; + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then + as_fn_error $? "PAM headers not found" "$LINENO" 5 + fi + + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlopen in -ldl" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for dlopen in -ldl... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-ldl $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char dlopen (); +int +main () +{ +return dlopen (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBDL 1 +_ACEOF + + LIBS="-ldl $LIBS" + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_set_item in -lpam" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for pam_set_item in -lpam... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lpam $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char pam_set_item (); +int +main () +{ +return pam_set_item (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LIBPAM 1 +_ACEOF + + LIBS="-lpam $LIBS" + +else + as_fn_error $? "*** libpam missing" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + + for ac_func in pam_getenvlist +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_getenvlist" "ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + for ac_func in pam_putenv +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_putenv" "ac_cv_func_pam_putenv" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_putenv" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + + PAM_MSG="yes" + + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" + +$as_echo "#define USE_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h + + + if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then + case "$LIBS" in + *-ldl*) + # libdl already in LIBS + ;; + *) + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" + ;; + esac + fi + fi + + +fi + + + +# Check whether --with-pam-service was given. +if test "${with_pam_service+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_pam_service; + if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE "$withval" +_ACEOF + + fi + + +fi + + +# Check for older PAM +if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then + # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) +#include +#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) +#include +#endif + +int +main () +{ + +(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +else + + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_OLD_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + PAM_MSG="yes (old library)" + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +case "$host" in +*-*-cygwin*) + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER + ;; +*) + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd + ;; +esac + +# Check whether --with-privsep-user was given. +if test "${with_privsep_user+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_privsep_user; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval + fi + + +fi + +if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER +_ACEOF + +else + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" +_ACEOF + +fi + + +if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" "ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" " + #include + #include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" = xyes; then : + have_seccomp_filter=1 +fi + +fi +if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking kernel for seccomp_filter support" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking kernel for seccomp_filter support... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + +int +main () +{ + int i = $seccomp_audit_arch; + errno = 0; + prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0); + exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + # Disable seccomp filter as a target + have_seccomp_filter=0 + + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +# Decide which sandbox style to use +sandbox_arg="" + +# Check whether --with-sandbox was given. +if test "${with_sandbox+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_sandbox; + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + sandbox_arg="" + else + sandbox_arg="$withval" + fi + + +fi + + +# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type +# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor +# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if select works with descriptor rlimit" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if select works with descriptor rlimit... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} + select_works_with_rlimit=yes + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + struct rlimit rl_zero; + int fd, r; + fd_set fds; + struct timeval tv; + + fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY); + FD_ZERO(&fds); + FD_SET(fd, &fds); + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero); + setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); + tv.tv_sec = 1; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv); + exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + select_works_with_rlimit=yes +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + select_works_with_rlimit=no +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} + rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + struct rlimit rl_zero; + int fd, r; + fd_set fds; + + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); + exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works... " >&6; } +if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + struct rlimit rl_zero; + + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then + test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \ + as_fn_error $? "pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support" "$LINENO" 5 + SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge" + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_PLEDGE 1" >>confdefs.h + +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then + test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \ + as_fn_error $? "systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support" "$LINENO" 5 + SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace" + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SYSTRACE 1" >>confdefs.h + +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then + test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \ + "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \ + as_fn_error $? "Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function" "$LINENO" 5 + SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin" + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_DARWIN 1" >>confdefs.h + +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ + test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \ + test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then + test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \ + as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host" "$LINENO" 5 + test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \ + as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "$LINENO" 5 + test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \ + as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers" "$LINENO" 5 + test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \ + as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" "$LINENO" 5 + SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h + +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ + as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header" "$LINENO" 5 + test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ + as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5 + SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1" >>confdefs.h + +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then + test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ + as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function" "$LINENO" 5 + test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \ + as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit" "$LINENO" 5 + SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit" + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_RLIMIT 1" >>confdefs.h + +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then + SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris" + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SOLARIS 1" >>confdefs.h + +elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \ + test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then + SANDBOX_STYLE="none" + +$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_NULL 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + as_fn_error $? "unsupported --with-sandbox" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + +# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right. +if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then + LIBS="$LIBS -liberty"; +fi + +# Check for long long datatypes +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long long" "ac_cv_type_long_long" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_long" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "unsigned long long" "ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long double" "ac_cv_type_long_double" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_double" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + + +# Check datatype sizes +# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler +# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects +# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'. +# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of short int" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking size of short int... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_sizeof_short_int+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (short int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then : + +else + if test "$ac_cv_type_short_int" = yes; then + { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (short int) +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } + else + ac_cv_sizeof_short_int=0 + fi +fi + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&6; } + + + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int +_ACEOF + + +# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler +# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects +# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'. +# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of int" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking size of int... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_sizeof_int+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then : + +else + if test "$ac_cv_type_int" = yes; then + { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (int) +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } + else + ac_cv_sizeof_int=0 + fi +fi + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&6; } + + + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define SIZEOF_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_int +_ACEOF + + +# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler +# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects +# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'. +# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long int" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking size of long int... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_int+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then : + +else + if test "$ac_cv_type_long_int" = yes; then + { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long int) +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } + else + ac_cv_sizeof_long_int=0 + fi +fi + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&6; } + + + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define SIZEOF_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int +_ACEOF + + +# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler +# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects +# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'. +# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364. +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long long int" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking size of long long int... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then : + +else + if test "$ac_cv_type_long_long_int" = yes; then + { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} +as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long long int) +See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } + else + ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0 + fi +fi + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&6; } + + + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int +_ACEOF + + + +# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX) +if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then + ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0 +fi + +# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them. +if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for max value of long long" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for max value of long long... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;} + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +/* Why is this so damn hard? */ +#ifdef __GNUC__ +# undef __GNUC__ +#endif +#define __USE_ISOC99 +#include +#define DATA "conftest.llminmax" +#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a)) + +/* + * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so + * we do this the hard way. + */ +static int +fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n) +{ + unsigned int i; + int l[sizeof(long long) * 8]; + + if (n < 0) + if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0) + return -1; + for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) { + l[i] = my_abs(n % 10); + n /= 10; + } + do { + if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0) + return -1; + } while (i != 0); + if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +int +main () +{ + + FILE *f; + long long i, llmin, llmax = 0; + + if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL) + exit(1); + +#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX) + fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); + llmin = LLONG_MIN; + llmax = LLONG_MAX; +#else + fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); + /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */ + for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++) + llmax = i; + llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */ +#endif + + /* Sanity check */ + if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax + || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0 + || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) { + fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n"); + exit(2); + } + + if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0) + exit(3); + if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0) + exit(4); + if (fclose(f) < 0) + exit(5); + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax` + llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax` + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_max" >&5 +$as_echo "$llong_max" >&6; } + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define LLONG_MAX ${llong_max}LL +_ACEOF + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for min value of long long" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for min value of long long... " >&6; } + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_min" >&5 +$as_echo "$llong_min" >&6; } + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define LLONG_MIN ${llong_min}LL +_ACEOF + + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5 +$as_echo "not found" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + + +# More checks for data types +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int type" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for u_int type... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_u_int+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + u_int a; a = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_u_int="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_int" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT 1" >>confdefs.h + + have_u_int=1 +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t types... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_intxx_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + have_intxx_t=1 +fi + +if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for int64_t type" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for int64_t type... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_int64_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +# include +#endif + +int +main () +{ + +int64_t a; a = 1; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for u_intXX_t types... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + have_u_intxx_t=1 +fi + +if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t types" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for u_int64_t types... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_u_int64_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + u_int64_t a; a = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + have_u_int64_t=1 +fi + +if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + u_int64_t a; a = 1 + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_uintxx_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include + +int +main () +{ + + uint8_t a; + uint16_t b; + uint32_t c; + a = b = c = 1; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&6; } + if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi +fi + +if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes") +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") +then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include + +int +main () +{ + + int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; + u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g; + a = b = c = e = f = g = 1; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_char" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for u_char... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_u_char+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + u_char foo; foo = 125; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_u_char="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_char" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_char" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_CHAR 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "intmax_t" "ac_cv_type_intmax_t" " +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_intmax_t" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "uintmax_t" "ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" " +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + + + + ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "socklen_t" "ac_cv_type_socklen_t" "#include +#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_socklen_t" = xyes; then : + +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socklen_t equivalent" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for socklen_t equivalent... " >&6; } + if ${curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or + # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername + curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv= + for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do + for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + + #include + #include + + int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *); + +int +main () +{ + + $t len; + getpeername(0,0,&len); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + + curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t" + break + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + done + done + + if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then + as_fn_error $? "Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" "$LINENO" 5 + fi + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&5 +$as_echo "$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&6; } + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define socklen_t $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv +_ACEOF + +fi + + + +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "sig_atomic_t" "ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsblkcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" " +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsfilcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" " +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct statfs" "f_flags" "ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" " +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H +#include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + + + +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_addr_t" "ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" "#include +#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_port_t" "ac_cv_type_in_port_t" "#include +#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_port_t" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for size_t" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for size_t... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_size_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + size_t foo; foo = 1235; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_size_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_size_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_size_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ssize_t" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ssize_t... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_ssize_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for clock_t" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for clock_t... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_clock_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + clock_t foo; foo = 1235; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_clock_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for sa_family_t" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for sa_family_t... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_sa_family_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pid_t" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for pid_t... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_pid_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + pid_t foo; foo = 1235; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_T 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for mode_t" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for mode_t... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_mode_t+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + mode_t foo; foo = 1235; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_MODE_T 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_storage" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + struct sockaddr_storage s; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_in6" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for struct sockaddr_in6... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct in6_addr" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for struct in6_addr... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1" >>confdefs.h + + + ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct sockaddr_in6" "sin6_scope_id" "ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for struct addrinfo... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct timeval" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for struct timeval... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_struct_timeval+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1" >>confdefs.h + + have_struct_timeval=1 +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "struct timespec" "ac_cv_type_struct_timespec" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_type_struct_timespec" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + + +# We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail. +if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then + echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install" + echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." + echo "" + exit 1; +else + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;} + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF +main() +{ + char buf[50]; + char expected_out[50]; + int mazsize = 50 ; +#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) + long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; +#else + long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; +#endif + strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); + snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); + if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) + exit(1); + exit(0); +} +#else +main() { exit(0); } +#endif + +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + true +else + $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +fi + + +# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmp.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmp.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmp.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmpx.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'syslen' in header 'utmpx.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"syslen + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for syslen field in utmpx.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for syslen field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "syslen" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_pid' in header 'utmp.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_pid + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_pid" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmp.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmp.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmp.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmpx.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmp.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmp.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmp.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmp.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmpx.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmp.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmpx.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmp.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6 + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmpx.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6 + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_exit' in header 'utmp.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_exit + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_exit" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmp.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmp.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_time field in utmp.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmpx.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmpx.h' + ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` + ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } + if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ +#include + +_ACEOF +if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | + $EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : + eval "$ossh_varname=yes" +else + eval "$ossh_varname=no" +fi +rm -f conftest* + +fi + + ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` + if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 +$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } + if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_blksize" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtim" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtime" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_gecos" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" " +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_class" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" " +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_change" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" " +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_expire" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" " +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" = xyes; then : + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1 +_ACEOF + + +fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct __res_state" "retrans" "ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" " +#include +#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" = xyes; then : + +else + +$as_echo "#define __res_state state" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" +else + ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + +#ifdef msg_accrights +#error "msg_accrights is a macro" +exit(1); +#endif +struct msghdr m; +m.msg_accrights = 0; +exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif + +int +main () +{ + struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if fsid_t has member val" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if fsid_t has member val... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define FSID_HAS_VAL 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if f_fsid has member __val" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if f_fsid has member __val... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define FSID_HAS___VAL 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + +#ifdef msg_control +#error "msg_control is a macro" +exit(1); +#endif +struct msghdr m; +m.msg_control = 0; +exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines __progname" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines __progname... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_libc_defines___progname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +int +main () +{ + extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" +else + ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE___PROGNAME 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" +else + ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __func__" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC implements __func__... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_cc_implements___func__+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + printf("%s", __func__); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" +else + ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE___func__ 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether va_copy exists" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether va_copy exists... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_va_copy+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +va_list x,y; + +int +main () +{ + va_copy(x,y); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_va_copy="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether __va_copy exists" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether __va_copy exists... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have___va_copy+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +va_list x,y; + +int +main () +{ + __va_copy(x,y); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" +else + ac_cv_have___va_copy="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE___VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether getopt has optreset support" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether getopt has optreset support... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include +int +main () +{ + extern int optreset; optreset = 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" +else + ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_errlist" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines sys_errlist... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +int +main () +{ + extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" +else + ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_nerr" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines sys_nerr... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +int +main () +{ + extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" +else + ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + +# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing getrrsetbyname" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing getrrsetbyname... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char getrrsetbyname (); +int +main () +{ +return getrrsetbyname (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' resolv; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + + # Needed by our getrrsetbyname() + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing res_query" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing res_query... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char res_query (); +int +main () +{ +return res_query (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' resolv; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_res_query=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_res_query=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_res_query" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_res_query" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_res_query +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char dn_expand (); +int +main () +{ +return dn_expand (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' resolv; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if res_query will link" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if res_query will link... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +main () +{ + + res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + for ac_func in _getshort _getlong +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getshort" "ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" "#include + #include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getlong" "ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" "#include + #include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "HEADER" "ad" "ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" "#include +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" = xyes; then : + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + +fi + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +extern struct __res_state _res; + +int +main () +{ + +struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */ +return 0; + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1" >>confdefs.h + + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext + +# Check whether user wants SELinux support +SELINUX_MSG="no" +LIBSELINUX="" + +# Check whether --with-selinux was given. +if test "${with_selinux+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_selinux; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define WITH_SELINUX 1" >>confdefs.h + + SELINUX_MSG="yes" + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "selinux/selinux.h" "ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" = xyes; then : + +else + as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires selinux.h header" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setexeccon in -lselinux" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for setexeccon in -lselinux... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lselinux $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char setexeccon (); +int +main () +{ +return setexeccon (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" = xyes; then : + LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" + LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux" + +else + as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires libselinux library" "$LINENO" 5 +fi + + SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX" + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" + for ac_func in getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + fi + +fi + + + + +# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support +KRB5_MSG="no" + +# Check whether --with-kerberos5 was given. +if test "${with_kerberos5+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_kerberos5; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + KRB5ROOT="/usr/local" + else + KRB5ROOT=${withval} + fi + + +$as_echo "#define KRB5 1" >>confdefs.h + + KRB5_MSG="yes" + + if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $KRB5CONF in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH" +for as_dir in $as_dummy +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF +if test -n "$KRB5CONF"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KRB5CONF" >&5 +$as_echo "$KRB5CONF" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + +fi +if test -z "$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF"; then + ac_pt_KRB5CONF=$KRB5CONF + # Extract the first word of "krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy krb5-config; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $ac_pt_KRB5CONF in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF="$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH" +for as_dir in $as_dummy +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +ac_pt_KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF +if test -n "$ac_pt_KRB5CONF"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_KRB5CONF" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + if test "x$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" = x; then + KRB5CONF="$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config" + else + case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in +yes:) +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} +ac_tool_warned=yes ;; +esac + KRB5CONF=$ac_pt_KRB5CONF + fi +else + KRB5CONF="$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF" +fi + + if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then + K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`" + K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS" + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gssapi support" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for gssapi support... " >&6; } + if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h + + GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`" + GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS" + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include + +int +main () +{ + char *tmp = heimdal_version; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + else + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + #include + +int +main () +{ + char *tmp = heimdal_version; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + $as_echo "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h + + K5LIBS="-lkrb5" + K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for net_write in -lroken" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for net_write in -lroken... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lroken $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char net_write (); +int +main () +{ +return net_write (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" = xyes; then : + K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken" +fi + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-ldes $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char des_cbc_encrypt (); +int +main () +{ +return des_cbc_encrypt (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" = xyes; then : + K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes" +fi + + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err" + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char dn_expand (); +int +main () +{ +return dn_expand (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' resolv; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +fi + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lgssapi_krb5 $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char gss_init_sec_context (); +int +main () +{ +return gss_init_sec_context (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then : + $as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h + + GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lgssapi $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char gss_init_sec_context (); +int +main () +{ +return gss_init_sec_context (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then : + $as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h + + GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS +LIBS="-lgss $LIBS" +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char gss_init_sec_context (); +int +main () +{ +return gss_init_sec_context (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=yes +else + ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=no +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; } +if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then : + $as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h + + GSSLIBS="-lgss" +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&2;} +fi + + +fi + + +fi + + + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then : + +else + unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" + for ac_header in gssapi.h +do : + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_GSSAPI_H 1 +_ACEOF + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&2;} + +fi + +done + + + +fi + + + + oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" + ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi_krb5.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" = xyes; then : + +else + CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" +fi + + + + fi + if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib" + fi + if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then + blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib" + fi + + for ac_header in gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h +do : + as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + for ac_header in gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h +do : + as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + for ac_header in gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h +do : + as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi + +done + + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing k_hasafs" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for library containing k_hasafs... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. + Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC + builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" +#endif +char k_hasafs (); +int +main () +{ +return k_hasafs (); + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +for ac_lib in '' kafs; do + if test -z "$ac_lib"; then + ac_res="none required" + else + ac_res=-l$ac_lib + LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" + fi + if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : + ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=$ac_res +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ + conftest$ac_exeext + if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then : + break +fi +done +if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then : + +else + ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=no +fi +rm conftest.$ac_ext +LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS +fi +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&6; } +ac_res=$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs +if test "$ac_res" != no; then : + test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" + +$as_echo "#define USE_AFS 1" >>confdefs.h + +fi + + + ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" "ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" " +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H +# include +#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H +# include +#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H) +# include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" = xyes; then : + ac_have_decl=1 +else + ac_have_decl=0 +fi + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE $ac_have_decl +_ACEOF + + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS" + for ac_func in krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + + fi + + +fi + + + + +# Looking for programs, paths and files + +PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty + +# Check whether --with-privsep-path was given. +if test "${with_privsep_path+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_privsep_path; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval + fi + + +fi + + + + +# Check whether --with-xauth was given. +if test "${with_xauth+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_xauth; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + xauth_path=$withval + fi + +else + + TestPath="$PATH" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin" + # Extract the first word of "xauth", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy xauth; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_xauth_path+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $xauth_path in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$xauth_path" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $TestPath +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +xauth_path=$ac_cv_path_xauth_path +if test -n "$xauth_path"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $xauth_path" >&5 +$as_echo "$xauth_path" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then + xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" + fi + + +fi + + +STRIP_OPT=-s +# Check whether --enable-strip was given. +if test "${enable_strip+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_strip; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + STRIP_OPT= + fi + + +fi + + + +if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then + XAUTH_PATH="undefined" + +else + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define XAUTH_PATH "$xauth_path" +_ACEOF + + XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path + +fi + +# Check for mail directory + +# Check whether --with-maildir was given. +if test "${with_maildir+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_maildir; + if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \ + test "x${withval}" != xyes; then + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$withval" +_ACEOF + + fi + +else + + if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir" +_ACEOF + + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking Discovering system mail directory" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking Discovering system mail directory... " >&6; } + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&2;} + + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H +#include +#endif +#define DATA "conftest.maildir" + +int +main () +{ + + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + +#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR) + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0) + exit(1); +#elif defined (MAILDIR) + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0) + exit(1); +#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL) + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0) + exit(1); +#else + exit (2); +#endif + + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + + maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir` + maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \ + | sed 's|/$||'` + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&5 +$as_echo "Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&6; } + if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir" +_ACEOF + + fi + +else + + if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then +# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&5 +$as_echo "Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&6; } + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "/var/spool/mail" +_ACEOF + + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: *** not found ***" >&5 +$as_echo "*** not found ***" >&6; } + fi + +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + + fi + + +fi + # maildir + +if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&2;} + disable_ptmx_check=yes +fi +if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then + if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then + as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptmx"" | $as_tr_sh` +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"... " >&6; } +if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + test "$cross_compiling" = yes && + as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5 +if test -r ""/dev/ptmx""; then + eval "$as_ac_File=yes" +else + eval "$as_ac_File=no" +fi +fi +eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; } +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then : + + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DEV_PTMX 1 +_ACEOF + + have_dev_ptmx=1 + + +fi + + fi +fi + +if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then + as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptc"" | $as_tr_sh` +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptc\"" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for \"/dev/ptc\"... " >&6; } +if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + test "$cross_compiling" = yes && + as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5 +if test -r ""/dev/ptc""; then + eval "$as_ac_File=yes" +else + eval "$as_ac_File=no" +fi +fi +eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; } +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then : + + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC 1 +_ACEOF + + have_dev_ptc=1 + + +fi + +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&2;} +fi + +# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above + +# Check whether --with-mantype was given. +if test "${with_mantype+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_mantype; + case "$withval" in + man|cat|doc) + MANTYPE=$withval + ;; + *) + as_fn_error $? "invalid man type: $withval" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; + esac + + +fi + +if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then + TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb" + for ac_prog in nroff awf +do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + case $NROFF in + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) + ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. + ;; + *) + as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $TestPath +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + + ;; +esac +fi +NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF +if test -n "$NROFF"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5 +$as_echo "$NROFF" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + test -n "$NROFF" && break +done +test -n "$NROFF" || NROFF="/bin/false" + + if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then + MANTYPE=doc + elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then + MANTYPE=man + else + MANTYPE=cat + fi +fi + +if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then + mansubdir=man; +else + mansubdir=$MANTYPE; +fi + + +# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords +MD5_MSG="no" + +# Check whether --with-md5-passwords was given. +if test "${with_md5_passwords+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_md5_passwords; + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h + + MD5_MSG="yes" + fi + + +fi + + +# Whether to disable shadow password support + +# Check whether --with-shadow was given. +if test "${with_shadow+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_shadow; + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h + + disable_shadow=yes + fi + + +fi + + +if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if the systems has expire shadow information" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if the systems has expire shadow information... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +struct spwd sp; + +int +main () +{ + sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + sp_expire_available=yes +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + + if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h + + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi +fi + +# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY +if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then + DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" + +$as_echo "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h + +else + DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no" + +# Check whether --with-ipaddr-display was given. +if test "${with_ipaddr_display+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_ipaddr_display; + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + $as_echo "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h + + DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" + fi + + +fi + +fi + +# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present. +# Check whether --enable-etc-default-login was given. +if test "${enable_etc_default_login+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_etc_default_login; if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&6;} + etc_default_login=no + else + etc_default_login=yes + fi +else + if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; + then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&2;} + etc_default_login=no + else + etc_default_login=yes + fi + +fi + + +if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then + as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/etc/default/login"" | $as_tr_sh` +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/etc/default/login\"" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for \"/etc/default/login\"... " >&6; } +if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + test "$cross_compiling" = yes && + as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5 +if test -r ""/etc/default/login""; then + eval "$as_ac_File=yes" +else + eval "$as_ac_File=no" +fi +fi +eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; } +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then : + external_path_file=/etc/default/login +fi + + if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then + +$as_echo "#define HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi +fi + +if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \ + test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then + external_path_file=/etc/login.conf +fi + +# Whether to mess with the default path +SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" + +# Check whether --with-default-path was given. +if test "${with_default_path+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_default_path; + if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: +--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system. +Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: +--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system. +Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&2;} + elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: +--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in +$external_path_file ." >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: +--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in +$external_path_file ." >&2;} + fi + user_path="$withval" + SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval" + fi + +else + if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&2;} + else + if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: +If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included, +otherwise scp will not work." >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: +If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included, +otherwise scp will not work." >&2;} + fi + if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : + user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" + +else + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +/* find out what STDPATH is */ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH +# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */ +# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH +# else +# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" +# endif +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#define DATA "conftest.stdpath" + +int +main () +{ + + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + + if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0) + exit(1); + + exit(0); + + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : + user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` +else + user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" +fi +rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ + conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext +fi + +# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work + t_bindir="${bindir}" + while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do + t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}` + case $t_bindir in + NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;; + esac + case $t_bindir in + NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; + esac + done + echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 + if test $? -ne 0 ; then + echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 + if test $? -ne 0 ; then + user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&5 +$as_echo "Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&6; } + fi + fi + fi + +fi + +if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define USER_PATH "$user_path" +_ACEOF + + +fi + +# Set superuser path separately to user path + +# Check whether --with-superuser-path was given. +if test "${with_superuser_path+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_superuser_path; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define SUPERUSER_PATH "$withval" +_ACEOF + + superuser_path=$withval + fi + + +fi + + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses... " >&6; } +IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no" + +# Check whether --with-4in6 was given. +if test "${with_4in6+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_4in6; + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } + +$as_echo "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h + + IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + fi + +else + + if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes (default)" >&5 +$as_echo "yes (default)" >&6; } + $as_echo "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h + + IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" + else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no (default)" >&5 +$as_echo "no (default)" >&6; } + fi + + +fi + + +# Whether to enable BSD auth support +BSD_AUTH_MSG=no + +# Check whether --with-bsd-auth was given. +if test "${with_bsd_auth+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_bsd_auth; + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + +$as_echo "#define BSD_AUTH 1" >>confdefs.h + + BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes + fi + + +fi + + +# Where to place sshd.pid +piddir=/var/run +# make sure the directory exists +if test ! -d $piddir ; then + piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` + case $piddir in + NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; + esac +fi + + +# Check whether --with-pid-dir was given. +if test "${with_pid_dir+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_pid_dir; + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + piddir=$withval + if test ! -d $piddir ; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&2;} + fi + fi + + +fi + + + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "$piddir" +_ACEOF + + + +# Check whether --enable-lastlog was given. +if test "${enable_lastlog+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_lastlog; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + + +fi + +# Check whether --enable-utmp was given. +if test "${enable_utmp+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_utmp; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + + +fi + +# Check whether --enable-utmpx was given. +if test "${enable_utmpx+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_utmpx; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + + +fi + +# Check whether --enable-wtmp was given. +if test "${enable_wtmp+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_wtmp; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + + +fi + +# Check whether --enable-wtmpx was given. +if test "${enable_wtmpx+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_wtmpx; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + + +fi + +# Check whether --enable-libutil was given. +if test "${enable_libutil+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_libutil; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + + +fi + +# Check whether --enable-pututline was given. +if test "${enable_pututline+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_pututline; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_PUTUTLINE 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + + +fi + +# Check whether --enable-pututxline was given. +if test "${enable_pututxline+set}" = set; then : + enableval=$enable_pututxline; + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + +$as_echo "#define DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + + +fi + + +# Check whether --with-lastlog was given. +if test "${with_lastlog+set}" = set; then : + withval=$with_lastlog; + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h + + elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + conf_lastlog_location=$withval + fi + + +fi + + + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H +# include +#endif + +int +main () +{ + char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG... " >&6; } + cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + +int +main () +{ + char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + system_lastlog_path=no + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext + +if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then + if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then + for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do + if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then + conf_lastlog_location=$f + fi + done + if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&2;} + fi + fi +fi + +if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define CONF_LASTLOG_FILE "$conf_lastlog_location" +_ACEOF + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + +int +main () +{ + char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + system_utmp_path=no + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then + if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then + for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do + if test -f $f ; then + conf_utmp_location=$f + fi + done + if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + fi +fi +if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define CONF_UTMP_FILE "$conf_utmp_location" +_ACEOF + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + +int +main () +{ + char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + system_wtmp_path=no + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then + if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then + for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do + if test -f $f ; then + conf_wtmp_location=$f + fi + done + if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + fi +fi +if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define CONF_WTMP_FILE "$conf_wtmp_location" +_ACEOF + +fi + +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE... " >&6; } +cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext +/* end confdefs.h. */ + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + +int +main () +{ + char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; + ; + return 0; +} +_ACEOF +if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 +$as_echo "yes" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } + system_wtmpx_path=no + +fi +rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext +if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then + if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi +else + +cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define CONF_WTMPX_FILE "$conf_wtmpx_location" +_ACEOF + +fi + + +if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&2;} +fi + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct lastlog" "ll_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +#include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" = xyes; then : + +else + + if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h + + fi + +fi + + +ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct utmp" "ut_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" " +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +#include +#endif + +" +if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" = xyes; then : + +else + + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + $as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h + + +fi + + +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags" + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then + TEST_SSH_IPV6=no +else + TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes +fi +ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "$ac_includes_default" +if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" = xyes; then : + TEST_SSH_IPV6=no +fi + +TEST_SSH_IPV6=$TEST_SSH_IPV6 + +TEST_SSH_UTF8=$TEST_SSH_UTF8 + +TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS=$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS + +UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS=$unsupported_algorithms + +DEPEND=$(cat $srcdir/.depend) + + +CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}" +LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}" + + +ac_config_files="$ac_config_files Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile survey.sh" + +cat >confcache <<\_ACEOF +# This file is a shell script that caches the results of configure +# tests run on this system so they can be shared between configure +# scripts and configure runs, see configure's option --config-cache. +# It is not useful on other systems. 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Invocation command line was + + CONFIG_FILES = $CONFIG_FILES + CONFIG_HEADERS = $CONFIG_HEADERS + CONFIG_LINKS = $CONFIG_LINKS + CONFIG_COMMANDS = $CONFIG_COMMANDS + $ $0 $@ + +on `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q` +" + +_ACEOF + +case $ac_config_files in *" +"*) set x $ac_config_files; shift; ac_config_files=$*;; +esac + +case $ac_config_headers in *" +"*) set x $ac_config_headers; shift; ac_config_headers=$*;; +esac + + +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +# Files that config.status was made for. +config_files="$ac_config_files" +config_headers="$ac_config_headers" + +_ACEOF + +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +ac_cs_usage="\ +\`$as_me' instantiates files and other configuration actions +from templates according to the current configuration. Unless the files +and actions are specified as TAGs, all are instantiated by default. + +Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [TAG]... + + -h, --help print this help, then exit + -V, --version print version number and configuration settings, then exit + --config print configuration, then exit + -q, --quiet, --silent + do not print progress messages + -d, --debug don't remove temporary files + --recheck update $as_me by reconfiguring in the same conditions + --file=FILE[:TEMPLATE] + instantiate the configuration file FILE + --header=FILE[:TEMPLATE] + instantiate the configuration header FILE + +Configuration files: +$config_files + +Configuration headers: +$config_headers + +Report bugs to ." + +_ACEOF +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +ac_cs_config="`$as_echo "$ac_configure_args" | sed 's/^ //; s/[\\""\`\$]/\\\\&/g'`" +ac_cs_version="\\ +OpenSSH config.status Portable +configured by $0, generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69, + with options \\"\$ac_cs_config\\" + +Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +This config.status script is free software; the Free Software Foundation +gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it." + +ac_pwd='$ac_pwd' +srcdir='$srcdir' +INSTALL='$INSTALL' +MKDIR_P='$MKDIR_P' +AWK='$AWK' +test -n "\$AWK" || AWK=awk +_ACEOF + +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +# The default lists apply if the user does not specify any file. +ac_need_defaults=: +while test $# != 0 +do + case $1 in + --*=?*) + ac_option=`expr "X$1" : 'X\([^=]*\)='` + ac_optarg=`expr "X$1" : 'X[^=]*=\(.*\)'` + ac_shift=: + ;; + --*=) + ac_option=`expr "X$1" : 'X\([^=]*\)='` + ac_optarg= + ac_shift=: + ;; + *) + ac_option=$1 + ac_optarg=$2 + ac_shift=shift + ;; + esac + + case $ac_option in + # Handling of the options. + -recheck | --recheck | --rechec | --reche | --rech | --rec | --re | --r) + ac_cs_recheck=: ;; + --version | --versio | --versi | --vers | --ver | --ve | --v | -V ) + $as_echo "$ac_cs_version"; exit ;; + --config | --confi | --conf | --con | --co | --c ) + $as_echo "$ac_cs_config"; exit ;; + --debug | --debu | --deb | --de | --d | -d ) + debug=: ;; + --file | --fil | --fi | --f ) + $ac_shift + case $ac_optarg in + *\'*) ac_optarg=`$as_echo "$ac_optarg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;; + '') as_fn_error $? "missing file argument" ;; + esac + as_fn_append CONFIG_FILES " '$ac_optarg'" + ac_need_defaults=false;; + --header | --heade | --head | --hea ) + $ac_shift + case $ac_optarg in + *\'*) ac_optarg=`$as_echo "$ac_optarg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;; + esac + as_fn_append CONFIG_HEADERS " '$ac_optarg'" + ac_need_defaults=false;; + --he | --h) + # Conflict between --help and --header + as_fn_error $? "ambiguous option: \`$1' +Try \`$0 --help' for more information.";; + --help | --hel | -h ) + $as_echo "$ac_cs_usage"; exit ;; + -q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \ + | -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil | --si | --s) + ac_cs_silent=: ;; + + # This is an error. + -*) as_fn_error $? "unrecognized option: \`$1' +Try \`$0 --help' for more information." ;; + + *) as_fn_append ac_config_targets " $1" + ac_need_defaults=false ;; + + esac + shift +done + +ac_configure_extra_args= + +if $ac_cs_silent; then + exec 6>/dev/null + ac_configure_extra_args="$ac_configure_extra_args --silent" +fi + +_ACEOF +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +if \$ac_cs_recheck; then + set X $SHELL '$0' $ac_configure_args \$ac_configure_extra_args --no-create --no-recursion + shift + \$as_echo "running CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL \$*" >&6 + CONFIG_SHELL='$SHELL' + export CONFIG_SHELL + exec "\$@" +fi + +_ACEOF +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +exec 5>>config.log +{ + echo + sed 'h;s/./-/g;s/^.../## /;s/...$/ ##/;p;x;p;x' <<_ASBOX +## Running $as_me. ## +_ASBOX + $as_echo "$ac_log" +} >&5 + +_ACEOF +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +_ACEOF + +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 + +# Handling of arguments. +for ac_config_target in $ac_config_targets +do + case $ac_config_target in + "config.h") CONFIG_HEADERS="$CONFIG_HEADERS config.h" ;; + "Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES Makefile" ;; + "buildpkg.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES buildpkg.sh" ;; + "opensshd.init") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES opensshd.init" ;; + "openssh.xml") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openssh.xml" ;; + "openbsd-compat/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/Makefile" ;; + "openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile" ;; + "survey.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES survey.sh" ;; + + *) as_fn_error $? "invalid argument: \`$ac_config_target'" "$LINENO" 5;; + esac +done + + +# If the user did not use the arguments to specify the items to instantiate, +# then the envvar interface is used. Set only those that are not. +# We use the long form for the default assignment because of an extremely +# bizarre bug on SunOS 4.1.3. +if $ac_need_defaults; then + test "${CONFIG_FILES+set}" = set || CONFIG_FILES=$config_files + test "${CONFIG_HEADERS+set}" = set || CONFIG_HEADERS=$config_headers +fi + +# Have a temporary directory for convenience. Make it in the build tree +# simply because there is no reason against having it here, and in addition, +# creating and moving files from /tmp can sometimes cause problems. +# Hook for its removal unless debugging. +# Note that there is a small window in which the directory will not be cleaned: +# after its creation but before its name has been assigned to `$tmp'. +$debug || +{ + tmp= ac_tmp= + trap 'exit_status=$? + : "${ac_tmp:=$tmp}" + { test ! -d "$ac_tmp" || rm -fr "$ac_tmp"; } && exit $exit_status +' 0 + trap 'as_fn_exit 1' 1 2 13 15 +} +# Create a (secure) tmp directory for tmp files. + +{ + tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "./confXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && + test -d "$tmp" +} || +{ + tmp=./conf$$-$RANDOM + (umask 077 && mkdir "$tmp") +} || as_fn_error $? "cannot create a temporary directory in ." "$LINENO" 5 +ac_tmp=$tmp + +# Set up the scripts for CONFIG_FILES section. +# No need to generate them if there are no CONFIG_FILES. +# This happens for instance with `./config.status config.h'. +if test -n "$CONFIG_FILES"; then + + +ac_cr=`echo X | tr X '\015'` +# On cygwin, bash can eat \r inside `` if the user requested igncr. +# But we know of no other shell where ac_cr would be empty at this +# point, so we can use a bashism as a fallback. +if test "x$ac_cr" = x; then + eval ac_cr=\$\'\\r\' +fi +ac_cs_awk_cr=`$AWK 'BEGIN { print "a\rb" }' /dev/null` +if test "$ac_cs_awk_cr" = "a${ac_cr}b"; then + ac_cs_awk_cr='\\r' +else + ac_cs_awk_cr=$ac_cr +fi + +echo 'BEGIN {' >"$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" && +_ACEOF + + +{ + echo "cat >conf$$subs.awk <<_ACEOF" && + echo "$ac_subst_vars" | sed 's/.*/&!$&$ac_delim/' && + echo "_ACEOF" +} >conf$$subs.sh || + as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5 +ac_delim_num=`echo "$ac_subst_vars" | grep -c '^'` +ac_delim='%!_!# ' +for ac_last_try in false false false false false :; do + . ./conf$$subs.sh || + as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5 + + ac_delim_n=`sed -n "s/.*$ac_delim\$/X/p" conf$$subs.awk | grep -c X` + if test $ac_delim_n = $ac_delim_num; then + break + elif $ac_last_try; then + as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5 + else + ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! " + fi +done +rm -f conf$$subs.sh + +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +cat >>"\$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" <<\\_ACAWK && +_ACEOF +sed -n ' +h +s/^/S["/; s/!.*/"]=/ +p +g +s/^[^!]*!// +:repl +t repl +s/'"$ac_delim"'$// +t delim +:nl +h +s/\(.\{148\}\)..*/\1/ +t more1 +s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/\\n"\\/ +p +n +b repl +:more1 +s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"\\/ +p +g +s/.\{148\}// +t nl +:delim +h +s/\(.\{148\}\)..*/\1/ +t more2 +s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"/ +p +b +:more2 +s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"\\/ +p +g +s/.\{148\}// +t delim +' >$CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1 +rm -f conf$$subs.awk +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +_ACAWK +cat >>"\$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" <<_ACAWK && + for (key in S) S_is_set[key] = 1 + FS = "" + +} +{ + line = $ 0 + nfields = split(line, field, "@") + substed = 0 + len = length(field[1]) + for (i = 2; i < nfields; i++) { + key = field[i] + keylen = length(key) + if (S_is_set[key]) { + value = S[key] + line = substr(line, 1, len) "" value "" substr(line, len + keylen + 3) + len += length(value) + length(field[++i]) + substed = 1 + } else + len += 1 + keylen + } + + print line +} + +_ACAWK +_ACEOF +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +if sed "s/$ac_cr//" < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then + sed "s/$ac_cr\$//; s/$ac_cr/$ac_cs_awk_cr/g" +else + cat +fi < "$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" > "$ac_tmp/subs.awk" \ + || as_fn_error $? "could not setup config files machinery" "$LINENO" 5 +_ACEOF + +# VPATH may cause trouble with some makes, so we remove sole $(srcdir), +# ${srcdir} and @srcdir@ entries from VPATH if srcdir is ".", strip leading and +# trailing colons and then remove the whole line if VPATH becomes empty +# (actually we leave an empty line to preserve line numbers). +if test "x$srcdir" = x.; then + ac_vpsub='/^[ ]*VPATH[ ]*=[ ]*/{ +h +s/// +s/^/:/ +s/[ ]*$/:/ +s/:\$(srcdir):/:/g +s/:\${srcdir}:/:/g +s/:@srcdir@:/:/g +s/^:*// +s/:*$// +x +s/\(=[ ]*\).*/\1/ +G +s/\n// +s/^[^=]*=[ ]*$// +}' +fi + +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +fi # test -n "$CONFIG_FILES" + +# Set up the scripts for CONFIG_HEADERS section. +# No need to generate them if there are no CONFIG_HEADERS. +# This happens for instance with `./config.status Makefile'. +if test -n "$CONFIG_HEADERS"; then +cat >"$ac_tmp/defines.awk" <<\_ACAWK || +BEGIN { +_ACEOF + +# Transform confdefs.h into an awk script `defines.awk', embedded as +# here-document in config.status, that substitutes the proper values into +# config.h.in to produce config.h. + +# Create a delimiter string that does not exist in confdefs.h, to ease +# handling of long lines. +ac_delim='%!_!# ' +for ac_last_try in false false :; do + ac_tt=`sed -n "/$ac_delim/p" confdefs.h` + if test -z "$ac_tt"; then + break + elif $ac_last_try; then + as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_HEADERS" "$LINENO" 5 + else + ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! " + fi +done + +# For the awk script, D is an array of macro values keyed by name, +# likewise P contains macro parameters if any. Preserve backslash +# newline sequences. + +ac_word_re=[_$as_cr_Letters][_$as_cr_alnum]* +sed -n ' +s/.\{148\}/&'"$ac_delim"'/g +t rset +:rset +s/^[ ]*#[ ]*define[ ][ ]*/ / +t def +d +:def +s/\\$// +t bsnl +s/["\\]/\\&/g +s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)\(([^()]*)\)[ ]*\(.*\)/P["\1"]="\2"\ +D["\1"]=" \3"/p +s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)[ ]*\(.*\)/D["\1"]=" \2"/p +d +:bsnl +s/["\\]/\\&/g +s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)\(([^()]*)\)[ ]*\(.*\)/P["\1"]="\2"\ +D["\1"]=" \3\\\\\\n"\\/p +t cont +s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)[ ]*\(.*\)/D["\1"]=" \2\\\\\\n"\\/p +t cont +d +:cont +n +s/.\{148\}/&'"$ac_delim"'/g +t clear +:clear +s/\\$// +t bsnlc +s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"/p +d +:bsnlc +s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/\\\\\\n"\\/p +b cont +' >$CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1 + +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 + for (key in D) D_is_set[key] = 1 + FS = "" +} +/^[\t ]*#[\t ]*(define|undef)[\t ]+$ac_word_re([\t (]|\$)/ { + line = \$ 0 + split(line, arg, " ") + if (arg[1] == "#") { + defundef = arg[2] + mac1 = arg[3] + } else { + defundef = substr(arg[1], 2) + mac1 = arg[2] + } + split(mac1, mac2, "(") #) + macro = mac2[1] + prefix = substr(line, 1, index(line, defundef) - 1) + if (D_is_set[macro]) { + # Preserve the white space surrounding the "#". + print prefix "define", macro P[macro] D[macro] + next + } else { + # Replace #undef with comments. This is necessary, for example, + # in the case of _POSIX_SOURCE, which is predefined and required + # on some systems where configure will not decide to define it. + if (defundef == "undef") { + print "/*", prefix defundef, macro, "*/" + next + } + } +} +{ print } +_ACAWK +_ACEOF +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 + as_fn_error $? "could not setup config headers machinery" "$LINENO" 5 +fi # test -n "$CONFIG_HEADERS" + + +eval set X " :F $CONFIG_FILES :H $CONFIG_HEADERS " +shift +for ac_tag +do + case $ac_tag in + :[FHLC]) ac_mode=$ac_tag; continue;; + esac + case $ac_mode$ac_tag in + :[FHL]*:*);; + :L* | :C*:*) as_fn_error $? "invalid tag \`$ac_tag'" "$LINENO" 5;; + :[FH]-) ac_tag=-:-;; + :[FH]*) ac_tag=$ac_tag:$ac_tag.in;; + esac + ac_save_IFS=$IFS + IFS=: + set x $ac_tag + IFS=$ac_save_IFS + shift + ac_file=$1 + shift + + case $ac_mode in + :L) ac_source=$1;; + :[FH]) + ac_file_inputs= + for ac_f + do + case $ac_f in + -) ac_f="$ac_tmp/stdin";; + *) # Look for the file first in the build tree, then in the source tree + # (if the path is not absolute). The absolute path cannot be DOS-style, + # because $ac_f cannot contain `:'. + test -f "$ac_f" || + case $ac_f in + [\\/$]*) false;; + *) test -f "$srcdir/$ac_f" && ac_f="$srcdir/$ac_f";; + esac || + as_fn_error 1 "cannot find input file: \`$ac_f'" "$LINENO" 5;; + esac + case $ac_f in *\'*) ac_f=`$as_echo "$ac_f" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; esac + as_fn_append ac_file_inputs " '$ac_f'" + done + + # Let's still pretend it is `configure' which instantiates (i.e., don't + # use $as_me), people would be surprised to read: + # /* config.h. Generated by config.status. */ + configure_input='Generated from '` + $as_echo "$*" | sed 's|^[^:]*/||;s|:[^:]*/|, |g' + `' by configure.' + if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then + configure_input="$ac_file. $configure_input" + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating $ac_file" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: creating $ac_file" >&6;} + fi + # Neutralize special characters interpreted by sed in replacement strings. + case $configure_input in #( + *\&* | *\|* | *\\* ) + ac_sed_conf_input=`$as_echo "$configure_input" | + sed 's/[\\\\&|]/\\\\&/g'`;; #( + *) ac_sed_conf_input=$configure_input;; + esac + + case $ac_tag in + *:-:* | *:-) cat >"$ac_tmp/stdin" \ + || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5 ;; + esac + ;; + esac + + ac_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$ac_file" || +$as_expr X"$ac_file" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \ + X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \ + X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \ + X"$ac_file" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null || +$as_echo X"$ac_file" | + sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\(\/\/\)$/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\(\/\).*/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + s/.*/./; q'` + as_dir="$ac_dir"; as_fn_mkdir_p + ac_builddir=. + +case "$ac_dir" in +.) ac_dir_suffix= ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;; +*) + ac_dir_suffix=/`$as_echo "$ac_dir" | sed 's|^\.[\\/]||'` + # A ".." for each directory in $ac_dir_suffix. + ac_top_builddir_sub=`$as_echo "$ac_dir_suffix" | sed 's|/[^\\/]*|/..|g;s|/||'` + case $ac_top_builddir_sub in + "") ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;; + *) ac_top_build_prefix=$ac_top_builddir_sub/ ;; + esac ;; +esac +ac_abs_top_builddir=$ac_pwd +ac_abs_builddir=$ac_pwd$ac_dir_suffix +# for backward compatibility: +ac_top_builddir=$ac_top_build_prefix + +case $srcdir in + .) # We are building in place. + ac_srcdir=. + ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_builddir_sub + ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd ;; + [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) # Absolute name. + ac_srcdir=$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix; + ac_top_srcdir=$srcdir + ac_abs_top_srcdir=$srcdir ;; + *) # Relative name. + ac_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix + ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir + ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd/$srcdir ;; +esac +ac_abs_srcdir=$ac_abs_top_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix + + + case $ac_mode in + :F) + # + # CONFIG_FILE + # + + case $INSTALL in + [\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* ) ac_INSTALL=$INSTALL ;; + *) ac_INSTALL=$ac_top_build_prefix$INSTALL ;; + esac + ac_MKDIR_P=$MKDIR_P + case $MKDIR_P in + [\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* ) ;; + */*) ac_MKDIR_P=$ac_top_build_prefix$MKDIR_P ;; + esac +_ACEOF + +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +# If the template does not know about datarootdir, expand it. +# FIXME: This hack should be removed a few years after 2.60. +ac_datarootdir_hack=; ac_datarootdir_seen= +ac_sed_dataroot=' +/datarootdir/ { + p + q +} +/@datadir@/p +/@docdir@/p +/@infodir@/p +/@localedir@/p +/@mandir@/p' +case `eval "sed -n \"\$ac_sed_dataroot\" $ac_file_inputs"` in +*datarootdir*) ac_datarootdir_seen=yes;; +*@datadir@*|*@docdir@*|*@infodir@*|*@localedir@*|*@mandir@*) + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&2;} +_ACEOF +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 + ac_datarootdir_hack=' + s&@datadir@&$datadir&g + s&@docdir@&$docdir&g + s&@infodir@&$infodir&g + s&@localedir@&$localedir&g + s&@mandir@&$mandir&g + s&\\\${datarootdir}&$datarootdir&g' ;; +esac +_ACEOF + +# Neutralize VPATH when `$srcdir' = `.'. +# Shell code in configure.ac might set extrasub. +# FIXME: do we really want to maintain this feature? +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +ac_sed_extra="$ac_vpsub +$extrasub +_ACEOF +cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1 +:t +/@[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*@/!b +s|@configure_input@|$ac_sed_conf_input|;t t +s&@top_builddir@&$ac_top_builddir_sub&;t t +s&@top_build_prefix@&$ac_top_build_prefix&;t t +s&@srcdir@&$ac_srcdir&;t t +s&@abs_srcdir@&$ac_abs_srcdir&;t t +s&@top_srcdir@&$ac_top_srcdir&;t t +s&@abs_top_srcdir@&$ac_abs_top_srcdir&;t t +s&@builddir@&$ac_builddir&;t t +s&@abs_builddir@&$ac_abs_builddir&;t t +s&@abs_top_builddir@&$ac_abs_top_builddir&;t t +s&@INSTALL@&$ac_INSTALL&;t t +s&@MKDIR_P@&$ac_MKDIR_P&;t t +$ac_datarootdir_hack +" +eval sed \"\$ac_sed_extra\" "$ac_file_inputs" | $AWK -f "$ac_tmp/subs.awk" \ + >$ac_tmp/out || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5 + +test -z "$ac_datarootdir_hack$ac_datarootdir_seen" && + { ac_out=`sed -n '/\${datarootdir}/p' "$ac_tmp/out"`; test -n "$ac_out"; } && + { ac_out=`sed -n '/^[ ]*datarootdir[ ]*:*=/p' \ + "$ac_tmp/out"`; test -z "$ac_out"; } && + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir' +which seems to be undefined. Please make sure it is defined" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir' +which seems to be undefined. Please make sure it is defined" >&2;} + + rm -f "$ac_tmp/stdin" + case $ac_file in + -) cat "$ac_tmp/out" && rm -f "$ac_tmp/out";; + *) rm -f "$ac_file" && mv "$ac_tmp/out" "$ac_file";; + esac \ + || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5 + ;; + :H) + # + # CONFIG_HEADER + # + if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then + { + $as_echo "/* $configure_input */" \ + && eval '$AWK -f "$ac_tmp/defines.awk"' "$ac_file_inputs" + } >"$ac_tmp/config.h" \ + || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5 + if diff "$ac_file" "$ac_tmp/config.h" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_file is unchanged" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: $ac_file is unchanged" >&6;} + else + rm -f "$ac_file" + mv "$ac_tmp/config.h" "$ac_file" \ + || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5 + fi + else + $as_echo "/* $configure_input */" \ + && eval '$AWK -f "$ac_tmp/defines.awk"' "$ac_file_inputs" \ + || as_fn_error $? "could not create -" "$LINENO" 5 + fi + ;; + + + esac + +done # for ac_tag + + +as_fn_exit 0 +_ACEOF +ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save + +test $ac_write_fail = 0 || + as_fn_error $? "write failure creating $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5 + + +# configure is writing to config.log, and then calls config.status. +# config.status does its own redirection, appending to config.log. +# Unfortunately, on DOS this fails, as config.log is still kept open +# by configure, so config.status won't be able to write to it; its +# output is simply discarded. So we exec the FD to /dev/null, +# effectively closing config.log, so it can be properly (re)opened and +# appended to by config.status. When coming back to configure, we +# need to make the FD available again. +if test "$no_create" != yes; then + ac_cs_success=: + ac_config_status_args= + test "$silent" = yes && + ac_config_status_args="$ac_config_status_args --quiet" + exec 5>/dev/null + $SHELL $CONFIG_STATUS $ac_config_status_args || ac_cs_success=false + exec 5>>config.log + # Use ||, not &&, to avoid exiting from the if with $? = 1, which + # would make configure fail if this is the last instruction. + $ac_cs_success || as_fn_exit 1 +fi +if test -n "$ac_unrecognized_opts" && test "$enable_option_checking" != no; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&2;} +fi + + +# Print summary of options + +# Someone please show me a better way :) +A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}` +B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}` +C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}` +D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}` +E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}` +F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}` +G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}` +H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}` +I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}` +J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}` + +echo "" +echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:" +echo " User binaries: $B" +echo " System binaries: $C" +echo " Configuration files: $D" +echo " Askpass program: $E" +echo " Manual pages: $F" +echo " PID file: $G" +echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H" +if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then +echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file" +echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work" +else +echo " sshd default user PATH: $I" + if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then +echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If" +echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)" + fi +fi +if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then +echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J" +fi +echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" +echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG" +echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG" +echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG" +echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG" +echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" +echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" +echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG" +echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" +echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" +echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" +echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" +echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" +echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" +echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" +echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" + +echo "" + +echo " Host: ${host}" +echo " Compiler: ${CC}" +echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" +echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" +echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" +echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" +if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then +echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" +fi +if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then +echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}" +fi + +echo "" + +if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then + echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\"" + echo "" +fi + +if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then + echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file " + echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. " + echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ " + echo "subdirectory" + echo "" +fi + +if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then + echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not" + echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the" + echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to" + echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to" + echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious" + echo "user can connect to your agent." + echo "" +fi + +if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then + echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL." + echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details." +fi diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7379ab3 --- /dev/null +++ b/configure.ac @@ -0,0 +1,5363 @@ +# +# Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller +# +# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any +# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above +# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES +# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR +# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES +# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN +# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF +# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + +AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org]) +AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $) +AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) +AC_LANG([C]) + +AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h]) +AC_PROG_CC +AC_CANONICAL_HOST +AC_C_BIGENDIAN + +# Checks for programs. +AC_PROG_AWK +AC_PROG_CPP +AC_PROG_RANLIB +AC_PROG_INSTALL +AC_PROG_EGREP +AC_PROG_MKDIR_P +AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar]) +AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat]) +AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill]) +AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed]) +AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent]) +AC_SUBST([ENT]) +AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash]) +AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh]) +AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh]) +AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh]) +AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff]) +AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff]) +AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc]) +AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh]) + +dnl select manpage formatter +if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then + MANFMT="$MANDOC" +elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then + MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" +elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then + MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" +else + AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatted found]) + MANFMT="false" +fi +AC_SUBST([MANFMT]) + +dnl for buildpkg.sh +AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd], + [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) +AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd], + [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) +AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no]) +if test -x /sbin/sh; then + AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh]) +else + AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh]) +fi + +# System features +AC_SYS_LARGEFILE + +if test -z "$AR" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***]) +fi + +AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd]) +if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"], + [Full path of your "passwd" program]) +fi + +dnl Since autoconf doesn't support it very well, we no longer allow users to +dnl override LD, however keeping the hook here for now in case there's a use +dnl use case we overlooked and someone needs to re-enable it. Unless a good +dnl reason is found we'll be removing this in future. +LD="$CC" +AC_SUBST([LD]) + +AC_C_INLINE + +AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include ]) +AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [ + #include + #include + #include +]) +AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [ + #include + #include +]) +AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [ + #include + #include +]) + +openssl=yes +AC_ARG_WITH([openssl], + [ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ], + [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + openssl=no + fi + ] +) +AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography]) +if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography]) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) +fi + +use_stack_protector=1 +use_toolchain_hardening=1 +AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect], + [ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then + use_stack_protector=0 + fi ]) +AC_ARG_WITH([hardening], + [ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then + use_toolchain_hardening=0 + fi ]) + +# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is +# on by default" for things like -fPIE. +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror]) +saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + WERROR="-Werror"], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + WERROR="" ] +) +CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + +if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-pipe]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing]) + if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-mretpoline]) # clang + OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,retpolineplt]) + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2]) + OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro]) + OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now]) + OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack]) + # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in + # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations + # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it + # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number + # of integer operations that should exercise this. + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv]) + fi + AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version]) + GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'` + case $GCC_VER in + 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; + 2.8* | 2.9*) + no_attrib_nonnull=1 + ;; + 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; + *) ;; + esac + AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER]) + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset]) + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset" + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] + ) + + # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions + # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported + # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror. + if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then + for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \ + -fstack-protector; do + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t]) + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror" + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ + char x[256]; + snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); + ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t" + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t" + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ + char x[256]; + snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); + ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + break ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], + [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test]) + break ] + ) + ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] + ) + CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + done + fi + + if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then + # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes + unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX + saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99" + AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], + [have_llong_max=1], + [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"], + [#include ] + ) + fi +fi + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]], + [[ exit(0); ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1, + [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));]], + [[ exit(0); ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS, 1, + [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args]) ] +) + +if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull]) +fi + +AC_ARG_WITH([rpath], + [ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + need_dash_r="" + fi + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + need_dash_r=1 + fi + ] +) + +# Allow user to specify flags +AC_ARG_WITH([cflags], + [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval" + fi + ] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH([cflags-after], + [ --with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags], + [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] , + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval" + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags], + [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval" + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags-after], + [ --with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval" + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH([libs], + [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + LIBS="$LIBS $withval" + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH([Werror], + [ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then + werror_flags="-Werror" + if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + werror_flags="$withval" + fi + fi + ] +) + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ + blf.h \ + bstring.h \ + crypt.h \ + crypto/sha2.h \ + dirent.h \ + endian.h \ + elf.h \ + err.h \ + features.h \ + fcntl.h \ + floatingpoint.h \ + getopt.h \ + glob.h \ + ia.h \ + iaf.h \ + ifaddrs.h \ + inttypes.h \ + langinfo.h \ + limits.h \ + locale.h \ + login.h \ + maillock.h \ + ndir.h \ + net/if_tun.h \ + netdb.h \ + netgroup.h \ + pam/pam_appl.h \ + paths.h \ + poll.h \ + pty.h \ + readpassphrase.h \ + rpc/types.h \ + security/pam_appl.h \ + sha2.h \ + shadow.h \ + stddef.h \ + stdint.h \ + string.h \ + strings.h \ + sys/bitypes.h \ + sys/bsdtty.h \ + sys/cdefs.h \ + sys/dir.h \ + sys/file.h \ + sys/mman.h \ + sys/label.h \ + sys/ndir.h \ + sys/poll.h \ + sys/prctl.h \ + sys/pstat.h \ + sys/ptrace.h \ + sys/random.h \ + sys/select.h \ + sys/stat.h \ + sys/stream.h \ + sys/stropts.h \ + sys/strtio.h \ + sys/statvfs.h \ + sys/sysmacros.h \ + sys/time.h \ + sys/timers.h \ + sys/vfs.h \ + time.h \ + tmpdir.h \ + ttyent.h \ + ucred.h \ + unistd.h \ + usersec.h \ + util.h \ + utime.h \ + utmp.h \ + utmpx.h \ + vis.h \ + wchar.h \ +]) + +# On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h] +# to be included first. +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/audit.h], [], [], [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H +# include +#endif +]) + +# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +]) + +# net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h. +# sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([net/route.h sys/sysctl.h], [], [], [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +]) + +# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +]) + +# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H +# include +#endif +]) + +# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [ +#include +]) + +# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [ +#include +]) + +# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [ +#include +#include +]) + +# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section +SIA_MSG="no" +SPC_MSG="no" +SP_MSG="no" +SPP_MSG="no" + +# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both +# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris). +SOLARIS_PRIVS="no" + +# Check for some target-specific stuff +case "$host" in +*-*-aix*) + # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at + # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that + # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc. + # It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are + # not fatal. + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#define testmacro foo +#define testmacro bar]], + [[ exit(0); ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" + CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" + CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" + ] + ) + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)]) + if (test -z "$blibpath"); then + blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib" + fi + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then + flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:" + else + flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath," + fi + for tryflags in $flags ;do + if (test -z "$blibflags"); then + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath" + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])], + [blibflags=$tryflags], []) + fi + done + if (test -z "$blibflags"); then + AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags]) + fi + LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" + dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes + AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1], + [Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])], + [AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate], + [ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE]) + LIBS="$LIBS -ls" + ]) + ]) + dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers. + AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess, + passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include ]) + dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed], + [AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1], + [Define if your AIX loginfailed() function + takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ])], + [], + [#include ] + ) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb]) + AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM], + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]), + [], + [ #include + #include ] + ) + check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1 + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1], [Define if you have a broken realpath.]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1], + [Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken]) + dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog]) + AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1], + [Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work]) + AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], + [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is + supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) + AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], + [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this]) + AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd]) + AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNDUP], 1, [strndup broken, see APAR IY61211]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNLEN], 1, [strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551]) + ;; +*-*-android*) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) + ;; +*-*-cygwin*) + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o" + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()]) + AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1], + [Define to disable UID restoration test]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1], + [Define if you want to disable shadow passwords]) + AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1], + [Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], + [Define if your platform needs to skip post auth + file descriptor passing]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size]) + AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters]) + # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical + # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings. + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes]) + ;; +*-*-dgux*) + AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1], + [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + ;; +*-*-darwin*) + use_pie=auto + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include +main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) + exit(0); + else + exit(1); +} + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([working])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1], + [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)]) + ], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1], + [Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], + [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) + m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) + AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], + AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) + [#include ] + AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], + [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too]) + ) + AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], + [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is + supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h]) + AC_CHECK_LIB([sandbox], [sandbox_apply], [ + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox" + ]) + ;; +*-*-dragonfly*) + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt" + TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" + ;; +*-*-haiku*) + LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd " + AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) + MANTYPE=man + ;; +*-*-hpux*) + # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" + IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) + AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) + AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"], + [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) + AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT]) + AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) + maildir="/var/mail" + LIBS="$LIBS -lsec" + AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], , + [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])]) + + # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases + case "$host" in + *-*-hpux10*) + if test -z "$GCC"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" + fi + ;; + *-*-hpux11*) + AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1], + [Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which + passes pam_messages to the conversation function + with an extra level of indirection]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], + [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) + check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1 + check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1 + ;; + esac + + # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases + case "$host" in + *-*-hpux10.26) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1], + [Define if you have SecureWare-based + protected password database]) + disable_ptmx_check=yes + LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw" + ;; + esac + ;; +*-*-irix5*) + PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1], + [Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted + (e.g. Irix gcc issue)]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1], + [Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your + ttyname in [uw]tmp]) + AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) + ;; +*-*-irix6*) + PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" + AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1], + [Define if you have/want arrays + (cluster-wide session management, not C arrays)]) + AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1], + [Define if you want IRIX project management]) + AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1], + [Define if you want IRIX audit trails]) + AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1], + [Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)]) + AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) + AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) + ;; +*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu) + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) + AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"]) + AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) + AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) + ;; +*-*-linux*) + no_dev_ptmx=1 + use_pie=auto + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 + dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics. + dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE" + AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1], + [Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY]) + AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"], + [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) + AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) + AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM], + [Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" + if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.]) + AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP]) + AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer]) + inet6_default_4in6=yes + case `uname -r` in + 1.*|2.0.*) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1], + [Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly]) + ;; + esac + # tun(4) forwarding compat code + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h]) + if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1], + [Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], + [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) + fi + AC_CHECK_HEADER([linux/if.h], + AC_DEFINE([SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX], [1], + [Support routing domains using Linux VRF]), [], [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif + ]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [], + [], [#include ]) + # Obtain MIPS ABI + case "$host" in + mips*) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32 +#error +#endif + ]])],[mips_abi="o32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32 +#error +#endif + ]])],[mips_abi="n32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64 +#error +#endif + ]])],[mips_abi="n64"],[AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown MIPS ABI]) + ]) + ]) + ]) + ;; + esac + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture]) + seccomp_audit_arch= + case "$host" in + x86_64-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 + ;; + i*86-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 + ;; + arm*-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM + ;; + aarch64*-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 + ;; + s390x-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X + ;; + s390-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390 + ;; + powerpc64-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64 + ;; + powerpc64le-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE + ;; + mips-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS + ;; + mipsel-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL + ;; + mips64-*) + case "$mips_abi" in + "n32") + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 + ;; + "n64") + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 + ;; + esac + ;; + mips64el-*) + case "$mips_abi" in + "n32") + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32 + ;; + "n64") + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 + ;; + esac + ;; + esac + if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch], + [Specify the system call convention in use]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported]) + fi + ;; +mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) + AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty]) + SONY=1 + ;; +*-*-netbsd*) + check_for_libcrypt_before=1 + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + need_dash_r=1 + fi + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE" + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) + AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) + TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1], + [NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it]) + ;; +*-*-freebsd*) + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) + AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need]) + TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" + # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload + # and will crash if they cannot be opened. + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1], + [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things]) + ;; +*-*-bsdi*) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + ;; +*-next-*) + conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog" + conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp + conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp + maildir=/usr/spool/mail + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT]) + ;; +*-*-openbsd*) + use_pie=auto + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way]) + AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1], + [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler]) + TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" + ;; +*-*-solaris*) + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + need_dash_r=1 + fi + AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) + AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) + AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) + AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], + [Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set + to the unpriv'ed user]) + AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) + # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty. + AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1], + [Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY + after setsid()]) + AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd + in case the name is longer than 8 chars]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang]) + external_path_file=/etc/default/login + # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions) + conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog" + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x]) + sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'` + if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], + [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + fi + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setpflags]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setppriv]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([priv_basicset]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([priv.h]) + AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts], + [ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)], + [ + AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate], + [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1], + [Define if you have Solaris process contracts]) + LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract" + SPC_MSG="yes" ], ) + ], + ) + AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects], + [ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)], + [ + AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject], + [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1], + [Define if you have Solaris projects]) + LIBS="$LIBS -lproject" + SP_MSG="yes" ], ) + ], + ) + AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-privs], + [ --with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)], + [ + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Solaris/Illumos privilege support]) + if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \ + "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then + SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes + AC_MSG_RESULT([found]) + AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1], + [Define to disable UID restoration test]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS], [1], + [Define if you have Solaris privileges]) + SPP_MSG="yes" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs]) + fi + ], + ) + TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell + ;; +*-*-sunos4*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam]) + AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) + conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp + conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp + conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx]) + ;; +*-ncr-sysv*) + LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) + AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + ;; +*-sni-sysv*) + # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX + AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,) + # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break + AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ]) + IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) + AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) + external_path_file=/etc/default/login + # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX + # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc, + # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog + ;; +# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel. +*-*-sysv4.2*) + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd]) + AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) + TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell + ;; +# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8 +*-*-sysv5*) + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf" + AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON]) + TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell + check_for_libcrypt_later=1 + case "$host" in + *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x + maildir=/var/spool/mail + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) + AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot]) + ], , ) + ;; + *) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) + ;; + esac + ;; +*-*-sysv*) + ;; +# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX +*-*-sco3.2v4*) + AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.") + ;; +# SCO OpenServer 5.x +*-*-sco3.2v5*) + if test -z "$GCC"; then + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" + fi + LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm" + no_dev_ptmx=1 + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) + AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid]) + MANTYPE=man + TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell + SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes + ;; +*-dec-osf*) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA]) + no_osfsia="" + AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia], + [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled]) + no_osfsia=1 + fi + ], + ) + if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then + if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1], + [Define if you have Digital Unix Security + Integration Architecture]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1], + [Define if you don't want to use your + system's login() call]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) + LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud" + SIA_MSG="yes" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"], + [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) + fi + fi + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) + AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv]) + ;; + +*-*-nto-qnx*) + AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) + AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) + AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken]) + enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login + case "$host" in + *-*-nto-qnx6*) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) + ;; + esac + ;; + +*-*-ultrix*) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1]) + AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix]) + ;; + +*-*-lynxos) + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__" + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1], + [LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation]) + ;; +esac + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***]) + ], + [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ] +) + +dnl Checks for header files. +# Checks for libraries. +AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])]) + +dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [ + AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [ + AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname], + ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [ + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ +#include +#include + +int main(int argc, char **argv) { + char *s, buf[32]; + + strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32); + s = dirname(buf); + if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) { + exit(1); + } else { + exit(0); + } +} + ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], + [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], + ) + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + ]) + if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then + LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h]) + fi + ]) +]) + +AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], , + [AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1], + [Define if you have the basename function.])]) + +dnl zlib is required +AC_ARG_WITH([zlib], + [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH], + [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib is required ***]) + elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then + if test -d "$withval/lib"; then + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + else + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + fi + if test -d "$withval/include"; then + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" + else + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" + fi + fi ] +) + +AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) +AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], , + [ + saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" + saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + dnl Check default zlib install dir + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" + fi + CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" + LIBS="$LIBS -lz" + AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])], + [ + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***]) + ] + ) + ] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check], + [ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check], + [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + zlib_check_nonfatal=1 + fi + ] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include + ]], + [[ + int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v; + n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d); + if (n != 3 && n != 4) + exit(1); + v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d; + fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v); + + /* 1.1.4 is OK */ + if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4) + exit(0); + + /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */ + if (v >= 1020300) + exit(0); + + exit(2); + ]])], + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]), + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log *** +Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your +vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you +are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running +"./configure --without-zlib-version-check". +If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater. +See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.]) + else + AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems]) + fi + ], + [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ] +) + +dnl UnixWare 2.x +AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp], + [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ] +) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes], + [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES]) + LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ] +) + +dnl Checks for libutil functions +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd]) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp]) + +# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv +# or libnsl. +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl]) + +# "Particular Function Checks" +# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html +AC_FUNC_STRFTIME +AC_FUNC_MALLOC +AC_FUNC_REALLOC +# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL; +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if calloc(0, N) returns non-null]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( + [[ #include ]], + [[ void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL); ]] + )], + [ func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes ], + [ func_calloc_0_nonnull=no ], + [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming same as malloc]) + func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"] +) +AC_MSG_RESULT([$func_calloc_0_nonnull]) + +if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 1, [calloc(0, x) returns non-null]) +else + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 0, [calloc(0, x) returns NULL]) + AC_DEFINE(calloc, rpl_calloc, + [Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used.]) +fi + +# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support]) +AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT], + [ + #include + #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC + FOUNDIT + #endif + ], + [ + AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1], + [Define if your system glob() function has + the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ] +) + +# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])], + [ + AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1], + [Define if your system glob() function has + gl_matchc options in glob_t]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) +]) + +# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ +#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT +#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension" +#endif +glob_t g; +g.gl_statv = NULL; +]])], + [ + AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1], + [Define if your system glob() function has + gl_statv options in glob_t]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + +]) + +AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include ]) + +AC_CHECK_DECL([VIS_ALL], , + AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_STRNVIS, 1, [missing VIS_ALL]), [#include ]) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include ]], + [[ + struct dirent d; + exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char)); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1], + [Define if your struct dirent expects you to + allocate extra space for d_name]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) + ] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory]) +if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) +else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) +fi + +# Check whether user wants to use ldns +LDNS_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(ldns, + [ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)], + [ + ldns="" + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no]) + if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" + LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" + ldns=yes + else + LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`" + ldns=yes + fi + elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" + LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" + ldns=yes + fi + + # Verify that it works. + if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support]) + LDNS_MSG="yes" + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ +#include +#include +#include +#include +int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); } + ]]) + ], + [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.]) + ]) + fi +]) + +# Check whether user wants libedit support +LIBEDIT_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH([libedit], + [ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp], + [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) + if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit]) + if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + fi + fi + else + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + fi + if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then + LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit` + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`" + else + LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses" + fi + OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'` + AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init], + [ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp]) + LIBEDIT_MSG="yes" + AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT]) + ], + [ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ], + [ $OTHERLIBS ] + ) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ + int i = H_SETSIZE; + el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL); + exit(0); + ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ] + ) + fi ] +) + +AUDIT_MODULE=none +AC_ARG_WITH([audit], + [ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)], + [ + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module]) + case "$withval" in + bsm) + AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm]) + AUDIT_MODULE=bsm + dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])], + [ +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H +# include +#endif + ] +) + AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [], + [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])]) + # These are optional + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module]) + if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1], + [The system has incomplete BSM API]) + fi + ;; + linux) + AC_MSG_RESULT([linux]) + AUDIT_MODULE=linux + dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h]) + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" + AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module]) + ;; + debug) + AUDIT_MODULE=debug + AC_MSG_RESULT([debug]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module]) + ;; + no) + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval]) + ;; + esac ] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH([pie], + [ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then + use_pie=no + fi + if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then + use_pie=yes + fi + ] +) +if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then + use_pie=no +fi +if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then + # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. + use_pie=no +fi +if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then + # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ +#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4 +#error gcc is too old +#endif +]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + use_pie=no ] +) +fi +if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then + SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" + SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" + OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE]) + OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie]) + # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither. + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported]) + if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ + echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS" + LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS" + fi +fi + +dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ + Blowfish_initstate \ + Blowfish_expandstate \ + Blowfish_expand0state \ + Blowfish_stream2word \ + asprintf \ + b64_ntop \ + __b64_ntop \ + b64_pton \ + __b64_pton \ + bcopy \ + bcrypt_pbkdf \ + bindresvport_sa \ + blf_enc \ + bzero \ + cap_rights_limit \ + clock \ + closefrom \ + dirfd \ + endgrent \ + err \ + errx \ + explicit_bzero \ + fchmod \ + fchown \ + flock \ + freeaddrinfo \ + freezero \ + fstatfs \ + fstatvfs \ + futimes \ + getaddrinfo \ + getcwd \ + getgrouplist \ + getline \ + getnameinfo \ + getopt \ + getpagesize \ + getpeereid \ + getpeerucred \ + getpgid \ + _getpty \ + getrlimit \ + getrandom \ + getsid \ + getttyent \ + glob \ + group_from_gid \ + inet_aton \ + inet_ntoa \ + inet_ntop \ + innetgr \ + llabs \ + login_getcapbool \ + md5_crypt \ + memmove \ + memset_s \ + mkdtemp \ + ngetaddrinfo \ + nsleep \ + ogetaddrinfo \ + openlog_r \ + pledge \ + poll \ + prctl \ + pstat \ + raise \ + readpassphrase \ + reallocarray \ + recvmsg \ + recallocarray \ + rresvport_af \ + sendmsg \ + setdtablesize \ + setegid \ + setenv \ + seteuid \ + setgroupent \ + setgroups \ + setlinebuf \ + setlogin \ + setpassent\ + setpcred \ + setproctitle \ + setregid \ + setreuid \ + setrlimit \ + setsid \ + setvbuf \ + sigaction \ + sigvec \ + snprintf \ + socketpair \ + statfs \ + statvfs \ + strcasestr \ + strdup \ + strerror \ + strlcat \ + strlcpy \ + strmode \ + strndup \ + strnlen \ + strnvis \ + strptime \ + strsignal \ + strtonum \ + strtoll \ + strtoul \ + strtoull \ + swap32 \ + sysconf \ + tcgetpgrp \ + timingsafe_bcmp \ + truncate \ + unsetenv \ + updwtmpx \ + user_from_uid \ + usleep \ + vasprintf \ + vsnprintf \ + waitpid \ + warn \ +]) + +AC_CHECK_DECLS([bzero]) + +dnl Wide character support. +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth]) + +TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes} +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ + char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8"); + if (loc != NULL) + exit(0); + exit(1); + ]])], + AC_MSG_RESULT(yes), + [AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + TEST_SSH_UTF8=no], + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) +) + +AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( + [[ #include ]], + [[ return (isblank('a')); ]])], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).]) +]) + +disable_pkcs11= +AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11], + [ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + disable_pkcs11=1 + fi + ] +) + +# PKCS11 depends on OpenSSL. +if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then + # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl], + AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], + AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support]), + [], [#include ] + ) + ) +fi + +# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include + +const char *gai_strerror(int); + ]], [[ + char *str; + str = gai_strerror(0); + ]])], [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1], + [Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])]) + +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1], + [Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])]) + +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])]) + +dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them. +AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep], + [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])], + [], + [ +#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H +# include +#endif + ]) + +dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro +AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])], + [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])], + [#include ] +) + +AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include ]) + +AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD], , , + [ +#include +#include + ]) + +AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , , + [ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +# include +#endif + ]) + +AC_CHECK_DECLS([readv, writev], , , [ +#include +#include +#include + ]) + +AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [ +#include + ]) + +AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [ +#include + ]) + +# extra bits for select(2) +AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + ]]) +AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +#include +#endif + ]]) + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [ + dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ + errno=0; + setresuid(0,0,0); + if (errno==ENOSYS) + exit(1); + else + exit(0); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1], + [Define if your setresuid() is broken]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], + [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] + ) +]) + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [ + dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ + errno=0; + setresgid(0,0,0); + if (errno==ENOSYS) + exit(1); + else + exit(0); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1], + [Define if your setresgid() is broken]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], + [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] + ) +]) + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([realpath], [ + dnl the sftp v3 spec says SSH_FXP_REALPATH will "canonicalize any given + dnl path name", however some implementations of realpath (and some + dnl versions of the POSIX spec) do not work on non-existent files, + dnl so we use the OpenBSD implementation on those platforms. + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if realpath works with non-existent files]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include + ]], [[ + char buf[PATH_MAX]; + if (realpath("/opensshnonexistentfilename1234", buf) == NULL) + if (errno == ENOENT) + exit(1); + exit(0); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1], + [realpath does not work with nonexistent files]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], + [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working])] + ) +]) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working fflush(NULL)]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include ]], [[fflush(NULL); exit(0);]])], + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]), + [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([FFLUSH_NULL_BUG], [1], + [define if fflush(NULL) does not work])], + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working]) +) + +dnl Checks for time functions +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time]) +dnl Checks for utmp functions +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent]) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname]) +dnl Checks for utmpx functions +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline]) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname]) +dnl Checks for lastlog functions +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname]) + +AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])], + [AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon], + [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])] +) + +AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1], + [Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])], + [AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize], + [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])] +) + +# Check for broken snprintf +if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ + char b[5]; + snprintf(b,5,"123456789"); + exit(b[4]!='\0'); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], + [Define if your snprintf is busted]) + AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) + ], + [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ] + ) +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf understands %zu]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], + [[ + size_t a = 1, b = 2; + char z[128]; + snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b); + exit(strcmp(z, "12")); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], + [snprintf does not understand %zu]) + ], + [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ] + ) +fi + +# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the +# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3) +if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include + +int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + size_t ret; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + ]], [[ +char x[1]; +if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) + return 1; +if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) + return 1; +return 0; + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], + [Define if your snprintf is busted]) + AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) + ], + [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ] + ) +fi + +# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio, +# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *. +# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF +AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; } + ]], [[ + snprintf(0, 0, 0); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const], + [Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])]) + +# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support +NO_PEERCHECK="" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include ]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option]) + ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + NO_PEERCHECK=1 + ]) +fi + +dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX +if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then +AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include + ]], [[ + char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test"; + if (mkstemp(template) == -1) + exit(1); + unlink(template); + exit(0); + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP]) + ] +) +fi + +dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal +if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include +#include + ]], [[ + pid_t pid; + int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) { /* failed */ + exit(1); + } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */ + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + if (WIFEXITED(status)) + exit(WEXITSTATUS(status)); + else + exit(2); + } else { /* child */ + close(0); close(1); close(2); + setsid(); + openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); + fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (fd >= 0) + exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */ + else + exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */ + } + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) + ] + ) +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define TEST_PORT "2222" + ]], [[ + int err, sock; + struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + + err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); + if (err != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); + exit(1); + } + + for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + + err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, + sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); + + if (err != 0) { + if (err == EAI_SYSTEM) + perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM"); + else + fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n", + gai_strerror(err)); + exit(2); + } + + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); + if (sock < 0) + perror("socket"); + if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + if (errno == EBADF) + exit(3); + } + } + exit(0); + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) + ] + ) +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define TEST_PORT "2222" + ]], [[ + int err, sock; + struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + + err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); + if (err != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); + exit(1); + } + + for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + + err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, + sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); + + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) { + perror("getnameinfo"); + exit(2); + } + } + exit(0); + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1], + [Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails + for the all-zeros IPv6 address]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no]) + ] + ) +fi + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then + AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , , + [#include + #include + #include ]) +fi + +if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ exit(0); ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1], + [Conflicting defs for getspnam]) + ] + ) +fi + +dnl NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the +dnl existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed +dnl for over ten years). Despite this incompatibility being reported during +dnl development (see http://gnats.netbsd.org/44977) they still shipped it. +dnl Even more unfortunately FreeBSD and later MacOS picked up this incompatible +dnl implementation. Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option +dnl if we're cross compiling. +dnl +dnl OpenBSD, 2001: strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dlen, int flag); +dnl NetBSD: 2012, strnvis(char *dst, size_t dlen, const char *src, int flag); +if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working strnvis]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include +#include +static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); } + ]], [[ + char dst[16]; + + signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler); + if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0) + exit(0); + exit(1) + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis detected broken])], + [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming broken]) + AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis assumed broken])] + ) +fi + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpgrp],[ + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getpgrp accepts zero args]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[$ac_includes_default]], [[ getpgrp(); ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [1], [getpgrp takes zero args])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [0], [getpgrp takes one arg])] + ) +]) + +# Search for OpenSSL +saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" +saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" +AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir], + [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ], + [ + if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled]) + fi + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + case "$withval" in + # Relative paths + ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval" + esac + if test -d "$withval/lib"; then + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + else + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" + fi + fi + if test -d "$withval/include"; then + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" + else + CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" + fi + fi + ] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check], + [ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + openssl_check_nonfatal=1 + fi + ] +) + +openssl_engine=no +AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine], + [ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled]) + fi + openssl_engine=yes + fi + ] +) + +if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then + LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS" + AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL], [1], + [Define if your ssl headers are included + with #include ])], + [ + dnl Check default openssl install dir + if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then + LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" + else + LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" + fi + CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" + AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], , + [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) + AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL])], + [ + AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***]) + ] + ) + ] + ) + + # Determine OpenSSL header version + AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + #include + #include + #define DATA "conftest.sslincver" + ]], [[ + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + + if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", + (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, + OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0) + exit(1); + + exit(0); + ]])], + [ + ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver` + AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) + ] + ) + + # Determine OpenSSL library version + AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + #include + #include + #define DATA "conftest.ssllibver" + ]], [[ + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + + if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n", (unsigned long)SSLeay(), + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) < 0) + exit(1); + + exit(0); + ]])], + [ + ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver` + # Check version is supported. + case "$ssl_library_ver" in + 10000*|0*) + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) + ;; + 100*) ;; # 1.0.x + 101000[0123456]*) + # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613 + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) + ;; + 101*) ;; # 1.1.x + 200*) ;; # LibreSSL + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL > 1.1.x is not yet supported (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) + ;; + esac + AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) + ] + ) + + # Sanity check OpenSSL headers + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + #include + ]], [[ + exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your + library. Check config.log for details. + If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check + by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check". + Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches. + ]) + else + AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your + library. Check config.log for details. + Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.]) + fi + ], + [ + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) + ] + ) + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS -ldl" + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + ] + ) + ] + ) + + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ + BN_is_prime_ex \ + DSA_generate_parameters_ex \ + EVP_DigestInit_ex \ + EVP_DigestFinal_ex \ + EVP_MD_CTX_init \ + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \ + EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \ + HMAC_CTX_init \ + RSA_generate_key_ex \ + RSA_get_default_method \ + ]) + + if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + ]], [[ + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); + ENGINE_register_all_complete(); + ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1], + [Enable OpenSSL engine support]) + ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found]) + ]) + fi + + # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + ]], [[ + exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1], + [libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions]) + ] + ) + + # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + ]], [[ + exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL || + EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || + EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1], + [libcrypto has EVP AES CTR]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ] + ) + + # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + ]], [[ + exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || + EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || + EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || + EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || + EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || + EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1], + [libcrypto has EVP AES GCM]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ + aes128-gcm@openssh.com \ + aes256-gcm@openssh.com" + ] + ) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl])]) + + # LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_get0_key], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DH_get0_key])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_get0_pqg], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DH_get0_pqg])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_set0_key], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DH_set0_key])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_set_length], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DH_set_length])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DH_set0_pqg], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DH_set0_pqg])]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_get0_key], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DSA_get0_key])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_get0_pqg], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DSA_get0_pqg])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_set0_key], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DSA_set0_key])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_set0_pqg], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DSA_set0_pqg])]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_SIG_get0], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DSA_SIG_get0])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([DSA_SIG_set0], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has DSA_SIG_set0])]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([ECDSA_SIG_get0], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has ECDSA_SIG_get0])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([ECDSA_SIG_set0], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has ECDSA_SIG_set0])]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv])]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_get0_crt_params], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_crt_params])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_get0_factors], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_factors])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_get0_key], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_key])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_set0_crt_params], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_get0_srt_params])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_set0_factors], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_set0_factors])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_set0_key], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_set0_key])]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_free], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_free])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_dup], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_dup])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_set1_name], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set1_name])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_get_finish], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_get_finish])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_set_priv_enc], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_priv_enc])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_set_priv_dec], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_priv_dec])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([RSA_meth_set_finish], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has RSA_meth_set_finish])]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA])]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_MD_CTX_new], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has EVP_MD_CTX_new])]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_MD_CTX_free], [crypto], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE], [1], + [Define if libcrypto has EVP_MD_CTX_free])]) + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + ]], [[ + if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) + exit(0); + ]])], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1], + [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void]) + ] + ) + + # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, + # because the system crypt() is more featureful. + if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then + AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt]) + fi + + # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the + # version in OpenSSL. + if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then + AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) + fi + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt]) + + # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SHA256_Update EVP_sha256], , + [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + hmac-sha2-256 \ + hmac-sha2-512 \ + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \ + hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com \ + hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" + ] + ) + # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_ripemd160], , + [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + hmac-ripemd160 \ + hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com \ + hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com" + ] + ) + + # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + ]], [[ + EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ + ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + enable_nistp256=1 ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] + ) + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + ]], [[ + EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); + const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ + ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + enable_nistp384=1 ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] + ) + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + ]], [[ + EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); + const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ + ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + ]],[[ + EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); + const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ + exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); + ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + enable_nistp521=1 ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], + [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes]) + enable_nistp521=1 ] + )], + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ) + + COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" + TEST_SSH_ECC=no + + if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ + test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then + AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC]) + fi + if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then + AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1], + [libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) + TEST_SSH_ECC=yes + COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" + else + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ + ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" + fi + if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then + AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1]) + TEST_SSH_ECC=yes + COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" + else + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ + ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" + fi + if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then + AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1]) + TEST_SSH_ECC=yes + COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" + else + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \ + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" + fi + + AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC]) + AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC]) +else + AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt]) +fi + +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ + arc4random \ + arc4random_buf \ + arc4random_stir \ + arc4random_uniform \ +]) + +saved_LIBS="$LIBS" +AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [ + LIBS="$LIBS -liaf" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf" + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1], + [Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id]) + ]) +]) +LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + +### Configure cryptographic random number support + +# Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself +if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + ]], [[ + exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); + ]])], + [ + OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) + # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if + # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly. + OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes + ] + ) +fi + +# PRNGD TCP socket +AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port], + [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT], + [ + case "$withval" in + no) + withval="" + ;; + [[0-9]]*) + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port]) + ;; + esac + if test ! -z "$withval" ; then + PRNGD_PORT="$withval" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT], + [Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) + fi + ] +) + +# PRNGD Unix domain socket +AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket], + [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)], + [ + case "$withval" in + yes) + withval="/var/run/egd-pool" + ;; + no) + withval="" + ;; + /*) + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket]) + ;; + esac + + if test ! -z "$withval" ; then + if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket]) + fi + if test ! -r "$withval" ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable]) + fi + PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"], + [Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) + fi + ], + [ + # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already + if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket]) + # Insert other locations here + for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do + if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then + PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock" + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"]) + break; + fi + done + if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) + fi + fi + ] +) + +# Which randomness source do we use? +if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then + RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT" +elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then + RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET" +elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then + AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1], + [Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only]) + RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY" +elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible]) +else + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options]) +fi + +# Check for PAM libs +PAM_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH([pam], + [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found]) + fi + + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , ) + AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv]) + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + + PAM_MSG="yes" + + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" + AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1], + [Define if you want to enable PAM support]) + + if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then + case "$LIBS" in + *-ldl*) + # libdl already in LIBS + ;; + *) + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" + ;; + esac + fi + fi + ] +) + +AC_ARG_WITH([pam-service], + [ --with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name ], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSHD_PAM_SERVICE], + ["$withval"], [sshd PAM service name]) + fi + ] +) + +# Check for older PAM +if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then + # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) +#include +#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) +#include +#endif + ]], [[ +(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1); + ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1], + [Define if you have an old version of PAM + which takes only one argument to pam_strerror]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + PAM_MSG="yes (old library)" + + ]) +fi + +case "$host" in +*-*-cygwin*) + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER + ;; +*) + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd + ;; +esac +AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user], + [ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval + fi + ] +) +if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], + [Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation]) +else + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"], + [non-privileged user for privilege separation]) +fi +AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER]) + +if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then +AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [ + #include + #include +]) +fi +if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then +AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support]) +AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + #include + ]], + [[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch; + errno = 0; + prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0); + exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + # Disable seccomp filter as a target + have_seccomp_filter=0 + ] +) +fi + +# Decide which sandbox style to use +sandbox_arg="" +AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox], + [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + sandbox_arg="" + else + sandbox_arg="$withval" + fi + ] +) + +# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type +# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor +# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox. +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + ]],[[ + struct rlimit rl_zero; + int fd, r; + fd_set fds; + struct timeval tv; + + fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY); + FD_ZERO(&fds); + FD_SET(fd, &fds); + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero); + setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); + tv.tv_sec = 1; + tv.tv_usec = 0; + r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv); + exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + select_works_with_rlimit=yes], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + select_works_with_rlimit=no], + [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) + select_works_with_rlimit=yes] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + ]],[[ + struct rlimit rl_zero; + int fd, r; + fd_set fds; + + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); + exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no], + [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) + rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes] +) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works]) +AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include + ]],[[ + struct rlimit rl_zero; + + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1, + [setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])], + [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] +) + +if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then + test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support]) + SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_PLEDGE], [1], [Sandbox using pledge(2)]) +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then + test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support]) + SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)]) +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then + test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \ + "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function]) + SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)]) +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ + test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \ + test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then + test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host]) + test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS]) + test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers]) + test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function]) + SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter]) +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header]) + test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function]) + SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum]) +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ + test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then + test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function]) + test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \ + AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit]) + SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)]) +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then + SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SOLARIS], [1], [Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges]) +elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \ + test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then + SANDBOX_STYLE="none" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing]) +else + AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox]) +fi + +# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right. +if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then + LIBS="$LIBS -liberty"; +fi + +# Check for long long datatypes +AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double]) + +# Check datatype sizes +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int], [2]) +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int], [4]) +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int], [4]) +AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int], [8]) + +# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX) +if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then + ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0 +fi + +# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them. +if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +/* Why is this so damn hard? */ +#ifdef __GNUC__ +# undef __GNUC__ +#endif +#define __USE_ISOC99 +#include +#define DATA "conftest.llminmax" +#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a)) + +/* + * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so + * we do this the hard way. + */ +static int +fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n) +{ + unsigned int i; + int l[sizeof(long long) * 8]; + + if (n < 0) + if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0) + return -1; + for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) { + l[i] = my_abs(n % 10); + n /= 10; + } + do { + if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0) + return -1; + } while (i != 0); + if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + ]], [[ + FILE *f; + long long i, llmin, llmax = 0; + + if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL) + exit(1); + +#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX) + fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); + llmin = LLONG_MIN; + llmax = LLONG_MAX; +#else + fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); + /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */ + for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++) + llmax = i; + llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */ +#endif + + /* Sanity check */ + if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax + || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0 + || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) { + fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n"); + exit(2); + } + + if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0) + exit(3); + if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0) + exit(4); + if (fclose(f) < 0) + exit(5); + exit(0); + ]])], + [ + llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax` + llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax` + + AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL], + [max value of long long calculated by configure]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL], + [min value of long long calculated by configure]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) + ], + [ + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) + ] + ) +fi + + +# More checks for data types +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ u_int a; a = 1;]])], + [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type]) + have_u_int=1 +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], + [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type]) + have_intxx_t=1 +fi + +if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") +then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], + [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +# include +#endif + ]], [[ +int64_t a; a = 1; + ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], + [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type]) + have_u_intxx_t=1 +fi + +if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], + [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])], + [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type]) + have_u_int64_t=1 +fi + +if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") +then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])], + [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) +fi + +if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then + AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include + ]], [[ + uint8_t a; + uint16_t b; + uint32_t c; + a = b = c = 1; + ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no" + ]) + ]) + if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1], + [define if you have uintxx_t data type]) + fi +fi + +if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") +then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], + [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) +fi + +if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes") +then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], + [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) +fi + +if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") +then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include + ]], [[ + int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; + u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g; + a = b = c = e = f = g = 1; + ]])], + [ + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) +fi + + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type]) +fi + +AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [ +#include +#include +]) + +TYPE_SOCKLEN_T + +AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include ]) +AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif +]) + +AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct statfs.f_flags], [], [], [[ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H +#include +#endif +]]) + + +AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , , +[#include +#include ]) + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], + [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include + ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ] + ) + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1], + [define if you have sa_family_t data type]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type]) +fi + + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1], + [define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1], + [define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1], + [define if you have struct in6_addr data type]) + +dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id + AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , , + [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#include + ]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include + ]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1], + [define if you have struct addrinfo data type]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval]) + have_struct_timeval=1 +fi + +AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct timespec]) + +# We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail. +if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \ + test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then + echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install" + echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." + echo "" + exit 1; +else +dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF +main() +{ + char buf[50]; + char expected_out[50]; + int mazsize = 50 ; +#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) + long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; +#else + long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; +#endif + strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); + snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); + if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) + exit(1); + exit(0); +} +#else +main() { exit(0); } +#endif + ]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ], + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) + ) +fi + +dnl Checks for structure members +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX]) +OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX]) + +AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize]) +AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim]) +AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtime]) +AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class, +struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire], +[], [], [[ +#include +#include +]]) + +AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state], + [Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])], +[[ +#include +#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +]]) + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], + ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], + ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], + [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) +fi + +dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr], + ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include + ]], [[ +#ifdef msg_accrights +#error "msg_accrights is a macro" +exit(1); +#endif +struct msghdr m; +m.msg_accrights = 0; +exit(0); + ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1], + [Define if your system uses access rights style + file descriptor passing]) +fi + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif + ]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include + ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) +]) + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr], + ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [ + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include + ]], [[ +#ifdef msg_control +#error "msg_control is a macro" +exit(1); +#endif +struct msghdr m; +m.msg_control = 0; +exit(0); + ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ] + ) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1], + [Define if your system uses ancillary data style + file descriptor passing]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [ + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], + [[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [ + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])], + [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1], + [Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [ + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])], + [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [ + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +va_list x,y; + ]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [ + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +va_list x,y; + ]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])], + [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support], + ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [ + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], + [[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])], + [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1], + [Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset]) +fi + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [ + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], +[[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1], + [Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]]) +fi + + +AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [ + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], +[[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ], + [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" + ]) +]) +if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr]) +fi + +# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support +AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1], + [Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])], + [ + # Needed by our getrrsetbyname() + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + ]], [[ + res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + ]])], + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]), + [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + ]], [[ + res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); + ]])], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], + [LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) + ]) + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong]) + AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , , + [#include + #include ]) + AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1], + [Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], , + [#include ]) + ]) + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern]) +AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +extern struct __res_state _res; + ]], [[ +struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */ +return 0; + ]],)], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1], + [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern]) + ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] +) + +# Check whether user wants SELinux support +SELINUX_MSG="no" +LIBSELINUX="" +AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], + [ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support], + [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + save_LIBS="$LIBS" + AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1], + [Define if you want SELinux support.]) + SELINUX_MSG="yes" + AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], , + AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header])) + AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon], + [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" + LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux" + ], + AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library])) + SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX" + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level]) + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + fi ] +) +AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS]) +AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS]) + +# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support +KRB5_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], + [ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support], + [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + KRB5ROOT="/usr/local" + else + KRB5ROOT=${withval} + fi + + AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support]) + KRB5_MSG="yes" + + AC_PATH_TOOL([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config], + [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config], + [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH]) + if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then + K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`" + K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS" + + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support]) + if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1], + [Define this if you want GSSAPI + support in the version 2 protocol]) + GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`" + GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + fi + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include + ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1], + [Define this if you are using the Heimdal + version of Kerberos V5]) ], + [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + ]) + else + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib" + AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include + ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL]) + K5LIBS="-lkrb5" + K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1" + AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write], + [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"]) + AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt], + [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"]) + ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err" + ]) + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) + + AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context], + [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) + GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ], + [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context], + [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) + GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ], + [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context], + [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) + GSSLIBS="-lgss" ], + AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail])) + ]) + ]) + + AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], , + [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], , + AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail]) + ) + ] + ) + + oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" + AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], , + [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ]) + + fi + if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib" + fi + if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then + blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib" + fi + + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h]) + AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h]) + + AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1], + [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])]) + + AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[ +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H +# include +#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H +# include +#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H) +# include +#endif + ]]) + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message]) + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" + + fi + ] +) +AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) +AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) + +# Looking for programs, paths and files + +PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty +AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path], + [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval + fi + ] +) +AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH]) + +AC_ARG_WITH([xauth], + [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + xauth_path=$withval + fi + ], + [ + TestPath="$PATH" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin" + TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin" + AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath]) + if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then + xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" + fi + ] +) + +STRIP_OPT=-s +AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip], + [ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + STRIP_OPT= + fi + ] +) +AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT]) + +if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then + XAUTH_PATH="undefined" + AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) +else + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"], + [Define if xauth is found in your path]) + XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path + AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) +fi + +dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority. +dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that. +dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers. +dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL +dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what +dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found +dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program +dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail. +# Check for mail directory +AC_ARG_WITH([maildir], + [ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory], + [ + if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \ + test "x${withval}" != xyes; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"], + [Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR]) + fi + ],[ + if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) + else + AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory]) + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H +#include +#endif +#define DATA "conftest.maildir" + ]], [[ + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + +#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR) + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0) + exit(1); +#elif defined (MAILDIR) + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0) + exit(1); +#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL) + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0) + exit(1); +#else + exit (2); +#endif + + exit(0); + ]])], + [ + maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir` + maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \ + | sed 's|/$||'` + AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what]) + if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) + fi + ], + [ + if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then +# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail + AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***]) + fi + ], + [ + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail]) + ] + ) + fi + ] +) # maildir + +if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test]) + disable_ptmx_check=yes +fi +if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then + if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then + AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"], + [ + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1], + [Define if you have /dev/ptmx]) + have_dev_ptmx=1 + ] + ) + fi +fi + +if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then + AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"], + [ + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1], + [Define if you have /dev/ptc]) + have_dev_ptc=1 + ] + ) +else + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test]) +fi + +# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above +AC_ARG_WITH([mantype], + [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type], + [ + case "$withval" in + man|cat|doc) + MANTYPE=$withval + ;; + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval]) + ;; + esac + ] +) +if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then + TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb" + AC_PATH_PROGS([NROFF], [nroff awf], [/bin/false], [$TestPath]) + if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then + MANTYPE=doc + elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then + MANTYPE=man + else + MANTYPE=cat + fi +fi +AC_SUBST([MANTYPE]) +if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then + mansubdir=man; +else + mansubdir=$MANTYPE; +fi +AC_SUBST([mansubdir]) + +# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords +MD5_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords], + [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1], + [Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords]) + MD5_MSG="yes" + fi + ] +) + +# Whether to disable shadow password support +AC_ARG_WITH([shadow], + [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) + disable_shadow=yes + fi + ] +) + +if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +struct spwd sp; + ]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])], + [ sp_expire_available=yes ], [ + ]) + + if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], + [Define if you want to use shadow password expire field]) + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + fi +fi + +# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY +if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then + DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" + AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1], + [Define if you need to use IP address + instead of hostname in $DISPLAY]) +else + DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no" + AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display], + [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY]) + DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" + fi + ] + ) +fi + +# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present. +AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login], + [ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]], + [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then + AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled]) + etc_default_login=no + else + etc_default_login=yes + fi ], + [ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; + then + AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login]) + etc_default_login=no + else + etc_default_login=yes + fi ] +) + +if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then + AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"], + [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ]) + if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then + AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1], + [Define if your system has /etc/default/login]) + fi +fi + +dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect +if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \ + test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then + external_path_file=/etc/login.conf +fi + +# Whether to mess with the default path +SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" +AC_ARG_WITH([default-path], + [ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server], + [ + if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([ +--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system. +Edit /etc/login.conf instead.]) + elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([ +--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in +$external_path_file .]) + fi + user_path="$withval" + SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval" + fi + ], + [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf]) + else + if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([ +If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included, +otherwise scp will not work.]) + fi + AC_RUN_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +/* find out what STDPATH is */ +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH +# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */ +# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH +# else +# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" +# endif +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#define DATA "conftest.stdpath" + ]], [[ + FILE *fd; + int rc; + + fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); + if(fd == NULL) + exit(1); + + if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0) + exit(1); + + exit(0); + ]])], + [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ], + [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ], + [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ] + ) +# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work + t_bindir="${bindir}" + while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do + t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}` + case $t_bindir in + NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;; + esac + case $t_bindir in + NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; + esac + done + echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 + if test $? -ne 0 ; then + echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 + if test $? -ne 0 ; then + user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir + AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work]) + fi + fi + fi ] +) +if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH]) + AC_SUBST([user_path]) +fi + +# Set superuser path separately to user path +AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path], + [ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"], + [Define if you want a different $PATH + for the superuser]) + superuser_path=$withval + fi + ] +) + + +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses]) +IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(4in6, + [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1], + [Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses + and treat as IPv4]) + IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + fi + ], [ + if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)]) + AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6]) + IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)]) + fi + ] +) + +# Whether to enable BSD auth support +BSD_AUTH_MSG=no +AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth], + [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1], + [Define if you have BSD auth support]) + BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes + fi + ] +) + +# Where to place sshd.pid +piddir=/var/run +# make sure the directory exists +if test ! -d $piddir ; then + piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` + case $piddir in + NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; + esac +fi + +AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir], + [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of sshd.pid file], + [ + if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ + test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + piddir=$withval + if test ! -d $piddir ; then + AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **]) + fi + fi + ] +) + +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"], + [Specify location of ssh.pid]) +AC_SUBST([piddir]) + +dnl allow user to disable some login recording features +AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog], + [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp], + [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx], + [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], + [Define if you don't want to use utmpx]) + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp], + [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx], + [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1], + [Define if you don't want to use wtmpx]) + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil], + [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN]) + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline], + [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1], + [Define if you don't want to use pututline() + etc. to write [uw]tmp]) + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline], + [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]], + [ + if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], + [Define if you don't want to use pututxline() + etc. to write [uw]tmpx]) + fi + ] +) +AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog], + [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) + elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then + conf_lastlog_location=$withval + fi + ] +) + +dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection +dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the +dnl need for command-line parameters +dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails + +dnl lastlog detection +dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H +# include +#endif + ]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG]) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + ]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + system_lastlog_path=no + ]) +]) + +if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then + if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then + for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do + if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then + conf_lastlog_location=$f + fi + done + if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then + AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **]) + dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx + fi + fi +fi + +if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"], + [Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file]) +fi + +dnl utmp detection +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + ]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + system_utmp_path=no +]) +if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then + if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then + for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do + if test -f $f ; then + conf_utmp_location=$f + fi + done + if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) + fi + fi +fi +if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"], + [Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file]) +fi + +dnl wtmp detection +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + ]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + system_wtmp_path=no +]) +if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then + if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then + for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do + if test -f $f ; then + conf_wtmp_location=$f + fi + done + if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) + fi + fi +fi +if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"], + [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file]) +fi + +dnl wtmpx detection +AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE]) +AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + ]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], + [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + system_wtmpx_path=no +]) +if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then + if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX]) + fi +else + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"], + [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file]) +fi + + +if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath" + AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile]) +fi + +AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [ + if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) + fi + ], [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +#include +#endif + ]) + +AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [ + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) + AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) + ], [ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +#include +#endif + ]) + +dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running. +dnl Add now. +CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags" + +if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then + TEST_SSH_IPV6=no +else + TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes +fi +AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no]) +AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6]) +AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_UTF8], [$TEST_SSH_UTF8]) +AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS]) +AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms]) +AC_SUBST([DEPEND], [$(cat $srcdir/.depend)]) + +CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}" +LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}" + +AC_EXEEXT +AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \ + openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \ + survey.sh]) +AC_OUTPUT + +# Print summary of options + +# Someone please show me a better way :) +A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}` +B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}` +C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}` +D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}` +E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}` +F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}` +G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}` +H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}` +I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}` +J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}` + +echo "" +echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:" +echo " User binaries: $B" +echo " System binaries: $C" +echo " Configuration files: $D" +echo " Askpass program: $E" +echo " Manual pages: $F" +echo " PID file: $G" +echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H" +if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then +echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file" +echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work" +else +echo " sshd default user PATH: $I" + if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then +echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If" +echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)" + fi +fi +if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then +echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J" +fi +echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" +echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG" +echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG" +echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG" +echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG" +echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" +echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" +echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG" +echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" +echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" +echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" +echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" +echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" +echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" +echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" +echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" + +echo "" + +echo " Host: ${host}" +echo " Compiler: ${CC}" +echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" +echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" +echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" +echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" +if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then +echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" +fi +if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then +echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}" +fi + +echo "" + +if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then + echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\"" + echo "" +fi + +if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then + echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file " + echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. " + echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ " + echo "subdirectory" + echo "" +fi + +if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then + echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not" + echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the" + echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to" + echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to" + echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious" + echo "user can connect to your agent." + echo "" +fi + +if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then + echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL." + echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details." +fi diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a36387 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +PKG_CONFIG = pkg-config + +all: + @echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2" + +gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \ + gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \ + `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui` + +gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \ + gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \ + `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11` + +gnome-ssh-askpass3: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-3.0` \ + gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass3 \ + `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-3.0 x11` + +clean: + rm -f *.o gnome-ssh-askpass gnome-ssh-askpass[123] diff --git a/contrib/README b/contrib/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60e19ba --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/README @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +Other patches and addons for OpenSSH. Please send submissions to +djm@mindrot.org + +Externally maintained +--------------------- + +SSH Proxy Command -- connect.c + +Shun-ichi GOTO has written a very useful ProxyCommand +which allows the use of outbound SSH from behind a SOCKS4, SOCKS5 or +https CONNECT style proxy server. His page for connect.c has extensive +documentation on its use as well as compiled versions for Win32. + +https://bitbucket.org/gotoh/connect/wiki/Home + + +X11 SSH Askpass: + +Jim Knoble has written an excellent X11 +passphrase requester. This is highly recommended: + +http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/ + + +In this directory +----------------- + +ssh-copy-id: + +Phil Hands' shell script to automate the process of adding +your public key to a remote machine's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file. + +gnome-ssh-askpass[12]: + +A GNOME and Gtk2 passphrase requesters. Use "make gnome-ssh-askpass1" or +"make gnome-ssh-askpass2" to build. + +sshd.pam.generic: + +A generic PAM config file which may be useful on your system. YMMV + +sshd.pam.freebsd: + +A PAM config file which works with FreeBSD's PAM port. Contributed by +Dominik Brettnacher + +findssl.sh: + +Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries and print their +versions. This is intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not +match your library" errors. + +aix: + Files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT installable) package. + +caldera: + RPM spec file and scripts for building Caldera OpenLinuix packages + +cygwin: + Support files for Cygwin + +hpux: + Support files for HP-UX + +redhat: + RPM spec file and scripts for building Redhat packages + +suse: + RPM spec file and scripts for building SuSE packages + diff --git a/contrib/aix/README b/contrib/aix/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1aa5919 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/aix/README @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +Overview: + +This directory contains files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT +installable) openssh package. + + +Directions: + +(optional) create config.local in your build dir +./configure [options] +contrib/aix/buildbff.sh + +The file config.local or the environment is read to set the following options +(default first): +PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=[no|yes] +X11_FORWARDING=[no|yes] +AIX_SRC=[no|yes] + +Acknowledgements: + +The contents of this directory are based on Ben Lindstrom's Solaris +buildpkg.sh. Ben also supplied inventory.sh. + +Jim Abbey's (GPL'ed) lppbuild-2.1 was used to learn how to build .bff's +and for comparison with the output from this script, however no code +from lppbuild is included and it is not required for operation. + +SRC support based on examples provided by Sandor Sklar and Maarten Kreuger. +PrivSep account handling fixes contributed by W. Earl Allen. + + +Other notes: + +The script treats all packages as USR packages (not ROOT+USR when +appropriate). It seems to work, though...... + +If there are any patches to this that have not yet been integrated they +may be found at http://www.dtucker.net/openssh/. + + +Disclaimer: + +It is hoped that it is useful but there is no warranty. If it breaks +you get to keep both pieces. + + + - Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au) + 2002/03/01 + diff --git a/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh b/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..55113d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh @@ -0,0 +1,366 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# buildbff.sh: Create AIX SMIT-installable OpenSSH packages +# +# Author: Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au) +# This file is placed in the public domain and comes with absolutely +# no warranty. +# +# Based originally on Ben Lindstrom's buildpkg.sh for Solaris +# + +# +# Tunable configuration settings +# create a "config.local" in your build directory or set +# environment variables to override these. +# +[ -z "$PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN" ] && PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no +[ -z "$X11_FORWARDING" ] && X11_FORWARDING=no +[ -z "$AIX_SRC" ] && AIX_SRC=no + +umask 022 + +startdir=`pwd` + +perl -v >/dev/null || (echo perl required; exit 1) + +# Path to inventory.sh: same place as buildbff.sh +if echo $0 | egrep '^/' +then + inventory=`dirname $0`/inventory.sh # absolute path +else + inventory=`pwd`/`dirname $0`/inventory.sh # relative path +fi + +# +# We still support running from contrib/aix, but this is deprecated +# +if pwd | egrep 'contrib/aix$' +then + echo "Changing directory to `pwd`/../.." + echo "Please run buildbff.sh from your build directory in future." + cd ../.. + contribaix=1 +fi + +if [ ! -f Makefile ] +then + echo "Makefile not found (did you run configure?)" + exit 1 +fi + +# +# Directories used during build: +# current dir = $objdir directory you ran ./configure in. +# $objdir/$PKGDIR/ directory package files are constructed in +# $objdir/$PKGDIR/root/ package root ($FAKE_ROOT) +# +objdir=`pwd` +PKGNAME=openssh +PKGDIR=package + +# +# Collect local configuration settings to override defaults +# +if [ -s ./config.local ] +then + echo Reading local settings from config.local + . ./config.local +fi + +# +# Fill in some details from Makefile, like prefix and sysconfdir +# the eval also expands variables like sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc +# provided they are eval'ed in the correct order +# +for confvar in prefix exec_prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datadir mandir mansubdir sysconfdir piddir srcdir +do + eval $confvar=`grep "^$confvar=" $objdir/Makefile | cut -d = -f 2` +done + +# +# Collect values of privsep user and privsep path +# currently only found in config.h +# +for confvar in SSH_PRIVSEP_USER PRIVSEP_PATH +do + eval $confvar=`awk '/#define[ \t]'$confvar'/{print $3}' $objdir/config.h` +done + +# Set privsep defaults if not defined +if [ -z "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ] +then + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd +fi +if [ -z "$PRIVSEP_PATH" ] +then + PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty +fi + +# Clean package build directory +rm -rf $objdir/$PKGDIR +FAKE_ROOT=$objdir/$PKGDIR/root +mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT + +# Start by faking root install +echo "Faking root install..." +cd $objdir +make install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT + +if [ $? -gt 0 ] +then + echo "Fake root install failed, stopping." + exit 1 +fi + +# +# Copy informational files to include in package +# +cp $srcdir/LICENCE $objdir/$PKGDIR/ +cp $srcdir/README* $objdir/$PKGDIR/ + +# +# Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package. +# AIX requires 4-part version numbers +# +VERSION=`./ssh -V 2>&1 | cut -f 1 -d , | cut -f 2 -d _` +MAJOR=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 1 -d .` +MINOR=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 2 -d .` +PATCH=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 3 -d .` +PORTABLE=`echo $VERSION | awk 'BEGIN{FS="p"}{print $2}'` +[ "$PATCH" = "" ] && PATCH=0 +[ "$PORTABLE" = "" ] && PORTABLE=0 +BFFVERSION=`printf "%d.%d.%d.%d" $MAJOR $MINOR $PATCH $PORTABLE` + +echo "Building BFF for $PKGNAME $VERSION (package version $BFFVERSION)" + +# +# Set ssh and sshd parameters as per config.local +# +if [ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ] +then + perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \ + $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config +fi +if [ "${X11_FORWARDING}" = yes ] +then + perl -p -i -e "s/#X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/" \ + $FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config +fi + + +# Rename config files; postinstall script will copy them if necessary +for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config +do + mv $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile.default +done + +# +# Generate lpp control files. +# working dir is $FAKE_ROOT but files are generated in dir above +# and moved into place just before creation of .bff +# +cd $FAKE_ROOT +echo Generating LPP control files +find . ! -name . -print >../openssh.al +$inventory >../openssh.inventory + +cat <../openssh.copyright +This software is distributed under a BSD-style license. +For the full text of the license, see /usr/lpp/openssh/LICENCE +EOD + +# +# openssh.size file allows filesystem expansion as required +# generate list of directories containing files +# then calculate disk usage for each directory and store in openssh.size +# +files=`find . -type f -print` +dirs=`for file in $files; do dirname $file; done | sort -u` +for dir in $dirs +do + du $dir +done > ../openssh.size + +# +# Create postinstall script +# +cat <>../openssh.post_i +#!/bin/sh + +echo Creating configs from defaults if necessary. +for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config +do + if [ ! -f $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile ] + then + echo "Creating \$cfgfile from default" + cp $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile.default $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile + else + echo "\$cfgfile already exists." + fi +done +echo + +# Create PrivilegeSeparation user and group if not present +echo Checking for PrivilegeSeparation user and group. +if cut -f1 -d: /etc/group | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null +then + echo "PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists." +else + echo "Creating PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER." + mkgroup -A $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER +fi + +# Create user if required +if lsuser "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" >/dev/null +then + echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists." +else + echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER." + mkuser gecos='SSHD PrivSep User' login=false rlogin=false account_locked=true pgrp=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER +fi + +if egrep '^[ \t]*UsePrivilegeSeparation[ \t]+no' $sysconfdir/sshd_config >/dev/null +then + echo UsePrivilegeSeparation not enabled, privsep directory not required. +else + # create chroot directory if required + if [ -d $PRIVSEP_PATH ] + then + echo "PrivSep chroot directory $PRIVSEP_PATH already exists." + else + echo "Creating PrivSep chroot directory $PRIVSEP_PATH." + mkdir $PRIVSEP_PATH + chown 0 $PRIVSEP_PATH + chgrp 0 $PRIVSEP_PATH + chmod 755 $PRIVSEP_PATH + fi +fi +echo + +# Generate keys unless they already exist +echo Creating host keys if required. +$bindir/ssh-keygen -A +echo + +# Set startup command depending on SRC support +if [ "$AIX_SRC" = "yes" ] +then + echo Creating SRC sshd subsystem. + rmssys -s sshd 2>&1 >/dev/null + mkssys -s sshd -p "$sbindir/sshd" -a '-D' -u 0 -S -n 15 -f 9 -R -G tcpip + startupcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"\\\$src_running\\\"" + oldstartcmd="$sbindir/sshd" +else + startupcmd="$sbindir/sshd" + oldstartcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"$src_running\\\"" +fi + +# If migrating to or from SRC, change previous startup command +# otherwise add to rc.tcpip +if egrep "^\$oldstartcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null +then + if sed "s|^\$oldstartcmd|\$startupcmd|g" /etc/rc.tcpip >/etc/rc.tcpip.new + then + chmod 0755 /etc/rc.tcpip.new + mv /etc/rc.tcpip /etc/rc.tcpip.old && \ + mv /etc/rc.tcpip.new /etc/rc.tcpip + else + echo "Updating /etc/rc.tcpip failed, please check." + fi +else + # Add to system startup if required + if grep "^\$startupcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null + then + echo "sshd found in rc.tcpip, not adding." + else + echo "Adding sshd to rc.tcpip" + echo >>/etc/rc.tcpip + echo "# Start sshd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip + echo "\$startupcmd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip + fi +fi +EOF + +# +# Create liblpp.a and move control files into it +# +echo Creating liblpp.a +( + cd .. + for i in openssh.al openssh.copyright openssh.inventory openssh.post_i openssh.size LICENCE README* + do + ar -r liblpp.a $i + rm $i + done +) + +# +# Create lpp_name +# +# This will end up looking something like: +# 4 R I OpenSSH { +# OpenSSH 3.0.2.1 1 N U en_US OpenSSH 3.0.2p1 Portable for AIX +# [ +# % +# /usr/local/bin 8073 +# /usr/local/etc 189 +# /usr/local/libexec 185 +# /usr/local/man/man1 145 +# /usr/local/man/man8 83 +# /usr/local/sbin 2105 +# /usr/local/share 3 +# % +# ] +# } + +echo Creating lpp_name +cat <../lpp_name +4 R I $PKGNAME { +$PKGNAME $BFFVERSION 1 N U en_US OpenSSH $VERSION Portable for AIX +[ +% +EOF + +for i in $bindir $sysconfdir $libexecdir $mandir/${mansubdir}1 $mandir/${mansubdir}8 $sbindir $datadir /usr/lpp/openssh +do + # get size in 512 byte blocks + if [ -d $FAKE_ROOT/$i ] + then + size=`du $FAKE_ROOT/$i | awk '{print $1}'` + echo "$i $size" >>../lpp_name + fi +done + +echo '%' >>../lpp_name +echo ']' >>../lpp_name +echo '}' >>../lpp_name + +# +# Move pieces into place +# +mkdir -p usr/lpp/openssh +mv ../liblpp.a usr/lpp/openssh +mv ../lpp_name . + +# +# Now invoke backup to create .bff file +# note: lpp_name needs to be the first file so we generate the +# file list on the fly and feed it to backup using -i +# +echo Creating $PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff with backup... +rm -f $PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff +( + echo "./lpp_name" + find . ! -name lpp_name -a ! -name . -print +) | backup -i -q -f ../$PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff $filelist + +# +# Move package into final location and clean up +# +mv ../$PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff $startdir +cd $startdir +rm -rf $objdir/$PKGDIR + +echo $0: done. + diff --git a/contrib/aix/inventory.sh b/contrib/aix/inventory.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..7d76f49 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/aix/inventory.sh @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# inventory.sh +# +# Originally written by Ben Lindstrom, modified by Darren Tucker to use perl +# This file is placed into the public domain. +# +# This will produce an AIX package inventory file, which looks like: +# +# /usr/local/bin: +# class=apply,inventory,openssh +# owner=root +# group=system +# mode=755 +# type=DIRECTORY +# /usr/local/bin/slogin: +# class=apply,inventory,openssh +# owner=root +# group=system +# mode=777 +# type=SYMLINK +# target=ssh +# /usr/local/share/Ssh.bin: +# class=apply,inventory,openssh +# owner=root +# group=system +# mode=644 +# type=FILE +# size=VOLATILE +# checksum=VOLATILE + +find . ! -name . -print | perl -ne '{ + chomp; + if ( -l $_ ) { + ($dev,$ino,$mod,$nl,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$sz,$at,$mt,$ct,$bsz,$blk)=lstat; + } else { + ($dev,$ino,$mod,$nl,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$sz,$at,$mt,$ct,$bsz,$blk)=stat; + } + + # Start to display inventory information + $name = $_; + $name =~ s|^.||; # Strip leading dot from path + print "$name:\n"; + print "\tclass=apply,inventory,openssh\n"; + print "\towner=root\n"; + print "\tgroup=system\n"; + printf "\tmode=%lo\n", $mod & 07777; # Mask perm bits + + if ( -l $_ ) { + # Entry is SymLink + print "\ttype=SYMLINK\n"; + printf "\ttarget=%s\n", readlink($_); + } elsif ( -f $_ ) { + # Entry is File + print "\ttype=FILE\n"; + print "\tsize=$sz\n"; + print "\tchecksum=VOLATILE\n"; + } elsif ( -d $_ ) { + # Entry is Directory + print "\ttype=DIRECTORY\n"; + } +}' diff --git a/contrib/aix/pam.conf b/contrib/aix/pam.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1528b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/aix/pam.conf @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +# +# PAM configuration file /etc/pam.conf +# Example for OpenSSH on AIX 5.2 +# + +# Authentication Management +sshd auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix +OTHER auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix + +# Account Management +sshd account required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix +OTHER account required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix + +# Password Management +sshd password required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix +OTHER password required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix + +# Session Management +sshd session required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix +OTHER session required /usr/lib/security/pam_aix diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/Makefile b/contrib/cygwin/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b78cd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/cygwin/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +srcdir=../.. +copyidsrcdir=.. +prefix=/usr +exec_prefix=$(prefix) +bindir=$(prefix)/bin +datadir=$(prefix)/share +mandir=$(datadir)/man +docdir=$(datadir)/doc +sshdocdir=$(docdir)/openssh +cygdocdir=$(docdir)/Cygwin +sysconfdir=/etc +defaultsdir=$(sysconfdir)/defaults/etc +inetdefdir=$(defaultsdir)/inetd.d +PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty +INSTALL=/usr/bin/install -c +MKDIR_P=$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs + +DESTDIR= + +all: + @echo + @echo "Use \`make cygwin-postinstall DESTDIR=[package directory]'" + @echo "Be sure having DESTDIR set correctly!" + @echo + +move-config-files: $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir) + mv $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir) + mv $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir) + +remove-empty-dir: + rm -rf $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH) + +install-inetd-config: + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(inetdefdir) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd-inetd $(DESTDIR)$(inetdefdir)/sshd-inetd + +install-sshdoc: + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir) + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/CREDITS $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/CREDITS + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/ChangeLog $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/ChangeLog + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/LICENCE $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/LICENCE + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/OVERVIEW $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/OVERVIEW + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.agent $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.agent + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.certkeys $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.certkeys + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.mux $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.mux + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.dns $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.dns + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.platform $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.platform + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.privsep $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.privsep + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.tun $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.tun + -$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/TODO $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/TODO + +install-cygwindoc: README + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(cygdocdir) + $(INSTALL) -m 644 README $(DESTDIR)$(cygdocdir)/openssh.README + +install-doc: install-sshdoc install-cygwindoc + +install-scripts: ssh-host-config ssh-user-config + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) + $(INSTALL) -m 755 ssh-host-config $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-host-config + $(INSTALL) -m 755 ssh-user-config $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-user-config + +install-copy-id: $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id.1 + $(INSTALL) -m 755 $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-copy-id + $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/ssh-copy-id.1 + +gzip-man-pages: + rm $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/slogin.1 + gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/*.1 + gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man5/*.5 + gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man8/*.8 + cd $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1 && ln -s ssh.1.gz slogin.1.gz + +cygwin-postinstall: move-config-files remove-empty-dir install-inetd-config install-doc install-scripts install-copy-id gzip-man-pages + @echo "Cygwin specific configuration finished." diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/README b/contrib/cygwin/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a73a0f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/cygwin/README @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +This package describes important Cygwin specific stuff concerning OpenSSH. + +The binary package is usually built for recent Cygwin versions and might +not run on older versions. Please check http://cygwin.com/ for information +about current Cygwin releases. + +================== +Host configuration +================== + +If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config +files and server keys, as well as installing sshd as a service, by running + + /usr/bin/ssh-host-config + +Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc. +That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started. + +To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got +some options: + +usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]... +Options: + --debug -d Enable shell's debug output. + --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically. + --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically. + --cygwin -c Use "options" as value for CYGWIN environment var. + --name -N sshd windows service name. + --port -p sshd listens on port n. + --user -u privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'. + --pwd -w Use "pwd" as password for privileged user. + --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user + instead of LocalSystem for sshd service. + +Installing sshd as daemon via ssh-host-config is recommended. + +Alternatively you can start sshd via inetd, if you have the inetutils +package installed. Just run ssh-host-config, but answer "no" when asked +to install sshd as service. The ssh-host-config script also adds the +required lines to /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services. + +================== +User configuration +================== + +Any user can simplify creating the own private and public keys by running + + /usr/bin/ssh-user-config + +To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got +some options as well: + +usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]... +Options: + --debug -d Enable shell's debug output. + --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically. + --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically. + --passphrase -p word Use "word" as passphrase automatically. + +Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to +search for the users configuration files! It always uses the +value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory. +If no home diretory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory +is used instead! + +================ +Building OpenSSH +================ + +Building from source is easy. Just unpack the source archive, cd to that +directory, and call cygport: + + cygport openssh.cygport all + +You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH +with the aforementioned cygport script: + + zlib + crypt + openssl-devel + libedit-devel + libkrb5-devel + +Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin@cygwin.com. + + +Have fun, + +Corinna Vinschen +Cygwin Developer +Red Hat Inc. diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config b/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config new file mode 100644 index 0000000..261020a --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config @@ -0,0 +1,693 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# +# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc. +# +# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH. +# +# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any +# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above +# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS +# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. +# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, +# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR +# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR +# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + +# ====================================================================== +# Initialization +# ====================================================================== + +CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh + +# List of apps used. This is checkad for existence in csih_sanity_check +# Don't use *any* transient commands before sourcing the csih helper script, +# otherwise the sanity checks are short-circuited. +declare -a csih_required_commands=( + /usr/bin/basename coreutils + /usr/bin/cat coreutils + /usr/bin/chmod coreutils + /usr/bin/dirname coreutils + /usr/bin/id coreutils + /usr/bin/mv coreutils + /usr/bin/rm coreutils + /usr/bin/cygpath cygwin + /usr/bin/mkpasswd cygwin + /usr/bin/mount cygwin + /usr/bin/ps cygwin + /usr/bin/umount cygwin + /usr/bin/cmp diffutils + /usr/bin/grep grep + /usr/bin/awk gawk + /usr/bin/ssh-keygen openssh + /usr/sbin/sshd openssh + /usr/bin/sed sed +) +csih_sanity_check_server=yes +source ${CSIH_SCRIPT} + +PROGNAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $0) +_tdir=$(/usr/bin/dirname $0) +PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd) + +# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed +PREFIX=/usr + +# Directory where the config files are stored +SYSCONFDIR=/etc +LOCALSTATEDIR=/var + +sshd_config_configured=no +port_number=22 +service_name=sshd +strictmodes=yes +cygwin_value="" +user_account= +password_value= +opt_force=no + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: update_services_file +# ====================================================================== +update_services_file() { + local _my_etcdir="/ssh-host-config.$$" + local _win_etcdir + local _services + local _spaces + local _serv_tmp + local _wservices + local ret=0 + + _win_etcdir="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc" + _services="${_my_etcdir}/services" + _spaces=" #" + _serv_tmp="${_my_etcdir}/srv.out.$$" + + /usr/bin/mount -o text,posix=0,noacl -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}" + + # Depends on the above mount + _wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"` + + # Add ssh 22/tcp and ssh 22/udp to services + if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[[:space:]][[:space:]]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ] + then + if /usr/bin/awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh 22/tcp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh 22/udp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}" + then + if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}" + then + csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}" + else + csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!" + let ++ret + fi + /usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}" + else + csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + /usr/bin/umount "${_my_etcdir}" + return $ret +} # --- End of update_services_file --- # + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: sshd_strictmodes +# MODIFIES: strictmodes +# ====================================================================== +sshd_strictmodes() { + if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ] + then + echo + csih_inform "StrictModes is set to 'yes' by default." + csih_inform "This is the recommended setting, but it requires that the POSIX" + csih_inform "permissions of the user's home directory, the user's .ssh" + csih_inform "directory, and the user's ssh key files are tight so that" + csih_inform "only the user has write permissions." + csih_inform "On the other hand, StrictModes don't work well with default" + csih_inform "Windows permissions of a home directory mounted with the" + csih_inform "'noacl' option, and they don't work at all if the home" + csih_inform "directory is on a FAT or FAT32 partition." + if ! csih_request "Should StrictModes be used?" + then + strictmodes=no + fi + fi + return 0 +} + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: sshd_privsep +# Try to create ssshd user account +# ====================================================================== +sshd_privsep() { + local ret=0 + + if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ] + then + if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd + then + csih_error_recoverable "Could not create user 'sshd'!" + csih_error_recoverable "You will not be able to run an sshd service" + csih_error_recoverable "under a privileged account successfully." + csih_error_recoverable "Make sure to create a non-privileged user 'sshd'" + csih_error_recoverable "manually before trying to run the service!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + return $ret +} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- # + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: sshd_config_tweak +# ====================================================================== +sshd_config_tweak() { + local ret=0 + + # Modify sshd_config + csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file" + if [ "${port_number}" -ne 22 ] + then + /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]].*/Port ${port_number}/" \ + ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config + if [ $? -ne 0 ] + then + csih_warning "Setting listening port to ${port_number} failed!" + csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + if [ "${strictmodes}" = "no" ] + then + /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*StrictModes[[:space:]].*/StrictModes no/" \ + ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config + if [ $? -ne 0 ] + then + csih_warning "Setting StrictModes to 'no' failed!" + csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + return $ret +} # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- # + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: update_inetd_conf +# ====================================================================== +update_inetd_conf() { + local _inetcnf="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf" + local _inetcnf_tmp="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf.$$" + local _inetcnf_dir="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.d" + local _sshd_inetd_conf="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd" + local _sshd_inetd_conf_tmp="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd.$$" + local _with_comment=1 + local ret=0 + + if [ -d "${_inetcnf_dir}" ] + then + # we have inetutils-1.5 inetd.d support + if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ] + then + /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0 + + # check for sshd OR ssh in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove + # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/ + if [ $(/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?) -eq 0 ] + then + /usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}" + if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ] + then + if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}" + then + csih_inform "Removed ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf}" + else + csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!" + let ++ret + fi + /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" + else + csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + fi + + csih_install_config "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" + if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ] + then + /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" + else + /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" + fi + if /usr/bin/mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" + then + csih_inform "Updated ${_sshd_inetd_conf}" + else + csih_warning "Updating ${_sshd_inetd_conf} failed!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + + elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ] + then + /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0 + + # check for sshd in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove + # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/ + if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ] + then + /usr/bin/grep -v '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}" + if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ] + then + if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}" + then + csih_inform "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}" + else + csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!" + let ++ret + fi + /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" + else + csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + + # Add ssh line to inetd.conf + if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ] + then + if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ] + then + echo 'ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}" + else + echo '# ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}" + fi + if [ $? -eq 0 ] + then + csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}" + else + csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_inetcnf} failed!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + fi + return $ret +} # --- End of update_inetd_conf --- # + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: check_service_files_ownership +# Checks that the files in /etc and /var belong to the right owner +# ====================================================================== +check_service_files_ownership() { + local run_service_as=$1 + local ret=0 + + if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ] + then + accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ sshd | + /usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp') + if [ "${accnt_name}" = "LocalSystem" ] + then + # Convert "LocalSystem" to "SYSTEM" as is the correct account name + run_service_as="SYSTEM" + else + dom="${accnt_name%%\\*}" + accnt_name="${accnt_name#*\\}" + if [ "${dom}" = '.' ] + then + # Check local account + run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -l -u "${accnt_name}" | + /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}') + else + # Check domain + run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -d "${dom}" -u "${accnt_name}" | + /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}') + fi + fi + if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ] + then + csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running sshd service from account database!" + csih_warning "As a result, this script cannot make sure that the files used" + csih_warning "by the sshd service belong to the user running the service." + return 1 + fi + fi + for i in "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/sshd_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key.pub + do + if [ -f "$i" ] + then + if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 "$i" >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of $i!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + done + if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!" + let ++ret + fi + if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!" + let ++ret + fi + if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ] + then + if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log!" + let ++ret + fi + fi + if [ $ret -ne 0 ] + then + csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of important files to ${run_service_as}!" + csih_warning "This may cause the sshd service to fail! Please make sure that" + csih_warning "you have suufficient permissions to change the ownership of files" + csih_warning "and try to run the ssh-host-config script again." + fi + return $ret +} # --- End of check_service_files_ownership --- # + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: install_service +# Install sshd as a service +# ====================================================================== +install_service() { + local run_service_as + local password + local ret=0 + + echo + if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + csih_inform "Sshd service is already installed." + check_service_files_ownership "" || let ret+=$? + else + echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Do you want to install sshd as a service?" + if csih_request "(Say \"no\" if it is already installed as a service)" + then + csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}" + + if ( csih_is_nt2003 || [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] ) + then + csih_inform "On Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and above, the" + csih_inform "SYSTEM account cannot setuid to other users -- a capability" + csih_inform "sshd requires. You need to have or to create a privileged" + csih_inform "account. This script will help you do so." + echo + + [ "${opt_force}" = "yes" ] && opt_f=-f + [ -n "${user_account}" ] && opt_u="-u ""${user_account}""" + csih_select_privileged_username ${opt_f} ${opt_u} sshd + + if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}" + then + csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user." + csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1 + let ++ret + fi + fi + + # Never returns empty if NT or above + run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as) + + if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ] + then + password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}" + if [ -z "${password}" ] + then + csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s" + password="${csih_value}" + fi + fi + + # At this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and + # $password is empty, or $run_service_as is some privileged user and + # (hopefully) $password contains the correct password. So, from here + # out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate the two cases. + + csih_check_user "${run_service_as}" + + if [ -n "${csih_cygenv}" ] + then + cygwin_env=( -e "CYGWIN=${csih_cygenv}" ) + fi + if [ -z "${password}" ] + then + if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \ + -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" + then + echo + csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem" + csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call" + csih_inform "\`net start sshd' or \`cygrunsrv -S sshd'. Otherwise, it" + csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot." + fi + else + if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \ + -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" \ + -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}" + then + /usr/bin/editrights -u "${run_service_as}" -a SeServiceLogonRight + echo + csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'" + csih_inform "account. To start the service now, call \`net start ${service_name}' or" + csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'. Otherwise, it will start automatically" + csih_inform "after the next reboot." + fi + fi + + if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + check_service_files_ownership "${run_service_as}" || let ret+=$? + else + csih_error_recoverable "Installing sshd as a service failed!" + let ++ret + fi + fi # user allowed us to install as service + fi # service not yet installed + return $ret +} # --- End of install_service --- # + +# ====================================================================== +# Main Entry Point +# ====================================================================== + +# Check how the script has been started. If +# (1) it has been started by giving the full path and +# that path is /etc/postinstall, OR +# (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable +# SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set +# then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic +# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting +# them if they already exist. In both cases, color +# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent +# cluttering setup's logfiles. +if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ] +then + csih_auto_answer="no" + csih_disable_color + opt_force=yes +fi +if [ -n "${SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ] +then + csih_auto_answer="no" + csih_disable_color + opt_force=yes +fi + +# ====================================================================== +# Parse options +# ====================================================================== +while : +do + case $# in + 0) + break + ;; + esac + + option=$1 + shift + + case "${option}" in + -d | --debug ) + set -x + csih_trace_on + ;; + + -y | --yes ) + csih_auto_answer=yes + opt_force=yes + ;; + + -n | --no ) + csih_auto_answer=no + opt_force=yes + ;; + + -c | --cygwin ) + cygwin_value="$1" + shift + ;; + + -N | --name ) + service_name=$1 + shift + ;; + + -p | --port ) + port_number=$1 + shift + ;; + + -u | --user ) + user_account="$1" + shift + ;; + + -w | --pwd ) + password_value="$1" + shift + ;; + + --privileged ) + csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes + ;; + + *) + echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..." + echo + echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration." + echo + echo "Options:" + echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output." + echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically." + echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically." + echo " --cygwin -c Use \"options\" as value for CYGWIN environment var." + echo " --name -N sshd windows service name." + echo " --port -p sshd listens on port n." + echo " --user -u privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'." + echo " --pwd -w Use \"pwd\" as password for privileged user." + echo " --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user" + echo " instead of LocalSystem for sshd service." + echo + exit 1 + ;; + + esac +done + +# ====================================================================== +# Action! +# ====================================================================== + +# Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while +# some ssh processes are still running +if /usr/bin/ps -ef | /usr/bin/grep -q '/sshd\?$' +then + echo + csih_error "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first." +fi + +# Make sure the user is running in an administrative context +admin=$(/usr/bin/id -G | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '\<544\>' && echo yes || echo no) +if [ "${admin}" != "yes" ] +then + echo + csih_warning "Running this script typically requires administrator privileges!" + csih_warning "However, it seems your account does not have these privileges." + csih_warning "Here's the list of groups in your user token:" + echo + /usr/bin/id -Gnz | xargs -0n1 echo " " + echo + csih_warning "This usually means you're running this script from a non-admin" + csih_warning "desktop session, or in a non-elevated shell under UAC control." + echo + csih_warning "Make sure you have the appropriate privileges right now," + csih_warning "otherwise parts of this script will probably fail!" + echo + echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Are you sure you want to continue? (Say \"no\" if you're not sure" + if ! csih_request "you have the required privileges)" + then + echo + csih_inform "Ok. Exiting. Make sure to switch to an administrative account" + csih_inform "or to start this script from an elevated shell." + exit 1 + fi +fi + +echo + +warning_cnt=0 + +# Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists +if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ] +then + echo + csih_error_multi "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog exists, but is not a file." \ + "Cannot create ssh host configuration." +fi +if [ ! -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ] +then + /usr/bin/cat /dev/null > ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog + if ! /usr/bin/chmod 644 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!" + let ++warning_cnt + fi +fi + +# Create /var/empty file used as chroot jail for privilege separation +csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" "Cannot create ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty directory." +if ! /usr/bin/chmod 755 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1 +then + csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!" + let ++warning_cnt +fi + +# generate missing host keys +csih_inform "Generating missing SSH host keys" +/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A || let warning_cnt+=$? + +# handle ssh_config +csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt +if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" >/dev/null 2>&1 +then + if [ "${port_number}" != "22" ] + then + csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file with requested port" + echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config + echo " Port ${port_number}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config + fi +fi + +# handle sshd_config +csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt +if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1 +then + sshd_config_configured=yes +fi +sshd_strictmodes || let warning_cnt+=$? +sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$? +sshd_config_tweak || let warning_cnt+=$? +update_services_file || let warning_cnt+=$? +update_inetd_conf || let warning_cnt+=$? +install_service || let warning_cnt+=$? + +echo +if [ $warning_cnt -eq 0 ] +then + csih_inform "Host configuration finished. Have fun!" +else + csih_warning "Host configuration exited with ${warning_cnt} errors or warnings!" + csih_warning "Make sure that all problems reported are fixed," + csih_warning "then re-run ssh-host-config." +fi +exit $warning_cnt diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config b/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fa4bb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config @@ -0,0 +1,257 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# +# ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc. +# +# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH. +# +# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any +# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above +# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS +# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. +# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, +# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR +# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR +# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. + +# ====================================================================== +# Initialization +# ====================================================================== +PROGNAME=$(basename -- $0) +_tdir=$(dirname -- $0) +PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd) + +CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh + +# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed +PREFIX=/usr + +# Directory where the config files are stored +SYSCONFDIR=/etc + +source ${CSIH_SCRIPT} + +auto_passphrase="no" +passphrase="" +pwdhome= +with_passphrase= + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: create_identity +# optionally create identity of type argument in ~/.ssh +# optionally add result to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +# ====================================================================== +create_identity() { + local file="$1" + local type="$2" + local name="$3" + if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" ] + then + if csih_request "Shall I create a ${name} identity file for you?" + then + csih_inform "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" + if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ] + then + ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null + else + ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null + fi + if csih_request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?" + then + csih_inform "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" + cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" + fi + fi + fi +} # === End of create_ssh1_identity() === # +readonly -f create_identity + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: check_user_homedir +# Perform various checks on the user's home directory +# SETS GLOBAL VARIABLE: +# pwdhome +# ====================================================================== +check_user_homedir() { + pwdhome=$(getent passwd $UID | awk -F: '{ print $6; }') + if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X" ] + then + csih_error_multi \ + "There is no home directory set for you in the account database." \ + 'Setting $HOME is not sufficient!' + fi + + if [ ! -d "${pwdhome}" ] + then + csih_error_multi \ + "${pwdhome} is set in the account database as your home directory" \ + 'but it is not a valid directory. Cannot create user identity files.' + fi + + # If home is the root dir, set home to empty string to avoid error messages + # in subsequent parts of that script. + if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X/" ] + then + # But first raise a warning! + csih_warning "Your home directory in the account database is set to root (/). This is not recommended!" + if csih_request "Would you like to proceed anyway?" + then + pwdhome='' + else + csih_warning "Exiting. Configuration is not complete" + exit 1 + fi + fi + + if [ -d "${pwdhome}" -a -n "`chmod -c g-w,o-w "${pwdhome}"`" ] + then + echo + csih_warning 'group and other have been revoked write permission to your home' + csih_warning "directory ${pwdhome}." + csih_warning 'This is required by OpenSSH to allow public key authentication using' + csih_warning 'the key files stored in your .ssh subdirectory.' + csih_warning 'Revert this change ONLY if you know what you are doing!' + echo + fi +} # === End of check_user_homedir() === # +readonly -f check_user_homedir + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: check_user_dot_ssh_dir +# Perform various checks on the ~/.ssh directory +# PREREQUISITE: +# pwdhome -- check_user_homedir() +# ====================================================================== +check_user_dot_ssh_dir() { + if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" -a ! -d "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ] + then + csih_error "${pwdhome}/.ssh is existent but not a directory. Cannot create user identity files." + fi + + if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ] + then + mkdir "${pwdhome}/.ssh" + if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ] + then + csih_error "Creating users ${pwdhome}/.ssh directory failed" + fi + fi +} # === End of check_user_dot_ssh_dir() === # +readonly -f check_user_dot_ssh_dir + +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: fix_authorized_keys_perms +# Corrects the permissions of ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +# PREREQUISITE: +# pwdhome -- check_user_homedir() +# ====================================================================== +fix_authorized_keys_perms() { + if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ] + then + setfacl -b "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" 2>/dev/null || echo -n + if ! chmod u-x,g-wx,o-wx "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" + then + csih_warning "Setting correct permissions to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" + csih_warning "failed. Please care for the correct permissions. The minimum requirement" + csih_warning "is, the owner needs read permissions." + echo + fi + fi +} # === End of fix_authorized_keys_perms() === # +readonly -f fix_authorized_keys_perms + + +# ====================================================================== +# Main Entry Point +# ====================================================================== + +# Check how the script has been started. If +# (1) it has been started by giving the full path and +# that path is /etc/postinstall, OR +# (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable +# SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set +# then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic +# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting +# them if they already exist. In both cases, color +# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent +# cluttering setup's logfiles. +if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ] +then + csih_auto_answer="no" + csih_disable_color +fi +if [ -n "${SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ] +then + csih_auto_answer="no" + csih_disable_color +fi + +# ====================================================================== +# Parse options +# ====================================================================== +while : +do + case $# in + 0) + break + ;; + esac + + option=$1 + shift + + case "$option" in + -d | --debug ) + set -x + csih_trace_on + ;; + + -y | --yes ) + csih_auto_answer=yes + ;; + + -n | --no ) + csih_auto_answer=no + ;; + + -p | --passphrase ) + with_passphrase="yes" + passphrase=$1 + shift + ;; + + *) + echo "usage: ${PROGNAME} [OPTION]..." + echo + echo "This script creates an OpenSSH user configuration." + echo + echo "Options:" + echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output." + echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically." + echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically." + echo " --passphrase -p word Use \"word\" as passphrase automatically." + echo + exit 1 + ;; + + esac +done + +# ====================================================================== +# Action! +# ====================================================================== + +check_user_homedir +check_user_dot_ssh_dir +create_identity id_rsa rsa "SSH2 RSA" +create_identity id_dsa dsa "SSH2 DSA" +create_identity id_ecdsa ecdsa "SSH2 ECDSA" +create_identity identity rsa1 "(deprecated) SSH1 RSA" +fix_authorized_keys_perms + +echo +csih_inform "Configuration finished. Have fun!" + + diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd b/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa6bf07 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +# This file can be used to enable sshd as a slave of the inetd service +# To do so, the line below should be uncommented. +@COMMENT@ ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i + diff --git a/contrib/findssl.sh b/contrib/findssl.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95a0d66 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/findssl.sh @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# findssl.sh +# Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries +# and print their versions. +# Intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not +# match your library" errors. +# +# Written by Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au) +# This file is placed in the public domain. +# +# Release history: +# 2002-07-27: Initial release. +# 2002-08-04: Added public domain notice. +# 2003-06-24: Incorporated readme, set library paths. First cvs version. +# 2004-12-13: Add traps to cleanup temp files, from Amarendra Godbole. +# +# "OpenSSL headers do not match your library" are usually caused by +# OpenSSH's configure picking up an older version of OpenSSL headers +# or libraries. You can use the following # procedure to help identify +# the cause. +# +# The output of configure will tell you the versions of the OpenSSL +# headers and libraries that were picked up, for example: +# +# checking OpenSSL header version... 90604f (OpenSSL 0.9.6d 9 May 2002) +# checking OpenSSL library version... 90602f (OpenSSL 0.9.6b [engine] 9 Jul 2001) +# checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... no +# configure: error: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library +# +# Now run findssl.sh. This should identify the headers and libraries +# present and their versions. You should be able to identify the +# libraries and headers used and adjust your CFLAGS or remove incorrect +# versions. The output will show OpenSSL's internal version identifier +# and should look something like: + +# $ ./findssl.sh +# Searching for OpenSSL header files. +# 0x0090604fL /usr/include/openssl/opensslv.h +# 0x0090604fL /usr/local/ssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h +# +# Searching for OpenSSL shared library files. +# 0x0090602fL /lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6b +# 0x0090602fL /lib/libcrypto.so.2 +# 0x0090581fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0 +# 0x0090602fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so +# 0x0090581fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.5a +# 0x0090600fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6 +# 0x0090600fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.1 +# +# Searching for OpenSSL static library files. +# 0x0090602fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.a +# 0x0090604fL /usr/local/ssl/lib/libcrypto.a +# +# In this example, I gave configure no extra flags, so it's picking up +# the OpenSSL header from /usr/include/openssl (90604f) and the library +# from /usr/lib/ (90602f). + +# +# Adjust these to suit your compiler. +# You may also need to set the *LIB*PATH environment variables if +# DEFAULT_LIBPATH is not correct for your system. +# +CC=gcc +STATIC=-static + +# +# Cleanup on interrupt +# +trap 'rm -f conftest.c' INT HUP TERM + +# +# Set up conftest C source +# +rm -f findssl.log +cat >conftest.c < +int main(){printf("0x%08xL\n", SSLeay());} +EOD + +# +# Set default library paths if not already set +# +DEFAULT_LIBPATH=/usr/lib:/usr/local/lib +LIBPATH=${LIBPATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH} +LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH} +LIBRARY_PATH=${LIBRARY_PATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH} +export LIBPATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH LIBRARY_PATH + +# not all platforms have a 'which' command +if which ls >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then + : which is defined +else + which () { + saveIFS="$IFS" + IFS=: + for p in $PATH; do + if test -x "$p/$1" -a -f "$p/$1"; then + IFS="$saveIFS" + echo "$p/$1" + return 0 + fi + done + IFS="$saveIFS" + return 1 + } +fi + +# +# Search for OpenSSL headers and print versions +# +echo Searching for OpenSSL header files. +if [ -x "`which locate`" ] +then + headers=`locate opensslv.h` +else + headers=`find / -name opensslv.h -print 2>/dev/null` +fi + +for header in $headers +do + ver=`awk '/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER/{printf \$3}' $header` + echo "$ver $header" +done +echo + +# +# Search for shared libraries. +# Relies on shared libraries looking like "libcrypto.s*" +# +echo Searching for OpenSSL shared library files. +if [ -x "`which locate`" ] +then + libraries=`locate libcrypto.s` +else + libraries=`find / -name 'libcrypto.s*' -print 2>/dev/null` +fi + +for lib in $libraries +do + (echo "Trying libcrypto $lib" >>findssl.log + dir=`dirname $lib` + LIBPATH="$dir:$LIBPATH" + LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$dir:$LIBPATH" + LIBRARY_PATH="$dir:$LIBPATH" + export LIBPATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH LIBRARY_PATH + ${CC} -o conftest conftest.c $lib 2>>findssl.log + if [ -x ./conftest ] + then + ver=`./conftest 2>/dev/null` + rm -f ./conftest + echo "$ver $lib" + fi) +done +echo + +# +# Search for static OpenSSL libraries and print versions +# +echo Searching for OpenSSL static library files. +if [ -x "`which locate`" ] +then + libraries=`locate libcrypto.a` +else + libraries=`find / -name libcrypto.a -print 2>/dev/null` +fi + +for lib in $libraries +do + libdir=`dirname $lib` + echo "Trying libcrypto $lib" >>findssl.log + ${CC} ${STATIC} -o conftest conftest.c -L${libdir} -lcrypto 2>>findssl.log + if [ -x ./conftest ] + then + ver=`./conftest 2>/dev/null` + rm -f ./conftest + echo "$ver $lib" + fi +done + +# +# Clean up +# +rm -f conftest.c diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d51032 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the + * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of + * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null". + * + * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable + * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab + * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the + * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if + * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always. + */ + +/* + * Compile with: + * + * cc `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \ + * gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \ + * `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui` + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +report_failed_grab (void) +{ + GtkWidget *err; + + err = gnome_message_box_new("Could not grab keyboard or mouse.\n" + "A malicious client may be eavesdropping on your session.", + GNOME_MESSAGE_BOX_ERROR, "EXIT", NULL); + gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(err), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL); + + gnome_dialog_run_and_close(GNOME_DIALOG(err)); +} + +int +passphrase_dialog(char *message) +{ + char *passphrase; + char **messages; + int result, i, grab_server, grab_pointer; + GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *label; + + grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL); + grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL); + + dialog = gnome_dialog_new("OpenSSH", GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_OK, + GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_CANCEL, NULL); + + messages = g_strsplit(message, "\\n", 0); + if (messages) + for(i = 0; messages[i]; i++) { + label = gtk_label_new(messages[i]); + gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), + label, FALSE, FALSE, 0); + } + + entry = gtk_entry_new(); + gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE, + FALSE, 0); + gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE); + gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry); + + /* Center window and prepare for grab */ + gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(dialog), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL); + gnome_dialog_set_default(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), 0); + gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + gtk_window_set_policy(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), FALSE, FALSE, TRUE); + gnome_dialog_close_hides(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), TRUE); + gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), + GNOME_PAD); + gtk_widget_show_all(dialog); + + /* Grab focus */ + if (grab_server) + XGrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY()); + if (grab_pointer && gdk_pointer_grab(dialog->window, TRUE, 0, + NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME)) + goto nograb; + if (gdk_keyboard_grab(dialog->window, FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME)) + goto nograbkb; + + /* Make close dialog */ + gnome_dialog_editable_enters(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_EDITABLE(entry)); + + /* Run dialog */ + result = gnome_dialog_run(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)); + + /* Ungrab */ + if (grab_server) + XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY()); + if (grab_pointer) + gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + gdk_flush(); + + /* Report passphrase if user selected OK */ + passphrase = gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)); + if (result == 0) + puts(passphrase); + + /* Zero passphrase in memory */ + memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase)); + gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase); + + gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)); + return (result == 0 ? 0 : -1); + + /* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report + the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot + fail. */ + nograbkb: + gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + nograb: + if (grab_server) + XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY()); + gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)); + + report_failed_grab(); + return (-1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *message; + int result; + + gnome_init("GNOME ssh-askpass", "0.1", argc, argv); + + if (argc == 2) + message = argv[1]; + else + message = "Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:"; + + setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0); + result = passphrase_dialog(message); + + return (result); +} diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..535a692 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* GTK2 support by Nalin Dahyabhai */ + +/* + * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the + * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of + * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null". + * + * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable + * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab + * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the + * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if + * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always. + */ + +#define GRAB_TRIES 16 +#define GRAB_WAIT 250 /* milliseconds */ + +/* + * Compile with: + * + * cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \ + * gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \ + * `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0` + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static void +report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what) +{ + GtkWidget *err; + + err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0, + GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, + GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE, + "Could not grab %s. " + "A malicious client may be eavesdropping " + "on your session.", what); + gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + + gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err)); + + gtk_widget_destroy(err); +} + +static void +ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dialog) +{ + g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_DIALOG(dialog)); + gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK); +} + +static int +passphrase_dialog(char *message) +{ + const char *failed; + char *passphrase, *local; + int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer; + GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry; + GdkGrabStatus status; + + grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL); + grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL); + grab_tries = 0; + + /* Create an invisible parent window so that GtkDialog doesn't + * complain. */ + parent_window = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL); + + dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0, + GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION, + GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL, + "%s", + message); + + entry = gtk_entry_new(); + gtk_box_pack_start( + GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry, + FALSE, FALSE, 0); + gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE); + gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry); + gtk_widget_show(entry); + + gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH"); + gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER); + gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE); + + /* Make close dialog */ + gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK); + g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate", + G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog); + + gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE); + + /* Grab focus */ + gtk_widget_show_now(dialog); + if (grab_pointer) { + for(;;) { + status = gdk_pointer_grab( + (gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog))), TRUE, + 0, NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS) + break; + usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000); + if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) { + failed = "mouse"; + goto nograb; + } + } + } + for(;;) { + status = gdk_keyboard_grab( + gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog)), FALSE, + GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS) + break; + usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000); + if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) { + failed = "keyboard"; + goto nograbkb; + } + } + if (grab_server) { + gdk_x11_grab_server(); + } + + result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)); + + /* Ungrab */ + if (grab_server) + XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay()); + if (grab_pointer) + gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + gdk_flush(); + + /* Report passphrase if user selected OK */ + passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry))); + if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) { + local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), + NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (local != NULL) { + puts(local); + memset(local, '\0', strlen(local)); + g_free(local); + } else { + puts(passphrase); + } + } + + /* Zero passphrase in memory */ + memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase)); + gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase); + memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase)); + g_free(passphrase); + + gtk_widget_destroy(dialog); + return (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK ? 0 : -1); + + /* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report + the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot + fail. */ + nograbkb: + gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME); + nograb: + if (grab_server) + XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay()); + gtk_widget_destroy(dialog); + + report_failed_grab(parent_window, failed); + + return (-1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *message; + int result; + + gtk_init(&argc, &argv); + + if (argc > 1) { + message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1); + } else { + message = g_strdup("Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:"); + } + + setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0); + result = passphrase_dialog(message); + g_free(message); + + return (result); +} diff --git a/contrib/hpux/README b/contrib/hpux/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f8bfa84 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/hpux/README @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +README for OpenSSH HP-UX contrib files +Kevin Steves + +sshd: configuration file for sshd.rc +sshd.rc: SSH startup script +egd: configuration file for egd.rc +egd.rc: EGD (entropy gathering daemon) startup script + +To install: + +sshd.rc: + +o Verify paths in sshd.rc match your local installation + (WHAT_PATH and WHAT_PID) +o Customize sshd if needed (SSHD_ARGS) +o Install: + + # cp sshd /etc/rc.config.d + # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/sshd + # cp sshd.rc /sbin/init.d + # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc + # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K100sshd + # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S900sshd + +egd.rc: + +o Verify egd.pl path in egd.rc matches your local installation + (WHAT_PATH) +o Customize egd if needed (EGD_ARGS and EGD_LOG) +o Add pseudo account: + + # groupadd egd + # useradd -g egd egd + # mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd + # chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd + # chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd + +o Install: + + # cp egd /etc/rc.config.d + # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/egd + # cp egd.rc /sbin/init.d + # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/egd.rc + # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K600egd + # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S400egd diff --git a/contrib/hpux/egd b/contrib/hpux/egd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21af0bd --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/hpux/egd @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# EGD_START: Set to 1 to start entropy gathering daemon +# EGD_ARGS: Command line arguments to pass to egd +# EGD_LOG: EGD stdout and stderr log file (default /etc/opt/egd/egd.log) +# +# To configure the egd environment: + +# groupadd egd +# useradd -g egd egd +# mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd +# chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd +# chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd + +EGD_START=1 +EGD_ARGS='/etc/opt/egd/entropy' +EGD_LOG= diff --git a/contrib/hpux/egd.rc b/contrib/hpux/egd.rc new file mode 100755 index 0000000..919dea7 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/hpux/egd.rc @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +#!/sbin/sh + +# +# egd.rc: EGD start-up and shutdown script +# + +# Allowed exit values: +# 0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist. +# 1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist. +# 2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist. +# Use this value if execution of this script is overridden +# by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not +# appropriate to execute for some other reason. +# 3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution. + +# Input and output: +# stdin is redirected from /dev/null +# +# stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file +# during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode. + +umask 022 + +PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin +export PATH + +WHAT='EGD (entropy gathering daemon)' +WHAT_PATH=/opt/perl/bin/egd.pl +WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/egd +WHAT_LOG=/etc/opt/egd/egd.log + +# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might +# not be available. Do not attempt to access commands or files in +# /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater. Other +# file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var +# and /opt. + +rval=0 + +# Check the exit value of a command run by this script. If non-zero, the +# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script +# is set to indicate failure. + +set_return() { + x=$? + if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then + echo "EXIT CODE: $x" + rval=1 # script FAILed + fi +} + +case $1 in +'start_msg') + echo "Starting $WHAT" + ;; + +'stop_msg') + echo "Stopping $WHAT" + ;; + +'start') + if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then + . $WHAT_CONFIG + else + echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING" + fi + + + if [ "$EGD_START" -eq 1 -a -x $WHAT_PATH ]; then + EGD_LOG=${EGD_LOG:-$WHAT_LOG} + su egd -c "nohup $WHAT_PATH $EGD_ARGS >$EGD_LOG 2>&1" && + echo $WHAT started + set_return + else + rval=2 + fi + ;; + +'stop') + pid=`ps -fuegd | awk '$1 == "egd" { print $2 }'` + if [ "X$pid" != "X" ]; then + if kill "$pid"; then + echo "$WHAT stopped" + else + rval=1 + echo "Unable to stop $WHAT" + fi + fi + set_return + ;; + +*) + echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}" + rval=1 + ;; +esac + +exit $rval diff --git a/contrib/hpux/sshd b/contrib/hpux/sshd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8eb5e92 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/hpux/sshd @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# SSHD_START: Set to 1 to start SSH daemon +# SSHD_ARGS: Command line arguments to pass to sshd +# +SSHD_START=1 +SSHD_ARGS= diff --git a/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc b/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc new file mode 100755 index 0000000..f9a1099 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +#!/sbin/sh + +# +# sshd.rc: SSH daemon start-up and shutdown script +# + +# Allowed exit values: +# 0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist. +# 1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist. +# 2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist. +# Use this value if execution of this script is overridden +# by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not +# appropriate to execute for some other reason. +# 3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution. + +# Input and output: +# stdin is redirected from /dev/null +# +# stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file +# during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode. + +PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin +export PATH + +WHAT='OpenSSH' +WHAT_PATH=/opt/openssh/sbin/sshd +WHAT_PID=/var/run/sshd.pid +WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/sshd + +# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might +# not be available. Do not attempt to access commands or files in +# /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater. Other +# file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var +# and /opt. + +rval=0 + +# Check the exit value of a command run by this script. If non-zero, the +# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script +# is set to indicate failure. + +set_return() { + x=$? + if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then + echo "EXIT CODE: $x" + rval=1 # script FAILed + fi +} + +case $1 in +'start_msg') + echo "Starting $WHAT" + ;; + +'stop_msg') + echo "Stopping $WHAT" + ;; + +'start') + if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then + . $WHAT_CONFIG + else + echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING" + fi + + if [ "$SSHD_START" -eq 1 -a -x "$WHAT_PATH" ]; then + $WHAT_PATH $SSHD_ARGS && echo "$WHAT started" + set_return + else + rval=2 + fi + ;; + +'stop') + if kill `cat $WHAT_PID`; then + echo "$WHAT stopped" + else + rval=1 + echo "Unable to stop $WHAT" + fi + set_return + ;; + +*) + echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}" + rval=1 + ;; +esac + +exit $rval diff --git a/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh b/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd77712 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +setenv SSH_ASKPASS /usr/libexec/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass diff --git a/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh b/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..355189f --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/libexec/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +export SSH_ASKPASS diff --git a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d782348 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec @@ -0,0 +1,843 @@ +%define ver 7.9p1 +%define rel 1%{?dist} + +# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID +%define sshd_uid 74 +%define sshd_gid 74 + +# Version of ssh-askpass +%define aversion 1.2.4.1 + +# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) +%define no_x11_askpass 0 + +# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) +%define no_gnome_askpass 0 + +# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) +%define static_libcrypto 0 + +# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no) +%define scard 0 + +# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass +%define gtk2 1 + +# Use build6x options for older RHEL builds +# RHEL 7 not yet supported +%if 0%{?rhel} > 6 +%define build6x 0 +%else +%define build6x 1 +%endif + +%if 0%{?fedora} >= 26 +%define compat_openssl 1 +%else +%define compat_openssl 0 +%endif + +# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no) +%define kerberos5 1 + +# Reserve options to override askpass settings with: +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' +%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1} +%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1} + +# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+. +# RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples. +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1' +%{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0} + +# Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier? +%{?build_6x:%define build6x 1} + +# If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc. +%if %{build6x} +%define _sysconfdir /etc +%endif + +# Options for static OpenSSL link: +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" +%{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1} + +# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine) +# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1" +%{?smartcard:%define scard 1} + +# Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no) +%define rescue 0 +%{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1} + +# Turn off some stuff for resuce builds +%if %{rescue} +%define kerberos5 0 +%endif + +Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol version 2. +Name: openssh +Version: %{ver} +%if %{rescue} +Release: %{rel}rescue +%else +Release: %{rel} +%endif +URL: https://www.openssh.com/portable.html +Source0: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz +Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz +License: BSD +Group: Applications/Internet +BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot +Obsoletes: ssh +%if %{build6x} +PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00 +%else +Requires: initscripts >= 5.20 +%endif +BuildRequires: perl +%if %{compat_openssl} +BuildRequires: compat-openssl10-devel +%else +BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.0.1 +BuildRequires: openssl-devel < 1.1 +%endif +BuildRequires: /bin/login +%if ! %{build6x} +BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam +%else +BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h +%endif +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h +# Xt development tools +BuildRequires: libXt-devel +# Provides xmkmf +BuildRequires: imake +# Rely on relatively recent gtk +BuildRequires: gtk2-devel +%endif +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +BuildRequires: pkgconfig +%endif +%if %{kerberos5} +BuildRequires: krb5-devel +BuildRequires: krb5-libs +%endif + +%package clients +Summary: OpenSSH clients. +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Group: Applications/Internet +Obsoletes: ssh-clients + +%package server +Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon. +Group: System Environment/Daemons +Obsoletes: ssh-server +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9 +%if ! %{build6x} +Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth +%endif + +%package askpass +Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X. +Group: Applications/Internet +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: ssh-extras + +%package askpass-gnome +Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME. +Group: Applications/Internet +Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} +Obsoletes: ssh-extras + +%description +SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing +commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and +rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two +untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and +arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. + +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing +it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing +all patented algorithms to separate libraries. + +This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH +client and server. To make this package useful, you should also +install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. + +%description clients +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes +the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. +You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients. + +%description server +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains +the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to +securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh +package installed. + +%description askpass +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains +an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. + +%description askpass-gnome +OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging +into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains +an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop +environment. + +%prep + +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +%setup -q -a 1 +%else +%setup -q +%endif + +%build +%if %{rescue} +CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS +%endif + +%configure \ + --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ + --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ + --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ + --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \ + --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ + --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ + --with-md5-passwords \ + --mandir=%{_mandir} \ + --with-mantype=man \ + --disable-strip \ +%if %{scard} + --with-smartcard \ +%endif +%if %{rescue} + --without-pam \ +%else + --with-pam \ +%endif +%if %{kerberos5} + --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \ +%endif + + +%if %{static_libcrypto} +perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile +%endif + +make + +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion} +%configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh +xmkmf -a +make +popd +%endif + +# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary +# because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements. +%if %{gtk2} + gtk2=yes +%else + gtk2=no +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +pushd contrib +if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then + make gnome-ssh-askpass2 + mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass +else + make gnome-ssh-askpass1 + mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass +fi +popd +%endif + +%install +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh +mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd + +make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT + +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh +%if %{build6x} +install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd +%else +install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd +%endif +install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd + +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +install x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass +ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +%endif + +%if ! %{scard} + rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ +install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ +install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ +%endif + +perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* + +%clean +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT + +%triggerun server -- ssh-server +if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then + touch /var/run/sshd.restart +fi + +%triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1 +# Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have. +gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1} + /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1} + END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config +# And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default +# behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't +# specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying +# one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both. +if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then + echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config + echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config +fi + +%triggerpostun server -- ssh-server +if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then + /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd + if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then + rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart + /sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || : + fi +fi + +%pre server +%{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || : +%{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \ + -g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || : + +%post server +/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd + +%postun server +/sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || : + +%preun server +if [ "$1" = 0 ] +then + /sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || : + /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd +fi + +%files +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli +%if ! %{rescue} +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh +%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* +%endif +%if %{scard} +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin +%endif + +%files clients +%defattr(-,root,root) +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config +%if ! %{rescue} +%attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* +%endif + +%if ! %{rescue} +%files server +%defattr(-,root,root) +%dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd +%endif + +%if ! %{no_x11_askpass} +%files askpass +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README +%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog +%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad +%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass +%endif + +%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} +%files askpass-gnome +%defattr(-,root,root) +%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +%endif + +%changelog +* Sat Feb 10 2018 Darren Tucker +- Update openssl-devel dependency to match current requirements. +- Handle Fedora >=6 openssl 1.0 compat libs. +- Remove SSH1 from description. +- Don't strip binaries at build time so that debuginfo package can be + created. + +* Sun Nov 16 2014 Nico Kadel-Garcia +- Add '--mandir' and '--with-mantype' for RHEL 5 compatibility +- Add 'dist' option to 'ver' so package names reflect OS at build time +- Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in SRPM +- Add openssh-x11-aspass BuildRequires for libXT-devel, imake, gtk2-devel +- Discard 'K5DIR' reporting, not usable inside 'mock' for RHEL 5 compatibility +- Discard obsolete '--with-rsh' configure option +- Update openssl-devel dependency to 0.9.8f, as found in autoconf + +* Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice +- test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass + +* Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller +- Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config + file using new AddressFamily directive + +* Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller +- Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass + (patch from bet@rahul.net) + +* Tue Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller +- Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks + +* Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller +- Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs + +* Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller +- Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta) +- Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages +- Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client + +* Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller +- Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little +- Add Privsep user, group and directory + +* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2 +- bump and grind (through the build system) + +* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-1 +- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137) +- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't + work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck +- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again +- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from + http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're + building for 6.x + +* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-0 +- update to 3.1p1 + +* Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020305 +- update to SNAP-20020305 +- drop debug patch, fixed upstream + +* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020220 +- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's + anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind) + +* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-3 +- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key + exchange, authentication, and named key support + +* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-2 +- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole + by gnome-libs-devel + +* Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix + from Hugo van der Kooij) + +* Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-1 +- update to 3.0.2p1 + +* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.1p1-1 +- update to 3.0.1p1 + +* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution) + +* Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0p1-1 +- merge some of Damien Miller changes from the upstream + 3.0p1 spec file and init script + +* Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 3.0p1 +- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1 +- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package +- replace primes with moduli + +* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-9 +- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs + +* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer 2.9p2-8 +- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd + +* Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-7 +- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper + preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc. + (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827) +- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247) +- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298) +- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337) +- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug +- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751) +- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611) +- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221) + +* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-6 +- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke) + +* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2 + +* Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions +- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly +- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable + it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263) + +* Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci) + +* Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151) + +* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2 + +* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- rebuild in new environment + +* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- disable the gssapi patch + +* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.9p2 +- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch + +* Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD +- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem + so that we can verify it +- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch) +- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate +- clear supplemental groups list at startup + +* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config +- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not + dealing with comments right + +* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house, + to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure + from the upstream version + +* Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- finish marking strings in the init script for translation +- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd + at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by + Pekka Savola) +- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable + it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed + +* Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.9 +- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS + +* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer) + +* Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown +- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue +- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid + races in condrestart + +* Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't + limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378) +- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly, + because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like + open connections) +- require the version of openssl we had when we were built + +* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and + when to reinitialize them +- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata + +* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.5.2p2 +- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually + be group memberships + +* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation) +- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not + have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to + three password attempts as it is) +- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely + +* Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise + +* Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- rebuild in new environment + +* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session. +- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750) +- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540) + +* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Chuck the closing patch. +- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that + configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we + specify any other HostKey values, which we do. + +* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user. +- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf. + +* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update for 2.5.1p1. +- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola. +- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely. +- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try + adding id_rsa. + +* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update for 2.5.0p1. +- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass +- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including + update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0. +- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init + script now. + +* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690). +- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which + host the user is attempting a login from. +- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS. +- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS). +- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS). + +* Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd +- i18n-tweak to initscript. + +* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- More gettextizing. +- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing). +- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client). +- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness. + +* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Finish with the gettextizing. + +* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877) +- Gettextize the init script. + +* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case. + +* Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs. + +* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has + succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none" + authentication. (#21268) + +* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301) +- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290) + +* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when + doing keyboard-interactive authentication. + +* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM. +- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and + enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client + will try it when the server disallows password authentication. +- Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway. + +* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall. +- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch. + +* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884). +- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984). +- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself. + +* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata. +- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh. + +* Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1. +- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0. +- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication. + +* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3. +- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966). + +* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files + it generates. + +* Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always + build PAM authentication in. +- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed. +- Clean out no-longer-used patches. +- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only + when neither exists. + +* Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835) +- Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will + always find them in the right place. (#17909) +- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but + add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909) +- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names + are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865) + +* Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835) +- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023) + +* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 20000823 snapshot. +- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release} +- Back out the pipe patch. + +* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems. +- Move the init script back. +- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness. + +* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok(). + +* Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Move condrestart to server postun. +- Move key generation to init script. +- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script. +- Clean up the init script a bit. + +* Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard. + +* Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.1.1p2. +- Use of strtok() considered harmful. + +* Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Get the build root out of the man pages. + +* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Add and use condrestart support in the init script. +- Add newer initscripts as a prereq. + +* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Build in new environment (release 2) +- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group + +* Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Update to 2.2.1p1 + +* Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai +- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref. +- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks. +- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages. + +* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller +- Updated for new location +- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build + +* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller +- Added Jim Knoble's askpass + +* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller +- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble + +* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller +- Added 'Obsoletes' directives + +* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller +- Use make install +- Subpackages + +* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller +- Added links for slogin +- Fixed perms on manpages + +* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller +- Renamed init script + +* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller +- Back to old binary names + +* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller +- Use autoconf +- New binary names + +* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller +- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. diff --git a/contrib/redhat/sshd.init b/contrib/redhat/sshd.init new file mode 100755 index 0000000..8ee5fcd --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/redhat/sshd.init @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# +# Init file for OpenSSH server daemon +# +# chkconfig: 2345 55 25 +# description: OpenSSH server daemon +# +# processname: sshd +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed +# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config +# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid + +# source function library +. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions + +# pull in sysconfig settings +[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd + +RETVAL=0 +prog="sshd" + +# Some functions to make the below more readable +SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd +PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid + +do_restart_sanity_check() +{ + $SSHD -t + RETVAL=$? + if [ $RETVAL -ne 0 ]; then + failure $"Configuration file or keys are invalid" + echo + fi +} + +start() +{ + # Create keys if necessary + /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A + if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then + /sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub + /sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub + /sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub + fi + + echo -n $"Starting $prog:" + $SSHD $OPTIONS && success || failure + RETVAL=$? + [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd + echo +} + +stop() +{ + echo -n $"Stopping $prog:" + killproc $SSHD -TERM + RETVAL=$? + [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd + echo +} + +reload() +{ + echo -n $"Reloading $prog:" + killproc $SSHD -HUP + RETVAL=$? + echo +} + +case "$1" in + start) + start + ;; + stop) + stop + ;; + restart) + stop + start + ;; + reload) + reload + ;; + condrestart) + if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then + do_restart_sanity_check + if [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] ; then + stop + # avoid race + sleep 3 + start + fi + fi + ;; + status) + status $SSHD + RETVAL=$? + ;; + *) + echo $"Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|reload|condrestart|status}" + RETVAL=1 +esac +exit $RETVAL diff --git a/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old b/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old new file mode 100755 index 0000000..8a30f7d --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/redhat/sshd.init.old @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# +# Init file for OpenSSH server daemon +# +# chkconfig: 2345 55 25 +# description: OpenSSH server daemon +# +# processname: sshd +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub +# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed +# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config +# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid + +# source function library +. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions + +# pull in sysconfig settings +[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd + +RETVAL=0 +prog="sshd" + +# Some functions to make the below more readable +KEYGEN=/usr/bin/ssh-keygen +SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd +RSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +DSA_KEY=/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid + +my_success() { + local msg + if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then + msg="$2" + else + msg="done" + fi + case "`type -type success`" in + function) + success "$1" + ;; + *) + echo -n "${msg}" + ;; + esac +} +my_failure() { + local msg + if [ $# -gt 1 ]; then + msg="$2" + else + msg="FAILED" + fi + case "`type -type failure`" in + function) + failure "$1" + ;; + *) + echo -n "${msg}" + ;; + esac +} +do_rsa_keygen() { + if [ ! -s $RSA_KEY ]; then + echo -n "Generating SSH2 RSA host key: " + if $KEYGEN -q -t rsa -f $RSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + chmod 600 $RSA_KEY + chmod 644 $RSA_KEY.pub + my_success "RSA key generation" + echo + else + my_failure "RSA key generation" + echo + exit 1 + fi + fi +} +do_dsa_keygen() { + if [ ! -s $DSA_KEY ]; then + echo -n "Generating SSH2 DSA host key: " + if $KEYGEN -q -t dsa -f $DSA_KEY -C '' -N '' >&/dev/null; then + chmod 600 $DSA_KEY + chmod 644 $DSA_KEY.pub + my_success "DSA key generation" + echo + else + my_failure "DSA key generation" + echo + exit 1 + fi + fi +} +do_restart_sanity_check() { + $SSHD -t + RETVAL=$? + if [ ! "$RETVAL" = 0 ]; then + my_failure "Configuration file or keys" + echo + fi +} + + +case "$1" in + start) + # Create keys if necessary + do_rsa_keygen; + do_dsa_keygen; + + echo -n "Starting sshd: " + if [ ! -f $PID_FILE ] ; then + sshd $OPTIONS + RETVAL=$? + if [ "$RETVAL" = "0" ] ; then + my_success "sshd startup" "sshd" + touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd + else + my_failure "sshd startup" "" + fi + fi + echo + ;; + stop) + echo -n "Shutting down sshd: " + if [ -f $PID_FILE ] ; then + killproc sshd + RETVAL=$? + [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd + fi + echo + ;; + restart) + do_restart_sanity_check + $0 stop + $0 start + RETVAL=$? + ;; + condrestart) + if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then + do_restart_sanity_check + $0 stop + $0 start + RETVAL=$? + fi + ;; + status) + status sshd + RETVAL=$? + ;; + *) + echo "Usage: sshd {start|stop|restart|status|condrestart}" + exit 1 + ;; +esac + +exit $RETVAL diff --git a/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam b/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ffa5adb --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth required pam_stack.so service=system-auth +account required pam_nologin.so +account required pam_stack.so service=system-auth +password required pam_stack.so service=system-auth +session required pam_stack.so service=system-auth diff --git a/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old b/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26dcb34 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nodelay +auth required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so +account required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so +password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so +password required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so shadow nullok use_authtok +session required /lib/security/pam_pwdb.so +session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so diff --git a/contrib/solaris/README b/contrib/solaris/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cabecaa --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/solaris/README @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +The following is a new package build script for Solaris. This is being +introduced into OpenSSH 3.0 and above in hopes of simplifying the build +process. As of 3.1p2 the script should work on all platforms that have +SVR4 style package tools. + +The build process is called a 'dummy install'.. Which means the software does +a "make install-nokeys DESTDIR=[fakeroot]". This way all manpages should +be handled correctly and key are deferred until the first time the sshd +is started. + +Directions: + +1. make -F Makefile.in distprep (Only if you are getting from the CVS tree) +2. ./configure --with-pam [..any other options you want..] +3. look at the top of buildpkg.sh for the configurable options and put + any changes you want in openssh-config.local. Additional customizations + can be done to the build process by creating one or more of the following + scripts that will be sourced by buildpkg.sh. + pkg_post_make_install_fixes.sh pkg-post-prototype-edit.sh + pkg-preinstall.local pkg-postinstall.local pkg-preremove.local + pkg-postremove.local pkg-request.local +4. Run "make package" + +If all goes well you should have a solaris package ready to be installed. + +If you have any problems with this script please post them to +openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org and I will try to assist you as best as I can. + +- Ben Lindstrom + diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b83b836 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id @@ -0,0 +1,324 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +# Copyright (c) 1999-2016 Philip Hands +# 2013 Martin Kletzander +# 2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= +# 2010 Eric Moret +# 2009 Xr +# 2007 Justin Pryzby +# 2004 Reini Urban +# 2003 Colin Watson +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +# are met: +# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + +# Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine +# See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details + +# check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better +if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0" +then + SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh} + if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH" + then + printf "'%s' seems viable.\n" "$SANE_SH" + exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@" + else + cat <<-EOF + oh dear. + + If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc. + please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that + shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report + a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work. + + EOF + printf "%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n" "$0" + exit 1 + fi +fi + +most_recent_id="$(cd "$HOME" ; ls -t .ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)" +DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE="${most_recent_id:+$HOME/}$most_recent_id" + +usage () { + printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [[-o ] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2 + printf '\t-f: force mode -- copy keys without trying to check if they are already installed\n' >&2 + printf '\t-n: dry run -- no keys are actually copied\n' >&2 + printf '\t-h|-?: print this help\n' >&2 + exit 1 +} + +# escape any single quotes in an argument +quote() { + printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g" +} + +use_id_file() { + local L_ID_FILE="$1" + + if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then + printf "%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n" "$0" + exit 1 + fi + + if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : ".*\.pub$" >/dev/null ; then + PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE" + else + PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub" + fi + + [ "$FORCED" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub) + + # check that the files are readable + for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do + ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || { + local L_PRIVMSG="" + [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG=" (to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)" + printf "\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf "%s\n%s\n" "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')" + exit 1 + } + done + printf '%s: INFO: Source of key(s) to be installed: "%s"\n' "$0" "$PUB_ID_FILE" >&2 + GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\"" +} + +if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + GET_ID="ssh-add -L" +fi + +while test "$#" -gt 0 +do + [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && { + printf "\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n" "$0" + usage + } + + OPT= OPTARG= + # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain + case "$1" in + -i?*|-o?*|-p?*) + OPT="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c1-2)" + OPTARG="$(printf -- "$1"|cut -c3-)" + shift + ;; + -o|-p) + OPT="$1" + OPTARG="$2" + shift 2 + ;; + -i) + OPT="$1" + test "$#" -le 2 || expr "$2" : "[-]" >/dev/null || { + OPTARG="$2" + shift + } + shift + ;; + -f|-n|-h|-\?) + OPT="$1" + OPTARG= + shift + ;; + --) + shift + while test "$#" -gt 0 + do + SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'" + shift + done + break + ;; + -*) + printf "\n%s: ERROR: invalid option (%s)\n\n" "$0" "$1" + usage + ;; + *) + SAVEARGS="${SAVEARGS:+$SAVEARGS }'$(quote "$1")'" + shift + continue + ;; + esac + + case "$OPT" in + -i) + SEEN_OPT_I="yes" + use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" + ;; + -o|-p) + SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }$OPT '$(quote "$OPTARG")'" + ;; + -f) + FORCED=1 + ;; + -n) + DRY_RUN=1 + ;; + -h|-\?) + usage + ;; + esac +done + +eval set -- "$SAVEARGS" + +if [ $# = 0 ] ; then + usage +fi +if [ $# != 1 ] ; then + printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments. Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2 + usage +fi + +# drop trailing colon +USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//') +# tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS +SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'" +# and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options) +eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS" + +if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then + use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE" +fi + +if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then + printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2 + exit 1 +fi + +# populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...) +# and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS +populate_new_ids() { + local L_SUCCESS="$1" + + if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then + NEW_IDS=$(eval $GET_ID) + return + fi + + # repopulate "$@" inside this function + eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS" + + umask 0177 + local L_TMP_ID_FILE=$(mktemp ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id_id.XXXXXXXXXX) + if test $? -ne 0 || test "x$L_TMP_ID_FILE" = "x" ; then + printf '%s: ERROR: mktemp failed\n' "$0" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + local L_CLEANUP="rm -f \"$L_TMP_ID_FILE\" \"${L_TMP_ID_FILE}.stderr\"" + trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT + printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2 + NEW_IDS=$( + eval $GET_ID | { + while read ID || [ "$ID" ] ; do + printf '%s\n' "$ID" > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE" + + # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this + # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options. + # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot + # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile + ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \ + -o ControlPath=none \ + -o LogLevel=INFO \ + -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \ + -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" "$L_TMP_ID_FILE" + else + grep 'Permission denied' "$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >/dev/null || { + sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <"$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr" >"$L_TMP_ID_FILE" + cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end + } + fi + + cat "$L_TMP_ID_FILE" + done + } + ) + eval "$L_CLEANUP" && trap - EXIT TERM INT QUIT + + if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then + printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then + printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2 + printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2 + exit 0 + fi + printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2 +} + +REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' -o ControlPath=none "$@" 2>&1 | + sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p') + +case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in + NetScreen*) + populate_new_ids 1 + for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do + KEY_NO=$(($KEY_NO + 1)) + printf "%s\n" "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || { + printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2 + continue + } + [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | ssh -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? = 255 ] ; then + printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2 + else + ADDED=$(($ADDED + 1)) + fi + done + if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then + exit 1 + fi + ;; + *) + # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect + populate_new_ids 0 + # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX; + # 'cd' to be at $HOME; add a newline if it's missing; and all on one line, because tcsh. + [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \ + ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys ; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \ + || exit 1 + ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l) + ;; +esac + +if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then + cat <<-EOF + =-=-=-=-=-=-=-= + Would have added the following key(s): + + $NEW_IDS + =-=-=-=-=-=-=-= + EOF +else + cat <<-EOF + + Number of key(s) added: $ADDED + + Now try logging into the machine, with: "ssh $SSH_OPTS" + and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added. + + EOF +fi + +# =-=-=-= diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8850cce --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +.ig \" -*- nroff -*- +Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: +1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.. +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $ +.Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-copy-id +.Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl f +.Op Fl n +.Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option +.Op Ar user Ns @ Ns +.Ar hostname +.Nm +.Fl h | Fl ? +.br +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a script that uses +.Xr ssh 1 +to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password, +so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some +clever use of multiple identities). It assembles a list of one or more +fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to +see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases). +It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh, +enables logins with those keys on the remote server. By default it adds +the keys by appending them to the remote user's +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +(creating the file, and directory, if necessary). It is also capable +of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its +.Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ... +command instead. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl i Ar identity_file +Use only the key(s) contained in +.Ar identity_file +(rather than looking for identities via +.Xr ssh-add 1 +or in the +.Ic default_ID_file ) . +If the filename does not end in +.Pa .pub +this is added. If the filename is omitted, the +.Ic default_ID_file +is used. +.Pp +Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the +comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the +key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted. +.It Fl f +Forced mode: doesn't check if the keys are present on the remote server. +This means that it does not need the private key. Of course, this can result +in more than one copy of the key being installed on the remote system. +.It Fl n +do a dry-run. Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply +prints the key(s) that would have been installed. +.It Fl h , Fl ? +Print Usage summary +.It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option +These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their +argument, to allow one to set the port or other +.Xr ssh 1 +options, respectively. +.Pp +Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in +.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's +configuration file: +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +.El +.Pp +Default behaviour without +.Fl i , +is to check if +.Ql ssh-add -L +provides any output, and if so those keys are used. Note that this results in +the comment on the key being the filename that was given to +.Xr ssh-add 1 +when the key was loaded into your +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame. +Otherwise, if +.Xr ssh-add 1 +provides no keys contents of the +.Ic default_ID_file +will be used. +.Pp +The +.Ic default_ID_file +is the most recent file that matches: +.Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub , +(excluding those that match +.Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub ) +so if you create a key that is not the one you want +.Nm +to use, just use +.Xr touch 1 +on your preferred key's +.Pa .pub +file to reinstate it as the most recent. +.Pp +.Sh EXAMPLES +If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote +hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say, +it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've +installed the new key. One way of dealing with this is to load both +the new key and old key(s) into your +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +Load the new key first, without the +.Fl c +option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by +ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the +.Fl A +option to allow agent forwarding: +.Pp +.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-add +.D1 user@newclient$ ssh -A old.client +.D1 user@oldl$ ssh-add -c +.D1 No ... prompt for pass-phrase ... +.D1 user@old$ logoff +.D1 user@newclient$ ssh someserver +.Pp +now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in +unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be +asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run +.Pp +.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver +.Pp +The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to +ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the +.Pa .pub +file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into you agent. +It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than +all the keys that you have in your +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +as you prefer. +.Pp +Having mentioned +.Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's +.Fl c +option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding +to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use +.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's +.Ar ProxyCommand +and +.Fl W +option, +to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end +authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +A web search for +.Ql ssh proxycommand nc +should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the +.Fl W +option, rather than +.Xr nc 1 ) . +.Sh "SEE ALSO" +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 diff --git a/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd b/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0bc364 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +sshd auth required pam_unix.so try_first_pass +sshd account required pam_unix.so +sshd password required pam_permit.so +sshd session required pam_permit.so + diff --git a/contrib/sshd.pam.generic b/contrib/sshd.pam.generic new file mode 100644 index 0000000..215f0fe --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/sshd.pam.generic @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#%PAM-1.0 +auth required /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nodelay +account required /lib/security/pam_nologin.so +account required /lib/security/pam_unix.so +password required /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so +password required /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nullok use_authtok +session required /lib/security/pam_unix.so +session required /lib/security/pam_limits.so diff --git a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b43d898 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +# Default values for additional components +%define build_x11_askpass 1 + +# Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation +%define sshd_gid 65 +%define sshd_uid 71 + +# The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use +%define xversion 1.2.4.1 + +# Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1 +%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0} + +Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation +Name: openssh +Version: 7.9p1 +URL: https://www.openssh.com/ +Release: 1 +Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz +Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz +License: BSD +Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH +BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot +PreReq: openssl +Obsoletes: ssh +Provides: ssh +# +# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.) +# building prerequisites -- stuff for +# OpenSSL (openssl-devel), +# and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd) +# +BuildPrereq: openssl +BuildPrereq: zlib-devel +#BuildPrereq: glibdev +#BuildPrereq: gtkdev +#BuildPrereq: gnlibsd + +%package askpass +Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System. +Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH +Requires: openssh = %{version} +Obsoletes: ssh-extras +Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass + +%if %{build_x11_askpass} +BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel +%endif + +%description +Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for +executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace +rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between +two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and +arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. + +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it +up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all +patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL). + +This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH +client and server. + +%description askpass +Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for +executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace +rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between +two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and +arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. + +OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it +up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all +patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL). + +This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. + +%changelog +* Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan +- Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check +* Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan +- Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH +* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller +- Glob manpages to catch compressed files +* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller +- Updated for new location +- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build +* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia +- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass +* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia +- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and + /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into + his released tarfile +- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600 + even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs +- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host + key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing + message if an SSH host key is already in place +- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation) +* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia +- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support +- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer) +* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia +- Made this package correct for SuSE. +- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly + with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default. +* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller +- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble +* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller +- Added 'Obsoletes' directives +* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller +- Use make install +- Subpackages +* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller +- Added links for slogin +- Fixed perms on manpages +* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller +- Renamed init script +* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller +- Back to old binary names +* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller +- Use autoconf +- New binary names +* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller +- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. + +%prep + +%if %{build_x11_askpass} +%setup -q -a 1 +%else +%setup -q +%endif + +%build +CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ +%configure --prefix=/usr \ + --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ + --mandir=%{_mandir} \ + --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \ + --with-pam \ + --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh +make + +%if %{build_x11_askpass} +cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} +%configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \ + --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh +xmkmf -a +make +cd .. +%endif + +%install +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT +make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/ +install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates +install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd +install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd +install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \ + $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates + +%if %{build_x11_askpass} +cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} +make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ +rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin +%endif + +%clean +rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT + +%pre +/usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || : +/usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : + +%post +/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A +%{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd} +%run_permissions + +%verifyscript +%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh + +%preun +%stop_on_removal sshd + +%postun +%restart_on_update sshd +%{insserv_cleanup} + +%files +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* +%doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config +%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli +%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd +%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server +%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh + +%if %{build_x11_askpass} +%files askpass +%defattr(-,root,root) +%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README +%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog +%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x* +%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x* +%attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass +%endif diff --git a/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd b/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..baaa7a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# +# Start the Secure Shell (SSH) Daemon? +# +START_SSHD="yes" + diff --git a/contrib/suse/rc.sshd b/contrib/suse/rc.sshd new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28f28e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/suse/rc.sshd @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# Copyright (c) 1995-2000 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany. +# +# Author: Jiri Smid +# +# /etc/init.d/sshd +# +# and symbolic its link +# +# /usr/sbin/rcsshd +# +### BEGIN INIT INFO +# Provides: sshd +# Required-Start: $network $remote_fs +# Required-Stop: $network $remote_fs +# Default-Start: 3 5 +# Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6 +# Description: Start the sshd daemon +### END INIT INFO + +SSHD_BIN=/usr/sbin/sshd +test -x $SSHD_BIN || exit 5 + +SSHD_SYSCONFIG=/etc/sysconfig/ssh +test -r $SSHD_SYSCONFIG || exit 6 +. $SSHD_SYSCONFIG + +SSHD_PIDFILE=/var/run/sshd.init.pid + +. /etc/rc.status + +# Shell functions sourced from /etc/rc.status: +# rc_check check and set local and overall rc status +# rc_status check and set local and overall rc status +# rc_status -v ditto but be verbose in local rc status +# rc_status -v -r ditto and clear the local rc status +# rc_failed set local and overall rc status to failed +# rc_reset clear local rc status (overall remains) +# rc_exit exit appropriate to overall rc status + +# First reset status of this service +rc_reset + +case "$1" in + start) + # Generate any missing host keys + ssh-keygen -A + echo -n "Starting SSH daemon" + ## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails + ## the echo return value is set appropriate. + + startproc -f -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN $SSHD_OPTS -o "PidFile=$SSHD_PIDFILE" + + # Remember status and be verbose + rc_status -v + ;; + stop) + echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon" + ## Stop daemon with killproc(8) and if this fails + ## set echo the echo return value. + + killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN + + # Remember status and be verbose + rc_status -v + ;; + try-restart) + ## Stop the service and if this succeeds (i.e. the + ## service was running before), start it again. + $0 status >/dev/null && $0 restart + + # Remember status and be quiet + rc_status + ;; + restart) + ## Stop the service and regardless of whether it was + ## running or not, start it again. + $0 stop + $0 start + + # Remember status and be quiet + rc_status + ;; + force-reload|reload) + ## Signal the daemon to reload its config. Most daemons + ## do this on signal 1 (SIGHUP). + + echo -n "Reload service sshd" + + killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -HUP $SSHD_BIN + + rc_status -v + + ;; + status) + echo -n "Checking for service sshd " + ## Check status with checkproc(8), if process is running + ## checkproc will return with exit status 0. + + # Status has a slightly different for the status command: + # 0 - service running + # 1 - service dead, but /var/run/ pid file exists + # 2 - service dead, but /var/lock/ lock file exists + # 3 - service not running + + checkproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN + + rc_status -v + ;; + probe) + ## Optional: Probe for the necessity of a reload, + ## give out the argument which is required for a reload. + + test /etc/ssh/sshd_config -nt $SSHD_PIDFILE && echo reload + ;; + *) + echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|status|try-restart|restart|force-reload|reload|probe}" + exit 1 + ;; +esac +rc_exit diff --git a/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh b/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6a37e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +## Path: Network/Remote access/SSH +## Description: SSH server settings +## Type: string +## Default: "" +## ServiceRestart: sshd +# +# Options for sshd +# +SSHD_OPTS="" diff --git a/crc32.c b/crc32.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c192eb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crc32.c @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: crc32.c,v 1.11 2006/04/22 18:29:33 stevesk Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#include "includes.h" +#include "crc32.h" + +static const u_int32_t crc32tab[] = { + 0x00000000L, 0x77073096L, 0xee0e612cL, 0x990951baL, + 0x076dc419L, 0x706af48fL, 0xe963a535L, 0x9e6495a3L, + 0x0edb8832L, 0x79dcb8a4L, 0xe0d5e91eL, 0x97d2d988L, + 0x09b64c2bL, 0x7eb17cbdL, 0xe7b82d07L, 0x90bf1d91L, + 0x1db71064L, 0x6ab020f2L, 0xf3b97148L, 0x84be41deL, + 0x1adad47dL, 0x6ddde4ebL, 0xf4d4b551L, 0x83d385c7L, + 0x136c9856L, 0x646ba8c0L, 0xfd62f97aL, 0x8a65c9ecL, + 0x14015c4fL, 0x63066cd9L, 0xfa0f3d63L, 0x8d080df5L, + 0x3b6e20c8L, 0x4c69105eL, 0xd56041e4L, 0xa2677172L, + 0x3c03e4d1L, 0x4b04d447L, 0xd20d85fdL, 0xa50ab56bL, + 0x35b5a8faL, 0x42b2986cL, 0xdbbbc9d6L, 0xacbcf940L, + 0x32d86ce3L, 0x45df5c75L, 0xdcd60dcfL, 0xabd13d59L, + 0x26d930acL, 0x51de003aL, 0xc8d75180L, 0xbfd06116L, + 0x21b4f4b5L, 0x56b3c423L, 0xcfba9599L, 0xb8bda50fL, + 0x2802b89eL, 0x5f058808L, 0xc60cd9b2L, 0xb10be924L, + 0x2f6f7c87L, 0x58684c11L, 0xc1611dabL, 0xb6662d3dL, + 0x76dc4190L, 0x01db7106L, 0x98d220bcL, 0xefd5102aL, + 0x71b18589L, 0x06b6b51fL, 0x9fbfe4a5L, 0xe8b8d433L, + 0x7807c9a2L, 0x0f00f934L, 0x9609a88eL, 0xe10e9818L, + 0x7f6a0dbbL, 0x086d3d2dL, 0x91646c97L, 0xe6635c01L, + 0x6b6b51f4L, 0x1c6c6162L, 0x856530d8L, 0xf262004eL, + 0x6c0695edL, 0x1b01a57bL, 0x8208f4c1L, 0xf50fc457L, + 0x65b0d9c6L, 0x12b7e950L, 0x8bbeb8eaL, 0xfcb9887cL, + 0x62dd1ddfL, 0x15da2d49L, 0x8cd37cf3L, 0xfbd44c65L, + 0x4db26158L, 0x3ab551ceL, 0xa3bc0074L, 0xd4bb30e2L, + 0x4adfa541L, 0x3dd895d7L, 0xa4d1c46dL, 0xd3d6f4fbL, + 0x4369e96aL, 0x346ed9fcL, 0xad678846L, 0xda60b8d0L, + 0x44042d73L, 0x33031de5L, 0xaa0a4c5fL, 0xdd0d7cc9L, + 0x5005713cL, 0x270241aaL, 0xbe0b1010L, 0xc90c2086L, + 0x5768b525L, 0x206f85b3L, 0xb966d409L, 0xce61e49fL, + 0x5edef90eL, 0x29d9c998L, 0xb0d09822L, 0xc7d7a8b4L, + 0x59b33d17L, 0x2eb40d81L, 0xb7bd5c3bL, 0xc0ba6cadL, + 0xedb88320L, 0x9abfb3b6L, 0x03b6e20cL, 0x74b1d29aL, + 0xead54739L, 0x9dd277afL, 0x04db2615L, 0x73dc1683L, + 0xe3630b12L, 0x94643b84L, 0x0d6d6a3eL, 0x7a6a5aa8L, + 0xe40ecf0bL, 0x9309ff9dL, 0x0a00ae27L, 0x7d079eb1L, + 0xf00f9344L, 0x8708a3d2L, 0x1e01f268L, 0x6906c2feL, + 0xf762575dL, 0x806567cbL, 0x196c3671L, 0x6e6b06e7L, + 0xfed41b76L, 0x89d32be0L, 0x10da7a5aL, 0x67dd4accL, + 0xf9b9df6fL, 0x8ebeeff9L, 0x17b7be43L, 0x60b08ed5L, + 0xd6d6a3e8L, 0xa1d1937eL, 0x38d8c2c4L, 0x4fdff252L, + 0xd1bb67f1L, 0xa6bc5767L, 0x3fb506ddL, 0x48b2364bL, + 0xd80d2bdaL, 0xaf0a1b4cL, 0x36034af6L, 0x41047a60L, + 0xdf60efc3L, 0xa867df55L, 0x316e8eefL, 0x4669be79L, + 0xcb61b38cL, 0xbc66831aL, 0x256fd2a0L, 0x5268e236L, + 0xcc0c7795L, 0xbb0b4703L, 0x220216b9L, 0x5505262fL, + 0xc5ba3bbeL, 0xb2bd0b28L, 0x2bb45a92L, 0x5cb36a04L, + 0xc2d7ffa7L, 0xb5d0cf31L, 0x2cd99e8bL, 0x5bdeae1dL, + 0x9b64c2b0L, 0xec63f226L, 0x756aa39cL, 0x026d930aL, + 0x9c0906a9L, 0xeb0e363fL, 0x72076785L, 0x05005713L, + 0x95bf4a82L, 0xe2b87a14L, 0x7bb12baeL, 0x0cb61b38L, + 0x92d28e9bL, 0xe5d5be0dL, 0x7cdcefb7L, 0x0bdbdf21L, + 0x86d3d2d4L, 0xf1d4e242L, 0x68ddb3f8L, 0x1fda836eL, + 0x81be16cdL, 0xf6b9265bL, 0x6fb077e1L, 0x18b74777L, + 0x88085ae6L, 0xff0f6a70L, 0x66063bcaL, 0x11010b5cL, + 0x8f659effL, 0xf862ae69L, 0x616bffd3L, 0x166ccf45L, + 0xa00ae278L, 0xd70dd2eeL, 0x4e048354L, 0x3903b3c2L, + 0xa7672661L, 0xd06016f7L, 0x4969474dL, 0x3e6e77dbL, + 0xaed16a4aL, 0xd9d65adcL, 0x40df0b66L, 0x37d83bf0L, + 0xa9bcae53L, 0xdebb9ec5L, 0x47b2cf7fL, 0x30b5ffe9L, + 0xbdbdf21cL, 0xcabac28aL, 0x53b39330L, 0x24b4a3a6L, + 0xbad03605L, 0xcdd70693L, 0x54de5729L, 0x23d967bfL, + 0xb3667a2eL, 0xc4614ab8L, 0x5d681b02L, 0x2a6f2b94L, + 0xb40bbe37L, 0xc30c8ea1L, 0x5a05df1bL, 0x2d02ef8dL +}; + +u_int32_t +ssh_crc32(const u_char *buf, u_int32_t size) +{ + u_int32_t i, crc; + + crc = 0; + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) + crc = crc32tab[(crc ^ buf[i]) & 0xff] ^ (crc >> 8); + return crc; +} diff --git a/crc32.h b/crc32.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d7131a --- /dev/null +++ b/crc32.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: crc32.h,v 1.15 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef SSH_CRC32_H +#define SSH_CRC32_H +u_int32_t ssh_crc32(const u_char *, u_int32_t); +#endif diff --git a/crypto_api.h b/crypto_api.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f45bbd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto_api.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: crypto_api.h,v 1.4 2017/12/14 21:07:39 naddy Exp $ */ + +/* + * Assembled from generated headers and source files by Markus Friedl. + * Placed in the public domain. + */ + +#ifndef crypto_api_h +#define crypto_api_h + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include + +typedef int32_t crypto_int32; +typedef uint32_t crypto_uint32; + +#define randombytes(buf, buf_len) arc4random_buf((buf), (buf_len)) + +#define crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES 64U + +int crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, + unsigned long long); + +int crypto_verify_32(const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *); + +#define crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES 64U +#define crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32U +#define crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES 64U + +int crypto_sign_ed25519(unsigned char *, unsigned long long *, + const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, const unsigned char *); +int crypto_sign_ed25519_open(unsigned char *, unsigned long long *, + const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, const unsigned char *); +int crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(unsigned char *, unsigned char *); + +#endif /* crypto_api_h */ diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f42130 --- /dev/null +++ b/defines.h @@ -0,0 +1,876 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _DEFINES_H +#define _DEFINES_H + +/* Constants */ + +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0 +enum +{ + SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */ + SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */ + SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */ +}; +# define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD +# define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR +# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR +#endif + +/* + * Cygwin doesn't really have a notion of reserved ports. It is still + * is useful on the client side so for compatibility it defines as 1024 via + * netinet/in.h inside an enum. We * don't actually want that restriction + * so we want to set that to zero, but we can't do it direct in config.h + * because it'll cause a conflicting definition the first time we include + * netinet/in.h. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN +#define IPPORT_RESERVED 0 +#endif + +/* + * Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos) + */ +#include +#include +#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY +# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10 +# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08 +# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04 +# define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02 +# define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST +#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */ + +/* + * Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474 + */ +#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 0x28 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 0x30 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 0x38 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 0x48 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 0x50 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 0x58 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 0x68 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 0x70 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 0x78 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 0x88 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 0x90 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 0x98 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8 +#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */ +#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 0x00 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 0x20 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 0x40 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 0x60 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 0x80 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 0xa0 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 0xc0 +# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 0xe0 +#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */ +#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF +# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8 +#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */ + +#ifndef PATH_MAX +# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX +# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef MAXPATHLEN +# ifdef PATH_MAX +# define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX +# else /* PATH_MAX */ +# define MAXPATHLEN 64 +/* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */ +# ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH +# define BROKEN_REALPATH 1 +# endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */ +# endif /* PATH_MAX */ +#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */ + +#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX +# include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */ +# if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX) +# define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX +# elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN) +# define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN +# else +# define HOST_NAME_MAX 255 +# endif +#endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */ + +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0 +# define MAXSYMLINKS 5 +#endif + +#ifndef STDIN_FILENO +# define STDIN_FILENO 0 +#endif +#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO +# define STDOUT_FILENO 1 +#endif +#ifndef STDERR_FILENO +# define STDERR_FILENO 2 +#endif + +#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */ +#ifdef NGROUPS +#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS +#else +#define NGROUPS_MAX 0 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0 +# define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */ +#endif + +#ifndef S_IFSOCK +# define S_IFSOCK 0 +#endif /* S_IFSOCK */ + +#ifndef S_ISDIR +# define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR)) +#endif /* S_ISDIR */ + +#ifndef S_ISREG +# define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG)) +#endif /* S_ISREG */ + +#ifndef S_ISLNK +# define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) +#endif /* S_ISLNK */ + +#ifndef S_IXUSR +# define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */ +# define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */ +# define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */ +# define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */ +# define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */ +# define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */ +# define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */ +# define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */ +# define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */ +# define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */ +# define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */ +# define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */ +# define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */ +#endif /* S_IXUSR */ + +#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS) +#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS +#endif + +#ifndef MAP_FAILED +# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1) +#endif + +/* +SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but +including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6 +*/ +#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK +#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001) +#endif + +/* Types */ + +/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ +/* (or die trying) */ + +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT +typedef unsigned int u_int; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T +typedef signed char int8_t; +# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) +typedef short int int16_t; +# else +# error "16 bit int type not found." +# endif +# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) +typedef int int32_t; +# else +# error "32 bit int type not found." +# endif +#endif + +/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ +#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T +# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T +typedef uint8_t u_int8_t; +typedef uint16_t u_int16_t; +typedef uint32_t u_int32_t; +# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1 +# else +typedef unsigned char u_int8_t; +# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) +typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t; +# else +# error "16 bit int type not found." +# endif +# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) +typedef unsigned int u_int32_t; +# else +# error "32 bit int type not found." +# endif +# endif +#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__ +#endif + +/* 64-bit types */ +#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T +# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) +typedef long int int64_t; +# else +# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) +typedef long long int int64_t; +# endif +# endif +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T +# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) +typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t; +# else +# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) +typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t; +# endif +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T +typedef u_int8_t uint8_t; +typedef u_int16_t uint16_t; +typedef u_int32_t uint32_t; +typedef u_int64_t uint64_t; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T +typedef long long intmax_t; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T +typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR +typedef unsigned char u_char; +# define HAVE_U_CHAR +#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */ + +#ifndef ULLONG_MAX +# define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1) +#endif + +#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX +#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX +#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T +typedef unsigned int size_t; +# define HAVE_SIZE_T +# define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX +#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */ + +#ifndef SIZE_MAX +#define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX +#endif + +#ifndef INT32_MAX +# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) +# define INT32_MAX INT_MAX +# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 4) +# define INT32_MAX LONG_MAX +# else +# error "need INT32_MAX" +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef INT64_MAX +# if (SIZEOF_INT == 8) +# define INT64_MAX INT_MAX +# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 8) +# define INT64_MAX LONG_MAX +# elif (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) +# define INT64_MAX LLONG_MAX +# else +# error "need INT64_MAX" +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T +typedef int ssize_t; +# define HAVE_SSIZE_T +#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T +typedef long clock_t; +# define HAVE_CLOCK_T +#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T +typedef int sa_family_t; +# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T +#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_PID_T +typedef int pid_t; +# define HAVE_PID_T +#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T +typedef int sig_atomic_t; +# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T +#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */ + +#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T +typedef int mode_t; +# define HAVE_MODE_T +#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) +# define ss_family __ss_family +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +struct sockaddr_un { + short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */ + char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */ +}; +#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ + +#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T +typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t; +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T +typedef u_int16_t in_port_t; +#endif + +#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE) +#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE +struct winsize { + unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */ + unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */ + unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */ + unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */ +}; +#endif + +/* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */ +#ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK + typedef unsigned long int fd_mask; +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0 +# define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long)) +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0 +# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y)) +#endif + +/* Paths */ + +#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL +# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" +#endif + +#ifdef USER_PATH +# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH +# undef _PATH_STDPATH +# endif +# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH +# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" +#endif + +#ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH +# define SUPERUSER_PATH _PATH_STDPATH +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL +# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" +#endif + +/* user may have set a different path */ +#if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) +# undef _PATH_MAILDIR +#endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */ + +#ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY +# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN +# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" +#endif + +/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */ +#ifdef XAUTH_PATH +#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH +#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */ + +/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */ +#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH +# ifdef __hpux +# define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u" +# else +# define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u" +# endif +#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */ +#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH + +#ifndef _PATH_TTY +# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty" +#endif + +/* Macros */ + +#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H) +# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +#endif + +#ifndef MAX +# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) +# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) +#endif + +#ifndef roundup +# define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) +#endif + +#ifndef timersub +#define timersub(a, b, result) \ + do { \ + (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \ + (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \ + if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \ + --(result)->tv_sec; \ + (result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#endif + +#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC +#define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \ + (ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \ + (ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \ +} +#endif + +#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL +#define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \ + (tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \ + (tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \ +} +#endif + +#ifndef timespeccmp +#define timespeccmp(tsp, usp, cmp) \ + (((tsp)->tv_sec == (usp)->tv_sec) ? \ + ((tsp)->tv_nsec cmp (usp)->tv_nsec) : \ + ((tsp)->tv_sec cmp (usp)->tv_sec)) +#endif + +#ifndef __P +# define __P(x) x +#endif + +#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) +# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \ + ((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \ + (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff))) +#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */ + +#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) +# define __attribute__(x) +#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__) +# define __sentinel__ +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__) +# define __bounded__(x, y, z) +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__) +# define __nonnull__(x) +#endif + +#ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES +#define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1) +#endif +#ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN +#define __CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) +#endif + +/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */ +#ifndef CMSG_LEN +#define CMSG_LEN(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len)) +#endif + +/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */ +#ifndef CMSG_SPACE +#define CMSG_SPACE(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len)) +#endif + +/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */ +#ifndef CMSG_DATA +#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr))) +#endif /* CMSG_DATA */ + +/* + * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns + * an empty list for some reasons. + */ +#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR +#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \ + ((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \ + (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \ + (struct cmsghdr *)NULL) +#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */ + +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0 +# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member) +#endif + +/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */ +/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */ +#ifndef BYTE_ORDER +# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN +# define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234 +# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */ +# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN +# define BIG_ENDIAN 4321 +# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */ +# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN +# define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN +# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ +# define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN +# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ +#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */ + +/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO)) +# define HAVE_GETADDRINFO +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET +# undef getopt +# undef opterr +# undef optind +# undef optopt +# undef optreset +# undef optarg +# define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o) +# define opterr BSDopterr +# define optind BSDoptind +# define optopt BSDoptopt +# define optreset BSDoptreset +# define optarg BSDoptarg +#endif + +#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) +# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO +#endif +#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO) +# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO +#endif +#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) +# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) +# if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0 +# define AI_NUMERICSERV 0 +# endif +#endif + +#if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX) +# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX +#endif + +#if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) +# undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \ + defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND) +# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) +# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n)) +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */ + +#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID +# include +# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0) +#endif + +#ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT +# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +#endif + +#ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT +# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__) +# define __func__ __FUNCTION__ +#elif !defined(HAVE___func__) +# define __func__ "" +#endif + +#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) +# define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code) +#endif + +/* Maximum number of file descriptors available */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF +# define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) +#else +# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000 +#endif + +#ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL +/* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value */ +#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \ + ((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \ + ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL)) +#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL) +#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \ + ((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \ + ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL)) +#else +# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f)) +#endif + +#if defined(__Lynx__) + /* + * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since + * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions. + */ +# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1) +# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES) + /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */ + int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...); + int mkstemp (char *); + char *crypt (const char *, const char *); + int seteuid (uid_t); + int setegid (gid_t); + char *mkdtemp (char *); + int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t); + int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +#endif + +/* + * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the + * client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems. + * + * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems + * but you may need to set it yourself + */ +/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */ + +/** + ** login recorder definitions + **/ + +/* FIXME: put default paths back in */ +#ifndef UTMP_FILE +# ifdef _PATH_UTMP +# define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP +# else +# ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE +# define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE +# endif +# endif +#endif +#ifndef WTMP_FILE +# ifdef _PATH_WTMP +# define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP +# else +# ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE +# define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE +# endif +# endif +#endif +/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */ +#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE +# ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG +# define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG +# else +# ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE +# define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE +# endif +# endif +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) +# define USE_SHADOW +#endif + +/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */ +#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN) +# define USE_LOGIN + +#else +/* Simply select your favourite login types. */ +/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... */ +# if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX) +# define USE_UTMPX +# endif +# if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP) +# define USE_UTMP +# endif +# if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX) +# define USE_WTMPX +# endif +# if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP) +# define USE_WTMP +# endif + +#endif + +#ifndef UT_LINESIZE +# define UT_LINESIZE 8 +#endif + +/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */ +#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG) +# define USE_LASTLOG +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA +# ifdef USE_SHADOW +# undef USE_SHADOW +# endif +# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) +# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF) +# define USE_LIBIAF +#endif + +/* HP-UX 11.11 */ +#ifdef BTMP_FILE +# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP) +# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN +#endif + +/** end of login recorder definitions */ + +#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS +# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b))) +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP) +# undef HAVE_MMAP +#endif + +#ifndef IOV_MAX +# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX) +# define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX +# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX) +# define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX +# else +# define IOV_MAX 16 +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef EWOULDBLOCK +# define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN +#endif + +#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */ +#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46 +#endif + +#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ +# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192 +#endif + +/* + * We want functions in openbsd-compat, if enabled, to override system ones. + * We no-op out the weak symbol definition rather than remove it to reduce + * future sync problems. + */ +#define DEF_WEAK(x) + +/* + * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir() + * shouldn't need the latter. + */ +#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \ + !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR) +# define arc4random_stir() +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY +# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY +# define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src) +# else +# define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src) +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef __predict_true +# if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96))) +# define __predict_true(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1) +# define __predict_false(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0) +# else +# define __predict_true(exp) ((exp) != 0) +# define __predict_false(exp) ((exp) != 0) +# endif /* gcc version */ +#endif /* __predict_true */ + +#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \ + defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \ + defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \ + !defined(BROKEN_GLOB) +# define USE_SYSTEM_GLOB +#endif + +#endif /* _DEFINES_H */ diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..657b32d --- /dev/null +++ b/dh.c @@ -0,0 +1,492 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.68 2018/09/17 15:40:14 millert Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "dh.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +static int +parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg) +{ + char *cp, *arg; + char *strsize, *gen, *prime; + const char *errstr = NULL; + long long n; + + dhg->p = dhg->g = NULL; + cp = line; + if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) + return 0; + /* Ignore leading whitespace */ + if (*arg == '\0') + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') + return 0; + + /* time */ + if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') + goto truncated; + arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */ + if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') + goto truncated; + /* Ensure this is a safe prime */ + n = strtonum(arg, 0, 5, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL || n != MODULI_TYPE_SAFE) { + error("moduli:%d: type is not %d", linenum, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE); + goto fail; + } + arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */ + if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') + goto truncated; + /* Ensure prime has been tested and is not composite */ + n = strtonum(arg, 0, 0x1f, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL || + (n & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) || !(n & ~MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE)) { + error("moduli:%d: invalid moduli tests flag", linenum); + goto fail; + } + arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */ + if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') + goto truncated; + n = strtonum(arg, 0, 1<<30, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL || n == 0) { + error("moduli:%d: invalid primality trial count", linenum); + goto fail; + } + strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */ + if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' || + (dhg->size = (int)strtonum(strsize, 0, 64*1024, &errstr)) == 0 || + errstr) { + error("moduli:%d: invalid prime length", linenum); + goto fail; + } + /* The whole group is one bit larger */ + dhg->size++; + gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */ + if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0') + goto truncated; + prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */ + if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0') { + truncated: + error("moduli:%d: truncated", linenum); + goto fail; + } + + if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL) { + error("parse_prime: BN_new failed"); + goto fail; + } + if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0) { + error("moduli:%d: could not parse generator value", linenum); + goto fail; + } + if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0) { + error("moduli:%d: could not parse prime value", linenum); + goto fail; + } + if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size) { + error("moduli:%d: prime has wrong size: actual %d listed %d", + linenum, BN_num_bits(dhg->p), dhg->size - 1); + goto fail; + } + if (BN_cmp(dhg->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) { + error("moduli:%d: generator is invalid", linenum); + goto fail; + } + return 1; + + fail: + BN_clear_free(dhg->g); + BN_clear_free(dhg->p); + dhg->g = dhg->p = NULL; + return 0; +} + +DH * +choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) +{ + FILE *f; + char *line = NULL; + size_t linesize = 0; + int best, bestcount, which, linenum; + struct dhgroup dhg; + + if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) { + logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus", + _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno)); + return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); + } + + linenum = 0; + best = bestcount = 0; + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + linenum++; + if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg)) + continue; + BN_clear_free(dhg.g); + BN_clear_free(dhg.p); + + if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) + continue; + + if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) || + (dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) { + best = dhg.size; + bestcount = 0; + } + if (dhg.size == best) + bestcount++; + } + free(line); + line = NULL; + linesize = 0; + rewind(f); + + if (bestcount == 0) { + fclose(f); + logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_MODULI); + return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); + } + which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount); + + linenum = 0; + bestcount = 0; + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + linenum++; + if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg)) + continue; + if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) || + dhg.size != best || + bestcount++ != which) { + BN_clear_free(dhg.g); + BN_clear_free(dhg.p); + continue; + } + break; + } + free(line); + line = NULL; + fclose(f); + if (bestcount != which + 1) { + logit("WARNING: selected prime disappeared in %s, giving up", + _PATH_DH_MODULI); + return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); + } + + return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p)); +} + +/* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */ + +int +dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub) +{ + int i; + int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub); + int bits_set = 0; + BIGNUM *tmp; + const BIGNUM *dh_p; + + DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL); + + if (BN_is_negative(dh_pub)) { + logit("invalid public DH value: negative"); + return 0; + } + if (BN_cmp(dh_pub, BN_value_one()) != 1) { /* pub_exp <= 1 */ + logit("invalid public DH value: <= 1"); + return 0; + } + + if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) { + error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); + return 0; + } + if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh_p, BN_value_one()) || + BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) { /* pub_exp > p-2 */ + BN_clear_free(tmp); + logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1"); + return 0; + } + BN_clear_free(tmp); + + for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) + if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i)) + bits_set++; + debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p)); + + /* + * if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial + */ + if (bits_set < 4) { + logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", + bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p)); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +int +dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) +{ + int pbits; + const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key; + + DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL); + + if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL || + (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 || + need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (need < 256) + need = 256; + /* + * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)), + * so double requested need here. + */ + if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1))) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + + if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL); + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + return 0; +} + +DH * +dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus) +{ + DH *dh; + BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL; + + if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (BN_hex2bn(&dh_p, modulus) == 0 || + BN_hex2bn(&dh_g, gen) == 0) + goto fail; + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) + goto fail; + return dh; + fail: + DH_free(dh); + BN_clear_free(dh_p); + BN_clear_free(dh_g); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange + * value. + */ +DH * +dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus) +{ + DH *dh; + + if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, modulus, NULL, gen)) { + DH_free(dh); + return NULL; + } + + return dh; +} + +/* rfc2409 "Second Oakley Group" (1024 bits) */ +DH * +dh_new_group1(void) +{ + static char *gen = "2", *group1 = + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" + "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" + "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" + "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381" + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; + + return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1)); +} + +/* rfc3526 group 14 "2048-bit MODP Group" */ +DH * +dh_new_group14(void) +{ + static char *gen = "2", *group14 = + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" + "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" + "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" + "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" + "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" + "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" + "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" + "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" + "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" + "15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; + + return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group14)); +} + +/* rfc3526 group 16 "4096-bit MODP Group" */ +DH * +dh_new_group16(void) +{ + static char *gen = "2", *group16 = + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" + "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" + "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" + "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" + "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" + "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" + "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" + "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" + "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" + "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64" + "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7" + "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B" + "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C" + "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31" + "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7" + "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA" + "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6" + "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED" + "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9" + "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34063199" + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; + + return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16)); +} + +/* rfc3526 group 18 "8192-bit MODP Group" */ +DH * +dh_new_group18(void) +{ + static char *gen = "2", *group16 = + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" + "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" + "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" + "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" + "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" + "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" + "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" + "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" + "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" + "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64" + "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7" + "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B" + "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C" + "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31" + "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7" + "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA" + "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6" + "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED" + "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9" + "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34028492" + "36C3FAB4" "D27C7026" "C1D4DCB2" "602646DE" "C9751E76" "3DBA37BD" + "F8FF9406" "AD9E530E" "E5DB382F" "413001AE" "B06A53ED" "9027D831" + "179727B0" "865A8918" "DA3EDBEB" "CF9B14ED" "44CE6CBA" "CED4BB1B" + "DB7F1447" "E6CC254B" "33205151" "2BD7AF42" "6FB8F401" "378CD2BF" + "5983CA01" "C64B92EC" "F032EA15" "D1721D03" "F482D7CE" "6E74FEF6" + "D55E702F" "46980C82" "B5A84031" "900B1C9E" "59E7C97F" "BEC7E8F3" + "23A97A7E" "36CC88BE" "0F1D45B7" "FF585AC5" "4BD407B2" "2B4154AA" + "CC8F6D7E" "BF48E1D8" "14CC5ED2" "0F8037E0" "A79715EE" "F29BE328" + "06A1D58B" "B7C5DA76" "F550AA3D" "8A1FBFF0" "EB19CCB1" "A313D55C" + "DA56C9EC" "2EF29632" "387FE8D7" "6E3C0468" "043E8F66" "3F4860EE" + "12BF2D5B" "0B7474D6" "E694F91E" "6DBE1159" "74A3926F" "12FEE5E4" + "38777CB6" "A932DF8C" "D8BEC4D0" "73B931BA" "3BC832B6" "8D9DD300" + "741FA7BF" "8AFC47ED" "2576F693" "6BA42466" "3AAB639C" "5AE4F568" + "3423B474" "2BF1C978" "238F16CB" "E39D652D" "E3FDB8BE" "FC848AD9" + "22222E04" "A4037C07" "13EB57A8" "1A23F0C7" "3473FC64" "6CEA306B" + "4BCBC886" "2F8385DD" "FA9D4B7F" "A2C087E8" "79683303" "ED5BDD3A" + "062B3CF5" "B3A278A6" "6D2A13F8" "3F44F82D" "DF310EE0" "74AB6A36" + "4597E899" "A0255DC1" "64F31CC5" "0846851D" "F9AB4819" "5DED7EA1" + "B1D510BD" "7EE74D73" "FAF36BC3" "1ECFA268" "359046F4" "EB879F92" + "4009438B" "481C6CD7" "889A002E" "D5EE382B" "C9190DA6" "FC026E47" + "9558E447" "5677E9AA" "9E3050E2" "765694DF" "C81F56E8" "80B96E71" + "60C980DD" "98EDD3DF" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; + + return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16)); +} + +/* Select fallback group used by DH-GEX if moduli file cannot be read. */ +DH * +dh_new_group_fallback(int max) +{ + debug3("%s: requested max size %d", __func__, max); + if (max < 3072) { + debug3("using 2k bit group 14"); + return dh_new_group14(); + } else if (max < 6144) { + debug3("using 4k bit group 16"); + return dh_new_group16(); + } + debug3("using 8k bit group 18"); + return dh_new_group18(); +} + +/* + * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an + * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). + * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key + * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value + * from RFC4419 section 3. + */ +u_int +dh_estimate(int bits) +{ + if (bits <= 112) + return 2048; + if (bits <= 128) + return 3072; + if (bits <= 192) + return 7680; + return 8192; +} + +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..344b29e --- /dev/null +++ b/dh.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.15 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef DH_H +#define DH_H + +struct dhgroup { + int size; + BIGNUM *g; + BIGNUM *p; +}; + +DH *choose_dh(int, int, int); +DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *); +DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *); +DH *dh_new_group1(void); +DH *dh_new_group14(void); +DH *dh_new_group16(void); +DH *dh_new_group18(void); +DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int); + +int dh_gen_key(DH *, int); +int dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *); + +u_int dh_estimate(int); + +/* + * Max value from RFC4419. + * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks. + */ +#define DH_GRP_MIN 2048 +#define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 + +/* + * Values for "type" field of moduli(5) + * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus. + */ +#define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0) +#define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED (1) +#define MODULI_TYPE_SAFE (2) +#define MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR (3) +#define MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN (4) +#define MODULI_TYPE_STRONG (5) + +/* + * Values for "tests" field of moduli(5) + * Specifies the methods used in checking for primality. + * Usually, more than one test is used. + */ +#define MODULI_TESTS_UNTESTED (0x00) +#define MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE (0x01) +#define MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE (0x02) +#define MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN (0x04) +#define MODULI_TESTS_JACOBI (0x08) +#define MODULI_TESTS_ELLIPTIC (0x10) + + +#endif diff --git a/digest-libc.c b/digest-libc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2b0b24 --- /dev/null +++ b/digest-libc.c @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.6 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller + * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if 0 +#include +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "digest.h" + +typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx); +typedef void md_update_fn(void *mdctx, const u_int8_t *m, size_t mlen); +typedef void md_final_fn(u_int8_t[], void *mdctx); + +struct ssh_digest_ctx { + int alg; + void *mdctx; +}; + +struct ssh_digest { + int id; + const char *name; + size_t block_len; + size_t digest_len; + size_t ctx_len; + md_init_fn *md_init; + md_update_fn *md_update; + md_final_fn *md_final; +}; + +/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */ +const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = { + { + SSH_DIGEST_MD5, + "MD5", + MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, + sizeof(MD5_CTX), + (md_init_fn *) MD5Init, + (md_update_fn *) MD5Update, + (md_final_fn *) MD5Final + }, + { + SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, + "SHA1", + SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH, + SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, + sizeof(SHA1_CTX), + (md_init_fn *) SHA1Init, + (md_update_fn *) SHA1Update, + (md_final_fn *) SHA1Final + }, + { + SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, + "SHA256", + SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH, + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, + sizeof(SHA256_CTX), + (md_init_fn *) SHA256_Init, + (md_update_fn *) SHA256_Update, + (md_final_fn *) SHA256_Final + }, + { + SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, + "SHA384", + SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH, + SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, + sizeof(SHA384_CTX), + (md_init_fn *) SHA384_Init, + (md_update_fn *) SHA384_Update, + (md_final_fn *) SHA384_Final + }, + { + SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, + "SHA512", + SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH, + SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, + sizeof(SHA512_CTX), + (md_init_fn *) SHA512_Init, + (md_update_fn *) SHA512_Update, + (md_final_fn *) SHA512_Final + } +}; + +static const struct ssh_digest * +ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg) +{ + if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX) + return NULL; + if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */ + return NULL; + return &(digests[alg]); +} + +int +ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name) +{ + int alg; + + for (alg = 0; alg < SSH_DIGEST_MAX; alg++) { + if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0) + return digests[alg].id; + } + return -1; +} + +const char * +ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); + + return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name; +} + +size_t +ssh_digest_bytes(int alg) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); + + return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len; +} + +size_t +ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); + + return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->block_len; +} + +struct ssh_digest_ctx * +ssh_digest_start(int alg) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); + struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret; + + if (digest == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((ret->mdctx = calloc(1, digest->ctx_len)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret->alg = alg; + digest->md_init(ret->mdctx); + return ret; +} + +int +ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg); + + if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len); + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); + + if (digest == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen); + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); +} + +int +ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); + + if (digest == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen > UINT_MAX) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */ + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx); + return 0; +} + +void +ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest; + + if (ctx != NULL) { + digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); + if (digest) { + explicit_bzero(ctx->mdctx, digest->ctx_len); + free(ctx->mdctx); + explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); + free(ctx); + } + } +} + +int +ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +{ + struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg); + + if (ctx == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 || + ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + ssh_digest_free(ctx); + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +{ + return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen); +} +#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da7ed72 --- /dev/null +++ b/digest-openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.7 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 +# define EVP_ripemd160 NULL +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 */ +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 +# define EVP_sha256 NULL +# define EVP_sha384 NULL +# define EVP_sha512 NULL +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ + +struct ssh_digest_ctx { + int alg; + EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; +}; + +struct ssh_digest { + int id; + const char *name; + size_t digest_len; + const EVP_MD *(*mdfunc)(void); +}; + +/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */ +const struct ssh_digest digests[] = { + { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 }, + { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 }, + { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 }, + { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 }, + { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 }, + { -1, NULL, 0, NULL }, +}; + +static const struct ssh_digest * +ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg) +{ + if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX) + return NULL; + if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */ + return NULL; + if (digests[alg].mdfunc == NULL) + return NULL; + return &(digests[alg]); +} + +int +ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name) +{ + int alg; + + for (alg = 0; digests[alg].id != -1; alg++) { + if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0) + return digests[alg].id; + } + return -1; +} + +const char * +ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); + + return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name; +} + +size_t +ssh_digest_bytes(int alg) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); + + return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len; +} + +size_t +ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) +{ + return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(ctx->mdctx); +} + +struct ssh_digest_ctx * +ssh_digest_start(int alg) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); + struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret; + + if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)) + return NULL; + ret->alg = alg; + if ((ret->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) { + ssh_digest_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +int +ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to) +{ + if (from->alg != to->alg) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + /* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */ + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(to->mdctx, from->mdctx)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) +{ + if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); +} + +int +ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); + u_int l = dlen; + + if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */ + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */ + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; +} + +void +ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) + return; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); + freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int +ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +{ + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); + u_int mdlen; + + if (digest == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen > UINT_MAX) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen < digest->digest_len) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + mdlen = dlen; + if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, digest->mdfunc(), NULL)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +{ + return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen); +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..274574d --- /dev/null +++ b/digest.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.8 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _DIGEST_H +#define _DIGEST_H + +/* Maximum digest output length */ +#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH 64 + +/* Digest algorithms */ +#define SSH_DIGEST_MD5 0 +#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 1 +#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 2 +#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 3 +#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 4 +#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 5 + +struct sshbuf; +struct ssh_digest_ctx; + +/* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */ +int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name); + +/* Returns the algorithm name for a digest identifier */ +const char *ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg); + +/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */ +size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg); + +/* Returns the block size of the digest, e.g. for implementing HMAC */ +size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx); + +/* Copies internal state of digest of 'from' to 'to' */ +int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, + struct ssh_digest_ctx *to); + +/* One-shot API */ +int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, + u_char *d, size_t dlen) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5))); +int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4))); + +/* Update API */ +struct ssh_digest_ctx *ssh_digest_start(int alg); +int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); +int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, + const struct sshbuf *b); +int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); +void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx); + +#endif /* _DIGEST_H */ + diff --git a/dispatch.c b/dispatch.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b3ea61 --- /dev/null +++ b/dispatch.c @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.31 2017/05/31 07:00:13 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +int +dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r; + + logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); + return 0; +} + +int +dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq); + return 0; +} + +void +ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *ssh, dispatch_fn *dflt) +{ + u_int i; + for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++) + ssh->dispatch[i] = dflt; +} + +void +ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *ssh, u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = from; i <= to; i++) { + if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX) + break; + ssh->dispatch[i] = fn; + } +} + +void +ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *ssh, int type, dispatch_fn *fn) +{ + ssh->dispatch[type] = fn; +} + +int +ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done) +{ + int r; + u_char type; + u_int32_t seqnr; + + for (;;) { + if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) { + r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr); + if (r != 0) + return r; + } else { + r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr); + if (r != 0) + return r; + if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE) + return 0; + } + if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && + ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) { + if (ssh->dispatch_skip_packets) { + debug2("skipped packet (type %u)", type); + ssh->dispatch_skip_packets--; + continue; + } + r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh); + if (r != 0) + return r; + } else { + r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, + "protocol error: rcvd type %d", type); + if (r != 0) + return r; + return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; + } + if (done != NULL && *done) + return 0; + } +} + +void +ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); +} diff --git a/dispatch.h b/dispatch.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17a6f3d --- /dev/null +++ b/dispatch.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.14 2017/05/31 07:00:13 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef DISPATCH_H +#define DISPATCH_H + +#define DISPATCH_MAX 255 + +enum { + DISPATCH_BLOCK, + DISPATCH_NONBLOCK +}; + +struct ssh; + +typedef int dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +int dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +void ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *, dispatch_fn *); +void ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *, int, dispatch_fn *); +void ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *, u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *); +int ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *); +void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *); + +#define dispatch_init(dflt) \ + ssh_dispatch_init(active_state, (dflt)) +#define dispatch_range(from, to, fn) \ + ssh_dispatch_range(active_state, (from), (to), (fn)) +#define dispatch_set(type, fn) \ + ssh_dispatch_set(active_state, (type), (fn)) + +#endif diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff1a2c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/dns.c @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.38 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "dns.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "digest.h" + +static const char *errset_text[] = { + "success", /* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */ + "out of memory", /* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */ + "general failure", /* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */ + "invalid parameter", /* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */ + "name does not exist", /* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */ + "data does not exist", /* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */ +}; + +static const char * +dns_result_totext(unsigned int res) +{ + switch (res) { + case ERRSET_SUCCESS: + return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS]; + case ERRSET_NOMEMORY: + return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY]; + case ERRSET_FAIL: + return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL]; + case ERRSET_INVAL: + return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL]; + case ERRSET_NONAME: + return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME]; + case ERRSET_NODATA: + return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA]; + default: + return "unknown error"; + } +} + +/* + * Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer. + */ +static int +dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, + u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, struct sshkey *key) +{ + int r, success = 0; + int fp_alg = -1; + + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; + break; + case KEY_ED25519: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ED25519; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; + break; + case KEY_XMSS: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_XMSS; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; + break; + default: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */ + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */ + } + + switch (*digest_type) { + case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1: + fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + break; + case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256: + fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + break; + default: + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */ + } + + if (*algorithm && *digest_type) { + if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_alg, digest, + digest_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint_raw: %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + success = 1; + } else { + *digest = NULL; + *digest_len = 0; + success = 0; + } + + return success; +} + +/* + * Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer. + */ +static int +dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, + u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len) +{ + int success = 0; + + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; + + if (rdata_len >= 2) { + *algorithm = rdata[0]; + *digest_type = rdata[1]; + *digest_len = rdata_len - 2; + + if (*digest_len > 0) { + *digest = xmalloc(*digest_len); + memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len); + } else { + *digest = (u_char *)xstrdup(""); + } + + success = 1; + } + + return success; +} + +/* + * Check if hostname is numerical. + * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise + */ +static int +is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname) +{ + struct addrinfo hints, *ai; + + /* + * We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error + * and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing. + */ + if (hostname == NULL) { + error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname"); + return -1; + } + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; + + if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { + freeaddrinfo(ai); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS. + * Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise + */ +int +verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address, + struct sshkey *hostkey, int *flags) +{ + u_int counter; + int result; + struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL; + + u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm; + u_int8_t hostkey_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; + u_char *hostkey_digest; + size_t hostkey_digest_len; + + u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm; + u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type; + u_char *dnskey_digest; + size_t dnskey_digest_len; + + *flags = 0; + + debug3("verify_host_key_dns"); + if (hostkey == NULL) + fatal("No key to look up!"); + + if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) { + debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname"); + return -1; + } + + result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN, + DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints); + if (result) { + verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result)); + return -1; + } + + if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) { + *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE; + debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS", + fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); + } else { + debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS", + fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); + } + + /* Initialize default host key parameters */ + if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type, + &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { + error("Error calculating host key fingerprint."); + freerrset(fingerprints); + return -1; + } + + if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas) + *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND; + + for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) { + /* + * Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly + * formatted fingerprints. + */ + if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type, + &dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len, + fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data, + fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) { + verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS."); + continue; + } + + if (hostkey_digest_type != dnskey_digest_type) { + hostkey_digest_type = dnskey_digest_type; + free(hostkey_digest); + + /* Initialize host key parameters */ + if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, + &hostkey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest, + &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { + error("Error calculating key fingerprint."); + freerrset(fingerprints); + return -1; + } + } + + /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */ + if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm && + hostkey_digest_type == dnskey_digest_type) { + if (hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len && + timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest, + hostkey_digest_len) == 0) + *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH; + } + free(dnskey_digest); + } + + free(hostkey_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */ + freerrset(fingerprints); + + if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) + if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) + debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); + else + debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); + else + debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS"); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record + */ +int +export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, struct sshkey *key, FILE *f, int generic) +{ + u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0; + u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; + u_int8_t dtype; + u_char *rdata_digest; + size_t i, rdata_digest_len; + int success = 0; + + for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) { + rdata_digest_type = dtype; + if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type, + &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) { + if (generic) { + fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %zu %02x %02x ", + hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, + 2 + rdata_digest_len, + rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); + } else { + fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname, + rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); + } + for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++) + fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]); + fprintf(f, "\n"); + free(rdata_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */ + success = 1; + } + } + + /* No SSHFP record was generated at all */ + if (success == 0) { + error("%s: unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type", __func__); + } + + return success; +} diff --git a/dns.h b/dns.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91f3c63 --- /dev/null +++ b/dns.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.18 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef DNS_H +#define DNS_H + +enum sshfp_types { + SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0, + SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1, + SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2, + SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3, + SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4, + SSHFP_KEY_XMSS = 5 +}; + +enum sshfp_hashes { + SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED = 0, + SSHFP_HASH_SHA1 = 1, + SSHFP_HASH_SHA256 = 2, + SSHFP_HASH_MAX = 3 +}; + +#define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN 1 +#define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP 44 + +#define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND 0x00000001 +#define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH 0x00000002 +#define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE 0x00000004 + +int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, + struct sshkey *, int *); +int export_dns_rr(const char *, struct sshkey *, FILE *, int); + +#endif /* DNS_H */ diff --git a/ed25519.c b/ed25519.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..767ec24 --- /dev/null +++ b/ed25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ed25519.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, + * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. + * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ed25519.c + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "crypto_api.h" + +#include "ge25519.h" + +static void get_hram(unsigned char *hram, const unsigned char *sm, const unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *playground, unsigned long long smlen) +{ + unsigned long long i; + + for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) playground[i] = sm[i]; + for (i = 32;i < 64;++i) playground[i] = pk[i-32]; + for (i = 64;i < smlen;++i) playground[i] = sm[i]; + + crypto_hash_sha512(hram,playground,smlen); +} + + +int crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair( + unsigned char *pk, + unsigned char *sk + ) +{ + sc25519 scsk; + ge25519 gepk; + unsigned char extsk[64]; + int i; + + randombytes(sk, 32); + crypto_hash_sha512(extsk, sk, 32); + extsk[0] &= 248; + extsk[31] &= 127; + extsk[31] |= 64; + + sc25519_from32bytes(&scsk,extsk); + + ge25519_scalarmult_base(&gepk, &scsk); + ge25519_pack(pk, &gepk); + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + sk[32 + i] = pk[i]; + return 0; +} + +int crypto_sign_ed25519( + unsigned char *sm,unsigned long long *smlen, + const unsigned char *m,unsigned long long mlen, + const unsigned char *sk + ) +{ + sc25519 sck, scs, scsk; + ge25519 ger; + unsigned char r[32]; + unsigned char s[32]; + unsigned char extsk[64]; + unsigned long long i; + unsigned char hmg[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES]; + unsigned char hram[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES]; + + crypto_hash_sha512(extsk, sk, 32); + extsk[0] &= 248; + extsk[31] &= 127; + extsk[31] |= 64; + + *smlen = mlen+64; + for(i=0;i +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include /* for offsetof */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "ssh.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +/* + * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding: + * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from + * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from + * PRNGd. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY + +#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48 + +/* + * Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon + * listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at * + * 'socket_path'. + * Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be + * supplied. + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error + */ +int +get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len, + unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path) +{ + int fd, addr_len, rval, errors; + u_char msg[2]; + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; + struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr; + mysig_t old_sigpipe; + + /* Sanity checks */ + if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0) + fatal("You must specify a port or a socket"); + if (socket_path != NULL && + strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path)) + fatal("Random pool path is too long"); + if (len <= 0 || len > 255) + fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len); + + memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); + + if (tcp_port != 0) { + addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET; + addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); + addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port); + addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in); + } else { + addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path, + sizeof(addr_un->sun_path)); + addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + + strlen(socket_path) + 1; + } + + old_sigpipe = signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + errors = 0; + rval = -1; +reopen: + fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd == -1) { + error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } + + if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) { + if (tcp_port != 0) { + error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s", + tcp_port, strerror(errno)); + } else { + error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s", + addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno)); + } + goto done; + } + + /* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */ + msg[0] = 0x02; + msg[1] = len; + + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) { + if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) { + close(fd); + errors++; + goto reopen; + } + error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s", + strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } + + if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) { + if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) { + close(fd); + errors++; + goto reopen; + } + error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s", + strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } + + rval = 0; +done: + signal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe); + if (fd != -1) + close(fd); + return rval; +} + +static int +seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes) +{ +#ifdef PRNGD_PORT + debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT); + if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0) + return 0; +#endif +#ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET + debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET); + if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0) + return 0; +#endif + return -1; +} + +void +rexec_send_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE]; + size_t len = sizeof(buf); + int r; + + if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) { + error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)", + ERR_get_error()); + len = 0; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, buf, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +void +rexec_recv_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_char *buf = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &buf, &len)) != 0 + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %u bytes", len); + RAND_add(buf, len, len); +} +#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ + +void +seed_rng(void) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY + unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE]; +#endif + if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay())) + fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you " + "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY + if (RAND_status() == 1) { + debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding"); + return; + } + + if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1) + fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd"); + RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); + memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); + +#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ + if (RAND_status() != 1) + fatal("PRNG is not seeded"); +} + +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +/* Handled in arc4random() */ +void +seed_rng(void) +{ +} + +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/entropy.h b/entropy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..870164d --- /dev/null +++ b/entropy.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _RANDOMS_H +#define _RANDOMS_H + +struct sshbuf; + +void seed_rng(void); +void rexec_send_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *); +void rexec_recv_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *); + +#endif /* _RANDOMS_H */ diff --git a/fatal.c b/fatal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e5aa3f --- /dev/null +++ b/fatal.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include + +#include "log.h" + +/* Fatal messages. This function never returns. */ + +void +fatal(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + cleanup_exit(255); +} diff --git a/fe25519.c b/fe25519.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e54fd15 --- /dev/null +++ b/fe25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,337 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: fe25519.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, + * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. + * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/fe25519.c + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#define WINDOWSIZE 1 /* Should be 1,2, or 4 */ +#define WINDOWMASK ((1<>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ + return x; +} + +static crypto_uint32 ge(crypto_uint32 a,crypto_uint32 b) /* 16-bit inputs */ +{ + unsigned int x = a; + x -= (unsigned int) b; /* 0..65535: yes; 4294901761..4294967295: no */ + x >>= 31; /* 0: yes; 1: no */ + x ^= 1; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ + return x; +} + +static crypto_uint32 times19(crypto_uint32 a) +{ + return (a << 4) + (a << 1) + a; +} + +static crypto_uint32 times38(crypto_uint32 a) +{ + return (a << 5) + (a << 2) + (a << 1); +} + +static void reduce_add_sub(fe25519 *r) +{ + crypto_uint32 t; + int i,rep; + + for(rep=0;rep<4;rep++) + { + t = r->v[31] >> 7; + r->v[31] &= 127; + t = times19(t); + r->v[0] += t; + for(i=0;i<31;i++) + { + t = r->v[i] >> 8; + r->v[i+1] += t; + r->v[i] &= 255; + } + } +} + +static void reduce_mul(fe25519 *r) +{ + crypto_uint32 t; + int i,rep; + + for(rep=0;rep<2;rep++) + { + t = r->v[31] >> 7; + r->v[31] &= 127; + t = times19(t); + r->v[0] += t; + for(i=0;i<31;i++) + { + t = r->v[i] >> 8; + r->v[i+1] += t; + r->v[i] &= 255; + } + } +} + +/* reduction modulo 2^255-19 */ +void fe25519_freeze(fe25519 *r) +{ + int i; + crypto_uint32 m = equal(r->v[31],127); + for(i=30;i>0;i--) + m &= equal(r->v[i],255); + m &= ge(r->v[0],237); + + m = -m; + + r->v[31] -= m&127; + for(i=30;i>0;i--) + r->v[i] -= m&255; + r->v[0] -= m&237; +} + +void fe25519_unpack(fe25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]) +{ + int i; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = x[i]; + r->v[31] &= 127; +} + +/* Assumes input x being reduced below 2^255 */ +void fe25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const fe25519 *x) +{ + int i; + fe25519 y = *x; + fe25519_freeze(&y); + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + r[i] = y.v[i]; +} + +int fe25519_iszero(const fe25519 *x) +{ + int i; + int r; + fe25519 t = *x; + fe25519_freeze(&t); + r = equal(t.v[0],0); + for(i=1;i<32;i++) + r &= equal(t.v[i],0); + return r; +} + +int fe25519_iseq_vartime(const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y) +{ + int i; + fe25519 t1 = *x; + fe25519 t2 = *y; + fe25519_freeze(&t1); + fe25519_freeze(&t2); + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + if(t1.v[i] != t2.v[i]) return 0; + return 1; +} + +void fe25519_cmov(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, unsigned char b) +{ + int i; + crypto_uint32 mask = b; + mask = -mask; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] ^= mask & (x->v[i] ^ r->v[i]); +} + +unsigned char fe25519_getparity(const fe25519 *x) +{ + fe25519 t = *x; + fe25519_freeze(&t); + return t.v[0] & 1; +} + +void fe25519_setone(fe25519 *r) +{ + int i; + r->v[0] = 1; + for(i=1;i<32;i++) r->v[i]=0; +} + +void fe25519_setzero(fe25519 *r) +{ + int i; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i]=0; +} + +void fe25519_neg(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x) +{ + fe25519 t; + int i; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) t.v[i]=x->v[i]; + fe25519_setzero(r); + fe25519_sub(r, r, &t); +} + +void fe25519_add(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y) +{ + int i; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = x->v[i] + y->v[i]; + reduce_add_sub(r); +} + +void fe25519_sub(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y) +{ + int i; + crypto_uint32 t[32]; + t[0] = x->v[0] + 0x1da; + t[31] = x->v[31] + 0xfe; + for(i=1;i<31;i++) t[i] = x->v[i] + 0x1fe; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = t[i] - y->v[i]; + reduce_add_sub(r); +} + +void fe25519_mul(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y) +{ + int i,j; + crypto_uint32 t[63]; + for(i=0;i<63;i++)t[i] = 0; + + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + for(j=0;j<32;j++) + t[i+j] += x->v[i] * y->v[j]; + + for(i=32;i<63;i++) + r->v[i-32] = t[i-32] + times38(t[i]); + r->v[31] = t[31]; /* result now in r[0]...r[31] */ + + reduce_mul(r); +} + +void fe25519_square(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x) +{ + fe25519_mul(r, x, x); +} + +void fe25519_invert(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x) +{ + fe25519 z2; + fe25519 z9; + fe25519 z11; + fe25519 z2_5_0; + fe25519 z2_10_0; + fe25519 z2_20_0; + fe25519 z2_50_0; + fe25519 z2_100_0; + fe25519 t0; + fe25519 t1; + int i; + + /* 2 */ fe25519_square(&z2,x); + /* 4 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&z2); + /* 8 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); + /* 9 */ fe25519_mul(&z9,&t0,x); + /* 11 */ fe25519_mul(&z11,&z9,&z2); + /* 22 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z11); + /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_5_0,&t0,&z9); + + /* 2^6 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_5_0); + /* 2^7 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^8 - 2^3 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); + /* 2^9 - 2^4 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^10 - 2^5 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); + /* 2^10 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_10_0,&t0,&z2_5_0); + + /* 2^11 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_10_0); + /* 2^12 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); } + /* 2^20 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_20_0,&t1,&z2_10_0); + + /* 2^21 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_20_0); + /* 2^22 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 2;i < 20;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); } + /* 2^40 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t0,&t1,&z2_20_0); + + /* 2^41 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^42 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); + /* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); } + /* 2^50 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_50_0,&t0,&z2_10_0); + + /* 2^51 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_50_0); + /* 2^52 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); } + /* 2^100 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_100_0,&t1,&z2_50_0); + + /* 2^101 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&z2_100_0); + /* 2^102 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); + /* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 2;i < 100;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); } + /* 2^200 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t1,&t0,&z2_100_0); + + /* 2^201 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); + /* 2^202 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^250 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); } + /* 2^250 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t0,&t1,&z2_50_0); + + /* 2^251 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^252 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); + /* 2^253 - 2^3 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^254 - 2^4 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); + /* 2^255 - 2^5 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); + /* 2^255 - 21 */ fe25519_mul(r,&t1,&z11); +} + +void fe25519_pow2523(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x) +{ + fe25519 z2; + fe25519 z9; + fe25519 z11; + fe25519 z2_5_0; + fe25519 z2_10_0; + fe25519 z2_20_0; + fe25519 z2_50_0; + fe25519 z2_100_0; + fe25519 t; + int i; + + /* 2 */ fe25519_square(&z2,x); + /* 4 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2); + /* 8 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); + /* 9 */ fe25519_mul(&z9,&t,x); + /* 11 */ fe25519_mul(&z11,&z9,&z2); + /* 22 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z11); + /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_5_0,&t,&z9); + + /* 2^6 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_5_0); + /* 2^10 - 2^5 */ for (i = 1;i < 5;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } + /* 2^10 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_10_0,&t,&z2_5_0); + + /* 2^11 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_10_0); + /* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 1;i < 10;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } + /* 2^20 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_20_0,&t,&z2_10_0); + + /* 2^21 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_20_0); + /* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 1;i < 20;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } + /* 2^40 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_20_0); + + /* 2^41 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); + /* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 1;i < 10;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } + /* 2^50 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_50_0,&t,&z2_10_0); + + /* 2^51 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_50_0); + /* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 1;i < 50;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } + /* 2^100 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_100_0,&t,&z2_50_0); + + /* 2^101 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_100_0); + /* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 1;i < 100;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } + /* 2^200 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_100_0); + + /* 2^201 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); + /* 2^250 - 2^50 */ for (i = 1;i < 50;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); } + /* 2^250 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_50_0); + + /* 2^251 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); + /* 2^252 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t); + /* 2^252 - 3 */ fe25519_mul(r,&t,x); +} diff --git a/fe25519.h b/fe25519.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..41b3cbb --- /dev/null +++ b/fe25519.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: fe25519.h,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, + * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. + * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/fe25519.h + */ + +#ifndef FE25519_H +#define FE25519_H + +#include "crypto_api.h" + +#define fe25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519 +#define fe25519_freeze crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze +#define fe25519_unpack crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack +#define fe25519_pack crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack +#define fe25519_iszero crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero +#define fe25519_iseq_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime +#define fe25519_cmov crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov +#define fe25519_setone crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone +#define fe25519_setzero crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero +#define fe25519_neg crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg +#define fe25519_getparity crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity +#define fe25519_add crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add +#define fe25519_sub crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub +#define fe25519_mul crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul +#define fe25519_square crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square +#define fe25519_invert crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert +#define fe25519_pow2523 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523 + +typedef struct +{ + crypto_uint32 v[32]; +} +fe25519; + +void fe25519_freeze(fe25519 *r); + +void fe25519_unpack(fe25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]); + +void fe25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const fe25519 *x); + +int fe25519_iszero(const fe25519 *x); + +int fe25519_iseq_vartime(const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y); + +void fe25519_cmov(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, unsigned char b); + +void fe25519_setone(fe25519 *r); + +void fe25519_setzero(fe25519 *r); + +void fe25519_neg(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x); + +unsigned char fe25519_getparity(const fe25519 *x); + +void fe25519_add(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y); + +void fe25519_sub(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y); + +void fe25519_mul(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y); + +void fe25519_square(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x); + +void fe25519_invert(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x); + +void fe25519_pow2523(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x); + +#endif diff --git a/fixalgorithms b/fixalgorithms new file mode 100755 index 0000000..115dce8 --- /dev/null +++ b/fixalgorithms @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# fixciphers - remove unsupported ciphers from man pages. +# Usage: fixpaths /path/to/sed cipher1 [cipher2] outfile +# +# Author: Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com.au). Placed in the public domain. + +die() { + echo $* + exit -1 +} + +SED=$1 +shift + +for c in $*; do + subs="$subs -e /.Dq.$c.*$/d" + subs="$subs -e s/$c,//g" +done + +# now remove any entirely empty lines +subs="$subs -e /^$/d" + +${SED} $subs + +exit 0 diff --git a/fixpaths b/fixpaths new file mode 100755 index 0000000..60a6799 --- /dev/null +++ b/fixpaths @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# fixpaths - substitute makefile variables into text files +# Usage: fixpaths -Dsomething=somethingelse ... + +die() { + echo $* + exit -1 +} + +test -n "`echo $1|grep -- -D`" || \ + die $0: nothing to do - no substitutions listed! + +test -n "`echo $1|grep -- '-D[^=]\+=[^ ]\+'`" || \ + die $0: error in command line arguments. + +test -n "`echo $*|grep -- ' [^-]'`" || \ + die Usage: $0 '[-Dstring=replacement] [[infile] ...]' + +sed `echo $*|sed -e 's/-D\([^=]\+\)=\([^ ]*\)/-e s=\1=\2=g/g'` + +exit 0 diff --git a/ge25519.c b/ge25519.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfe3849 --- /dev/null +++ b/ge25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ge25519.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, + * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. + * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.c + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "fe25519.h" +#include "sc25519.h" +#include "ge25519.h" + +/* + * Arithmetic on the twisted Edwards curve -x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2 + * with d = -(121665/121666) = 37095705934669439343138083508754565189542113879843219016388785533085940283555 + * Base point: (15112221349535400772501151409588531511454012693041857206046113283949847762202,46316835694926478169428394003475163141307993866256225615783033603165251855960); + */ + +/* d */ +static const fe25519 ge25519_ecd = {{0xA3, 0x78, 0x59, 0x13, 0xCA, 0x4D, 0xEB, 0x75, 0xAB, 0xD8, 0x41, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x0A, 0x70, 0x00, + 0x98, 0xE8, 0x79, 0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xC7, 0x8C, 0x73, 0xFE, 0x6F, 0x2B, 0xEE, 0x6C, 0x03, 0x52}}; +/* 2*d */ +static const fe25519 ge25519_ec2d = {{0x59, 0xF1, 0xB2, 0x26, 0x94, 0x9B, 0xD6, 0xEB, 0x56, 0xB1, 0x83, 0x82, 0x9A, 0x14, 0xE0, 0x00, + 0x30, 0xD1, 0xF3, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x80, 0x8E, 0x19, 0xE7, 0xFC, 0xDF, 0x56, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0x06, 0x24}}; +/* sqrt(-1) */ +static const fe25519 ge25519_sqrtm1 = {{0xB0, 0xA0, 0x0E, 0x4A, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x78, 0xE4, 0x2F, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x18, 0x43, 0x2F, + 0xA7, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x3D, 0x99, 0x00, 0x4D, 0x2B, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0xC1, 0x4F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x83, 0x2B}}; + +#define ge25519_p3 ge25519 + +typedef struct +{ + fe25519 x; + fe25519 z; + fe25519 y; + fe25519 t; +} ge25519_p1p1; + +typedef struct +{ + fe25519 x; + fe25519 y; + fe25519 z; +} ge25519_p2; + +typedef struct +{ + fe25519 x; + fe25519 y; +} ge25519_aff; + + +/* Packed coordinates of the base point */ +const ge25519 ge25519_base = {{{0x1A, 0xD5, 0x25, 0x8F, 0x60, 0x2D, 0x56, 0xC9, 0xB2, 0xA7, 0x25, 0x95, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x2C, 0x69, + 0x5C, 0xDC, 0xD6, 0xFD, 0x31, 0xE2, 0xA4, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x53, 0x6E, 0xCD, 0xD3, 0x36, 0x69, 0x21}}, + {{0x58, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, + 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66}}, + {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0xA3, 0xDD, 0xB7, 0xA5, 0xB3, 0x8A, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0xF5, 0x52, 0x51, 0x77, 0x80, 0x9F, 0xF0, 0x20, + 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xAB, 0x64, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xEA, 0x66, 0x65, 0x76, 0x8B, 0xD7, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0x87, 0x67}}}; + +/* Multiples of the base point in affine representation */ +static const ge25519_aff ge25519_base_multiples_affine[425] = { +#include "ge25519_base.data" +}; + +static void p1p1_to_p2(ge25519_p2 *r, const ge25519_p1p1 *p) +{ + fe25519_mul(&r->x, &p->x, &p->t); + fe25519_mul(&r->y, &p->y, &p->z); + fe25519_mul(&r->z, &p->z, &p->t); +} + +static void p1p1_to_p3(ge25519_p3 *r, const ge25519_p1p1 *p) +{ + p1p1_to_p2((ge25519_p2 *)r, p); + fe25519_mul(&r->t, &p->x, &p->y); +} + +static void ge25519_mixadd2(ge25519_p3 *r, const ge25519_aff *q) +{ + fe25519 a,b,t1,t2,c,d,e,f,g,h,qt; + fe25519_mul(&qt, &q->x, &q->y); + fe25519_sub(&a, &r->y, &r->x); /* A = (Y1-X1)*(Y2-X2) */ + fe25519_add(&b, &r->y, &r->x); /* B = (Y1+X1)*(Y2+X2) */ + fe25519_sub(&t1, &q->y, &q->x); + fe25519_add(&t2, &q->y, &q->x); + fe25519_mul(&a, &a, &t1); + fe25519_mul(&b, &b, &t2); + fe25519_sub(&e, &b, &a); /* E = B-A */ + fe25519_add(&h, &b, &a); /* H = B+A */ + fe25519_mul(&c, &r->t, &qt); /* C = T1*k*T2 */ + fe25519_mul(&c, &c, &ge25519_ec2d); + fe25519_add(&d, &r->z, &r->z); /* D = Z1*2 */ + fe25519_sub(&f, &d, &c); /* F = D-C */ + fe25519_add(&g, &d, &c); /* G = D+C */ + fe25519_mul(&r->x, &e, &f); + fe25519_mul(&r->y, &h, &g); + fe25519_mul(&r->z, &g, &f); + fe25519_mul(&r->t, &e, &h); +} + +static void add_p1p1(ge25519_p1p1 *r, const ge25519_p3 *p, const ge25519_p3 *q) +{ + fe25519 a, b, c, d, t; + + fe25519_sub(&a, &p->y, &p->x); /* A = (Y1-X1)*(Y2-X2) */ + fe25519_sub(&t, &q->y, &q->x); + fe25519_mul(&a, &a, &t); + fe25519_add(&b, &p->x, &p->y); /* B = (Y1+X1)*(Y2+X2) */ + fe25519_add(&t, &q->x, &q->y); + fe25519_mul(&b, &b, &t); + fe25519_mul(&c, &p->t, &q->t); /* C = T1*k*T2 */ + fe25519_mul(&c, &c, &ge25519_ec2d); + fe25519_mul(&d, &p->z, &q->z); /* D = Z1*2*Z2 */ + fe25519_add(&d, &d, &d); + fe25519_sub(&r->x, &b, &a); /* E = B-A */ + fe25519_sub(&r->t, &d, &c); /* F = D-C */ + fe25519_add(&r->z, &d, &c); /* G = D+C */ + fe25519_add(&r->y, &b, &a); /* H = B+A */ +} + +/* See http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-twisted-extended-1.html#doubling-dbl-2008-hwcd */ +static void dbl_p1p1(ge25519_p1p1 *r, const ge25519_p2 *p) +{ + fe25519 a,b,c,d; + fe25519_square(&a, &p->x); + fe25519_square(&b, &p->y); + fe25519_square(&c, &p->z); + fe25519_add(&c, &c, &c); + fe25519_neg(&d, &a); + + fe25519_add(&r->x, &p->x, &p->y); + fe25519_square(&r->x, &r->x); + fe25519_sub(&r->x, &r->x, &a); + fe25519_sub(&r->x, &r->x, &b); + fe25519_add(&r->z, &d, &b); + fe25519_sub(&r->t, &r->z, &c); + fe25519_sub(&r->y, &d, &b); +} + +/* Constant-time version of: if(b) r = p */ +static void cmov_aff(ge25519_aff *r, const ge25519_aff *p, unsigned char b) +{ + fe25519_cmov(&r->x, &p->x, b); + fe25519_cmov(&r->y, &p->y, b); +} + +static unsigned char equal(signed char b,signed char c) +{ + unsigned char ub = b; + unsigned char uc = c; + unsigned char x = ub ^ uc; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */ + crypto_uint32 y = x; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */ + y -= 1; /* 4294967295: yes; 0..254: no */ + y >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ + return y; +} + +static unsigned char negative(signed char b) +{ + unsigned long long x = b; /* 18446744073709551361..18446744073709551615: yes; 0..255: no */ + x >>= 63; /* 1: yes; 0: no */ + return x; +} + +static void choose_t(ge25519_aff *t, unsigned long long pos, signed char b) +{ + /* constant time */ + fe25519 v; + *t = ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+0]; + cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+1],equal(b,1) | equal(b,-1)); + cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+2],equal(b,2) | equal(b,-2)); + cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+3],equal(b,3) | equal(b,-3)); + cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+4],equal(b,-4)); + fe25519_neg(&v, &t->x); + fe25519_cmov(&t->x, &v, negative(b)); +} + +static void setneutral(ge25519 *r) +{ + fe25519_setzero(&r->x); + fe25519_setone(&r->y); + fe25519_setone(&r->z); + fe25519_setzero(&r->t); +} + +/* ******************************************************************** + * EXPORTED FUNCTIONS + ******************************************************************** */ + +/* return 0 on success, -1 otherwise */ +int ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(ge25519_p3 *r, const unsigned char p[32]) +{ + unsigned char par; + fe25519 t, chk, num, den, den2, den4, den6; + fe25519_setone(&r->z); + par = p[31] >> 7; + fe25519_unpack(&r->y, p); + fe25519_square(&num, &r->y); /* x = y^2 */ + fe25519_mul(&den, &num, &ge25519_ecd); /* den = dy^2 */ + fe25519_sub(&num, &num, &r->z); /* x = y^2-1 */ + fe25519_add(&den, &r->z, &den); /* den = dy^2+1 */ + + /* Computation of sqrt(num/den) */ + /* 1.: computation of num^((p-5)/8)*den^((7p-35)/8) = (num*den^7)^((p-5)/8) */ + fe25519_square(&den2, &den); + fe25519_square(&den4, &den2); + fe25519_mul(&den6, &den4, &den2); + fe25519_mul(&t, &den6, &num); + fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &den); + + fe25519_pow2523(&t, &t); + /* 2. computation of r->x = t * num * den^3 */ + fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &num); + fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &den); + fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &den); + fe25519_mul(&r->x, &t, &den); + + /* 3. Check whether sqrt computation gave correct result, multiply by sqrt(-1) if not: */ + fe25519_square(&chk, &r->x); + fe25519_mul(&chk, &chk, &den); + if (!fe25519_iseq_vartime(&chk, &num)) + fe25519_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &ge25519_sqrtm1); + + /* 4. Now we have one of the two square roots, except if input was not a square */ + fe25519_square(&chk, &r->x); + fe25519_mul(&chk, &chk, &den); + if (!fe25519_iseq_vartime(&chk, &num)) + return -1; + + /* 5. Choose the desired square root according to parity: */ + if(fe25519_getparity(&r->x) != (1-par)) + fe25519_neg(&r->x, &r->x); + + fe25519_mul(&r->t, &r->x, &r->y); + return 0; +} + +void ge25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const ge25519_p3 *p) +{ + fe25519 tx, ty, zi; + fe25519_invert(&zi, &p->z); + fe25519_mul(&tx, &p->x, &zi); + fe25519_mul(&ty, &p->y, &zi); + fe25519_pack(r, &ty); + r[31] ^= fe25519_getparity(&tx) << 7; +} + +int ge25519_isneutral_vartime(const ge25519_p3 *p) +{ + int ret = 1; + if(!fe25519_iszero(&p->x)) ret = 0; + if(!fe25519_iseq_vartime(&p->y, &p->z)) ret = 0; + return ret; +} + +/* computes [s1]p1 + [s2]p2 */ +void ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(ge25519_p3 *r, const ge25519_p3 *p1, const sc25519 *s1, const ge25519_p3 *p2, const sc25519 *s2) +{ + ge25519_p1p1 tp1p1; + ge25519_p3 pre[16]; + unsigned char b[127]; + int i; + + /* precomputation s2 s1 */ + setneutral(pre); /* 00 00 */ + pre[1] = *p1; /* 00 01 */ + dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1,(ge25519_p2 *)p1); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[2], &tp1p1); /* 00 10 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1], &pre[2]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[3], &tp1p1); /* 00 11 */ + pre[4] = *p2; /* 01 00 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1], &pre[4]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[5], &tp1p1); /* 01 01 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[2], &pre[4]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[6], &tp1p1); /* 01 10 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[3], &pre[4]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[7], &tp1p1); /* 01 11 */ + dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1,(ge25519_p2 *)p2); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[8], &tp1p1); /* 10 00 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1], &pre[8]); p1p1_to_p3( &pre[9], &tp1p1); /* 10 01 */ + dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1,(ge25519_p2 *)&pre[5]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[10], &tp1p1); /* 10 10 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[3], &pre[8]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[11], &tp1p1); /* 10 11 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[4], &pre[8]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[12], &tp1p1); /* 11 00 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1],&pre[12]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[13], &tp1p1); /* 11 01 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[2],&pre[12]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[14], &tp1p1); /* 11 10 */ + add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[3],&pre[12]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[15], &tp1p1); /* 11 11 */ + + sc25519_2interleave2(b,s1,s2); + + /* scalar multiplication */ + *r = pre[b[126]]; + for(i=125;i>=0;i--) + { + dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1, (ge25519_p2 *)r); + p1p1_to_p2((ge25519_p2 *) r, &tp1p1); + dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1, (ge25519_p2 *)r); + if(b[i]!=0) + { + p1p1_to_p3(r, &tp1p1); + add_p1p1(&tp1p1, r, &pre[b[i]]); + } + if(i != 0) p1p1_to_p2((ge25519_p2 *)r, &tp1p1); + else p1p1_to_p3(r, &tp1p1); + } +} + +void ge25519_scalarmult_base(ge25519_p3 *r, const sc25519 *s) +{ + signed char b[85]; + int i; + ge25519_aff t; + sc25519_window3(b,s); + + choose_t((ge25519_aff *)r, 0, b[0]); + fe25519_setone(&r->z); + fe25519_mul(&r->t, &r->x, &r->y); + for(i=1;i<85;i++) + { + choose_t(&t, (unsigned long long) i, b[i]); + ge25519_mixadd2(r, &t); + } +} diff --git a/ge25519.h b/ge25519.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a097637 --- /dev/null +++ b/ge25519.h @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ge25519.h,v 1.4 2015/02/16 18:26:26 miod Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, + * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. + * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.h + */ + +#ifndef GE25519_H +#define GE25519_H + +#include "fe25519.h" +#include "sc25519.h" + +#define ge25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519 +#define ge25519_base crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519_base +#define ge25519_unpackneg_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime +#define ge25519_pack crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack +#define ge25519_isneutral_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime +#define ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime +#define ge25519_scalarmult_base crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base + +typedef struct +{ + fe25519 x; + fe25519 y; + fe25519 z; + fe25519 t; +} ge25519; + +extern const ge25519 ge25519_base; + +int ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(ge25519 *r, const unsigned char p[32]); + +void ge25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const ge25519 *p); + +int ge25519_isneutral_vartime(const ge25519 *p); + +void ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p1, const sc25519 *s1, const ge25519 *p2, const sc25519 *s2); + +void ge25519_scalarmult_base(ge25519 *r, const sc25519 *s); + +#endif diff --git a/ge25519_base.data b/ge25519_base.data new file mode 100644 index 0000000..66fb1b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/ge25519_base.data @@ -0,0 +1,858 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ge25519_base.data,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, + * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. + * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519_base.data + */ + +{{{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}, + {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}}, +{{{0x1a, 0xd5, 0x25, 0x8f, 0x60, 0x2d, 0x56, 0xc9, 0xb2, 0xa7, 0x25, 0x95, 0x60, 0xc7, 0x2c, 0x69, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0xd6, 0xfd, 0x31, 0xe2, 0xa4, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x53, 0x6e, 0xcd, 0xd3, 0x36, 0x69, 0x21}} , + {{0x58, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66}}}, +{{{0x0e, 0xce, 0x43, 0x28, 0x4e, 0xa1, 0xc5, 0x83, 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--git a/groupaccess.c b/groupaccess.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e4d255 --- /dev/null +++ b/groupaccess.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "groupaccess.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "log.h" + +static int ngroups; +static char **groups_byname; + +/* + * Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and + * supplementary groups. Return the number of groups in the list. + */ +int +ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base) +{ + gid_t *groups_bygid; + int i, j, retry = 0; + struct group *gr; + + if (ngroups > 0) + ga_free(); + + ngroups = NGROUPS_MAX; +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX) + ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)); +#endif + + groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid)); + while (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1) { + if (retry++ > 0) + fatal("getgrouplist: groups list too small"); + groups_bygid = xreallocarray(groups_bygid, ngroups, + sizeof(*groups_bygid)); + } + groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname)); + + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++) + if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL) + groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name); + free(groups_bygid); + return (ngroups = j); +} + +/* + * Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups. + * Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison. + */ +int +ga_match(char * const *groups, int n) +{ + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) + if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j])) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return 1 if one of user's groups matches group_pattern list. + * Return 0 on negated or no match. + */ +int +ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern) +{ + int i, found = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { + switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i], group_pattern, 0)) { + case -1: + return 0; /* Negated match wins */ + case 0: + continue; + case 1: + found = 1; + } + } + return found; +} + +/* + * Free memory allocated for group access list. + */ +void +ga_free(void) +{ + int i; + + if (ngroups > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) + free(groups_byname[i]); + ngroups = 0; + free(groups_byname); + groups_byname = NULL; + } +} diff --git a/groupaccess.h b/groupaccess.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..000578e --- /dev/null +++ b/groupaccess.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.h,v 1.8 2008/07/04 03:44:59 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef GROUPACCESS_H +#define GROUPACCESS_H + +int ga_init(const char *, gid_t); +int ga_match(char * const *, int); +int ga_match_pattern_list(const char *); +void ga_free(void); + +#endif diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d56257b --- /dev/null +++ b/gss-genr.c @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.26 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef GSSAPI + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh2.h" + +#include "ssh-gss.h" + +extern u_char *session_id2; +extern u_int session_id2_len; + +/* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */ +int +ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g) +{ + int r; + u_char *p; + size_t len; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &p, &len)) != 0) + return r; + g->value = p; + g->length = len; + return 0; +} + +/* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ +int +ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +{ + return (ctx != NULL && ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID && + ctx->oid->length == len && + memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, data, len) == 0); +} + +/* Set the contexts OID from a data stream */ +void +ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +{ + if (ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) { + free(ctx->oid->elements); + free(ctx->oid); + } + ctx->oid = xcalloc(1, sizeof(gss_OID_desc)); + ctx->oid->length = len; + ctx->oid->elements = xmalloc(len); + memcpy(ctx->oid->elements, data, len); +} + +/* Set the contexts OID */ +void +ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid) +{ + ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(ctx, oid->elements, oid->length); +} + +/* All this effort to report an error ... */ +void +ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt) +{ + char *s; + + s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL); + debug("%s", s); + free(s); +} + +char * +ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status, + OM_uint32 *minor_status) +{ + OM_uint32 lmin; + gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 ctx; + struct sshbuf *b; + char *ret; + int r; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + if (major_status != NULL) + *major_status = ctxt->major; + if (minor_status != NULL) + *minor_status = ctxt->minor; + + ctx = 0; + /* The GSSAPI error */ + do { + gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major, + GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, msg.value, msg.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg); + } while (ctx != 0); + + /* The mechanism specific error */ + do { + gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor, + GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, msg.value, msg.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg); + } while (ctx != 0); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ret = xstrdup((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(b)); + sshbuf_free(b); + return (ret); +} + +/* + * Initialise our GSSAPI context. We use this opaque structure to contain all + * of the data which both the client and server need to persist across + * {accept,init}_sec_context calls, so that when we do it from the userauth + * stuff life is a little easier + */ +void +ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) +{ + *ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt)); + (*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; + (*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID; + (*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + (*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + (*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; +} + +/* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */ +void +ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) +{ + OM_uint32 ms; + + if ((*ctx) == NULL) + return; + if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context(&ms, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + if ((*ctx)->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) + gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->name); + if ((*ctx)->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) { + free((*ctx)->oid->elements); + free((*ctx)->oid); + (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID; + } + if ((*ctx)->creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) + gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->creds); + if ((*ctx)->client != GSS_C_NO_NAME) + gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client); + if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) + gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds); + + free(*ctx); + *ctx = NULL; +} + +/* + * Wrapper to init_sec_context + * Requires that the context contains: + * oid + * server name (from ssh_gssapi_import_name) + */ +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, + gss_buffer_desc* send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags) +{ + int deleg_flag = 0; + + if (deleg_creds) { + deleg_flag = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; + debug("Delegating credentials"); + } + + ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, + 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); + + if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + + return (ctx->major); +} + +/* Create a service name for the given host */ +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host) +{ + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; + char *val; + + xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host); + gssbuf.value = val; + gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); + + if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, + &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + + free(gssbuf.value); + return (ctx->major); +} + +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) +{ + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + + return (ctx->major); +} + +void +ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service, + const char *context) +{ + int r; + + sshbuf_reset(b); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, user)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, context)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +int +ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) +{ + gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; + + /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ + if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && + (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0)) + return 0; /* false */ + + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); + major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, + NULL); + gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token); + if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) + gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + } + + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); + + return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); +} + +#endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a151bc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef GSSAPI +#ifdef KRB5 + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" + +#include "ssh-gss.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; + +#ifdef HEIMDAL +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H +# include +#elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H +# include +#endif + +static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; + +/* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ + +static int +ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) +{ + krb5_error_code problem; + + if (krb_context != NULL) + return 1; + + problem = krb5_init_context(&krb_context); + if (problem) { + logit("Cannot initialize krb5 context"); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other + * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own. + * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0 + */ + +static int +ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) +{ + krb5_principal princ; + int retval; + const char *errmsg; + + if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) + return 0; + + if ((retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value, + &princ))) { + errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, retval); + logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg); + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); + return 0; + } + if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) { + retval = 1; + logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", + name, (char *)client->displayname.value); + } else + retval = 0; + + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); + return retval; +} + + +/* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated + * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ + +static void +ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) +{ + krb5_ccache ccache; + krb5_error_code problem; + krb5_principal princ; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + int len; + const char *errmsg; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { + debug("No credentials stored"); + return; + } + + if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) + return; + +#ifdef HEIMDAL +# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE + if ((problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, + NULL, &ccache)) != 0) { + errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); + logit("krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg); +# else + if ((problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(krb_context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache))) { + logit("krb5_cc_gen_new(): %.100s", + krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); +# endif + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); + return; + } +#else + if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) { + errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); + logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg); + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); + return; + } +#endif /* #ifdef HEIMDAL */ + + if ((problem = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, + client->exportedname.value, &princ))) { + errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); + logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg); + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); + return; + } + + if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) { + errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); + logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", errmsg); + krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); + krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); + return; + } + + krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); + + if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, + client->creds, ccache))) { + logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed"); + krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); + return; + } + + client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; + len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; + client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); + snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) + do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval); +#endif + + krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); + + return; +} + +ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", + "Kerberos", + {9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"}, + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds +}; + +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +#endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab3a15f --- /dev/null +++ b/gss-serv.c @@ -0,0 +1,404 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.31 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef GSSAPI + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" + +#include "ssh-gss.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; + +static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = + { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, + GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; + +ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = + { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + +#ifdef KRB5 +extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; +#endif + +ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= { +#ifdef KRB5 + &gssapi_kerberos_mech, +#endif + &gssapi_null_mech, +}; + +/* + * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the + * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up. + */ +static gss_OID_set supported_oids; + +void +ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void) +{ + ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids); +} + +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present) +{ + if (supported_oids == NULL) + ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); + return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present); +} + +/* + * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host. + * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID + */ + +/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */ +/* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */ +static OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) +{ + OM_uint32 status; + char lname[NI_MAXHOST]; + gss_OID_set oidset; + + if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); + + if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (-1); + } + + if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); + } + + if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, + ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, + NULL, NULL))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); + } else { + ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + } + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* Privileged */ +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) +{ + if (*ctx) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); + return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx)); +} + +/* Unprivileged */ +void +ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) +{ + int i = 0; + OM_uint32 min_status; + int present; + gss_OID_set supported; + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); + gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); + + while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, + &supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present))) + present = 0; + if (present) + gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status, + &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset); + i++; + } + + gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported); +} + + +/* Wrapper around accept_sec_context + * Requires that the context contains: + * oid + * credentials (from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred) + */ +/* Privileged */ +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, + gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags) +{ + OM_uint32 status; + gss_OID mech; + + ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor, + &ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok, + GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech, + send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds); + + if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + + if (ctx->client_creds) + debug("Received some client credentials"); + else + debug("Got no client credentials"); + + status = ctx->major; + + /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then + * we flag the user as also having been authenticated + */ + + if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) && + (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) { + if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client)) + fatal("Couldn't convert client name"); + } + + return (status); +} + +/* + * This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion + * to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism + * originally selected. + */ +static OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name) +{ + u_char *tok; + OM_uint32 offset; + OM_uint32 oidl; + + tok = ename->value; + + /* + * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length + * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct + */ + + if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + /* + * Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition + * and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things + * there are two lengths - the first including these, and the + * second without. + */ + + oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */ + oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */ + + /* + * Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the + * string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context + */ + if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl || + ename->length < oidl+6 || + !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl)) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + offset = oidl+6; + + if (ename->length < offset+4) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + name->length = get_u32(tok+offset); + offset += 4; + + if (UINT_MAX - offset < name->length) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + if (ename->length < offset+name->length) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1); + memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length); + ((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably + * be called once for a context */ + +/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */ +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) +{ + int i = 0; + + gss_buffer_desc ename; + + client->mech = NULL; + + while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { + if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length && + (memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements, + ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0)) + client->mech = supported_mechs[i]; + i++; + } + + if (client->mech == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, + &client->displayname, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } + + if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, + &ename))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + return (ctx->major); + } + + if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename, + &client->exportedname))) { + return (ctx->major); + } + + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + return (ctx->major); +} + +/* As user - called on fatal/exit */ +void +ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) +{ + if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { + /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ + debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", + gssapi_client.store.filename); + unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); + } +} + +/* As user */ +void +ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void) +{ + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) { + (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client); + } else + debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism"); +} + +/* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based + * on the passed authentication process and credentials. + */ +/* As user */ +void +ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep) +{ + + if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL && + gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) { + debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, + gssapi_client.store.envval); + child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar, + gssapi_client.store.envval); + } +} + +/* Privileged */ +int +ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) +{ + OM_uint32 lmin; + + if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 || + gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) { + debug("No suitable client data"); + return 0; + } + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) + if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) + return 1; + else { + /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); + gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds); + explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, + sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); + return 0; + } + else + debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism"); + return (0); +} + +/* Privileged */ +OM_uint32 +ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) +{ + ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); + + return (ctx->major); +} + +/* Privileged */ +const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void) +{ + if (gssapi_client.displayname.length == 0 || + gssapi_client.displayname.value == NULL) + return NULL; + return (char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value; +} + +#endif diff --git a/hash.c b/hash.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5875d41 --- /dev/null +++ b/hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.4 2017/12/14 21:07:39 naddy Exp $ */ + +/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.5 2018/01/13 00:24:09 naddy Exp $ */ +/* + * Public domain. Author: Christian Weisgerber + * API compatible reimplementation of function from nacl + */ + +#include "crypto_api.h" + +#include + +#include "digest.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +int +crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, + unsigned long long inlen) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, in, inlen, out, + crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return 0; +} diff --git a/hmac.c b/hmac.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c87964 --- /dev/null +++ b/hmac.c @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.12 2015/03/24 20:03:44 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "hmac.h" + +struct ssh_hmac_ctx { + int alg; + struct ssh_digest_ctx *ictx; + struct ssh_digest_ctx *octx; + struct ssh_digest_ctx *digest; + u_char *buf; + size_t buf_len; +}; + +size_t +ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg) +{ + return ssh_digest_bytes(alg); +} + +struct ssh_hmac_ctx * +ssh_hmac_start(int alg) +{ + struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ret; + + if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) + return NULL; + ret->alg = alg; + if ((ret->ictx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL || + (ret->octx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL || + (ret->digest = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL) + goto fail; + ret->buf_len = ssh_digest_blocksize(ret->ictx); + if ((ret->buf = calloc(1, ret->buf_len)) == NULL) + goto fail; + return ret; +fail: + ssh_hmac_free(ret); + return NULL; +} + +int +ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen) +{ + size_t i; + + /* reset ictx and octx if no is key given */ + if (key != NULL) { + /* truncate long keys */ + if (klen <= ctx->buf_len) + memcpy(ctx->buf, key, klen); + else if (ssh_digest_memory(ctx->alg, key, klen, ctx->buf, + ctx->buf_len) < 0) + return -1; + for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++) + ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36; + if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->ictx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0) + return -1; + for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++) + ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; + if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->octx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0) + return -1; + explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len); + } + /* start with ictx */ + if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->ictx, ctx->digest) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) +{ + return ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, m, mlen); +} + +int +ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return ssh_digest_update_buffer(ctx->digest, b); +} + +int +ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +{ + size_t len; + + len = ssh_digest_bytes(ctx->alg); + if (dlen < len || + ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len)) + return -1; + /* switch to octx */ + if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->octx, ctx->digest) < 0 || + ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len) < 0 || + ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, d, dlen) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +void +ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx != NULL) { + ssh_digest_free(ctx->ictx); + ssh_digest_free(ctx->octx); + ssh_digest_free(ctx->digest); + if (ctx->buf) { + explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len); + free(ctx->buf); + } + explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); + free(ctx); + } +} + +#ifdef TEST + +/* cc -DTEST hmac.c digest.c buffer.c cleanup.c fatal.c log.c xmalloc.c -lcrypto */ +static void +hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen) +{ + struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx; + size_t i; + u_char digest[16]; + + if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) + printf("ssh_hmac_start failed"); + if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 || + ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 || + ssh_hmac_final(ctx, digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0) + printf("ssh_hmac_xxx failed"); + ssh_hmac_free(ctx); + + if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) { + for (i = 0; i < elen; i++) + printf("[%zu] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]); + printf("mismatch\n"); + } else + printf("ok\n"); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + /* try test vectors from RFC 2104 */ + + u_char key1[16] = { + 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, + 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb }; + u_char *data1 = "Hi There"; + u_char dig1[16] = { + 0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c, + 0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d }; + + u_char *key2 = "Jefe"; + u_char *data2 = "what do ya want for nothing?"; + u_char dig2[16] = { + 0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03, + 0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38 }; + + u_char key3[16]; + u_char data3[50]; + u_char dig3[16] = { + 0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88, + 0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 }; + memset(key3, 0xaa, sizeof(key3)); + memset(data3, 0xdd, sizeof(data3)); + + hmac_test(key1, sizeof(key1), data1, strlen(data1), dig1, sizeof(dig1)); + hmac_test(key2, strlen(key2), data2, strlen(data2), dig2, sizeof(dig2)); + hmac_test(key3, sizeof(key3), data3, sizeof(data3), dig3, sizeof(dig3)); + + return 0; +} + +#endif diff --git a/hmac.h b/hmac.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..42b33d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/hmac.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.9 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _HMAC_H +#define _HMAC_H + +/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */ +size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg); + +struct sshbuf; +struct ssh_hmac_ctx; +struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ssh_hmac_start(int alg); + +/* Sets the state of the HMAC or resets the state if key == NULL */ +int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); +int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); +int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b); +int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); +void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx); + +#endif /* _HMAC_H */ diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1f826b --- /dev/null +++ b/hostfile.c @@ -0,0 +1,834 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.73 2018/07/16 03:09:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "hmac.h" + +struct hostkeys { + struct hostkey_entry *entries; + u_int num_entries; +}; + +/* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */ + +static int +extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len) +{ + char *p, *b64salt; + u_int b64len; + int ret; + + if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) { + debug2("extract_salt: string too short"); + return (-1); + } + if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { + debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier"); + return (-1); + } + s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; + l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; + if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) { + debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character"); + return (-1); + } + + b64len = p - s; + /* Sanity check */ + if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) { + debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len); + return (-1); + } + b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len); + memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len); + b64salt[b64len] = '\0'; + + ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len); + free(b64salt); + if (ret == -1) { + debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error"); + return (-1); + } + if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) { + debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d", + ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret); + return (-1); + } + + return (0); +} + +char * +host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len) +{ + struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx; + u_char salt[256], result[256]; + char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512]; + static char encoded[1024]; + u_int len; + + len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); + + if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) { + /* Create new salt */ + arc4random_buf(salt, len); + } else { + /* Extract salt from known host entry */ + if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt, + sizeof(salt)) == -1) + return (NULL); + } + + if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || + ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 || + ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || + ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result))) + fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__); + ssh_hmac_free(ctx); + + if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 || + __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1) + fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__); + + snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt, + HASH_DELIM, uu_result); + + return (encoded); +} + +/* + * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the + * pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end. + */ + +int +hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret) +{ + char *cp; + int r; + + /* Skip leading whitespace. */ + for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + + if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, &cp)) != 0) + return 0; + + /* Skip trailing whitespace. */ + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + + /* Return results. */ + *cpp = cp; + if (bitsp != NULL) + *bitsp = sshkey_size(ret); + return 1; +} + +static HostkeyMarker +check_markers(char **cpp) +{ + char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp; + int ret = MRK_NONE; + + while (*cp == '@') { + /* Only one marker is allowed */ + if (ret != MRK_NONE) + return MRK_ERROR; + /* Markers are terminated by whitespace */ + if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL && + (sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL) + return MRK_ERROR; + /* Extract marker for comparison */ + if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker)) + return MRK_ERROR; + memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp); + marker[sp - cp] = '\0'; + if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0) + ret = MRK_CA; + else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0) + ret = MRK_REVOKE; + else + return MRK_ERROR; + + /* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */ + cp = sp; + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + } + *cpp = cp; + return ret; +} + +struct hostkeys * +init_hostkeys(void) +{ + struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); + + ret->entries = NULL; + return ret; +} + +struct load_callback_ctx { + const char *host; + u_long num_loaded; + struct hostkeys *hostkeys; +}; + +static int +record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) +{ + struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx; + struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys; + struct hostkey_entry *tmp; + + if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { + /* XXX make this verbose() in the future */ + debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file", + l->path, l->linenum); + return 0; + } + + debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__, + l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" : + (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "), + sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); + if ((tmp = recallocarray(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries, + hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + hostkeys->entries = tmp; + hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host); + hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path); + hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum; + hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key; + l->key = NULL; /* steal it */ + hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker; + hostkeys->num_entries++; + ctx->num_loaded++; + + return 0; +} + +void +load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path) +{ + int r; + struct load_callback_ctx ctx; + + ctx.host = host; + ctx.num_loaded = 0; + ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys; + + if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(path, record_hostkey, &ctx, host, NULL, + HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT) + debug("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s", + __func__, path, ssh_err(r)); + } + if (ctx.num_loaded != 0) + debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys from %s", __func__, + ctx.num_loaded, host); +} + +void +free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { + free(hostkeys->entries[i].host); + free(hostkeys->entries[i].file); + sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key); + explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries)); + } + free(hostkeys->entries); + explicit_bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys)); + free(hostkeys); +} + +static int +check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k) +{ + int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k); + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { + if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE) + continue; + if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) + return -1; + if (is_cert && + sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, + hostkeys->entries[i].key)) + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type. + * + * If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return + * HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW. + * + * If looking for a key (key != NULL): + * 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK + * 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK + * 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then + * return HOST_CHANGED + * 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW. + * + * Finally, check any found key is not revoked. + */ +static HostStatus +check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, + struct sshkey *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found) +{ + u_int i; + HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW; + int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k); + HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE; + + if (found != NULL) + *found = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { + if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker) + continue; + if (k == NULL) { + if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype) + continue; + end_return = HOST_FOUND; + if (found != NULL) + *found = hostkeys->entries + i; + k = hostkeys->entries[i].key; + break; + } + if (want_cert) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, + hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { + /* A matching CA exists */ + end_return = HOST_OK; + if (found != NULL) + *found = hostkeys->entries + i; + break; + } + } else { + if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { + end_return = HOST_OK; + if (found != NULL) + *found = hostkeys->entries + i; + break; + } + /* A non-maching key exists */ + end_return = HOST_CHANGED; + if (found != NULL) + *found = hostkeys->entries + i; + } + } + if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) { + end_return = HOST_REVOKED; + if (found != NULL) + *found = NULL; + } + return end_return; +} + +HostStatus +check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key, + const struct hostkey_entry **found) +{ + if (key == NULL) + fatal("no key to look up"); + return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found); +} + +int +lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype, + const struct hostkey_entry **found) +{ + return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype, + found) == HOST_FOUND); +} + +static int +write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip, + const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash) +{ + int r, success = 0; + char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost; + + lhost = xstrdup(host); + lowercase(lhost); + + if (store_hash) { + if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) { + error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__); + free(lhost); + return 0; + } + fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host); + } else if (ip != NULL) + fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip); + else { + fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost); + } + free(lhost); + if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0) + success = 1; + else + error("%s: sshkey_write failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fputc('\n', f); + return success; +} + +/* + * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not + * be appended. + */ +int +add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, + const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash) +{ + FILE *f; + int success; + + if (key == NULL) + return 1; /* XXX ? */ + f = fopen(filename, "a"); + if (!f) + return 0; + success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash); + fclose(f); + return success; +} + +struct host_delete_ctx { + FILE *out; + int quiet; + const char *host; + int *skip_keys; /* XXX split for host/ip? might want to ensure both */ + struct sshkey * const *keys; + size_t nkeys; + int modified; +}; + +static int +host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) +{ + struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx; + int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; + size_t i; + + if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { + if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { + /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + return 0; + } + + /* + * If this line contains one of the keys that we will be + * adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for + * skipping. + */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key)) { + ctx->skip_keys[i] = 1; + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + debug3("%s: %s key already at %s:%ld", __func__, + sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); + return 0; + } + } + + /* + * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it + * by *not* writing the line to ctx->out. + */ + do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s", + ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "", + l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host); + ctx->modified = 1; + return 0; + } + /* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */ + if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { + do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry", + ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "", + l->path, l->linenum); + } + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + return 0; +} + +int +hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip, + struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg) +{ + int r, fd, oerrno = 0; + int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; + struct host_delete_ctx ctx; + char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL; + mode_t omask; + size_t i; + + omask = umask(077); + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.host = host; + ctx.quiet = quiet; + if ((ctx.skip_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.skip_keys))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + ctx.keys = keys; + ctx.nkeys = nkeys; + ctx.modified = 0; + + /* + * Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion. + */ + if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) < 0 || + (r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + + if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) { + oerrno = errno; + error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno)); + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto fail; + } + if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { + oerrno = errno; + close(fd); + error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno)); + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto fail; + } + + /* Remove all entries for the specified host from the file */ + if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip, + HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) { + error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto fail; + } + + /* Add the requested keys */ + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if (ctx.skip_keys[i]) + continue; + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + do_log2(loglevel, "%s%sAdding new key for %s to %s: %s %s", + quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", host, filename, + sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp); + free(fp); + if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip, keys[i], store_hash)) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto fail; + } + ctx.modified = 1; + } + fclose(ctx.out); + ctx.out = NULL; + + if (ctx.modified) { + /* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */ + if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) { + oerrno = errno; + error("%s: unlink %.100s: %s", __func__, + back, strerror(errno)); + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto fail; + } + if (link(filename, back) == -1) { + oerrno = errno; + error("%s: link %.100s to %.100s: %s", __func__, + filename, back, strerror(errno)); + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto fail; + } + if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) { + oerrno = errno; + error("%s: rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", __func__, + temp, filename, strerror(errno)); + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto fail; + } + } else { + /* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */ + if (unlink(temp) != 0) + error("%s: unlink \"%s\": %s", __func__, + temp, strerror(errno)); + } + + /* success */ + r = 0; + fail: + if (temp != NULL && r != 0) + unlink(temp); + free(temp); + free(back); + if (ctx.out != NULL) + fclose(ctx.out); + free(ctx.skip_keys); + umask(omask); + if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) + errno = oerrno; + return r; +} + +static int +match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed) +{ + int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM; + const char *hashed_host; + size_t nlen = strlen(names); + + if (was_hashed != NULL) + *was_hashed = hashed; + if (hashed) { + if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL) + return -1; + return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) && + strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0; + } + return match_hostname(host, names) == 1; +} + +int +hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, + const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options) +{ + FILE *f; + char *line = NULL, ktype[128]; + u_long linenum = 0; + char *cp, *cp2; + u_int kbits; + int hashed; + int s, r = 0; + struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo; + size_t linesize = 0, l; + + memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo)); + if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + + debug3("%s: reading file \"%s\"", __func__, path); + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + linenum++; + line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0'; + + free(lineinfo.line); + sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); + memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo)); + lineinfo.path = path; + lineinfo.linenum = linenum; + lineinfo.line = xstrdup(line); + lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE; + lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK; + lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; + + /* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */ + for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') { + if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) { + lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT; + if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) + break; + } + continue; + } + + if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) { + verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu", + __func__, path, linenum); + if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) + goto bad; + continue; + } + + /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ + for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++) + ; + lineinfo.hosts = cp; + *cp2++ = '\0'; + + /* Check if the host name matches. */ + if (host != NULL) { + if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts, + &hashed)) == -1) { + debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"", + __func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts); + goto bad; + } + if (s == 1) { + lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; + lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST | + (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0); + } + /* Try matching IP address if supplied */ + if (ip != NULL) { + if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts, + &hashed)) == -1) { + debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad ip hash " + "\"%.32s\"", __func__, path, + linenum, lineinfo.hosts); + goto bad; + } + if (s == 1) { + lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; + lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP | + (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0); + } + } + /* + * Skip this line if host matching requested and + * neither host nor address matched. + */ + if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 && + lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) + continue; + } + + /* Got a match. Skip host name and any following whitespace */ + for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++) + ; + if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') { + debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type", + path, linenum); + goto bad; + } + lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2; + + if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) { + /* + * Extract the key from the line. This will skip + * any leading whitespace. Ignore badly formatted + * lines. + */ + if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + break; + } + if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) { + goto bad; + } + lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type; + lineinfo.comment = cp; + } else { + /* Extract and parse key type */ + l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t"); + if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) || + lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0') + goto bad; + memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l); + ktype[l] = '\0'; + lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); + + /* + * Assume legacy RSA1 if the first component is a short + * decimal number. + */ + if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 && + strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l) + goto bad; + + /* + * Check that something other than whitespace follows + * the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but + * it does catch trivial truncation. + */ + cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */ + for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++) + ; + if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') { + debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type", + path, linenum); + lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; + } + if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) { + bad: + sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); + lineinfo.key = NULL; + lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; + if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) + break; + continue; + } + } + if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) + break; + } + sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); + free(lineinfo.line); + free(line); + fclose(f); + return r; +} diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd21043 --- /dev/null +++ b/hostfile.h @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.24 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +#ifndef HOSTFILE_H +#define HOSTFILE_H + +typedef enum { + HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_REVOKED, HOST_FOUND +} HostStatus; + +typedef enum { + MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA +} HostkeyMarker; + +struct hostkey_entry { + char *host; + char *file; + u_long line; + struct sshkey *key; + HostkeyMarker marker; +}; +struct hostkeys; + +struct hostkeys *init_hostkeys(void); +void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *, const char *); +void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *); + +HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *, + const struct hostkey_entry **); +int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int, + const struct hostkey_entry **); + +int hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *); +int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, + const struct sshkey *, int); + +int hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, + const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, + int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg); + +#define HASH_MAGIC "|1|" +#define HASH_DELIM '|' + +#define CA_MARKER "@cert-authority" +#define REVOKE_MARKER "@revoked" + +char *host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int); + +/* + * Iterate through a hostkeys file, optionally parsing keys and matching + * hostnames. Allows access to the raw keyfile lines to allow + * streaming edits to the file to take place. + */ +#define HKF_WANT_MATCH (1) /* return only matching hosts/addrs */ +#define HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY (1<<1) /* need key parsed */ + +#define HKF_STATUS_OK 0 /* Line parsed, didn't match host */ +#define HKF_STATUS_INVALID 1 /* line had parse error */ +#define HKF_STATUS_COMMENT 2 /* valid line contained no key */ +#define HKF_STATUS_MATCHED 3 /* hostname or IP matched */ + +#define HKF_MATCH_HOST (1) /* hostname matched */ +#define HKF_MATCH_IP (1<<1) /* address matched */ +#define HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED (1<<2) /* hostname was hashed */ +#define HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED (1<<3) /* address was hashed */ +/* XXX HKF_MATCH_KEY_TYPE? */ + +/* + * The callback function receives this as an argument for each matching + * hostkey line. The callback may "steal" the 'key' field by setting it to NULL. + * If a parse error occurred, then "hosts" and subsequent options may be NULL. + */ +struct hostkey_foreach_line { + const char *path; /* Path of file */ + u_long linenum; /* Line number */ + u_int status; /* One of HKF_STATUS_* */ + u_int match; /* Zero or more of HKF_MATCH_* OR'd together */ + char *line; /* Entire key line; mutable by callback */ + int marker; /* CA/revocation markers; indicated by MRK_* value */ + const char *hosts; /* Raw hosts text, may be hashed or list multiple */ + const char *rawkey; /* Text of key and any comment following it */ + int keytype; /* Type of key; KEY_UNSPEC for invalid/comment lines */ + struct sshkey *key; /* Key, if parsed ok and HKF_WANT_MATCH_HOST set */ + const char *comment; /* Any comment following the key */ +}; + +/* + * Callback fires for each line (or matching line if a HKF_WANT_* option + * is set). The foreach loop will terminate if the callback returns a non- + * zero exit status. + */ +typedef int hostkeys_foreach_fn(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *ctx); + +/* Iterate over a hostkeys file */ +int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, + const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options); + +#endif diff --git a/includes.h b/includes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0fd7179 --- /dev/null +++ b/includes.h @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.54 2006/07/22 20:48:23 stevesk Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file includes most of the needed system headers. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef INCLUDES_H +#define INCLUDES_H + +#include "config.h" + +#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE +#define _GNU_SOURCE /* activate extra prototypes for glibc */ +#endif + +#include +#include +#include /* For CMSG_* */ + +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +# include /* For PATH_MAX, _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_TTYENT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H +# include /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_NEXT +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif + +/* + *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively + */ +#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H +# include /* For u_intXX_t */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H +# include /* For __P() */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include /* For S_* constants and macros */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H +# include /* For MIN, MAX, etc */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include /* for timespeccmp if present */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H +#include /* for MAP_ANONYMOUS */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H +#include /* for TIOCCBRK on HP-UX */ +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H) && defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) +# if defined(HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H) +# include /* reqd for queue_t on Solaris 2.5.1 */ +# endif +#include /* for grantpt() and friends */ +#endif + +#include +#include /* For typedefs */ +#ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H +# include /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */ +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM +#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) +# include +#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) +# include +#endif +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_IA_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_IAF_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H +# include +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H) +# include +#elif defined(HAVE_LIBUTIL_H) +# include +#endif + +#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) +# include +# include +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H) +# include +#endif + +#include + +/* + * On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations + * of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here. + */ +#ifdef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS +# ifdef _INCLUDE__STDC__ +# undef _INCLUDE__STDC__ +# endif +#endif + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ +#endif + +#include "defines.h" + +#include "platform.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h" + +#include "entropy.h" + +#endif /* INCLUDES_H */ diff --git a/install-sh b/install-sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..377bb86 --- /dev/null +++ b/install-sh @@ -0,0 +1,527 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# install - install a program, script, or datafile + +scriptversion=2011-11-20.07; # UTC + +# This originates from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh), which was +# later released in X11R6 (xc/config/util/install.sh) with the +# following copyright and license. +# +# Copyright (C) 1994 X Consortium +# +# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy +# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to +# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the +# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or +# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is +# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: +# +# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in +# all copies or substantial portions of the Software. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR +# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, +# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +# X CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN +# AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNEC- +# TION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. +# +# Except as contained in this notice, the name of the X Consortium shall not +# be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the sale, use or other deal- +# ings in this Software without prior written authorization from the X Consor- +# tium. +# +# +# FSF changes to this file are in the public domain. +# +# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent +# 'make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it +# when there is no Makefile. +# +# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written +# from scratch. + +nl=' +' +IFS=" "" $nl" + +# set DOITPROG to echo to test this script + +# Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it. +doit=${DOITPROG-} +if test -z "$doit"; then + doit_exec=exec +else + doit_exec=$doit +fi + +# Put in absolute file names if you don't have them in your path; +# or use environment vars. + +chgrpprog=${CHGRPPROG-chgrp} +chmodprog=${CHMODPROG-chmod} +chownprog=${CHOWNPROG-chown} +cmpprog=${CMPPROG-cmp} +cpprog=${CPPROG-cp} +mkdirprog=${MKDIRPROG-mkdir} +mvprog=${MVPROG-mv} +rmprog=${RMPROG-rm} +stripprog=${STRIPPROG-strip} + +posix_glob='?' +initialize_posix_glob=' + test "$posix_glob" != "?" || { + if (set -f) 2>/dev/null; then + posix_glob= + else + posix_glob=: + fi + } +' + +posix_mkdir= + +# Desired mode of installed file. +mode=0755 + +chgrpcmd= +chmodcmd=$chmodprog +chowncmd= +mvcmd=$mvprog +rmcmd="$rmprog -f" +stripcmd= + +src= +dst= +dir_arg= +dst_arg= + +copy_on_change=false +no_target_directory= + +usage="\ +Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [-T] SRCFILE DSTFILE + or: $0 [OPTION]... SRCFILES... DIRECTORY + or: $0 [OPTION]... -t DIRECTORY SRCFILES... + or: $0 [OPTION]... -d DIRECTORIES... + +In the 1st form, copy SRCFILE to DSTFILE. +In the 2nd and 3rd, copy all SRCFILES to DIRECTORY. +In the 4th, create DIRECTORIES. + +Options: + --help display this help and exit. + --version display version info and exit. + + -c (ignored) + -C install only if different (preserve the last data modification time) + -d create directories instead of installing files. + -g GROUP $chgrpprog installed files to GROUP. + -m MODE $chmodprog installed files to MODE. + -o USER $chownprog installed files to USER. + -s $stripprog installed files. + -t DIRECTORY install into DIRECTORY. + -T report an error if DSTFILE is a directory. + +Environment variables override the default commands: + CHGRPPROG CHMODPROG CHOWNPROG CMPPROG CPPROG MKDIRPROG MVPROG + RMPROG STRIPPROG +" + +while test $# -ne 0; do + case $1 in + -c) ;; + + -C) copy_on_change=true;; + + -d) dir_arg=true;; + + -g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2" + shift;; + + --help) echo "$usage"; exit $?;; + + -m) mode=$2 + case $mode in + *' '* | *' '* | *' +'* | *'*'* | *'?'* | *'['*) + echo "$0: invalid mode: $mode" >&2 + exit 1;; + esac + shift;; + + -o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2" + shift;; + + -s) stripcmd=$stripprog;; + + -t) dst_arg=$2 + # Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities. + case $dst_arg in + -* | [=\(\)!]) dst_arg=./$dst_arg;; + esac + shift;; + + -T) no_target_directory=true;; + + --version) echo "$0 $scriptversion"; exit $?;; + + --) shift + break;; + + -*) echo "$0: invalid option: $1" >&2 + exit 1;; + + *) break;; + esac + shift +done + +if test $# -ne 0 && test -z "$dir_arg$dst_arg"; then + # When -d is used, all remaining arguments are directories to create. + # When -t is used, the destination is already specified. + # Otherwise, the last argument is the destination. Remove it from $@. + for arg + do + if test -n "$dst_arg"; then + # $@ is not empty: it contains at least $arg. + set fnord "$@" "$dst_arg" + shift # fnord + fi + shift # arg + dst_arg=$arg + # Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities. + case $dst_arg in + -* | [=\(\)!]) dst_arg=./$dst_arg;; + esac + done +fi + +if test $# -eq 0; then + if test -z "$dir_arg"; then + echo "$0: no input file specified." >&2 + exit 1 + fi + # It's OK to call 'install-sh -d' without argument. + # This can happen when creating conditional directories. + exit 0 +fi + +if test -z "$dir_arg"; then + do_exit='(exit $ret); exit $ret' + trap "ret=129; $do_exit" 1 + trap "ret=130; $do_exit" 2 + trap "ret=141; $do_exit" 13 + trap "ret=143; $do_exit" 15 + + # Set umask so as not to create temps with too-generous modes. + # However, 'strip' requires both read and write access to temps. + case $mode in + # Optimize common cases. + *644) cp_umask=133;; + *755) cp_umask=22;; + + *[0-7]) + if test -z "$stripcmd"; then + u_plus_rw= + else + u_plus_rw='% 200' + fi + cp_umask=`expr '(' 777 - $mode % 1000 ')' $u_plus_rw`;; + *) + if test -z "$stripcmd"; then + u_plus_rw= + else + u_plus_rw=,u+rw + fi + cp_umask=$mode$u_plus_rw;; + esac +fi + +for src +do + # Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities. + case $src in + -* | [=\(\)!]) src=./$src;; + esac + + if test -n "$dir_arg"; then + dst=$src + dstdir=$dst + test -d "$dstdir" + dstdir_status=$? + else + + # Waiting for this to be detected by the "$cpprog $src $dsttmp" command + # might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad + # if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'. + if test ! -f "$src" && test ! -d "$src"; then + echo "$0: $src does not exist." >&2 + exit 1 + fi + + if test -z "$dst_arg"; then + echo "$0: no destination specified." >&2 + exit 1 + fi + dst=$dst_arg + + # If destination is a directory, append the input filename; won't work + # if double slashes aren't ignored. + if test -d "$dst"; then + if test -n "$no_target_directory"; then + echo "$0: $dst_arg: Is a directory" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + dstdir=$dst + dst=$dstdir/`basename "$src"` + dstdir_status=0 + else + # Prefer dirname, but fall back on a substitute if dirname fails. + dstdir=` + (dirname "$dst") 2>/dev/null || + expr X"$dst" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \ + X"$dst" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \ + X"$dst" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \ + X"$dst" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null || + echo X"$dst" | + sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\(\/\/\)$/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + /^X\(\/\).*/{ + s//\1/ + q + } + s/.*/./; q' + ` + + test -d "$dstdir" + dstdir_status=$? + fi + fi + + obsolete_mkdir_used=false + + if test $dstdir_status != 0; then + case $posix_mkdir in + '') + # Create intermediate dirs using mode 755 as modified by the umask. + # This is like FreeBSD 'install' as of 1997-10-28. + umask=`umask` + case $stripcmd.$umask in + # Optimize common cases. + *[2367][2367]) mkdir_umask=$umask;; + .*0[02][02] | .[02][02] | .[02]) mkdir_umask=22;; + + *[0-7]) + mkdir_umask=`expr $umask + 22 \ + - $umask % 100 % 40 + $umask % 20 \ + - $umask % 10 % 4 + $umask % 2 + `;; + *) mkdir_umask=$umask,go-w;; + esac + + # With -d, create the new directory with the user-specified mode. + # Otherwise, rely on $mkdir_umask. + if test -n "$dir_arg"; then + mkdir_mode=-m$mode + else + mkdir_mode= + fi + + posix_mkdir=false + case $umask in + *[123567][0-7][0-7]) + # POSIX mkdir -p sets u+wx bits regardless of umask, which + # is incompatible with FreeBSD 'install' when (umask & 300) != 0. + ;; + *) + tmpdir=${TMPDIR-/tmp}/ins$RANDOM-$$ + trap 'ret=$?; rmdir "$tmpdir/d" "$tmpdir" 2>/dev/null; exit $ret' 0 + + if (umask $mkdir_umask && + exec $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode -p -- "$tmpdir/d") >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + if test -z "$dir_arg" || { + # Check for POSIX incompatibilities with -m. + # HP-UX 11.23 and IRIX 6.5 mkdir -m -p sets group- or + # other-writable bit of parent directory when it shouldn't. + # FreeBSD 6.1 mkdir -m -p sets mode of existing directory. + ls_ld_tmpdir=`ls -ld "$tmpdir"` + case $ls_ld_tmpdir in + d????-?r-*) different_mode=700;; + d????-?--*) different_mode=755;; + *) false;; + esac && + $mkdirprog -m$different_mode -p -- "$tmpdir" && { + ls_ld_tmpdir_1=`ls -ld "$tmpdir"` + test "$ls_ld_tmpdir" = "$ls_ld_tmpdir_1" + } + } + then posix_mkdir=: + fi + rmdir "$tmpdir/d" "$tmpdir" + else + # Remove any dirs left behind by ancient mkdir implementations. + rmdir ./$mkdir_mode ./-p ./-- 2>/dev/null + fi + trap '' 0;; + esac;; + esac + + if + $posix_mkdir && ( + umask $mkdir_umask && + $doit_exec $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode -p -- "$dstdir" + ) + then : + else + + # The umask is ridiculous, or mkdir does not conform to POSIX, + # or it failed possibly due to a race condition. Create the + # directory the slow way, step by step, checking for races as we go. + + case $dstdir in + /*) prefix='/';; + [-=\(\)!]*) prefix='./';; + *) prefix='';; + esac + + eval "$initialize_posix_glob" + + oIFS=$IFS + IFS=/ + $posix_glob set -f + set fnord $dstdir + shift + $posix_glob set +f + IFS=$oIFS + + prefixes= + + for d + do + test X"$d" = X && continue + + prefix=$prefix$d + if test -d "$prefix"; then + prefixes= + else + if $posix_mkdir; then + (umask=$mkdir_umask && + $doit_exec $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode -p -- "$dstdir") && break + # Don't fail if two instances are running concurrently. + test -d "$prefix" || exit 1 + else + case $prefix in + *\'*) qprefix=`echo "$prefix" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; + *) qprefix=$prefix;; + esac + prefixes="$prefixes '$qprefix'" + fi + fi + prefix=$prefix/ + done + + if test -n "$prefixes"; then + # Don't fail if two instances are running concurrently. + (umask $mkdir_umask && + eval "\$doit_exec \$mkdirprog $prefixes") || + test -d "$dstdir" || exit 1 + obsolete_mkdir_used=true + fi + fi + fi + + if test -n "$dir_arg"; then + { test -z "$chowncmd" || $doit $chowncmd "$dst"; } && + { test -z "$chgrpcmd" || $doit $chgrpcmd "$dst"; } && + { test "$obsolete_mkdir_used$chowncmd$chgrpcmd" = false || + test -z "$chmodcmd" || $doit $chmodcmd $mode "$dst"; } || exit 1 + else + + # Make a couple of temp file names in the proper directory. + dsttmp=$dstdir/_inst.$$_ + rmtmp=$dstdir/_rm.$$_ + + # Trap to clean up those temp files at exit. + trap 'ret=$?; rm -f "$dsttmp" "$rmtmp" && exit $ret' 0 + + # Copy the file name to the temp name. + (umask $cp_umask && $doit_exec $cpprog "$src" "$dsttmp") && + + # and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits. + # + # If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. If we want to + # ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore + # errors from the above "$doit $cpprog $src $dsttmp" command. + # + { test -z "$chowncmd" || $doit $chowncmd "$dsttmp"; } && + { test -z "$chgrpcmd" || $doit $chgrpcmd "$dsttmp"; } && + { test -z "$stripcmd" || $doit $stripcmd "$dsttmp"; } && + { test -z "$chmodcmd" || $doit $chmodcmd $mode "$dsttmp"; } && + + # If -C, don't bother to copy if it wouldn't change the file. + if $copy_on_change && + old=`LC_ALL=C ls -dlL "$dst" 2>/dev/null` && + new=`LC_ALL=C ls -dlL "$dsttmp" 2>/dev/null` && + + eval "$initialize_posix_glob" && + $posix_glob set -f && + set X $old && old=:$2:$4:$5:$6 && + set X $new && new=:$2:$4:$5:$6 && + $posix_glob set +f && + + test "$old" = "$new" && + $cmpprog "$dst" "$dsttmp" >/dev/null 2>&1 + then + rm -f "$dsttmp" + else + # Rename the file to the real destination. + $doit $mvcmd -f "$dsttmp" "$dst" 2>/dev/null || + + # The rename failed, perhaps because mv can't rename something else + # to itself, or perhaps because mv is so ancient that it does not + # support -f. + { + # Now remove or move aside any old file at destination location. + # We try this two ways since rm can't unlink itself on some + # systems and the destination file might be busy for other + # reasons. In this case, the final cleanup might fail but the new + # file should still install successfully. + { + test ! -f "$dst" || + $doit $rmcmd -f "$dst" 2>/dev/null || + { $doit $mvcmd -f "$dst" "$rmtmp" 2>/dev/null && + { $doit $rmcmd -f "$rmtmp" 2>/dev/null; :; } + } || + { echo "$0: cannot unlink or rename $dst" >&2 + (exit 1); exit 1 + } + } && + + # Now rename the file to the real destination. + $doit $mvcmd "$dsttmp" "$dst" + } + fi || exit 1 + + trap '' 0 + fi +done + +# Local variables: +# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp) +# time-stamp-start: "scriptversion=" +# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d.%02H" +# time-stamp-time-zone: "UTC" +# time-stamp-end: "; # UTC" +# End: diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25f9f66 --- /dev/null +++ b/kex.c @@ -0,0 +1,1043 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.141 2018/07/09 13:37:10 sf Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "monitor.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "digest.h" + +/* prototype */ +static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); +static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { + "KEX algorithms", + "host key algorithms", + "ciphers ctos", + "ciphers stoc", + "MACs ctos", + "MACs stoc", + "compression ctos", + "compression stoc", + "languages ctos", + "languages stoc", +}; + +struct kexalg { + char *name; + u_int type; + int ec_nid; + int hash_alg; +}; +static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, + { KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, + { KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, + { KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, + { KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, + { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 + { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, + NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, + { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, + SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, + SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, + { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ + { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, +}; + +char * +kex_alg_list(char sep) +{ + char *ret = NULL, *tmp; + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct kexalg *k; + + for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = sep; + nlen = strlen(k->name); + if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret = tmp; + memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1); + rlen += nlen; + } + return ret; +} + +static const struct kexalg * +kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) +{ + const struct kexalg *k; + + for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { + if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) + return k; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* Validate KEX method name list */ +int +kex_names_valid(const char *names) +{ + char *s, *cp, *p; + + if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) + return 0; + if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) + return 0; + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { + error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); + free(s); + return 0; + } + } + debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names); + free(s); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process. + * Caller must free returned string. + */ +char * +kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) +{ + char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m; + size_t len; + + if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') + return strdup(b); + if (b == NULL || *b == '\0') + return strdup(a); + if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024) + return NULL; + len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2; + if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL || + (ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { + free(tmp); + return NULL; + } + strlcpy(ret, a, len); + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) { + free(m); + continue; /* Algorithm already present */ + } + if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len || + strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) { + free(tmp); + free(ret); + return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */ + } + } + free(tmp); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a + * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to + * indicate that it should be appended to the default or '-' that the + * specified names should be removed. + */ +int +kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all) +{ + char *cp, *tmp, *patterns; + char *list = NULL, *ret = NULL, *matching = NULL, *opatterns = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (listp == NULL || *listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') { + if ((*listp = strdup(def)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; + } + + list = *listp; + *listp = NULL; + if (*list == '+') { + /* Append names to default list */ + if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(def, list + 1)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + free(list); + list = tmp; + } else if (*list == '-') { + /* Remove names from default list */ + if ((*listp = match_filter_blacklist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + free(list); + /* filtering has already been done */ + return 0; + } else { + /* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */ + } + + /* + * The supplied names may be a pattern-list. For the -list case, + * the patterns are applied above. For the +list and explicit list + * cases we need to do it now. + */ + ret = NULL; + if ((patterns = opatterns = strdup(list)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + /* Apply positive (i.e. non-negated) patterns from the list */ + while ((cp = strsep(&patterns, ",")) != NULL) { + if (*cp == '!') { + /* negated matches are not supported here */ + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto fail; + } + free(matching); + if ((matching = match_filter_whitelist(all, cp)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(ret, matching)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + free(ret); + ret = tmp; + } + if (ret == NULL || *ret == '\0') { + /* An empty name-list is an error */ + /* XXX better error code? */ + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto fail; + } + + /* success */ + *listp = ret; + ret = NULL; + r = 0; + + fail: + free(matching); + free(opatterns); + free(list); + free(ret); + return r; +} + +/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ +int +kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) +{ + u_int i; + int r; + + sshbuf_reset(b); + + /* + * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by + * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set + */ + for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0) + return r; + } + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0) + return r; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */ + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */ + return r; + return 0; +} + +/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */ +int +kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + u_char v; + u_int i; + char **proposal = NULL; + int r; + + *propp = NULL; + if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) /* skip cookie */ + goto out; + /* extract kex init proposal strings */ + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]); + } + /* first kex follows / reserved */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */ + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) /* reserved */ + goto out; + if (first_kex_follows != NULL) + *first_kex_follows = v; + debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v); + debug2("reserved %u ", i); + r = 0; + *propp = proposal; + out: + if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL) + kex_prop_free(proposal); + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +void +kex_prop_free(char **proposal) +{ + u_int i; + + if (proposal == NULL) + return; + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) + free(proposal[i]); + free(proposal); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r; + + error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +static void +kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN, + SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error); +} + +static int +kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r; + char *algs; + + if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + /* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + free(algs); + return r; +} + +int +kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r; + + kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent"); + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys); + if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c) + if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +int +kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + u_int32_t i, ninfo; + char *name; + u_char *val; + size_t vlen; + int r; + + debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0) + return r; + for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) { + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &vlen)) != 0) { + free(name); + return r; + } + if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) { + /* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */ + if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) { + error("%s: nul byte in %s", __func__, name); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val); + kex->server_sig_algs = val; + val = NULL; + } else + debug("%s: %s (unrecognised)", __func__, name); + free(name); + free(val); + } + return sshpkt_get_end(ssh); +} + +static int +kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + int r; + + debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0) + return r; + kex->done = 1; + sshbuf_reset(kex->peer); + /* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */ + kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT; + free(kex->name); + kex->name = NULL; + return 0; +} + +int +kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_char *cookie; + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + int r; + + if (kex == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) + return 0; + kex->done = 0; + + /* generate a random cookie */ + if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent"); + kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT; + return 0; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + const u_char *ptr; + u_int i; + size_t dlen; + int r; + + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received"); + if (kex == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL); + ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) + return r; + + /* discard packet */ + for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + /* + * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported + * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using + * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should + * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a + * packet later. + * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means + * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should + * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now. + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */ + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + + if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) + if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + + if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) + return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh); + + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +int +kex_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **kexp) +{ + struct kex *kex; + int r; + + *kexp = NULL; + if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, proposal)) != 0) + goto out; + kex->done = 0; + kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); + r = 0; + *kexp = kex; + out: + if (r != 0) + kex_free(kex); + return r; +} + +void +kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys) +{ + if (newkeys == NULL) + return; + if (newkeys->enc.key) { + explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len); + free(newkeys->enc.key); + newkeys->enc.key = NULL; + } + if (newkeys->enc.iv) { + explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len); + free(newkeys->enc.iv); + newkeys->enc.iv = NULL; + } + free(newkeys->enc.name); + explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc)); + free(newkeys->comp.name); + explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); + mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); + if (newkeys->mac.key) { + explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len); + free(newkeys->mac.key); + newkeys->mac.key = NULL; + } + free(newkeys->mac.name); + explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac)); + explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys)); + free(newkeys); +} + +void +kex_free(struct kex *kex) +{ + u_int mode; + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + DH_free(kex->dh); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]); + kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; + } + sshbuf_free(kex->peer); + sshbuf_free(kex->my); + free(kex->session_id); + free(kex->client_version_string); + free(kex->server_version_string); + free(kex->failed_choice); + free(kex->hostkey_alg); + free(kex->name); + free(kex); +} + +int +kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0) + return r; + if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */ + kex_free(ssh->kex); + ssh->kex = NULL; + return r; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error + * code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress. + */ +int +kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (ssh->kex == NULL) { + error("%s: no kex", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if (ssh->kex->done == 0) { + error("%s: requested twice", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ssh->kex->done = 0; + return kex_send_kexinit(ssh); +} + +static int +choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) +{ + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + + if (name == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; + if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) { + free(name); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + enc->name = name; + enc->enabled = 0; + enc->iv = NULL; + enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher); + enc->key = NULL; + enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher); + enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher); + return 0; +} + +static int +choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server) +{ + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + + if (name == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; + if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) { + free(name); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + mac->name = name; + mac->key = NULL; + mac->enabled = 0; + return 0; +} + +static int +choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) +{ + char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + + if (name == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; + if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { + comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; + } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { + comp->type = COMP_ZLIB; + } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) { + comp->type = COMP_NONE; + } else { + free(name); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + comp->name = name; + return 0; +} + +static int +choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) +{ + const struct kexalg *kexalg; + + k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL); + + debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)"); + if (k->name == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH; + if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + k->kex_type = kexalg->type; + k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg; + k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid; + return 0; +} + +static int +choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) +{ + k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL); + + debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s", + k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)"); + if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH; + k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg); + if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg); + return 0; +} + +static int +proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX]) +{ + static int check[] = { + PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1 + }; + int *idx; + char *p; + + for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) { + if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL) + *p = '\0'; + if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL) + *p = '\0'; + if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) { + debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s", + my[*idx], peer[*idx]); + return (0); + } + } + debug2("proposals match"); + return (1); +} + +static int +kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + struct newkeys *newkeys; + char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL; + char **cprop, **sprop; + int nenc, nmac, ncomp; + u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen; + int r, first_kex_follows; + + debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client"); + if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0) + goto out; + debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server"); + if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0) + goto out; + + if (kex->server) { + cprop=peer; + sprop=my; + } else { + cprop=my; + sprop=peer; + } + + /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */ + if (kex->server) { + char *ext; + + ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); + kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL); + free(ext); + } + + /* Algorithm Negotiation */ + if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], + sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; + peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], + sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; + peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL; + goto out; + } + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys; + ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || + (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); + nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; + nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; + ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; + if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], + sprop[nenc])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc]; + peer[nenc] = NULL; + goto out; + } + authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher); + /* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */ + if (authlen == 0 && + (r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], + sprop[nmac])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac]; + peer[nmac] = NULL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], + sprop[ncomp])) != 0) { + kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp]; + peer[ncomp] = NULL; + goto out; + } + debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s", + ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client", + newkeys->enc.name, + authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", + newkeys->comp.name); + } + need = dh_need = 0; + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; + need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.key_len); + need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.block_size); + need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); + need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->mac.key_len); + dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher)); + dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); + dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); + dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); + } + /* XXX need runden? */ + kex->we_need = need; + kex->dh_need = dh_need; + + /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ + if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer)) + ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1; + r = 0; + out: + kex_prop_free(my); + kex_prop_free(peer); + return r; +} + +static int +derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, + const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL; + char c = id; + u_int have; + size_t mdsz; + u_char *digest; + int r; + + if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((digest = calloc(1, ROUNDUP(need, mdsz))) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */ + if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || + ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || + ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || + ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 || + ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id, + kex->session_id_len) != 0 || + ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + ssh_digest_free(hashctx); + hashctx = NULL; + + /* + * expand key: + * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1) + * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn + */ + for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) { + if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || + ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || + ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || + ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 || + ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + ssh_digest_free(hashctx); + hashctx = NULL; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c); + dump_digest("key", digest, need); +#endif + *keyp = digest; + digest = NULL; + r = 0; + out: + free(digest); + ssh_digest_free(hashctx); + return r; +} + +#define NKEYS 6 +int +kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, + const struct sshbuf *shared_secret) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + u_char *keys[NKEYS]; + u_int i, j, mode, ctos; + int r; + + for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) { + if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen, + shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) { + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + free(keys[j]); + return r; + } + } + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || + (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); + kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1]; + kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3]; + kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5]; + } + return 0; +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +int +kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, + const BIGNUM *secret) +{ + struct sshbuf *shared_secret; + int r; + + if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(shared_secret, secret)) == 0) + r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); + sshbuf_free(shared_secret); + return r; +} +#endif + + +#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) +void +dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); + sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr); +} +#endif diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..593de12 --- /dev/null +++ b/kex.h @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.91 2018/07/11 18:53:29 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef KEX_H +#define KEX_H + +#include "mac.h" + +#ifdef WITH_LEAKMALLOC +#include "leakmalloc.h" +#endif + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +# include +# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +# define EC_KEY void +# define EC_GROUP void +# define EC_POINT void +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +# define DH void +# define BIGNUM void +# define EC_KEY void +# define EC_GROUP void +# define EC_POINT void +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16 + +#define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" +#define KEX_DH14_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" +#define KEX_DH14_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" +#define KEX_DH16_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" +#define KEX_DH18_SHA512 "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512" +#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" +#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" +#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256 "ecdh-sha2-nistp256" +#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384 "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" +#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521 "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" +#define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256 "curve25519-sha256" +#define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" + +#define COMP_NONE 0 +/* pre-auth compression (COMP_ZLIB) is only supported in the client */ +#define COMP_ZLIB 1 +#define COMP_DELAYED 2 + +#define CURVE25519_SIZE 32 + +enum kex_init_proposals { + PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, + PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, + PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS, + PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC, + PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS, + PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC, + PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS, + PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC, + PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS, + PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC, + PROPOSAL_MAX +}; + +enum kex_modes { + MODE_IN, + MODE_OUT, + MODE_MAX +}; + +enum kex_exchange { + KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, + KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, + KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, + KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, + KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, + KEX_ECDH_SHA2, + KEX_C25519_SHA256, + KEX_MAX +}; + +#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001 + +struct sshenc { + char *name; + const struct sshcipher *cipher; + int enabled; + u_int key_len; + u_int iv_len; + u_int block_size; + u_char *key; + u_char *iv; +}; +struct sshcomp { + u_int type; + int enabled; + char *name; +}; +struct newkeys { + struct sshenc enc; + struct sshmac mac; + struct sshcomp comp; +}; + +struct ssh; + +struct kex { + u_char *session_id; + size_t session_id_len; + struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; + u_int we_need; + u_int dh_need; + int server; + char *name; + char *hostkey_alg; + int hostkey_type; + int hostkey_nid; + u_int kex_type; + char *server_sig_algs; + int ext_info_c; + struct sshbuf *my; + struct sshbuf *peer; + sig_atomic_t done; + u_int flags; + int hash_alg; + int ec_nid; + char *client_version_string; + char *server_version_string; + char *failed_choice; + int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); + struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); + struct sshkey *(*load_host_private_key)(int, int, struct ssh *); + int (*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *); + int (*sign)(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); + int (*kex[KEX_MAX])(struct ssh *); + /* kex specific state */ + DH *dh; /* DH */ + u_int min, max, nbits; /* GEX */ + EC_KEY *ec_client_key; /* ECDH */ + const EC_GROUP *ec_group; /* ECDH */ + u_char c25519_client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */ + u_char c25519_client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */ +}; + +int kex_names_valid(const char *); +char *kex_alg_list(char); +char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *); +int kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *); + +int kex_new(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **); +int kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); +void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *); +void kex_free(struct kex *); + +int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *, int *, char ***); +int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]); +void kex_prop_free(char **); + +int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *); +int kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int kex_input_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *); +int kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const BIGNUM *); +int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *); +int kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *); + +int kexdh_client(struct ssh *); +int kexdh_server(struct ssh *); +int kexgex_client(struct ssh *); +int kexgex_server(struct ssh *); +int kexecdh_client(struct ssh *); +int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *); +int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *); +int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *); + +int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *, + const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, + const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *); + +int kexgex_hash(int, const char *, const char *, + const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, + int, int, int, + const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, + const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, + u_char *, size_t *); + +int kex_ecdh_hash(int, const EC_GROUP *, const char *, const char *, + const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, + const EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *); + +int kex_c25519_hash(int, const char *, const char *, + const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, + const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, const u_char *, + const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t *); + +void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); +int kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], + const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); + +#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) +void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int); +#endif + +#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) || !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +# undef EC_KEY +# undef EC_GROUP +# undef EC_POINT +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/kexc25519.c b/kexc25519.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0897b8c --- /dev/null +++ b/kexc25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.10 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE], + const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE]) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE))); + +void +kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) +{ + static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9}; + + arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE); + crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint); +} + +int +kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], + const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out) +{ + u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; + int r; + + /* Check for all-zero public key */ + explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(pub, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; + + crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); +#endif + sshbuf_reset(out); + r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); + explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); + return r; +} + +int +kex_c25519_hash( + int hash_alg, + const char *client_version_string, + const char *server_version_string, + const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen, + const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen, + const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen, + const u_char client_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], + const u_char server_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], + const u_char *shared_secret, size_t secretlen, + u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + int r; + + if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) < 0 || + /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, client_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, server_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, shared_secret, secretlen)) < 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + sshbuf_free(b); + *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen); +#endif + return 0; +} diff --git a/kexc25519c.c b/kexc25519c.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8d9214 --- /dev/null +++ b/kexc25519c.c @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519c.c,v 1.9 2017/12/18 02:25:15 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +static int +input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh); + +int +kexc25519_client(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + int r; + + kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, kex->c25519_client_pubkey); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + dump_digest("client private key:", kex->c25519_client_key, + sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); +#endif + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, kex->c25519_client_pubkey, + sizeof(kex->c25519_client_pubkey))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_c25519_reply); + return 0; +} + +static int +input_kex_c25519_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; + struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; + u_char *server_pubkey = NULL; + u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen; + int r; + + if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + + /* hostkey */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob, + &sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + &server_host_key)) != 0) + goto out; + if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type || + (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA && + server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + + /* Q_S, server public key */ + /* signed H */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + dump_digest("server public key:", server_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE); +#endif + + if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pubkey, + shared_secret)) < 0) + goto out; + + /* calc and verify H */ + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kex_c25519_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), + sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + kex->c25519_client_pubkey, + server_pubkey, + sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), + hash, &hashlen)) < 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen, + kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* save session id */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); +out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key)); + free(server_host_key_blob); + free(server_pubkey); + free(signature); + sshkey_free(server_host_key); + sshbuf_free(shared_secret); + return r; +} diff --git a/kexc25519s.c b/kexc25519s.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0800a7a --- /dev/null +++ b/kexc25519s.c @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.11 2017/05/31 04:19:28 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved. + * + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +static int input_kex_c25519_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +int +kexc25519_server(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_c25519_init); + return 0; +} + +static int +input_kex_c25519_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public; + struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; + u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; + u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; + u_char *client_pubkey = NULL; + u_char server_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen; + int r; + + /* generate private key */ + kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pubkey); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + dump_digest("server private key:", server_key, sizeof(server_key)); +#endif + if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || + kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, + kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); + server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, + kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); + if (server_host_public == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &client_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + dump_digest("client public key:", client_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE); +#endif + + if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(server_key, client_pubkey, + shared_secret)) < 0) + goto out; + + /* calc H */ + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, + &sbloblen)) != 0) + goto out; + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kex_c25519_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), + sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + client_pubkey, + server_pubkey, + sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), + hash, &hashlen)) < 0) + goto out; + + /* save session id := H */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + /* sign H */ + if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, + &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0) + goto out; + + /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_pubkey, sizeof(server_pubkey))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); +out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key)); + free(server_host_key_blob); + free(signature); + free(client_pubkey); + sshbuf_free(shared_secret); + return r; +} diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6925b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/kexdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.26 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include + +#include + +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "digest.h" + +int +kex_dh_hash( + int hash_alg, + const char *client_version_string, + const char *server_version_string, + const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen, + const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen, + const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen, + const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub, + const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub, + const BIGNUM *shared_secret, + u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + int r; + + if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 || + /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + sshbuf_free(b); + *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen); +#endif + return 0; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/kexdhc.c b/kexdhc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b56377 --- /dev/null +++ b/kexdhc.c @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexdhc.c,v 1.22 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +static int input_kex_dh(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +int +kexdh_client(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + int r; + const BIGNUM *pub_key; + + /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: + kex->dh = dh_new_group1(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: + case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256: + kex->dh = dh_new_group14(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512: + kex->dh = dh_new_group16(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: + kex->dh = dh_new_group18(); + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if (kex->dh == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT"); + if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) + goto out; + DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); + fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +#endif + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY, &input_kex_dh); + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +static int +input_kex_dh(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL; + const BIGNUM *pub_key; + struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; + u_char *kbuf = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen; + int kout, r; + + if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + /* key, cert */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob, + &sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + &server_host_key)) != 0) + goto out; + if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type || + (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA && + server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */ + if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* signed H */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub)); +#endif + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) { + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value"); + r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + goto out; + } + + klen = DH_size(kex->dh); + if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || + (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); +#endif + + /* calc and verify H */ + DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kex_dh_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), + sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + pub_key, + dh_server_pub, + shared_secret, + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen, + kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* save session id */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + DH_free(kex->dh); + kex->dh = NULL; + BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); + if (kbuf) { + explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); + free(kbuf); + } + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + sshkey_free(server_host_key); + free(server_host_key_blob); + free(signature); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/kexdhs.c b/kexdhs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..337aab5 --- /dev/null +++ b/kexdhs.c @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.27 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" + +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +static int input_kex_dh_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +int +kexdh_server(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + int r; + + /* generate server DH public key */ + switch (kex->kex_type) { + case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1: + kex->dh = dh_new_group1(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1: + case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256: + kex->dh = dh_new_group14(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512: + kex->dh = dh_new_group16(); + break; + case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512: + kex->dh = dh_new_group18(); + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if (kex->dh == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) + goto out; + + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT, &input_kex_dh_init); + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +int +input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; + const BIGNUM *pub_key; + struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private; + u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t sbloblen, slen; + size_t klen = 0, hashlen; + int kout, r; + + if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || + kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, + kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); + server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, + kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); + if (server_host_public == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; + goto out; + } + + /* key, cert */ + if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub)); + DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); + fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +#endif + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) { + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value"); + r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + goto out; + } + + klen = DH_size(kex->dh); + if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || + (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); +#endif + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, + &sbloblen)) != 0) + goto out; + /* calc H */ + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kex_dh_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), + sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + dh_client_pub, + pub_key, + shared_secret, + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* save session id := H */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + /* sign H */ + if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, + &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0) + goto out; + + /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */ + + /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + DH_free(kex->dh); + kex->dh = NULL; + BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); + if (kbuf) { + explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); + free(kbuf); + } + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + free(server_host_key_blob); + free(signature); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2a4fec6 --- /dev/null +++ b/kexecdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.6 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +int +kex_ecdh_hash( + int hash_alg, + const EC_GROUP *ec_group, + const char *client_version_string, + const char *server_version_string, + const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen, + const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen, + const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen, + const EC_POINT *client_dh_pub, + const EC_POINT *server_dh_pub, + const BIGNUM *shared_secret, + u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + int r; + + if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 || + /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_ec(b, client_dh_pub, ec_group)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_ec(b, server_dh_pub, ec_group)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + sshbuf_free(b); + *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEX + dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen); +#endif + return 0; +} +#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */ diff --git a/kexecdhc.c b/kexecdhc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac146a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/kexecdhc.c @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.13 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +static int input_kex_ecdh_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +int +kexecdh_client(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + EC_KEY *client_key = NULL; + const EC_GROUP *group; + const EC_POINT *public_key; + int r; + + if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key); + public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, public_key, group)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT"); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + fputs("client private key:\n", stderr); + sshkey_dump_ec_key(client_key); +#endif + kex->ec_client_key = client_key; + kex->ec_group = group; + client_key = NULL; /* owned by the kex */ + + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_ecdh_reply); + r = 0; + out: + EC_KEY_free(client_key); + return r; +} + +static int +input_kex_ecdh_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + const EC_GROUP *group; + EC_POINT *server_public = NULL; + EC_KEY *client_key; + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; + struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; + u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; + u_char *kbuf = NULL; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t slen, sbloblen; + size_t klen = 0, hashlen; + int r; + + if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + group = kex->ec_group; + client_key = kex->ec_client_key; + + /* hostkey */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob, + &sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + &server_host_key)) != 0) + goto out; + if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type || + (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA && + server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + + /* Q_S, server public key */ + /* signed H */ + if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, server_public, group)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + fputs("server public key:\n", stderr); + sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, server_public); +#endif + if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0) { + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid server public key"); + r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + goto out; + } + + klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; + if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || + (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public, + client_key, NULL) != (int)klen || + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen); +#endif + /* calc and verify H */ + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + group, + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), + sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key), + server_public, + shared_secret, + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, + hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* save session id */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); + kex->ec_client_key = NULL; + EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public); + if (kbuf) { + explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); + free(kbuf); + } + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + sshkey_free(server_host_key); + free(server_host_key_blob); + free(signature); + return r; +} +#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */ + diff --git a/kexecdhs.c b/kexecdhs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af4f303 --- /dev/null +++ b/kexecdhs.c @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.17 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "ssh2.h" + +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +static int input_kex_ecdh_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +int +kexecdh_server(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_ecdh_init); + return 0; +} + +static int +input_kex_ecdh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + EC_POINT *client_public; + EC_KEY *server_key = NULL; + const EC_GROUP *group; + const EC_POINT *public_key; + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; + struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public; + u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; + u_char *kbuf = NULL; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t slen, sbloblen; + size_t klen = 0, hashlen; + int r; + + if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + fputs("server private key:\n", stderr); + sshkey_dump_ec_key(server_key); +#endif + + if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || + kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, + kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); + server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, + kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); + if (server_host_public == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; + goto out; + } + if ((client_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, client_public, group)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + fputs("client public key:\n", stderr); + sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, client_public); +#endif + if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, client_public) != 0) { + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid client public key"); + r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + goto out; + } + + /* Calculate shared_secret */ + klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; + if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || + (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, client_public, + server_key, NULL) != (int)klen || + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen); +#endif + /* calc H */ + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, + &sbloblen)) != 0) + goto out; + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kex_ecdh_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + group, + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), + sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + client_public, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key), + shared_secret, + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* save session id := H */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + /* sign H */ + if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, + &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0) + goto out; + + /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */ + + public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key); + /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, public_key, group)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); + kex->ec_client_key = NULL; + EC_KEY_free(server_key); + if (kbuf) { + explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); + free(kbuf); + } + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + free(server_host_key_blob); + free(signature); + return r; +} +#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */ + diff --git a/kexgex.c b/kexgex.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ca4bd3 --- /dev/null +++ b/kexgex.c @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.29 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "digest.h" + +int +kexgex_hash( + int hash_alg, + const char *client_version_string, + const char *server_version_string, + const u_char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen, + const u_char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen, + const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen, + int min, int wantbits, int max, + const BIGNUM *prime, + const BIGNUM *gen, + const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub, + const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub, + const BIGNUM *shared_secret, + u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + int r; + + if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) != 0 || + /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) != 0 || + (min != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, min)) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, wantbits)) != 0 || + (max != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, max)) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, prime)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, gen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, shared_secret)) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(b); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + sshbuf_free(b); + *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen); +#endif + return 0; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d07f73 --- /dev/null +++ b/kexgexc.c @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.27 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" + +static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +int +kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + int r; + u_int nbits; + + nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); + + kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; + kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; + kex->nbits = nbits; + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE) + kex->nbits = MINIMUM(kex->nbits, 4096); + /* New GEX request */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent", + kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n", + kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); +#endif + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, + &input_kex_dh_gex_group); + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +static int +input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL; + const BIGNUM *pub_key; + int r, bits; + + debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP"); + + if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (g = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 || + (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) { + r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; + goto out; + } + if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ + + /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ + if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) + goto out; + DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent"); +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); + fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +#endif + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply); + r = 0; +out: + BN_clear_free(p); + BN_clear_free(g); + return r; +} + +static int +input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL; + const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; + struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; + u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen; + int kout, r; + + debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY"); + if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + /* key, cert */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob, + &sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + &server_host_key)) != 0) + goto out; + if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type || + (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA && + server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */ + if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* signed H */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub)); +#endif + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) { + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value"); + r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + goto out; + } + + klen = DH_size(kex->dh); + if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || + (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); +#endif + if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) + kex->min = kex->max = -1; + + /* calc and verify H */ + DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); + DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kexgex_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), + sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, + dh_p, dh_g, + pub_key, + dh_server_pub, + shared_secret, + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, + hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* save session id */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + DH_free(kex->dh); + kex->dh = NULL; + BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); + if (kbuf) { + explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); + free(kbuf); + } + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + sshkey_free(server_host_key); + free(server_host_key_blob); + free(signature); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/kexgexs.c b/kexgexs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc9c0bc --- /dev/null +++ b/kexgexs.c @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.35 2018/10/04 00:04:41 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "compat.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" + +static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +int +kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, + &input_kex_dh_gex_request); + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST"); + return 0; +} + +static int +input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + int r; + u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0; + const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; + + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + kex->nbits = nbits; + kex->min = min; + kex->max = max; + min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min); + max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max); + nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); + nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); + + if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || + kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) { + r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; + goto out; + } + + /* Contact privileged parent */ + kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); + if (kex->dh == NULL) { + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found"); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent"); + DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ + if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) + goto out; + + debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init); + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +static int +input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; + const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g; + struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private; + u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; + u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t sbloblen, slen; + size_t klen = 0, hashlen; + int kout, r; + + if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || + kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, + kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); + server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, + kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); + if (server_host_public == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; + goto out; + } + + /* key, cert */ + if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL); + DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub)); + DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); + fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); + BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +#endif + if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) { + sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value"); + r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + goto out; + } + + klen = DH_size(kex->dh); + if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || + (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || + BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); +#endif + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, + &sbloblen)) != 0) + goto out; + /* calc H */ + hashlen = sizeof(hash); + if ((r = kexgex_hash( + kex->hash_alg, + kex->client_version_string, + kex->server_version_string, + sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), + sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), + server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, + kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, + dh_p, dh_g, + dh_client_pub, + pub_key, + shared_secret, + hash, &hashlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* save session id := H */ + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + kex->session_id_len = hashlen; + kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); + if (kex->session_id == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); + } + + /* sign H */ + if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, + &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) < 0) + goto out; + + /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */ + + /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) + r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); + out: + explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); + DH_free(kex->dh); + kex->dh = NULL; + BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); + if (kbuf) { + explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); + free(kbuf); + } + BN_clear_free(shared_secret); + free(server_host_key_blob); + free(signature); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e2d5d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/krl.c @@ -0,0 +1,1366 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.42 2018/09/12 01:21:34 djm Exp $ */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "bitmap.h" + +#include "krl.h" + +/* #define DEBUG_KRL */ +#ifdef DEBUG_KRL +# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x +#else +# define KRL_DBG(x) +#endif + +/* + * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows + * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order. + */ + +/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */ +struct revoked_serial { + u_int64_t lo, hi; + RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry; +}; +static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b); +RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial); +RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp); + +/* Tree of key IDs */ +struct revoked_key_id { + char *key_id; + RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry; +}; +static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b); +RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id); +RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp); + +/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */ +struct revoked_blob { + u_char *blob; + size_t len; + RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry; +}; +static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b); +RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob); +RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp); + +/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */ +struct revoked_certs { + struct sshkey *ca_key; + struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials; + struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids; + TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry; +}; +TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs); + +struct ssh_krl { + u_int64_t krl_version; + u_int64_t generated_date; + u_int64_t flags; + char *comment; + struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys; + struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s; + struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha256s; + struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs; +}; + +/* Return equal if a and b overlap */ +static int +serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b) +{ + if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi) + return 0; + return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1; +} + +static int +key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b) +{ + return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id); +} + +static int +blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b) +{ + int r; + + if (a->len != b->len) { + if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0) + return r; + return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1; + } else + return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len); +} + +struct ssh_krl * +ssh_krl_init(void) +{ + struct ssh_krl *krl; + + if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL) + return NULL; + RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys); + RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s); + RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha256s); + TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs); + return krl; +} + +static void +revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc) +{ + struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs; + struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki; + + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); + free(rs); + } + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); + free(rki->key_id); + free(rki); + } + sshkey_free(rc->ca_key); +} + +void +ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl) +{ + struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb; + struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc; + + if (krl == NULL) + return; + + free(krl->comment); + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb); + free(rb->blob); + free(rb); + } + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb); + free(rb->blob); + free(rb); + } + RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, trb) { + RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, rb); + free(rb->blob); + free(rb); + } + TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); + revoked_certs_free(rc); + } +} + +void +ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version) +{ + krl->krl_version = version; +} + +int +ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment) +{ + free(krl->comment); + if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then + * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already. + */ +static int +revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, + struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create) +{ + struct revoked_certs *rc; + int r; + + *rcp = NULL; + TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { + if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) || + sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) { + *rcp = rc; + return 0; + } + } + if (!allow_create) + return 0; + /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */ + if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (ca_key == NULL) + rc->ca_key = NULL; + else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) { + free(rc); + return r; + } + RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials); + RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); + KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__, + ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key))); + *rcp = rc; + return 0; +} + +static int +insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) +{ + struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs; + + KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi)); + memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); + rs.lo = lo; + rs.hi = hi; + ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs); + if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) { + /* No entry matches. Just insert */ + if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs)); + ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs); + if (ers != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__)); + /* Shouldn't happen */ + free(irs); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ers = irs; + } else { + KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__, + ers->lo, ers->hi)); + /* + * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the + * existing entry. + */ + if (ers->lo > lo) + ers->lo = lo; + if (ers->hi < hi) + ers->hi = hi; + } + + /* + * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones; + * coalesce as necessary. + */ + + /* Check predecessors */ + while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); + if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1) + break; + /* This entry overlaps. */ + if (crs->lo < ers->lo) { + ers->lo = crs->lo; + KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__, + ers->lo, ers->hi)); + } + RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); + free(crs); + } + /* Check successors */ + while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); + if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1) + break; + /* This entry overlaps. */ + if (crs->hi > ers->hi) { + ers->hi = crs->hi; + KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__, + ers->lo, ers->hi)); + } + RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); + free(crs); + } + KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, + u_int64_t serial) +{ + return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial); +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, + const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) +{ + struct revoked_certs *rc; + int r; + + if (lo > hi || lo == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) + return r; + return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi); +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, + const char *key_id) +{ + struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki; + struct revoked_certs *rc; + int r; + + if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) + return r; + + KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id)); + if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL || + (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) { + free(rki); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); + if (erki != NULL) { + free(rki->key_id); + free(rki); + } + return 0; +} + +/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */ +static int +plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen) +{ + struct sshkey *kcopy; + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0) + return r; + if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) { + if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) { + sshkey_free(kcopy); + return r; + } + } + r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen); + sshkey_free(kcopy); + return r; +} + +/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */ +static int +revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len) +{ + struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb; + + if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + rb->blob = blob; + rb->len = len; + erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb); + if (erb != NULL) { + free(rb->blob); + free(rb); + } + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + u_char *blob; + size_t len; + int r; + + debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); + if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0) + return r; + return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len); +} + +static int +revoke_by_hash(struct revoked_blob_tree *target, const u_char *p, size_t len) +{ + u_char *blob; + int r; + + /* need to copy hash, as revoke_blob steals ownership */ + if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + memcpy(blob, p, len); + if ((r = revoke_blob(target, blob, len)) != 0) { + free(blob); + return r; + } + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) +{ + debug3("%s: revoke by sha1", __func__); + if (len != 20) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha1s, p, len); +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len) +{ + debug3("%s: revoke by sha256", __func__); + if (len != 32) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha256s, p, len); +} + +int +ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + /* XXX replace with SHA256? */ + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) + return ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); + + if (key->cert->serial == 0) { + return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, + key->cert->signature_key, + key->cert->key_id); + } else { + return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, + key->cert->signature_key, + key->cert->serial); + } +} + +/* + * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on + * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial + * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial. + * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type + * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL. + */ +static int +choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final, + u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section) +{ + int new_state; + u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart; + + /* + * Avoid unsigned overflows. + * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations. + */ + contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31); + last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31); + next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31); + + /* + * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates. + * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their + * switching cost is independent of the current_state. + */ + cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0; + cost_range = 8; + switch (current_state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + cost_list = 8; + cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + case 0: + cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; + cost_list = 8; + } + + /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */ + cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64); + cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64); + cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); + cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64)); + + /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */ + cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8; + cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8; + cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8; + cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8; + + /* Now pick the best choice */ + *force_new_section = 0; + new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; + cost = cost_bitmap; + if (cost_range < cost) { + new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE; + cost = cost_range; + } + if (cost_list < cost) { + new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST; + cost = cost_list; + } + if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) { + new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; + *force_new_section = 1; + cost = cost_bitmap_restart; + } + KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:" + "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, " + "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig, + (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final, + (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range, + (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap, + (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state, + *force_new_section ? " restart" : "")); + return new_state; +} + +static int +put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap) +{ + size_t len; + u_char *blob; + int r; + + len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap); + if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) { + free(blob); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len); + free(blob); + return r; +} + +/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */ +static int +revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0; + struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs; + struct revoked_key_id *rki; + int next_state, state = 0; + struct sshbuf *sect; + struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; + + if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */ + if (rc->ca_key == NULL) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + } else { + if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Store the revoked serials. */ + for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials); + rs != NULL; + rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__, + (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi, + state)); + + /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */ + nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); + final = nrs == NULL; + gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi; + contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo); + + /* Choose next state based on these */ + next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final, + state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect); + + /* + * If the current section is a range section or has a different + * type to the next section, then finish it off now. + */ + if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state || + state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state)); + switch (state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) + goto out; + bitmap_free(bitmap); + bitmap = NULL; + break; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + sshbuf_reset(sect); + } + + /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */ + if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, + next_state)); + state = next_state; + sshbuf_reset(sect); + switch (state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + bitmap_start = rs->lo; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, + bitmap_start)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + } + } + + /* Perform section-specific processing */ + switch (state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0) + goto out; + } + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { + error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__); + goto out; + } + for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { + if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap, + rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + } + break; + } + last = rs->hi; + } + /* Flush the remaining section, if any */ + if (state != 0) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x", + __func__, state)); + switch (state) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) + goto out; + bitmap_free(bitmap); + bitmap = NULL; + break; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__)); + + /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */ + sshbuf_reset(sect); + RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + r = 0; + out: + bitmap_free(bitmap); + sshbuf_free(sect); + return r; +} + +int +ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, + const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct revoked_certs *rc; + struct revoked_blob *rb; + struct sshbuf *sect; + u_char *sblob = NULL; + size_t slen, i; + + if (krl->generated_date == 0) + krl->generated_date = time(NULL); + + if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* Store the header */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Store sections for revoked certificates */ + TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { + sshbuf_reset(sect); + if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */ + sshbuf_reset(sect); + RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + sshbuf_reset(sect); + RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, + KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + sshbuf_reset(sect); + RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, + KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__, + sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i]))); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, + sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + r = 0; + out: + free(sblob); + sshbuf_free(sect); + return r; +} + +static void +format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts) +{ + time_t t; + struct tm *tm; + + t = timestamp; + tm = localtime(&t); + if (tm == NULL) + strlcpy(ts, "", nts); + else { + *ts = '\0'; + strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm); + } +} + +static int +parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + u_char type; + const u_char *blob; + size_t blen, nbits; + struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL; + u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi; + struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; + char *key_id = NULL; + struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL; + + if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* Header: key, reserved */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) + goto out; + if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0) + goto out; + + while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { + sshbuf_free(subsect); + subsect = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0) + goto out; + KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type)); + /* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */ + + switch (type) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: + while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, + ca_key, serial)) != 0) + goto out; + } + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, + ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: + if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect, + &blob, &blen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap); + for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) { + if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) { + error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial)) + continue; + if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, + ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0) + goto out; + } + bitmap_free(bitmap); + bitmap = NULL; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID: + while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect, + &key_id, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, + ca_key, key_id)) != 0) + goto out; + free(key_id); + key_id = NULL; + } + break; + default: + error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { + error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + + r = 0; + out: + if (bitmap != NULL) + bitmap_free(bitmap); + free(key_id); + sshkey_free(ca_key); + sshbuf_free(subsect); + return r; +} + +static int +blob_section(struct sshbuf *sect, struct revoked_blob_tree *target_tree, + size_t expected_len) +{ + u_char *rdata = NULL; + size_t rlen = 0; + int r; + + while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0) + return r; + if (expected_len != 0 && rlen != expected_len) { + error("%s: bad length", __func__); + free(rdata); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + if ((r = revoke_blob(target_tree, rdata, rlen)) != 0) { + free(rdata); + return r; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */ +int +ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, + const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys) +{ + struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL; + struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; + char timestamp[64]; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen; + struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used; + u_char type; + const u_char *blob; + size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, nca_used; + u_int format_version; + + nca_used = 0; + *krlp = NULL; + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 || + memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { + debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC; + } + + /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */ + if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { + error("%s: alloc failed", __func__); + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0) + goto out; + if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + + format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); + debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", + (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp, + *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment); + + /* + * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid + * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified. + */ + sig_seen = 0; + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); + while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) + goto out; + KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); + if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) { + if (sig_seen) { + error("KRL contains non-signature section " + "after signature"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* Not interested for now. */ + continue; + } + sig_seen = 1; + /* First string component is the signing key */ + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); + /* Second string component is the signature itself */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */ + if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen, + sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */ + for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) { + error("KRL signed more than once with " + "the same key"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ + tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1, + sizeof(*ca_used)); + if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + ca_used = tmp_ca_used; + ca_used[nca_used++] = key; + key = NULL; + } + + if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + /* + * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point + * where the section start. + */ + sshbuf_free(copy); + if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0) + goto out; + while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { + sshbuf_free(sect); + sect = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, §)) != 0) + goto out; + KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); + + switch (type) { + case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES: + if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY: + if ((r = blob_section(sect, + &krl->revoked_keys, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1: + if ((r = blob_section(sect, + &krl->revoked_sha1s, 20)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256: + if ((r = blob_section(sect, + &krl->revoked_sha256s, 32)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE: + /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */ + sshbuf_free(sect); + sect = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + default: + error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { + error("KRL section contains unparsed data"); + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + + /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */ + sig_seen = 0; + for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { + if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0) + sig_seen = 1; + else { + sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); + ca_used[i] = NULL; + } + } + if (nca_used && !sig_seen) { + error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked"); + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + goto out; + } + + /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */ + if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) { + sig_seen = 0; + for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) { + if (ca_used[j] == NULL) + continue; + if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) { + sig_seen = 1; + break; + } + } + } + if (!sig_seen) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + error("KRL not signed with any trusted key"); + goto out; + } + } + + *krlp = krl; + r = 0; + out: + if (r != 0) + ssh_krl_free(krl); + for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) + sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); + free(ca_used); + sshkey_free(key); + sshbuf_free(copy); + sshbuf_free(sect); + return r; +} + +/* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */ +static int +is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc) +{ + struct revoked_serial rs, *ers; + struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki; + + /* Check revocation by cert key ID */ + memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki)); + rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id; + erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki); + if (erki != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__)); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + + /* + * Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the + * CA doesn't specify one). + */ + if (key->cert->serial == 0) + return 0; + + memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); + rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial; + ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs); + if (ers != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__, + key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi)); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */ +static int +is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct revoked_blob rb, *erb; + struct revoked_certs *rc; + int r; + + /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */ + memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); + if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, + &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); + free(rb.blob); + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__)); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); + if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, + &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb); + free(rb.blob); + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA256", __func__)); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + + /* Next, explicit keys */ + memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); + if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) + return r; + erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); + free(rb.blob); + if (erb != NULL) { + KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__)); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; + } + + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) + return 0; + + /* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */ + if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key, + &rc, 0)) != 0) + return r; + if (rc != NULL) { + if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) + return r; + } + /* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */ + if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0) + return r; + if (rc != NULL) { + if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) + return r; + } + + KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial)); + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + int r; + + KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__)); + if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0) + return r; + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__); + if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0) + return r; + } + KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__)); + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL; + struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; + int oerrno = 0, r, fd; + + if (path == NULL) + return 0; + + if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + oerrno = errno; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) { + oerrno = errno; + goto out; + } + if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path); + r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key); + out: + if (fd != -1) + close(fd); + sshbuf_free(krlbuf); + ssh_krl_free(krl); + if (r != 0) + errno = oerrno; + return r; +} diff --git a/krl.h b/krl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..815a1df --- /dev/null +++ b/krl.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.6 2018/09/12 01:21:34 djm Exp $ */ + +#ifndef _KRL_H +#define _KRL_H + +/* Functions to manage key revocation lists */ + +#define KRL_MAGIC "SSHKRL\n\0" +#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION 1 + +/* KRL section types */ +#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES 1 +#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY 2 +#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 3 +#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE 4 +#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256 5 + +/* KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES subsection types */ +#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST 0x20 +#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE 0x21 +#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP 0x22 +#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID 0x23 + +struct sshkey; +struct sshbuf; +struct ssh_krl; + +struct ssh_krl *ssh_krl_init(void); +void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl); +void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version); +int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment); +int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, + const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial); +int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, + const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi); +int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, + const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id); +int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); +int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len); +int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len); +int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); +int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, + const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys); +int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, + const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys); +int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key); +int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key); + +#endif /* _KRL_H */ + diff --git a/log.c b/log.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9c2d13 --- /dev/null +++ b/log.c @@ -0,0 +1,480 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.51 2018/07/27 12:03:17 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) +# include +#endif + +#include "log.h" + +static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; +static int log_on_stderr = 1; +static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO; +static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH; +static char *argv0; +static log_handler_fn *log_handler; +static void *log_handler_ctx; + +extern char *__progname; + +#define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS (VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL) +#define LOG_STDERR_VIS (VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL) + +/* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */ + +static struct { + const char *name; + SyslogFacility val; +} log_facilities[] = { + { "DAEMON", SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON }, + { "USER", SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER }, + { "AUTH", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH }, +#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV + { "AUTHPRIV", SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV }, +#endif + { "LOCAL0", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 }, + { "LOCAL1", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 }, + { "LOCAL2", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 }, + { "LOCAL3", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 }, + { "LOCAL4", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 }, + { "LOCAL5", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 }, + { "LOCAL6", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 }, + { "LOCAL7", SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 }, + { NULL, SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET } +}; + +static struct { + const char *name; + LogLevel val; +} log_levels[] = +{ + { "QUIET", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET }, + { "FATAL", SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL }, + { "ERROR", SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR }, + { "INFO", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO }, + { "VERBOSE", SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE }, + { "DEBUG", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 }, + { "DEBUG1", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 }, + { "DEBUG2", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 }, + { "DEBUG3", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 }, + { NULL, SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET } +}; + +LogLevel +log_level_get(void) +{ + return log_level; +} + +SyslogFacility +log_facility_number(char *name) +{ + int i; + + if (name != NULL) + for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++) + if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0) + return log_facilities[i].val; + return SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; +} + +const char * +log_facility_name(SyslogFacility facility) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++) + if (log_facilities[i].val == facility) + return log_facilities[i].name; + return NULL; +} + +LogLevel +log_level_number(char *name) +{ + int i; + + if (name != NULL) + for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++) + if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0) + return log_levels[i].val; + return SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; +} + +const char * +log_level_name(LogLevel level) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name != NULL; i++) + if (log_levels[i].val == level) + return log_levels[i].name; + return NULL; +} + +/* Error messages that should be logged. */ + +void +error(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +void +sigdie(const char *fmt,...) +{ +#ifdef DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +#endif + _exit(1); +} + +void +logdie(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + cleanup_exit(255); +} + +/* Log this message (information that usually should go to the log). */ + +void +logit(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +/* More detailed messages (information that does not need to go to the log). */ + +void +verbose(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +/* Debugging messages that should not be logged during normal operation. */ + +void +debug(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +void +debug2(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +void +debug3(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +/* + * Initialize the log. + */ + +void +log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) + struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; +#endif + + argv0 = av0; + + if (log_change_level(level) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n", + (int) level); + exit(1); + } + + log_handler = NULL; + log_handler_ctx = NULL; + + log_on_stderr = on_stderr; + if (on_stderr) + return; + + switch (facility) { + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON: + log_facility = LOG_DAEMON; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER: + log_facility = LOG_USER; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH: + log_facility = LOG_AUTH; + break; +#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV: + log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV; + break; +#endif + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6; + break; + case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7: + log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7; + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, + "Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n", + (int) facility); + exit(1); + } + + /* + * If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog + * immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong + * facility, so we force an open/close of syslog here. + */ +#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) + openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata); + closelog_r(&sdata); +#else + openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility); + closelog(); +#endif +} + +int +log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level) +{ + /* no-op if log_init has not been called */ + if (argv0 == NULL) + return 0; + + switch (new_log_level) { + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: + log_level = new_log_level; + return 0; + default: + return -1; + } +} + +int +log_is_on_stderr(void) +{ + return log_on_stderr && log_stderr_fd == STDERR_FILENO; +} + +/* redirect what would usually get written to stderr to specified file */ +void +log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *logfile) +{ + int fd; + + if ((fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0600)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open logfile %s: %s\n", logfile, + strerror(errno)); + exit(1); + } + log_stderr_fd = fd; +} + +#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024 + +void +set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *handler, void *ctx) +{ + log_handler = handler; + log_handler_ctx = ctx; +} + +void +do_log2(LogLevel level, const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(level, fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +void +do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, va_list args) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) + struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; +#endif + char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; + char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; + char *txt = NULL; + int pri = LOG_INFO; + int saved_errno = errno; + log_handler_fn *tmp_handler; + + if (level > log_level) + return; + + switch (level) { + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: + if (!log_on_stderr) + txt = "fatal"; + pri = LOG_CRIT; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR: + if (!log_on_stderr) + txt = "error"; + pri = LOG_ERR; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO: + pri = LOG_INFO; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE: + pri = LOG_INFO; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1: + txt = "debug1"; + pri = LOG_DEBUG; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2: + txt = "debug2"; + pri = LOG_DEBUG; + break; + case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3: + txt = "debug3"; + pri = LOG_DEBUG; + break; + default: + txt = "internal error"; + pri = LOG_ERR; + break; + } + if (txt != NULL && log_handler == NULL) { + snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt); + vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args); + } else { + vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args); + } + strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), + log_on_stderr ? LOG_STDERR_VIS : LOG_SYSLOG_VIS); + if (log_handler != NULL) { + /* Avoid recursion */ + tmp_handler = log_handler; + log_handler = NULL; + tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx); + log_handler = tmp_handler; + } else if (log_on_stderr) { + snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n", + (int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf); + (void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf)); + } else { +#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) + openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata); + syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf); + closelog_r(&sdata); +#else + openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility); + syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf); + closelog(); +#endif + } + errno = saved_errno; +} diff --git a/log.h b/log.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef7bea7 --- /dev/null +++ b/log.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.23 2018/07/27 12:03:17 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef SSH_LOG_H +#define SSH_LOG_H + +/* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */ +typedef enum { + SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, +#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV + SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV, +#endif + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET = -1 +} SyslogFacility; + +typedef enum { + SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, + SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET = -1 +} LogLevel; + +typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *); + +void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int); +LogLevel log_level_get(void); +int log_change_level(LogLevel); +int log_is_on_stderr(void); +void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *); + +SyslogFacility log_facility_number(char *); +const char * log_facility_name(SyslogFacility); +LogLevel log_level_number(char *); +const char * log_level_name(LogLevel); + +void fatal(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn)) + __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void error(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void sigdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn)) + __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void logdie(const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn)) + __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void logit(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void verbose(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void debug(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void debug2(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void debug3(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); + + +void set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *); +void do_log2(LogLevel, const char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); +void do_log(LogLevel, const char *, va_list); +void cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn)); +#endif diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a427de --- /dev/null +++ b/loginrec.c @@ -0,0 +1,1724 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. + * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller + * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs + * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under + * the the following license: + * + * Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted + * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, + * advertising materials, and other materials related to such + * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed + * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the + * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived + * from this software without specific prior written permission. + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + */ + + +/** + ** loginrec.c: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval + **/ + +/* + * The new login code explained + * ============================ + * + * This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording + * (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval. + * + * Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a + * union of all the useful fields in the various different types of + * system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants. + * + * We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be + * used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures + * on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code + * gets compiled here. + * + * The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular + * recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so + * many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in + * the old code. + * + * For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as + * these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems + * this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably + * in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back + * to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method + * requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing + * information. These files and their access methods are very system + * specific indeed. + * + * For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are + * setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have + * these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such + * a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp + * code should suffice. + * + * Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even + * more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a + * simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a + * relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in + * a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the + * information separately at all. For systems in the latter category, + * we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry + * for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could + * incur a significant performance penalty. + * + * Calling the new code + * -------------------- + * + * In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in + * login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c + * program there are more examples. + * + * Internal handler calling method + * ------------------------------- + * + * When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both + * routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in, + * or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which + * calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf + * selects for the local system. + * + * The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both + * struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see + * construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems + * that introduce new features to either structure. + * + * While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar + * code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to + * write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining + * support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is + * a difficult and time-consuming task. + * + * Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog() + * (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call + * getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last + * login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can, + * otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0, + * meaning "tilt". + * + * Maintenance + * ----------- + * + * In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct + * methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection + * code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_ or CONF__FILE + * symbols for the platform. + * + * Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying + * configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself + * with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.) + * + * Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful! + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif + +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "loginrec.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include +#endif + +/** + ** prototypes for helper functions in this file + **/ + +#if HAVE_UTMP_H +void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut); +void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H +void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut); +void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut); +#endif + +int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li); + +int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); +int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li); + +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + +/* pick the shortest string */ +#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2)) + +/** + ** platform-independent login functions + **/ + +/* + * login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login + * + * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with + * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry() + * + * Returns: + * >0 if successful + * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) + */ +int +login_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN; + return (login_write(li)); +} + + +/* + * login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout + * + * Call as with login_login() + * + * Returns: + * >0 if successful + * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) + */ +int +login_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT; + return (login_write(li)); +} + +/* + * login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time + * + * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the + * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back + * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary + * + * Returns: + * 0 on failure, or if user has never logged in + * Time in seconds from the epoch if successful + * + * Useful preprocessor symbols: + * DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog + * info + * USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog + * facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set, + * try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx. + */ +unsigned int +login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid) +{ + struct logininfo li; + + if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid)) + return (li.tv_sec); + else + return (0); +} + +/* + * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int) - Retrieve a lastlog entry + * + * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with + * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no + * system lastlog information exists. + * + * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo. + * + * Returns: + * >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful + * 0 on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics) + */ +struct logininfo * +login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid) +{ + struct passwd *pw; + + memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li)); + li->uid = uid; + + /* + * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to + * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see + * wtmp_get_entry().) + */ + pw = getpwuid(uid); + if (pw == NULL) + fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %ld", __func__, + (long)uid); + + if (strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)) >= + sizeof(li->username)) { + error("%s: username too long (%lu > max %lu)", __func__, + (unsigned long)strlen(pw->pw_name), + (unsigned long)sizeof(li->username) - 1); + return NULL; + } + + if (getlast_entry(li)) + return (li); + else + return (NULL); +} + +/* + * login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*) - Allocate and initialise + * a logininfo structure + * + * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure + * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info. + * + * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory + * allocation fails, the program halts. + */ +struct +logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *line) +{ + struct logininfo *newli; + + newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli)); + login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line); + return (newli); +} + + +/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *) - free struct memory */ +void +login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + free(li); +} + + +/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*) + * - initialise a struct logininfo + * + * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry + * the information required to portably record login info. + * + * Returns: 1 + */ +int +login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *line) +{ + struct passwd *pw; + + memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li)); + + li->pid = pid; + + /* set the line information */ + if (line) + line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line)); + + if (username) { + strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username)); + pw = getpwnam(li->username); + if (pw == NULL) { + fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__, + li->username); + } + li->uid = pw->pw_uid; + } + + if (hostname) + strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname)); + + return (1); +} + +/* + * login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *) - set the current time + * + * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is + * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for + * time handling. + */ +void +login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct timeval tv; + + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); + + li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec; + li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec; +} + +/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */ +void +login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa, + const unsigned int sa_size) +{ + unsigned int bufsize = sa_size; + + /* make sure we don't overrun our union */ + if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size) + bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr); + + memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize); +} + + +/** + ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf + ** results + **/ +int +login_write(struct logininfo *li) +{ +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (geteuid() != 0) { + logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)"); + return (1); + } +#endif + + /* set the timestamp */ + login_set_current_time(li); +#ifdef USE_LOGIN + syslogin_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef USE_LASTLOG + if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN) + lastlog_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef USE_UTMP + utmp_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef USE_WTMP + wtmp_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef USE_UTMPX + utmpx_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef USE_WTMPX + wtmpx_write_entry(li); +#endif +#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN + if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN && + !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line, + &loginmsg)) + logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username); +#endif +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN) + audit_session_open(li); + else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) + audit_session_close(li); +#endif + return (0); +} + +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +int +login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li) +{ + li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN; + login_set_current_time(li); +# ifdef USE_UTMP + utmp_write_entry(li); +# endif +# ifdef USE_WTMP + wtmp_write_entry(li); +# endif +# ifdef USE_UTMPX + utmpx_write_entry(li); +# endif +# ifdef USE_WTMPX + wtmpx_write_entry(li); +# endif + return (0); +} +#endif + +/** + ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login + ** time. + **/ + +/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */ +int +getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ +#ifdef USE_LASTLOG + return(lastlog_get_entry(li)); +#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */ +#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \ + defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER) + return (utmpx_get_entry(li)); +#endif + +#if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG) + /* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login + * time, e.g. AIX */ + return (0); +# elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \ + (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)) + /* retrieve last login time from utmp */ + return (wtmp_get_entry(li)); +# elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \ + (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)) + /* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */ + return (wtmpx_get_entry(li)); +# else + /* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */ + return (0); +# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */ +#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */ +} + + + +/* + * 'line' string utility functions + * + * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms: + * + * 1. The full filename (including '/dev') + * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev') + * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00 + * /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 ) + * + * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when + * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is + * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice + * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok. + */ + + +/* + * line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make + * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh) + */ +char * +line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize) +{ + memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); + if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5))) + strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize); + else { + strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize); + strlcat(dst, src, dstsize); + } + return (dst); +} + +/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */ +char * +line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize) +{ + memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); + if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) + strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize); + else + strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize); + return (dst); +} + +/* + * line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character) + * form of the line (Just use the last characters of the + * full name.) + * + * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero + * termination + */ +char * +line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize) +{ + size_t len; + + memset(dst, '\0', dstsize); + + /* Always skip prefix if present */ + if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) + src += 5; + +#ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY + if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0) + src += 3; +#endif + + len = strlen(src); + + if (len > 0) { + if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0) + src += ((int)len - dstsize); + + /* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */ + strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize); + } + + return (dst); +} + +/** + ** utmp utility functions + ** + ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences + ** into account. + **/ + +#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN) + +/* build the utmp structure */ +void +set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ +# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP) + ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec; + ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec; +# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) + ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec; +# endif +} + +void +construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, + struct utmp *ut) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP + struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; +# endif + + memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut)); + + /* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */ + +# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP + line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id)); +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP + /* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */ + switch (li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + break; + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; + break; + } +# endif + set_utmp_time(li, ut); + + line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)); + +# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP + ut->ut_pid = li->pid; +# endif + + /* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */ + if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) + return; + + /* + * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank + * for logouts. + */ + + /* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */ + strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username, + MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username)); +# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP + strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname, + MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname)); +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP + /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */ + if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) + ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr; +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP + /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */ + if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { + sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa); + memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16); + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) { + ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3]; + ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0; + ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0; + ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0; + } + } +# endif +} +#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */ + +/** + ** utmpx utility functions + ** + ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system + ** variations. + **/ + +#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX) +/* build the utmpx structure */ +void +set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ +# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX) + utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec; + utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec; +# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) + utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec; +# endif +} + +void +construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP + struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; +# endif + memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx)); + +# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX + line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id)); +# endif + + /* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */ + switch (li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS; + break; + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; + break; + } + line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line)); + set_utmpx_time(li, utx); + utx->ut_pid = li->pid; + + /* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */ + strncpy(utx->ut_user, li->username, + MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_user, li->username)); + + if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT) + return; + + /* + * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank + * for logouts. + */ + +# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX + strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname, + MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname)); +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX + /* this is just a 32-bit IP address */ + if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) + utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr; +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP + /* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */ + if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { + sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa); + memcpy(utx->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16); + if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) { + utx->ut_addr_v6[0] = utx->ut_addr_v6[3]; + utx->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0; + utx->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0; + utx->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0; + } + } +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX + /* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */ + utx->ut_syslen = MIN(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host)); +# endif +} +#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */ + +/** + ** Low-level utmp functions + **/ + +/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */ +#ifdef USE_UTMP + +/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */ +# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \ + defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE) +# define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY +# endif + + +/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */ +# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY +static int +utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ + setutent(); + pututline(ut); +# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT + endutent(); +# endif + return (1); +} +# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */ + +/* + * Write a utmp entry direct to the file + * This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c + */ +static int +utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ + struct utmp old_ut; + register int fd; + int tty; + + /* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */ + +#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT) + struct ttyent *ty; + + tty=0; + setttyent(); + while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) { + tty++; + if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line))) + break; + } + endttyent(); + + if (NULL == ty) { + logit("%s: tty not found", __func__); + return (0); + } +#else /* FIXME */ + + tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */ + +#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */ + + if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) { + off_t pos, ret; + + pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp); + if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) { + logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return (0); + } + if (ret != pos) { + logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s", + __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE); + close(fd); + return (0); + } + /* + * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host. + * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not + * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line. + */ + if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) && + (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') && + (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) && + (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0)) + memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host)); + + if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) { + logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return (0); + } + if (ret != pos) { + logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s", + __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE); + close(fd); + return (0); + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) { + logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__, + UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return (0); + } + + close(fd); + return (1); + } else { + return (0); + } +} +# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */ + +static int +utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp ut; + + construct_utmp(li, &ut); +# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY + if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) { + logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__); + return (0); + } +# else + if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) { + logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__); + return (0); + } +# endif + return (1); +} + + +static int +utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp ut; + + construct_utmp(li, &ut); +# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY + if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) { + logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__); + return (0); + } +# else + if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) { + logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__); + return (0); + } +# endif + return (1); +} + + +int +utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return (utmp_perform_login(li)); + + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return (utmp_perform_logout(li)); + + default: + logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); + return (0); + } +} +#endif /* USE_UTMP */ + + +/** + ** Low-level utmpx functions + **/ + +/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */ +#ifdef USE_UTMPX + +/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */ +# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \ + defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE) +# define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY +# endif + + +/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */ +# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY +static int +utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ + setutxent(); + pututxline(utx); + +# ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT + endutxent(); +# endif + return (1); +} + +# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */ + +/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */ +static int +utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ + logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__); + return (0); +} +# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */ + +static int +utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmpx utx; + + construct_utmpx(li, &utx); +# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY + if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) { + logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__); + return (0); + } +# else + if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) { + logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__); + return (0); + } +# endif + return (1); +} + + +static int +utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmpx utx; + + construct_utmpx(li, &utx); +# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX + line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id)); +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX + utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS; +# endif + +# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY + utmpx_write_library(li, &utx); +# else + utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx); +# endif + return (1); +} + +int +utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return (utmpx_perform_login(li)); + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return (utmpx_perform_logout(li)); + default: + logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); + return (0); + } +} +#endif /* USE_UTMPX */ + + +/** + ** Low-level wtmp functions + **/ + +#ifdef USE_WTMP + +/* + * Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file + * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c + */ +static int +wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ + struct stat buf; + int fd, ret = 1; + + if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) { + logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__, + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0) + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) { + ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size); + logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__, + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + ret = 0; + } + close(fd); + return (ret); +} + +static int +wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp ut; + + construct_utmp(li, &ut); + return (wtmp_write(li, &ut)); +} + + +static int +wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp ut; + + construct_utmp(li, &ut); + return (wtmp_write(li, &ut)); +} + + +int +wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return (wtmp_perform_login(li)); + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return (wtmp_perform_logout(li)); + default: + logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); + return (0); + } +} + + +/* + * Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx + * + * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank + * username on a given tty line. However, some systems (HP-UX is one) + * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS. + * + * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username + * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for + * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.) + * + * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS + * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also, + * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in + * place and not have ut_type. + */ + +/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */ +static int +wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut) +{ + if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) { +# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP + if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS) + return (1); +# else + return (1); +# endif + } + return (0); +} + +int +wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct stat st; + struct utmp ut; + int fd, found = 0; + + /* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */ + li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0; + + if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { + logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return (0); + } + + /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */ + if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) { + /* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */ + close(fd); + return (0); + } + + while (!found) { + if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) { + logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__, + WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno)); + close (fd); + return (0); + } + if (wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) { + found = 1; + /* + * We've already checked for a time in struct + * utmp, in login_getlast() + */ +# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP + li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time; +# else +# if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP + li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec; +# endif +# endif + line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line)); +# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP + strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host)); +# endif + continue; + } + /* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */ + if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) { + /* We've found the start of the file, so quit */ + close(fd); + return (0); + } + } + + /* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */ + close(fd); + return (1); +} +# endif /* USE_WTMP */ + + +/** + ** Low-level wtmpx functions + **/ + +#ifdef USE_WTMPX +/* + * Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file + * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c + */ +static int +wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ +#ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX + struct stat buf; + int fd, ret = 1; + + if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) { + logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + + if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0) + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) { + ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size); + logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__, + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); + ret = 0; + } + close(fd); + + return (ret); +#else + updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx); + return (1); +#endif +} + + +static int +wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmpx utx; + + construct_utmpx(li, &utx); + return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx)); +} + + +static int +wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmpx utx; + + construct_utmpx(li, &utx); + return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx)); +} + + +int +wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return (wtmpx_perform_login(li)); + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li)); + default: + logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__); + return (0); + } +} + +/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the + next two functions */ + +/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */ +static int +wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx) +{ + if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_user, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_user)) == 0 ) { +# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX + if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS) + return (1); +# else + return (1); +# endif + } + return (0); +} + + +int +wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct stat st; + struct utmpx utx; + int fd, found=0; + + /* Clear the time entries */ + li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0; + + if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__, + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) { + logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return (0); + } + + /* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */ + if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) { + /* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */ + close(fd); + return (0); + } + + while (!found) { + if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) { + logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__, + WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno)); + close (fd); + return (0); + } + /* + * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular + * line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx + */ + if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) { + found = 1; +# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX) + li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec; +# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) + li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time; +# endif + line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line)); +# if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX) + strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host)); +# endif + continue; + } + if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) { + close(fd); + return (0); + } + } + + close(fd); + return (1); +} +#endif /* USE_WTMPX */ + +/** + ** Low-level libutil login() functions + **/ + +#ifdef USE_LOGIN +static int +syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmp *ut; + + ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut)); + construct_utmp(li, ut); + login(ut); + free(ut); + + return (1); +} + +static int +syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT + char line[UT_LINESIZE]; + + (void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line)); + + if (!logout(line)) + logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__); +# ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP + else + logwtmp(line, "", ""); +# endif + /* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have + * login, but no logout? what if logout but no logwtmp? All + * routines are in libutil so they should all be there, + * but... */ +# endif + return (1); +} + +int +syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch (li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return (syslogin_perform_login(li)); + case LTYPE_LOGOUT: + return (syslogin_perform_logout(li)); + default: + logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__); + return (0); + } +} +#endif /* USE_LOGIN */ + +/* end of file log-syslogin.c */ + +/** + ** Low-level lastlog functions + **/ + +#ifdef USE_LASTLOG + +#if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME) +/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */ +static int +lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode) +{ + off_t offset; + char lastlog_file[1024]; + struct stat st; + + if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) { + logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__, + LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { + snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s", + LASTLOG_FILE, li->username); + } else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { + strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file)); + } else { + logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__, + LASTLOG_FILE); + return (0); + } + + *fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600); + if (*fd < 0) { + debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__, + lastlog_file, strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + + if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { + /* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */ + offset = (off_t) ((u_long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog)); + + if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) { + logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__, + lastlog_file, strerror(errno)); + close(*fd); + return (0); + } + } + + return (1); +} +#endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ + +#ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE +int +lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */ + default: + logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field"); + return 0; + } +} +#else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */ +int +lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct lastlog last; + int fd; + + switch(li->type) { + case LTYPE_LOGIN: + /* create our struct lastlog */ + memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last)); + line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line)); + strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname, + MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname)); + last.ll_time = li->tv_sec; + + if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT)) + return (0); + + /* write the entry */ + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) { + close(fd); + logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__, + LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + + close(fd); + return (1); + default: + logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__); + return (0); + } +} +#endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */ + +#ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME +int +lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct lastlogx l, *ll; + + if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) { + memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l)); + ll = &l; + } + line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line)); + strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host)); + li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec; + li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec; + return (1); +} +#else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ +int +lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct lastlog last; + int fd, ret; + + if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY)) + return (0); + + ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last)); + close(fd); + + switch (ret) { + case 0: + memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last)); + /* FALLTHRU */ + case sizeof(last): + line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line)); + strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host)); + li->tv_sec = last.ll_time; + return (1); + case -1: + error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__, + LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno)); + return (0); + default: + error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d", + __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret); + return (0); + } + + /* NOTREACHED */ + return (0); +} +#endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */ +#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */ + +#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \ + defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER) +int +utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li) +{ + struct utmpx *utx; + + if (setutxdb(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN, NULL) != 0) + return (0); + utx = getutxuser(li->username); + if (utx == NULL) { + endutxent(); + return (0); + } + + line_fullname(li->line, utx->ut_line, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, utx->ut_line)); + strlcpy(li->hostname, utx->ut_host, + MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx->ut_host)); + li->tv_sec = utx->ut_tv.tv_sec; + li->tv_usec = utx->ut_tv.tv_usec; + endutxent(); + return (1); +} +#endif /* USE_UTMPX && HAVE_SETUTXDB && UTXDB_LASTLOGIN && HAVE_GETUTXUSER */ + +#ifdef USE_BTMP + /* + * Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists. + * The most common login failure is to give password instead of username. + * So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that + * only root can read it. + */ + +void +record_failed_login(const char *username, const char *hostname, + const char *ttyn) +{ + int fd; + struct utmp ut; + struct sockaddr_storage from; + socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from); + struct sockaddr_in *a4; + struct sockaddr_in6 *a6; + time_t t; + struct stat fst; + + if (geteuid() != 0) + return; + if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) { + debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP, + strerror(errno)); + return; + } + if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) { + logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP, + strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if((fst.st_mode & (S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){ + logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s", + _PATH_BTMP); + goto out; + } + + memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut)); + /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ + strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user)); + strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line)); + + time(&t); + ut.ut_time = t; /* ut_time is not always a time_t */ + ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS; + ut.ut_pid = getpid(); + + /* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */ + strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host)); + + if (packet_connection_is_on_socket() && + getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) { + ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); + if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) { + a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from; + memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr), + MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr)); + } +#ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP + if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) { + a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from; + memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr), + MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr)); + } +#endif + } + + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) + error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP, + strerror(errno)); + +out: + close(fd); +} +#endif /* USE_BTMP */ diff --git a/loginrec.h b/loginrec.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28923e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/loginrec.h @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +#ifndef _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ +#define _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/** + ** loginrec.h: platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval + **/ + +#include "includes.h" + +/** + ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies + **/ + +/* + * login_netinfo structure + */ + +union login_netinfo { + struct sockaddr sa; + struct sockaddr_in sa_in; + struct sockaddr_storage sa_storage; +}; + +/* + * * logininfo structure * + */ +/* types - different to utmp.h 'type' macros */ +/* (though set to the same value as linux, openbsd and others...) */ +#define LTYPE_LOGIN 7 +#define LTYPE_LOGOUT 8 + +/* string lengths - set very long */ +#define LINFO_PROGSIZE 64 +#define LINFO_LINESIZE 64 +#define LINFO_NAMESIZE 512 +#define LINFO_HOSTSIZE 256 + +struct logininfo { + char progname[LINFO_PROGSIZE]; /* name of program (for PAM) */ + int progname_null; + short int type; /* type of login (LTYPE_*) */ + pid_t pid; /* PID of login process */ + uid_t uid; /* UID of this user */ + char line[LINFO_LINESIZE]; /* tty/pty name */ + char username[LINFO_NAMESIZE]; /* login username */ + char hostname[LINFO_HOSTSIZE]; /* remote hostname */ + /* 'exit_status' structure components */ + int exit; /* process exit status */ + int termination; /* process termination status */ + /* struct timeval (sys/time.h) isn't always available, if it isn't we'll + * use time_t's value as tv_sec and set tv_usec to 0 + */ + unsigned int tv_sec; + unsigned int tv_usec; + union login_netinfo hostaddr; /* caller's host address(es) */ +}; /* struct logininfo */ + +/* + * login recording functions + */ + +/** 'public' functions */ + +/* construct a new login entry */ +struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *line); +/* free a structure */ +void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li); +/* fill out a pre-allocated structure with useful information */ +int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *line); +/* place the current time in a logininfo struct */ +void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li); + +/* record the entry */ +int login_login (struct logininfo *li); +int login_logout(struct logininfo *li); +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li); +#endif + +/** End of public functions */ + +/* record the entry */ +int login_write (struct logininfo *li); +int login_log_entry(struct logininfo *li); + +/* set the network address based on network address type */ +void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa, + const unsigned int sa_size); + +/* + * lastlog retrieval functions + */ +/* lastlog *entry* functions fill out a logininfo */ +struct logininfo *login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid); +/* lastlog *time* functions return time_t equivalent (uint) */ +unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid); + +/* produce various forms of the line filename */ +char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize); +char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize); +char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize); + +void record_failed_login(const char *, const char *, const char *); + +#endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */ diff --git a/logintest.c b/logintest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4897ae0 --- /dev/null +++ b/logintest.c @@ -0,0 +1,308 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/** + ** logintest.c: simple test driver for platform-independent login recording + ** and lastlog retrieval + **/ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H +#include +#endif + +#include "loginrec.h" + +extern char *__progname; + +#define PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT 3 + +int nologtest = 0; +int compile_opts_only = 0; +int be_verbose = 0; + + +/* Dump a logininfo to stdout. Assumes a tab size of 8 chars. */ +void +dump_logininfo(struct logininfo *li, char *descname) +{ + /* yes I know how nasty this is */ + printf("struct logininfo %s = {\n\t" + "progname\t'%s'\n\ttype\t\t%d\n\t" + "pid\t\t%d\n\tuid\t\t%d\n\t" + "line\t\t'%s'\n\tusername\t'%s'\n\t" + "hostname\t'%s'\n\texit\t\t%d\n\ttermination\t%d\n\t" + "tv_sec\t%d\n\ttv_usec\t%d\n\t" + "struct login_netinfo hostaddr {\n\t\t" + "struct sockaddr sa {\n" + "\t\t\tfamily\t%d\n\t\t}\n" + "\t}\n" + "}\n", + descname, li->progname, li->type, + li->pid, li->uid, li->line, + li->username, li->hostname, li->exit, + li->termination, li->tv_sec, li->tv_usec, + li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family); +} + + +int +testAPI() +{ + struct logininfo *li1; + struct passwd *pw; + struct hostent *he; + struct sockaddr_in sa_in4; + char cmdstring[256], stripline[8]; + char username[32]; +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + time_t t0, t1, t2, logintime, logouttime; + char s_t0[64],s_t1[64],s_t2[64]; + char s_logintime[64], s_logouttime[64]; /* ctime() strings */ +#endif + + printf("**\n** Testing the API...\n**\n"); + + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username)); + + /* gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); */ + + printf("login_alloc_entry test (no host info):\n"); + + /* FIXME fake tty more effectively - this could upset some platforms */ + li1 = login_alloc_entry((int)getpid(), username, NULL, ttyname(0)); + strlcpy(li1->progname, "OpenSSH-logintest", sizeof(li1->progname)); + + if (be_verbose) + dump_logininfo(li1, "li1"); + + printf("Setting host address info for 'localhost' (may call out):\n"); + if (! (he = gethostbyname("localhost"))) { + printf("Couldn't set hostname(lookup failed)\n"); + } else { + /* NOTE: this is messy, but typically a program wouldn't have to set + * any of this, a sockaddr_in* would be already prepared */ + memcpy((void *)&(sa_in4.sin_addr), (void *)&(he->h_addr_list[0][0]), + sizeof(struct in_addr)); + login_set_addr(li1, (struct sockaddr *) &sa_in4, sizeof(sa_in4)); + strlcpy(li1->hostname, "localhost", sizeof(li1->hostname)); + } + if (be_verbose) + dump_logininfo(li1, "li1"); + + if ((int)geteuid() != 0) { + printf("NOT RUNNING LOGIN TESTS - you are not root!\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (nologtest) + return 1; + + line_stripname(stripline, li1->line, sizeof(stripline)); + + printf("Performing an invalid login attempt (no type field)\n--\n"); + login_write(li1); + printf("--\n(Should have written errors to stderr)\n"); + +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + (void)time(&t0); + strlcpy(s_t0, ctime(&t0), sizeof(s_t0)); + t1 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid()); + strlcpy(s_t1, ctime(&t1), sizeof(s_t1)); + printf("Before logging in:\n\tcurrent time is %d - %s\t" + "lastlog time is %d - %s\n", + (int)t0, s_t0, (int)t1, s_t1); +#endif + + printf("Performing a login on line %s ", stripline); +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + (void)time(&logintime); + strlcpy(s_logintime, ctime(&logintime), sizeof(s_logintime)); + printf("at %d - %s", (int)logintime, s_logintime); +#endif + printf("--\n"); + login_login(li1); + + snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "who | grep '%s '", + stripline); + system(cmdstring); + + printf("--\nPausing for %d second(s)...\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT); + sleep(PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT); + + printf("Performing a logout "); +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + (void)time(&logouttime); + strlcpy(s_logouttime, ctime(&logouttime), sizeof(s_logouttime)); + printf("at %d - %s", (int)logouttime, s_logouttime); +#endif + printf("\nThe root login shown above should be gone.\n" + "If the root login hasn't gone, but another user on the same\n" + "pty has, this is OK - we're hacking it here, and there\n" + "shouldn't be two users on one pty in reality...\n" + "-- ('who' output follows)\n"); + login_logout(li1); + + system(cmdstring); + printf("-- ('who' output ends)\n"); + +#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H + t2 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid()); + strlcpy(s_t2, ctime(&t2), sizeof(s_t2)); + printf("After logging in, lastlog time is %d - %s\n", (int)t2, s_t2); + if (t1 == t2) + printf("The lastlog times before and after logging in are the " + "same.\nThis indicates that lastlog is ** NOT WORKING " + "CORRECTLY **\n"); + else if (t0 != t2) + /* We can be off by a second or so, even when recording works fine. + * I'm not 100% sure why, but it's true. */ + printf("** The login time and the lastlog time differ.\n" + "** This indicates that lastlog is either recording the " + "wrong time,\n** or retrieving the wrong entry.\n" + "If it's off by less than %d second(s) " + "run the test again.\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT); + else + printf("lastlog agrees with the login time. This is a good thing.\n"); + +#endif + + printf("--\nThe output of 'last' shown next should have " + "an entry for root \n on %s for the time shown above:\n--\n", + stripline); + snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "last | grep '%s ' | head -3", + stripline); + system(cmdstring); + + printf("--\nEnd of login test.\n"); + + login_free_entry(li1); + + return 1; +} /* testAPI() */ + + +void +testLineName(char *line) +{ + /* have to null-terminate - these functions are designed for + * structures with fixed-length char arrays, and don't null-term.*/ + char full[17], strip[9], abbrev[5]; + + memset(full, '\0', sizeof(full)); + memset(strip, '\0', sizeof(strip)); + memset(abbrev, '\0', sizeof(abbrev)); + + line_fullname(full, line, sizeof(full)-1); + line_stripname(strip, full, sizeof(strip)-1); + line_abbrevname(abbrev, full, sizeof(abbrev)-1); + printf("%s: %s, %s, %s\n", line, full, strip, abbrev); + +} /* testLineName() */ + + +int +testOutput() +{ + printf("**\n** Testing linename functions\n**\n"); + testLineName("/dev/pts/1"); + testLineName("pts/1"); + testLineName("pts/999"); + testLineName("/dev/ttyp00"); + testLineName("ttyp00"); + + return 1; +} /* testOutput() */ + + +/* show which options got compiled in */ +void +showOptions(void) +{ + printf("**\n** Compile-time options\n**\n"); + + printf("login recording methods selected:\n"); +#ifdef USE_LOGIN + printf("\tUSE_LOGIN\n"); +#endif +#ifdef USE_UTMP + printf("\tUSE_UTMP (UTMP_FILE=%s)\n", UTMP_FILE); +#endif +#ifdef USE_UTMPX + printf("\tUSE_UTMPX\n"); +#endif +#ifdef USE_WTMP + printf("\tUSE_WTMP (WTMP_FILE=%s)\n", WTMP_FILE); +#endif +#ifdef USE_WTMPX + printf("\tUSE_WTMPX (WTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", WTMPX_FILE); +#endif +#ifdef USE_LASTLOG + printf("\tUSE_LASTLOG (LASTLOG_FILE=%s)\n", LASTLOG_FILE); +#endif + printf("\n"); + +} /* showOptions() */ + + +int +main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + printf("Platform-independent login recording test driver\n"); + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + if (argc == 2) { + if (strncmp(argv[1], "-i", 3) == 0) + compile_opts_only = 1; + else if (strncmp(argv[1], "-v", 3) == 0) + be_verbose=1; + } + + if (!compile_opts_only) { + if (be_verbose && !testOutput()) + return 1; + + if (!testAPI()) + return 1; + } + + showOptions(); + + return 0; +} /* main() */ + diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51dc11d --- /dev/null +++ b/mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.34 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "digest.h" +#include "hmac.h" +#include "umac.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#define SSH_DIGEST 1 /* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */ +#define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */ +#define SSH_UMAC128 3 + +struct macalg { + char *name; + int type; + int alg; + int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */ + int key_len; /* just for UMAC */ + int len; /* just for UMAC */ + int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ +}; + +static const struct macalg macs[] = { + /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ + { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 + { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, +#endif + { "hmac-md5", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "hmac-md5-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "umac-64@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 }, + { "umac-128@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 }, + + /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */ + { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, + { "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 1 }, +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 + { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, + { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, +#endif + { "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, + { "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 }, + { "umac-64-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 }, + { "umac-128-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 }, + + { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +/* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */ +char * +mac_alg_list(char sep) +{ + char *ret = NULL, *tmp; + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct macalg *m; + + for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = sep; + nlen = strlen(m->name); + if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret = tmp; + memcpy(ret + rlen, m->name, nlen + 1); + rlen += nlen; + } + return ret; +} + +static int +mac_setup_by_alg(struct sshmac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg) +{ + mac->type = macalg->type; + if (mac->type == SSH_DIGEST) { + if ((mac->hmac_ctx = ssh_hmac_start(macalg->alg)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = ssh_hmac_bytes(macalg->alg); + } else { + mac->mac_len = macalg->len / 8; + mac->key_len = macalg->key_len / 8; + mac->umac_ctx = NULL; + } + if (macalg->truncatebits != 0) + mac->mac_len = macalg->truncatebits / 8; + mac->etm = macalg->etm; + return 0; +} + +int +mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name) +{ + const struct macalg *m; + + for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { + if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0) + continue; + if (mac != NULL) + return mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m); + return 0; + } + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +int +mac_init(struct sshmac *mac) +{ + if (mac->key == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + switch (mac->type) { + case SSH_DIGEST: + if (mac->hmac_ctx == NULL || + ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return 0; + case SSH_UMAC: + if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; + case SSH_UMAC128: + if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} + +int +mac_compute(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, + const u_char *data, int datalen, + u_char *digest, size_t dlen) +{ + static union { + u_char m[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + u_int64_t for_align; + } u; + u_char b[4]; + u_char nonce[8]; + + if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(u)) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + switch (mac->type) { + case SSH_DIGEST: + put_u32(b, seqno); + /* reset HMAC context */ + if (ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0) < 0 || + ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, b, sizeof(b)) < 0 || + ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, data, datalen) < 0 || + ssh_hmac_final(mac->hmac_ctx, u.m, sizeof(u.m)) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + break; + case SSH_UMAC: + POKE_U64(nonce, seqno); + umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen); + umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce); + break; + case SSH_UMAC128: + put_u64(nonce, seqno); + umac128_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen); + umac128_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce); + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (digest != NULL) { + if (dlen > mac->mac_len) + dlen = mac->mac_len; + memcpy(digest, u.m, dlen); + } + return 0; +} + +int +mac_check(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, + const u_char *data, size_t dlen, + const u_char *theirmac, size_t mlen) +{ + u_char ourmac[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + int r; + + if (mac->mac_len > mlen) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = mac_compute(mac, seqno, data, dlen, + ourmac, sizeof(ourmac))) != 0) + return r; + if (timingsafe_bcmp(ourmac, theirmac, mac->mac_len) != 0) + return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; + return 0; +} + +void +mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac) +{ + if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) { + if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL) + umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx); + } else if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC128) { + if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL) + umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx); + } else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL) + ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx); + mac->hmac_ctx = NULL; + mac->umac_ctx = NULL; +} + +/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ +#define MAC_SEP "," +int +mac_valid(const char *names) +{ + char *maclist, *cp, *p; + + if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) + return 0; + if ((maclist = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) + return 0; + for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) { + if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) { + free(maclist); + return 0; + } + } + free(maclist); + return 1; +} diff --git a/mac.h b/mac.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b119d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/mac.h @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.10 2016/07/08 03:44:42 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef SSHMAC_H +#define SSHMAC_H + +#include + +struct sshmac { + char *name; + int enabled; + u_int mac_len; + u_char *key; + u_int key_len; + int type; + int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ + struct ssh_hmac_ctx *hmac_ctx; + struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx; +}; + +int mac_valid(const char *); +char *mac_alg_list(char); +int mac_setup(struct sshmac *, char *); +int mac_init(struct sshmac *); +int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int, + u_char *, size_t); +int mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t, + const u_char *, size_t); +void mac_clear(struct sshmac *); + +#endif /* SSHMAC_H */ diff --git a/match.c b/match.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb3e95f --- /dev/null +++ b/match.c @@ -0,0 +1,350 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.38 2018/07/04 13:49:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "misc.h" + +/* + * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ? + * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match. + */ + +int +match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern) +{ + for (;;) { + /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */ + if (!*pattern) + return !*s; + + if (*pattern == '*') { + /* Skip the asterisk. */ + pattern++; + + /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */ + if (!*pattern) + return 1; + + /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */ + if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') { + /* + * Look instances of the next character in + * pattern, and try to match starting from + * those. + */ + for (; *s; s++) + if (*s == *pattern && + match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1)) + return 1; + /* Failed. */ + return 0; + } + /* + * Move ahead one character at a time and try to + * match at each position. + */ + for (; *s; s++) + if (match_pattern(s, pattern)) + return 1; + /* Failed. */ + return 0; + } + /* + * There must be at least one more character in the string. + * If we are at the end, fail. + */ + if (!*s) + return 0; + + /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */ + if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s) + return 0; + + /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */ + s++; + pattern++; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * Tries to match the string against the + * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to + * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is + * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. + */ +int +match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower) +{ + char sub[1024]; + int negated; + int got_positive; + u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern); + + got_positive = 0; + for (i = 0; i < len;) { + /* Check if the subpattern is negated. */ + if (pattern[i] == '!') { + negated = 1; + i++; + } else + negated = 0; + + /* + * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the + * subpattern to lowercase. + */ + for (subi = 0; + i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ','; + subi++, i++) + sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ? + tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i]; + /* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */ + if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1) + return 0; + + /* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */ + if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',') + i++; + + /* Null-terminate the subpattern. */ + sub[subi] = '\0'; + + /* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */ + if (match_pattern(string, sub)) { + if (negated) + return -1; /* Negative */ + else + got_positive = 1; /* Positive */ + } + } + + /* + * Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative + * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here. + */ + return got_positive; +} + +/* + * Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the + * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to + * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is + * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. + */ +int +match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern) +{ + char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host); + int r; + + lowercase(hostcopy); + r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1); + free(hostcopy); + return r; +} + +/* + * returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip + * or if we get no match at all. returns -1 on error, or 1 on + * successful match. + */ +int +match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr, + const char *patterns) +{ + int mhost, mip; + + if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2) + return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */ + else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1) + return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */ + + /* negative hostname match */ + if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1) + return 0; + /* no match at all */ + if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern. + * If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/ + * Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match. + */ +int +match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr, + const char *pattern) +{ + char *p, *pat; + int ret; + + /* test mode */ + if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) { + if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL && + match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0) + return -1; + return 0; + } + + if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL) + return match_pattern(user, pattern); + + pat = xstrdup(pattern); + p = strchr(pat, '@'); + *p++ = '\0'; + + if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1) + ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p); + free(pat); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list, + * caller must free the returned string. + */ +#define MAX_PROP 40 +#define SEP "," +char * +match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next) +{ + char *sproposals[MAX_PROP]; + char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp; + int i, j, nproposals; + + c = cp = xstrdup(client); + s = sp = xstrdup(server); + + for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) { + if (i < MAX_PROP) + sproposals[i] = p; + else + break; + } + nproposals = i; + + for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) { + for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) { + if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) { + ret = xstrdup(p); + if (next != NULL) + *next = (cp == NULL) ? + strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c); + free(c); + free(s); + return ret; + } + } + } + if (next != NULL) + *next = strlen(c); + free(c); + free(s); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Filter proposal using pattern-list filter. + * "blacklist" determines sense of filter: + * non-zero indicates that items matching filter should be excluded. + * zero indicates that only items matching filter should be included. + * returns NULL on allocation error, otherwise caller must free result. + */ +static char * +filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter, int blacklist) +{ + size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1; + char *fix_prop = malloc(len); + char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal); + char *cp, *tmp; + int r; + + if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) { + free(orig_prop); + free(fix_prop); + return NULL; + } + + tmp = orig_prop; + *fix_prop = '\0'; + while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) { + r = match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0); + if ((blacklist && r != 1) || (!blacklist && r == 1)) { + if (*fix_prop != '\0') + strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len); + strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len); + } + } + free(orig_prop); + return fix_prop; +} + +/* + * Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching + * the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string. + */ +char * +match_filter_blacklist(const char *proposal, const char *filter) +{ + return filter_list(proposal, filter, 1); +} + +/* + * Filters a comma-separated list of strings, including only entries matching + * the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string. + */ +char * +match_filter_whitelist(const char *proposal, const char *filter) +{ + return filter_list(proposal, filter, 0); +} diff --git a/match.h b/match.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..852b1a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/match.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.18 2018/07/04 13:49:31 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +#ifndef MATCH_H +#define MATCH_H + +int match_pattern(const char *, const char *); +int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, int); +int match_hostname(const char *, const char *); +int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *); +int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *); +char *match_filter_blacklist(const char *, const char *); +char *match_filter_whitelist(const char *, const char *); + +/* addrmatch.c */ +int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *); +int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *); +#endif diff --git a/md5crypt.c b/md5crypt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52cf295 --- /dev/null +++ b/md5crypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +/* + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42): + * wrote this file. As long as you retain this + * notice you can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some + * day, and you think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in + * return. Poul-Henning Kamp + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) +#include + +#include + +#include + +/* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */ +static unsigned char itoa64[] = + "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; + +static char *magic = "$1$"; + +static char * +to64(unsigned long v, int n) +{ + static char buf[5]; + char *s = buf; + + if (n > 4) + return (NULL); + + memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); + while (--n >= 0) { + *s++ = itoa64[v&0x3f]; + v >>= 6; + } + + return (buf); +} + +int +is_md5_salt(const char *salt) +{ + return (strncmp(salt, magic, strlen(magic)) == 0); +} + +char * +md5_crypt(const char *pw, const char *salt) +{ + static char passwd[120], salt_copy[9]; + static const char *sp, *ep; + unsigned char final[16]; + int sl, pl, i, j; + MD5_CTX ctx, ctx1; + unsigned long l; + + /* Refine the Salt first */ + sp = salt; + + /* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */ + if(strncmp(sp, magic, strlen(magic)) == 0) + sp += strlen(magic); + + /* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */ + for (ep = sp; *ep != '$'; ep++) { + if (*ep == '\0' || ep >= (sp + 8)) + return (NULL); + } + + /* get the length of the true salt */ + sl = ep - sp; + + /* Stash the salt */ + memcpy(salt_copy, sp, sl); + salt_copy[sl] = '\0'; + + MD5_Init(&ctx); + + /* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */ + MD5_Update(&ctx, pw, strlen(pw)); + + /* Then our magic string */ + MD5_Update(&ctx, magic, strlen(magic)); + + /* Then the raw salt */ + MD5_Update(&ctx, sp, sl); + + /* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw, salt, pw) */ + MD5_Init(&ctx1); + MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); + MD5_Update(&ctx1, sp, sl); + MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); + MD5_Final(final, &ctx1); + + for(pl = strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= 16) + MD5_Update(&ctx, final, pl > 16 ? 16 : pl); + + /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */ + memset(final, '\0', sizeof final); + + /* Then something really weird... */ + for (j = 0, i = strlen(pw); i != 0; i >>= 1) + if (i & 1) + MD5_Update(&ctx, final + j, 1); + else + MD5_Update(&ctx, pw + j, 1); + + /* Now make the output string */ + snprintf(passwd, sizeof(passwd), "%s%s$", magic, salt_copy); + + MD5_Final(final, &ctx); + + /* + * and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast + * On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would + * need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary... + */ + for(i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { + MD5_Init(&ctx1); + if (i & 1) + MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); + else + MD5_Update(&ctx1, final, 16); + + if (i % 3) + MD5_Update(&ctx1, sp, sl); + + if (i % 7) + MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); + + if (i & 1) + MD5_Update(&ctx1, final, 16); + else + MD5_Update(&ctx1, pw, strlen(pw)); + + MD5_Final(final, &ctx1); + } + + l = (final[ 0]<<16) | (final[ 6]<<8) | final[12]; + strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); + l = (final[ 1]<<16) | (final[ 7]<<8) | final[13]; + strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); + l = (final[ 2]<<16) | (final[ 8]<<8) | final[14]; + strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); + l = (final[ 3]<<16) | (final[ 9]<<8) | final[15]; + strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); + l = (final[ 4]<<16) | (final[10]<<8) | final[ 5]; + strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 4), sizeof(passwd)); + l = final[11] ; + strlcat(passwd, to64(l, 2), sizeof(passwd)); + + /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */ + memset(final, 0, sizeof(final)); + memset(salt_copy, 0, sizeof(salt_copy)); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + memset(&ctx1, 0, sizeof(ctx1)); + (void)to64(0, 4); + + return (passwd); +} + +#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */ diff --git a/md5crypt.h b/md5crypt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..978e579 --- /dev/null +++ b/md5crypt.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42): + * wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you + * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think + * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- + */ + +#ifndef _MD5CRYPT_H +#define _MD5CRYPT_H + +#include "config.h" + +#if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) + +int is_md5_salt(const char *); +char *md5_crypt(const char *, const char *); + +#endif /* defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) */ + +#endif /* MD5CRYPT_H */ diff --git a/mdoc2man.awk b/mdoc2man.awk new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d393ae6 --- /dev/null +++ b/mdoc2man.awk @@ -0,0 +1,370 @@ +#!/usr/bin/awk +# +# Version history: +# v4+ Adapted for OpenSSH Portable (see cvs Id and history) +# v3, I put the program under a proper license +# Dan Nelson added .An, .Aq and fixed a typo +# v2, fixed to work on GNU awk --posix and MacOS X +# v1, first attempt, didn't work on MacOS X +# +# Copyright (c) 2003 Peter Stuge +# +# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any +# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above +# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES +# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR +# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES +# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN +# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF +# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + + +BEGIN { + optlist=0 + oldoptlist=0 + nospace=0 + synopsis=0 + reference=0 + block=0 + ext=0 + extopt=0 + literal=0 + prenl=0 + breakw=0 + line="" +} + +function wtail() { + retval="" + while(w0;i--) { + add(refauthors[i]) + if(i>1) + add(", ") + } + if(nrefauthors>1) + add(" and ") + if(nrefauthors>0) + add(refauthors[0] ", ") + add("\\fI" reftitle "\\fP") + if(length(refissue)) + add(", " refissue) + if(length(refreport)) { + add(", " refreport) + } + if(length(refdate)) + add(", " refdate) + if(length(refopt)) + add(", " refopt) + add(".") + reference=0 + } else if(reference) { + if(match(words[w],"^%A$")) { refauthors[nrefauthors++]=wtail() } + if(match(words[w],"^%T$")) { + reftitle=wtail() + sub("^\"","",reftitle) + sub("\"$","",reftitle) + } + if(match(words[w],"^%N$")) { refissue=wtail() } + if(match(words[w],"^%D$")) { refdate=wtail() } + if(match(words[w],"^%O$")) { refopt=wtail() } + if(match(words[w],"^%R$")) { refreport=wtail() } + } else if(match(words[w],"^Nm$")) { + if(synopsis) { + add(".br") + prenl++ + } + n=words[++w] + if(!length(name)) + name=n + if(!length(n)) + n=name + add("\\fB" n "\\fP") + if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]")) + nospace=1 + } else if(match(words[w],"^Nd$")) { + add("\\- " wtail()) + } else if(match(words[w],"^Fl$")) { + add("\\fB\\-" words[++w] "\\fP") + if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]")) + nospace=1 + } else if(match(words[w],"^Ar$")) { + add("\\fI") + if(w==nwords) + add("file ...\\fP") + else { + add(words[++w] "\\fP") + while(match(words[w+1],"^\\|$")) + add(OFS words[++w] " \\fI" words[++w] "\\fP") + } + if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]")) + nospace=1 + } else if(match(words[w],"^Cm$")) { + add("\\fB" words[++w] "\\fP") + while(w") + if(option) + add("]") + if(ext&&!extopt&&!match(line," $")) + add(OFS) + if(!ext&&!extopt&&length(line)) { + print line + prenl=0 + line="" + } +} diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bdc06fd --- /dev/null +++ b/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,2039 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.133 2018/10/05 14:26:09 naddy Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#include +#endif +#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD +#include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "platform.h" + +/* remove newline at end of string */ +char * +chop(char *s) +{ + char *t = s; + while (*t) { + if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') { + *t = '\0'; + return s; + } + t++; + } + return s; + +} + +/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */ +int +set_nonblock(int fd) +{ + int val; + + val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL); + if (val < 0) { + error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } + if (val & O_NONBLOCK) { + debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd); + return (0); + } + debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd); + val |= O_NONBLOCK; + if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { + debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, + strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } + return (0); +} + +int +unset_nonblock(int fd) +{ + int val; + + val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL); + if (val < 0) { + error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } + if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { + debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd); + return (0); + } + debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd); + val &= ~O_NONBLOCK; + if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { + debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s", + fd, strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } + return (0); +} + +const char * +ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr) +{ + if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0) + return strerror(errno); + return gai_strerror(gaierr); +} + +/* disable nagle on socket */ +void +set_nodelay(int fd) +{ + int opt; + socklen_t optlen; + + optlen = sizeof opt; + if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) { + debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return; + } + if (opt == 1) { + debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd); + return; + } + opt = 1; + debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd); + if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1) + error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +} + +/* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT */ +int +set_reuseaddr(int fd) +{ + int on = 1; + + if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) { + error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Get/set routing domain */ +char * +get_rdomain(int fd) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN) + return sys_get_rdomain(fd); +#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) + int rtable; + char *ret; + socklen_t len = sizeof(rtable); + + if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtable, &len) == -1) { + error("Failed to get routing domain for fd %d: %s", + fd, strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + xasprintf(&ret, "%d", rtable); + return ret; +#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ + return NULL; +#endif +} + +int +set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN) + return sys_set_rdomain(fd, name); +#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) + int rtable; + const char *errstr; + + if (name == NULL) + return 0; /* default table */ + + rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + error("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr); + return -1; + } + if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, + &rtable, sizeof(rtable)) == -1) { + error("Failed to set routing domain %d on fd %d: %s", + rtable, fd, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ + error("Setting routing domain is not supported on this platform"); + return -1; +#endif +} + +/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ +#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" +#define QUOTE "\"" + +/* return next token in configuration line */ +static char * +strdelim_internal(char **s, int split_equals) +{ + char *old; + int wspace = 0; + + if (*s == NULL) + return NULL; + + old = *s; + + *s = strpbrk(*s, + split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE); + if (*s == NULL) + return (old); + + if (*s[0] == '\"') { + memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */ + /* Find matching quote */ + if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) { + return (NULL); /* no matching quote */ + } else { + *s[0] = '\0'; + *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; + return (old); + } + } + + /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */ + if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=') + wspace = 1; + *s[0] = '\0'; + + /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */ + *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; + if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=' && !wspace) + *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; + + return (old); +} + +/* + * Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace or a + * single '=' character. + */ +char * +strdelim(char **s) +{ + return strdelim_internal(s, 1); +} + +/* + * Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace only. + */ +char * +strdelimw(char **s) +{ + return strdelim_internal(s, 0); +} + +struct passwd * +pwcopy(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy)); + + copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS + copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos); +#endif + copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; + copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE + copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE + copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS + copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); +#endif + copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); + copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); + return copy; +} + +/* + * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number. + * Port must be >=0 and <=65535. + * Return -1 if invalid. + */ +int +a2port(const char *s) +{ + struct servent *se; + long long port; + const char *errstr; + + port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr); + if (errstr == NULL) + return (int)port; + if ((se = getservbyname(s, "tcp")) != NULL) + return ntohs(se->s_port); + return -1; +} + +int +a2tun(const char *s, int *remote) +{ + const char *errstr = NULL; + char *sp, *ep; + int tun; + + if (remote != NULL) { + *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; + sp = xstrdup(s); + if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) { + free(sp); + return (a2tun(s, NULL)); + } + ep[0] = '\0'; ep++; + *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL); + tun = a2tun(sp, NULL); + free(sp); + return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun); + } + + if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0) + return (SSH_TUNID_ANY); + + tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) + return (SSH_TUNID_ERR); + + return (tun); +} + +#define SECONDS 1 +#define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60) +#define HOURS (MINUTES * 60) +#define DAYS (HOURS * 24) +#define WEEKS (DAYS * 7) + +/* + * Convert a time string into seconds; format is + * a sequence of: + * time[qualifier] + * + * Valid time qualifiers are: + * seconds + * s|S seconds + * m|M minutes + * h|H hours + * d|D days + * w|W weeks + * + * Examples: + * 90m 90 minutes + * 1h30m 90 minutes + * 2d 2 days + * 1w 1 week + * + * Return -1 if time string is invalid. + */ +long +convtime(const char *s) +{ + long total, secs, multiplier = 1; + const char *p; + char *endp; + + errno = 0; + total = 0; + p = s; + + if (p == NULL || *p == '\0') + return -1; + + while (*p) { + secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10); + if (p == endp || + (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) || + secs < 0) + return -1; + + switch (*endp++) { + case '\0': + endp--; + break; + case 's': + case 'S': + break; + case 'm': + case 'M': + multiplier = MINUTES; + break; + case 'h': + case 'H': + multiplier = HOURS; + break; + case 'd': + case 'D': + multiplier = DAYS; + break; + case 'w': + case 'W': + multiplier = WEEKS; + break; + default: + return -1; + } + if (secs >= LONG_MAX / multiplier) + return -1; + secs *= multiplier; + if (total >= LONG_MAX - secs) + return -1; + total += secs; + if (total < 0) + return -1; + p = endp; + } + + return total; +} + +/* + * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string. + * Caller must free returned string. + */ +char * +put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port) +{ + char *hoststr; + + if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) + return(xstrdup(host)); + if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0) + fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno)); + debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr); + return hoststr; +} + +/* + * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports. + * Argument may be modified (for termination). + * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds. + * *cp is set to the start of the next field, if one was found. + * The delimiter char, if present, is stored in delim. + * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL. + */ +static char * +hpdelim2(char **cp, char *delim) +{ + char *s, *old; + + if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL) + return NULL; + + old = s = *cp; + if (*s == '[') { + if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL) + return NULL; + else + s++; + } else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL) + s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */ + + switch (*s) { + case '\0': + *cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/ + break; + + case ':': + case '/': + if (delim != NULL) + *delim = *s; + *s = '\0'; /* terminate */ + *cp = s + 1; + break; + + default: + return NULL; + } + + return old; +} + +char * +hpdelim(char **cp) +{ + return hpdelim2(cp, NULL); +} + +char * +cleanhostname(char *host) +{ + if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') { + host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0'; + return (host + 1); + } else + return host; +} + +char * +colon(char *cp) +{ + int flag = 0; + + if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ + return NULL; + if (*cp == '[') + flag = 1; + + for (; *cp; ++cp) { + if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[') + flag = 1; + if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag) + return (cp+1); + if (*cp == ':' && !flag) + return (cp); + if (*cp == '/') + return NULL; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Parse a [user@]host:[path] string. + * Caller must free returned user, host and path. + * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking). + * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL. + * If host was not specified then *hostp will be set to NULL. + * If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to ".". + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +parse_user_host_path(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, char **pathp) +{ + char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL; + char *sdup, *tmp; + int ret = -1; + + if (userp != NULL) + *userp = NULL; + if (hostp != NULL) + *hostp = NULL; + if (pathp != NULL) + *pathp = NULL; + + sdup = xstrdup(s); + + /* Check for remote syntax: [user@]host:[path] */ + if ((tmp = colon(sdup)) == NULL) + goto out; + + /* Extract optional path */ + *tmp++ = '\0'; + if (*tmp == '\0') + tmp = "."; + path = xstrdup(tmp); + + /* Extract optional user and mandatory host */ + tmp = strrchr(sdup, '@'); + if (tmp != NULL) { + *tmp++ = '\0'; + host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(tmp)); + if (*sdup != '\0') + user = xstrdup(sdup); + } else { + host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(sdup)); + user = NULL; + } + + /* Success */ + if (userp != NULL) { + *userp = user; + user = NULL; + } + if (hostp != NULL) { + *hostp = host; + host = NULL; + } + if (pathp != NULL) { + *pathp = path; + path = NULL; + } + ret = 0; +out: + free(sdup); + free(user); + free(host); + free(path); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse a [user@]host[:port] string. + * Caller must free returned user and host. + * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking). + * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL. + * If port was not specified then *portp will be -1. + * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +parse_user_host_port(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp) +{ + char *sdup, *cp, *tmp; + char *user = NULL, *host = NULL; + int port = -1, ret = -1; + + if (userp != NULL) + *userp = NULL; + if (hostp != NULL) + *hostp = NULL; + if (portp != NULL) + *portp = -1; + + if ((sdup = tmp = strdup(s)) == NULL) + return -1; + /* Extract optional username */ + if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) { + *cp = '\0'; + if (*tmp == '\0') + goto out; + if ((user = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) + goto out; + tmp = cp + 1; + } + /* Extract mandatory hostname */ + if ((cp = hpdelim(&tmp)) == NULL || *cp == '\0') + goto out; + host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp)); + /* Convert and verify optional port */ + if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') { + if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0) + goto out; + } + /* Success */ + if (userp != NULL) { + *userp = user; + user = NULL; + } + if (hostp != NULL) { + *hostp = host; + host = NULL; + } + if (portp != NULL) + *portp = port; + ret = 0; + out: + free(sdup); + free(user); + free(host); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Converts a two-byte hex string to decimal. + * Returns the decimal value or -1 for invalid input. + */ +static int +hexchar(const char *s) +{ + unsigned char result[2]; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + if (s[i] >= '0' && s[i] <= '9') + result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - '0'); + else if (s[i] >= 'a' && s[i] <= 'f') + result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'a') + 10; + else if (s[i] >= 'A' && s[i] <= 'F') + result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'A') + 10; + else + return -1; + } + return (result[0] << 4) | result[1]; +} + +/* + * Decode an url-encoded string. + * Returns a newly allocated string on success or NULL on failure. + */ +static char * +urldecode(const char *src) +{ + char *ret, *dst; + int ch; + + ret = xmalloc(strlen(src) + 1); + for (dst = ret; *src != '\0'; src++) { + switch (*src) { + case '+': + *dst++ = ' '; + break; + case '%': + if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) || + !isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) || + (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + *dst++ = ch; + src += 2; + break; + default: + *dst++ = *src; + break; + } + } + *dst = '\0'; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse an (scp|ssh|sftp)://[user@]host[:port][/path] URI. + * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04 + * Either user or path may be url-encoded (but not host or port). + * Caller must free returned user, host and path. + * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking) + * but the scheme must always be specified. + * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL. + * If port was not specified then *portp will be -1. + * If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to NULL. + * Returns 0 on success, 1 if non-uri/wrong scheme, -1 on error/invalid uri. + */ +int +parse_uri(const char *scheme, const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, + int *portp, char **pathp) +{ + char *uridup, *cp, *tmp, ch; + char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL; + int port = -1, ret = -1; + size_t len; + + len = strlen(scheme); + if (strncmp(uri, scheme, len) != 0 || strncmp(uri + len, "://", 3) != 0) + return 1; + uri += len + 3; + + if (userp != NULL) + *userp = NULL; + if (hostp != NULL) + *hostp = NULL; + if (portp != NULL) + *portp = -1; + if (pathp != NULL) + *pathp = NULL; + + uridup = tmp = xstrdup(uri); + + /* Extract optional ssh-info (username + connection params) */ + if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) { + char *delim; + + *cp = '\0'; + /* Extract username and connection params */ + if ((delim = strchr(tmp, ';')) != NULL) { + /* Just ignore connection params for now */ + *delim = '\0'; + } + if (*tmp == '\0') { + /* Empty username */ + goto out; + } + if ((user = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL) + goto out; + tmp = cp + 1; + } + + /* Extract mandatory hostname */ + if ((cp = hpdelim2(&tmp, &ch)) == NULL || *cp == '\0') + goto out; + host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp)); + if (!valid_domain(host, 0, NULL)) + goto out; + + if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') { + if (ch == ':') { + /* Convert and verify port. */ + if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '/')) != NULL) + *cp = '\0'; + if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0) + goto out; + tmp = cp ? cp + 1 : NULL; + } + if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') { + /* Extract optional path */ + if ((path = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL) + goto out; + } + } + + /* Success */ + if (userp != NULL) { + *userp = user; + user = NULL; + } + if (hostp != NULL) { + *hostp = host; + host = NULL; + } + if (portp != NULL) + *portp = port; + if (pathp != NULL) { + *pathp = path; + path = NULL; + } + ret = 0; + out: + free(uridup); + free(user); + free(host); + free(path); + return ret; +} + +/* function to assist building execv() arguments */ +void +addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char *cp; + u_int nalloc; + int r; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + if (r == -1) + fatal("addargs: argument too long"); + + nalloc = args->nalloc; + if (args->list == NULL) { + nalloc = 32; + args->num = 0; + } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc) + nalloc *= 2; + + args->list = xrecallocarray(args->list, args->nalloc, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); + args->nalloc = nalloc; + args->list[args->num++] = cp; + args->list[args->num] = NULL; +} + +void +replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char *cp; + int r; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + if (r == -1) + fatal("replacearg: argument too long"); + + if (which >= args->num) + fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d", + which, args->num); + free(args->list[which]); + args->list[which] = cp; +} + +void +freeargs(arglist *args) +{ + u_int i; + + if (args->list != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++) + free(args->list[i]); + free(args->list); + args->nalloc = args->num = 0; + args->list = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc. + * Warning: this calls getpw*. + */ +char * +tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid) +{ + const char *path, *sep; + char user[128], *ret; + struct passwd *pw; + u_int len, slash; + + if (*filename != '~') + return (xstrdup(filename)); + filename++; + + path = strchr(filename, '/'); + if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */ + slash = path - filename; + if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1) + fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long"); + memcpy(user, filename, slash); + user[slash] = '\0'; + if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) + fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user); + } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */ + fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid); + + /* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */ + len = strlen(pw->pw_dir); + if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/') + sep = "/"; + else + sep = ""; + + /* Skip leading '/' from specified path */ + if (path != NULL) + filename = path + 1; + + if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX) + fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long"); + + return (ret); +} + +/* + * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be + * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must + * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory + * allocated by xmalloc. + */ +char * +percent_expand(const char *string, ...) +{ +#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16 + u_int num_keys, i, j; + struct { + const char *key; + const char *repl; + } keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS]; + char buf[4096]; + va_list ap; + + /* Gather keys */ + va_start(ap, string); + for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) { + keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *); + if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL) + break; + keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *); + if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL) + fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__); + } + if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL) + fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__); + va_end(ap); + + /* Expand string */ + *buf = '\0'; + for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) { + if (*string != '%') { + append: + buf[i++] = *string; + if (i >= sizeof(buf)) + fatal("%s: string too long", __func__); + buf[i] = '\0'; + continue; + } + string++; + /* %% case */ + if (*string == '%') + goto append; + if (*string == '\0') + fatal("%s: invalid format", __func__); + for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) { + if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) { + i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf)); + if (i >= sizeof(buf)) + fatal("%s: string too long", __func__); + break; + } + } + if (j >= num_keys) + fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string); + } + return (xstrdup(buf)); +#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS +} + +int +tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname) +{ +#if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN) + return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode, ifname)); +#elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD) + struct ifreq ifr; + char name[100]; + int fd = -1, sock; + const char *tunbase = "tun"; + + if (ifname != NULL) + *ifname = NULL; + + if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) + tunbase = "tap"; + + /* Open the tunnel device */ + if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) { + snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun); + fd = open(name, O_RDWR); + } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) { + for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) { + snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", + tunbase, tun); + if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0) + break; + } + } else { + debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun); + return -1; + } + + if (fd < 0) { + debug("%s: %s open: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd); + + /* Bring interface up if it is not already */ + snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun); + if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) + goto failed; + + if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) { + debug("%s: get interface %s flags: %s", __func__, + ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno)); + goto failed; + } + + if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) { + ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP; + if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) { + debug("%s: activate interface %s: %s", __func__, + ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno)); + goto failed; + } + } + + if (ifname != NULL) + *ifname = xstrdup(ifr.ifr_name); + + close(sock); + return fd; + + failed: + if (fd >= 0) + close(fd); + if (sock >= 0) + close(sock); + return -1; +#else + error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform"); + return (-1); +#endif +} + +void +sanitise_stdfd(void) +{ + int nullfd, dupfd; + + if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + exit(1); + } + while (++dupfd <= STDERR_FILENO) { + /* Only populate closed fds. */ + if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL) == -1 && errno == EBADF) { + if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + exit(1); + } + } + } + if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO) + close(nullfd); +} + +char * +tohex(const void *vp, size_t l) +{ + const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; + char b[3], *r; + size_t i, hl; + + if (l > 65536) + return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536"); + + hl = l * 2 + 1; + r = xcalloc(1, hl); + for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { + snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]); + strlcat(r, b, hl); + } + return (r); +} + +u_int64_t +get_u64(const void *vp) +{ + const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; + u_int64_t v; + + v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56; + v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48; + v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40; + v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32; + v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24; + v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16; + v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8; + v |= (u_int64_t)p[7]; + + return (v); +} + +u_int32_t +get_u32(const void *vp) +{ + const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; + u_int32_t v; + + v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24; + v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16; + v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8; + v |= (u_int32_t)p[3]; + + return (v); +} + +u_int32_t +get_u32_le(const void *vp) +{ + const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; + u_int32_t v; + + v = (u_int32_t)p[0]; + v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8; + v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16; + v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24; + + return (v); +} + +u_int16_t +get_u16(const void *vp) +{ + const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; + u_int16_t v; + + v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8; + v |= (u_int16_t)p[1]; + + return (v); +} + +void +put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v) +{ + u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; + + p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff; + p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff; + p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff; + p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff; + p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; + p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; + p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; + p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff; +} + +void +put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v) +{ + u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; + + p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; + p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; + p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; + p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff; +} + +void +put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v) +{ + u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; + + p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff; + p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; + p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; + p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; +} + +void +put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v) +{ + u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; + + p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; + p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff; +} + +void +ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms) +{ + struct timeval diff, finish; + + monotime_tv(&finish); + timersub(&finish, start, &diff); + *ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000); +} + +void +ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms) +{ + if (ms < 0) + ms = 0; + tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000; + tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000; +} + +void +monotime_ts(struct timespec *ts) +{ + struct timeval tv; +#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && (defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || \ + defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_REALTIME)) + static int gettime_failed = 0; + + if (!gettime_failed) { +# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME + if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ts) == 0) + return; +# endif /* CLOCK_BOOTTIME */ +# ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC + if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts) == 0) + return; +# endif /* CLOCK_MONOTONIC */ +# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME + /* Not monotonic, but we're almost out of options here. */ + if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ts) == 0) + return; +# endif /* CLOCK_REALTIME */ + debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno)); + gettime_failed = 1; + } +#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (BOOTTIME || MONOTONIC || REALTIME) */ + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); + ts->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec; + ts->tv_nsec = (long)tv.tv_usec * 1000; +} + +void +monotime_tv(struct timeval *tv) +{ + struct timespec ts; + + monotime_ts(&ts); + tv->tv_sec = ts.tv_sec; + tv->tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000; +} + +time_t +monotime(void) +{ + struct timespec ts; + + monotime_ts(&ts); + return ts.tv_sec; +} + +double +monotime_double(void) +{ + struct timespec ts; + + monotime_ts(&ts); + return ts.tv_sec + ((double)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000000); +} + +void +bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen) +{ + bw->buflen = buflen; + bw->rate = kbps; + bw->thresh = bw->rate; + bw->lamt = 0; + timerclear(&bw->bwstart); + timerclear(&bw->bwend); +} + +/* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */ +void +bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len) +{ + u_int64_t waitlen; + struct timespec ts, rm; + + if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) { + monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart); + return; + } + + bw->lamt += read_len; + if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh) + return; + + monotime_tv(&bw->bwend); + timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend); + if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend)) + return; + + bw->lamt *= 8; + waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate; + + bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L; + bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L; + + if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) { + timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend); + + /* Adjust the wait time */ + if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) { + bw->thresh /= 2; + if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4) + bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4; + } else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) { + bw->thresh *= 2; + if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8) + bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8; + } + + TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts); + while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) { + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + ts = rm; + } + } + + bw->lamt = 0; + monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart); +} + +/* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */ +void +mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len) +{ + const char *tmpdir; + int r; + + if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) { + r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir); + if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len) + return; + } + r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX"); + if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len) + fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__); +} + +static const struct { + const char *name; + int value; +} ipqos[] = { + { "none", INT_MAX }, /* can't use 0 here; that's CS0 */ + { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, + { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, + { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, + { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 }, + { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 }, + { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 }, + { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 }, + { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 }, + { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 }, + { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 }, + { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 }, + { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 }, + { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 }, + { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 }, + { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 }, + { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 }, + { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 }, + { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 }, + { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 }, + { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 }, + { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF }, + { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY }, + { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT }, + { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; + +int +parse_ipqos(const char *cp) +{ + u_int i; + char *ep; + long val; + + if (cp == NULL) + return -1; + for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { + if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0) + return ipqos[i].value; + } + /* Try parsing as an integer */ + val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0); + if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255) + return -1; + return val; +} + +const char * +iptos2str(int iptos) +{ + int i; + static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"]; + + for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { + if (ipqos[i].value == iptos) + return ipqos[i].name; + } + snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos); + return iptos_str; +} + +void +lowercase(char *s) +{ + for (; *s; s++) + *s = tolower((u_char)*s); +} + +int +unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first) +{ + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + int saved_errno, sock; + + memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); + sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path, + sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { + error("%s: path \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", + __func__, path); + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return -1; + } + + sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("%s: socket: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + if (unlink_first == 1) { + if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT) + error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno)); + } + if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("%s: cannot bind to path %s: %s", + __func__, path, strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + if (listen(sock, backlog) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("%s: cannot listen on path %s: %s", + __func__, path, strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + unlink(path); + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + return sock; +} + +void +sock_set_v6only(int s) +{ +#if defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) + int on = 1; + + debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s); + if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) + error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno)); +#endif +} + +/* + * Compares two strings that maybe be NULL. Returns non-zero if strings + * are both NULL or are identical, returns zero otherwise. + */ +static int +strcmp_maybe_null(const char *a, const char *b) +{ + if ((a == NULL && b != NULL) || (a != NULL && b == NULL)) + return 0; + if (a != NULL && strcmp(a, b) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Compare two forwards, returning non-zero if they are identical or + * zero otherwise. + */ +int +forward_equals(const struct Forward *a, const struct Forward *b) +{ + if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_host, b->listen_host) == 0) + return 0; + if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port) + return 0; + if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_path, b->listen_path) == 0) + return 0; + if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_host, b->connect_host) == 0) + return 0; + if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port) + return 0; + if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_path, b->connect_path) == 0) + return 0; + /* allocated_port and handle are not checked */ + return 1; +} + +/* returns 1 if process is already daemonized, 0 otherwise */ +int +daemonized(void) +{ + int fd; + + if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) { + close(fd); + return 0; /* have controlling terminal */ + } + if (getppid() != 1) + return 0; /* parent is not init */ + if (getsid(0) != getpid()) + return 0; /* not session leader */ + debug3("already daemonized"); + return 1; +} + + +/* + * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic + * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector + * and its members. + */ +int +argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int argc = 0, quote, i, j; + char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv)); + + *argvp = NULL; + *argcp = 0; + + for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') + continue; + + /* Start of a token */ + quote = 0; + if (s[i] == '\\' && + (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\')) + i++; + else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"') + quote = s[i++]; + + argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv)); + arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1); + argv[argc] = NULL; + + /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */ + for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + if (s[i] == '\\') { + if (s[i + 1] == '\'' || + s[i + 1] == '\"' || + s[i + 1] == '\\') { + i++; /* Skip '\' */ + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } else { + /* Unrecognised escape */ + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } + } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')) + break; /* done */ + else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote) + break; /* done */ + else + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } + if (s[i] == '\0') { + if (quote != 0) { + /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */ + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + break; + } + } + /* Success */ + *argcp = argc; + *argvp = argv; + argc = 0; + argv = NULL; + r = 0; + out: + if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + free(argv[i]); + free(argv); + } + return r; +} + +/* + * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as + * necessary. Caller must free returned string. + */ +char * +argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, j, ws, r; + char c, *ret; + struct sshbuf *buf, *arg; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + ws = 0; + sshbuf_reset(arg); + for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) { + r = 0; + c = argv[i][j]; + switch (c) { + case ' ': + case '\t': + ws = 1; + r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); + break; + case '\\': + case '\'': + case '"': + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0) + break; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); + break; + } + if (r != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) || + (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 || + (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0)) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__); + memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0'; + sshbuf_free(buf); + sshbuf_free(arg); + return ret; +} + +/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */ +int +exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd, int quiet) +{ + int status; + + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { + if (errno != EINTR) { + error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status)); + return -1; + } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { + do_log2(quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, + "%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components + * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of + * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. + * + * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? + * + * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to + * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an + * error buffer plus max size as arguments. + * + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure + */ +int +safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, + uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) +{ + char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; + char *cp; + int comparehome = 0; + struct stat st; + + if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) + comparehome = 1; + + if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); + return -1; + } + if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || + (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", + buf); + return -1; + } + + /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ + for (;;) { + if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); + return -1; + } + strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); + + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || + (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, + "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); + return -1; + } + + /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ + if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) + break; + + /* + * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, + * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too + */ + if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Version of safe_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to + * avoid races. + * + * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure + */ +int +safe_path_fd(int fd, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, + char *err, size_t errlen) +{ + struct stat st; + + /* check the open file to avoid races */ + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", + file, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + return safe_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); +} + +/* + * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable + * already exists, its value is overridden. + */ +void +child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, + const char *value) +{ + char **env; + u_int envsize; + u_int i, namelen; + + if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) { + error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name); + return; + } + + /* + * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null + * entry before continuing. + */ + if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) { + *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); + *envp[0] = NULL; + *envsizep = 1; + } + + /* + * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable + * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot + * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. + */ + env = *envp; + namelen = strlen(name); + for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) + if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=') + break; + if (env[i]) { + /* Reuse the slot. */ + free(env[i]); + } else { + /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */ + envsize = *envsizep; + if (i >= envsize - 1) { + if (envsize >= 1000) + fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); + envsize += 50; + env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); + *envsizep = envsize; + } + /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ + env[i + 1] = NULL; + } + + /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */ + /* XXX xasprintf */ + env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); + snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value); +} + +/* + * Check and optionally lowercase a domain name, also removes trailing '.' + * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure, storing an error message in errstr. + */ +int +valid_domain(char *name, int makelower, const char **errstr) +{ + size_t i, l = strlen(name); + u_char c, last = '\0'; + static char errbuf[256]; + + if (l == 0) { + strlcpy(errbuf, "empty domain name", sizeof(errbuf)); + goto bad; + } + if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) { + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name \"%.100s\" " + "starts with invalid character", name); + goto bad; + } + for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { + c = tolower((u_char)name[i]); + if (makelower) + name[i] = (char)c; + if (last == '.' && c == '.') { + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name " + "\"%.100s\" contains consecutive separators", name); + goto bad; + } + if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) && + c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ { + snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name " + "\"%.100s\" contains invalid characters", name); + goto bad; + } + last = c; + } + if (name[l - 1] == '.') + name[l - 1] = '\0'; + if (errstr != NULL) + *errstr = NULL; + return 1; +bad: + if (errstr != NULL) + *errstr = errbuf; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Verify that a environment variable name (not including initial '$') is + * valid; consisting of one or more alphanumeric or underscore characters only. + * Returns 1 on valid, 0 otherwise. + */ +int +valid_env_name(const char *name) +{ + const char *cp; + + if (name[0] == '\0') + return 0; + for (cp = name; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { + if (!isalnum((u_char)*cp) && *cp != '_') + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +const char * +atoi_err(const char *nptr, int *val) +{ + const char *errstr = NULL; + long long num; + + if (nptr == NULL || *nptr == '\0') + return "missing"; + num = strtonum(nptr, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr == NULL) + *val = (int)num; + return errstr; +} + +int +parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp) +{ + struct tm tm; + time_t tt; + char buf[32], *fmt; + + *tp = 0; + + /* + * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there + * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between + * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way. + */ + switch (strlen(s)) { + case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */ + fmt = "%Y-%m-%d"; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6); + break; + case 12: /* YYYYMMDDHHMM */ + fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M"; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s", + s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10); + break; + case 14: /* YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */ + fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s", + s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12); + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm)); + if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + /* success */ + *tp = (uint64_t)tt; + return 0; +} + +void +format_absolute_time(uint64_t t, char *buf, size_t len) +{ + time_t tt = t > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : t; /* XXX revisit in 2038 :P */ + struct tm tm; + + localtime_r(&tt, &tm); + strftime(buf, len, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", &tm); +} diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31b207a --- /dev/null +++ b/misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.75 2018/10/03 06:38:35 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef _MISC_H +#define _MISC_H + +#include +#include + +/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */ +struct Forward { + char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */ + int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */ + char *listen_path; /* Path to bind domain socket. */ + char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */ + int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */ + char *connect_path; /* Path to connect domain socket. */ + int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */ + int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */ +}; + +int forward_equals(const struct Forward *, const struct Forward *); +int daemonized(void); + +/* Common server and client forwarding options. */ +struct ForwardOptions { + int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */ + mode_t streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */ + int streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */ +}; + +/* misc.c */ + +char *chop(char *); +char *strdelim(char **); +char *strdelimw(char **); +int set_nonblock(int); +int unset_nonblock(int); +void set_nodelay(int); +int set_reuseaddr(int); +char *get_rdomain(int); +int set_rdomain(int, const char *); +int a2port(const char *); +int a2tun(const char *, int *); +char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short); +char *hpdelim(char **); +char *cleanhostname(char *); +char *colon(char *); +int parse_user_host_path(const char *, char **, char **, char **); +int parse_user_host_port(const char *, char **, char **, int *); +int parse_uri(const char *, const char *, char **, char **, int *, char **); +long convtime(const char *); +char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t); +char *percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__)); +char *tohex(const void *, size_t); +void sanitise_stdfd(void); +void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *); +void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int); +void monotime_ts(struct timespec *); +void monotime_tv(struct timeval *); +time_t monotime(void); +double monotime_double(void); +void lowercase(char *s); +int unix_listener(const char *, int, int); +int valid_domain(char *, int, const char **); +int valid_env_name(const char *); +const char *atoi_err(const char *, int *); +int parse_absolute_time(const char *, uint64_t *); +void format_absolute_time(uint64_t, char *, size_t); + +void sock_set_v6only(int); + +struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *); +const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int); + +typedef struct arglist arglist; +struct arglist { + char **list; + u_int num; + u_int nalloc; +}; +void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); +void replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4))); +void freeargs(arglist *); + +int tun_open(int, int, char **); + +/* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */ +#define SSH_TUNMODE_NO 0x00 +#define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 0x01 +#define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 0x02 +#define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT +#define SSH_TUNMODE_YES (SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) + +#define SSH_TUNID_ANY 0x7fffffff +#define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1) +#define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2) + +/* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */ +#define PORT_STREAMLOCAL -2 + +/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */ +u_int64_t get_u64(const void *) + __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8))); +u_int32_t get_u32(const void *) + __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4))); +u_int16_t get_u16(const void *) + __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2))); +void put_u64(void *, u_int64_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8))); +void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4))); +void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2))); + +/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */ +u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); +void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); + +struct bwlimit { + size_t buflen; + u_int64_t rate, thresh, lamt; + struct timeval bwstart, bwend; +}; + +void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t); +void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t); + +int parse_ipqos(const char *); +const char *iptos2str(int); +void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t); + +void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, + const char *value); + +int argv_split(const char *, int *, char ***); +char *argv_assemble(int, char **argv); +int exited_cleanly(pid_t, const char *, const char *, int); + +struct stat; +int safe_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, + char *, size_t); +int safe_path_fd(int, const char *, struct passwd *, + char *err, size_t errlen); + +/* readpass.c */ + +#define RP_ECHO 0x0001 +#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002 +#define RP_ALLOW_EOF 0x0004 +#define RP_USE_ASKPASS 0x0008 + +char *read_passphrase(const char *, int); +int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); + +#define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) +#define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) +#define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) + +#endif /* _MISC_H */ diff --git a/mkinstalldirs b/mkinstalldirs new file mode 100755 index 0000000..399f409 --- /dev/null +++ b/mkinstalldirs @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy +# Author: Noah Friedman +# Created: 1993-05-16 +# Public domain + +errstatus=0 + +for file +do + set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'` + shift + + pathcomp= + for d + do + pathcomp="$pathcomp$d" + case "$pathcomp" in + -* ) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;; + esac + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + echo "mkdir $pathcomp" + + mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$? + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + errstatus=$lasterr + fi + fi + + pathcomp="$pathcomp/" + done +done + +exit $errstatus + +# mkinstalldirs ends here diff --git a/moduli b/moduli new file mode 100644 index 0000000..372c382 --- /dev/null +++ b/moduli @@ -0,0 +1,428 @@ +# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.22 2018/09/20 08:07:03 dtucker Exp $ 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diff --git a/moduli.0 b/moduli.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59767da --- /dev/null +++ b/moduli.0 @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +MODULI(5) File Formats Manual MODULI(5) + +NAME + moduli M-bM-^@M-^S Diffie-Hellman moduli + +DESCRIPTION + The /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by + sshd(8) in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method. + + New moduli may be generated with ssh-keygen(1) using a two-step process. + An initial candidate generation pass, using ssh-keygen -G, calculates + numbers that are likely to be useful. A second primality testing pass, + using ssh-keygen -T, provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers + are prime and are safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by sshd(8). + This moduli format is used as the output from each pass. + + The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus, + containing seven space-separated fields. These fields are as follows: + + timestamp The time that the modulus was last processed as + YYYYMMDDHHMMSS. + + type Decimal number specifying the internal structure of + the prime modulus. Supported types are: + + 0 Unknown, not tested. + 2 "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime. + 4 Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime. + + Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1) + are Sophie Germain primes (type 4). Further primality + testing with ssh-keygen(1) produces safe prime moduli + (type 2) that are ready for use in sshd(8). Other + types are not used by OpenSSH. + + tests Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests + that the number has been subjected to represented as a + bitmask of the following values: + + 0x00 Not tested. + 0x01 Composite number M-bM-^@M-^S not prime. + 0x02 Sieve of Eratosthenes. + 0x04 Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests. + + The ssh-keygen(1) moduli candidate generation uses the + Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02). Subsequent + ssh-keygen(1) primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests + (flag 0x04). + + trials Decimal number indicating the number of primality + trials that have been performed on the modulus. + + size Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in + bits. + + generator The recommended generator for use with this modulus + (hexadecimal). + + modulus The modulus itself in hexadecimal. + + When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, sshd(8) first estimates + the size of the modulus required to produce enough Diffie-Hellman output + to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher. sshd(8) then randomly + selects a modulus from /etc/moduli that best meets the size requirement. + +SEE ALSO + ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) + +STANDARDS + M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for + the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006, + 2006. + +OpenBSD 6.4 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef0de08 --- /dev/null +++ b/moduli.5 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: moduli.5,v 1.17 2012/09/26 17:34:38 jmc Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller +.\" +.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any +.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above +.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. +.\" +.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES +.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR +.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES +.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN +.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF +.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 26 2012 $ +.Dt MODULI 5 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm moduli +.Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Pa /etc/moduli +file contains prime numbers and generators for use by +.Xr sshd 8 +in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method. +.Pp +New moduli may be generated with +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +using a two-step process. +An initial +.Em candidate generation +pass, using +.Ic ssh-keygen -G , +calculates numbers that are likely to be useful. +A second +.Em primality testing +pass, using +.Ic ssh-keygen -T , +provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers are prime and are +safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by +.Xr sshd 8 . +This +.Nm +format is used as the output from each pass. +.Pp +The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus, +containing seven space-separated fields. +These fields are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Description -offset indent +.It timestamp +The time that the modulus was last processed as YYYYMMDDHHMMSS. +.It type +Decimal number specifying the internal structure of the prime modulus. +Supported types are: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width 0x00 -compact +.It 0 +Unknown, not tested. +.It 2 +"Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime. +.It 4 +Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime. +.El +.Pp +Moduli candidates initially produced by +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +are Sophie Germain primes (type 4). +Further primality testing with +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +produces safe prime moduli (type 2) that are ready for use in +.Xr sshd 8 . +Other types are not used by OpenSSH. +.It tests +Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests that the number +has been subjected to represented as a bitmask of the following values: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width 0x00 -compact +.It 0x00 +Not tested. +.It 0x01 +Composite number \(en not prime. +.It 0x02 +Sieve of Eratosthenes. +.It 0x04 +Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests. +.El +.Pp +The +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +moduli candidate generation uses the Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02). +Subsequent +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests (flag 0x04). +.It trials +Decimal number indicating the number of primality trials +that have been performed on the modulus. +.It size +Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in bits. +.It generator +The recommended generator for use with this modulus (hexadecimal). +.It modulus +The modulus itself in hexadecimal. +.El +.Pp +When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, +.Xr sshd 8 +first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough +Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher. +.Xr sshd 8 +then randomly selects a modulus from +.Fa /etc/moduli +that best meets the size requirement. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Sh STANDARDS +.Rs +.%A M. Friedl +.%A N. Provos +.%A W. Simpson +.%D March 2006 +.%R RFC 4419 +.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol +.%D 2006 +.Re diff --git a/moduli.c b/moduli.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..233cba8 --- /dev/null +++ b/moduli.c @@ -0,0 +1,808 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.32 2017/12/08 03:45:52 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright 1994 Phil Karn + * Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson + * Copyright 2000 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Two-step process to generate safe primes for DHGEX + * + * Sieve candidates for "safe" primes, + * suitable for use as Diffie-Hellman moduli; + * that is, where q = (p-1)/2 is also prime. + * + * First step: generate candidate primes (memory intensive) + * Second step: test primes' safety (processor intensive) + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +/* + * File output defines + */ + +/* need line long enough for largest moduli plus headers */ +#define QLINESIZE (100+8192) + +/* + * Size: decimal. + * Specifies the number of the most significant bit (0 to M). + * WARNING: internally, usually 1 to N. + */ +#define QSIZE_MINIMUM (511) + +/* + * Prime sieving defines + */ + +/* Constant: assuming 8 bit bytes and 32 bit words */ +#define SHIFT_BIT (3) +#define SHIFT_BYTE (2) +#define SHIFT_WORD (SHIFT_BIT+SHIFT_BYTE) +#define SHIFT_MEGABYTE (20) +#define SHIFT_MEGAWORD (SHIFT_MEGABYTE-SHIFT_BYTE) + +/* + * Using virtual memory can cause thrashing. This should be the largest + * number that is supported without a large amount of disk activity -- + * that would increase the run time from hours to days or weeks! + */ +#define LARGE_MINIMUM (8UL) /* megabytes */ + +/* + * Do not increase this number beyond the unsigned integer bit size. + * Due to a multiple of 4, it must be LESS than 128 (yielding 2**30 bits). + */ +#define LARGE_MAXIMUM (127UL) /* megabytes */ + +/* + * Constant: when used with 32-bit integers, the largest sieve prime + * has to be less than 2**32. + */ +#define SMALL_MAXIMUM (0xffffffffUL) + +/* Constant: can sieve all primes less than 2**32, as 65537**2 > 2**32-1. */ +#define TINY_NUMBER (1UL<<16) + +/* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */ +#define TEST_MAXIMUM (1UL<<16) +#define TEST_MINIMUM (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1) +/* real TEST_MINIMUM (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */ +#define TEST_POWER (3) /* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */ + +/* bit operations on 32-bit words */ +#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31))) +#define BIT_SET(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31))) +#define BIT_TEST(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31))) + +/* + * Prime testing defines + */ + +/* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */ +#define TRIAL_MINIMUM (4) + +/* + * Sieving data (XXX - move to struct) + */ + +/* sieve 2**16 */ +static u_int32_t *TinySieve, tinybits; + +/* sieve 2**30 in 2**16 parts */ +static u_int32_t *SmallSieve, smallbits, smallbase; + +/* sieve relative to the initial value */ +static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers; +static u_int32_t largebits, largememory; /* megabytes */ +static BIGNUM *largebase; + +int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); +int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, + unsigned long); + +/* + * print moduli out in consistent form, + */ +static int +qfileout(FILE * ofile, u_int32_t otype, u_int32_t otests, u_int32_t otries, + u_int32_t osize, u_int32_t ogenerator, BIGNUM * omodulus) +{ + struct tm *gtm; + time_t time_now; + int res; + + time(&time_now); + gtm = gmtime(&time_now); + + res = fprintf(ofile, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d %u %u %u %u %x ", + gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_mon + 1, gtm->tm_mday, + gtm->tm_hour, gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec, + otype, otests, otries, osize, ogenerator); + + if (res < 0) + return (-1); + + if (BN_print_fp(ofile, omodulus) < 1) + return (-1); + + res = fprintf(ofile, "\n"); + fflush(ofile); + + return (res > 0 ? 0 : -1); +} + + +/* + ** Sieve p's and q's with small factors + */ +static void +sieve_large(u_int32_t s) +{ + u_int32_t r, u; + + debug3("sieve_large %u", s); + largetries++; + /* r = largebase mod s */ + r = BN_mod_word(largebase, s); + if (r == 0) + u = 0; /* s divides into largebase exactly */ + else + u = s - r; /* largebase+u is first entry divisible by s */ + + if (u < largebits * 2) { + /* + * The sieve omits p's and q's divisible by 2, so ensure that + * largebase+u is odd. Then, step through the sieve in + * increments of 2*s + */ + if (u & 0x1) + u += s; /* Make largebase+u odd, and u even */ + + /* Mark all multiples of 2*s */ + for (u /= 2; u < largebits; u += s) + BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u); + } + + /* r = p mod s */ + r = (2 * r + 1) % s; + if (r == 0) + u = 0; /* s divides p exactly */ + else + u = s - r; /* p+u is first entry divisible by s */ + + if (u < largebits * 4) { + /* + * The sieve omits p's divisible by 4, so ensure that + * largebase+u is not. Then, step through the sieve in + * increments of 4*s + */ + while (u & 0x3) { + if (SMALL_MAXIMUM - u < s) + return; + u += s; + } + + /* Mark all multiples of 4*s */ + for (u /= 4; u < largebits; u += s) + BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u); + } +} + +/* + * list candidates for Sophie-Germain primes (where q = (p-1)/2) + * to standard output. + * The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30). + */ +int +gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start) +{ + BIGNUM *q; + u_int32_t j, r, s, t; + u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6; + u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6; + time_t time_start, time_stop; + u_int32_t i; + int ret = 0; + + largememory = memory; + + if (memory != 0 && + (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) { + error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)", + LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM); + return (-1); + } + + /* + * Set power to the length in bits of the prime to be generated. + * This is changed to 1 less than the desired safe prime moduli p. + */ + if (power > TEST_MAXIMUM) { + error("Too many bits: %u > %lu", power, TEST_MAXIMUM); + return (-1); + } else if (power < TEST_MINIMUM) { + error("Too few bits: %u < %u", power, TEST_MINIMUM); + return (-1); + } + power--; /* decrement before squaring */ + + /* + * The density of ordinary primes is on the order of 1/bits, so the + * density of safe primes should be about (1/bits)**2. Set test range + * to something well above bits**2 to be reasonably sure (but not + * guaranteed) of catching at least one safe prime. + */ + largewords = ((power * power) >> (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)); + + /* + * Need idea of how much memory is available. We don't have to use all + * of it. + */ + if (largememory > LARGE_MAXIMUM) { + logit("Limited memory: %u MB; limit %lu MB", + largememory, LARGE_MAXIMUM); + largememory = LARGE_MAXIMUM; + } + + if (largewords <= (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD)) { + logit("Increased memory: %u MB; need %u bytes", + largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE)); + largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD); + } else if (largememory > 0) { + logit("Decreased memory: %u MB; want %u bytes", + largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE)); + largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD); + } + + TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t)); + tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD; + + SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t)); + smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD; + + /* + * dynamically determine available memory + */ + while ((LargeSieve = calloc(largewords, sizeof(u_int32_t))) == NULL) + largewords -= (1L << (SHIFT_MEGAWORD - 2)); /* 1/4 MB chunks */ + + largebits = largewords << SHIFT_WORD; + largenumbers = largebits * 2; /* even numbers excluded */ + + /* validation check: count the number of primes tried */ + largetries = 0; + if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("BN_new failed"); + + /* + * Generate random starting point for subprime search, or use + * specified parameter. + */ + if ((largebase = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("BN_new failed"); + if (start == NULL) { + if (BN_rand(largebase, power, 1, 1) == 0) + fatal("BN_rand failed"); + } else { + if (BN_copy(largebase, start) == NULL) + fatal("BN_copy: failed"); + } + + /* ensure odd */ + if (BN_set_bit(largebase, 0) == 0) + fatal("BN_set_bit: failed"); + + time(&time_start); + + logit("%.24s Sieve next %u plus %u-bit", ctime(&time_start), + largenumbers, power); + debug2("start point: 0x%s", BN_bn2hex(largebase)); + + /* + * TinySieve + */ + for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) { + if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i)) + continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */ + + /* The next tiny prime */ + t = 2 * i + 3; + + /* Mark all multiples of t */ + for (j = i + t; j < tinybits; j += t) + BIT_SET(TinySieve, j); + + sieve_large(t); + } + + /* + * Start the small block search at the next possible prime. To avoid + * fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped. + */ + for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3; + smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER); + smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) { + for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) { + if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i)) + continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */ + + /* The next tiny prime */ + t = 2 * i + 3; + r = smallbase % t; + + if (r == 0) { + s = 0; /* t divides into smallbase exactly */ + } else { + /* smallbase+s is first entry divisible by t */ + s = t - r; + } + + /* + * The sieve omits even numbers, so ensure that + * smallbase+s is odd. Then, step through the sieve + * in increments of 2*t + */ + if (s & 1) + s += t; /* Make smallbase+s odd, and s even */ + + /* Mark all multiples of 2*t */ + for (s /= 2; s < smallbits; s += t) + BIT_SET(SmallSieve, s); + } + + /* + * SmallSieve + */ + for (i = 0; i < smallbits; i++) { + if (BIT_TEST(SmallSieve, i)) + continue; /* 2*i+smallbase is composite */ + + /* The next small prime */ + sieve_large((2 * i) + smallbase); + } + + memset(SmallSieve, 0, smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE); + } + + time(&time_stop); + + logit("%.24s Sieved with %u small primes in %lld seconds", + ctime(&time_stop), largetries, (long long)(time_stop - time_start)); + + for (j = r = 0; j < largebits; j++) { + if (BIT_TEST(LargeSieve, j)) + continue; /* Definitely composite, skip */ + + debug2("test q = largebase+%u", 2 * j); + if (BN_set_word(q, 2 * j) == 0) + fatal("BN_set_word failed"); + if (BN_add(q, q, largebase) == 0) + fatal("BN_add failed"); + if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN, + MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE, largetries, + (power - 1) /* MSB */, (0), q) == -1) { + ret = -1; + break; + } + + r++; /* count q */ + } + + time(&time_stop); + + free(LargeSieve); + free(SmallSieve); + free(TinySieve); + + logit("%.24s Found %u candidates", ctime(&time_stop), r); + + return (ret); +} + +static void +write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t lineno) +{ + FILE *fp; + char tmp[PATH_MAX]; + int r; + + r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s.XXXXXXXXXX", cpfile); + if (r == -1 || r >= PATH_MAX) { + logit("write_checkpoint: temp pathname too long"); + return; + } + if ((r = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) { + logit("mkstemp(%s): %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + if ((fp = fdopen(r, "w")) == NULL) { + logit("write_checkpoint: fdopen: %s", strerror(errno)); + unlink(tmp); + close(r); + return; + } + if (fprintf(fp, "%lu\n", (unsigned long)lineno) > 0 && fclose(fp) == 0 + && rename(tmp, cpfile) == 0) + debug3("wrote checkpoint line %lu to '%s'", + (unsigned long)lineno, cpfile); + else + logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile, + strerror(errno)); +} + +static unsigned long +read_checkpoint(char *cpfile) +{ + FILE *fp; + unsigned long lineno = 0; + + if ((fp = fopen(cpfile, "r")) == NULL) + return 0; + if (fscanf(fp, "%lu\n", &lineno) < 1) + logit("Failed to load checkpoint from '%s'", cpfile); + else + logit("Loaded checkpoint from '%s' line %lu", cpfile, lineno); + fclose(fp); + return lineno; +} + +static unsigned long +count_lines(FILE *f) +{ + unsigned long count = 0; + char lp[QLINESIZE + 1]; + + if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) { + debug("input file is not seekable"); + return ULONG_MAX; + } + while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, f) != NULL) + count++; + rewind(f); + debug("input file has %lu lines", count); + return count; +} + +static char * +fmt_time(time_t seconds) +{ + int day, hr, min; + static char buf[128]; + + min = (seconds / 60) % 60; + hr = (seconds / 60 / 60) % 24; + day = seconds / 60 / 60 / 24; + if (day > 0) + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%dd %d:%02d", day, hr, min); + else + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d:%02d", hr, min); + return buf; +} + +static void +print_progress(unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long current_lineno, + unsigned long end_lineno) +{ + static time_t time_start, time_prev; + time_t time_now, elapsed; + unsigned long num_to_process, processed, remaining, percent, eta; + double time_per_line; + char *eta_str; + + time_now = monotime(); + if (time_start == 0) { + time_start = time_prev = time_now; + return; + } + /* print progress after 1m then once per 5m */ + if (time_now - time_prev < 5 * 60) + return; + time_prev = time_now; + elapsed = time_now - time_start; + processed = current_lineno - start_lineno; + remaining = end_lineno - current_lineno; + num_to_process = end_lineno - start_lineno; + time_per_line = (double)elapsed / processed; + /* if we don't know how many we're processing just report count+time */ + time(&time_now); + if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) { + logit("%.24s processed %lu in %s", ctime(&time_now), + processed, fmt_time(elapsed)); + return; + } + percent = 100 * processed / num_to_process; + eta = time_per_line * remaining; + eta_str = xstrdup(fmt_time(eta)); + logit("%.24s processed %lu of %lu (%lu%%) in %s, ETA %s", + ctime(&time_now), processed, num_to_process, percent, + fmt_time(elapsed), eta_str); + free(eta_str); +} + +/* + * perform a Miller-Rabin primality test + * on the list of candidates + * (checking both q and p) + * The result is a list of so-call "safe" primes + */ +int +prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted, + char *checkpoint_file, unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long num_lines) +{ + BIGNUM *q, *p, *a; + BN_CTX *ctx; + char *cp, *lp; + u_int32_t count_in = 0, count_out = 0, count_possible = 0; + u_int32_t generator_known, in_tests, in_tries, in_type, in_size; + unsigned long last_processed = 0, end_lineno; + time_t time_start, time_stop; + int res; + + if (trials < TRIAL_MINIMUM) { + error("Minimum primality trials is %d", TRIAL_MINIMUM); + return (-1); + } + + if (num_lines == 0) + end_lineno = count_lines(in); + else + end_lineno = start_lineno + num_lines; + + time(&time_start); + + if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("BN_new failed"); + if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("BN_new failed"); + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + fatal("BN_CTX_new failed"); + + debug2("%.24s Final %u Miller-Rabin trials (%x generator)", + ctime(&time_start), trials, generator_wanted); + + if (checkpoint_file != NULL) + last_processed = read_checkpoint(checkpoint_file); + last_processed = start_lineno = MAXIMUM(last_processed, start_lineno); + if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) + debug("process from line %lu from pipe", last_processed); + else + debug("process from line %lu to line %lu", last_processed, + end_lineno); + + res = 0; + lp = xmalloc(QLINESIZE + 1); + while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, in) != NULL && count_in < end_lineno) { + count_in++; + if (count_in <= last_processed) { + debug3("skipping line %u, before checkpoint or " + "specified start line", count_in); + continue; + } + if (checkpoint_file != NULL) + write_checkpoint(checkpoint_file, count_in); + print_progress(start_lineno, count_in, end_lineno); + if (strlen(lp) < 14 || *lp == '!' || *lp == '#') { + debug2("%10u: comment or short line", count_in); + continue; + } + + /* XXX - fragile parser */ + /* time */ + cp = &lp[14]; /* (skip) */ + + /* type */ + in_type = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); + + /* tests */ + in_tests = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); + + if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) { + debug2("%10u: known composite", count_in); + continue; + } + + /* tries */ + in_tries = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); + + /* size (most significant bit) */ + in_size = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10); + + /* generator (hex) */ + generator_known = strtoul(cp, &cp, 16); + + /* Skip white space */ + cp += strspn(cp, " "); + + /* modulus (hex) */ + switch (in_type) { + case MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN: + debug2("%10u: (%u) Sophie-Germain", count_in, in_type); + a = q; + if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0) + fatal("BN_hex2bn failed"); + /* p = 2*q + 1 */ + if (BN_lshift(p, q, 1) == 0) + fatal("BN_lshift failed"); + if (BN_add_word(p, 1) == 0) + fatal("BN_add_word failed"); + in_size += 1; + generator_known = 0; + break; + case MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED: + case MODULI_TYPE_SAFE: + case MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR: + case MODULI_TYPE_STRONG: + case MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN: + debug2("%10u: (%u)", count_in, in_type); + a = p; + if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0) + fatal("BN_hex2bn failed"); + /* q = (p-1) / 2 */ + if (BN_rshift(q, p, 1) == 0) + fatal("BN_rshift failed"); + break; + default: + debug2("Unknown prime type"); + break; + } + + /* + * due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check + * the proposed bit size. + */ + if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) { + debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size); + continue; + } + if (in_size < QSIZE_MINIMUM) { + debug2("%10u: bit size %u too short", count_in, in_size); + continue; + } + + if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN) + in_tries += trials; + else + in_tries = trials; + + /* + * guess unknown generator + */ + if (generator_known == 0) { + if (BN_mod_word(p, 24) == 11) + generator_known = 2; + else if (BN_mod_word(p, 12) == 5) + generator_known = 3; + else { + u_int32_t r = BN_mod_word(p, 10); + + if (r == 3 || r == 7) + generator_known = 5; + } + } + /* + * skip tests when desired generator doesn't match + */ + if (generator_wanted > 0 && + generator_wanted != generator_known) { + debug2("%10u: generator %d != %d", + count_in, generator_known, generator_wanted); + continue; + } + + /* + * Primes with no known generator are useless for DH, so + * skip those. + */ + if (generator_known == 0) { + debug2("%10u: no known generator", count_in); + continue; + } + + count_possible++; + + /* + * The (1/4)^N performance bound on Miller-Rabin is + * extremely pessimistic, so don't spend a lot of time + * really verifying that q is prime until after we know + * that p is also prime. A single pass will weed out the + * vast majority of composite q's. + */ + if (BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, ctx, NULL) <= 0) { + debug("%10u: q failed first possible prime test", + count_in); + continue; + } + + /* + * q is possibly prime, so go ahead and really make sure + * that p is prime. If it is, then we can go back and do + * the same for q. If p is composite, chances are that + * will show up on the first Rabin-Miller iteration so it + * doesn't hurt to specify a high iteration count. + */ + if (!BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, ctx, NULL)) { + debug("%10u: p is not prime", count_in); + continue; + } + debug("%10u: p is almost certainly prime", count_in); + + /* recheck q more rigorously */ + if (!BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, ctx, NULL)) { + debug("%10u: q is not prime", count_in); + continue; + } + debug("%10u: q is almost certainly prime", count_in); + + if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE, + in_tests | MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN, + in_tries, in_size, generator_known, p)) { + res = -1; + break; + } + + count_out++; + } + + time(&time_stop); + free(lp); + BN_free(p); + BN_free(q); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + + if (checkpoint_file != NULL) + unlink(checkpoint_file); + + logit("%.24s Found %u safe primes of %u candidates in %ld seconds", + ctime(&time_stop), count_out, count_possible, + (long) (time_stop - time_start)); + + return (res); +} + +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..531b299 --- /dev/null +++ b/monitor.c @@ -0,0 +1,1875 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.186 2018/07/20 03:46:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos + * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +#include +#else +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H +# include +# endif +#endif + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#endif + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "auth-pam.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "sshlogin.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "monitor.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "monitor_fdpass.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +#ifdef GSSAPI +static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; +#endif + +/* Imports */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern u_int utmp_len; +extern u_char session_id[]; +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; +extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ + +/* State exported from the child */ +static struct sshbuf *child_state; + +/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */ + +int mm_answer_moduli(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_authserv(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_authpassword(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_keyverify(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_pty(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_term(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_sesskey(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_sessid(int, struct sshbuf *); + +#ifdef USE_PAM +int mm_answer_pam_start(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_pam_account(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_pam_query(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *); +#endif + +#ifdef GSSAPI +int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, struct sshbuf *); +#endif + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +int mm_answer_audit_event(int, struct sshbuf *); +int mm_answer_audit_command(int, struct sshbuf *); +#endif + +static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); + +static Authctxt *authctxt; + +/* local state for key verify */ +static u_char *key_blob = NULL; +static size_t key_bloblen = 0; +static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; +static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL; +static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; +static char *hostbased_chost = NULL; +static char *auth_method = "unknown"; +static char *auth_submethod = NULL; +static u_int session_id2_len = 0; +static u_char *session_id2 = NULL; +static pid_t monitor_child_pid; + +struct mon_table { + enum monitor_reqtype type; + int flags; + int (*f)(int, struct sshbuf *); +}; + +#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */ +#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */ +#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */ +#define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */ + +#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE) + +#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */ + +struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli}, +#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, +#ifdef USE_PAM + {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, +#endif +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, +#endif +#ifdef BSD_AUTH + {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, + {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, +#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed}, + {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify}, +#ifdef GSSAPI + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, +#endif + {0, 0, NULL} +}; + +struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, +#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, + {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, +#endif + {0, 0, NULL} +}; + +struct mon_table *mon_dispatch; + +/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */ +static void +monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit) +{ + while (ent->f != NULL) { + if (ent->type == type) { + ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; + ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; + return; + } + ent++; + } +} + +static void +monitor_permit_authentications(int permit) +{ + struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch; + + while (ent->f != NULL) { + if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) { + ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; + ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; + } + ent++; + } +} + +void +monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct mon_table *ent; + int authenticated = 0, partial = 0; + + debug3("preauth child monitor started"); + + if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0) + close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); + if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0) + close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; + + authctxt = _authctxt; + memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); + ssh->authctxt = authctxt; + + authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg; + + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20; + /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); + + /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ + while (!authenticated) { + partial = 0; + auth_method = "unknown"; + auth_submethod = NULL; + auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt); + + authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1); + + /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */ + if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { + if (authenticated && + !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, + auth_method, auth_submethod)) { + debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__, + auth_method); + authenticated = 0; + partial = 1; + } + } + + if (authenticated) { + if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE)) + fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d", + __func__, ent->type); + if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && + !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method)) + authenticated = 0; +#ifdef USE_PAM + /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */ + if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { + struct sshbuf *m; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", + __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); + authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account( + pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); + sshbuf_free(m); + } +#endif + } + if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) { + auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, + auth_method, auth_submethod); + if (!partial && !authenticated) + authctxt->failures++; + if (authenticated || partial) { + auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, + auth_method, auth_submethod); + } + } + } + + if (!authctxt->valid) + fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__); + if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0) + fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__); + + debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process", + __func__, authctxt->user); + ssh->authctxt = NULL; + ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user); + + mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); + + /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ + while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) + ; + + if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0) + close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); + if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0) + close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; +} + +static void +monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid) +{ + monitor_child_pid = pid; +} + +static void +monitor_child_handler(int sig) +{ + kill(monitor_child_pid, sig); +} + +void +monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor) +{ + close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); + pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; + + monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid); + signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); + signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); + signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler); +#ifdef SIGXFSZ + signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN); +#endif + + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20; + + /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); + + if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) { + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1); + } + + for (;;) + monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL); +} + +static int +monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor) +{ + struct sshbuf *logmsg; + u_int len, level; + char *msg; + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + + /* Read length */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) { + if (errno == EPIPE) { + sshbuf_free(logmsg); + debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__); + close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); + pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; + return -1; + } + fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: get len: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (len <= 4 || len > 8192) + fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len); + + /* Read severity, message */ + sshbuf_reset(logmsg); + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len) + fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* Log it */ + if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) + fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", + __func__, level); + do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg); + + sshbuf_free(logmsg); + free(msg); + + return 0; +} + +int +monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, + struct mon_table **pent) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, ret; + u_char type; + struct pollfd pfd[2]; + + for (;;) { + memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd)); + pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd; + pfd[0].events = POLLIN; + pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd; + pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN; + if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) { + if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) + continue; + fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + if (pfd[1].revents) { + /* + * Drain all log messages before processing next + * monitor request. + */ + monitor_read_log(pmonitor); + continue; + } + if (pfd[0].revents) + break; /* Continues below */ + } + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + + mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type); + + while (ent->f != NULL) { + if (ent->type == type) + break; + ent++; + } + + if (ent->f != NULL) { + if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT)) + fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__, + type); + ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m); + sshbuf_free(m); + + /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */ + if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) { + debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__, + type); + ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; + } + + if (pent != NULL) + *pent = ent; + + return ret; + } + + fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type); + + /* NOTREACHED */ + return (-1); +} + +/* allowed key state */ +static int +monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen) +{ + /* make sure key is allowed */ + if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen || + timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen)) + return (0); + return (1); +} + +static void +monitor_reset_key_state(void) +{ + /* reset state */ + free(key_blob); + free(hostbased_cuser); + free(hostbased_chost); + sshauthopt_free(key_opts); + key_blob = NULL; + key_bloblen = 0; + key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; + key_opts = NULL; + hostbased_cuser = NULL; + hostbased_chost = NULL; +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +int +mm_answer_moduli(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + DH *dh; + const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; + int r; + u_int min, want, max; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d", + __func__, min, want, max); + /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */ + if (max < min || want < min || max < want) + fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d", + __func__, min, want, max); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + + dh = choose_dh(min, want, max); + if (dh == NULL) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return (0); + } else { + /* Send first bignum */ + DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + DH_free(dh); + } + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m); + return (0); +} +#endif + +int +mm_answer_sign(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */ + struct sshkey *key; + struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; + u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL; + char *alg = NULL; + size_t datlen, siglen, alglen; + int r, is_proof = 0; + u_int keyid, compat; + const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (keyid > INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__); + + /* + * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes), + * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes). + * + * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey + * proof. + * + * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too? + * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather + * than the full kex structure... + */ + if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) { + /* + * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what + * the client sent us. + */ + if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */ + fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen); + if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid); + if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key " + "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) || + memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu", + __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf)); + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + is_proof = 1; + } + + /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */ + if (session_id2_len == 0) { + session_id2_len = datlen; + session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); + memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len); + } + + if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) { + if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg, + compat)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL && + auth_sock > 0) { + if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen, + p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else + fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid); + + debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__, + is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + free(alg); + free(p); + free(signature); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m); + + /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); + + return (0); +} + +/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */ + +int +mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + char *username; + struct passwd *pwent; + int r, allowed = 0; + u_int i; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + + if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0) + fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + pwent = getpwnamallow(username); + + authctxt->user = xstrdup(username); + setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown"); + free(username); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + + if (pwent == NULL) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + authctxt->pw = fakepw(); + goto out; + } + + allowed = 1; + authctxt->pw = pwent; + authctxt->valid = 1; + + /* XXX don't sent pwent to unpriv; send fake class/dir/shell too */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(*pwent))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 || +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 || +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 || +#endif + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + out: + ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", + authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + +#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ + if (options.x != NULL) { \ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ + __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ + for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ + __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ + } \ + } while (0) + /* See comment in servconf.h */ + COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); +#undef M_CP_STROPT +#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT + + /* Create valid auth method lists */ + if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) { + /* + * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child + * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any + * authentication to succeed. + */ + debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__); + } + + debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); + + /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1); +#endif + + return (0); +} + +int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + char *banner; + int r; + + sshbuf_reset(m); + banner = auth2_read_banner(); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); + free(banner); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int r; + + monitor_permit_authentications(1); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s", + __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style); + + if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) { + free(authctxt->style); + authctxt->style = NULL; + } + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + static int call_count; + char *passwd; + int r, authenticated; + size_t plen; + + if (!options.password_authentication) + fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */ + authenticated = options.password_authentication && + auth_password(ssh, passwd); + explicit_bzero(passwd, plen); + free(passwd); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#ifdef USE_PAM + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#endif + + debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); + + call_count++; + if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1) + auth_method = "none"; + else + auth_method = "password"; + + /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */ + return (authenticated); +} + +#ifdef BSD_AUTH +int +mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + char *name, *infotxt; + u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success; + char **prompts; + int r; + + if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) + fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__); + success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts, + &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1; + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (success) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); + + if (success) { + free(name); + free(infotxt); + free(prompts); + free(echo_on); + } + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + char *response; + int r, authok; + + if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) + fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__); + if (authctxt->as == NULL) + fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + authok = options.challenge_response_authentication && + auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0); + authctxt->as = NULL; + debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok); + free(response); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); + + auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; + auth_submethod = "bsdauth"; + + return (authok != 0); +} +#endif + +#ifdef USE_PAM +int +mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + if (!options.use_pam) + fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); + + start_pam(authctxt); + + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1); + if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_int ret; + int r; + + if (!options.use_pam) + fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__); + + ret = do_pam_account(); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); + + return (ret); +} + +static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok; +extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device; + +int +mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_int ok = 0; + int r; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication) + fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__); + if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) + fatal("%s: already called", __func__); + sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt); + sshpam_authok = NULL; + sshbuf_reset(m); + if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) { + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1); + ok = 1; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL; + u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0; + int r, ret; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + sshpam_authok = NULL; + if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL) + fatal("%s: no context", __func__); + ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, + &num, &prompts, &echo_on); + if (ret == 0 && num == 0) + sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; + if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL) + fatal("sshpam_device.query failed"); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1); + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, info)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(name); + free(info); + for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[i])) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echo_on[i])) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(prompts[i]); + } + free(prompts); + free(echo_on); + auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; + auth_submethod = "pam"; + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m); + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + char **resp; + u_int i, num; + int r, ret; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL) + fatal("%s: no context", __func__); + sshpam_authok = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &num)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (num > 0) { + resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *)); + for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &(resp[i]), NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp); + for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) + free(resp[i]); + free(resp); + } else { + ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL); + } + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m); + auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; + auth_submethod = "pam"; + if (ret == 0) + sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL) + fatal("%s: no context", __func__); + (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt); + sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL; + sshbuf_reset(m); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); + /* Allow another attempt */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1); + auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; + auth_submethod = "pam"; + return r; +} +#endif + +int +mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + char *cuser, *chost; + u_int pubkey_auth_attempt; + enum mm_keytype type = 0; + int r, allowed = 0; + struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key); + + if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) { + /* These should not make it past the privsep child */ + if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && + (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) + fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__); + + switch (type) { + case MM_USERKEY: + auth_method = "publickey"; + if (!options.pubkey_authentication) + break; + if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) + break; + if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) + break; + allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key, + pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts); + break; + case MM_HOSTKEY: + auth_method = "hostbased"; + if (!options.hostbased_authentication) + break; + if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) + break; + if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), + options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) + break; + allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, + cuser, chost, key); + auth2_record_info(authctxt, + "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", + cuser, chost); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type); + break; + } + } + + debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__, + auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test", + (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key), + allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); + + auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key); + + /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */ + monitor_reset_key_state(); + + if (allowed) { + /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + key_blobtype = type; + key_opts = opts; + hostbased_cuser = cuser; + hostbased_chost = chost; + } else { + /* Log failed attempt */ + auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL); + free(cuser); + free(chost); + } + sshkey_free(key); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m); + + if (!allowed) + sshauthopt_free(opts); + + return (0); +} + +static int +monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + const u_char *p; + char *userstyle, *cp; + size_t len; + u_char type; + int r, fail = 0; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, data, datalen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { + p = sshbuf_ptr(b); + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if ((session_id2 == NULL) || + (len < session_id2_len) || + (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) + fail++; + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((session_id2 == NULL) || + (len != session_id2_len) || + (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) + fail++; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) + fail++; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); + if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) { + logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: " + "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp); + fail++; + } + free(userstyle); + free(cp); + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */ + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0) + fail++; + free(cp); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (type == 0) + fail++; + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */ + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */ + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) + fail++; + sshbuf_free(b); + return (fail == 0); +} + +static int +monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser, + char *chost) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + const u_char *p; + char *cp, *userstyle; + size_t len; + int r, fail = 0; + u_char type; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, data, datalen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if ((session_id2 == NULL) || + (len != session_id2_len) || + (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) + fail++; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) + fail++; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, + authctxt->style ? ":" : "", + authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); + if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) { + logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: " + "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp); + fail++; + } + free(userstyle); + free(cp); + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */ + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0) + fail++; + free(cp); + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */ + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */ + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.') + cp[len - 1] = '\0'; + if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0) + fail++; + free(cp); + + /* verify client user */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0) + fail++; + free(cp); + + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) + fail++; + sshbuf_free(b); + return (fail == 0); +} + +int +mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct sshkey *key; + u_char *signature, *data, *blob; + char *sigalg; + size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; + int r, ret, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || + !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) + fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); + + /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */ + if (*sigalg == '\0') { + free(sigalg); + sigalg = NULL; + } + + /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */ + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0) + fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + switch (key_blobtype) { + case MM_USERKEY: + valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen); + auth_method = "publickey"; + break; + case MM_HOSTKEY: + valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, + hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); + auth_method = "hostbased"; + break; + default: + valid_data = 0; + break; + } + if (!valid_data) + fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); + + ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen, + sigalg, active_state->compat); + debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s", __func__, auth_method, key, + (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified"); + auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key); + + free(blob); + free(signature); + free(data); + free(sigalg); + + if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY) + auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts); + monitor_reset_key_state(); + + sshkey_free(key); + sshbuf_reset(m); + + /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */ + encoded_ret = (ret != 0); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); + + return ret == 0; +} + +static void +mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + socklen_t fromlen; + struct sockaddr_storage from; + + /* + * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let + * the address be 0.0.0.0. + */ + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + fromlen = sizeof(from); + if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { + if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + } + /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ + record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, + session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); +} + +static void +mm_session_close(Session *s) +{ + debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); + session_pty_cleanup2(s); + } + session_unused(s->self); +} + +int +mm_answer_pty(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + extern struct monitor *pmonitor; + Session *s; + int r, res, fd0; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + s = session_new(); + if (s == NULL) + goto error; + s->authctxt = authctxt; + s->pw = authctxt->pw; + s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid; + res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)); + if (res == 0) + goto error; + pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* We need to trick ttyslot */ + if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1) + fatal("%s: dup2", __func__); + + mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw); + + /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */ + close(0); + + /* send messages generated by record_login */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: put login message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); + + if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 || + mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1) + fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); + + /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */ + if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0) + fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (fd0 != 0) + error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0); + + /* slave is not needed */ + close(s->ttyfd); + s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd; + /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */ + s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; + + debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd); + + return (0); + + error: + if (s != NULL) + mm_session_close(s); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + Session *s; + char *tty; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) + mm_session_close(s); + sshbuf_reset(m); + free(tty); + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_term(int sock, struct sshbuf *req) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + extern struct monitor *pmonitor; + int res, status; + + debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__); + + /* The child is terminating */ + session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) + sshpam_cleanup(); +#endif + + while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + exit(1); + + res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1; + + /* Terminate process */ + exit(res); +} + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +/* Report that an audit event occurred */ +int +mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_int n; + ssh_audit_event_t event; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + event = (ssh_audit_event_t)n; + switch (event) { + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: + case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: + case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: + case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: + case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: + case SSH_INVALID_USER: + audit_event(event); + break; + default: + fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event); + } + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + char *cmd; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + /* sanity check command, if so how? */ + audit_run_command(cmd); + free(cmd); + return (0); +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + +void +monitor_clear_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + + ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN); + ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); + sshbuf_free(child_state); + child_state = NULL; +} + +void +monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct kex *kex; + int r; + + debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__); + if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0) + fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(child_state); + child_state = NULL; + + if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) { + /* XXX set callbacks */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; +# endif +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; + kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; + kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; + kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; + kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; + } +} + +/* This function requries careful sanity checking */ + +void +mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) +{ + debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); + + if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, + child_state); + debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__); +} + + +/* XXX */ + +#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \ + if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \ + fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \ +} while (0) + +static void +monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds) +{ + int pair[2]; +#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE + int on = 1; +#endif + + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) + fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); +#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE + if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#endif + FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); + FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); + mon->m_recvfd = pair[0]; + mon->m_sendfd = pair[1]; + + if (do_logfds) { + if (pipe(pair) == -1) + fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); + FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); + mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0]; + mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1]; + } else + mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1; +} + +#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536 + +struct monitor * +monitor_init(void) +{ + struct monitor *mon; + + mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon)); + monitor_openfds(mon, 1); + + return mon; +} + +void +monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) +{ + monitor_openfds(mon, 0); +} + +#ifdef GSSAPI +int +mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + gss_OID_desc goid; + OM_uint32 major; + size_t len; + u_char *p; + int r; + + if (!options.gss_authentication) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goid.elements = p; + goid.length = len; + + major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid); + + free(goid.elements); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m); + + /* Now we have a context, enable the step */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + gss_buffer_desc in; + gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ + int r; + + if (!options.gss_authentication) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); + free(in.value); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); + + gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out); + + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); + } + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic; + OM_uint32 ret; + int r; + + if (!options.gss_authentication) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + + if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic); + + free(gssbuf.value); + free(mic.value); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(ret)) + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int r, authenticated; + const char *displayname; + + if (!options.gss_authentication) + fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__); + + authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); + + auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; + + if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL) + auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname); + + /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ + return (authenticated); +} +#endif /* GSSAPI */ + diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1604729 --- /dev/null +++ b/monitor.h @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.21 2018/07/09 21:53:45 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _MONITOR_H_ +#define _MONITOR_H_ + +/* Please keep *_REQ_* values on even numbers and *_ANS_* on odd numbers */ +enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_MODULI = 0, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI = 1, + MONITOR_REQ_FREE = 2, + MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV = 4, + MONITOR_REQ_SIGN = 6, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN = 7, + MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM = 8, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM = 9, + MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 10, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 11, + MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD = 12, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD = 13, + MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY = 14, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY = 15, + MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 16, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 17, + MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED = 22, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED = 23, + MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY = 24, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY = 25, + MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT = 26, + MONITOR_REQ_PTY = 28, MONITOR_ANS_PTY = 29, + MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP = 30, + MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY = 32, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY = 33, + MONITOR_REQ_SESSID = 34, + MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED = 36, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED = 37, + MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE = 38, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE = 39, + MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE = 40, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE = 41, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP = 42, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP = 43, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP = 44, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP = 45, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49, + MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50, + + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, + +}; + +struct monitor { + int m_recvfd; + int m_sendfd; + int m_log_recvfd; + int m_log_sendfd; + struct kex **m_pkex; + pid_t m_pid; +}; + +struct monitor *monitor_init(void); +void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *); + +struct Authctxt; +void monitor_child_preauth(struct Authctxt *, struct monitor *); +void monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *); + +struct mon_table; +int monitor_read(struct monitor*, struct mon_table *, struct mon_table **); + +/* Prototypes for request sending and receiving */ +void mm_request_send(int, enum monitor_reqtype, struct sshbuf *); +void mm_request_receive(int, struct sshbuf *); +void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype, struct sshbuf *); + +#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */ diff --git a/monitor_fdpass.c b/monitor_fdpass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d766edc --- /dev/null +++ b/monitor_fdpass.c @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.21 2016/02/29 20:22:36 jca Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +# include +#else +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H +# include +# endif +#endif + +#include "log.h" +#include "monitor_fdpass.h" + +int +mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) + struct msghdr msg; +#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR + union { + struct cmsghdr hdr; + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; + } cmsgbuf; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; +#endif + struct iovec vec; + char ch = '\0'; + ssize_t n; + struct pollfd pfd; + + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); +#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR + msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd; + msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd); +#else + memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf)); + msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf; + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf); + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); + cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; + cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; + *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = fd; +#endif + + vec.iov_base = &ch; + vec.iov_len = 1; + msg.msg_iov = &vec; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; + + pfd.fd = sock; + pfd.events = POLLOUT; + while ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && + (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) { + debug3("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno)); + (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); + } + if (n == -1) { + error("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + if (n != 1) { + error("%s: sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %zd", __func__, n); + return -1; + } + return 0; +#else + error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__); + return -1; +#endif +} + +int +mm_receive_fd(int sock) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) + struct msghdr msg; +#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR + union { + struct cmsghdr hdr; + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; + } cmsgbuf; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; +#endif + struct iovec vec; + ssize_t n; + char ch; + int fd; + struct pollfd pfd; + + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); + vec.iov_base = &ch; + vec.iov_len = 1; + msg.msg_iov = &vec; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; +#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR + msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd; + msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd); +#else + memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf)); + msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf; + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf); +#endif + + pfd.fd = sock; + pfd.events = POLLIN; + while ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && + (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) { + debug3("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); + } + if (n == -1) { + error("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + if (n != 1) { + error("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %zd", __func__, n); + return -1; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR + if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(fd)) { + error("%s: no fd", __func__); + return -1; + } +#else + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); + if (cmsg == NULL) { + error("%s: no message header", __func__); + return -1; + } + +#ifndef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE + if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) { + error("%s: expected type %d got %d", __func__, + SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type); + return -1; + } +#endif + fd = (*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)); +#endif + return fd; +#else + error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__); + return -1; +#endif +} diff --git a/monitor_fdpass.h b/monitor_fdpass.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a4b1f63 --- /dev/null +++ b/monitor_fdpass.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.4 2007/09/04 03:21:03 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _MM_FDPASS_H_ +#define _MM_FDPASS_H_ + +int mm_send_fd(int, int); +int mm_receive_fd(int); + +#endif /* _MM_FDPASS_H_ */ diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..732fb34 --- /dev/null +++ b/monitor_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,1006 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.107 2018/07/20 03:46:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos + * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include "dh.h" +#endif +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "auth-pam.h" +#include "monitor.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "monitor_fdpass.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include "channels.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "servconf.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" + +/* Imports */ +extern struct monitor *pmonitor; +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; +extern ServerOptions options; + +void +mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx) +{ + struct sshbuf *log_msg; + struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx; + int r; + size_t len; + + if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1) + fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__); + + if ((log_msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, 0)) != 0 || /* length; filled below */ + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, level)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(log_msg, msg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((len = sshbuf_len(log_msg)) < 4 || len > 0xffffffff) + fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, len); + POKE_U32(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len - 4); + if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd, + sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len) != len) + fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + sshbuf_free(log_msg); +} + +int +mm_is_monitor(void) +{ + /* + * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and + * points to the unprivileged child. + */ + return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0); +} + +void +mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m); + u_char buf[5]; + + debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); + + if (mlen >= 0xffffffff) + fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, mlen); + POKE_U32(buf, mlen + 1); + buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */ + if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) + fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) + fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); +} + +void +mm_request_receive(int sock, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_char buf[4], *p = NULL; + u_int msg_len; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { + if (errno == EPIPE) + cleanup_exit(255); + fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + msg_len = PEEK_U32(buf); + if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) + fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len); + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (atomicio(read, sock, p, msg_len) != msg_len) + fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); +} + +void +mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_char rtype; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); + + mm_request_receive(sock, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &rtype)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (rtype != type) + fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__, + rtype, type); +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +DH * +mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) +{ + BIGNUM *p, *g; + int r; + u_char success = 0; + struct sshbuf *m; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, min)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, max)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, m); + + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &success)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (success == 0) + fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__); + + if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); + if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, g)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("%s: remaining %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(m)); + sshbuf_free(m); + + return (dh_new_group(g, p)); +} +#endif + +int +mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg, u_int compat) +{ + struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex; + struct sshbuf *m; + u_int ndx = kex->host_key_index(key, 0, active_state); + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ndx)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, hostkey_alg)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, compat)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, m); + + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, sigp, lenp)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + + return (0); +} + +struct passwd * +mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct sshbuf *m; + struct passwd *pw; + size_t len; + u_int i; + ServerOptions *newopts; + int r; + u_char ok; + const u_char *p; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, username)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, m); + + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ok)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (ok == 0) { + pw = NULL; + goto out; + } + + /* XXX don't like passing struct passwd like this */ + pw = xcalloc(sizeof(*pw), 1); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (len != sizeof(*pw)) + fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__); + memcpy(pw, p, sizeof(*pw)); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_passwd, NULL)) != 0 || +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_gecos, NULL)) != 0 || +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_class, NULL)) != 0 || +#endif + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_dir, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_shell, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + +out: + /* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (len != sizeof(*newopts)) + fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__); + newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1); + memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts)); + +#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ + if (newopts->x != NULL) { \ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \ + &newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ + __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ + newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \ + NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \ + for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \ + &newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \ + __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ + } \ + } while (0) + /* See comment in servconf.h */ + COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); +#undef M_CP_STROPT +#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT + + copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1); + log_change_level(options.log_level); + process_permitopen(ssh, &options); + free(newopts); + + sshbuf_free(m); + + return (pw); +} + +char * +mm_auth2_read_banner(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + char *banner; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); + sshbuf_reset(m); + + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &banner, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + + /* treat empty banner as missing banner */ + if (strlen(banner) == 0) { + free(banner); + banner = NULL; + } + return (banner); +} + +/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */ + +void +mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, style ? style : "")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, m); + + sshbuf_free(m); +} + +/* Do the password authentication */ +int +mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, authenticated = 0; +#ifdef USE_PAM + u_int maxtries = 0; +#endif + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, password)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, m); + + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#ifdef USE_PAM + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxtries)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (maxtries > INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: bad maxtries %u", __func__, maxtries); + sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(maxtries); +#endif + + sshbuf_free(m); + + debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated", + __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); + return (authenticated); +} + +int +mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, + int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp) +{ + return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key, + pubkey_auth_attempt, authoptp)); +} + +int +mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user, const char *host, + struct sshkey *key) +{ + return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0, NULL)); +} + +int +mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host, + struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, allowed = 0; + struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if (authoptp != NULL) + *authoptp = NULL; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, user ? user : "")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, host ? host : "")) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, m); + + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &allowed)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (allowed && type == MM_USERKEY) { + if ((r = sshauthopt_deserialise(m, &opts)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshauthopt_deserialise: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + sshbuf_free(m); + + if (authoptp != NULL) { + *authoptp = opts; + opts = NULL; + } + sshauthopt_free(opts); + + return allowed; +} + +/* + * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the + * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed + * for authentication. + */ + +int +mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + u_int encoded_ret = 0; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, m); + + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &encoded_ret)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + sshbuf_free(m); + + if (encoded_ret != 0) + return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + return 0; +} + +void +mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0) + fatal("%s: get_state failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m); + debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__); + sshbuf_free(m); +} + +int +mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + char *p, *msg; + int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1, r; + + /* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */ + if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || + (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { + error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__); + if (tmp1 > 0) + close(tmp1); + if (tmp2 > 0) + close(tmp2); + return 0; + } + close(tmp1); + close(tmp2); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, m); + + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (success == 0) { + debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__); + sshbuf_free(m); + return (0); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &p, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + + strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */ + free(p); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(msg); + + if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || + (*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) + fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__); + + /* Success */ + return (1); +} + +void +mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r; + + if (s->ttyfd == -1) + return; + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, m); + sshbuf_free(m); + + /* closed dup'ed master */ + if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0) + error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", + s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); + + /* unlink pty from session */ + s->ttyfd = -1; +} + +#ifdef USE_PAM +void +mm_start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + if (!options.use_pam) + fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, m); + + sshbuf_free(m); +} + +u_int +mm_do_pam_account(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + u_int ret; + char *msg; + size_t msglen; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + if (!options.use_pam) + fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); + + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, &msglen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, msglen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + free(msg); + sshbuf_free(m); + + debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret); + + return (ret); +} + +void * +mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, success; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (success == 0) { + debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__); + sshbuf_free(m); + return (NULL); + } + sshbuf_free(m); + return (authctxt); +} + +int +mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, + u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + u_int i, n; + int r, ret; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, m); + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, info, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, num)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret); + sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(n); + if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) + fatal("%s: received %u PAM messages, expected <= %u", + __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG); + *prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *)); + *echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int)); + for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &((*prompts)[i]), NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &((*echo_on)[i]))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + sshbuf_free(m); + return (ret); +} + +int +mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + u_int n, i; + int r, ret; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, resp[i])) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, m); + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + ret = (int)n; /* XXX */ + debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret); + sshbuf_free(m); + return (ret); +} + +void +mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); + debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); + sshbuf_free(m); +} +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + +/* Request process termination */ + +void +mm_terminate(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, m); + sshbuf_free(m); +} + +static void +mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, + char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) +{ + *name = xstrdup(""); + *infotxt = xstrdup(""); + *numprompts = 1; + *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); + *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); + (*echo_on)[0] = 0; +} + +int +mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, + u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + u_int success; + char *challenge; + int r; + + debug3("%s: entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); + + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (success == 0) { + debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); + sshbuf_free(m); + return (-1); + } + + /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &challenge, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + + mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); + (*prompts)[0] = challenge; + + debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, authok; + + debug3("%s: entering", __func__); + if (numresponses != 1) + return (-1); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, responses[0])) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); + + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authok)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + + return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0); +} + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +void +mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, event)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, m); + sshbuf_free(m); +} + +void +mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r; + + debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); + sshbuf_free(m); +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ + +#ifdef GSSAPI +OM_uint32 +mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + OM_uint32 major; + int r; + + /* Client doesn't get to see the context */ + *ctx = NULL; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, goid->elements, goid->length)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + sshbuf_free(m); + return (major); +} + +OM_uint32 +mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in, + gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flagsp) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + OM_uint32 major; + u_int flags; + int r; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, in->value, in->length)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, out)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (flagsp != NULL) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &flags)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + *flagsp = flags; + } + + sshbuf_free(m); + + return (major); +} + +OM_uint32 +mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + OM_uint32 major; + int r; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + return(major); +} + +int +mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r, authenticated = 0; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, + MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + sshbuf_free(m); + debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); + return (authenticated); +} +#endif /* GSSAPI */ diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..644da08 --- /dev/null +++ b/monitor_wrap.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.38 2018/07/11 18:53:29 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_ +#define _MM_WRAP_H_ + +extern int use_privsep; +#define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x) + +enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY }; + +struct monitor; +struct Authctxt; +struct sshkey; +struct sshauthopt; + +void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *); +int mm_is_monitor(void); +DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); +int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, + const char *, u_int compat); +void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); +struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); +char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); +int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *); +int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *, + int, struct sshauthopt **); +int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int, + struct sshauthopt **); +int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, + const char *, struct sshkey *); +int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); + +#ifdef GSSAPI +OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); +OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); +#endif + +#ifdef USE_PAM +void mm_start_pam(struct Authctxt *); +u_int mm_do_pam_account(void); +void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *); +int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); +int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **); +void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); +#endif + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +#include "audit.h" +void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); +void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); +#endif + +struct Session; +void mm_terminate(void); +int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t); +void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *); + +/* Key export functions */ +struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int); +int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *); + +void monitor_clear_keystate(struct monitor *); +void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *); +void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *); +void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*); + +/* bsdauth */ +int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); +int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); + +#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */ diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1bd20f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/msg.c @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.17 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "msg.h" +#include "misc.h" + +int +ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_char buf[5]; + u_int mlen = sshbuf_len(m); + + debug3("ssh_msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff); + + put_u32(buf, mlen + 1); + buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */ + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { + error("ssh_msg_send: write"); + return (-1); + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) { + error("ssh_msg_send: write"); + return (-1); + } + return (0); +} + +int +ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_char buf[4], *p; + u_int msg_len; + int r; + + debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering"); + + if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { + if (errno != EPIPE) + error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header"); + return (-1); + } + msg_len = get_u32(buf); + if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) { + error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len); + return (-1); + } + sshbuf_reset(m); + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + if (atomicio(read, fd, p, msg_len) != msg_len) { + error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %s", strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } + return (0); +} diff --git a/msg.h b/msg.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfb3424 --- /dev/null +++ b/msg.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.5 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef SSH_MSG_H +#define SSH_MSG_H + +struct sshbuf; +int ssh_msg_send(int, u_char, struct sshbuf *); +int ssh_msg_recv(int, struct sshbuf *); + +#endif diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e4b608 --- /dev/null +++ b/mux.c @@ -0,0 +1,2391 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.77 2018/09/26 07:32:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* ssh session multiplexing support */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +#include +#else +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H +# include +# endif +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include +#endif + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "msg.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "monitor_fdpass.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "clientloop.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +/* from ssh.c */ +extern int tty_flag; +extern Options options; +extern int stdin_null_flag; +extern char *host; +extern int subsystem_flag; +extern struct sshbuf *command; +extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; + +/* Context for session open confirmation callback */ +struct mux_session_confirm_ctx { + u_int want_tty; + u_int want_subsys; + u_int want_x_fwd; + u_int want_agent_fwd; + struct sshbuf *cmd; + char *term; + struct termios tio; + char **env; + u_int rid; +}; + +/* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */ +struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx { + u_int rid; +}; + +/* Context for global channel callback */ +struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx { + u_int cid; /* channel id */ + u_int rid; /* request id */ + int fid; /* forward id */ +}; + +/* fd to control socket */ +int muxserver_sock = -1; + +/* client request id */ +u_int muxclient_request_id = 0; + +/* Multiplexing control command */ +u_int muxclient_command = 0; + +/* Set when signalled. */ +static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0; + +/* PID of multiplex server */ +static u_int muxserver_pid = 0; + +static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL; + +struct mux_master_state { + int hello_rcvd; +}; + +/* mux protocol messages */ +#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001 +#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002 +#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004 +#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005 +#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006 +#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007 +#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008 +#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009 +#define MUX_C_PROXY 0x1000000f +#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001 +#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002 +#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003 +#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004 +#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005 +#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006 +#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007 +#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008 +#define MUX_S_PROXY 0x8000000f + +/* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */ +#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1 +#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2 +#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3 + +static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); +static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *); + +static int mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +static int mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *, u_int, + Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); + +static const struct { + u_int type; + int (*handler)(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *, + struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *); +} mux_master_handlers[] = { + { MUX_MSG_HELLO, mux_master_process_hello }, + { MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, mux_master_process_new_session }, + { MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, mux_master_process_alive_check }, + { MUX_C_TERMINATE, mux_master_process_terminate }, + { MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, mux_master_process_open_fwd }, + { MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, mux_master_process_close_fwd }, + { MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, mux_master_process_stdio_fwd }, + { MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, mux_master_process_stop_listening }, + { MUX_C_PROXY, mux_master_process_proxy }, + { 0, NULL } +}; + +/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void +mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused) +{ + Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid); + + debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); + if (c == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); + if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { + if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d", + __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); + c->ctl_chan = -1; + cc->remote_id = 0; + cc->have_remote_id = 0; + chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, cc); + } + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self); +} + +/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void +mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused) +{ + Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid); + + debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); + if (c == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); + if (c->have_remote_id) { + if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->remote_id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %u", + __func__, c->self, c->remote_id); + c->remote_id = 0; + c->have_remote_id = 0; + sc->ctl_chan = -1; + if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && + sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) { + debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self); + chan_mark_dead(ssh, sc); + } else { + if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) + chan_read_failed(ssh, sc); + if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) + chan_write_failed(ssh, sc); + } + } + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self); +} + +/* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */ +static int +env_permitted(char *env) +{ + int i, ret; + char name[1024], *cp; + + if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env) + return 0; + ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env); + if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) { + error("%s: name '%.100s...' too long", __func__, env); + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++) + if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i])) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/* Mux master protocol message handlers */ + +static int +mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + u_int ver; + struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; + int r; + + if (state == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self); + if (state->hello_rcvd) { + error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__); + return -1; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) { + error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { + error("%s: unsupported multiplexing protocol version %u " + "(expected %u)", __func__, ver, SSHMUX_VER); + return -1; + } + debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver); + + /* No extensions are presently defined */ + while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) { + char *name = NULL; + size_t value_len = 0; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, NULL, &value_len)) != 0) { + error("%s: malformed extension: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + debug2("%s: Unrecognised extension \"%s\" length %zu", + __func__, name, value_len); + free(name); + } + state->hello_rcvd = 1; + return 0; +} + +/* Enqueue a "ok" response to the reply buffer */ +static void +reply_ok(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int rid) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_OK)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +/* Enqueue an error response to the reply buffer */ +static void +reply_error(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int type, u_int rid, const char *msg) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(reply, msg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static int +mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + Channel *nc; + struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx; + char *cmd, *cp; + u_int i, j, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax; + int r, new_fd[3]; + + /* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */ + cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); + cctx->term = NULL; + cctx->rid = rid; + cmd = NULL; + cctx->env = NULL; + env_len = 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */ + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_tty)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_x_fwd)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_agent_fwd)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_subsys)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &escape_char)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cctx->term, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) { + malf: + free(cmd); + for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) + free(cctx->env[j]); + free(cctx->env); + free(cctx->term); + free(cctx); + error("%s: malformed message", __func__); + return -1; + } + +#define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096 + while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cp, NULL)) != 0) + goto malf; + if (!env_permitted(cp)) { + free(cp); + continue; + } + cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2, + sizeof(*cctx->env)); + cctx->env[env_len++] = cp; + cctx->env[env_len] = NULL; + if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) { + error("%s: >%d environment variables received, " + "ignoring additional", __func__, MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS); + break; + } + } + + debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, " + "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self, + cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd, + cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len); + + if ((cctx->cmd = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd))) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(cmd); + cmd = NULL; + + /* Gather fds from client */ + for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { + error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", + __func__, i); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + close(new_fd[j]); + for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) + free(cctx->env[j]); + free(cctx->env); + free(cctx->term); + sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd); + free(cctx); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, + "did not receive file descriptors"); + return -1; + } + } + + debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__, + new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]); + + /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ + if (c->have_remote_id) { + debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, + "Multiple sessions not supported"); + cleanup: + close(new_fd[0]); + close(new_fd[1]); + close(new_fd[2]); + free(cctx->term); + if (env_len != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++) + free(cctx->env[i]); + free(cctx->env); + } + sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd); + free(cctx); + return 0; + } + + if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || + options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { + if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) { + debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, + "Permission denied"); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */ + if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1) + error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ + if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) + set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); + if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) + set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); + if (!isatty(new_fd[2])) + set_nonblock(new_fd[2]); + + window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; + if (cctx->want_tty) { + window >>= 1; + packetmax >>= 1; + } + + nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, + new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax, + CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); + + nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ + c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ + c->have_remote_id = 1; + + if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) { + channel_register_filter(ssh, nc->self, + client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, + client_filter_cleanup, + client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char)); + } + + debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", + __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); + + channel_send_open(ssh, nc->self); + channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx); + c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self, + mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); + + /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ + return 0; +} + +static int +mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + int r; + + debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self); + + /* prepare reply */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_ALIVE)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, (u_int)getpid())) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + return 0; +} + +static int +mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self); + + if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || + options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { + if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ", + host)) { + debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, + "Permission denied"); + return 0; + } + } + + quit_pending = 1; + reply_ok(reply, rid); + /* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */ + return 0; +} + +static char * +format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) +{ + char *ret; + + switch (ftype) { + case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: + xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", + (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : + (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? + (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : + fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, + (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : + fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); + break; + case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: + xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *", + (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? + (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : + fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); + break; + case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: + xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", + (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : + (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? + "LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host, + fwd->listen_port, + (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : + fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype); + } + return ret; +} + +static int +compare_host(const char *a, const char *b) +{ + if (a == NULL && b == NULL) + return 1; + if (a == NULL || b == NULL) + return 0; + return strcmp(a, b) == 0; +} + +static int +compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b) +{ + if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host)) + return 0; + if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path)) + return 0; + if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port) + return 0; + if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host)) + return 0; + if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path)) + return 0; + if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static void +mux_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +{ + struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt; + char *failmsg = NULL; + struct Forward *rfwd; + Channel *c; + struct sshbuf *out; + int r; + + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, fctx->cid)) == NULL) { + /* no channel for reply */ + error("%s: unknown channel", __func__); + return; + } + if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards || + (options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL && + options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) { + xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid); + goto fail; + } + rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid]; + debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__, + type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", + rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : + rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); + if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { + if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) { + rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int(); + debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward" + " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, + rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, + MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, fctx->rid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, + rfwd->allocated_port)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, + rfwd->allocated_port); + } else { + reply_ok(out, fctx->rid); + } + goto out; + } else { + if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) + channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); + if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) + xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " + "listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); + else + xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " + "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + + debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, " + "connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port, + rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : + rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); + + free(rfwd->listen_host); + free(rfwd->listen_path); + free(rfwd->connect_host); + free(rfwd->connect_path); + memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd)); + } + fail: + error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg); + reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, fctx->rid, failmsg); + free(failmsg); + out: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(out); + if (c->mux_pause <= 0) + fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause); + c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ +} + +static int +mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + struct Forward fwd; + char *fwd_desc = NULL; + char *listen_addr, *connect_addr; + u_int ftype; + u_int lport, cport; + int r, i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1; + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + + /* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 || + (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || + (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { + error("%s: malformed message", __func__); + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + if (*listen_addr == '\0') { + free(listen_addr); + listen_addr = NULL; + } + if (*connect_addr == '\0') { + free(connect_addr); + connect_addr = NULL; + } + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_port = lport; + if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; + else + fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; + fwd.connect_port = cport; + if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; + else + fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; + + debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self, + (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); + + if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && + ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { + logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype); + invalid: + free(listen_addr); + free(connect_addr); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, + "Invalid forwarding request"); + return 0; + } + if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) { + logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards " + "are mutually exclusive", __func__); + goto invalid; + } + if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) { + logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__, + fwd.listen_port); + goto invalid; + } + if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && + fwd.connect_port >= 65536) || + (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && + fwd.connect_port == 0)) { + logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__, + fwd.connect_port); + goto invalid; + } + if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && + fwd.connect_path == NULL) { + logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__); + goto invalid; + } + + /* Skip forwards that have already been requested */ + switch (ftype) { + case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: + case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: + for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { + if (compare_forward(&fwd, + options.local_forwards + i)) { + exists: + debug2("%s: found existing forwarding", + __func__); + reply_ok(reply, rid); + goto out; + } + } + break; + case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: + for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { + if (!compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) + continue; + if (fwd.listen_port != 0) + goto exists; + debug2("%s: found allocated port", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, + MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, + options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + break; + } + + if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || + options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { + if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) { + debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, + "Permission denied"); + goto out; + } + } + + if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { + if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, + &options.fwd_opts)) { + fail: + logit("%s: requested %s failed", __func__, fwd_desc); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, + "Port forwarding failed"); + goto out; + } + add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); + freefwd = 0; + } else { + struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx; + + fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd); + if (fwd.handle < 0) + goto fail; + add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); + fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx)); + fctx->cid = c->self; + fctx->rid = rid; + fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1; + client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward, + fctx); + freefwd = 0; + c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */ + /* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */ + goto out; + } + reply_ok(reply, rid); + out: + free(fwd_desc); + if (freefwd) { + free(fwd.listen_host); + free(fwd.listen_path); + free(fwd.connect_host); + free(fwd.connect_path); + } + return ret; +} + +static int +mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd; + char *fwd_desc = NULL; + const char *error_reason = NULL; + char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL; + u_int ftype; + int r, i, ret = 0; + u_int lport, cport; + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 || + (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || + (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { + error("%s: malformed message", __func__); + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + + if (*listen_addr == '\0') { + free(listen_addr); + listen_addr = NULL; + } + if (*connect_addr == '\0') { + free(connect_addr); + connect_addr = NULL; + } + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_port = lport; + if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; + else + fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; + fwd.connect_port = cport; + if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; + else + fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; + + debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self, + (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); + + /* make sure this has been requested */ + found_fwd = NULL; + switch (ftype) { + case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: + case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: + for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { + if (compare_forward(&fwd, + options.local_forwards + i)) { + found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i; + break; + } + } + break; + case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: + for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { + if (compare_forward(&fwd, + options.remote_forwards + i)) { + found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i; + break; + } + } + break; + } + + if (found_fwd == NULL) + error_reason = "port not forwarded"; + else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) { + /* + * This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port + * between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens. + * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need + * to use the actual listen port. + */ + if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, found_fwd) == -1) + error_reason = "port not in permitted opens"; + } else { /* local and dynamic forwards */ + /* Ditto */ + if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, fwd.connect_port, + &options.fwd_opts) == -1) + error_reason = "port not found"; + } + + if (error_reason != NULL) + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, error_reason); + else { + reply_ok(reply, rid); + free(found_fwd->listen_host); + free(found_fwd->listen_path); + free(found_fwd->connect_host); + free(found_fwd->connect_path); + found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL; + found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL; + found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0; + } + out: + free(fwd_desc); + free(listen_addr); + free(connect_addr); + + return ret; +} + +static int +mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + Channel *nc; + char *chost = NULL; + u_int cport, i, j; + int r, new_fd[2]; + struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx; + + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */ + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0) { + free(chost); + error("%s: malformed message", __func__); + return -1; + } + + debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u", + __func__, c->self, chost, cport); + + /* Gather fds from client */ + for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { + error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", + __func__, i); + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) + close(new_fd[j]); + free(chost); + + /* prepare reply */ + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, + "did not receive file descriptors"); + return -1; + } + } + + debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__, + new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); + + /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ + if (c->have_remote_id) { + debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, + "Multiple sessions not supported"); + cleanup: + close(new_fd[0]); + close(new_fd[1]); + free(chost); + return 0; + } + + if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || + options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { + if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ", + chost, cport)) { + debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, + "Permission denied"); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ + if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) + set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); + if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) + set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); + + nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); + free(chost); + + nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ + c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ + c->have_remote_id = 1; + + debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", + __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); + + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self, + mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); + + cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); + cctx->rid = rid; + channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx); + c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ + + /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ + return 0; +} + +/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */ +static void +mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) +{ + struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; + Channel *c, *cc; + struct sshbuf *reply; + int r; + + if (cctx == NULL) + fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); + if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, + id, c->ctl_chan); + if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + + if (!success) { + debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid, + "Session open refused by peer"); + /* prepare reply */ + goto done; + } + + debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); + /* prepare reply */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + done: + /* Send reply */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(reply); + + if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) + fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); + cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ + c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; + free(cctx); +} + +static int +mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self); + + if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || + options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { + if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared " + "connection to %s? ", host)) { + debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid, + "Permission denied"); + return 0; + } + } + + if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) { + channel_free(ssh, mux_listener_channel); + client_stop_mux(); + free(options.control_path); + options.control_path = NULL; + mux_listener_channel = NULL; + muxserver_sock = -1; + } + + reply_ok(reply, rid); + return 0; +} + +static int +mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid, + Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply) +{ + int r; + + debug("%s: channel %d: proxy request", __func__, c->self); + + c->mux_rcb = channel_proxy_downstream; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_PROXY)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + return 0; +} + +/* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */ +static int +mux_master_read_cb(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; + struct sshbuf *in = NULL, *out = NULL; + u_int type, rid, i; + int r, ret = -1; + + if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + + /* Setup ctx and */ + if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) { + state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state)); + c->mux_ctx = state; + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, + mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0); + + /* Send hello */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + /* no extensions */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self); + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + + /* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */ + if ((r = sshbuf_froms(c->input, &in)) != 0) { + malf: + error("%s: malformed message", __func__); + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &type)) != 0) + goto malf; + debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %zu", + __func__, c->self, type, sshbuf_len(in)); + + if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO) + rid = 0; + else { + if (!state->hello_rcvd) { + error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), " + "received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &rid)) != 0) + goto malf; + } + + for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { + if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) { + ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(ssh, rid, + c, in, out); + break; + } + } + if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { + error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type); + reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "unsupported request"); + ret = 0; + } + /* Enqueue reply packet */ + if (sshbuf_len(out) != 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + out: + sshbuf_free(in); + sshbuf_free(out); + return ret; +} + +void +mux_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int exitval) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + Channel *mux_chan; + int r; + + debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self, + exitval); + + if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", + __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); + + /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, exitval)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); +} + +void +mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + Channel *mux_chan; + int r; + + debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self); + + if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", + __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); + + /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); +} + +/* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */ +void +muxserver_listen(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + mode_t old_umask; + char *orig_control_path = options.control_path; + char rbuf[16+1]; + u_int i, r; + int oerrno; + + if (options.control_path == NULL || + options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) + return; + + debug("setting up multiplex master socket"); + + /* + * Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically + * establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid + * other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting + * an unready socket. + */ + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) { + r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10); + rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r : + (r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 : + '0' + r - 26 - 26; + } + rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0'; + options.control_path = NULL; + xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf); + debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path); + + old_umask = umask(0177); + muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0); + oerrno = errno; + umask(old_umask); + if (muxserver_sock < 0) { + if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) { + error("ControlSocket %s already exists, " + "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path); + disable_mux_master: + if (muxserver_sock != -1) { + close(muxserver_sock); + muxserver_sock = -1; + } + free(orig_control_path); + free(options.control_path); + options.control_path = NULL; + options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; + return; + } else { + /* unix_listener() logs the error */ + cleanup_exit(255); + } + } + + /* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */ + if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) { + if (errno != EEXIST) { + fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__, + options.control_path, orig_control_path, + strerror(errno)); + } + error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing", + orig_control_path); + unlink(options.control_path); + goto disable_mux_master; + } + unlink(options.control_path); + free(options.control_path); + options.control_path = orig_control_path; + + set_nonblock(muxserver_sock); + + mux_listener_channel = channel_new(ssh, "mux listener", + SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, options.control_path, 1); + mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb; + debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__, + mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock); +} + +/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */ +static void +mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) +{ + struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; + const char *display; + Channel *c, *cc; + int i, r; + struct sshbuf *reply; + + if (cctx == NULL) + fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); + if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, + id, c->ctl_chan); + if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + + if (!success) { + debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); + reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid, + "Session open refused by peer"); + goto done; + } + + display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { + char *proto, *data; + + /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ + if (client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location, + options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, + &proto, &data) == 0) { + /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ + debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " + "spoofing."); + x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, + display, proto, data, 1); + /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", + CONFIRM_WARN); + } + } + + if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) { + debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); + packet_send(); + } + + client_session2_setup(ssh, id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, + cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, cctx->cmd, cctx->env); + + debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); + /* prepare reply */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + done: + /* Send reply */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(reply); + + if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) + fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); + cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ + c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; + sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd); + free(cctx->term); + if (cctx->env != NULL) { + for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++) + free(cctx->env[i]); + free(cctx->env); + } + free(cctx); +} + +/* ** Multiplexing client support */ + +/* Exit signal handler */ +static void +control_client_sighandler(int signo) +{ + muxclient_terminate = signo; +} + +/* + * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to + * mux master. + */ +static void +control_client_sigrelay(int signo) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + + if (muxserver_pid > 1) + kill(muxserver_pid, signo); + + errno = save_errno; +} + +static int +mux_client_read(int fd, struct sshbuf *b, size_t need) +{ + size_t have; + ssize_t len; + u_char *p; + struct pollfd pfd; + int r; + + pfd.fd = fd; + pfd.events = POLLIN; + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(b, need, &p)) != 0) + fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (have = 0; have < need; ) { + if (muxclient_terminate) { + errno = EINTR; + return -1; + } + len = read(fd, p + have, need - have); + if (len < 0) { + switch (errno) { +#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) + case EWOULDBLOCK: +#endif + case EAGAIN: + (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case EINTR: + continue; + default: + return -1; + } + } + if (len == 0) { + errno = EPIPE; + return -1; + } + have += (size_t)len; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +mux_client_write_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + struct sshbuf *queue; + u_int have, need; + int r, oerrno, len; + const u_char *ptr; + struct pollfd pfd; + + pfd.fd = fd; + pfd.events = POLLOUT; + if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(queue, m)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + need = sshbuf_len(queue); + ptr = sshbuf_ptr(queue); + + for (have = 0; have < need; ) { + if (muxclient_terminate) { + sshbuf_free(queue); + errno = EINTR; + return -1; + } + len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have); + if (len < 0) { + switch (errno) { +#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) + case EWOULDBLOCK: +#endif + case EAGAIN: + (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case EINTR: + continue; + default: + oerrno = errno; + sshbuf_free(queue); + errno = oerrno; + return -1; + } + } + if (len == 0) { + sshbuf_free(queue); + errno = EPIPE; + return -1; + } + have += (u_int)len; + } + sshbuf_free(queue); + return 0; +} + +static int +mux_client_read_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + struct sshbuf *queue; + size_t need, have; + const u_char *ptr; + int r, oerrno; + + if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, 4) != 0) { + if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE) + debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + sshbuf_free(queue); + errno = oerrno; + return -1; + } + need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(queue)); + if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, need) != 0) { + oerrno = errno; + debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + sshbuf_free(queue); + errno = oerrno; + return -1; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(queue, &ptr, &have)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(m, ptr, have)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(queue); + return 0; +} + +static int +mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + u_int type, ver; + int r, ret = -1; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0) + fatal("%s: hello: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + /* no extensions */ + + if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) { + debug("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + sshbuf_reset(m); + + /* Read their HELLO */ + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { + debug("%s: read packet failed", __func__); + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) { + error("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u", + __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode version: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { + error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " + "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); + goto out; + } + debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver); + /* No extensions are presently defined */ + while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) { + char *name = NULL; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0) { /* value */ + error("%s: malformed extension: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name); + free(name); + } + /* success */ + ret = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(m); + return ret; +} + +static u_int +mux_client_request_alive(int fd) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + char *e; + u_int pid, type, rid; + int r; + + debug3("%s: entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) + fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + + /* Read their reply */ + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(m); + return 0; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode remote ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (rid != muxclient_request_id) + fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", + __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode PID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + + debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid); + + muxclient_request_id++; + + return pid; +} + +static void +mux_client_request_terminate(int fd) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + char *e; + u_int type, rid; + int r; + + debug3("%s: entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_TERMINATE)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) + fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + + /* Read their reply */ + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { + /* Remote end exited already */ + if (errno == EPIPE) { + sshbuf_free(m); + return; + } + fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (rid != muxclient_request_id) + fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", + __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); + switch (type) { + case MUX_S_OK: + break; + case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e); + case MUX_S_FAILURE: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e); + default: + fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", + __func__, type); + } + sshbuf_free(m); + muxclient_request_id++; +} + +static int +mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + char *e, *fwd_desc; + const char *lhost, *chost; + u_int type, rid; + int r; + + fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd); + debug("Requesting %s %s", + cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc); + free(fwd_desc); + + type = cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD; + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) + lhost = fwd->listen_path; + else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL) + lhost = ""; + else if (*fwd->listen_host == '\0') + lhost = "*"; + else + lhost = fwd->listen_host; + + if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) + chost = fwd->connect_path; + else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) + chost = ""; + else + chost = fwd->connect_host; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ftype)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, lhost)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, chost)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->connect_port)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) + fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + + /* Read their reply */ + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(m); + return -1; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (rid != muxclient_request_id) + fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", + __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); + + switch (type) { + case MUX_S_OK: + break; + case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT: + if (cancel_flag) + fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &fwd->allocated_port)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode port: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", + fwd->allocated_port, + fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "", + fwd->connect_port); + if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD) + fprintf(stdout, "%i\n", fwd->allocated_port); + break; + case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e); + return -1; + case MUX_S_FAILURE: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e); + return -1; + default: + fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", + __func__, type); + } + sshbuf_free(m); + + muxclient_request_id++; + return 0; +} + +static int +mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + + debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__, + cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request", + options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards); + + /* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { + if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, + options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ? + MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL, + options.local_forwards + i) != 0) + ret = -1; + } + for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { + if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, + options.remote_forwards + i) != 0) + ret = -1; + } + return ret; +} + +static int +mux_client_request_session(int fd) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + char *e; + const char *term; + u_int echar, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen; + extern char **environ; + int r, i, devnull, rawmode; + + debug3("%s: entering", __func__); + + if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { + error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); + return -1; + } + + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + if (stdin_null_flag) { + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) + fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); + if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) + fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); + } + + if ((term = getenv("TERM")) == NULL) + term = ""; + echar = 0xffffffff; + if (options.escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) + echar = (u_int)options.escape_char; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, tty_flag)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_x11)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_agent)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, subsystem_flag)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echar)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, term)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, command)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* Pass environment */ + if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) { + for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { + if (!env_permitted(environ[i])) + continue; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, environ[i])) != 0) + fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.setenv[i])) != 0) + fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) + fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ + if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || + mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || + mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) + fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); + + debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__); + + /* Read their reply */ + sshbuf_reset(m); + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { + error("%s: read from master failed: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + sshbuf_free(m); + return -1; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (rid != muxclient_request_id) + fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", + __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); + + switch (type) { + case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + break; + case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + error("Master refused session request: %s", e); + sshbuf_free(m); + return -1; + case MUX_S_FAILURE: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e); + sshbuf_free(m); + return -1; + default: + sshbuf_free(m); + error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", + __func__, type); + return -1; + } + muxclient_request_id++; + + if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + platform_pledge_mux(); + + signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); + signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); + signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); + signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); + + rawmode = tty_flag; + if (tty_flag) + enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + + /* + * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. + * Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message. + * This process must read the value and wait for the closure of + * the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will + * terminate early too (possibly losing data). + */ + for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) { + sshbuf_reset(m); + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) + break; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + switch (type) { + case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (esid != sid) + fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: " + "my id %u theirs %u", + __func__, sid, esid); + leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == + REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + rawmode = 0; + continue; + case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (esid != sid) + fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: " + "my id %u theirs %u", + __func__, sid, esid); + if (exitval_seen) + fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &exitval)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode exit value: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + exitval_seen = 1; + continue; + default: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); + } + } + + close(fd); + if (rawmode) + leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); + + if (muxclient_terminate) { + debug2("Exiting on signal: %s", strsignal(muxclient_terminate)); + exitval = 255; + } else if (!exitval_seen) { + debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly"); + exitval = 255; + } else + debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval); + + if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) + fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host); + + exit(exitval); +} + +static int +mux_client_proxy(int fd) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + char *e; + u_int type, rid; + int r; + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_PROXY)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) + fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + + /* Read their reply */ + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(m); + return 0; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (rid != muxclient_request_id) + fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", + __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); + if (type != MUX_S_PROXY) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); + } + sshbuf_free(m); + + debug3("%s: done", __func__); + muxclient_request_id++; + return 0; +} + +static int +mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + char *e; + u_int type, rid, sid; + int r, devnull; + + debug3("%s: entering", __func__); + + if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { + error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); + return -1; + } + + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + if (stdin_null_flag) { + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) + fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); + if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) + fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); + } + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.stdio_forward_host)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.stdio_forward_port)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) + fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ + if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || + mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) + fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); + + if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + platform_pledge_mux(); + + debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__); + + /* Read their reply */ + sshbuf_reset(m); + + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { + error("%s: read from master failed: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + sshbuf_free(m); + return -1; + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (rid != muxclient_request_id) + fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", + __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); + switch (type) { + case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid); + break; + case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e); + case MUX_S_FAILURE: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(m); + fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e); + default: + sshbuf_free(m); + error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", + __func__, type); + return -1; + } + muxclient_request_id++; + + signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); + signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); + signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); + signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); + + /* + * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. + */ + sshbuf_reset(m); + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) { + if (errno == EPIPE || + (errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0)) + return 0; + fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type); +} + +static void +mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + char *e; + u_int type, rid; + int r; + + debug3("%s: entering", __func__); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) + fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + sshbuf_reset(m); + + /* Read their reply */ + if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) + fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (rid != muxclient_request_id) + fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", + __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); + + switch (type) { + case MUX_S_OK: + break; + case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e); + case MUX_S_FAILURE: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e); + default: + fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", + __func__, type); + } + sshbuf_free(m); + muxclient_request_id++; +} + +/* Multiplex client main loop. */ +int +muxclient(const char *path) +{ + struct sockaddr_un addr; + int sock; + u_int pid; + + if (muxclient_command == 0) { + if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) + muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD; + else + muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN; + } + + switch (options.control_master) { + case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO: + case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK: + debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master"); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO: + break; + default: + return -1; + } + + memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); + addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + + if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, + sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) + fatal("ControlPath too long ('%s' >= %u bytes)", path, + (unsigned int)sizeof(addr.sun_path)); + + if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) + fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) { + switch (muxclient_command) { + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: + break; + default: + fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, + strerror(errno)); + } + if (errno == ECONNREFUSED && + options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) { + debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path); + unlink(path); + } else if (errno == ENOENT) { + debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path); + } else { + error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, + strerror(errno)); + } + close(sock); + return -1; + } + set_nonblock(sock); + + if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) { + error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__); + close(sock); + return -1; + } + + switch (muxclient_command) { + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK: + if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0) + fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__); + fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%u)\r\n", pid); + exit(0); + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE: + mux_client_request_terminate(sock); + if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) + fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n"); + exit(0); + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD: + if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) + fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); + exit(0); + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: + if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) { + error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); + return -1; + } + mux_client_request_session(sock); + return -1; + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: + mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock); + exit(0); + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP: + mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock); + if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) + fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n"); + exit(0); + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD: + if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0) + error("%s: master cancel forward request failed", + __func__); + exit(0); + case SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY: + mux_client_proxy(sock); + return (sock); + default: + fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command); + } +} diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..27b4a15 --- /dev/null +++ b/myproposal.h @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.57 2018/09/12 01:34:02 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include + +/* conditional algorithm support */ + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 +# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ + "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ + "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \ + "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," +# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," +# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," +#else +# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ + "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ + "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," +# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," +# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," +#endif +#else +# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS +# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS +# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS +#endif + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM +# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \ + ",aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com" +#else +# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 +# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS \ + "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \ + "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \ + "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," +# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \ + "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256," +#define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \ + "hmac-sha2-256," \ + "hmac-sha2-512," +#else +# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS +# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 +# define SHA2_HMAC_MODES +#endif + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 +# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \ + "curve25519-sha256," \ + "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," +# else +# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "" +# endif +#define KEX_COMMON_KEX \ + KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \ + KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ + KEX_SHA2_METHODS + +#define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \ + KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \ + "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \ + +#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \ + "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \ + KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \ + "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" + +#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ + HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ + "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ + "ssh-ed25519," \ + "rsa-sha2-512," \ + "rsa-sha2-256," \ + "ssh-rsa" + +/* the actual algorithms */ + +#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \ + AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES + +#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT + +#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ + "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ + "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ + "umac-64@openssh.com," \ + "umac-128@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-256," \ + "hmac-sha2-512," \ + "hmac-sha1" + +#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC + +/* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */ +#define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \ + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \ + "ssh-ed25519," \ + "rsa-sha2-512," \ + "rsa-sha2-256," \ + "ssh-rsa" + +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ + "curve25519-sha256," \ + "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" +#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ + "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "ssh-ed25519" +#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" +#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ + "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ + "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ + "umac-64@openssh.com," \ + "umac-128@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-256," \ + "hmac-sha2-512," \ + "hmac-sha1" + +#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX +#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT +#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC + +#define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS "ssh-ed25519" + +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com" +#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" + +#define KEX_CLIENT \ + KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ + KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ + KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ + KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ + KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_LANG + +#define KEX_SERVER \ + KEX_SERVER_KEX, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ + KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ + KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ + KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ + KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_LANG + diff --git a/nchan.c b/nchan.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8294d7f --- /dev/null +++ b/nchan.c @@ -0,0 +1,446 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.69 2018/10/04 07:47:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" + +/* + * SSH Protocol 1.5 aka New Channel Protocol + * Thanks to Martina, Axel and everyone who left Erlangen, leaving me bored. + * Written by Markus Friedl in October 1999 + * + * Protocol versions 1.3 and 1.5 differ in the handshake protocol used for the + * tear down of channels: + * + * 1.3: strict request-ack-protocol: + * CLOSE -> + * <- CLOSE_CONFIRM + * + * 1.5: uses variations of: + * IEOF -> + * <- OCLOSE + * <- IEOF + * OCLOSE -> + * i.e. both sides have to close the channel + * + * 2.0: the EOF messages are optional + * + * See the debugging output from 'ssh -v' and 'sshd -d' of + * ssh-1.2.27 as an example. + * + */ + +/* functions manipulating channel states */ +/* + * EVENTS update channel input/output states execute ACTIONS + */ +/* + * ACTIONS: should never update the channel states + */ +static void chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *, Channel *); +static void chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *, Channel *); + +/* helper */ +static void chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *, Channel *); +static void chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *, Channel *); +static void chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *, Channel *); + +static const char *ostates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_ieof", "closed" }; +static const char *istates[] = { "open", "drain", "wait_oclose", "closed" }; + +static void +chan_set_istate(Channel *c, u_int next) +{ + if (c->istate > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) + fatal("chan_set_istate: bad state %d -> %d", c->istate, next); + debug2("channel %d: input %s -> %s", c->self, istates[c->istate], + istates[next]); + c->istate = next; +} + +static void +chan_set_ostate(Channel *c, u_int next) +{ + if (c->ostate > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) + fatal("chan_set_ostate: bad state %d -> %d", c->ostate, next); + debug2("channel %d: output %s -> %s", c->self, ostates[c->ostate], + ostates[next]); + c->ostate = next; +} + +void +chan_read_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + debug2("channel %d: read failed", c->self); + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: + chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c); + chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); + break; + default: + error("channel %d: chan_read_failed for istate %d", + c->self, c->istate); + break; + } +} + +void +chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + debug2("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self); + if (sshbuf_len(c->input)) { + error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer", + c->self); + return; + } + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + if (!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_LOCAL))) + chan_send_eof2(ssh, c); + chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); + break; + default: + error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d", + c->self, c->istate); + break; + } +} + +void +chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + debug2("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self); + if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) { + error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer", + c->self); + return; + } + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c); + chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); + break; + default: + error("channel %d: internal error: obuf_empty for ostate %d", + c->self, c->ostate); + break; + } +} + +void +chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + debug2("channel %d: rcvd eow", c->self); + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: + chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c); + chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); + break; + } +} + +static void +chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + int r; + + debug2("channel %d: send eof", c->self); + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", + __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_SENT; + break; + default: + error("channel %d: cannot send eof for istate %d", + c->self, c->istate); + break; + } +} + +static void +chan_send_close2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + int r; + + debug2("channel %d: send close", c->self); + if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || + c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) { + error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d", + c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); + } else if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) { + error("channel %d: already sent close", c->self); + } else { + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", + __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT; + } +} + +static void +chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + int r; + + debug2("channel %d: send eow", c->self); + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) { + error("channel %d: must not sent eow on closed output", + c->self); + return; + } + if (!(datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) + return; + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", __func__, c->self); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "eow@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: send CHANNEL_EOF: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +/* shared */ + +void +chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + debug2("channel %d: rcvd eof", c->self); + c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_RCVD; + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) + chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); + if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN && + sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0 && + !CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) + chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c); +} + +void +chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + debug2("channel %d: rcvd close", c->self); + if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL)) { + if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) + error("channel %d: protocol error: close rcvd twice", + c->self); + c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD; + } + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { + /* tear down larval channels immediately */ + chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); + chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); + return; + } + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: + /* + * wait until a data from the channel is consumed if a CLOSE + * is received + */ + chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN); + break; + } + switch (c->istate) { + case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN: + chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c); + chan_shutdown_extended_read(ssh, c); + chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); + break; + case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL)) + chan_send_eof2(ssh, c); + chan_shutdown_extended_read(ssh, c); + chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED); + break; + } +} + +void +chan_write_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + debug2("channel %d: write failed", c->self); + switch (c->ostate) { + case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN: + case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN: + chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c); + if (strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0) + chan_send_eow2(ssh, c); + chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED); + break; + default: + error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d", + c->self, c->ostate); + break; + } +} + +void +chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE; +} + +int +chan_is_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int do_send) +{ + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE) { + debug2("channel %d: zombie", c->self); + return 1; + } + if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) + return 0; + if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) && + c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && + c->efd != -1 && + sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) { + debug2("channel %d: active efd: %d len %zu", + c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended)); + return 0; + } + if (c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL) { + debug2("channel %d: is dead (local)", c->self); + return 1; + } + if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { + if (do_send) { + chan_send_close2(ssh, c); + } else { + /* channel would be dead if we sent a close */ + if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) { + debug2("channel %d: almost dead", + c->self); + return 1; + } + } + } + if ((c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) && + (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) { + debug2("channel %d: is dead", c->self); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* helper */ +static void +chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + sshbuf_reset(c->output); + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) + return; + /* shutdown failure is allowed if write failed already */ + debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])", + c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->wfd, c->efd, + channel_format_extended_usage(c)); + if (c->sock != -1) { + if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_WR) < 0) { + debug2("channel %d: %s: shutdown() failed for " + "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, __func__, + c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate, + strerror(errno)); + } + } else { + if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) { + logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for " + "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", + c->self, __func__, c->wfd, c->istate, c->ostate, + strerror(errno)); + } + } +} + +static void +chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) + return; + debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])", + c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd, + channel_format_extended_usage(c)); + if (c->sock != -1) { + /* + * shutdown(sock, SHUT_READ) may return ENOTCONN if the + * write side has been closed already. (bug on Linux) + * HP-UX may return ENOTCONN also. + */ + if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RD) < 0 && errno != ENOTCONN) { + error("channel %d: %s: shutdown() failed for " + "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", + c->self, __func__, c->sock, c->istate, c->ostate, + strerror(errno)); + } + } else { + if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) { + logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for " + "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", + c->self, __func__, c->rfd, c->istate, c->ostate, + strerror(errno)); + } + } +} + +static void +chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c) +{ + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || c->efd == -1) + return; + if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && + c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) + return; + debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])", + c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd, + channel_format_extended_usage(c)); + if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd) < 0) { + logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for " + "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", + c->self, __func__, c->efd, c->istate, c->ostate, + strerror(errno)); + } +} diff --git a/nchan.ms b/nchan.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5757601 --- /dev/null +++ b/nchan.ms @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: nchan.ms,v 1.8 2003/11/21 11:57:03 djm Exp $ +.\" +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.TL +OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 1.5 Implementation +.SH +Channel Input State Diagram +.PS +reset +l=1 +s=1.2 +ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid +boxwid=s*boxwid +ellipseht=s*ellipseht +S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN" +move right 2*l from last ellipse.e +S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED" +move down l from last ellipse.s +S3: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "OCLOSED" +move down l from 1st ellipse.s +S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" +arrow "" "rcvd OCLOSE/" "shutdown_read" "send IEOF" from S1.e to S4.w +arrow "ibuf_empty/" "send IEOF" from S2.e to S3.w +arrow from S1.s to S2.n +box invis "read_failed/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c +arrow from S3.n to S4.s +box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c +ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 +arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w +arrow from S2.ne to S4.sw +box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/ " with .e at last arrow.c +box invis " send IEOF" with .w at last arrow.c +.PE +.SH +Channel Output State Diagram +.PS +S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN" +move right 2*l from last ellipse.e +S3: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "IEOF" +move down l from last ellipse.s +S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED" +move down l from 1st ellipse.s +S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" +arrow "" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S1.e to S3.w +arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S2.e to S4.w +arrow from S1.s to S2.n +box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c +arrow from S3.s to S4.n +box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c +ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 +arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w +.PE +.SH +Notes +.PP +The input buffer is filled with data from the socket +(the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the +forwarded channel). +The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the +remote peer. +Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end), +saved in the output buffer and written to the socket. +.PP +If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the +INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an IEOF message to the peer. +If the peer receives the IEOF and has consumed all +data he replies with an OCLOSE. +When the local instance receives the OCLOSE +he considers the INPUT-half of the channel closed. +The peer has his OUTOUT-half closed. +.PP +A channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance +if both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half on his +side of the channel are closed. +Note that when an instance is unable to consume the +received data, he is permitted to send an OCLOSE +before the matching IEOF is received. diff --git a/nchan2.ms b/nchan2.ms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7001504 --- /dev/null +++ b/nchan2.ms @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: nchan2.ms,v 1.4 2008/05/15 23:52:24 djm Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.TL +OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 2.0 Implementation +.SH +Channel Input State Diagram +.PS +reset +l=1 +s=1.2 +ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid +boxwid=s*boxwid +ellipseht=s*ellipseht +S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN" +move right 2*l from last ellipse.e +S3: ellipse invis +move down l from last ellipse.s +S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED" +move down l from 1st ellipse.s +S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" +arrow from S1.e to S4.n +box invis "rcvd CLOSE/" "shutdown_read" with .sw at last arrow.c +arrow "ibuf_empty ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "send EOF" "" from S2.e to S4.w +arrow from S1.s to S2.n +box invis "read_failed ||" "rcvd EOW/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c +ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 +arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w +.PE +.SH +Channel Output State Diagram +.PS +S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN" +move right 2*l from last ellipse.e +S3: ellipse invis +move down l from last ellipse.s +S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED" +move down l from 1st ellipse.s +S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN" +arrow from S1.e to S4.n +box invis "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send EOW" with .sw at last arrow.c +arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "" from S2.e to S4.w +arrow from S1.s to S2.n +box invis "rcvd EOF ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c +ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4 +arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w +.PE +.SH +Notes +.PP +The input buffer is filled with data from the socket +(the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the +forwarded channel). +The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the +remote peer. +Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end), +saved in the output buffer and written to the socket. +.PP +If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the +INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an EOF message to the peer. +.PP +A CLOSE message is sent to the peer if +both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half of the local +end of the channel are closed. +.PP +The channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance +if a CLOSE message he been both sent and received. diff --git a/opacket.c b/opacket.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e637d7a --- /dev/null +++ b/opacket.c @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: opacket.c,v 1.7 2017/10/20 01:56:39 djm Exp $ */ +/* Written by Markus Friedl. Placed in the public domain. */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" + +struct ssh *active_state, *backup_state; + +/* Map old to new API */ + +void +ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +void +ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *ssh, int value) +{ + u_char ch = value; + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, ch)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +void +ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *ssh, u_int value) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, value)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +void +ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t value) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u64(ssh, value)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +void +ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +void +ssh_packet_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const char *str) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, str)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +void +ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *ssh, const void *buf, u_int len) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_put(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +void +ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, value)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +void +ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_GROUP *curve, + const EC_POINT *point) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_put_ec(ssh, point, curve)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} +# endif +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +void +ssh_packet_send(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +u_int +ssh_packet_get_char(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_char ch; + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &ch)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return ch; +} + +u_int +ssh_packet_get_int(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int val; + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &val)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return val; +} + +u_int64_t +ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int64_t val; + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u64(ssh, &val)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return val; +} + + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +void +ssh_packet_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM * value) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, value)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +void +ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_GROUP *curve, EC_POINT *point) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_ec(ssh, point, curve)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} +# endif +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +void * +ssh_packet_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr) +{ + int r; + size_t len; + u_char *val; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (length_ptr != NULL) + *length_ptr = (u_int)len; + return val; +} + +const void * +ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr) +{ + int r; + size_t len; + const u_char *val; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (length_ptr != NULL) + *length_ptr = (u_int)len; + return val; +} + +char * +ssh_packet_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, u_int *length_ptr) +{ + int r; + size_t len; + char *val; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (length_ptr != NULL) + *length_ptr = (u_int)len; + return val; +} + +/* Old API, that had to be reimplemented */ + +void +packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out) +{ + active_state = ssh_packet_set_connection(active_state, fd_in, fd_out); + if (active_state == NULL) + fatal("%s: ssh_packet_set_connection failed", __func__); +} + +u_int +packet_get_char(void) +{ + return (ssh_packet_get_char(active_state)); +} + +u_int +packet_get_int(void) +{ + return (ssh_packet_get_int(active_state)); +} + +int +packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr) +{ + u_char type; + int r; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(active_state, &type, seqnr)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); + return type; +} + +int +packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr) +{ + u_char type; + int r; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(active_state, &type, seqnr))) + sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); + return type; +} + +void +packet_close(void) +{ + ssh_packet_close(active_state); + active_state = NULL; +} + +void +packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(active_state, buf, len)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); +} + +void +packet_write_wait(void) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(active_state)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); +} + +void +packet_write_poll(void) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(active_state)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); +} + +void +packet_read_expect(int expected_type) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(active_state, expected_type)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(active_state, __func__, r); +} + +void +packet_disconnect(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + char buf[1024]; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + ssh_packet_disconnect(active_state, "%s", buf); +} + +void +packet_send_debug(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + char buf[1024]; + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + ssh_packet_send_debug(active_state, "%s", buf); +} diff --git a/opacket.h b/opacket.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f92fe58 --- /dev/null +++ b/opacket.h @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: opacket.h,v 1.13 2018/07/06 09:03:02 sf Exp $ */ +#ifndef _OPACKET_H +/* Written by Markus Friedl. Placed in the public domain. */ + +/* Map old to new API */ +void ssh_packet_start(struct ssh *, u_char); +void ssh_packet_put_char(struct ssh *, int ch); +void ssh_packet_put_int(struct ssh *, u_int value); +void ssh_packet_put_int64(struct ssh *, u_int64_t value); +void ssh_packet_put_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); +void ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); +void ssh_packet_put_string(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len); +void ssh_packet_put_cstring(struct ssh *, const char *str); +void ssh_packet_put_raw(struct ssh *, const void *buf, u_int len); +void ssh_packet_send(struct ssh *); + +u_int ssh_packet_get_char(struct ssh *); +u_int ssh_packet_get_int(struct ssh *); +u_int64_t ssh_packet_get_int64(struct ssh *); +void ssh_packet_get_bignum2(struct ssh *, BIGNUM * value); +void ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(struct ssh *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); +void *ssh_packet_get_string(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr); +char *ssh_packet_get_cstring(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr); + +/* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */ +#define ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh) \ +do { \ + int _len = ssh_packet_remaining(ssh); \ + if (_len > 0) { \ + logit("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \ + _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \ + ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, \ + "Packet integrity error."); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/* old API */ +void packet_close(void); +u_int packet_get_char(void); +u_int packet_get_int(void); +void packet_set_connection(int, int); +int packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *); +int packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *); +void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len); +void packet_write_wait(void); +void packet_write_poll(void); +void packet_read_expect(int expected_type); +#define packet_set_timeout(timeout, count) \ + ssh_packet_set_timeout(active_state, (timeout), (count)) +#define packet_connection_is_on_socket() \ + ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(active_state) +#define packet_set_nonblocking() \ + ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(active_state) +#define packet_get_connection_in() \ + ssh_packet_get_connection_in(active_state) +#define packet_get_connection_out() \ + ssh_packet_get_connection_out(active_state) +#define packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags) \ + ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(active_state, (protocol_flags)) +#define packet_get_protocol_flags() \ + ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(active_state) +#define packet_start(type) \ + ssh_packet_start(active_state, (type)) +#define packet_put_char(value) \ + ssh_packet_put_char(active_state, (value)) +#define packet_put_int(value) \ + ssh_packet_put_int(active_state, (value)) +#define packet_put_int64(value) \ + ssh_packet_put_int64(active_state, (value)) +#define packet_put_string( buf, len) \ + ssh_packet_put_string(active_state, (buf), (len)) +#define packet_put_cstring(str) \ + ssh_packet_put_cstring(active_state, (str)) +#define packet_put_raw(buf, len) \ + ssh_packet_put_raw(active_state, (buf), (len)) +#define packet_put_bignum2(value) \ + ssh_packet_put_bignum2(active_state, (value)) +#define packet_send() \ + ssh_packet_send(active_state) +#define packet_read() \ + ssh_packet_read(active_state) +#define packet_get_int64() \ + ssh_packet_get_int64(active_state) +#define packet_get_bignum2(value) \ + ssh_packet_get_bignum2(active_state, (value)) +#define packet_remaining() \ + ssh_packet_remaining(active_state) +#define packet_get_string(length_ptr) \ + ssh_packet_get_string(active_state, (length_ptr)) +#define packet_get_string_ptr(length_ptr) \ + ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(active_state, (length_ptr)) +#define packet_get_cstring(length_ptr) \ + ssh_packet_get_cstring(active_state, (length_ptr)) +void packet_send_debug(const char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void packet_disconnect(const char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))) + __attribute__((noreturn)); +#define packet_have_data_to_write() \ + ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(active_state) +#define packet_not_very_much_data_to_write() \ + ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(active_state) +#define packet_set_interactive(interactive, qos_interactive, qos_bulk) \ + ssh_packet_set_interactive(active_state, (interactive), (qos_interactive), (qos_bulk)) +#define packet_is_interactive() \ + ssh_packet_is_interactive(active_state) +#define packet_set_maxsize(s) \ + ssh_packet_set_maxsize(active_state, (s)) +#define packet_inc_alive_timeouts() \ + ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(active_state) +#define packet_set_alive_timeouts(ka) \ + ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(active_state, (ka)) +#define packet_get_maxsize() \ + ssh_packet_get_maxsize(active_state) +#define packet_add_padding(pad) \ + sshpkt_add_padding(active_state, (pad)) +#define packet_send_ignore(nbytes) \ + ssh_packet_send_ignore(active_state, (nbytes)) +#define packet_set_server() \ + ssh_packet_set_server(active_state) +#define packet_set_authenticated() \ + ssh_packet_set_authenticated(active_state) +#define packet_get_input() \ + ssh_packet_get_input(active_state) +#define packet_get_output() \ + ssh_packet_get_output(active_state) +#define packet_check_eom() \ + ssh_packet_check_eom(active_state) +#define set_newkeys(mode) \ + ssh_set_newkeys(active_state, (mode)) +#define packet_get_state(m) \ + ssh_packet_get_state(active_state, m) +#define packet_set_state(m) \ + ssh_packet_set_state(active_state, m) +#define packet_get_raw(lenp) \ + sshpkt_ptr(active_state, lenp) +#define packet_get_ecpoint(c,p) \ + ssh_packet_get_ecpoint(active_state, c, p) +#define packet_put_ecpoint(c,p) \ + ssh_packet_put_ecpoint(active_state, c, p) +#define packet_get_rekey_timeout() \ + ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(active_state) +#define packet_set_rekey_limits(x,y) \ + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(active_state, x, y) +#define packet_get_bytes(x,y) \ + ssh_packet_get_bytes(active_state, x, y) +#define packet_set_mux() \ + ssh_packet_set_mux(active_state) +#define packet_get_mux() \ + ssh_packet_get_mux(active_state) +#define packet_clear_keys() \ + ssh_packet_clear_keys(active_state) + +#endif /* _OPACKET_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1e14cb --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ +piddir=@piddir@ +srcdir=@srcdir@ +top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ + +VPATH=@srcdir@ +CC=@CC@ +LD=@LD@ +CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ +CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@ +LIBS=@LIBS@ +AR=@AR@ +RANLIB=@RANLIB@ +INSTALL=@INSTALL@ +LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@ + +OPENBSD=base64.o \ + basename.o \ + bcrypt_pbkdf.o \ + bcrypt_pbkdf.o \ + bindresvport.o \ + blowfish.o \ + daemon.o \ + dirname.o \ + explicit_bzero.o \ + fmt_scaled.o \ + freezero.o \ + getcwd.o \ + getgrouplist.o \ + getopt_long.o \ + getrrsetbyname.o \ + glob.o \ + inet_aton.o \ + inet_ntoa.o \ + inet_ntop.o \ + md5.o \ + mktemp.o \ + pwcache.o \ + readpassphrase.o \ + reallocarray.o \ + realpath.o \ + recallocarray.o \ + rmd160.o \ + rresvport.o \ + setenv.o \ + setproctitle.o \ + sha1.o \ + sha2.o \ + sigact.o \ + strcasestr.o \ + strlcat.o \ + strlcpy.o \ + strmode.o \ + strndup.o \ + strnlen.o \ + strptime.o \ + strsep.o \ + strtoll.o \ + strtonum.o \ + strtoull.o \ + strtoul.o \ + timingsafe_bcmp.o \ + vis.o + +COMPAT= arc4random.o \ + bsd-asprintf.o \ + bsd-closefrom.o \ + bsd-cygwin_util.o \ + bsd-err.o \ + bsd-flock.o \ + bsd-getline.o \ + bsd-getpagesize.o \ + bsd-getpeereid.o \ + bsd-malloc.o \ + bsd-misc.o \ + bsd-nextstep.o \ + bsd-openpty.o \ + bsd-poll.o \ + bsd-setres_id.o \ + bsd-signal.o \ + bsd-snprintf.o \ + bsd-statvfs.o \ + bsd-waitpid.o \ + fake-rfc2553.o \ + getrrsetbyname-ldns.o \ + kludge-fd_set.o \ + openssl-compat.o \ + libressl-api-compat.o \ + xcrypt.o + +PORTS= port-aix.o \ + port-irix.o \ + port-linux.o \ + port-solaris.o \ + port-net.o \ + port-uw.o + +.c.o: + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< + +all: libopenbsd-compat.a + +$(COMPAT): ../config.h +$(OPENBSD): ../config.h +$(PORTS): ../config.h + +libopenbsd-compat.a: $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS) + $(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS) + $(RANLIB) $@ + +clean: + rm -f *.o *.a core + +distclean: clean + rm -f Makefile *~ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c b/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..578f69f --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c @@ -0,0 +1,338 @@ +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypto/arc4random.c */ + +/* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.25 2013/10/01 18:34:57 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres + * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller + * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H +# include +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "log.h" + +#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY +#include "chacha_private.h" + +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#define inline __inline +#else /* !__GNUC__ */ +#define inline +#endif /* !__GNUC__ */ + +/* OpenSSH isn't multithreaded */ +#define _ARC4_LOCK() +#define _ARC4_UNLOCK() + +#define KEYSZ 32 +#define IVSZ 8 +#define BLOCKSZ 64 +#define RSBUFSZ (16*BLOCKSZ) +static int rs_initialized; +static pid_t rs_stir_pid; +static chacha_ctx rs; /* chacha context for random keystream */ +static u_char rs_buf[RSBUFSZ]; /* keystream blocks */ +static size_t rs_have; /* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */ +static size_t rs_count; /* bytes till reseed */ + +static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen); + +static inline void +_rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n) +{ + if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ) + return; + chacha_keysetup(&rs, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0); + chacha_ivsetup(&rs, buf + KEYSZ); +} + +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL +# ifndef SSH_RANDOM_DEV +# define SSH_RANDOM_DEV "/dev/urandom" +# endif /* SSH_RANDOM_DEV */ +static void +getrnd(u_char *s, size_t len) +{ + int fd; + ssize_t r; + size_t o = 0; + +#ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM + if ((r = getrandom(s, len, 0)) > 0 && (size_t)r == len) + return; +#endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */ + + if ((fd = open(SSH_RANDOM_DEV, O_RDONLY)) == -1) + fatal("Couldn't open %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno)); + while (o < len) { + r = read(fd, s + o, len - o); + if (r < 0) { + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || + errno == EWOULDBLOCK) + continue; + fatal("read %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno)); + } + o += r; + } + close(fd); +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +static void +_rs_stir(void) +{ + u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ]; + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0) + fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error 0x%lx)", + (unsigned long)ERR_get_error()); +#else + getrnd(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); +#endif + + if (!rs_initialized) { + rs_initialized = 1; + _rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + } else + _rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + + /* invalidate rs_buf */ + rs_have = 0; + memset(rs_buf, 0, RSBUFSZ); + + rs_count = 1600000; +} + +static inline void +_rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len) +{ + pid_t pid = getpid(); + + if (rs_count <= len || !rs_initialized || rs_stir_pid != pid) { + rs_stir_pid = pid; + _rs_stir(); + } else + rs_count -= len; +} + +static inline void +_rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen) +{ +#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY + memset(rs_buf, 0,RSBUFSZ); +#endif + /* fill rs_buf with the keystream */ + chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rs, rs_buf, rs_buf, RSBUFSZ); + /* mix in optional user provided data */ + if (dat) { + size_t i, m; + + m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ); + for (i = 0; i < m; i++) + rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i]; + } + /* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */ + _rs_init(rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ); + memset(rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ); + rs_have = RSBUFSZ - KEYSZ - IVSZ; +} + +static inline void +_rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n) +{ + u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf; + size_t m; + + _rs_stir_if_needed(n); + while (n > 0) { + if (rs_have > 0) { + m = MIN(n, rs_have); + memcpy(buf, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, m); + memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, m); + buf += m; + n -= m; + rs_have -= m; + } + if (rs_have == 0) + _rs_rekey(NULL, 0); + } +} + +static inline void +_rs_random_u32(u_int32_t *val) +{ + _rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val)); + if (rs_have < sizeof(*val)) + _rs_rekey(NULL, 0); + memcpy(val, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, sizeof(*val)); + memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, sizeof(*val)); + rs_have -= sizeof(*val); + return; +} + +void +arc4random_stir(void) +{ + _ARC4_LOCK(); + _rs_stir(); + _ARC4_UNLOCK(); +} + +void +arc4random_addrandom(u_char *dat, int datlen) +{ + int m; + + _ARC4_LOCK(); + if (!rs_initialized) + _rs_stir(); + while (datlen > 0) { + m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ); + _rs_rekey(dat, m); + dat += m; + datlen -= m; + } + _ARC4_UNLOCK(); +} + +u_int32_t +arc4random(void) +{ + u_int32_t val; + + _ARC4_LOCK(); + _rs_random_u32(&val); + _ARC4_UNLOCK(); + return val; +} + +/* + * If we are providing arc4random, then we can provide a more efficient + * arc4random_buf(). + */ +# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF +void +arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n) +{ + _ARC4_LOCK(); + _rs_random_buf(buf, n); + _ARC4_UNLOCK(); +} +# endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */ +#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ + +/* arc4random_buf() that uses platform arc4random() */ +#if !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) +void +arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n) +{ + size_t i; + u_int32_t r = 0; + char *buf = (char *)_buf; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + r = arc4random(); + buf[i] = r & 0xff; + r >>= 8; + } + explicit_bzero(&r, sizeof(r)); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */ + +#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM +/* + * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound + * avoiding "modulo bias". + * + * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one + * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This + * guarantees the selected random number will be inside + * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound) + * after reduction modulo upper_bound. + */ +u_int32_t +arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound) +{ + u_int32_t r, min; + + if (upper_bound < 2) + return 0; + + /* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */ + min = -upper_bound % upper_bound; + + /* + * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has + * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a + * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need + * to re-roll. + */ + for (;;) { + r = arc4random(); + if (r >= min) + break; + } + + return r % upper_bound; +} +#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */ + +#if 0 +/*-------- Test code for i386 --------*/ +#include +#include +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const int iter = 1000000; + int i; + pctrval v; + + v = rdtsc(); + for (i = 0; i < iter; i++) + arc4random(); + v = rdtsc() - v; + v /= iter; + + printf("%qd cycles\n", v); + exit(0); +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/base64.c b/openbsd-compat/base64.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e74667 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/base64.c @@ -0,0 +1,315 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.5 2006/10/21 09:55:03 otto Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS + * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE + * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR + * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS + * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc. + * + * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants + * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this + * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and + * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM + * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating + * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior + * permission. + * + * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit + * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to + * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System + * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software. No immunity is + * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A + * PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN + * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/base64.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if (!defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP)) || (!defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON)) + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "base64.h" + +static const char Base64[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; +static const char Pad64 = '='; + +/* (From RFC1521 and draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt) + The following encoding technique is taken from RFC 1521 by Borenstein + and Freed. It is reproduced here in a slightly edited form for + convenience. + + A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be + represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=", + is used to signify a special processing function.) + + The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output + strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a + 24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups. + These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each + of which is translated into a single digit in the base64 alphabet. + + Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable + characters. The character referenced by the index is placed in the + output string. + + Table 1: The Base64 Alphabet + + Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding + 0 A 17 R 34 i 51 z + 1 B 18 S 35 j 52 0 + 2 C 19 T 36 k 53 1 + 3 D 20 U 37 l 54 2 + 4 E 21 V 38 m 55 3 + 5 F 22 W 39 n 56 4 + 6 G 23 X 40 o 57 5 + 7 H 24 Y 41 p 58 6 + 8 I 25 Z 42 q 59 7 + 9 J 26 a 43 r 60 8 + 10 K 27 b 44 s 61 9 + 11 L 28 c 45 t 62 + + 12 M 29 d 46 u 63 / + 13 N 30 e 47 v + 14 O 31 f 48 w (pad) = + 15 P 32 g 49 x + 16 Q 33 h 50 y + + Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available + at the end of the data being encoded. A full encoding quantum is + always completed at the end of a quantity. When fewer than 24 input + bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on the + right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups. Padding at the + end of the data is performed using the '=' character. + + Since all base64 input is an integral number of octets, only the + ------------------------------------------------- + following cases can arise: + + (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral + multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded + output will be an integral multiple of 4 characters + with no "=" padding, + (2) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits; + here, the final unit of encoded output will be two + characters followed by two "=" padding characters, or + (3) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 16 bits; + here, the final unit of encoded output will be three + characters followed by one "=" padding character. + */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) +int +b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, size_t targsize) +{ + size_t datalength = 0; + u_char input[3]; + u_char output[4]; + u_int i; + + while (2 < srclength) { + input[0] = *src++; + input[1] = *src++; + input[2] = *src++; + srclength -= 3; + + output[0] = input[0] >> 2; + output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4); + output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6); + output[3] = input[2] & 0x3f; + + if (datalength + 4 > targsize) + return (-1); + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]]; + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]]; + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]]; + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[3]]; + } + + /* Now we worry about padding. */ + if (0 != srclength) { + /* Get what's left. */ + input[0] = input[1] = input[2] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < srclength; i++) + input[i] = *src++; + + output[0] = input[0] >> 2; + output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4); + output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6); + + if (datalength + 4 > targsize) + return (-1); + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]]; + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]]; + if (srclength == 1) + target[datalength++] = Pad64; + else + target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]]; + target[datalength++] = Pad64; + } + if (datalength >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[datalength] = '\0'; /* Returned value doesn't count \0. */ + return (datalength); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON) + +/* skips all whitespace anywhere. + converts characters, four at a time, starting at (or after) + src from base - 64 numbers into three 8 bit bytes in the target area. + it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or -1 on error. + */ + +int +b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize) +{ + u_int tarindex, state; + int ch; + char *pos; + + state = 0; + tarindex = 0; + + while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') { + if (isspace(ch)) /* Skip whitespace anywhere. */ + continue; + + if (ch == Pad64) + break; + + pos = strchr(Base64, ch); + if (pos == 0) /* A non-base64 character. */ + return (-1); + + switch (state) { + case 0: + if (target) { + if (tarindex >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[tarindex] = (pos - Base64) << 2; + } + state = 1; + break; + case 1: + if (target) { + if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 4; + target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x0f) + << 4 ; + } + tarindex++; + state = 2; + break; + case 2: + if (target) { + if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64) >> 2; + target[tarindex+1] = ((pos - Base64) & 0x03) + << 6; + } + tarindex++; + state = 3; + break; + case 3: + if (target) { + if (tarindex >= targsize) + return (-1); + target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64); + } + tarindex++; + state = 0; + break; + } + } + + /* + * We are done decoding Base-64 chars. Let's see if we ended + * on a byte boundary, and/or with erroneous trailing characters. + */ + + if (ch == Pad64) { /* We got a pad char. */ + ch = *src++; /* Skip it, get next. */ + switch (state) { + case 0: /* Invalid = in first position */ + case 1: /* Invalid = in second position */ + return (-1); + + case 2: /* Valid, means one byte of info */ + /* Skip any number of spaces. */ + for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++) + if (!isspace(ch)) + break; + /* Make sure there is another trailing = sign. */ + if (ch != Pad64) + return (-1); + ch = *src++; /* Skip the = */ + /* Fall through to "single trailing =" case. */ + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + + case 3: /* Valid, means two bytes of info */ + /* + * We know this char is an =. Is there anything but + * whitespace after it? + */ + for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++) + if (!isspace(ch)) + return (-1); + + /* + * Now make sure for cases 2 and 3 that the "extra" + * bits that slopped past the last full byte were + * zeros. If we don't check them, they become a + * subliminal channel. + */ + if (target && target[tarindex] != 0) + return (-1); + } + } else { + /* + * We ended by seeing the end of the string. Make sure we + * have no partial bytes lying around. + */ + if (state != 0) + return (-1); + } + + return (tarindex); +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON) */ +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/base64.h b/openbsd-compat/base64.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd77293 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/base64.h @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS + * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE + * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR + * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS + * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc. + * + * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants + * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this + * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and + * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM + * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating + * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior + * permission. + * + * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit + * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to + * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System + * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software. No immunity is + * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, + * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A + * PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN + * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + */ + +#ifndef _BSD_BASE64_H +#define _BSD_BASE64_H + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE___B64_NTOP +# ifndef HAVE_B64_NTOP +int b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, + size_t targsize); +# endif /* !HAVE_B64_NTOP */ +# define __b64_ntop(a,b,c,d) b64_ntop(a,b,c,d) +#endif /* HAVE___B64_NTOP */ + +#ifndef HAVE___B64_PTON +# ifndef HAVE_B64_PTON +int b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize); +# endif /* !HAVE_B64_PTON */ +# define __b64_pton(a,b,c) b64_pton(a,b,c) +#endif /* HAVE___B64_PTON */ + +#endif /* _BSD_BASE64_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/basename.c b/openbsd-compat/basename.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ffa5c89 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/basename.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: basename.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/basename.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME +#include +#include + +char * +basename(const char *path) +{ + static char bname[MAXPATHLEN]; + size_t len; + const char *endp, *startp; + + /* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */ + if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { + bname[0] = '.'; + bname[1] = '\0'; + return (bname); + } + + /* Strip any trailing slashes */ + endp = path + strlen(path) - 1; + while (endp > path && *endp == '/') + endp--; + + /* All slashes becomes "/" */ + if (endp == path && *endp == '/') { + bname[0] = '/'; + bname[1] = '\0'; + return (bname); + } + + /* Find the start of the base */ + startp = endp; + while (startp > path && *(startp - 1) != '/') + startp--; + + len = endp - startp + 1; + if (len >= sizeof(bname)) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return (NULL); + } + memcpy(bname, startp, len); + bname[len] = '\0'; + return (bname); +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BASENAME) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c b/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7852345 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF + +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H +# include +#endif +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H +# include +#endif + +#include "crypto_api.h" +#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH +# undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH +#endif +#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES + +#define MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) + +/* + * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash + * + * The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing + * function with the following modifications: + * 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512. + * 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits. + * 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modified + * to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite" + * 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state + * expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.) + * + * Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller + * as a performance optimization. + * + * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material + * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to + * generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an + * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user + * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the + * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a + * wise caller could do; we just do it for you. + */ + +#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8 +#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4) + +static void +bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out) +{ + blf_ctx state; + u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] = + "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"; + uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS]; + int i; + uint16_t j; + size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; + + /* key expansion */ + Blowfish_initstate(&state); + Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen); + Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen); + } + + /* encryption */ + j = 0; + for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) + cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext), + &j); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) + blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t)); + + /* copy out */ + for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) { + out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff; + out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff; + out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff; + out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff; + } + + /* zap */ + explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext)); + explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata)); + explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state)); +} + +int +bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t saltlen, + u_int8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds) +{ + u_int8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_int8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_int8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]; + u_int8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]; + u_int8_t *countsalt; + size_t i, j, amt, stride; + uint32_t count; + size_t origkeylen = keylen; + + /* nothing crazy */ + if (rounds < 1) + return -1; + if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 || + keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20) + return -1; + if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL) + return -1; + stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out); + amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride; + + memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen); + + /* collapse password */ + crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen); + + /* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */ + for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) { + countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff; + countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff; + countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff; + countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff; + + /* first round, salt is salt */ + crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4); + + bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout); + memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out)); + + for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) { + /* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */ + crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout)); + bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout); + for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++) + out[j] ^= tmpout[j]; + } + + /* + * pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly. + */ + amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen); + for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) { + size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1); + if (dest >= origkeylen) + break; + key[dest] = out[i]; + } + keylen -= i; + } + + /* zap */ + explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out)); + free(countsalt); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eeb269d --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* This file has be substantially modified from the original OpenBSD source */ + +/* $OpenBSD: bindresvport.c,v 1.17 2005/12/21 01:40:22 millert Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright 1996, Jason Downs. All rights reserved. + * Copyright 1998, Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * Copyright 2000, Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/rpc/bindresvport.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#define STARTPORT 600 +#define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) +#define NPORTS (ENDPORT - STARTPORT + 1) + +/* + * Bind a socket to a privileged IP port + */ +int +bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa) +{ + int error, af; + struct sockaddr_storage myaddr; + struct sockaddr_in *in; + struct sockaddr_in6 *in6; + u_int16_t *portp; + u_int16_t port; + socklen_t salen; + int i; + + if (sa == NULL) { + memset(&myaddr, 0, sizeof(myaddr)); + sa = (struct sockaddr *)&myaddr; + salen = sizeof(myaddr); + + if (getsockname(sd, sa, &salen) == -1) + return -1; /* errno is correctly set */ + + af = sa->sa_family; + memset(&myaddr, 0, salen); + } else + af = sa->sa_family; + + if (af == AF_INET) { + in = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + portp = &in->sin_port; + } else if (af == AF_INET6) { + in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + portp = &in6->sin6_port; + } else { + errno = EPFNOSUPPORT; + return (-1); + } + sa->sa_family = af; + + port = ntohs(*portp); + if (port == 0) + port = arc4random_uniform(NPORTS) + STARTPORT; + + /* Avoid warning */ + error = -1; + + for(i = 0; i < NPORTS; i++) { + *portp = htons(port); + + error = bind(sd, sa, salen); + + /* Terminate on success */ + if (error == 0) + break; + + /* Terminate on errors, except "address already in use" */ + if ((error < 0) && !((errno == EADDRINUSE) || (errno == EINVAL))) + break; + + port++; + if (port > ENDPORT) + port = STARTPORT; + } + + return (error); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/blf.h b/openbsd-compat/blf.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1ac5a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/blf.h @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: blf.h,v 1.7 2007/03/14 17:59:41 grunk Exp $ */ +/* + * Blowfish - a fast block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier + * + * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by Niels Provos. + * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _BLF_H_ +#define _BLF_H_ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H) + +/* Schneier specifies a maximum key length of 56 bytes. + * This ensures that every key bit affects every cipher + * bit. However, the subkeys can hold up to 72 bytes. + * Warning: For normal blowfish encryption only 56 bytes + * of the key affect all cipherbits. + */ + +#define BLF_N 16 /* Number of Subkeys */ +#define BLF_MAXKEYLEN ((BLF_N-2)*4) /* 448 bits */ +#define BLF_MAXUTILIZED ((BLF_N+2)*4) /* 576 bits */ + +/* Blowfish context */ +typedef struct BlowfishContext { + u_int32_t S[4][256]; /* S-Boxes */ + u_int32_t P[BLF_N + 2]; /* Subkeys */ +} blf_ctx; + +/* Raw access to customized Blowfish + * blf_key is just: + * Blowfish_initstate( state ) + * Blowfish_expand0state( state, key, keylen ) + */ + +void Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *); +void Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *); +void Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *); +void Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); +void Blowfish_expandstate +(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); + +/* Standard Blowfish */ + +void blf_key(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t); +void blf_enc(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t); +void blf_dec(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t); + +void blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t); +void blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t); + +void blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t); +void blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t); + +/* Converts u_int8_t to u_int32_t */ +u_int32_t Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t , u_int16_t *); + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H) */ +#endif /* _BLF_H */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c b/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e10f7e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c @@ -0,0 +1,696 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: blowfish.c,v 1.18 2004/11/02 17:23:26 hshoexer Exp $ */ +/* + * Blowfish block cipher for OpenBSD + * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * + * Implementation advice by David Mazieres . + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by Niels Provos. + * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * This code is derived from section 14.3 and the given source + * in section V of Applied Cryptography, second edition. + * Blowfish is an unpatented fast block cipher designed by + * Bruce Schneier. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \ + !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC)) + +#if 0 +#include /* used for debugging */ +#include +#endif + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H +#include +#endif + +#undef inline +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#define inline __inline +#else /* !__GNUC__ */ +#define inline +#endif /* !__GNUC__ */ + +/* Function for Feistel Networks */ + +#define F(s, x) ((((s)[ (((x)>>24)&0xFF)] \ + + (s)[0x100 + (((x)>>16)&0xFF)]) \ + ^ (s)[0x200 + (((x)>> 8)&0xFF)]) \ + + (s)[0x300 + ( (x) &0xFF)]) + +#define BLFRND(s,p,i,j,n) (i ^= F(s,j) ^ (p)[n]) + +void +Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr) +{ + u_int32_t Xl; + u_int32_t Xr; + u_int32_t *s = c->S[0]; + u_int32_t *p = c->P; + + Xl = *xl; + Xr = *xr; + + Xl ^= p[0]; + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 1); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 2); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 3); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 4); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 5); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 6); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 7); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 8); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 9); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 10); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 11); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 12); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 13); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 14); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 15); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 16); + + *xl = Xr ^ p[17]; + *xr = Xl; +} + +void +Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr) +{ + u_int32_t Xl; + u_int32_t Xr; + u_int32_t *s = c->S[0]; + u_int32_t *p = c->P; + + Xl = *xl; + Xr = *xr; + + Xl ^= p[17]; + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 16); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 15); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 14); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 13); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 12); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 11); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 10); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 9); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 8); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 7); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 6); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 5); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 4); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 3); + BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 2); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 1); + + *xl = Xr ^ p[0]; + *xr = Xl; +} + +void +Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *c) +{ + /* P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi */ + + static const blf_ctx initstate = + { { + { + 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7, + 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99, + 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16, + 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e, + 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee, + 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013, + 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef, + 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e, + 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60, + 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440, + 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce, + 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a, + 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e, + 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677, + 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193, + 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032, + 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88, + 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239, + 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e, + 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0, + 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3, + 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98, + 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88, + 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe, + 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6, + 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d, + 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b, + 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7, + 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba, + 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463, + 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f, + 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09, + 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3, + 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb, + 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279, + 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8, + 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab, + 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82, + 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db, + 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573, + 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0, + 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b, + 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790, + 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8, + 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4, + 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0, + 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7, + 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c, + 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad, + 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1, + 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299, + 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9, + 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477, + 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf, + 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49, + 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af, + 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa, + 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5, + 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41, + 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915, + 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400, + 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915, + 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664, + 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a}, + { + 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623, + 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266, + 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1, + 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e, + 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6, + 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1, + 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e, + 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1, + 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737, + 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8, + 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff, + 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd, + 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701, + 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7, + 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41, + 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331, + 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf, + 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af, + 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e, + 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87, + 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c, + 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2, + 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16, + 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd, + 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b, + 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509, + 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e, + 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3, + 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f, + 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a, + 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4, + 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960, + 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66, + 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28, + 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802, + 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84, + 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510, + 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf, + 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14, + 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e, + 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50, + 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7, + 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8, + 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281, + 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99, + 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696, + 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128, + 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73, + 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0, + 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0, + 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105, + 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250, + 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3, + 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285, + 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00, + 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061, + 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb, + 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e, + 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735, + 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc, + 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9, + 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340, + 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20, + 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7}, + { + 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934, + 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068, + 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af, + 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840, + 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45, + 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504, + 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a, + 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb, + 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee, + 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6, + 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42, + 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b, + 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2, + 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb, + 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527, + 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b, + 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33, + 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c, + 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3, + 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc, + 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17, + 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564, + 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b, + 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115, + 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922, + 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728, + 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0, + 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e, + 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37, + 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d, + 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804, + 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b, + 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3, + 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb, + 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d, + 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c, + 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350, + 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9, + 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a, + 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe, + 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d, + 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc, + 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f, + 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61, + 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2, + 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9, + 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2, + 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c, + 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e, + 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633, + 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10, + 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169, + 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52, + 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027, + 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5, + 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62, + 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634, + 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76, + 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24, + 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc, + 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4, + 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c, + 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837, + 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0}, + { + 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b, + 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe, + 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b, + 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4, + 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8, + 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6, + 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304, + 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22, + 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4, + 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6, + 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9, + 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59, + 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593, + 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51, + 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28, + 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c, + 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b, + 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28, + 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c, + 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd, + 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a, + 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319, + 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb, + 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f, + 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991, + 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32, + 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680, + 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166, + 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae, + 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb, + 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5, + 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47, + 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370, + 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d, + 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84, + 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048, + 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8, + 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd, + 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9, + 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7, + 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38, + 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f, + 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c, + 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525, + 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1, + 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442, + 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964, + 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e, + 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8, + 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d, + 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f, + 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299, + 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02, + 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc, + 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614, + 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a, + 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6, + 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b, + 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0, + 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060, + 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e, + 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9, + 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f, + 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6} + }, + { + 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344, + 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89, + 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c, + 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917, + 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b + } }; + + *c = initstate; +} + +u_int32_t +Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes, + u_int16_t *current) +{ + u_int8_t i; + u_int16_t j; + u_int32_t temp; + + temp = 0x00000000; + j = *current; + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, j++) { + if (j >= databytes) + j = 0; + temp = (temp << 8) | data[j]; + } + + *current = j; + return temp; +} + +void +Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes) +{ + u_int16_t i; + u_int16_t j; + u_int16_t k; + u_int32_t temp; + u_int32_t datal; + u_int32_t datar; + + j = 0; + for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) { + /* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */ + temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j); + c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp; + } + + j = 0; + datal = 0x00000000; + datar = 0x00000000; + for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) { + Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar); + + c->P[i] = datal; + c->P[i + 1] = datar; + } + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) { + Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar); + + c->S[i][k] = datal; + c->S[i][k + 1] = datar; + } + } +} + + +void +Blowfish_expandstate(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes, + const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes) +{ + u_int16_t i; + u_int16_t j; + u_int16_t k; + u_int32_t temp; + u_int32_t datal; + u_int32_t datar; + + j = 0; + for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) { + /* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */ + temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j); + c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp; + } + + j = 0; + datal = 0x00000000; + datar = 0x00000000; + for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) { + datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j); + datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j); + Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar); + + c->P[i] = datal; + c->P[i + 1] = datar; + } + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) { + datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j); + datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j); + Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar); + + c->S[i][k] = datal; + c->S[i][k + 1] = datar; + } + } + +} + +void +blf_key(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *k, u_int16_t len) +{ + /* Initialize S-boxes and subkeys with Pi */ + Blowfish_initstate(c); + + /* Transform S-boxes and subkeys with key */ + Blowfish_expand0state(c, k, len); +} + +void +blf_enc(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks) +{ + u_int32_t *d; + u_int16_t i; + + d = data; + for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) { + Blowfish_encipher(c, d, d + 1); + d += 2; + } +} + +void +blf_dec(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks) +{ + u_int32_t *d; + u_int16_t i; + + d = data; + for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) { + Blowfish_decipher(c, d, d + 1); + d += 2; + } +} + +void +blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len) +{ + u_int32_t l, r; + u_int32_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) { + l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; + r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; + Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r); + data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; + data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; + data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; + data[3] = l & 0xff; + data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; + data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; + data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; + data[7] = r & 0xff; + data += 8; + } +} + +void +blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len) +{ + u_int32_t l, r; + u_int32_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) { + l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; + r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; + Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r); + data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; + data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; + data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; + data[3] = l & 0xff; + data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; + data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; + data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; + data[7] = r & 0xff; + data += 8; + } +} + +void +blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iv, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len) +{ + u_int32_t l, r; + u_int32_t i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) { + for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) + data[j] ^= iv[j]; + l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; + r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; + Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r); + data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; + data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; + data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; + data[3] = l & 0xff; + data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; + data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; + data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; + data[7] = r & 0xff; + iv = data; + data += 8; + } +} + +void +blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iva, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len) +{ + u_int32_t l, r; + u_int8_t *iv; + u_int32_t i, j; + + iv = data + len - 16; + data = data + len - 8; + for (i = len - 8; i >= 8; i -= 8) { + l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; + r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; + Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r); + data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; + data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; + data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; + data[3] = l & 0xff; + data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; + data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; + data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; + data[7] = r & 0xff; + for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) + data[j] ^= iv[j]; + iv -= 8; + data -= 8; + } + l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3]; + r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7]; + Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r); + data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff; + data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff; + data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff; + data[3] = l & 0xff; + data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff; + data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff; + data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff; + data[7] = r & 0xff; + for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) + data[j] ^= iva[j]; +} + +#if 0 +void +report(u_int32_t data[], u_int16_t len) +{ + u_int16_t i; + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2) + printf("Block %0hd: %08lx %08lx.\n", + i / 2, data[i], data[i + 1]); +} +void +main(void) +{ + + blf_ctx c; + char key[] = "AAAAA"; + char key2[] = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; + + u_int32_t data[10]; + u_int32_t data2[] = + {0x424c4f57l, 0x46495348l}; + + u_int16_t i; + + /* First test */ + for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) + data[i] = i; + + blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key, 5); + blf_enc(&c, data, 5); + blf_dec(&c, data, 1); + blf_dec(&c, data + 2, 4); + printf("Should read as 0 - 9.\n"); + report(data, 10); + + /* Second test */ + blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key2, strlen(key2)); + blf_enc(&c, data2, 1); + printf("\nShould read as: 0x324ed0fe 0xf413a203.\n"); + report(data2, 2); + blf_dec(&c, data2, 1); + report(data2, 2); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \ + !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC)) */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1092772 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker. + * + * Based originally on asprintf.c from OpenBSD: + * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +/* + * Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements + * via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally. + */ +#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) +# undef HAVE_VASPRINTF +# undef HAVE_ASPRINTF +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF + +#include +#include +#include + +#define INIT_SZ 128 + +int +vasprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + int ret = -1; + va_list ap2; + char *string, *newstr; + size_t len; + + VA_COPY(ap2, ap); + if ((string = malloc(INIT_SZ)) == NULL) + goto fail; + + ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2); + if (ret >= 0 && ret < INIT_SZ) { /* succeeded with initial alloc */ + *str = string; + } else if (ret == INT_MAX || ret < 0) { /* Bad length */ + free(string); + goto fail; + } else { /* bigger than initial, realloc allowing for nul */ + len = (size_t)ret + 1; + if ((newstr = realloc(string, len)) == NULL) { + free(string); + goto fail; + } else { + va_end(ap2); + VA_COPY(ap2, ap); + ret = vsnprintf(newstr, len, fmt, ap2); + if (ret >= 0 && (size_t)ret < len) { + *str = newstr; + } else { /* failed with realloc'ed string, give up */ + free(newstr); + goto fail; + } + } + } + va_end(ap2); + return (ret); + +fail: + *str = NULL; + errno = ENOMEM; + va_end(ap2); + return (-1); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF +int asprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + + *str = NULL; + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = vasprintf(str, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + return ret; +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b56476a --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004-2005 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H +# include +# define NAMLEN(dirent) strlen((dirent)->d_name) +#else +# define dirent direct +# define NAMLEN(dirent) (dirent)->d_namlen +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H +# include +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H +# include +# endif +# ifdef HAVE_NDIR_H +# include +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef OPEN_MAX +# define OPEN_MAX 256 +#endif + +#if 0 +__unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: closefrom.c,v 1.11 2006/08/17 15:26:54 millert Exp $"; +#endif /* lint */ + +/* + * Close all file descriptors greater than or equal to lowfd. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM +void +closefrom(int lowfd) +{ + (void) fcntl(lowfd, F_CLOSEM, 0); +} +#else +void +closefrom(int lowfd) +{ + long fd, maxfd; +#if defined(HAVE_DIRFD) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PID) + char fdpath[PATH_MAX], *endp; + struct dirent *dent; + DIR *dirp; + int len; + + /* Check for a /proc/$$/fd directory. */ + len = snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/%ld/fd", (long)getpid()); + if (len > 0 && (size_t)len < sizeof(fdpath) && (dirp = opendir(fdpath))) { + while ((dent = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { + fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10); + if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' && + fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp)) + (void) close((int) fd); + } + (void) closedir(dirp); + } else +#endif + { + /* + * Fall back on sysconf() or getdtablesize(). We avoid checking + * resource limits since it is possible to open a file descriptor + * and then drop the rlimit such that it is below the open fd. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF + maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX); +#else + maxfd = getdtablesize(); +#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */ + if (maxfd < 0) + maxfd = OPEN_MAX; + + for (fd = lowfd; fd < maxfd; fd++) + (void) close((int) fd); + } +} +#endif /* !HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */ +#endif /* HAVE_CLOSEFROM */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb49e30 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv + * + * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to + * binary mode on Windows systems. + */ + +#define NO_BINARY_OPEN /* Avoid redefining open to binary_open for this file */ +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" + +int +binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + mode_t mode; + + va_start(ap, flags); + mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t); + va_end(ap); + return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode)); +} + +int +check_ntsec(const char *filename) +{ + return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS)); +} + +const char * +cygwin_ssh_privsep_user() +{ + static char cyg_privsep_user[DNLEN + UNLEN + 2]; + + if (!cyg_privsep_user[0]) + { +#ifdef CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME + if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user, + sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0) +#endif + strlcpy(cyg_privsep_user, "sshd", sizeof(cyg_privsep_user)); + } + return cyg_privsep_user; +} + +#define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1) +#define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0])) + +static struct wenv { + const char *name; + size_t namelen; +} wenv_arr[] = { + { NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") }, + { NL("COMPUTERNAME=") }, + { NL("COMSPEC=") }, + { NL("CYGWIN=") }, + { NL("OS=") }, + { NL("PATH=") }, + { NL("PATHEXT=") }, + { NL("PROGRAMFILES=") }, + { NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") }, + { NL("SYSTEMROOT=") }, + { NL("WINDIR=") } +}; + +char ** +fetch_windows_environment(void) +{ + char **e, **p; + unsigned int i, idx = 0; + + p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *)); + for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) { + for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) { + if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen)) + p[idx++] = *e; + } + } + p[idx] = NULL; + return p; +} + +void +free_windows_environment(char **p) +{ + free(p); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..202c055 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv + * + * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to + * binary mode on Windows systems. + */ + +#ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H +#define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + +#undef ERROR + +/* Avoid including windows headers. */ +typedef void *HANDLE; +#define INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ((HANDLE) -1) +#define DNLEN 16 +#define UNLEN 256 + +/* Cygwin functions for which declarations are only available when including + windows headers, so we have to define them here explicitly. */ +extern HANDLE cygwin_logon_user (const struct passwd *, const char *); +extern void cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE); + +#include +#include + +#define CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER (cygwin_ssh_privsep_user()) +const char *cygwin_ssh_privsep_user(); + +int binary_open(const char *, int , ...); +int check_ntsec(const char *); +char **fetch_windows_environment(void); +void free_windows_environment(char **); + +#ifndef NO_BINARY_OPEN +#define open binary_open +#endif + +#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ + +#endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4ed22b --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Tim Rice + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_ERR +void +err(int r, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno)); + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); + fputc('\n', stderr); + va_end(args); + exit(r); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ERRX +void +errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); + fputc('\n', stderr); + va_end(args); + exit(r); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_WARN +void +warn(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno)); + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); + fputc('\n', stderr); + va_end(args); +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-flock.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-flock.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9b15d1e --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-flock.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* $NetBSD: flock.c,v 1.6 2008/04/28 20:24:12 martin Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2001 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation + * by Todd Vierling. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Emulate flock() with fcntl(), where available. + * Otherwise, don't do locking; just pretend success. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK +#include +#include + +int +flock(int fd, int op) +{ + int rc = 0; + +#if defined(F_SETLK) && defined(F_SETLKW) + struct flock fl = {0}; + + switch (op & (LOCK_EX|LOCK_SH|LOCK_UN)) { + case LOCK_EX: + fl.l_type = F_WRLCK; + break; + + case LOCK_SH: + fl.l_type = F_RDLCK; + break; + + case LOCK_UN: + fl.l_type = F_UNLCK; + break; + + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + fl.l_whence = SEEK_SET; + rc = fcntl(fd, op & LOCK_NB ? F_SETLK : F_SETLKW, &fl); + + if (rc && (errno == EAGAIN)) + errno = EWOULDBLOCK; +#else + rc = -1; + errno = ENOSYS; +#endif + + return rc; +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-getline.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getline.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d676f4c --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getline.c @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* $NetBSD: getline.c,v 1.1.1.6 2015/01/02 20:34:27 christos Exp $ */ + +/* NetBSD: getline.c,v 1.2 2014/09/16 17:23:50 christos Exp */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2011 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation + * by Christos Zoulas. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* NETBSD ORIGINAL: external/bsd/file/dist/src/getline.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if 0 +#include "file.h" +#endif + +#if !HAVE_GETLINE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static ssize_t +getdelim(char **buf, size_t *bufsiz, int delimiter, FILE *fp) +{ + char *ptr, *eptr; + + + if (*buf == NULL || *bufsiz == 0) { + if ((*buf = malloc(BUFSIZ)) == NULL) + return -1; + *bufsiz = BUFSIZ; + } + + for (ptr = *buf, eptr = *buf + *bufsiz;;) { + int c = fgetc(fp); + if (c == -1) { + if (feof(fp)) { + ssize_t diff = (ssize_t)(ptr - *buf); + if (diff != 0) { + *ptr = '\0'; + return diff; + } + } + return -1; + } + *ptr++ = c; + if (c == delimiter) { + *ptr = '\0'; + return ptr - *buf; + } + if (ptr + 2 >= eptr) { + char *nbuf; + size_t nbufsiz = *bufsiz * 2; + ssize_t d = ptr - *buf; + if ((nbuf = realloc(*buf, nbufsiz)) == NULL) + return -1; + *buf = nbuf; + *bufsiz = nbufsiz; + eptr = nbuf + nbufsiz; + ptr = nbuf + d; + } + } +} + +ssize_t +getline(char **buf, size_t *bufsiz, FILE *fp) +{ + return getdelim(buf, bufsiz, '\n', fp); +} + +#endif + +#ifdef TEST +int +main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + char *p = NULL; + ssize_t len; + size_t n = 0; + + while ((len = getline(&p, &n, stdin)) != -1) + (void)printf("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "d %s", len, p); + free(p); + return 0; +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..416a8d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* Placed in the public domain */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE + +#include +#include + +int +getpagesize(void) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_PAGESIZE) + long r = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); + if (r > 0 && r < INT_MAX) + return (int)r; +#endif + /* + * This is at the lower end of common values and appropriate for + * our current use of getpagesize() in recallocarray(). + */ + return 4096; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_GETPAGESIZE */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f7e677 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002,2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) + +#include +#include + +#include + +#if defined(SO_PEERCRED) +int +getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid) +{ + struct ucred cred; + socklen_t len = sizeof(cred); + + if (getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &len) < 0) + return (-1); + *euid = cred.uid; + *gid = cred.gid; + + return (0); +} +#elif defined(HAVE_GETPEERUCRED) + +#ifdef HAVE_UCRED_H +# include +#endif + +int +getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid) +{ + ucred_t *ucred = NULL; + + if (getpeerucred(s, &ucred) == -1) + return (-1); + if ((*euid = ucred_geteuid(ucred)) == -1) + return (-1); + if ((*gid = ucred_getrgid(ucred)) == -1) + return (-1); + + ucred_free(ucred); + + return (0); +} +#else +int +getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid) +{ + *euid = geteuid(); + *gid = getgid(); + + return (0); +} +#endif /* defined(SO_PEERCRED) */ + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..482facd --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au). + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "config.h" +#undef malloc +#undef calloc +#undef realloc + +#include +#include + +#if defined(HAVE_MALLOC) && HAVE_MALLOC == 0 +void * +rpl_malloc(size_t size) +{ + if (size == 0) + size = 1; + return malloc(size); +} +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_CALLOC) && HAVE_CALLOC == 0 +void * +rpl_calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) +{ + if (nmemb == 0) + nmemb = 1; + if (size == 0) + size = 1; + return calloc(nmemb, size); +} +#endif + +#if defined (HAVE_REALLOC) && HAVE_REALLOC == 0 +void * +rpl_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size) +{ + if (size == 0) + size = 1; + if (ptr == 0) + return malloc(size); + return realloc(ptr, size); +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d7540a --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME +char *__progname; +#endif + +/* + * NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0] + * Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle() + */ +char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0) +{ + char *p, *q; +#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME + extern char *__progname; + + p = __progname; +#else + if (argv0 == NULL) + return ("unknown"); /* XXX */ + p = strrchr(argv0, '/'); + if (p == NULL) + p = argv0; + else + p++; +#endif + if ((q = strdup(p)) == NULL) { + perror("strdup"); + exit(1); + } + return q; +} + +#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN +int setlogin(const char *name) +{ + return (0); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */ + +#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR +int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host, + const char *user, const char *domain) +{ + return (0); +} +#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) +int seteuid(uid_t euid) +{ + return (setreuid(-1, euid)); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) +int setegid(uid_t egid) +{ + return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1)); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR) +const char *strerror(int e) +{ + extern int sys_nerr; + extern char *sys_errlist[]; + + if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr)) + return (sys_errlist[e]); + + return ("unlisted error"); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES +int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp) +{ + struct utimbuf ub; + + ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec; + ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec; + + return (utime(filename, &ub)); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE +int truncate(const char *path, off_t length) +{ + int fd, ret, saverrno; + + fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return (-1); + + ret = ftruncate(fd, length); + saverrno = errno; + close(fd); + if (ret == -1) + errno = saverrno; + + return(ret); +} +#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP) +int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem) +{ + int rc, saverrno; + extern int errno; + struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait; + + TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req) + (void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL); + rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait); + if (rc == -1) { + saverrno = errno; + (void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL); + errno = saverrno; + tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec - + (tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec); + tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec - + (tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec); + tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L; + tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L; + } else { + tremain.tv_sec = 0; + tremain.tv_usec = 0; + } + if (rem != NULL) + TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem) + + return(rc); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP) +int usleep(unsigned int useconds) +{ + struct timespec ts; + + ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000; + ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000; + return nanosleep(&ts, NULL); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP +pid_t +tcgetpgrp(int fd) +{ + int ctty_pgrp; + + if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1) + return(-1); + else + return(ctty_pgrp); +} +#endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */ + +#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK +int +tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration) +{ +# if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK) + struct timeval sleepytime; + + sleepytime.tv_sec = 0; + sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000; + if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1) + return (-1); + (void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime); + if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1) + return (-1); + return (0); +# else + return -1; +# endif +} +#endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP +char * +strdup(const char *str) +{ + size_t len; + char *cp; + + len = strlen(str) + 1; + cp = malloc(len); + if (cp != NULL) + return(memcpy(cp, str, len)); + return NULL; +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK +int +isblank(int c) +{ + return (c == ' ' || c == '\t'); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID +pid_t +getpgid(pid_t pid) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID) && GETPGRP_VOID == 0 + return getpgrp(pid); +#elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) + if (pid == 0) + return getpgrp(); +#endif + + errno = ESRCH; + return -1; +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE +int +pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC +/* a mbtowc that only supports ASCII */ +int +mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n) +{ + if (s == NULL || *s == '\0') + return 0; /* ASCII is not state-dependent */ + if (*s < 0 || *s > 0x7f || n < 1) { + errno = EOPNOTSUPP; + return -1; + } + if (pwc != NULL) + *pwc = *s; + return 1; +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_LLABS +long long +llabs(long long j) +{ + return (j < 0 ? -j : j); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_BZERO +void +bzero(void *b, size_t n) +{ + (void)memset(b, 0, n); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_RAISE +int +raise(int sig) +{ + kill(getpid(), sig); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETSID +pid_t +getsid(pid_t pid) +{ + errno = ENOSYS; + return -1; +} +#endif + +#ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG +#undef fflush +int _ssh_compat_fflush(FILE *f) +{ + int r1, r2; + + if (f == NULL) { + r1 = fflush(stdout); + r2 = fflush(stderr); + if (r1 == -1 || r2 == -1) + return -1; + return 0; + } + return fflush(f); +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52ec528 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H +#define _BSD_MISC_H + +#include "includes.h" + +char *ssh_get_progname(char *); + +#ifndef HAVE_SETSID +#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid()) +#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SETENV +int setenv(const char *, const char *, int); +#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN +int setlogin(const char *); +#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */ + +#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR +int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) +int seteuid(uid_t); +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) +int setegid(uid_t); +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR) +const char *strerror(int); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF) +#define setlinebuf(a) (setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0)) +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL +struct timeval { + long tv_sec; + long tv_usec; +} +#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */ + +int utimes(char *, struct timeval *); +#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */ + +#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE +int truncate (const char *, off_t); +#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP) +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC +struct timespec { + time_t tv_sec; + long tv_nsec; +}; +#endif +int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_USLEEP +int usleep(unsigned int useconds); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP +pid_t tcgetpgrp(int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK +int tcsendbreak(int, int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV +int unsetenv(const char *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK +int isblank(int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID +pid_t getpgid(pid_t); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT +# define endgrent() do { } while(0) +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE +# define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE +# define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) do { } while(0) +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE +int pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]); +#endif + +/* bsd-err.h */ +#ifndef HAVE_ERR +void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_ERRX +void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_WARN +void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_LLABS +long long llabs(long long); +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_BZERO) && HAVE_DECL_BZERO == 0 +void bzero(void *, size_t); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_RAISE +int raise(int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETSID +pid_t getsid(pid_t); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK +# define LOCK_SH 0x01 +# define LOCK_EX 0x02 +# define LOCK_NB 0x04 +# define LOCK_UN 0x08 +int flock(int, int); +#endif + +#ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG +# define fflush(x) (_ssh_compat_fflush(x)) +#endif + +#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d52443f --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_NEXT +#include +#include +#include "bsd-nextstep.h" + +pid_t +posix_wait(int *status) +{ + union wait statusp; + pid_t wait_pid; + + #undef wait /* Use NeXT's wait() function */ + wait_pid = wait(&statusp); + if (status) + *status = (int) statusp.w_status; + + return (wait_pid); +} + +int +tcgetattr(int fd, struct termios *t) +{ + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCGETA, t)); +} + +int +tcsetattr(int fd, int opt, const struct termios *t) +{ + struct termios localterm; + + if (opt & TCSASOFT) { + localterm = *t; + localterm.c_cflag |= CIGNORE; + t = &localterm; + } + switch (opt & ~TCSASOFT) { + case TCSANOW: + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETA, t)); + case TCSADRAIN: + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAW, t)); + case TCSAFLUSH: + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAF, t)); + default: + errno = EINVAL; + return (-1); + } +} + +int tcsetpgrp(int fd, pid_t pgrp) +{ + return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSPGRP, &pgrp)); +} + +speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *t) +{ + return (t->c_ospeed); +} + +speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *t) +{ + return (t->c_ispeed); +} + +int +cfsetospeed(struct termios *t,int speed) +{ + t->c_ospeed = speed; + return (0); +} + +int +cfsetispeed(struct termios *t, int speed) +{ + t->c_ispeed = speed; + return (0); +} +#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a45b15 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifndef _NEXT_POSIX_H +#define _NEXT_POSIX_H + +#ifdef HAVE_NEXT +#include + +/* NGROUPS_MAX is behind -lposix. Use the BSD version which is NGROUPS */ +#undef NGROUPS_MAX +#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS + +/* NeXT's readdir() is BSD (struct direct) not POSIX (struct dirent) */ +#define dirent direct + +/* Swap out NeXT's BSD wait() for a more POSIX compliant one */ +pid_t posix_wait(int *); +#define wait(a) posix_wait(a) + +/* #ifdef wrapped functions that need defining for clean compiling */ +pid_t getppid(void); +void vhangup(void); +int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); + +/* TERMCAP */ +int tcgetattr(int, struct termios *); +int tcsetattr(int, int, const struct termios *); +int tcsetpgrp(int, pid_t); +speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *); +speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *); +int cfsetospeed(struct termios *, int); +int cfsetispeed(struct termios *, int); +#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */ +#endif /* _NEXT_POSIX_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8ad542 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +/* + * Please note: this implementation of openpty() is far from complete. + * it is just enough for portable OpenSSH's needs. + */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#if !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) + +#include + +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include +#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */ + +#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H +# include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H) +# include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef O_NOCTTY +#define O_NOCTTY 0 +#endif + +int +openpty(int *amaster, int *aslave, char *name, struct termios *termp, + struct winsize *winp) +{ +#if defined(HAVE__GETPTY) + /* + * _getpty(3) exists in SGI Irix 4.x, 5.x & 6.x -- it generates more + * pty's automagically when needed + */ + char *slave; + + if ((slave = _getpty(amaster, O_RDWR, 0622, 0)) == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* Open the slave side. */ + if ((*aslave = open(slave, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { + close(*amaster); + return (-1); + } + return (0); + +#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) + /* + * This code is used e.g. on Solaris 2.x. (Note that Solaris 2.3 + * also has bsd-style ptys, but they simply do not work.) + */ + int ptm; + char *pts; + mysig_t old_signal; + + if ((ptm = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) + return (-1); + + /* XXX: need to close ptm on error? */ + old_signal = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + if (grantpt(ptm) < 0) + return (-1); + signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal); + + if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0) + return (-1); + + if ((pts = ptsname(ptm)) == NULL) + return (-1); + *amaster = ptm; + + /* Open the slave side. */ + if ((*aslave = open(pts, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { + close(*amaster); + return (-1); + } + + /* + * Try to push the appropriate streams modules, as described + * in Solaris pts(7). + */ + ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ptem"); + ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ldterm"); +# ifndef __hpux + ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ttcompat"); +# endif /* __hpux */ + + return (0); + +#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC) + /* AIX-style pty code. */ + const char *ttname; + + if ((*amaster = open("/dev/ptc", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) + return (-1); + if ((ttname = ttyname(*amaster)) == NULL) + return (-1); + if ((*aslave = open(ttname, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { + close(*amaster); + return (-1); + } + return (0); + +#else + /* BSD-style pty code. */ + char ptbuf[64], ttbuf[64]; + int i; + const char *ptymajors = "pqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmno" + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"; + const char *ptyminors = "0123456789abcdef"; + int num_minors = strlen(ptyminors); + int num_ptys = strlen(ptymajors) * num_minors; + struct termios tio; + + for (i = 0; i < num_ptys; i++) { + snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/pty%c%c", + ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]); + snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/tty%c%c", + ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]); + + if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { + /* Try SCO style naming */ + snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/ptyp%d", i); + snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/ttyp%d", i); + if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) + continue; + } + + /* Open the slave side. */ + if ((*aslave = open(ttbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) { + close(*amaster); + return (-1); + } + /* set tty modes to a sane state for broken clients */ + if (tcgetattr(*amaster, &tio) != -1) { + tio.c_lflag |= (ECHO | ISIG | ICANON); + tio.c_oflag |= (OPOST | ONLCR); + tio.c_iflag |= ICRNL; + tcsetattr(*amaster, TCSANOW, &tio); + } + + return (0); + } + return (-1); +#endif +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8e6222 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005, 2007 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au). + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include "bsd-poll.h" + +/* + * A minimal implementation of poll(2), built on top of select(2). + * + * Only supports POLLIN and POLLOUT flags in pfd.events, and POLLIN, POLLOUT + * and POLLERR flags in revents. + * + * Supports pfd.fd = -1 meaning "unused" although it's not standard. + */ + +int +poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout) +{ + nfds_t i; + int saved_errno, ret, fd, maxfd = 0; + fd_set *readfds = NULL, *writefds = NULL, *exceptfds = NULL; + size_t nmemb; + struct timeval tv, *tvp = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) { + fd = fds[i].fd; + if (fd >= FD_SETSIZE) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + maxfd = MAX(maxfd, fd); + } + + nmemb = howmany(maxfd + 1 , NFDBITS); + if ((readfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL || + (writefds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL || + (exceptfds = calloc(nmemb, sizeof(fd_mask))) == NULL) { + saved_errno = ENOMEM; + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + + /* populate event bit vectors for the events we're interested in */ + for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) { + fd = fds[i].fd; + if (fd == -1) + continue; + if (fds[i].events & POLLIN) { + FD_SET(fd, readfds); + FD_SET(fd, exceptfds); + } + if (fds[i].events & POLLOUT) { + FD_SET(fd, writefds); + FD_SET(fd, exceptfds); + } + } + + /* poll timeout is msec, select is timeval (sec + usec) */ + if (timeout >= 0) { + tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; + tvp = &tv; + } + + ret = select(maxfd + 1, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp); + saved_errno = errno; + + /* scan through select results and set poll() flags */ + for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) { + fd = fds[i].fd; + fds[i].revents = 0; + if (fd == -1) + continue; + if (FD_ISSET(fd, readfds)) { + fds[i].revents |= POLLIN; + } + if (FD_ISSET(fd, writefds)) { + fds[i].revents |= POLLOUT; + } + if (FD_ISSET(fd, exceptfds)) { + fds[i].revents |= POLLERR; + } + } + +out: + free(readfds); + free(writefds); + free(exceptfds); + if (ret == -1) + errno = saved_errno; + return ret; +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17945f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) && !defined(HAVE_POLL_H) +#ifndef _COMPAT_POLL_H_ +#define _COMPAT_POLL_H_ + +typedef struct pollfd { + int fd; + short events; + short revents; +} pollfd_t; + +typedef unsigned int nfds_t; + +#define POLLIN 0x0001 +#define POLLOUT 0x0004 +#define POLLERR 0x0008 +#define POLLHUP 0x0010 +#define POLLNVAL 0x0020 +#if 0 +/* the following are currently not implemented */ +#define POLLPRI 0x0002 +#define POLLRDNORM 0x0040 +#define POLLNORM POLLRDNORM +#define POLLWRNORM POLLOUT +#define POLLRDBAND 0x0080 +#define POLLWRBAND 0x0100 +#endif + +#define INFTIM (-1) /* not standard */ + +int poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int); +#endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */ +#endif /* !HAVE_POLL_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..696ae7b --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au). + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID) +int +setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid) +{ + int ret = 0, saved_errno; + + if (rgid != sgid) { + errno = ENOSYS; + return -1; + } +#if defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID) + if (setregid(rgid, egid) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("setregid %u: %.100s", rgid, strerror(errno)); + errno = saved_errno; + ret = -1; + } +#else + if (setegid(egid) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)egid, strerror(errno)); + errno = saved_errno; + ret = -1; + } + if (setgid(rgid) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("setgid %u: %.100s", rgid, strerror(errno)); + errno = saved_errno; + ret = -1; + } +#endif + return ret; +} +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID) +int +setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid) +{ + int ret = 0, saved_errno; + + if (ruid != suid) { + errno = ENOSYS; + return -1; + } +#if defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID) + if (setreuid(ruid, euid) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("setreuid %u: %.100s", ruid, strerror(errno)); + errno = saved_errno; + ret = -1; + } +#else + +# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID + if (seteuid(euid) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("seteuid %u: %.100s", euid, strerror(errno)); + errno = saved_errno; + ret = -1; + } +# endif + if (setuid(ruid) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("setuid %u: %.100s", ruid, strerror(errno)); + errno = saved_errno; + ret = -1; + } +#endif + return ret; +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0350a59 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au). + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SETRESGID +int setresgid(gid_t, gid_t, gid_t); +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_SETRESUID +int setresuid(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t); +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..979010e --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h" + +#undef signal + +mysig_t +mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION + struct sigaction sa, osa; + + if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1) + return (mysig_t) -1; + if (osa.sa_handler != act) { + memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; +#ifdef SA_INTERRUPT + if (sig == SIGALRM) + sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT; +#endif + sa.sa_handler = act; + if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1) + return (mysig_t) -1; + } + return (osa.sa_handler); +#else + return (signal(sig, act)); +#endif +} + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL) +char *strsignal(int sig) +{ + static char buf[16]; + + (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", sig); + return buf; +} +#endif + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4cb8cb7 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _BSD_SIGNAL_H +#define _BSD_SIGNAL_H + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef _NSIG +# ifdef NSIG +# define _NSIG NSIG +# else +# define _NSIG 128 +# endif +#endif + +/* wrapper for signal interface */ +typedef void (*mysig_t)(int); +mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act); +#define signal(a,b) mysignal(a,b) + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL) +char *strsignal(int); +#endif + +#endif /* _BSD_SIGNAL_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f27b9d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c @@ -0,0 +1,880 @@ +/* + * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995 + * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell@astart.com) + * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact + * on all source code distributions + */ + +/************************************************************** + * Original: + * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995 + * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included. + * Sigh. This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with. Note that + * the version here does not include floating point... + * + * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks + * for string length. This covers a nasty loophole. + * + * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from + * causing nast effects. + * + * More Recently: + * Brandon Long 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43 + * This was ugly. It is still ugly. I opted out of floating point + * numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything + * from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from + * the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page. + * + * Brandon Long 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1 + * Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this + * probably requires libm on most operating systems. Don't yet + * support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G). Also, fmtint() + * was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways + * which showed it, so that's been fixed. Also, formatted the code + * to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the + * original. Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with: + * gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm + * and run snprintf for results. + * + * Thomas Roessler 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i + * The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats. + * Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work. + * + * Michael Elkins 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8 + * The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were + * missing. Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so + * the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF. + * + * Andrew Tridgell (tridge@samba.org) Oct 1998 + * fixed handling of %.0f + * added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE + * + * tridge@samba.org, idra@samba.org, April 2001 + * got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder) + * added C99 semantics + * + * date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31; author: herb; state: Exp; lines: +2 -0 + * actually print args for %g and %e + * + * date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +8 -0 + * Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here. I don't + * see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it + * locally. Fixes AIX and Solaris builds. + * + * date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24; author: tridge; state: Exp; lines: +5 -13 + * put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of + * functions + * + * date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +21 -4 + * Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg. Use __va_copy before using it + * when it exists. + * + * date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04; author: idra; state: Exp; lines: +20 -14 + * Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp. + * Thanks to Ollie Oldham for spotting it. + * few mods to make it easier to compile the tests. + * addedd the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones. + * + * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) April 2003 + * Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source + * tree with less trouble. + * Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition. + * + * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) May 2003 + * Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings. + * + * Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even + * if the C library has some snprintf functions already. + * + * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org) Jan 2007 + * Fix integer overflows in return value. + * Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch() + * + **************************************************************/ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) /* For those with broken snprintf() */ +# undef HAVE_SNPRINTF +# undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE +# define LDOUBLE long double +#else +# define LDOUBLE double +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG +# define LLONG long long +#else +# define LLONG long +#endif + +/* + * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf + */ + +/* format read states */ +#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0 +#define DP_S_FLAGS 1 +#define DP_S_MIN 2 +#define DP_S_DOT 3 +#define DP_S_MAX 4 +#define DP_S_MOD 5 +#define DP_S_CONV 6 +#define DP_S_DONE 7 + +/* format flags - Bits */ +#define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0) +#define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1) +#define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2) +#define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3) +#define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4) +#define DP_F_UP (1 << 5) +#define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6) + +/* Conversion Flags */ +#define DP_C_SHORT 1 +#define DP_C_LONG 2 +#define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3 +#define DP_C_LLONG 4 +#define DP_C_SIZE 5 +#define DP_C_INTMAX 6 + +#define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0') +#ifndef MAX +# define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q)) +#endif + +#define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \ + do { \ + if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \ + errno = ERANGE; \ + return -1; \ + } \ + if (pos < buflen) \ + buf[pos] = thechar; \ + (pos)++; \ + } while (0) + +static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, + va_list args_in); +static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, + char *value, int flags, int min, int max); +static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, + intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags); +static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, + LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags); + +static int +dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in) +{ + char ch; + intmax_t value; + LDOUBLE fvalue; + char *strvalue; + int min; + int max; + int state; + int flags; + int cflags; + size_t currlen; + va_list args; + + VA_COPY(args, args_in); + + state = DP_S_DEFAULT; + currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0; + max = -1; + ch = *format++; + + while (state != DP_S_DONE) { + if (ch == '\0') + state = DP_S_DONE; + + switch(state) { + case DP_S_DEFAULT: + if (ch == '%') + state = DP_S_FLAGS; + else + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch); + ch = *format++; + break; + case DP_S_FLAGS: + switch (ch) { + case '-': + flags |= DP_F_MINUS; + ch = *format++; + break; + case '+': + flags |= DP_F_PLUS; + ch = *format++; + break; + case ' ': + flags |= DP_F_SPACE; + ch = *format++; + break; + case '#': + flags |= DP_F_NUM; + ch = *format++; + break; + case '0': + flags |= DP_F_ZERO; + ch = *format++; + break; + default: + state = DP_S_MIN; + break; + } + break; + case DP_S_MIN: + if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { + min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch); + ch = *format++; + } else if (ch == '*') { + min = va_arg (args, int); + ch = *format++; + state = DP_S_DOT; + } else { + state = DP_S_DOT; + } + break; + case DP_S_DOT: + if (ch == '.') { + state = DP_S_MAX; + ch = *format++; + } else { + state = DP_S_MOD; + } + break; + case DP_S_MAX: + if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { + if (max < 0) + max = 0; + max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch); + ch = *format++; + } else if (ch == '*') { + max = va_arg (args, int); + ch = *format++; + state = DP_S_MOD; + } else { + state = DP_S_MOD; + } + break; + case DP_S_MOD: + switch (ch) { + case 'h': + cflags = DP_C_SHORT; + ch = *format++; + break; + case 'j': + cflags = DP_C_INTMAX; + ch = *format++; + break; + case 'l': + cflags = DP_C_LONG; + ch = *format++; + if (ch == 'l') { /* It's a long long */ + cflags = DP_C_LLONG; + ch = *format++; + } + break; + case 'L': + cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE; + ch = *format++; + break; + case 'z': + cflags = DP_C_SIZE; + ch = *format++; + break; + default: + break; + } + state = DP_S_CONV; + break; + case DP_S_CONV: + switch (ch) { + case 'd': + case 'i': + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) + value = va_arg (args, int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) + value = va_arg (args, long int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) + value = va_arg (args, LLONG); + else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) + value = va_arg (args, ssize_t); + else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) + value = va_arg (args, intmax_t); + else + value = va_arg (args, int); + if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, + value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1) + return -1; + break; + case 'o': + flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) + value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) + value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) + value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); + else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) + value = va_arg (args, size_t); +#ifdef notyet + else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) + value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); +#endif + else + value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); + if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, + 8, min, max, flags) == -1) + return -1; + break; + case 'u': + flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) + value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) + value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) + value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); + else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) + value = va_arg (args, size_t); +#ifdef notyet + else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) + value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); +#endif + else + value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); + if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, + 10, min, max, flags) == -1) + return -1; + break; + case 'X': + flags |= DP_F_UP; + case 'x': + flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) + value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) + value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); + else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) + value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); + else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) + value = va_arg (args, size_t); +#ifdef notyet + else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) + value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); +#endif + else + value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); + if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, + 16, min, max, flags) == -1) + return -1; + break; + case 'f': + if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) + fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); + else + fvalue = va_arg (args, double); + if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, + min, max, flags) == -1) + return -1; + break; + case 'E': + flags |= DP_F_UP; + case 'e': + if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) + fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); + else + fvalue = va_arg (args, double); + if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, + min, max, flags) == -1) + return -1; + break; + case 'G': + flags |= DP_F_UP; + case 'g': + if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) + fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); + else + fvalue = va_arg (args, double); + if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, + min, max, flags) == -1) + return -1; + break; + case 'c': + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, + va_arg (args, int)); + break; + case 's': + strvalue = va_arg (args, char *); + if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)"; + if (max == -1) { + max = strlen(strvalue); + } + if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min; + if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, + strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1) + return -1; + break; + case 'p': + strvalue = va_arg (args, void *); + if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, + (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1) + return -1; + break; +#if we_dont_want_this_in_openssh + case 'n': + if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) { + short int *num; + num = va_arg (args, short int *); + *num = currlen; + } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { + long int *num; + num = va_arg (args, long int *); + *num = (long int)currlen; + } else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) { + LLONG *num; + num = va_arg (args, LLONG *); + *num = (LLONG)currlen; + } else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) { + ssize_t *num; + num = va_arg (args, ssize_t *); + *num = (ssize_t)currlen; + } else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) { + intmax_t *num; + num = va_arg (args, intmax_t *); + *num = (intmax_t)currlen; + } else { + int *num; + num = va_arg (args, int *); + *num = currlen; + } + break; +#endif + case '%': + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch); + break; + case 'w': + /* not supported yet, treat as next char */ + ch = *format++; + break; + default: + /* Unknown, skip */ + break; + } + ch = *format++; + state = DP_S_DEFAULT; + flags = cflags = min = 0; + max = -1; + break; + case DP_S_DONE: + break; + default: + /* hmm? */ + break; /* some picky compilers need this */ + } + } + if (maxlen != 0) { + if (currlen < maxlen - 1) + buffer[currlen] = '\0'; + else if (maxlen > 0) + buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0'; + } + + return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1; +} + +static int +fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, + char *value, int flags, int min, int max) +{ + int padlen, strln; /* amount to pad */ + int cnt = 0; + +#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF + printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value); +#endif + if (value == 0) { + value = ""; + } + + for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */ + padlen = min - strln; + if (padlen < 0) + padlen = 0; + if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) + padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */ + + while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); + --padlen; + ++cnt; + } + while (*value && (cnt < max)) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value); + value++; + ++cnt; + } + while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); + ++padlen; + ++cnt; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */ + +static int +fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, + intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags) +{ + int signvalue = 0; + unsigned LLONG uvalue; + char convert[20]; + int place = 0; + int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */ + int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */ + int caps = 0; + + if (max < 0) + max = 0; + + uvalue = value; + + if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) { + if( value < 0 ) { + signvalue = '-'; + uvalue = -value; + } else { + if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */ + signvalue = '+'; + else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) + signvalue = ' '; + } + } + + if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */ + + do { + convert[place++] = + (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef") + [uvalue % (unsigned)base ]; + uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base ); + } while(uvalue && (place < 20)); + if (place == 20) place--; + convert[place] = 0; + + zpadlen = max - place; + spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0); + if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; + if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0; + if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) { + zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen); + spadlen = 0; + } + if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) + spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */ + +#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF + printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n", + zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place); +#endif + + /* Spaces */ + while (spadlen > 0) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); + --spadlen; + } + + /* Sign */ + if (signvalue) + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); + + /* Zeros */ + if (zpadlen > 0) { + while (zpadlen > 0) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); + --zpadlen; + } + } + + /* Digits */ + while (place > 0) { + --place; + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]); + } + + /* Left Justified spaces */ + while (spadlen < 0) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); + ++spadlen; + } + return 0; +} + +static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value) +{ + LDOUBLE result = value; + + if (value < 0) + result = -value; + + return result; +} + +static LDOUBLE POW10(int val) +{ + LDOUBLE result = 1; + + while (val) { + result *= 10; + val--; + } + + return result; +} + +static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value) +{ + LLONG intpart; + + intpart = (LLONG)value; + value = value - intpart; + if (value >= 0.5) intpart++; + + return intpart; +} + +/* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should + be portable, but slow */ +static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr) +{ + int i; + long l; + double x = x0; + double f = 1.0; + + for (i=0;i<100;i++) { + l = (long)x; + if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break; + x *= 0.1; + f *= 10.0; + } + + if (i == 100) { + /* + * yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle. + * What do we do? + */ + (*iptr) = 0; + return 0; + } + + if (i != 0) { + double i2; + double ret; + + ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2); + (*iptr) = l*f + i2; + return ret; + } + + (*iptr) = l; + return x - (*iptr); +} + + +static int +fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, + LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags) +{ + int signvalue = 0; + double ufvalue; + char iconvert[311]; + char fconvert[311]; + int iplace = 0; + int fplace = 0; + int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */ + int zpadlen = 0; + int caps = 0; + int idx; + double intpart; + double fracpart; + double temp; + + /* + * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default + * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6 + */ + if (max < 0) + max = 6; + + ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue); + + if (fvalue < 0) { + signvalue = '-'; + } else { + if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */ + signvalue = '+'; + } else { + if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) + signvalue = ' '; + } + } + +#if 0 + if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */ +#endif + +#if 0 + if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */ +#endif + + /* + * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our + * conversion method + */ + if (max > 16) + max = 16; + + /* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by + * multiplying by a factor of 10 + */ + + temp = ufvalue; + my_modf(temp, &intpart); + + fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart)); + + if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) { + intpart++; + fracpart -= POW10(max); + } + + /* Convert integer part */ + do { + temp = intpart*0.1; + my_modf(temp, &intpart); + idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0); + /* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */ + /* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */ + iconvert[iplace++] = + (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx]; + } while (intpart && (iplace < 311)); + if (iplace == 311) iplace--; + iconvert[iplace] = 0; + + /* Convert fractional part */ + if (fracpart) + { + do { + temp = fracpart*0.1; + my_modf(temp, &fracpart); + idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0); + /* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */ + /* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */ + fconvert[fplace++] = + (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx]; + } while(fracpart && (fplace < 311)); + if (fplace == 311) fplace--; + } + fconvert[fplace] = 0; + + /* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */ + padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); + zpadlen = max - fplace; + if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; + if (padlen < 0) + padlen = 0; + if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) + padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */ + + if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) { + if (signvalue) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); + --padlen; + signvalue = 0; + } + while (padlen > 0) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); + --padlen; + } + } + while (padlen > 0) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); + --padlen; + } + if (signvalue) + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); + + while (iplace > 0) { + --iplace; + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]); + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF + printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen); +#endif + + /* + * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct + * char to print out. + */ + if (max > 0) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.'); + + while (zpadlen > 0) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); + --zpadlen; + } + + while (fplace > 0) { + --fplace; + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]); + } + } + + while (padlen < 0) { + DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); + ++padlen; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) +int +vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args) +{ + return dopr(str, count, fmt, args); +} +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) +int +snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...) +{ + size_t ret; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3bd87d --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS) + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H +# include +#endif + +#include + +#ifndef MNAMELEN +# define MNAMELEN 32 +#endif + +static void +copy_statfs_to_statvfs(struct statvfs *to, struct statfs *from) +{ + to->f_bsize = from->f_bsize; + to->f_frsize = from->f_bsize; /* no exact equivalent */ + to->f_blocks = from->f_blocks; + to->f_bfree = from->f_bfree; + to->f_bavail = from->f_bavail; + to->f_files = from->f_files; + to->f_ffree = from->f_ffree; + to->f_favail = from->f_ffree; /* no exact equivalent */ + to->f_fsid = 0; /* XXX fix me */ +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS + to->f_flag = from->f_flags; +#else + to->f_flag = 0; +#endif + to->f_namemax = MNAMELEN; +} + +# ifndef HAVE_STATVFS +int statvfs(const char *path, struct statvfs *buf) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_STATFS + struct statfs fs; + + memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs)); + if (statfs(path, &fs) == -1) + return -1; + copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs); + return 0; +# else + errno = ENOSYS; + return -1; +# endif +} +# endif + +# ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS +int fstatvfs(int fd, struct statvfs *buf) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_FSTATFS + struct statfs fs; + + memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs)); + if (fstatfs(fd, &fs) == -1) + return -1; + copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs); + return 0; +# else + errno = ENOSYS; + return -1; +# endif +} +# endif + +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2a4c15 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS) + +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H +#include +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T +typedef unsigned long fsblkcnt_t; +#endif +#ifndef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T +typedef unsigned long fsfilcnt_t; +#endif + +#ifndef ST_RDONLY +#define ST_RDONLY 1 +#endif +#ifndef ST_NOSUID +#define ST_NOSUID 2 +#endif + + /* as defined in IEEE Std 1003.1, 2004 Edition */ +struct statvfs { + unsigned long f_bsize; /* File system block size. */ + unsigned long f_frsize; /* Fundamental file system block size. */ + fsblkcnt_t f_blocks; /* Total number of blocks on file system in */ + /* units of f_frsize. */ + fsblkcnt_t f_bfree; /* Total number of free blocks. */ + fsblkcnt_t f_bavail; /* Number of free blocks available to */ + /* non-privileged process. */ + fsfilcnt_t f_files; /* Total number of file serial numbers. */ + fsfilcnt_t f_ffree; /* Total number of free file serial numbers. */ + fsfilcnt_t f_favail; /* Number of file serial numbers available to */ + /* non-privileged process. */ + unsigned long f_fsid; /* File system ID. */ + unsigned long f_flag; /* BBit mask of f_flag values. */ + unsigned long f_namemax;/* Maximum filename length. */ +}; +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STATVFS +int statvfs(const char *, struct statvfs *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS +int fstatvfs(int, struct statvfs *); +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..113fb1e --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID +#include +#include +#include "bsd-waitpid.h" + +pid_t +waitpid(int pid, int *stat_loc, int options) +{ + union wait statusp; + pid_t wait_pid; + + if (pid <= 0) { + if (pid != -1) { + errno = EINVAL; + return (-1); + } + /* wait4() wants pid=0 for indiscriminate wait. */ + pid = 0; + } + wait_pid = wait4(pid, &statusp, options, NULL); + if (stat_loc) + *stat_loc = (int) statusp.w_status; + + return (wait_pid); +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b551268 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifndef _BSD_WAITPID_H +#define _BSD_WAITPID_H + +#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID +/* Clean out any potential issues */ +#undef WIFEXITED +#undef WIFSTOPPED +#undef WIFSIGNALED + +/* Define required functions to mimic a POSIX look and feel */ +#define _W_INT(w) (*(int*)&(w)) /* convert union wait to int */ +#define WIFEXITED(w) (!((_W_INT(w)) & 0377)) +#define WIFSTOPPED(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & 0100) +#define WIFSIGNALED(w) (!WIFEXITED(w) && !WIFSTOPPED(w)) +#define WEXITSTATUS(w) (int)(WIFEXITED(w) ? ((_W_INT(w) >> 8) & 0377) : -1) +#define WTERMSIG(w) (int)(WIFSIGNALED(w) ? (_W_INT(w) & 0177) : -1) +#define WCOREFLAG 0x80 +#define WCOREDUMP(w) ((_W_INT(w)) & WCOREFLAG) + +/* Prototype */ +pid_t waitpid(int, int *, int); + +#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */ +#endif /* _BSD_WAITPID_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h b/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c3680f --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +/* +chacha-merged.c version 20080118 +D. J. Bernstein +Public domain. +*/ + +/* $OpenBSD: chacha_private.h,v 1.2 2013/10/04 07:02:27 djm Exp $ */ + +typedef unsigned char u8; +typedef unsigned int u32; + +typedef struct +{ + u32 input[16]; /* could be compressed */ +} chacha_ctx; + +#define U8C(v) (v##U) +#define U32C(v) (v##U) + +#define U8V(v) ((u8)(v) & U8C(0xFF)) +#define U32V(v) ((u32)(v) & U32C(0xFFFFFFFF)) + +#define ROTL32(v, n) \ + (U32V((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n)))) + +#define U8TO32_LITTLE(p) \ + (((u32)((p)[0]) ) | \ + ((u32)((p)[1]) << 8) | \ + ((u32)((p)[2]) << 16) | \ + ((u32)((p)[3]) << 24)) + +#define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) \ + do { \ + (p)[0] = U8V((v) ); \ + (p)[1] = U8V((v) >> 8); \ + (p)[2] = U8V((v) >> 16); \ + (p)[3] = U8V((v) >> 24); \ + } while (0) + +#define ROTATE(v,c) (ROTL32(v,c)) +#define XOR(v,w) ((v) ^ (w)) +#define PLUS(v,w) (U32V((v) + (w))) +#define PLUSONE(v) (PLUS((v),1)) + +#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \ + a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a),16); \ + c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c),12); \ + a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a), 8); \ + c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c), 7); + +static const char sigma[16] = "expand 32-byte k"; +static const char tau[16] = "expand 16-byte k"; + +static void +chacha_keysetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits) +{ + const char *constants; + + x->input[4] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); + x->input[5] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); + x->input[6] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); + x->input[7] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); + if (kbits == 256) { /* recommended */ + k += 16; + constants = sigma; + } else { /* kbits == 128 */ + constants = tau; + } + x->input[8] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0); + x->input[9] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4); + x->input[10] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8); + x->input[11] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12); + x->input[0] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 0); + x->input[1] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 4); + x->input[2] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 8); + x->input[3] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 12); +} + +static void +chacha_ivsetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *iv) +{ + x->input[12] = 0; + x->input[13] = 0; + x->input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 0); + x->input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 4); +} + +static void +chacha_encrypt_bytes(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes) +{ + u32 x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15; + u32 j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7, j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15; + u8 *ctarget = NULL; + u8 tmp[64]; + u_int i; + + if (!bytes) return; + + j0 = x->input[0]; + j1 = x->input[1]; + j2 = x->input[2]; + j3 = x->input[3]; + j4 = x->input[4]; + j5 = x->input[5]; + j6 = x->input[6]; + j7 = x->input[7]; + j8 = x->input[8]; + j9 = x->input[9]; + j10 = x->input[10]; + j11 = x->input[11]; + j12 = x->input[12]; + j13 = x->input[13]; + j14 = x->input[14]; + j15 = x->input[15]; + + for (;;) { + if (bytes < 64) { + for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) tmp[i] = m[i]; + m = tmp; + ctarget = c; + c = tmp; + } + x0 = j0; + x1 = j1; + x2 = j2; + x3 = j3; + x4 = j4; + x5 = j5; + x6 = j6; + x7 = j7; + x8 = j8; + x9 = j9; + x10 = j10; + x11 = j11; + x12 = j12; + x13 = j13; + x14 = j14; + x15 = j15; + for (i = 20;i > 0;i -= 2) { + QUARTERROUND( x0, x4, x8,x12) + QUARTERROUND( x1, x5, x9,x13) + QUARTERROUND( x2, x6,x10,x14) + QUARTERROUND( x3, x7,x11,x15) + QUARTERROUND( x0, x5,x10,x15) + QUARTERROUND( x1, x6,x11,x12) + QUARTERROUND( x2, x7, x8,x13) + QUARTERROUND( x3, x4, x9,x14) + } + x0 = PLUS(x0,j0); + x1 = PLUS(x1,j1); + x2 = PLUS(x2,j2); + x3 = PLUS(x3,j3); + x4 = PLUS(x4,j4); + x5 = PLUS(x5,j5); + x6 = PLUS(x6,j6); + x7 = PLUS(x7,j7); + x8 = PLUS(x8,j8); + x9 = PLUS(x9,j9); + x10 = PLUS(x10,j10); + x11 = PLUS(x11,j11); + x12 = PLUS(x12,j12); + x13 = PLUS(x13,j13); + x14 = PLUS(x14,j14); + x15 = PLUS(x15,j15); + +#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY + x0 = XOR(x0,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 0)); + x1 = XOR(x1,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 4)); + x2 = XOR(x2,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 8)); + x3 = XOR(x3,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 12)); + x4 = XOR(x4,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 16)); + x5 = XOR(x5,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 20)); + x6 = XOR(x6,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 24)); + x7 = XOR(x7,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 28)); + x8 = XOR(x8,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 32)); + x9 = XOR(x9,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 36)); + x10 = XOR(x10,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 40)); + x11 = XOR(x11,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 44)); + x12 = XOR(x12,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 48)); + x13 = XOR(x13,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 52)); + x14 = XOR(x14,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 56)); + x15 = XOR(x15,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 60)); +#endif + + j12 = PLUSONE(j12); + if (!j12) { + j13 = PLUSONE(j13); + /* stopping at 2^70 bytes per nonce is user's responsibility */ + } + + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 0,x0); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 4,x1); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 8,x2); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 12,x3); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 16,x4); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 20,x5); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 24,x6); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 28,x7); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 32,x8); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 36,x9); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 40,x10); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 44,x11); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 48,x12); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 52,x13); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 56,x14); + U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 60,x15); + + if (bytes <= 64) { + if (bytes < 64) { + for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) ctarget[i] = c[i]; + } + x->input[12] = j12; + x->input[13] = j13; + return; + } + bytes -= 64; + c += 64; +#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY + m += 64; +#endif + } +} diff --git a/openbsd-compat/charclass.h b/openbsd-compat/charclass.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..91f5174 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/charclass.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Public domain, 2008, Todd C. Miller + * + * $OpenBSD: charclass.h,v 1.1 2008/10/01 23:04:13 millert Exp $ + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/charclass.h */ + +/* + * POSIX character class support for fnmatch() and glob(). + */ +static struct cclass { + const char *name; + int (*isctype)(int); +} cclasses[] = { + { "alnum", isalnum }, + { "alpha", isalpha }, + { "blank", isblank }, + { "cntrl", iscntrl }, + { "digit", isdigit }, + { "graph", isgraph }, + { "lower", islower }, + { "print", isprint }, + { "punct", ispunct }, + { "space", isspace }, + { "upper", isupper }, + { "xdigit", isxdigit }, + { NULL, NULL } +}; + +#define NCCLASSES (sizeof(cclasses) / sizeof(cclasses[0]) - 1) diff --git a/openbsd-compat/daemon.c b/openbsd-compat/daemon.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3efe14c --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/daemon.c @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: daemon.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $ */ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/daemon.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON + +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +# include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H +# include +#endif + +int +daemon(int nochdir, int noclose) +{ + int fd; + + switch (fork()) { + case -1: + return (-1); + case 0: + break; + default: + _exit(0); + } + + if (setsid() == -1) + return (-1); + + if (!nochdir) + (void)chdir("/"); + + if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { + (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); + (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); + (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); + if (fd > 2) + (void)close (fd); + } + return (0); +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/dirname.c b/openbsd-compat/dirname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30fcb49 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/dirname.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/dirname.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME + +#include +#include +#include + +char * +dirname(const char *path) +{ + static char dname[MAXPATHLEN]; + size_t len; + const char *endp; + + /* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */ + if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { + dname[0] = '.'; + dname[1] = '\0'; + return (dname); + } + + /* Strip any trailing slashes */ + endp = path + strlen(path) - 1; + while (endp > path && *endp == '/') + endp--; + + /* Find the start of the dir */ + while (endp > path && *endp != '/') + endp--; + + /* Either the dir is "/" or there are no slashes */ + if (endp == path) { + dname[0] = *endp == '/' ? '/' : '.'; + dname[1] = '\0'; + return (dname); + } else { + /* Move forward past the separating slashes */ + do { + endp--; + } while (endp > path && *endp == '/'); + } + + len = endp - path + 1; + if (len >= sizeof(dname)) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return (NULL); + } + memcpy(dname, path, len); + dname[len] = '\0'; + return (dname); +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c b/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ef9825 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/explicit_bzero.c */ +/* $OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.1 2014/01/22 21:06:45 tedu Exp $ */ +/* + * Public domain. + * Written by Ted Unangst + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +/* + * explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero + */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO + +#ifdef HAVE_MEMSET_S + +void +explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n) +{ + if (n == 0) + return; + (void)memset_s(p, n, 0, n); +} + +#else /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */ + +/* + * Indirect bzero through a volatile pointer to hopefully avoid + * dead-store optimisation eliminating the call. + */ +static void (* volatile ssh_bzero)(void *, size_t) = bzero; + +void +explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n) +{ + if (n == 0) + return; + /* + * clang -fsanitize=memory needs to intercept memset-like functions + * to correctly detect memory initialisation. Make sure one is called + * directly since our indirection trick above successfully confuses it. + */ +#if defined(__has_feature) +# if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) + memset(p, 0, n); +# endif +#endif + + ssh_bzero(p, n); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */ + +#endif /* HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c b/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d5a6297 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions + * + * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset + * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes + * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO +int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, + size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags) +{ + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa; + struct hostent *hp; + char tmpserv[16]; + + if (sa->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC && sa->sa_family != AF_INET) + return (EAI_FAMILY); + if (serv != NULL) { + snprintf(tmpserv, sizeof(tmpserv), "%d", ntohs(sin->sin_port)); + if (strlcpy(serv, tmpserv, servlen) >= servlen) + return (EAI_MEMORY); + } + + if (host != NULL) { + if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) { + if (strlcpy(host, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), + hostlen) >= hostlen) + return (EAI_MEMORY); + else + return (0); + } else { + hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&sin->sin_addr, + sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET); + if (hp == NULL) + return (EAI_NODATA); + + if (strlcpy(host, hp->h_name, hostlen) >= hostlen) + return (EAI_MEMORY); + else + return (0); + } + } + return (0); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR +#ifdef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO +const char * +#else +char * +#endif +gai_strerror(int err) +{ + switch (err) { + case EAI_NODATA: + return ("no address associated with name"); + case EAI_MEMORY: + return ("memory allocation failure."); + case EAI_NONAME: + return ("nodename nor servname provided, or not known"); + case EAI_FAMILY: + return ("ai_family not supported"); + default: + return ("unknown/invalid error."); + } +} +#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */ + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO +void +freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai) +{ + struct addrinfo *next; + + for(; ai != NULL;) { + next = ai->ai_next; + free(ai); + ai = next; + } +} +#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO +static struct +addrinfo *malloc_ai(int port, u_long addr, const struct addrinfo *hints) +{ + struct addrinfo *ai; + + ai = malloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); + if (ai == NULL) + return (NULL); + + memset(ai, '\0', sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); + + ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); + /* XXX -- ssh doesn't use sa_len */ + ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + ai->ai_addr->sa_family = ai->ai_family = AF_INET; + + ((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_port = port; + ((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = addr; + + /* XXX: the following is not generally correct, but does what we want */ + if (hints->ai_socktype) + ai->ai_socktype = hints->ai_socktype; + else + ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + + if (hints->ai_protocol) + ai->ai_protocol = hints->ai_protocol; + + return (ai); +} + +int +getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res) +{ + struct hostent *hp; + struct servent *sp; + struct in_addr in; + int i; + long int port; + u_long addr; + + port = 0; + if (hints && hints->ai_family != AF_UNSPEC && + hints->ai_family != AF_INET) + return (EAI_FAMILY); + if (servname != NULL) { + char *cp; + + port = strtol(servname, &cp, 10); + if (port > 0 && port <= 65535 && *cp == '\0') + port = htons(port); + else if ((sp = getservbyname(servname, NULL)) != NULL) + port = sp->s_port; + else + port = 0; + } + + if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) { + addr = htonl(0x00000000); + if (hostname && inet_aton(hostname, &in) != 0) + addr = in.s_addr; + *res = malloc_ai(port, addr, hints); + if (*res == NULL) + return (EAI_MEMORY); + return (0); + } + + if (!hostname) { + *res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x7f000001), hints); + if (*res == NULL) + return (EAI_MEMORY); + return (0); + } + + if (inet_aton(hostname, &in)) { + *res = malloc_ai(port, in.s_addr, hints); + if (*res == NULL) + return (EAI_MEMORY); + return (0); + } + + /* Don't try DNS if AI_NUMERICHOST is set */ + if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST) + return (EAI_NONAME); + + hp = gethostbyname(hostname); + if (hp && hp->h_name && hp->h_name[0] && hp->h_addr_list[0]) { + struct addrinfo *cur, *prev; + + cur = prev = *res = NULL; + for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) { + struct in_addr *in = (struct in_addr *)hp->h_addr_list[i]; + + cur = malloc_ai(port, in->s_addr, hints); + if (cur == NULL) { + if (*res != NULL) + freeaddrinfo(*res); + return (EAI_MEMORY); + } + if (prev) + prev->ai_next = cur; + else + *res = cur; + + prev = cur; + } + return (0); + } + + return (EAI_NODATA); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h b/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f913617 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions + * + * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset + * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes + * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose. + */ + +#ifndef _FAKE_RFC2553_H +#define _FAKE_RFC2553_H + +#include "includes.h" +#include +#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H) +# include +#endif + +/* + * First, socket and INET6 related definitions + */ +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE +# define _SS_MAXSIZE 128 /* Implementation specific max size */ +# define _SS_PADSIZE (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr)) +struct sockaddr_storage { + struct sockaddr ss_sa; + char __ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE]; +}; +# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family +#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */ + +#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK +# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \ + (((u_int32_t *)(a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[1] == 0 && \ + ((u_int32_t *)(a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[3] == htonl(1)) +#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR +struct in6_addr { + u_int8_t s6_addr[16]; +}; +#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */ + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 +struct sockaddr_in6 { + unsigned short sin6_family; + u_int16_t sin6_port; + u_int32_t sin6_flowinfo; + struct in6_addr sin6_addr; + u_int32_t sin6_scope_id; +}; +#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */ + +#ifndef AF_INET6 +/* Define it to something that should never appear */ +#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX +#endif + +/* + * Next, RFC2553 name / address resolution API + */ + +#ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST +# define NI_NUMERICHOST (1) +#endif +#ifndef NI_NAMEREQD +# define NI_NAMEREQD (1<<1) +#endif +#ifndef NI_NUMERICSERV +# define NI_NUMERICSERV (1<<2) +#endif + +#ifndef AI_PASSIVE +# define AI_PASSIVE (1) +#endif +#ifndef AI_CANONNAME +# define AI_CANONNAME (1<<1) +#endif +#ifndef AI_NUMERICHOST +# define AI_NUMERICHOST (1<<2) +#endif +#ifndef AI_NUMERICSERV +# define AI_NUMERICSERV (1<<3) +#endif + +#ifndef NI_MAXSERV +# define NI_MAXSERV 32 +#endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */ +#ifndef NI_MAXHOST +# define NI_MAXHOST 1025 +#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */ + +#ifndef EAI_NODATA +# define EAI_NODATA (INT_MAX - 1) +#endif +#ifndef EAI_MEMORY +# define EAI_MEMORY (INT_MAX - 2) +#endif +#ifndef EAI_NONAME +# define EAI_NONAME (INT_MAX - 3) +#endif +#ifndef EAI_SYSTEM +# define EAI_SYSTEM (INT_MAX - 4) +#endif +#ifndef EAI_FAMILY +# define EAI_FAMILY (INT_MAX - 5) +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO +struct addrinfo { + int ai_flags; /* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */ + int ai_family; /* PF_xxx */ + int ai_socktype; /* SOCK_xxx */ + int ai_protocol; /* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */ + size_t ai_addrlen; /* length of ai_addr */ + char *ai_canonname; /* canonical name for hostname */ + struct sockaddr *ai_addr; /* binary address */ + struct addrinfo *ai_next; /* next structure in linked list */ +}; +#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO +#ifdef getaddrinfo +# undef getaddrinfo +#endif +#define getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d) (ssh_getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d)) +int getaddrinfo(const char *, const char *, + const struct addrinfo *, struct addrinfo **); +#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) && !defined(HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO) +#define gai_strerror(a) (_ssh_compat_gai_strerror(a)) +char *gai_strerror(int); +#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */ + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO +#define freeaddrinfo(a) (ssh_freeaddrinfo(a)) +void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *); +#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */ + +#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO +#define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (ssh_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g)) +int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t, + char *, size_t, int); +#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */ + +#endif /* !_FAKE_RFC2553_H */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c b/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f76ef9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c @@ -0,0 +1,303 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.17 2018/05/14 04:39:04 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Ian F. Darwin. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libutil/fmt_scaled.c */ + +/* + * fmt_scaled: Format numbers scaled for human comprehension + * scan_scaled: Scan numbers in this format. + * + * "Human-readable" output uses 4 digits max, and puts a unit suffix at + * the end. Makes output compact and easy-to-read esp. on huge disks. + * Formatting code was originally in OpenBSD "df", converted to library routine. + * Scanning code written for OpenBSD libutil. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +typedef enum { + NONE = 0, KILO = 1, MEGA = 2, GIGA = 3, TERA = 4, PETA = 5, EXA = 6 +} unit_type; + +/* These three arrays MUST be in sync! XXX make a struct */ +static unit_type units[] = { NONE, KILO, MEGA, GIGA, TERA, PETA, EXA }; +static char scale_chars[] = "BKMGTPE"; +static long long scale_factors[] = { + 1LL, + 1024LL, + 1024LL*1024, + 1024LL*1024*1024, + 1024LL*1024*1024*1024, + 1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024, + 1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024*1024, +}; +#define SCALE_LENGTH (sizeof(units)/sizeof(units[0])) + +#define MAX_DIGITS (SCALE_LENGTH * 3) /* XXX strlen(sprintf("%lld", -1)? */ + +/* Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result". + * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set on error. + */ +int +scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result) +{ + char *p = scaled; + int sign = 0; + unsigned int i, ndigits = 0, fract_digits = 0; + long long scale_fact = 1, whole = 0, fpart = 0; + + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + while (isascii((unsigned char)*p) && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) + ++p; + + /* Then at most one leading + or - */ + while (*p == '-' || *p == '+') { + if (*p == '-') { + if (sign) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + sign = -1; + ++p; + } else if (*p == '+') { + if (sign) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + sign = +1; + ++p; + } + } + + /* Main loop: Scan digits, find decimal point, if present. + * We don't allow exponentials, so no scientific notation + * (but note that E for Exa might look like e to some!). + * Advance 'p' to end, to get scale factor. + */ + for (; isascii((unsigned char)*p) && + (isdigit((unsigned char)*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) { + if (*p == '.') { + if (fract_digits > 0) { /* oops, more than one '.' */ + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + fract_digits = 1; + continue; + } + + i = (*p) - '0'; /* whew! finally a digit we can use */ + if (fract_digits > 0) { + if (fract_digits >= MAX_DIGITS-1) + /* ignore extra fractional digits */ + continue; + fract_digits++; /* for later scaling */ + if (fpart > LLONG_MAX / 10) { + errno = ERANGE; + return -1; + } + fpart *= 10; + if (i > LLONG_MAX - fpart) { + errno = ERANGE; + return -1; + } + fpart += i; + } else { /* normal digit */ + if (++ndigits >= MAX_DIGITS) { + errno = ERANGE; + return -1; + } + if (whole > LLONG_MAX / 10) { + errno = ERANGE; + return -1; + } + whole *= 10; + if (i > LLONG_MAX - whole) { + errno = ERANGE; + return -1; + } + whole += i; + } + } + + if (sign) { + whole *= sign; + fpart *= sign; + } + + /* If no scale factor given, we're done. fraction is discarded. */ + if (!*p) { + *result = whole; + return 0; + } + + /* Validate scale factor, and scale whole and fraction by it. */ + for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) { + + /* Are we there yet? */ + if (*p == scale_chars[i] || + *p == tolower((unsigned char)scale_chars[i])) { + + /* If it ends with alphanumerics after the scale char, bad. */ + if (isalnum((unsigned char)*(p+1))) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + scale_fact = scale_factors[i]; + + /* check for overflow and underflow after scaling */ + if (whole > LLONG_MAX / scale_fact || + whole < LLONG_MIN / scale_fact) { + errno = ERANGE; + return -1; + } + + /* scale whole part */ + whole *= scale_fact; + + /* truncate fpart so it doesn't overflow. + * then scale fractional part. + */ + while (fpart >= LLONG_MAX / scale_fact) { + fpart /= 10; + fract_digits--; + } + fpart *= scale_fact; + if (fract_digits > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < fract_digits -1; i++) + fpart /= 10; + } + whole += fpart; + *result = whole; + return 0; + } + } + + /* Invalid unit or character */ + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; +} + +/* Format the given "number" into human-readable form in "result". + * Result must point to an allocated buffer of length FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE. + * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set if error. + */ +int +fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result) +{ + long long abval, fract = 0; + unsigned int i; + unit_type unit = NONE; + + abval = llabs(number); + + /* Not every negative long long has a positive representation. + * Also check for numbers that are just too darned big to format + */ + if (abval < 0 || abval / 1024 >= scale_factors[SCALE_LENGTH-1]) { + errno = ERANGE; + return -1; + } + + /* scale whole part; get unscaled fraction */ + for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) { + if (abval/1024 < scale_factors[i]) { + unit = units[i]; + fract = (i == 0) ? 0 : abval % scale_factors[i]; + number /= scale_factors[i]; + if (i > 0) + fract /= scale_factors[i - 1]; + break; + } + } + + fract = (10 * fract + 512) / 1024; + /* if the result would be >= 10, round main number */ + if (fract >= 10) { + if (number >= 0) + number++; + else + number--; + fract = 0; + } else if (fract < 0) { + /* shouldn't happen */ + fract = 0; + } + + if (number == 0) + strlcpy(result, "0B", FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE); + else if (unit == NONE || number >= 100 || number <= -100) { + if (fract >= 5) { + if (number >= 0) + number++; + else + number--; + } + (void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld%c", + number, scale_chars[unit]); + } else + (void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld.%1lld%c", + number, fract, scale_chars[unit]); + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef MAIN +/* + * This is the original version of the program in the man page. + * Copy-and-paste whatever you need from it. + */ +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *cinput = "1.5K", buf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; + long long ninput = 10483892, result; + + if (scan_scaled(cinput, &result) == 0) + printf("\"%s\" -> %lld\n", cinput, result); + else + perror(cinput); + + if (fmt_scaled(ninput, buf) == 0) + printf("%lld -> \"%s\"\n", ninput, buf); + else + fprintf(stderr, "%lld invalid (%s)\n", ninput, strerror(errno)); + + return 0; +} +#endif + +#endif /* HAVE_FMT_SCALED */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/freezero.c b/openbsd-compat/freezero.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bad018f --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/freezero.c @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2008, 2010, 2011, 2016 Otto Moerbeek + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO + +void +freezero(void *ptr, size_t sz) +{ + if (ptr == NULL) + return; + explicit_bzero(ptr, sz); + free(ptr); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_FREEZERO */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c b/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4f7f5a --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: getcwd.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getcwd.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "includes.h" + +#define ISDOT(dp) \ + (dp->d_name[0] == '.' && (dp->d_name[1] == '\0' || \ + (dp->d_name[1] == '.' && dp->d_name[2] == '\0'))) + +char * +getcwd(char *pt, size_t size) +{ + struct dirent *dp; + DIR *dir = NULL; + dev_t dev; + ino_t ino; + int first; + char *bpt, *bup; + struct stat s; + dev_t root_dev; + ino_t root_ino; + size_t ptsize, upsize; + int save_errno; + char *ept, *eup, *up; + + /* + * If no buffer specified by the user, allocate one as necessary. + * If a buffer is specified, the size has to be non-zero. The path + * is built from the end of the buffer backwards. + */ + if (pt) { + ptsize = 0; + if (!size) { + errno = EINVAL; + return (NULL); + } + ept = pt + size; + } else { + if ((pt = malloc(ptsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL) + return (NULL); + ept = pt + ptsize; + } + bpt = ept - 1; + *bpt = '\0'; + + /* + * Allocate bytes for the string of "../"'s. + * Should always be enough (it's 340 levels). If it's not, allocate + * as necessary. Special * case the first stat, it's ".", not "..". + */ + if ((up = malloc(upsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL) + goto err; + eup = up + upsize; + bup = up; + up[0] = '.'; + up[1] = '\0'; + + /* Save root values, so know when to stop. */ + if (stat("/", &s)) + goto err; + root_dev = s.st_dev; + root_ino = s.st_ino; + + errno = 0; /* XXX readdir has no error return. */ + + for (first = 1;; first = 0) { + /* Stat the current level. */ + if (lstat(up, &s)) + goto err; + + /* Save current node values. */ + ino = s.st_ino; + dev = s.st_dev; + + /* Check for reaching root. */ + if (root_dev == dev && root_ino == ino) { + *--bpt = '/'; + /* + * It's unclear that it's a requirement to copy the + * path to the beginning of the buffer, but it's always + * been that way and stuff would probably break. + */ + memmove(pt, bpt, ept - bpt); + free(up); + return (pt); + } + + /* + * Build pointer to the parent directory, allocating memory + * as necessary. Max length is 3 for "../", the largest + * possible component name, plus a trailing NUL. + */ + if (bup + 3 + MAXNAMLEN + 1 >= eup) { + char *nup; + + if ((nup = realloc(up, upsize *= 2)) == NULL) + goto err; + bup = nup + (bup - up); + up = nup; + eup = up + upsize; + } + *bup++ = '.'; + *bup++ = '.'; + *bup = '\0'; + + /* Open and stat parent directory. */ + if (!(dir = opendir(up)) || fstat(dirfd(dir), &s)) + goto err; + + /* Add trailing slash for next directory. */ + *bup++ = '/'; + + /* + * If it's a mount point, have to stat each element because + * the inode number in the directory is for the entry in the + * parent directory, not the inode number of the mounted file. + */ + save_errno = 0; + if (s.st_dev == dev) { + for (;;) { + if (!(dp = readdir(dir))) + goto notfound; + if (dp->d_fileno == ino) + break; + } + } else + for (;;) { + if (!(dp = readdir(dir))) + goto notfound; + if (ISDOT(dp)) + continue; + memcpy(bup, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen + 1); + + /* Save the first error for later. */ + if (lstat(up, &s)) { + if (!save_errno) + save_errno = errno; + errno = 0; + continue; + } + if (s.st_dev == dev && s.st_ino == ino) + break; + } + + /* + * Check for length of the current name, preceding slash, + * leading slash. + */ + if (bpt - pt < dp->d_namlen + (first ? 1 : 2)) { + size_t len; + char *npt; + + if (!ptsize) { + errno = ERANGE; + goto err; + } + len = ept - bpt; + if ((npt = realloc(pt, ptsize *= 2)) == NULL) + goto err; + bpt = npt + (bpt - pt); + pt = npt; + ept = pt + ptsize; + memmove(ept - len, bpt, len); + bpt = ept - len; + } + if (!first) + *--bpt = '/'; + bpt -= dp->d_namlen; + memcpy(bpt, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen); + (void)closedir(dir); + + /* Truncate any file name. */ + *bup = '\0'; + } + +notfound: + /* + * If readdir set errno, use it, not any saved error; otherwise, + * didn't find the current directory in its parent directory, set + * errno to ENOENT. + */ + if (!errno) + errno = save_errno ? save_errno : ENOENT; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ +err: + save_errno = errno; + + if (ptsize) + free(pt); + free(up); + if (dir) + (void)closedir(dir); + + errno = save_errno; + + return (NULL); +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c b/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3906cd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: getgrouplist.c,v 1.12 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getgrouplist.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST + +/* + * get credential + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +getgrouplist(const char *uname, gid_t agroup, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt) +{ + struct group *grp; + int i, ngroups; + int ret, maxgroups; + int bail; + + ret = 0; + ngroups = 0; + maxgroups = *grpcnt; + + /* + * install primary group + */ + if (ngroups >= maxgroups) { + *grpcnt = ngroups; + return (-1); + } + groups[ngroups++] = agroup; + + /* + * Scan the group file to find additional groups. + */ + setgrent(); + while ((grp = getgrent())) { + if (grp->gr_gid == agroup) + continue; + for (bail = 0, i = 0; bail == 0 && i < ngroups; i++) + if (groups[i] == grp->gr_gid) + bail = 1; + if (bail) + continue; + for (i = 0; grp->gr_mem[i]; i++) { + if (!strcmp(grp->gr_mem[i], uname)) { + if (ngroups >= maxgroups) { + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + groups[ngroups++] = grp->gr_gid; + break; + } + } + } +out: + endgrent(); + *grpcnt = ngroups; + return (ret); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_GETGROUPLIST */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getopt.h b/openbsd-compat/getopt.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8eb1244 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/getopt.h @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: getopt.h,v 1.2 2008/06/26 05:42:04 ray Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: getopt.h,v 1.4 2000/07/07 10:43:54 ad Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation + * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _GETOPT_H_ +#define _GETOPT_H_ + +/* + * GNU-like getopt_long() and 4.4BSD getsubopt()/optreset extensions + */ +#define no_argument 0 +#define required_argument 1 +#define optional_argument 2 + +struct option { + /* name of long option */ + const char *name; + /* + * one of no_argument, required_argument, and optional_argument: + * whether option takes an argument + */ + int has_arg; + /* if not NULL, set *flag to val when option found */ + int *flag; + /* if flag not NULL, value to set *flag to; else return value */ + int val; +}; + +int getopt_long(int, char * const *, const char *, + const struct option *, int *); +int getopt_long_only(int, char * const *, const char *, + const struct option *, int *); +#ifndef _GETOPT_DEFINED_ +#define _GETOPT_DEFINED_ +int getopt(int, char * const *, const char *); +int getsubopt(char **, char * const *, char **); + +extern char *optarg; /* getopt(3) external variables */ +extern int opterr; +extern int optind; +extern int optopt; +extern int optreset; +extern char *suboptarg; /* getsubopt(3) external variable */ +#endif + +#endif /* !_GETOPT_H_ */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c b/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e289474 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c @@ -0,0 +1,532 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.25 2011/03/05 22:10:11 guenther Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.15 2002/01/31 22:43:40 tv Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects + * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force + * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. + */ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation + * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/getopt_long.c */ +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) + +/* + * Some defines to make it easier to keep the code in sync with upstream. + * getopt opterr optind optopt optreset optarg are all in defines.h which is + * pulled in by includes.h. + */ +#define warnx logit + +#if 0 +#include +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" + +int opterr = 1; /* if error message should be printed */ +int optind = 1; /* index into parent argv vector */ +int optopt = '?'; /* character checked for validity */ +int optreset; /* reset getopt */ +char *optarg; /* argument associated with option */ + +#define PRINT_ERROR ((opterr) && (*options != ':')) + +#define FLAG_PERMUTE 0x01 /* permute non-options to the end of argv */ +#define FLAG_ALLARGS 0x02 /* treat non-options as args to option "-1" */ +#define FLAG_LONGONLY 0x04 /* operate as getopt_long_only */ + +/* return values */ +#define BADCH (int)'?' +#define BADARG ((*options == ':') ? (int)':' : (int)'?') +#define INORDER (int)1 + +#define EMSG "" + +static int getopt_internal(int, char * const *, const char *, + const struct option *, int *, int); +static int parse_long_options(char * const *, const char *, + const struct option *, int *, int); +static int gcd(int, int); +static void permute_args(int, int, int, char * const *); + +static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */ + +/* XXX: set optreset to 1 rather than these two */ +static int nonopt_start = -1; /* first non option argument (for permute) */ +static int nonopt_end = -1; /* first option after non options (for permute) */ + +/* Error messages */ +static const char recargchar[] = "option requires an argument -- %c"; +static const char recargstring[] = "option requires an argument -- %s"; +static const char ambig[] = "ambiguous option -- %.*s"; +static const char noarg[] = "option doesn't take an argument -- %.*s"; +static const char illoptchar[] = "unknown option -- %c"; +static const char illoptstring[] = "unknown option -- %s"; + +/* + * Compute the greatest common divisor of a and b. + */ +static int +gcd(int a, int b) +{ + int c; + + c = a % b; + while (c != 0) { + a = b; + b = c; + c = a % b; + } + + return (b); +} + +/* + * Exchange the block from nonopt_start to nonopt_end with the block + * from nonopt_end to opt_end (keeping the same order of arguments + * in each block). + */ +static void +permute_args(int panonopt_start, int panonopt_end, int opt_end, + char * const *nargv) +{ + int cstart, cyclelen, i, j, ncycle, nnonopts, nopts, pos; + char *swap; + + /* + * compute lengths of blocks and number and size of cycles + */ + nnonopts = panonopt_end - panonopt_start; + nopts = opt_end - panonopt_end; + ncycle = gcd(nnonopts, nopts); + cyclelen = (opt_end - panonopt_start) / ncycle; + + for (i = 0; i < ncycle; i++) { + cstart = panonopt_end+i; + pos = cstart; + for (j = 0; j < cyclelen; j++) { + if (pos >= panonopt_end) + pos -= nnonopts; + else + pos += nopts; + swap = nargv[pos]; + /* LINTED const cast */ + ((char **) nargv)[pos] = nargv[cstart]; + /* LINTED const cast */ + ((char **)nargv)[cstart] = swap; + } + } +} + +/* + * parse_long_options -- + * Parse long options in argc/argv argument vector. + * Returns -1 if short_too is set and the option does not match long_options. + */ +static int +parse_long_options(char * const *nargv, const char *options, + const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int short_too) +{ + char *current_argv, *has_equal; + size_t current_argv_len; + int i, match; + + current_argv = place; + match = -1; + + optind++; + + if ((has_equal = strchr(current_argv, '=')) != NULL) { + /* argument found (--option=arg) */ + current_argv_len = has_equal - current_argv; + has_equal++; + } else + current_argv_len = strlen(current_argv); + + for (i = 0; long_options[i].name; i++) { + /* find matching long option */ + if (strncmp(current_argv, long_options[i].name, + current_argv_len)) + continue; + + if (strlen(long_options[i].name) == current_argv_len) { + /* exact match */ + match = i; + break; + } + /* + * If this is a known short option, don't allow + * a partial match of a single character. + */ + if (short_too && current_argv_len == 1) + continue; + + if (match == -1) /* partial match */ + match = i; + else { + /* ambiguous abbreviation */ + if (PRINT_ERROR) + warnx(ambig, (int)current_argv_len, + current_argv); + optopt = 0; + return (BADCH); + } + } + if (match != -1) { /* option found */ + if (long_options[match].has_arg == no_argument + && has_equal) { + if (PRINT_ERROR) + warnx(noarg, (int)current_argv_len, + current_argv); + /* + * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag + */ + if (long_options[match].flag == NULL) + optopt = long_options[match].val; + else + optopt = 0; + return (BADARG); + } + if (long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument || + long_options[match].has_arg == optional_argument) { + if (has_equal) + optarg = has_equal; + else if (long_options[match].has_arg == + required_argument) { + /* + * optional argument doesn't use next nargv + */ + optarg = nargv[optind++]; + } + } + if ((long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument) + && (optarg == NULL)) { + /* + * Missing argument; leading ':' indicates no error + * should be generated. + */ + if (PRINT_ERROR) + warnx(recargstring, + current_argv); + /* + * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag + */ + if (long_options[match].flag == NULL) + optopt = long_options[match].val; + else + optopt = 0; + --optind; + return (BADARG); + } + } else { /* unknown option */ + if (short_too) { + --optind; + return (-1); + } + if (PRINT_ERROR) + warnx(illoptstring, current_argv); + optopt = 0; + return (BADCH); + } + if (idx) + *idx = match; + if (long_options[match].flag) { + *long_options[match].flag = long_options[match].val; + return (0); + } else + return (long_options[match].val); +} + +/* + * getopt_internal -- + * Parse argc/argv argument vector. Called by user level routines. + */ +static int +getopt_internal(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options, + const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int flags) +{ + char *oli; /* option letter list index */ + int optchar, short_too; + static int posixly_correct = -1; + + if (options == NULL) + return (-1); + + /* + * XXX Some GNU programs (like cvs) set optind to 0 instead of + * XXX using optreset. Work around this braindamage. + */ + if (optind == 0) + optind = optreset = 1; + + /* + * Disable GNU extensions if POSIXLY_CORRECT is set or options + * string begins with a '+'. + */ + if (posixly_correct == -1 || optreset) + posixly_correct = (getenv("POSIXLY_CORRECT") != NULL); + if (*options == '-') + flags |= FLAG_ALLARGS; + else if (posixly_correct || *options == '+') + flags &= ~FLAG_PERMUTE; + if (*options == '+' || *options == '-') + options++; + + optarg = NULL; + if (optreset) + nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1; +start: + if (optreset || !*place) { /* update scanning pointer */ + optreset = 0; + if (optind >= nargc) { /* end of argument vector */ + place = EMSG; + if (nonopt_end != -1) { + /* do permutation, if we have to */ + permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end, + optind, nargv); + optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start; + } + else if (nonopt_start != -1) { + /* + * If we skipped non-options, set optind + * to the first of them. + */ + optind = nonopt_start; + } + nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1; + return (-1); + } + if (*(place = nargv[optind]) != '-' || + (place[1] == '\0' && strchr(options, '-') == NULL)) { + place = EMSG; /* found non-option */ + if (flags & FLAG_ALLARGS) { + /* + * GNU extension: + * return non-option as argument to option 1 + */ + optarg = nargv[optind++]; + return (INORDER); + } + if (!(flags & FLAG_PERMUTE)) { + /* + * If no permutation wanted, stop parsing + * at first non-option. + */ + return (-1); + } + /* do permutation */ + if (nonopt_start == -1) + nonopt_start = optind; + else if (nonopt_end != -1) { + permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end, + optind, nargv); + nonopt_start = optind - + (nonopt_end - nonopt_start); + nonopt_end = -1; + } + optind++; + /* process next argument */ + goto start; + } + if (nonopt_start != -1 && nonopt_end == -1) + nonopt_end = optind; + + /* + * If we have "-" do nothing, if "--" we are done. + */ + if (place[1] != '\0' && *++place == '-' && place[1] == '\0') { + optind++; + place = EMSG; + /* + * We found an option (--), so if we skipped + * non-options, we have to permute. + */ + if (nonopt_end != -1) { + permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end, + optind, nargv); + optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start; + } + nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1; + return (-1); + } + } + + /* + * Check long options if: + * 1) we were passed some + * 2) the arg is not just "-" + * 3) either the arg starts with -- we are getopt_long_only() + */ + if (long_options != NULL && place != nargv[optind] && + (*place == '-' || (flags & FLAG_LONGONLY))) { + short_too = 0; + if (*place == '-') + place++; /* --foo long option */ + else if (*place != ':' && strchr(options, *place) != NULL) + short_too = 1; /* could be short option too */ + + optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options, + idx, short_too); + if (optchar != -1) { + place = EMSG; + return (optchar); + } + } + + if ((optchar = (int)*place++) == (int)':' || + (optchar == (int)'-' && *place != '\0') || + (oli = strchr(options, optchar)) == NULL) { + /* + * If the user specified "-" and '-' isn't listed in + * options, return -1 (non-option) as per POSIX. + * Otherwise, it is an unknown option character (or ':'). + */ + if (optchar == (int)'-' && *place == '\0') + return (-1); + if (!*place) + ++optind; + if (PRINT_ERROR) + warnx(illoptchar, optchar); + optopt = optchar; + return (BADCH); + } + if (long_options != NULL && optchar == 'W' && oli[1] == ';') { + /* -W long-option */ + if (*place) /* no space */ + /* NOTHING */; + else if (++optind >= nargc) { /* no arg */ + place = EMSG; + if (PRINT_ERROR) + warnx(recargchar, optchar); + optopt = optchar; + return (BADARG); + } else /* white space */ + place = nargv[optind]; + optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options, + idx, 0); + place = EMSG; + return (optchar); + } + if (*++oli != ':') { /* doesn't take argument */ + if (!*place) + ++optind; + } else { /* takes (optional) argument */ + optarg = NULL; + if (*place) /* no white space */ + optarg = place; + else if (oli[1] != ':') { /* arg not optional */ + if (++optind >= nargc) { /* no arg */ + place = EMSG; + if (PRINT_ERROR) + warnx(recargchar, optchar); + optopt = optchar; + return (BADARG); + } else + optarg = nargv[optind]; + } + place = EMSG; + ++optind; + } + /* dump back option letter */ + return (optchar); +} + +/* + * getopt -- + * Parse argc/argv argument vector. + * + * [eventually this will replace the BSD getopt] + */ +int +getopt(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options) +{ + + /* + * We don't pass FLAG_PERMUTE to getopt_internal() since + * the BSD getopt(3) (unlike GNU) has never done this. + * + * Furthermore, since many privileged programs call getopt() + * before dropping privileges it makes sense to keep things + * as simple (and bug-free) as possible. + */ + return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, NULL, NULL, 0)); +} + +#if 0 +/* + * getopt_long -- + * Parse argc/argv argument vector. + */ +int +getopt_long(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options, + const struct option *long_options, int *idx) +{ + + return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx, + FLAG_PERMUTE)); +} + +/* + * getopt_long_only -- + * Parse argc/argv argument vector. + */ +int +getopt_long_only(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options, + const struct option *long_options, int *idx) +{ + + return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx, + FLAG_PERMUTE|FLAG_LONGONLY)); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4647b62 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.10 2005/03/30 02:58:28 tedu Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2007 Simon Vallet / Genoscope + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM + * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL + * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, + * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING + * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION + * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS) + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "getrrsetbyname.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +#define malloc(x) (xmalloc(x)) +#define calloc(x, y) (xcalloc((x),(y))) + +int +getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass, + unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags, + struct rrsetinfo **res) +{ + int result; + unsigned int i, j, index_ans, index_sig; + struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL; + struct rdatainfo *rdata; + size_t len; + ldns_resolver *ldns_res = NULL; + ldns_rdf *domain = NULL; + ldns_pkt *pkt = NULL; + ldns_rr_list *rrsigs = NULL, *rrdata = NULL; + ldns_status err; + ldns_rr *rr; + + /* check for invalid class and type */ + if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) { + result = ERRSET_INVAL; + goto fail; + } + + /* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */ + if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) { + result = ERRSET_INVAL; + goto fail; + } + + /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */ + if (flags) { + result = ERRSET_INVAL; + goto fail; + } + + /* Initialize resolver from resolv.conf */ + domain = ldns_dname_new_frm_str(hostname); + if ((err = ldns_resolver_new_frm_file(&ldns_res, NULL)) != \ + LDNS_STATUS_OK) { + result = ERRSET_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + +#ifdef LDNS_DEBUG + ldns_resolver_set_debug(ldns_res, true); +#endif /* LDNS_DEBUG */ + + ldns_resolver_set_dnssec(ldns_res, true); /* Use DNSSEC */ + + /* make query */ + pkt = ldns_resolver_query(ldns_res, domain, rdtype, rdclass, LDNS_RD); + + /*** TODO: finer errcodes -- see original **/ + if (!pkt || ldns_pkt_ancount(pkt) < 1) { + result = ERRSET_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + + /* initialize rrset */ + rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo)); + if (rrset == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + + rrdata = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, rdtype, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER); + rrset->rri_nrdatas = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrdata); + if (!rrset->rri_nrdatas) { + result = ERRSET_NODATA; + goto fail; + } + + /* copy name from answer section */ + len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0))); + if ((rrset->rri_name = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + memcpy(rrset->rri_name, + ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0))), len); + + rrset->rri_rdclass = ldns_rr_get_class(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)); + rrset->rri_rdtype = ldns_rr_get_type(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)); + rrset->rri_ttl = ldns_rr_ttl(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)); + + debug2("ldns: got %u answers from DNS", rrset->rri_nrdatas); + + /* Check for authenticated data */ + if (ldns_pkt_ad(pkt)) { + rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED; + } else { /* AD is not set, try autonomous validation */ + ldns_rr_list * trusted_keys = ldns_rr_list_new(); + + debug2("ldns: trying to validate RRset"); + /* Get eventual sigs */ + rrsigs = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG, + LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER); + + rrset->rri_nsigs = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrsigs); + debug2("ldns: got %u signature(s) (RRTYPE %u) from DNS", + rrset->rri_nsigs, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG); + + if ((err = ldns_verify_trusted(ldns_res, rrdata, rrsigs, + trusted_keys)) == LDNS_STATUS_OK) { + rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED; + debug2("ldns: RRset is signed with a valid key"); + } else { + debug2("ldns: RRset validation failed: %s", + ldns_get_errorstr_by_id(err)); + } + + ldns_rr_list_deep_free(trusted_keys); + } + + /* allocate memory for answers */ + rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas, + sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); + + if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + + /* allocate memory for signatures */ + if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) { + rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs, + sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); + + if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + } + + /* copy answers & signatures */ + for (i=0, index_ans=0, index_sig=0; i< pkt->_header->_ancount; i++) { + rdata = NULL; + rr = ldns_rr_list_rr(ldns_pkt_answer(pkt), i); + + if (ldns_rr_get_class(rr) == rrset->rri_rdclass && + ldns_rr_get_type(rr) == rrset->rri_rdtype) { + rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++]; + } + + if (rr->_rr_class == rrset->rri_rdclass && + rr->_rr_type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG && + rrset->rri_sigs) { + rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++]; + } + + if (rdata) { + size_t rdata_offset = 0; + + rdata->rdi_length = 0; + for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) { + rdata->rdi_length += + ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)); + } + + rdata->rdi_data = malloc(rdata->rdi_length); + if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + + /* Re-create the raw DNS RDATA */ + for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) { + len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)); + memcpy(rdata->rdi_data + rdata_offset, + ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)), len); + rdata_offset += len; + } + } + } + + *res = rrset; + result = ERRSET_SUCCESS; + +fail: + /* freerrset(rrset); */ + ldns_rdf_deep_free(domain); + ldns_pkt_free(pkt); + ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrsigs); + ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrdata); + ldns_resolver_deep_free(ldns_res); + + return result; +} + + +void +freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset) +{ + u_int16_t i; + + if (rrset == NULL) + return; + + if (rrset->rri_rdatas) { + for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) { + if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL) + break; + free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data); + } + free(rrset->rri_rdatas); + } + + if (rrset->rri_sigs) { + for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) { + if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL) + break; + free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data); + } + free(rrset->rri_sigs); + } + + if (rrset->rri_name) + free(rrset->rri_name); + free(rrset); +} + + +#endif /* !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc6fe05 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c @@ -0,0 +1,610 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.11 2007/10/11 18:36:41 jakob Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM + * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL + * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, + * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING + * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION + * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/getrrsetbyname.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS) + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "getrrsetbyname.h" + +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO) && !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO +extern int h_errno; +#endif + +/* We don't need multithread support here */ +#ifdef _THREAD_PRIVATE +# undef _THREAD_PRIVATE +#endif +#define _THREAD_PRIVATE(a,b,c) (c) + +#ifndef HAVE__RES_EXTERN +struct __res_state _res; +#endif + +/* Necessary functions and macros */ + +/* + * Inline versions of get/put short/long. Pointer is advanced. + * + * These macros demonstrate the property of C whereby it can be + * portable or it can be elegant but rarely both. + */ + +#ifndef INT32SZ +# define INT32SZ 4 +#endif +#ifndef INT16SZ +# define INT16SZ 2 +#endif + +#ifndef GETSHORT +#define GETSHORT(s, cp) { \ + register u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \ + (s) = ((u_int16_t)t_cp[0] << 8) \ + | ((u_int16_t)t_cp[1]) \ + ; \ + (cp) += INT16SZ; \ +} +#endif + +#ifndef GETLONG +#define GETLONG(l, cp) { \ + register u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \ + (l) = ((u_int32_t)t_cp[0] << 24) \ + | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[1] << 16) \ + | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[2] << 8) \ + | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[3]) \ + ; \ + (cp) += INT32SZ; \ +} +#endif + +/* + * Routines to insert/extract short/long's. + */ + +#ifndef HAVE__GETSHORT +static u_int16_t +_getshort(msgp) + register const u_char *msgp; +{ + register u_int16_t u; + + GETSHORT(u, msgp); + return (u); +} +#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT) && (HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT == 0) +u_int16_t _getshort(register const u_char *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE__GETLONG +static u_int32_t +_getlong(msgp) + register const u_char *msgp; +{ + register u_int32_t u; + + GETLONG(u, msgp); + return (u); +} +#elif defined(HAVE_DECL__GETLONG) && (HAVE_DECL__GETLONG == 0) +u_int32_t _getlong(register const u_char *); +#endif + +/* ************** */ + +#define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 0xffff + +struct dns_query { + char *name; + u_int16_t type; + u_int16_t class; + struct dns_query *next; +}; + +struct dns_rr { + char *name; + u_int16_t type; + u_int16_t class; + u_int16_t ttl; + u_int16_t size; + void *rdata; + struct dns_rr *next; +}; + +struct dns_response { + HEADER header; + struct dns_query *query; + struct dns_rr *answer; + struct dns_rr *authority; + struct dns_rr *additional; +}; + +static struct dns_response *parse_dns_response(const u_char *, int); +static struct dns_query *parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *, int, + const u_char **, int); +static struct dns_rr *parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *, int, const u_char **, + int); + +static void free_dns_query(struct dns_query *); +static void free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *); +static void free_dns_response(struct dns_response *); + +static int count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *, u_int16_t, u_int16_t); + +int +getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass, + unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags, + struct rrsetinfo **res) +{ + struct __res_state *_resp = _THREAD_PRIVATE(_res, _res, &_res); + int result; + struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL; + struct dns_response *response = NULL; + struct dns_rr *rr; + struct rdatainfo *rdata; + int length; + unsigned int index_ans, index_sig; + u_char answer[ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + /* check for invalid class and type */ + if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) { + result = ERRSET_INVAL; + goto fail; + } + + /* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */ + if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) { + result = ERRSET_INVAL; + goto fail; + } + + /* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */ + if (flags) { + result = ERRSET_INVAL; + goto fail; + } + + /* initialize resolver */ + if ((_resp->options & RES_INIT) == 0 && res_init() == -1) { + result = ERRSET_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG + _resp->options |= RES_DEBUG; +#endif /* DEBUG */ + +#ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC + /* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */ + if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0) + _resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC; +#endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */ + + /* make query */ + length = res_query(hostname, (signed int) rdclass, (signed int) rdtype, + answer, sizeof(answer)); + if (length < 0) { + switch(h_errno) { + case HOST_NOT_FOUND: + result = ERRSET_NONAME; + goto fail; + case NO_DATA: + result = ERRSET_NODATA; + goto fail; + default: + result = ERRSET_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + } + + /* parse result */ + response = parse_dns_response(answer, length); + if (response == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + + if (response->header.qdcount != 1) { + result = ERRSET_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + + /* initialize rrset */ + rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo)); + if (rrset == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + rrset->rri_rdclass = response->query->class; + rrset->rri_rdtype = response->query->type; + rrset->rri_ttl = response->answer->ttl; + rrset->rri_nrdatas = response->header.ancount; + +#ifdef HAVE_HEADER_AD + /* check for authenticated data */ + if (response->header.ad == 1) + rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED; +#endif + + /* copy name from answer section */ + rrset->rri_name = strdup(response->answer->name); + if (rrset->rri_name == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + + /* count answers */ + rrset->rri_nrdatas = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass, + rrset->rri_rdtype); + rrset->rri_nsigs = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass, + T_RRSIG); + + /* allocate memory for answers */ + rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas, + sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); + if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + + /* allocate memory for signatures */ + if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) { + rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs, sizeof(struct rdatainfo)); + if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + } + + /* copy answers & signatures */ + for (rr = response->answer, index_ans = 0, index_sig = 0; + rr; rr = rr->next) { + + rdata = NULL; + + if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass && + rr->type == rrset->rri_rdtype) + rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++]; + + if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass && + rr->type == T_RRSIG) + rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++]; + + if (rdata) { + rdata->rdi_length = rr->size; + rdata->rdi_data = malloc(rr->size); + + if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) { + result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY; + goto fail; + } + memcpy(rdata->rdi_data, rr->rdata, rr->size); + } + } + free_dns_response(response); + + *res = rrset; + return (ERRSET_SUCCESS); + +fail: + if (rrset != NULL) + freerrset(rrset); + if (response != NULL) + free_dns_response(response); + return (result); +} + +void +freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset) +{ + u_int16_t i; + + if (rrset == NULL) + return; + + if (rrset->rri_rdatas) { + for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) { + if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL) + break; + free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data); + } + free(rrset->rri_rdatas); + } + + if (rrset->rri_sigs) { + for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) { + if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL) + break; + free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data); + } + free(rrset->rri_sigs); + } + + if (rrset->rri_name) + free(rrset->rri_name); + free(rrset); +} + +/* + * DNS response parsing routines + */ +static struct dns_response * +parse_dns_response(const u_char *answer, int size) +{ + struct dns_response *resp; + const u_char *cp; + + /* allocate memory for the response */ + resp = calloc(1, sizeof(*resp)); + if (resp == NULL) + return (NULL); + + /* initialize current pointer */ + cp = answer; + + /* copy header */ + memcpy(&resp->header, cp, HFIXEDSZ); + cp += HFIXEDSZ; + + /* fix header byte order */ + resp->header.qdcount = ntohs(resp->header.qdcount); + resp->header.ancount = ntohs(resp->header.ancount); + resp->header.nscount = ntohs(resp->header.nscount); + resp->header.arcount = ntohs(resp->header.arcount); + + /* there must be at least one query */ + if (resp->header.qdcount < 1) { + free_dns_response(resp); + return (NULL); + } + + /* parse query section */ + resp->query = parse_dns_qsection(answer, size, &cp, + resp->header.qdcount); + if (resp->header.qdcount && resp->query == NULL) { + free_dns_response(resp); + return (NULL); + } + + /* parse answer section */ + resp->answer = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp, + resp->header.ancount); + if (resp->header.ancount && resp->answer == NULL) { + free_dns_response(resp); + return (NULL); + } + + /* parse authority section */ + resp->authority = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp, + resp->header.nscount); + if (resp->header.nscount && resp->authority == NULL) { + free_dns_response(resp); + return (NULL); + } + + /* parse additional section */ + resp->additional = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp, + resp->header.arcount); + if (resp->header.arcount && resp->additional == NULL) { + free_dns_response(resp); + return (NULL); + } + + return (resp); +} + +static struct dns_query * +parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp, int count) +{ + struct dns_query *head, *curr, *prev; + int i, length; + char name[MAXDNAME]; + + for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) { + + /* allocate and initialize struct */ + curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_query)); + if (curr == NULL) { + free_dns_query(head); + return (NULL); + } + if (head == NULL) + head = curr; + if (prev != NULL) + prev->next = curr; + + /* name */ + length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name, + sizeof(name)); + if (length < 0) { + free_dns_query(head); + return (NULL); + } + curr->name = strdup(name); + if (curr->name == NULL) { + free_dns_query(head); + return (NULL); + } + *cp += length; + + /* type */ + curr->type = _getshort(*cp); + *cp += INT16SZ; + + /* class */ + curr->class = _getshort(*cp); + *cp += INT16SZ; + } + + return (head); +} + +static struct dns_rr * +parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp, + int count) +{ + struct dns_rr *head, *curr, *prev; + int i, length; + char name[MAXDNAME]; + + for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) { + + /* allocate and initialize struct */ + curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_rr)); + if (curr == NULL) { + free_dns_rr(head); + return (NULL); + } + if (head == NULL) + head = curr; + if (prev != NULL) + prev->next = curr; + + /* name */ + length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name, + sizeof(name)); + if (length < 0) { + free_dns_rr(head); + return (NULL); + } + curr->name = strdup(name); + if (curr->name == NULL) { + free_dns_rr(head); + return (NULL); + } + *cp += length; + + /* type */ + curr->type = _getshort(*cp); + *cp += INT16SZ; + + /* class */ + curr->class = _getshort(*cp); + *cp += INT16SZ; + + /* ttl */ + curr->ttl = _getlong(*cp); + *cp += INT32SZ; + + /* rdata size */ + curr->size = _getshort(*cp); + *cp += INT16SZ; + + /* rdata itself */ + curr->rdata = malloc(curr->size); + if (curr->rdata == NULL) { + free_dns_rr(head); + return (NULL); + } + memcpy(curr->rdata, *cp, curr->size); + *cp += curr->size; + } + + return (head); +} + +static void +free_dns_query(struct dns_query *p) +{ + if (p == NULL) + return; + + if (p->name) + free(p->name); + free_dns_query(p->next); + free(p); +} + +static void +free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p) +{ + if (p == NULL) + return; + + if (p->name) + free(p->name); + if (p->rdata) + free(p->rdata); + free_dns_rr(p->next); + free(p); +} + +static void +free_dns_response(struct dns_response *p) +{ + if (p == NULL) + return; + + free_dns_query(p->query); + free_dns_rr(p->answer); + free_dns_rr(p->authority); + free_dns_rr(p->additional); + free(p); +} + +static int +count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p, u_int16_t class, u_int16_t type) +{ + int n = 0; + + while(p) { + if (p->class == class && p->type == type) + n++; + p = p->next; + } + + return (n); +} + +#endif /* !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1283f55 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +/* OPENBSD BASED ON : include/netdb.h */ + +/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.4 2001/08/16 18:16:43 ho Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM + * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL + * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, + * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING + * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, + * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION + * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _GETRRSETBYNAME_H +#define _GETRRSETBYNAME_H + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef HFIXEDSZ +#define HFIXEDSZ 12 +#endif + +#ifndef T_RRSIG +#define T_RRSIG 46 +#endif + +/* + * Flags for getrrsetbyname() + */ +#ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED +# define RRSET_VALIDATED 1 +#endif + +/* + * Return codes for getrrsetbyname() + */ +#ifndef ERRSET_SUCCESS +# define ERRSET_SUCCESS 0 +# define ERRSET_NOMEMORY 1 +# define ERRSET_FAIL 2 +# define ERRSET_INVAL 3 +# define ERRSET_NONAME 4 +# define ERRSET_NODATA 5 +#endif + +struct rdatainfo { + unsigned int rdi_length; /* length of data */ + unsigned char *rdi_data; /* record data */ +}; + +struct rrsetinfo { + unsigned int rri_flags; /* RRSET_VALIDATED ... */ + unsigned int rri_rdclass; /* class number */ + unsigned int rri_rdtype; /* RR type number */ + unsigned int rri_ttl; /* time to live */ + unsigned int rri_nrdatas; /* size of rdatas array */ + unsigned int rri_nsigs; /* size of sigs array */ + char *rri_name; /* canonical name */ + struct rdatainfo *rri_rdatas; /* individual records */ + struct rdatainfo *rri_sigs; /* individual signatures */ +}; + +int getrrsetbyname(const char *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, struct rrsetinfo **); +void freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *); + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) */ + +#endif /* _GETRRSETBYNAME_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/openbsd-compat/glob.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c97e67 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/glob.c @@ -0,0 +1,1066 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.38 2011/09/22 06:27:29 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */ + +/* + * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2. + * + * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh). + * + * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX: + * + * GLOB_QUOTE: + * Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following + * character might have (except \ at end of string is retained). + * GLOB_MAGCHAR: + * Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character. + * GLOB_NOMAGIC: + * Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did + * not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing] + * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC: + * Use alternately specified directory access functions. + * GLOB_TILDE: + * expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo + * GLOB_BRACE: + * expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b + * gl_matchc: + * Number of matches in the current invocation of glob. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "glob.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \ + !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \ + !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \ + defined(BROKEN_GLOB) + +#include "charclass.h" + +#define DOLLAR '$' +#define DOT '.' +#define EOS '\0' +#define LBRACKET '[' +#define NOT '!' +#define QUESTION '?' +#define QUOTE '\\' +#define RANGE '-' +#define RBRACKET ']' +#define SEP '/' +#define STAR '*' +#define TILDE '~' +#define UNDERSCORE '_' +#define LBRACE '{' +#define RBRACE '}' +#define SLASH '/' +#define COMMA ',' + +#ifndef DEBUG + +#define M_QUOTE 0x8000 +#define M_PROTECT 0x4000 +#define M_MASK 0xffff +#define M_ASCII 0x00ff + +typedef u_short Char; + +#else + +#define M_QUOTE 0x80 +#define M_PROTECT 0x40 +#define M_MASK 0xff +#define M_ASCII 0x7f + +typedef char Char; + +#endif + + +#define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII)) +#define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE)) +#define M_ALL META('*') +#define M_END META(']') +#define M_NOT META('!') +#define M_ONE META('?') +#define M_RNG META('-') +#define M_SET META('[') +#define M_CLASS META(':') +#define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0) + +#define GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC 65536 +#define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 128 +#define GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR 16384 + +/* Limit of recursion during matching attempts. */ +#define GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR 64 + +struct glob_lim { + size_t glim_malloc; + size_t glim_stat; + size_t glim_readdir; +}; + +struct glob_path_stat { + char *gps_path; + struct stat *gps_stat; +}; + +static int compare(const void *, const void *); +static int compare_gps(const void *, const void *); +static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, u_int); +static int g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); +static DIR *g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *); +static Char *g_strchr(const Char *, int); +static int g_strncmp(const Char *, const char *, size_t); +static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *); +static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); +static int glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); +static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, + glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); +static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, + Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); +static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *, + struct stat *); +static const Char * + globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *); +static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *); +static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *, + struct glob_lim *); +static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *, int); +#ifdef DEBUG +static void qprintf(const char *, Char *); +#endif + +int +glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), + glob_t *pglob) +{ + const u_char *patnext; + int c; + Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; + struct glob_lim limit = { 0, 0, 0 }; + + if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX) + return(GLOB_NOMATCH); + + patnext = (u_char *) pattern; + if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) { + pglob->gl_pathc = 0; + pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; + pglob->gl_statv = NULL; + if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS)) + pglob->gl_offs = 0; + } + pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR; + pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc; + pglob->gl_matchc = 0; + + if (pglob->gl_offs < 0 || pglob->gl_pathc < 0 || + pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX || + pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1) + return GLOB_NOSPACE; + + bufnext = patbuf; + bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1; + if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE) + while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS) + *bufnext++ = c; + else { + /* Protect the quoted characters. */ + while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS) + if (c == QUOTE) { + if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) { + c = QUOTE; + --patnext; + } + *bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT; + } else + *bufnext++ = c; + } + *bufnext = EOS; + + if (flags & GLOB_BRACE) + return globexp1(patbuf, pglob, &limit); + else + return glob0(patbuf, pglob, &limit); +} + +/* + * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion + * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic + * characters + */ +static int +globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) +{ + const Char* ptr = pattern; + + /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */ + if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS) + return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp); + + if ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL) + return globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, limitp); + + return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp); +} + + +/* + * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace. + * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern. + * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns. + */ +static int +globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, + struct glob_lim *limitp) +{ + int i, rv; + Char *lm, *ls; + const Char *pe, *pm, *pl; + Char patbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + /* copy part up to the brace */ + for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++) + ; + *lm = EOS; + ls = lm; + + /* Find the balanced brace */ + for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++) + if (*pe == LBRACKET) { + /* Ignore everything between [] */ + for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++) + ; + if (*pe == EOS) { + /* + * We could not find a matching RBRACKET. + * Ignore and just look for RBRACE + */ + pe = pm; + } + } else if (*pe == LBRACE) + i++; + else if (*pe == RBRACE) { + if (i == 0) + break; + i--; + } + + /* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */ + if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS) + return glob0(patbuf, pglob, limitp); + + for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) { + switch (*pm) { + case LBRACKET: + /* Ignore everything between [] */ + for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++) + ; + if (*pm == EOS) { + /* + * We could not find a matching RBRACKET. + * Ignore and just look for RBRACE + */ + pm = pl; + } + break; + + case LBRACE: + i++; + break; + + case RBRACE: + if (i) { + i--; + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case COMMA: + if (i && *pm == COMMA) + break; + else { + /* Append the current string */ + for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++) + ; + + /* + * Append the rest of the pattern after the + * closing brace + */ + for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; ) + ; + + /* Expand the current pattern */ +#ifdef DEBUG + qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf); +#endif + rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob, limitp); + if (rv && rv != GLOB_NOMATCH) + return rv; + + /* move after the comma, to the next string */ + pl = pm + 1; + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + } + return 0; +} + + + +/* + * expand tilde from the passwd file. + */ +static const Char * +globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob) +{ + struct passwd *pwd; + char *h; + const Char *p; + Char *b, *eb; + + if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE)) + return pattern; + + /* Copy up to the end of the string or / */ + eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1]; + for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf; + h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++) + ; + + *h = EOS; + +#if 0 + if (h == (char *)eb) + return what; +#endif + + if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) { + /* + * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME + * first and then trying the password file + */ +#if 0 + if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { +#endif + if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) { + if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) + return pattern; + else + h = pwd->pw_dir; + } + } else { + /* + * Expand a ~user + */ + if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL) + return pattern; + else + h = pwd->pw_dir; + } + + /* Copy the home directory */ + for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++) + ; + + /* Append the rest of the pattern */ + while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS) + ; + *b = EOS; + + return patbuf; +} + +static int +g_strncmp(const Char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n) +{ + int rv = 0; + + while (n--) { + rv = *(Char *)s1 - *(const unsigned char *)s2++; + if (rv) + break; + if (*s1++ == '\0') + break; + } + return rv; +} + +static int +g_charclass(const Char **patternp, Char **bufnextp) +{ + const Char *pattern = *patternp + 1; + Char *bufnext = *bufnextp; + const Char *colon; + struct cclass *cc; + size_t len; + + if ((colon = g_strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']') + return 1; /* not a character class */ + + len = (size_t)(colon - pattern); + for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) { + if (!g_strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0') + break; + } + if (cc->name == NULL) + return -1; /* invalid character class */ + *bufnext++ = M_CLASS; + *bufnext++ = (Char)(cc - &cclasses[0]); + *bufnextp = bufnext; + *patternp += len + 3; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing + * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally + * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0 + * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error + * to find no matches. + */ +static int +glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) +{ + const Char *qpatnext; + int c, err, oldpathc; + Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob); + oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc; + bufnext = patbuf; + + /* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */ + while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) { + switch (c) { + case LBRACKET: + c = *qpatnext; + if (c == NOT) + ++qpatnext; + if (*qpatnext == EOS || + g_strchr(qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) { + *bufnext++ = LBRACKET; + if (c == NOT) + --qpatnext; + break; + } + *bufnext++ = M_SET; + if (c == NOT) + *bufnext++ = M_NOT; + c = *qpatnext++; + do { + if (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':') { + do { + err = g_charclass(&qpatnext, + &bufnext); + if (err) + break; + c = *qpatnext++; + } while (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':'); + if (err == -1 && + !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK)) + return GLOB_NOMATCH; + if (c == RBRACKET) + break; + } + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + if (*qpatnext == RANGE && + (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) { + *bufnext++ = M_RNG; + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + qpatnext += 2; + } + } while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET); + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + *bufnext++ = M_END; + break; + case QUESTION: + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + *bufnext++ = M_ONE; + break; + case STAR: + pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR; + /* collapse adjacent stars to one, + * to avoid exponential behavior + */ + if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL) + *bufnext++ = M_ALL; + break; + default: + *bufnext++ = CHAR(c); + break; + } + } + *bufnext = EOS; +#ifdef DEBUG + qprintf("glob0:", patbuf); +#endif + + if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0) + return(err); + + /* + * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern + * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified + * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters + * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh. + */ + if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) { + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) || + ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) && + !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR))) + return(globextend(pattern, pglob, limitp, NULL)); + else + return(GLOB_NOMATCH); + } + if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) { + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT)) { + /* Keep the paths and stat info synced during sort */ + struct glob_path_stat *path_stat; + int i; + int n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc; + int o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc; + + if ((path_stat = calloc(n, sizeof(*path_stat))) == NULL) + return GLOB_NOSPACE; + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + path_stat[i].gps_path = pglob->gl_pathv[o + i]; + path_stat[i].gps_stat = pglob->gl_statv[o + i]; + } + qsort(path_stat, n, sizeof(*path_stat), compare_gps); + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + pglob->gl_pathv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_path; + pglob->gl_statv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_stat; + } + free(path_stat); + } else { + qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc, + pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *), + compare); + } + } + return(0); +} + +static int +compare(const void *p, const void *q) +{ + return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q)); +} + +static int +compare_gps(const void *_p, const void *_q) +{ + const struct glob_path_stat *p = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_p; + const struct glob_path_stat *q = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_q; + + return(strcmp(p->gps_path, q->gps_path)); +} + +static int +glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) +{ + Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + /* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */ + if (*pattern == EOS) + return(0); + return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, + pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, + pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp)); +} + +/* + * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level + * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more + * meta characters. + */ +static int +glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last, + Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp) +{ + struct stat sb; + Char *p, *q; + int anymeta; + + /* + * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until + * segment with meta character found. + */ + for (anymeta = 0;;) { + if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */ + *pathend = EOS; + if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob)) + return(0); + + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && + limitp->glim_stat++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) { + errno = 0; + *pathend++ = SEP; + *pathend = EOS; + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + } + + if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) && + pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) || + (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) && + (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) && + S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) { + if (pathend+1 > pathend_last) + return (1); + *pathend++ = SEP; + *pathend = EOS; + } + ++pglob->gl_matchc; + return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp, &sb)); + } + + /* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */ + q = pathend; + p = pattern; + while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) { + if (ismeta(*p)) + anymeta = 1; + if (q+1 > pathend_last) + return (1); + *q++ = *p++; + } + + if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */ + pathend = q; + pattern = p; + while (*pattern == SEP) { + if (pathend+1 > pathend_last) + return (1); + *pathend++ = *pattern++; + } + } else + /* Need expansion, recurse. */ + return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend, + pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last, + pglob, limitp)); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +static int +glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last, + Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob, + struct glob_lim *limitp) +{ + struct dirent *dp; + DIR *dirp; + int err; + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + /* + * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is + * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h + * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque + * structures. + */ + struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *); + + if (pathend > pathend_last) + return (1); + *pathend = EOS; + errno = 0; + + if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) { + /* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */ + if (pglob->gl_errfunc) { + if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf))) + return(GLOB_ABORTED); + if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) || + pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR) + return(GLOB_ABORTED); + } + return(0); + } + + err = 0; + + /* Search directory for matching names. */ + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir; + else + readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir; + while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) { + u_char *sc; + Char *dc; + + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && + limitp->glim_readdir++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) { + errno = 0; + *pathend++ = SEP; + *pathend = EOS; + err = GLOB_NOSPACE; + break; + } + + /* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */ + if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT) + continue; + dc = pathend; + sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name; + while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS) + ; + if (dc >= pathend_last) { + *dc = EOS; + err = 1; + break; + } + + if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern, GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR)) { + *pathend = EOS; + continue; + } + err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last, + restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp); + if (err) + break; + } + + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + (*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp); + else + closedir(dirp); + return(err); +} + + +/* + * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item, + * add the new item, and update gl_pathc. + * + * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size + * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic + * behavior. + * + * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated. + * + * Invariant of the glob_t structure: + * Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and + * gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items. + */ +static int +globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp, + struct stat *sb) +{ + char **pathv; + ssize_t i; + size_t newn, len; + char *copy = NULL; + const Char *p; + struct stat **statv; + + newn = 2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs; + if (pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX || + pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX || + newn >= INT_MAX || + SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*pathv) <= newn || + SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*statv) <= newn) { + nospace: + for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < (ssize_t)(newn - 2); i++) { + if (pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i]) + free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]); + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0 && + pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i]) + free(pglob->gl_statv[i]); + } + if (pglob->gl_pathv) { + free(pglob->gl_pathv); + pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; + } + if (pglob->gl_statv) { + free(pglob->gl_statv); + pglob->gl_statv = NULL; + } + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + } + + pathv = realloc(pglob->gl_pathv, newn * sizeof(*pathv)); + if (pathv == NULL) + goto nospace; + if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) { + /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */ + pathv += pglob->gl_offs; + for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; ) + *--pathv = NULL; + } + pglob->gl_pathv = pathv; + + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0) { + statv = realloc(pglob->gl_statv, newn * sizeof(*statv)); + if (statv == NULL) + goto nospace; + if (pglob->gl_statv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) { + /* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */ + statv += pglob->gl_offs; + for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; ) + *--statv = NULL; + } + pglob->gl_statv = statv; + if (sb == NULL) + statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL; + else { + limitp->glim_malloc += sizeof(**statv); + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && + limitp->glim_malloc >= GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) { + errno = 0; + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + } + if ((statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = + malloc(sizeof(**statv))) == NULL) + goto copy_error; + memcpy(statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc], sb, + sizeof(*sb)); + } + statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc + 1] = NULL; + } + + for (p = path; *p++;) + ; + len = (size_t)(p - path); + limitp->glim_malloc += len; + if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) { + if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) { + free(copy); + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + } + pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy; + } + pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL; + + if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) && + (newn * sizeof(*pathv)) + limitp->glim_malloc > + GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) { + errno = 0; + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + } + copy_error: + return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0); +} + + +/* + * pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the * + * pattern causes a recursion level. + */ +static int +match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend, int recur) +{ + int ok, negate_range; + Char c, k; + + if (recur-- == 0) + return(GLOB_NOSPACE); + + while (pat < patend) { + c = *pat++; + switch (c & M_MASK) { + case M_ALL: + while (pat < patend && (*pat & M_MASK) == M_ALL) + pat++; /* eat consecutive '*' */ + if (pat == patend) + return(1); + do { + if (match(name, pat, patend, recur)) + return(1); + } while (*name++ != EOS); + return(0); + case M_ONE: + if (*name++ == EOS) + return(0); + break; + case M_SET: + ok = 0; + if ((k = *name++) == EOS) + return(0); + if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS) + ++pat; + while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) { + if ((c & M_MASK) == M_CLASS) { + Char idx = *pat & M_MASK; + if (idx < NCCLASSES && + cclasses[idx].isctype(k)) + ok = 1; + ++pat; + } + if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) { + if (c <= k && k <= pat[1]) + ok = 1; + pat += 2; + } else if (c == k) + ok = 1; + } + if (ok == negate_range) + return(0); + break; + default: + if (*name++ != c) + return(0); + break; + } + } + return(*name == EOS); +} + +/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */ +void +globfree(glob_t *pglob) +{ + int i; + char **pp; + + if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) { + pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs; + for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp) + if (*pp) + free(*pp); + free(pglob->gl_pathv); + pglob->gl_pathv = NULL; + } + if (pglob->gl_statv != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < pglob->gl_pathc; i++) { + if (pglob->gl_statv[i] != NULL) + free(pglob->gl_statv[i]); + } + free(pglob->gl_statv); + pglob->gl_statv = NULL; + } +} + +static DIR * +g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if (!*str) + strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf); + else { + if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf))) + return(NULL); + } + + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf)); + + return(opendir(buf)); +} + +static int +g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf))) + return(-1); + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb)); + return(lstat(buf, sb)); +} + +static int +g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob) +{ + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + + if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf))) + return(-1); + if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC) + return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb)); + return(stat(buf, sb)); +} + +static Char * +g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch) +{ + do { + if (*str == ch) + return ((Char *)str); + } while (*str++); + return (NULL); +} + +static int +g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, u_int len) +{ + + while (len--) { + if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS) + return (0); + } + return (1); +} + +#ifdef DEBUG +static void +qprintf(const char *str, Char *s) +{ + Char *p; + + (void)printf("%s:\n", str); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + (void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p)); + (void)printf("\n"); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + (void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' '); + (void)printf("\n"); + for (p = s; *p; p++) + (void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' '); + (void)printf("\n"); +} +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || + !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/glob.h b/openbsd-compat/glob.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f069a05 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/glob.h @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.11 2010/09/24 13:32:55 djm Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Guido van Rossum. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93 + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \ + !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \ + !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \ + defined(BROKEN_GLOB) + +#ifndef _COMPAT_GLOB_H_ +#define _COMPAT_GLOB_H_ + +#include + +# define glob_t _ssh_compat_glob_t +# define glob(a, b, c, d) _ssh__compat_glob(a, b, c, d) +# define globfree(a) _ssh__compat_globfree(a) + +struct stat; +typedef struct { + int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */ + int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */ + int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */ + int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */ + char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */ + struct stat **gl_statv; /* Stat entries corresponding to gl_pathv */ + /* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */ + int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int); + + /* + * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement + * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2) + * and lstat(2). + */ + void (*gl_closedir)(void *); + struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *); + void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *); + int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *); + int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *); +} glob_t; + +#define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */ +#define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */ +#define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */ +#define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */ +#define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */ +#define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */ +#define GLOB_NOESCAPE 0x1000 /* Disable backslash escaping. */ + +#define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */ +#define GLOB_ABORTED (-2) /* Unignored error. */ +#define GLOB_NOMATCH (-3) /* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */ +#define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */ + +#define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */ +#define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */ +#define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */ +#define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */ +#define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */ +#define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */ +#define GLOB_LIMIT 0x2000 /* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */ +#define GLOB_KEEPSTAT 0x4000 /* Retain stat data for paths in gl_statv. */ +#define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED /* backward compatibility */ + +int glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); +void globfree(glob_t *); + +#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */ + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || + !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOH_HAS_GL_STATV) */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c b/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..093a172 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.9 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * - + * Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that + * the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or + * publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without + * specific, written prior permission. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL + * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT + * CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR + * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS + * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + * - + * --Copyright-- + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_addr.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if 0 +/* + * Ascii internet address interpretation routine. + * The value returned is in network order. + */ +in_addr_t +inet_addr(const char *cp) +{ + struct in_addr val; + + if (inet_aton(cp, &val)) + return (val.s_addr); + return (INADDR_NONE); +} +#endif + +/* + * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation + * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address. + * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not. + * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which + * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address. + */ +int +inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr) +{ + u_int32_t val; + int base, n; + char c; + u_int parts[4]; + u_int *pp = parts; + + c = *cp; + for (;;) { + /* + * Collect number up to ``.''. + * Values are specified as for C: + * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal. + */ + if (!isdigit(c)) + return (0); + val = 0; base = 10; + if (c == '0') { + c = *++cp; + if (c == 'x' || c == 'X') + base = 16, c = *++cp; + else + base = 8; + } + for (;;) { + if (isascii(c) && isdigit(c)) { + val = (val * base) + (c - '0'); + c = *++cp; + } else if (base == 16 && isascii(c) && isxdigit(c)) { + val = (val << 4) | + (c + 10 - (islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A')); + c = *++cp; + } else + break; + } + if (c == '.') { + /* + * Internet format: + * a.b.c.d + * a.b.c (with c treated as 16 bits) + * a.b (with b treated as 24 bits) + */ + if (pp >= parts + 3) + return (0); + *pp++ = val; + c = *++cp; + } else + break; + } + /* + * Check for trailing characters. + */ + if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c))) + return (0); + /* + * Concoct the address according to + * the number of parts specified. + */ + n = pp - parts + 1; + switch (n) { + + case 0: + return (0); /* initial nondigit */ + + case 1: /* a -- 32 bits */ + break; + + case 2: /* a.b -- 8.24 bits */ + if ((val > 0xffffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff)) + return (0); + val |= parts[0] << 24; + break; + + case 3: /* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */ + if ((val > 0xffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff)) + return (0); + val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16); + break; + + case 4: /* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */ + if ((val > 0xff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff)) + return (0); + val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8); + break; + } + if (addr) + addr->s_addr = htonl(val); + return (1); +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c b/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0eb7b3b --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: inet_ntoa.c,v 1.6 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntoa.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) + +/* + * Convert network-format internet address + * to base 256 d.d.d.d representation. + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +char * +inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in) +{ + static char b[18]; + char *p; + + p = (char *)∈ +#define UC(b) (((int)b)&0xff) + (void)snprintf(b, sizeof(b), + "%u.%u.%u.%u", UC(p[0]), UC(p[1]), UC(p[2]), UC(p[3])); + return (b); +} + +#endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c b/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3259037 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.8 2008/12/09 19:38:38 otto Exp $ */ + +/* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS + * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE + * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR + * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS + * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS + * SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntop.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef IN6ADDRSZ +#define IN6ADDRSZ 16 /* IPv6 T_AAAA */ +#endif + +#ifndef INT16SZ +#define INT16SZ 2 /* for systems without 16-bit ints */ +#endif + +/* + * WARNING: Don't even consider trying to compile this on a system where + * sizeof(int) < 4. sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX. + */ + +static const char *inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size); +static const char *inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size); + +/* char * + * inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size) + * convert a network format address to presentation format. + * return: + * pointer to presentation format address (`dst'), or NULL (see errno). + * author: + * Paul Vixie, 1996. + */ +const char * +inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size) +{ + switch (af) { + case AF_INET: + return (inet_ntop4(src, dst, (size_t)size)); + case AF_INET6: + return (inet_ntop6(src, dst, (size_t)size)); + default: + errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; + return (NULL); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* const char * + * inet_ntop4(src, dst, size) + * format an IPv4 address, more or less like inet_ntoa() + * return: + * `dst' (as a const) + * notes: + * (1) uses no statics + * (2) takes a u_char* not an in_addr as input + * author: + * Paul Vixie, 1996. + */ +static const char * +inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size) +{ + static const char fmt[] = "%u.%u.%u.%u"; + char tmp[sizeof "255.255.255.255"]; + int l; + + l = snprintf(tmp, size, fmt, src[0], src[1], src[2], src[3]); + if (l <= 0 || l >= size) { + errno = ENOSPC; + return (NULL); + } + strlcpy(dst, tmp, size); + return (dst); +} + +/* const char * + * inet_ntop6(src, dst, size) + * convert IPv6 binary address into presentation (printable) format + * author: + * Paul Vixie, 1996. + */ +static const char * +inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size) +{ + /* + * Note that int32_t and int16_t need only be "at least" large enough + * to contain a value of the specified size. On some systems, like + * Crays, there is no such thing as an integer variable with 16 bits. + * Keep this in mind if you think this function should have been coded + * to use pointer overlays. All the world's not a VAX. + */ + char tmp[sizeof "ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:255.255.255.255"]; + char *tp, *ep; + struct { int base, len; } best, cur; + u_int words[IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ]; + int i; + int advance; + + /* + * Preprocess: + * Copy the input (bytewise) array into a wordwise array. + * Find the longest run of 0x00's in src[] for :: shorthanding. + */ + memset(words, '\0', sizeof words); + for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++) + words[i / 2] |= (src[i] << ((1 - (i % 2)) << 3)); + best.base = -1; + cur.base = -1; + for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) { + if (words[i] == 0) { + if (cur.base == -1) + cur.base = i, cur.len = 1; + else + cur.len++; + } else { + if (cur.base != -1) { + if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len) + best = cur; + cur.base = -1; + } + } + } + if (cur.base != -1) { + if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len) + best = cur; + } + if (best.base != -1 && best.len < 2) + best.base = -1; + + /* + * Format the result. + */ + tp = tmp; + ep = tmp + sizeof(tmp); + for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ) && tp < ep; i++) { + /* Are we inside the best run of 0x00's? */ + if (best.base != -1 && i >= best.base && + i < (best.base + best.len)) { + if (i == best.base) { + if (tp + 1 >= ep) + return (NULL); + *tp++ = ':'; + } + continue; + } + /* Are we following an initial run of 0x00s or any real hex? */ + if (i != 0) { + if (tp + 1 >= ep) + return (NULL); + *tp++ = ':'; + } + /* Is this address an encapsulated IPv4? */ + if (i == 6 && best.base == 0 && + (best.len == 6 || (best.len == 5 && words[5] == 0xffff))) { + if (!inet_ntop4(src+12, tp, (size_t)(ep - tp))) + return (NULL); + tp += strlen(tp); + break; + } + advance = snprintf(tp, ep - tp, "%x", words[i]); + if (advance <= 0 || advance >= ep - tp) + return (NULL); + tp += advance; + } + /* Was it a trailing run of 0x00's? */ + if (best.base != -1 && (best.base + best.len) == (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ)) { + if (tp + 1 >= ep) + return (NULL); + *tp++ = ':'; + } + if (tp + 1 >= ep) + return (NULL); + *tp++ = '\0'; + + /* + * Check for overflow, copy, and we're done. + */ + if ((size_t)(tp - tmp) > size) { + errno = ENOSPC; + return (NULL); + } + strlcpy(dst, tmp, size); + return (dst); +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c b/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6c2ffb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* Placed in the public domain. */ + +/* + * _FORTIFY_SOURCE includes a misguided check for FD_SET(n)/FD_ISSET(b) + * where n > FD_SETSIZE. This breaks OpenSSH and other programs that + * explicitly allocate fd_sets. To avoid this, we wrap FD_SET in a + * function compiled without _FORTIFY_SOURCE. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) +# include +# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) +# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) +# undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE +# undef __USE_FORTIFY_LEVEL +# include +void kludge_FD_SET(int n, fd_set *set) { + FD_SET(n, set); +} +int kludge_FD_ISSET(int n, fd_set *set) { + return FD_ISSET(n, set); +} +# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */ +# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */ +#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..de3e64a --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c @@ -0,0 +1,636 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: dsa_lib.c,v 1.29 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rsa_lib.c,v 1.37 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: evp_lib.c,v 1.17 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dh_lib.c,v 1.32 2018/05/02 15:48:38 tb Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: p_lib.c,v 1.24 2018/05/30 15:40:50 tb Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: dsa_asn1.c,v 1.22 2018/06/14 17:03:19 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ecs_asn1.c,v 1.9 2018/03/17 15:24:44 tb Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */ +/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL + * project 2000. + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: rsa_meth.c,v 1.2 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Theo Buehler + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG +void +DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) +{ + if (p != NULL) + *p = d->p; + if (q != NULL) + *q = d->q; + if (g != NULL) + *g = d->g; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG +int +DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) +{ + if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL) || + (d->g == NULL && g == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (p != NULL) { + BN_free(d->p); + d->p = p; + } + if (q != NULL) { + BN_free(d->q); + d->q = q; + } + if (g != NULL) { + BN_free(d->g); + d->g = g; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY +void +DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) +{ + if (pub_key != NULL) + *pub_key = d->pub_key; + if (priv_key != NULL) + *priv_key = d->priv_key; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY +int +DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) +{ + if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL) + return 0; + + if (pub_key != NULL) { + BN_free(d->pub_key); + d->pub_key = pub_key; + } + if (priv_key != NULL) { + BN_free(d->priv_key); + d->priv_key = priv_key; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY +void +RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) +{ + if (n != NULL) + *n = r->n; + if (e != NULL) + *e = r->e; + if (d != NULL) + *d = r->d; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY +int +RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) +{ + if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (n != NULL) { + BN_free(r->n); + r->n = n; + } + if (e != NULL) { + BN_free(r->e); + r->e = e; + } + if (d != NULL) { + BN_free(r->d); + r->d = d; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS +void +RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, + const BIGNUM **iqmp) +{ + if (dmp1 != NULL) + *dmp1 = r->dmp1; + if (dmq1 != NULL) + *dmq1 = r->dmq1; + if (iqmp != NULL) + *iqmp = r->iqmp; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS +int +RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) +{ + if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) || + (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) || + (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (dmp1 != NULL) { + BN_free(r->dmp1); + r->dmp1 = dmp1; + } + if (dmq1 != NULL) { + BN_free(r->dmq1); + r->dmq1 = dmq1; + } + if (iqmp != NULL) { + BN_free(r->iqmp); + r->iqmp = iqmp; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS +void +RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) +{ + if (p != NULL) + *p = r->p; + if (q != NULL) + *q = r->q; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS +int +RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) +{ + if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (p != NULL) { + BN_free(r->p); + r->p = p; + } + if (q != NULL) { + BN_free(r->q); + r->q = q; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV +int +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t len) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) + return 0; + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0) + return 0; + if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) + return 0; + if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) + return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */ + /* + * Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero, + * since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid. + */ + if (len != 0) { + if (iv == NULL) + return 0; +# ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV + memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx), len); +# else + memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, len); +# endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV */ + } + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV +int +EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) + return 0; + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0) + return 0; + if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) + return 0; + if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) + return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */ + /* + * Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero, + * since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid. + */ + if (len != 0) { + if (iv == NULL) + return 0; +# ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST + memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, len); +# else + memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); +# endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST */ + } + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 +void +DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) +{ + if (pr != NULL) + *pr = sig->r; + if (ps != NULL) + *ps = sig->s; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 +int +DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) +{ + if (r == NULL || s == NULL) + return 0; + + BN_clear_free(sig->r); + sig->r = r; + BN_clear_free(sig->s); + sig->s = s; + + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 */ + +#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 +void +ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) +{ + if (pr != NULL) + *pr = sig->r; + if (ps != NULL) + *ps = sig->s; +} +#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */ + +#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 +int +ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) +{ + if (r == NULL || s == NULL) + return 0; + + BN_clear_free(sig->r); + BN_clear_free(sig->s); + sig->r = r; + sig->s = s; + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG +void +DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g) +{ + if (p != NULL) + *p = dh->p; + if (q != NULL) + *q = dh->q; + if (g != NULL) + *g = dh->g; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG +int +DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) +{ + if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (p != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->p); + dh->p = p; + } + if (q != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->q); + dh->q = q; + } + if (g != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->g); + dh->g = g; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY +void +DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key) +{ + if (pub_key != NULL) + *pub_key = dh->pub_key; + if (priv_key != NULL) + *priv_key = dh->priv_key; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY +int +DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) +{ + if (pub_key != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->pub_key); + dh->pub_key = pub_key; + } + if (priv_key != NULL) { + BN_free(dh->priv_key); + dh->priv_key = priv_key; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH +int +DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length) +{ + if (length < 0 || length > INT_MAX) + return 0; + + dh->length = length; + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE +void +RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth) +{ + if (meth != NULL) { + free((char *)meth->name); + free(meth); + } +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP +RSA_METHOD * +RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth) +{ + RSA_METHOD *copy; + + if ((copy = calloc(1, sizeof(*copy))) == NULL) + return NULL; + memcpy(copy, meth, sizeof(*copy)); + if ((copy->name = strdup(meth->name)) == NULL) { + free(copy); + return NULL; + } + + return copy; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME +int +RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name) +{ + char *copy; + + if ((copy = strdup(name)) == NULL) + return 0; + free((char *)meth->name); + meth->name = copy; + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH +int +(*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa) +{ + return meth->finish; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC +int +RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) +{ + meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc; + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC +int +RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)) +{ + meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec; + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH +int +RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa)) +{ + meth->finish = finish; + return 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA +RSA * +EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + /* EVPerror(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY); */ + return NULL; + } + return pkey->pkey.rsa; +} +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW +EVP_MD_CTX * +EVP_MD_CTX_new(void) +{ + return calloc(1, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); +} +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE +void +EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) + return; + + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx); + + free(ctx); +} +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE */ + +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/md5.c b/openbsd-compat/md5.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..195ab51 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/md5.c @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: md5.c,v 1.9 2014/01/08 06:14:57 tedu Exp $ */ + +/* + * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm. + * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest. This code was + * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed. + * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish. + * + * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc. + * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent, + * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese + * with every copy. + * + * To compute the message digest of a chunk of bytes, declare an + * MD5Context structure, pass it to MD5Init, call MD5Update as + * needed on buffers full of bytes, and then call MD5Final, which + * will fill a supplied 16-byte array with the digest. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include +#include +#include "md5.h" + +#define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \ + (cp)[7] = (value) >> 56; \ + (cp)[6] = (value) >> 48; \ + (cp)[5] = (value) >> 40; \ + (cp)[4] = (value) >> 32; \ + (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \ + (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \ + (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \ + (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0) + +#define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \ + (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \ + (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \ + (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \ + (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0) + +static u_int8_t PADDING[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH] = { + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * Start MD5 accumulation. Set bit count to 0 and buffer to mysterious + * initialization constants. + */ +void +MD5Init(MD5_CTX *ctx) +{ + ctx->count = 0; + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xefcdab89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98badcfe; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; +} + +/* + * Update context to reflect the concatenation of another buffer full + * of bytes. + */ +void +MD5Update(MD5_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t len) +{ + size_t have, need; + + /* Check how many bytes we already have and how many more we need. */ + have = (size_t)((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1)); + need = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - have; + + /* Update bitcount */ + ctx->count += (u_int64_t)len << 3; + + if (len >= need) { + if (have != 0) { + memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need); + MD5Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer); + input += need; + len -= need; + have = 0; + } + + /* Process data in MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH-byte chunks. */ + while (len >= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH) { + MD5Transform(ctx->state, input); + input += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH; + len -= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH; + } + } + + /* Handle any remaining bytes of data. */ + if (len != 0) + memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, len); +} + +/* + * Pad pad to 64-byte boundary with the bit pattern + * 1 0* (64-bit count of bits processed, MSB-first) + */ +void +MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *ctx) +{ + u_int8_t count[8]; + size_t padlen; + + /* Convert count to 8 bytes in little endian order. */ + PUT_64BIT_LE(count, ctx->count); + + /* Pad out to 56 mod 64. */ + padlen = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - + ((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1)); + if (padlen < 1 + 8) + padlen += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH; + MD5Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8); /* padlen - 8 <= 64 */ + MD5Update(ctx, count, 8); +} + +/* + * Final wrapup--call MD5Pad, fill in digest and zero out ctx. + */ +void +MD5Final(unsigned char digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *ctx) +{ + int i; + + MD5Pad(ctx); + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i * 4, ctx->state[i]); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + + +/* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */ + +/* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */ +#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) +#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y) +#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z) +#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z)) + +/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */ +#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \ + ( w += f(x, y, z) + data, w = w<>(32-s), w += x ) + +/* + * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to + * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data. MD5Update blocks + * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine. + */ +void +MD5Transform(u_int32_t state[4], const u_int8_t block[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH]) +{ + u_int32_t a, b, c, d, in[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4]; + +#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN + memcpy(in, block, sizeof(in)); +#else + for (a = 0; a < MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4; a++) { + in[a] = (u_int32_t)( + (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 0]) | + (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 1]) << 8 | + (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 2]) << 16 | + (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 3]) << 24); + } +#endif + + a = state[0]; + b = state[1]; + c = state[2]; + d = state[3]; + + MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xd76aa478, 7); + MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12); + MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + 0x242070db, 17); + MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22); + MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7); + MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + 0x4787c62a, 12); + MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + 0xa8304613, 17); + MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + 0xfd469501, 22); + MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + 0x698098d8, 7); + MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12); + MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17); + MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22); + MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7); + MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12); + MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17); + MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22); + + MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xf61e2562, 5); + MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + 0xc040b340, 9); + MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14); + MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20); + MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xd62f105d, 5); + MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9); + MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14); + MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20); + MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5); + MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9); + MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14); + MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + 0x455a14ed, 20); + MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5); + MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9); + MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0x676f02d9, 14); + MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20); + + MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xfffa3942, 4); + MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 8] + 0x8771f681, 11); + MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16); + MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23); + MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xa4beea44, 4); + MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11); + MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16); + MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23); + MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4); + MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11); + MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16); + MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 6] + 0x04881d05, 23); + MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4); + MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11); + MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16); + MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2 ] + 0xc4ac5665, 23); + + MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xf4292244, 6); + MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7 ] + 0x432aff97, 10); + MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15); + MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5 ] + 0xfc93a039, 21); + MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6); + MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3 ] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10); + MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15); + MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1 ] + 0x85845dd1, 21); + MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8 ] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6); + MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10); + MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6 ] + 0xa3014314, 15); + MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21); + MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4 ] + 0xf7537e82, 6); + MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10); + MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2 ] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15); + MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9 ] + 0xeb86d391, 21); + + state[0] += a; + state[1] += b; + state[2] += c; + state[3] += d; +} +#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/md5.h b/openbsd-compat/md5.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c83c19d --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/md5.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: md5.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm. + * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest. This code was + * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed. + * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish. + * + * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc. + * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent, + * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese + * with every copy. + */ + +#ifndef _MD5_H_ +#define _MD5_H_ + +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + +#define MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH 64 +#define MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH 16 +#define MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) + +typedef struct MD5Context { + u_int32_t state[4]; /* state */ + u_int64_t count; /* number of bits, mod 2^64 */ + u_int8_t buffer[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* input buffer */ +} MD5_CTX; + +void MD5Init(MD5_CTX *); +void MD5Update(MD5_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); +void MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *); +void MD5Final(u_int8_t [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH))); +void MD5Transform(u_int32_t [4], const u_int8_t [MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH]) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,4))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH))); +char *MD5End(MD5_CTX *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *MD5File(const char *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *MD5FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *MD5Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); + +#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#endif /* _MD5_H_ */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c b/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4eb52f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/* THIS FILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL OPENBSD SOURCE */ +/* Changes: Removed mktemp */ + +/* $OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.30 2010/03/21 23:09:30 schwarze Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1996-1998, 2008 Theo de Raadt + * Copyright (c) 1997, 2008-2009 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdio/mktemp.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) + +#define MKTEMP_NAME 0 +#define MKTEMP_FILE 1 +#define MKTEMP_DIR 2 + +#define TEMPCHARS "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" +#define NUM_CHARS (sizeof(TEMPCHARS) - 1) + +static int +mktemp_internal(char *path, int slen, int mode) +{ + char *start, *cp, *ep; + const char *tempchars = TEMPCHARS; + unsigned int r, tries; + struct stat sb; + size_t len; + int fd; + + len = strlen(path); + if (len == 0 || slen < 0 || (size_t)slen >= len) { + errno = EINVAL; + return(-1); + } + ep = path + len - slen; + + tries = 1; + for (start = ep; start > path && start[-1] == 'X'; start--) { + if (tries < INT_MAX / NUM_CHARS) + tries *= NUM_CHARS; + } + tries *= 2; + + do { + for (cp = start; cp != ep; cp++) { + r = arc4random_uniform(NUM_CHARS); + *cp = tempchars[r]; + } + + switch (mode) { + case MKTEMP_NAME: + if (lstat(path, &sb) != 0) + return(errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1); + break; + case MKTEMP_FILE: + fd = open(path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR); + if (fd != -1 || errno != EEXIST) + return(fd); + break; + case MKTEMP_DIR: + if (mkdir(path, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR) == 0) + return(0); + if (errno != EEXIST) + return(-1); + break; + } + } while (--tries); + + errno = EEXIST; + return(-1); +} + +#if 0 +char *_mktemp(char *); + +char * +_mktemp(char *path) +{ + if (mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_NAME) == -1) + return(NULL); + return(path); +} + +__warn_references(mktemp, + "warning: mktemp() possibly used unsafely; consider using mkstemp()"); + +char * +mktemp(char *path) +{ + return(_mktemp(path)); +} +#endif + +int +mkstemp(char *path) +{ + return(mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_FILE)); +} + +int +mkstemps(char *path, int slen) +{ + return(mktemp_internal(path, slen, MKTEMP_FILE)); +} + +char * +mkdtemp(char *path) +{ + int error; + + error = mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_DIR); + return(error ? NULL : path); +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5c833b --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H +#define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include /* for wchar_t */ + +/* OpenBSD function replacements */ +#include "base64.h" +#include "sigact.h" +#include "readpassphrase.h" +#include "vis.h" +#include "getrrsetbyname.h" +#include "sha1.h" +#include "sha2.h" +#include "rmd160.h" +#include "md5.h" +#include "blf.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME +char *basename(const char *path); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA +int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM +void closefrom(int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETLINE +ssize_t getline(char **, size_t *, FILE *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE +int getpagesize(void); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETCWD +char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY +void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY +void *recallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) +/* + * glibc's FORTIFY_SOURCE can redefine this and prevent us picking up the + * compat version. + */ +# ifdef BROKEN_REALPATH +# define realpath(x, y) _ssh_compat_realpath(x, y) +# endif + +char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF +int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY +size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT +size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRCASESTR +char *strcasestr(const char *, const char *); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SETENV +int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE +void strmode(int mode, char *p); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME +#include +char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) +int mkstemps(char *path, int slen); +int mkstemp(char *path); +char *mkdtemp(char *path); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON +int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME +char *dirname(const char *path); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED +#define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7 +int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED +int scan_scaled(char *, long long *); +#endif + +#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) +char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP +const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON +int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP +char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE +void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...); +void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST +int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) +int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts); +#include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h" +#endif + +#if ((defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0) || \ + (defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0)) +# include +# include + +# if defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0 +int readv(int, struct iovec *, int); +# endif + +# if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0 +int writev(int, struct iovec *, int); +# endif +#endif + +/* Home grown routines */ +#include "bsd-misc.h" +#include "bsd-setres_id.h" +#include "bsd-signal.h" +#include "bsd-statvfs.h" +#include "bsd-waitpid.h" +#include "bsd-poll.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID +int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *); +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM +# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR +# define arc4random_stir() +# endif +#else +unsigned int arc4random(void); +void arc4random_stir(void); +#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ + +#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF +void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM +u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF +int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY +# include /* for struct winsize */ +int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *); +#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF +int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL +long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL +unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL +unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM +long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **); +#endif + +/* multibyte character support */ +#ifndef HAVE_MBLEN +# define mblen(x, y) (1) +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_WCWIDTH +# define wcwidth(x) (((x) >= 0x20 && (x) <= 0x7e) ? 1 : -1) +/* force our no-op nl_langinfo and mbtowc */ +# undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO +# undef HAVE_MBTOWC +# undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO +# define nl_langinfo(x) "" +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC +int mbtowc(wchar_t *, const char*, size_t); +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) +# include +#endif + +/* + * Some platforms unconditionally undefine va_copy() so we define VA_COPY() + * instead. This is known to be the case on at least some configurations of + * AIX with the xlc compiler. + */ +#ifndef VA_COPY +# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY +# define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src) +# else +# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY +# define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src) +# else +# define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src) +# endif +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF +int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF +int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID +char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID +char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP +int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF +int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t, + u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO +void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n); +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO +void freezero(void *, size_t); +#endif + +char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt); +char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw); + +/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */ +#include "fake-rfc2553.h" + +/* Routines for a single OS platform */ +#include "bsd-cygwin_util.h" + +#include "port-aix.h" +#include "port-irix.h" +#include "port-linux.h" +#include "port-solaris.h" +#include "port-net.h" +#include "port-uw.h" + +/* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */ +#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) +# include +# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) +# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) +# include /* Ensure include guard is defined */ +# undef FD_SET +# undef FD_ISSET +# define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set) +# define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set) +void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *); +int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *); +# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */ +# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */ +#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */ + +#endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b4a362 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include +#include + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE +# include +# include +#endif + +#include "log.h" + +#include "openssl-compat.h" + +/* + * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status + * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0. + * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we + * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed + * within a patch series. + */ + +int +ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver) +{ + long mask, hfix, lfix; + + /* exact match is always OK */ + if (headerver == libver) + return 1; + + /* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */ + if (headerver < 0x1000000f) { + mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */ + return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask); + } + + /* + * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library + * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header. + */ + mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */ + hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; + lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; + if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE +void +ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void) +{ + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + + /* Enable use of crypto hardware */ + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); + ENGINE_register_all_complete(); + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L + OPENSSL_config(NULL); +#else + OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS | + OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL); +#endif +} +#endif + +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e0264c --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER + * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H +#define _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long); + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x0090805fL) +# error OpenSSL 0.9.8f or greater is required +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L +# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int +#else +# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS +# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384 +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS +# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR +# define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr +# define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr +# define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr +const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void); +void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t); +#endif + +/* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */ +#if !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM) && !defined(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED) +# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED -1 +# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN -1 +# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG -1 +# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1 +#endif + +/* Replace missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with something that returns failure */ +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM +# error AES-GCM enabled without EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl /* shouldn't happen */ +# else +# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(a,b,c,d) (0) +# endif +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160) +# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_RMD160) +# undef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 +# endif +#endif + +/* + * We overload some of the OpenSSL crypto functions with ssh_* equivalents + * to automatically handle OpenSSL engine initialisation. + * + * In order for the compat library to call the real functions, it must + * define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS before including this file and + * implement the ssh_* equivalents. + */ +#ifndef SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS + +# ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE +# ifdef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms +# undef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms +# endif +# define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() +# endif + +void ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void); + +#endif /* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */ + +/* LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API compat */ +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG +void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, + const BIGNUM **g); +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG +int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY +void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, + const BIGNUM **priv_key); +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY +int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); +#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV +int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + unsigned char *iv, size_t len); +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV +int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t len); +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY +void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, + const BIGNUM **d); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY +int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS +void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, + const BIGNUM **iqmp); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS +int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS +void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS +int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */ + +#ifndef DSA_SIG_GET0 +void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); +#endif /* DSA_SIG_GET0 */ + +#ifndef DSA_SIG_SET0 +int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); +#endif /* DSA_SIG_SET0 */ + +#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 +void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); +#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */ + +#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 +int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); +#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG +void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, + const BIGNUM **g); +#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG +int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g); +#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY +void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key); +#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY +int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key); +#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */ + +#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH +int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length); +#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE +void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP +RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME +int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH +int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC +int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC +int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen, + const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */ + +#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH +int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa)); +#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA +RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey); +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new +EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void); +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new */ + +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free +void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free */ + +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +#endif /* _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..943177c --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c @@ -0,0 +1,480 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2003,2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ +#include "includes.h" + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh_api.h" +#include "log.h" + +#ifdef _AIX + +#include +#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H) +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE +# include +# include +# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG) +# include +# endif +# include +#endif + +#include "port-aix.h" + +static char *lastlogin_msg = NULL; + +# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB +static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = ""; +# endif + +/* + * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored - + * a few applications actually use this and die if it's not set + * + * NOTE: TTY= should be set, but since no one uses it and it's hard to + * acquire due to privsep code. We will just drop support. + */ +void +aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw) +{ + u_int i; + size_t len; + char *cp; + + len = sizeof("LOGNAME= NAME= ") + (2 * strlen(pw->pw_name)); + cp = xmalloc(len); + + i = snprintf(cp, len, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, '\0', + pw->pw_name, '\0'); + if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1) + fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", strerror(errno)); + debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i); + + free(cp); +} + +# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE +/* + * Remove embedded newlines in string (if any). + * Used before logging messages returned by AIX authentication functions + * so the message is logged on one line. + */ +void +aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *p) +{ + if (p == NULL) + return; + + for (; *p; p++) { + if (*p == '\n') + *p = ' '; + } + /* Remove trailing whitespace */ + if (*--p == ' ') + *p = '\0'; +} + +/* + * Test specifically for the case where SYSTEM == NONE and AUTH1 contains + * anything other than NONE or SYSTEM, which indicates that the admin has + * configured the account for purely AUTH1-type authentication. + * + * Since authenticate() doesn't check AUTH1, and sshd can't sanely support + * AUTH1 itself, in such a case authenticate() will allow access without + * authentation, which is almost certainly not what the admin intends. + * + * (The native tools, eg login, will process the AUTH1 list in addition to + * the SYSTEM list by using ckuserID(), however ckuserID() and AUTH1 methods + * have been deprecated since AIX 4.2.x and would be very difficult for sshd + * to support. + * + * Returns 0 if an unsupportable combination is found, 1 otherwise. + */ +static int +aix_valid_authentications(const char *user) +{ + char *auth1, *sys, *p; + int valid = 1; + + if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTHSYSTEM, &sys, SEC_CHAR) != 0) { + logit("Can't retrieve attribute SYSTEM for %s: %.100s", + user, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + debug3("AIX SYSTEM attribute %s", sys); + if (strcmp(sys, "NONE") != 0) + return 1; /* not "NONE", so is OK */ + + if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTH1, &auth1, SEC_LIST) != 0) { + logit("Can't retrieve attribute auth1 for %s: %.100s", + user, strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + + p = auth1; + /* A SEC_LIST is concatenated strings, ending with two NULs. */ + while (p[0] != '\0' && p[1] != '\0') { + debug3("AIX auth1 attribute list member %s", p); + if (strcmp(p, "NONE") != 0 && strcmp(p, "SYSTEM")) { + logit("Account %s has unsupported auth1 value '%s'", + user, p); + valid = 0; + } + p += strlen(p) + 1; + } + + return (valid); +} + +/* + * Do authentication via AIX's authenticate routine. We loop until the + * reenter parameter is 0, but normally authenticate is called only once. + * + * Note: this function returns 1 on success, whereas AIX's authenticate() + * returns 0. + */ +int +sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) +{ + Authctxt *ctxt = ssh->authctxt; + char *authmsg = NULL, *msg = NULL, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name; + int r, authsuccess = 0, expired, reenter, result; + + do { + result = authenticate((char *)name, (char *)password, &reenter, + &authmsg); + aix_remove_embedded_newlines(authmsg); + debug3("AIX/authenticate result %d, authmsg %.100s", result, + authmsg); + } while (reenter); + + if (!aix_valid_authentications(name)) + result = -1; + + if (result == 0) { + authsuccess = 1; + + /* + * Record successful login. We don't have a pty yet, so just + * label the line as "ssh" + */ + aix_setauthdb(name); + + /* + * Check if the user's password is expired. + */ + expired = passwdexpired(name, &msg); + if (msg && *msg) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(ctxt->loginmsg, + msg, strlen(msg))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg); + } + debug3("AIX/passwdexpired returned %d msg %.100s", expired, msg); + + switch (expired) { + case 0: /* password not expired */ + break; + case 1: /* expired, password change required */ + ctxt->force_pwchange = 1; + break; + default: /* user can't change(2) or other error (-1) */ + logit("Password can't be changed for user %s: %.100s", + name, msg); + free(msg); + authsuccess = 0; + } + + aix_restoreauthdb(); + } + + free(authmsg); + + return authsuccess; +} + +/* + * Check if specified account is permitted to log in. + * Returns 1 if login is allowed, 0 if not allowed. + */ +int +sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *loginmsg) +{ + char *msg = NULL; + int r, result, permitted = 0; + struct stat st; + + /* + * Don't perform checks for root account (PermitRootLogin controls + * logins via ssh) or if running as non-root user (since + * loginrestrictions will always fail due to insufficient privilege). + */ + if (pw->pw_uid == 0 || geteuid() != 0) { + debug3("%s: not checking", __func__); + return 1; + } + + result = loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg); + if (result == 0) + permitted = 1; + /* + * If restricted because /etc/nologin exists, the login will be denied + * in session.c after the nologin message is sent, so allow for now + * and do not append the returned message. + */ + if (result == -1 && errno == EPERM && stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0) + permitted = 1; + else if (msg != NULL) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if (msg == NULL) + msg = xstrdup("(none)"); + aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg); + debug3("AIX/loginrestrictions returned %d msg %.100s", result, msg); + + if (!permitted) + logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, msg); + free(msg); + return permitted; +} + +int +sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm, + struct sshbuf *loginmsg) +{ + char *msg = NULL; + int success = 0; + + aix_setauthdb(user); + if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) { + success = 1; + if (msg != NULL) { + debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg); + if (lastlogin_msg == NULL) + lastlogin_msg = msg; + } + } + aix_restoreauthdb(); + return (success); +} + +char * +sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *user, uid_t uid) +{ + char *msg = lastlogin_msg; + + lastlogin_msg = NULL; + return msg; +} + +# ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN +/* + * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function + */ +void +record_failed_login(const char *user, const char *hostname, const char *ttyname) +{ + if (geteuid() != 0) + return; + + aix_setauthdb(user); +# ifdef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG + loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname, + AUDIT_FAIL_AUTH); +# else + loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname); +# endif + aix_restoreauthdb(); +} +# endif /* CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN */ + +/* + * If we have setauthdb, retrieve the password registry for the user's + * account then feed it to setauthdb. This will mean that subsequent AIX auth + * functions will only use the specified loadable module. If we don't have + * setauthdb this is a no-op. + */ +void +aix_setauthdb(const char *user) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB + char *registry; + + if (setuserdb(S_READ) == -1) { + debug3("%s: Could not open userdb to read", __func__); + return; + } + + if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_REGISTRY, ®istry, SEC_CHAR) == 0) { + if (setauthdb(registry, old_registry) == 0) + debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s'", registry); + else + debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s' failed: %s", + registry, strerror(errno)); + } else + debug3("%s: Could not read S_REGISTRY for user: %s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + enduserdb(); +# endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */ +} + +/* + * Restore the user's registry settings from old_registry. + * Note that if the first aix_setauthdb fails, setauthdb("") is still safe + * (it restores the system default behaviour). If we don't have setauthdb, + * this is a no-op. + */ +void +aix_restoreauthdb(void) +{ +# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB + if (setauthdb(old_registry, NULL) == 0) + debug3("%s: restoring old registry '%s'", __func__, + old_registry); + else + debug3("%s: failed to restore old registry %s", __func__, + old_registry); +# endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */ +} + +# endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ + +# ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME +/* + * aix_krb5_get_principal_name: returns the user's kerberos client principal name if + * configured, otherwise NULL. Caller must free returned string. + */ +char * +aix_krb5_get_principal_name(char *pw_name) +{ + char *authname = NULL, *authdomain = NULL, *principal = NULL; + + setuserdb(S_READ); + if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHDOMAIN, &authdomain, SEC_CHAR) != 0) + debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHDOMAIN: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHNAME, &authname, SEC_CHAR) != 0) + debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHNAME: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (authdomain != NULL) + xasprintf(&principal, "%s@%s", authname ? authname : pw_name, authdomain); + else if (authname != NULL) + principal = xstrdup(authname); + enduserdb(); + return principal; +} +# endif /* USE_AIX_KRB_NAME */ + +# if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_ADDRINFO) +# undef getnameinfo +/* + * For some reason, AIX's getnameinfo will refuse to resolve the all-zeros + * IPv6 address into its textual representation ("::"), so we wrap it + * with a function that will. + */ +int +sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host, + size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; + u_int32_t *a6; + + if (flags & (NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) && + sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) { + sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa; + a6 = sa6->sin6_addr.u6_addr.u6_addr32; + + if (a6[0] == 0 && a6[1] == 0 && a6[2] == 0 && a6[3] == 0) { + strlcpy(host, "::", hostlen); + snprintf(serv, servlen, "%d", sa6->sin6_port); + return 0; + } + } + return getnameinfo(sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags); +} +# endif /* AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */ + +# if defined(USE_GETGRSET) +# include +int +getgrouplist(const char *user, gid_t pgid, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt) +{ + char *cp, *grplist, *grp; + gid_t gid; + int ret = 0, ngroups = 0, maxgroups; + long l; + + maxgroups = *grpcnt; + + if ((cp = grplist = getgrset(user)) == NULL) + return -1; + + /* handle zero-length case */ + if (maxgroups <= 0) { + *grpcnt = 0; + return -1; + } + + /* copy primary group */ + groups[ngroups++] = pgid; + + /* copy each entry from getgrset into group list */ + while ((grp = strsep(&grplist, ",")) != NULL) { + l = strtol(grp, NULL, 10); + if (ngroups >= maxgroups || l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) { + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + gid = (gid_t)l; + if (gid == pgid) + continue; /* we have already added primary gid */ + groups[ngroups++] = gid; + } +out: + free(cp); + *grpcnt = ngroups; + return ret; +} +# endif /* USE_GETGRSET */ + +#endif /* _AIX */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..748c0e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* + * + * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifdef _AIX + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +# include +#endif + +struct sshbuf; + +/* These should be in the system headers but are not. */ +int usrinfo(int, char *, int); +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB) && (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0) +int setauthdb(const char *, char *); +#endif +/* these may or may not be in the headers depending on the version */ +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE) && (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0) +int authenticate(char *, char *, int *, char **); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0) +int loginfailed(char *, char *, char *); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0) +int loginrestrictions(char *, int, char *, char **); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0) +int loginsuccess(char *, char *, char *, char **); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED) && (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0) +int passwdexpired(char *, char **); +#endif + +/* Some versions define r_type in the above headers, which causes a conflict */ +#ifdef r_type +# undef r_type +#endif + +/* AIX 4.2.x doesn't have nanosleep but does have nsleep which is equivalent */ +#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && defined(HAVE_NSLEEP) +# define nanosleep(a,b) nsleep(a,b) +#endif + +/* For struct timespec on AIX 4.2.x */ +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H +# include +#endif + +/* for setpcred and friends */ +#ifdef HAVE_USERSEC_H +# include +#endif + +/* + * According to the setauthdb man page, AIX password registries must be 15 + * chars or less plus terminating NUL. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB +# define REGISTRY_SIZE 16 +#endif + +void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *); + +#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE +# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 +# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER 1 +int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *, struct sshbuf *); +# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1 +int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, + const char *, struct sshbuf *); +# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG +char *sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *, uid_t); +# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1 +# if defined(S_AUTHDOMAIN) && defined (S_AUTHNAME) +# define USE_AIX_KRB_NAME +char *aix_krb5_get_principal_name(char *); +# endif +#endif + +void aix_setauthdb(const char *); +void aix_restoreauthdb(void); +void aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *); + +#if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) +# ifdef getnameinfo +# undef getnameinfo +# endif +int sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t, + char *, size_t, int); +# define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (sshaix_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g)) +#endif + +/* + * We use getgrset in preference to multiple getgrent calls for efficiency + * plus it supports NIS and LDAP groups. + */ +#if !defined(HAVE_GETGROUPLIST) && defined(HAVE_GETGRSET) +# define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST +# define USE_GETGRSET +int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); +#endif + +#endif /* _AIX */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c b/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..525b029 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \ + defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \ + defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT +# include +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS +# include +#endif +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT +# include +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */ + +void +irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) +{ +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT + prid_t projid; +#endif +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS + jid_t jid = 0; +#elif defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) + int jid = 0; +#endif + +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS + jid = jlimit_startjob(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, "interactive"); + if (jid == -1) + fatal("Failed to create job container: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */ +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY + /* initialize array session */ + if (jid == 0 && newarraysess() != 0) + fatal("Failed to set up new array session: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */ +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT + /* initialize irix project info */ + if ((projid = getdfltprojuser(pw->pw_name)) == -1) { + debug("Failed to get project id, using projid 0"); + projid = 0; + } + if (setprid(projid)) + fatal("Failed to initialize project %d for %s: %.100s", + (int)projid, pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */ +#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT + if (sysconf(_SC_AUDIT)) { + debug("Setting sat id to %d", (int) pw->pw_uid); + if (satsetid(pw->pw_uid)) + debug("error setting satid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } +#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */ +} + + +#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h b/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc8cc44 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _PORT_IRIX_H +#define _PORT_IRIX_H + +#if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \ + defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \ + defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) + +void irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw); + +#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */ + +#endif /* ! _PORT_IRIX_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6229888 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh + * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST) +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "port-linux.h" + +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +#include +#include + +#ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE +# define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:" +#endif + +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ +int +ssh_selinux_enabled(void) +{ + static int enabled = -1; + + if (enabled == -1) { + enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1); + debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + } + + return (enabled); +} + +/* Return the default security context for the given username */ +static security_context_t +ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) +{ + security_context_t sc = NULL; + char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL; + int r; + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME + if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0) + return NULL; +#else + sename = pwname; + lvl = NULL; +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL + r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); +#else + r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); +#endif + + if (r != 0) { + switch (security_getenforce()) { + case -1: + fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: " + "security_getenforce() failed", __func__); + case 0: + error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " + "context for %s", __func__, pwname); + sc = NULL; + break; + default: + fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " + "context for %s (in enforcing mode)", + __func__, pwname); + } + } + +#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME + free(sename); + free(lvl); +#endif + + return sc; +} + +/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ +void +ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) +{ + security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; + + if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) + return; + + debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); + + user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); + if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { + switch (security_getenforce()) { + case -1: + fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); + case 0: + error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " + "context for %s", __func__, pwname); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " + "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); + } + } + if (user_ctx != NULL) + freecon(user_ctx); + + debug3("%s: done", __func__); +} + +/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */ +void +ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty) +{ + security_context_t new_tty_ctx = NULL; + security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; + security_context_t old_tty_ctx = NULL; + security_class_t chrclass; + + if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) + return; + + debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty); + + user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); + + /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */ + + if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) { + error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if ((chrclass = string_to_security_class("chr_file")) == 0) { + error("%s: couldn't get security class for chr_file", __func__); + goto out; + } + if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx, + chrclass, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) { + error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0) + error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + out: + if (new_tty_ctx != NULL) + freecon(new_tty_ctx); + if (old_tty_ctx != NULL) + freecon(old_tty_ctx); + if (user_ctx != NULL) + freecon(user_ctx); + debug3("%s: done", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname) +{ + int len, newlen; + char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx; + void (*switchlog) (const char *fmt,...) = logit; + + if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) + return; + + if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) { + logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) == + NULL) { + logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx); + return; + } + + /* + * Check whether we are attempting to switch away from an unconfined + * security context. + */ + if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE, + sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0) + switchlog = debug3; + + newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1; + newctx = xmalloc(newlen); + len = cx - oldctx + 1; + memcpy(newctx, oldctx, len); + strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len); + if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':'))) + strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen); + debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__, + oldctx, newctx); + if (setcon(newctx) < 0) + switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__, + newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno)); + free(oldctx); + free(newctx); +} + +void +ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path) +{ + security_context_t context; + + if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) + return; + if (path == NULL) { + setfscreatecon(NULL); + return; + } + if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0) + setfscreatecon(context); +} + +#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ + +#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +/* + * The magic "don't kill me" values, old and new, as documented in eg: + * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.32/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt + * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.36/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt + */ + +static int oom_adj_save = INT_MIN; +static char *oom_adj_path = NULL; +struct { + char *path; + int value; +} oom_adjust[] = { + {"/proc/self/oom_score_adj", -1000}, /* kernels >= 2.6.36 */ + {"/proc/self/oom_adj", -17}, /* kernels <= 2.6.35 */ + {NULL, 0}, +}; + +/* + * Tell the kernel's out-of-memory killer to avoid sshd. + * Returns the previous oom_adj value or zero. + */ +void +oom_adjust_setup(void) +{ + int i, value; + FILE *fp; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + for (i = 0; oom_adjust[i].path != NULL; i++) { + oom_adj_path = oom_adjust[i].path; + value = oom_adjust[i].value; + if ((fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "r+")) != NULL) { + if (fscanf(fp, "%d", &oom_adj_save) != 1) + verbose("error reading %s: %s", oom_adj_path, + strerror(errno)); + else { + rewind(fp); + if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", value) <= 0) + verbose("error writing %s: %s", + oom_adj_path, strerror(errno)); + else + debug("Set %s from %d to %d", + oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save, value); + } + fclose(fp); + return; + } + } + oom_adj_path = NULL; +} + +/* Restore the saved OOM adjustment */ +void +oom_adjust_restore(void) +{ + FILE *fp; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + if (oom_adj_save == INT_MIN || oom_adj_path == NULL || + (fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "w")) == NULL) + return; + + if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", oom_adj_save) <= 0) + verbose("error writing %s: %s", oom_adj_path, strerror(errno)); + else + debug("Set %s to %d", oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save); + + fclose(fp); + return; +} +#endif /* LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */ +#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c22a85 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H +#define _PORT_LINUX_H + +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); +void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); +void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); +void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); +void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *); +#endif + +#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST +void oom_adjust_restore(void); +void oom_adjust_setup(void); +#endif + +#endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-net.c b/openbsd-compat/port-net.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb53562 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-net.c @@ -0,0 +1,374 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +/* + * This file contains various portability code for network support, + * including tun/tap forwarding and routing domains. + */ + +#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) +char * +sys_get_rdomain(int fd) +{ + char dev[IFNAMSIZ + 1]; + socklen_t len = sizeof(dev) - 1; + + if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, dev, &len) == -1) { + error("%s: cannot determine VRF for fd=%d : %s", + __func__, fd, strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + dev[len] = '\0'; + return strdup(dev); +} + +int +sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name) +{ + if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, + name, strlen(name)) == -1) { + error("%s: setsockopt(%d, SO_BINDTODEVICE, %s): %s", + __func__, fd, name, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sys_valid_rdomain(const char *name) +{ + int fd; + + /* + * This is a pretty crappy way to test. It would be better to + * check whether "name" represents a VRF device, but apparently + * that requires an rtnetlink transaction. + */ + if ((fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) + return 0; + if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, + name, strlen(name)) == -1) { + close(fd); + return 0; + } + close(fd); + return 1; +} +#elif defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) +/* XXX examples */ +char * +sys_get_rdomain(int fd) +{ + return NULL; +} + +int +sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name) +{ + return -1; +} + +int +valid_rdomain(const char *name) +{ + return 0; +} + +void +sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name) +{ + fatal("%s: not supported", __func__); +} +#endif /* defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) */ + +/* + * This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it + * uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific + * settings. + * + * SSH_TUN_LINUX Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device + * SSH_TUN_FREEBSD Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device + * SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF Translate the OpenBSD address family + * SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF Prepend/remove the address family + */ + +/* + * System-specific tunnel open function + */ + +#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) +#include + +int +sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname) +{ + struct ifreq ifr; + int fd = -1; + const char *name = NULL; + + if (ifname != NULL) + *ifname = NULL; + + if ((fd = open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR)) == -1) { + debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control interface: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } + + bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr)); + + if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) { + ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP; + name = "tap%d"; + } else { + ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN; + name = "tun%d"; + } + ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI; + + if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) { + if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) { + debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__, + tun, strerror(errno)); + goto failed; + } + snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun); + } + + if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) { + debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__, + mode, strerror(errno)); + goto failed; + } + + if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) + debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd); + else + debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd); + + if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL) + goto failed; + + return (fd); + + failed: + close(fd); + return (-1); +} +#endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */ + +#ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H +#include +#endif + +int +sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname) +{ + struct ifreq ifr; + char name[100]; + int fd = -1, sock, flag; + const char *tunbase = "tun"; + + if (ifname != NULL) + *ifname = NULL; + + if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) { +#ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2 + debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__); + return (-1); +#else + tunbase = "tap"; +#endif + } + + /* Open the tunnel device */ + if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) { + snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun); + fd = open(name, O_RDWR); + } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) { + for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) { + snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", + tunbase, tun); + if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0) + break; + } + } else { + debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun); + return (-1); + } + + if (fd < 0) { + debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name, + strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } + + /* Turn on tunnel headers */ + flag = 1; +#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) + if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET && + ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) { + debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd, + strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + } +#endif + + debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd); + + /* Set the tunnel device operation mode */ + snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun); + if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) + goto failed; + + if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) + goto failed; + if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) { + ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP; + if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) + goto failed; + } + + if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL) + goto failed; + + close(sock); + return (fd); + + failed: + if (fd >= 0) + close(fd); + if (sock >= 0) + close(sock); + debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name, + mode, strerror(errno)); + return (-1); +} +#endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */ + +/* + * System-specific channel filters + */ + +#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) +/* + * The tunnel forwarding protocol prepends the address family of forwarded + * IP packets using OpenBSD's numbers. + */ +#define OPENBSD_AF_INET 2 +#define OPENBSD_AF_INET6 24 + +int +sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, char *buf, int _len) +{ + int r; + size_t len; + char *ptr = buf; +#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) + char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF]; + struct ip iph; +#endif +#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) + u_int32_t af; +#endif + + /* XXX update channel input filter API to use unsigned length */ + if (_len < 0) + return -1; + len = _len; + +#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) + if (len <= sizeof(iph) || len > sizeof(rbuf) - 4) + return -1; + /* Determine address family from packet IP header. */ + memcpy(&iph, buf, sizeof(iph)); + af = iph.ip_v == 6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET; + /* Prepend address family to packet using OpenBSD constants */ + memcpy(rbuf + 4, buf, len); + len += 4; + POKE_U32(rbuf, af); + ptr = rbuf; +#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) + /* Convert existing address family header to OpenBSD value */ + if (len <= 4) + return -1; + af = PEEK_U32(buf); + /* Put it back */ + POKE_U32(buf, af == AF_INET6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET); +#endif + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, ptr, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return (0); +} + +u_char * +sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, + u_char **data, size_t *dlen) +{ + u_char *buf; + u_int32_t af; + int r; + + /* XXX new API is incompatible with this signature. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, data, dlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (*dlen < sizeof(af)) + return (NULL); + buf = *data; + +#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) + /* skip address family */ + *dlen -= sizeof(af); + buf = *data + sizeof(af); +#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) + /* translate address family */ + af = (PEEK_U32(buf) == OPENBSD_AF_INET6) ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET; + POKE_U32(buf, af); +#endif + return (buf); +} +#endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-net.h b/openbsd-compat/port-net.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a0d110 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-net.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _PORT_TUN_H +#define _PORT_TUN_H + +struct Channel; +struct ssh; + +#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_FREEBSD) +# define CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN +int sys_tun_open(int, int, char **); +#endif + +#if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) +# define SSH_TUN_FILTER +int sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int); +u_char *sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, u_char **, size_t *); +#endif + +#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) +# define HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN +# define HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN +# define HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN +char *sys_get_rdomain(int fd); +int sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name); +int sys_valid_rdomain(const char *name); +#endif + +#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) +# define HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN +void sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name); +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c b/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e89dc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "config.h" +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" + +#define CT_TEMPLATE CTFS_ROOT "/process/template" +#define CT_LATEST CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest" + +static int tmpl_fd = -1; + +/* Lookup the latest process contract */ +static ctid_t +get_active_process_contract_id(void) +{ + int stat_fd; + ctid_t ctid = -1; + ct_stathdl_t stathdl; + + if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process " + "contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) { + error("%s: Error reading process contract " + "status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) { + error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + ct_status_free(stathdl); + out: + close(stat_fd); + return ctid; +} + +void +solaris_contract_pre_fork(void) +{ + if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, + CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + + debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d", + __func__, tmpl_fd); + + /* First we set the template parameters and event sets. */ + if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY) != 0) { + error("%s: Error setting process contract parameter set " + "(pgrponly): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) { + error("%s: Error setting process contract template " + "fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, 0) != 0) { + error("%s: Error setting process contract template " + "critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + if (ct_tmpl_set_informative(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) { + error("%s: Error setting process contract template " + "informative events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + + /* Now make this the active template for this process. */ + if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) { + error("%s: Error activating process contract " + "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + return; + + fail: + if (tmpl_fd != -1) { + close(tmpl_fd); + tmpl_fd = -1; + } +} + +void +solaris_contract_post_fork_child() +{ + debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d", + __func__, tmpl_fd); + + /* Clear the active template. */ + if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0) + error("%s: Error clearing active process contract " + "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + close(tmpl_fd); + tmpl_fd = -1; +} + +void +solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid) +{ + ctid_t ctid; + char ctl_path[256]; + int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1; + + debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd); + + if (tmpl_fd == -1) + return; + + /* First clear the active template. */ + if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0) + error("%s: Error clearing active process contract " + "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + close(tmpl_fd); + tmpl_fd = -1; + + /* + * If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing + * th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing + * more do. + */ + if (r != 0 || pid <= 0) + return; + + /* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */ + ctid = get_active_process_contract_id(); + + debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid); + + snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path), + CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid); + if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) { + error("%s: Error opening process contract " + "ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) { + error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + close(ctl_fd); + return; + + fail: + if (tmpl_fd != -1) { + close(tmpl_fd); + tmpl_fd = -1; + } + if (stat_fd != -1) + close(stat_fd); + if (ctl_fd != -1) + close(ctl_fd); +} +#endif + +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS +#include +#include + +/* + * Get/set solaris default project. + * If we fail, just run along gracefully. + */ +void +solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct project *defaultproject; + struct project tempproject; + char buf[1024]; + + /* get default project, if we fail just return gracefully */ + if ((defaultproject = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &tempproject, &buf, + sizeof(buf))) != NULL) { + /* set default project */ + if (setproject(defaultproject->pj_name, pw->pw_name, + TASK_NORMAL) != 0) + debug("setproject(%s): %s", defaultproject->pj_name, + strerror(errno)); + } else { + /* debug on getdefaultproj() error */ + debug("getdefaultproj(%s): %s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); + } +} +#endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */ + +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS +# ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H +# include +# endif + +priv_set_t * +solaris_basic_privset(void) +{ + priv_set_t *pset; + +#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET + if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) { + error("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + priv_basicset(pset); +#else + if ((pset = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL)) == NULL) { + error("priv_str_to_set: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } +#endif + return pset; +} + +void +solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void) +{ + priv_set_t *pset = NULL, *npset = NULL; + + /* + * Note: this variant avoids dropping DAC filesystem rights, in case + * the process calling it is running as root and should have the + * ability to read/write/chown any file on the system. + * + * We start with the basic set, then *add* the DAC rights to it while + * taking away other parts of BASIC we don't need. Then we intersect + * this with our existing PERMITTED set. In this way we keep any + * DAC rights we had before, while otherwise reducing ourselves to + * the minimum set of privileges we need to proceed. + * + * This also means we drop any other parts of "root" that we don't + * need (e.g. the ability to kill any process, create new device nodes + * etc etc). + */ + + if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) + fatal("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno)); + if ((npset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL) + fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_CHOWN) != 0 || + priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_READ) != 0 || + priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_SEARCH) != 0 || + priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_WRITE) != 0 || + priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_OWNER) != 0) + fatal("priv_addset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (priv_delset(npset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || +#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 || + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || + priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) + fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (getppriv(PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0) + fatal("getppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); + + priv_intersect(pset, npset); + + if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, npset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, npset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, npset) != 0) + fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); + + priv_freeset(pset); + priv_freeset(npset); +} + +void +solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void) +{ + priv_set_t *pset = NULL; + + /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */ + if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL) + fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || +#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) + fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0) + fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); + + priv_freeset(pset); +} + +void +solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void) +{ + priv_set_t *pset = NULL; + + + /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */ + if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL) + fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || +#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || + priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) + fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0) + fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); + + priv_freeset(pset); +} + +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h b/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dde1a5b --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _PORT_SOLARIS_H + +#include + +#include + +void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void); +void solaris_contract_post_fork_child(void); +void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid); +void solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *); +# ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS +#include +priv_set_t *solaris_basic_privset(void); +void solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void); +void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void); +void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void); +# endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS */ + +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c b/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1322131 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 The SCO Group. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) +#include +#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ +#include "servconf.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh_api.h" + +int nischeck(char *); + +int +sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; + char *salt; + int result; + + /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */ + char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd; + + if (pw_password == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Check for users with no password. */ + if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0) + return (1); + + /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */ + salt = (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx"; + + /* + * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords + * are identical. + */ +#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS + if (!nischeck(pw->pw_name)) { + result = ((strcmp(bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0) + || (strcmp(osr5bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0)); + } + else +#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */ + result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0); + +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF + if (authctxt->valid) + free(pw_password); +#endif + return(result); +} + +#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS +int +nischeck(char *namep) +{ + char password_file[] = "/etc/passwd"; + FILE *fd; + struct passwd *ent = NULL; + + if ((fd = fopen (password_file, "r")) == NULL) { + /* + * If the passwd file has disappeared we are in a bad state. + * However, returning 0 will send us back through the + * authentication scheme that has checked the ia database for + * passwords earlier. + */ + return(0); + } + + /* + * fgetpwent() only reads from password file, so we know for certain + * that the user is local. + */ + while (ent = fgetpwent(fd)) { + if (strcmp (ent->pw_name, namep) == 0) { + /* Local user */ + fclose (fd); + return(0); + } + } + + fclose (fd); + return (1); +} + +#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */ + +/* + NOTE: ia_get_logpwd() allocates memory for arg 2 + functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free + */ + +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF +char * +get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *pw_password = NULL; + + uinfo_t uinfo; + if (!ia_openinfo(pw->pw_name,&uinfo)) { + ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &pw_password); + if (pw_password == NULL) + fatal("ia_get_logpwd: Unable to get the shadow passwd"); + ia_closeinfo(uinfo); + return pw_password; + } + else + fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file"); +} +#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ +#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h b/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..263d8b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF +char * get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw); +#endif + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c b/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a8b788 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: pwcache.c,v 1.9 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/pwcache.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define NCACHE 64 /* power of 2 */ +#define MASK (NCACHE - 1) /* bits to store with */ + +#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID +char * +user_from_uid(uid_t uid, int nouser) +{ + static struct ncache { + uid_t uid; + char *name; + } c_uid[NCACHE]; + static int pwopen; + static char nbuf[15]; /* 32 bits == 10 digits */ + struct passwd *pw; + struct ncache *cp; + + cp = c_uid + (uid & MASK); + if (cp->uid != uid || cp->name == NULL) { + if (pwopen == 0) { +#ifdef HAVE_SETPASSENT + setpassent(1); +#endif + pwopen = 1; + } + if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) { + if (nouser) + return (NULL); + (void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%u", uid); + } + cp->uid = uid; + if (cp->name != NULL) + free(cp->name); + cp->name = strdup(pw ? pw->pw_name : nbuf); + } + return (cp->name); +} +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID +char * +group_from_gid(gid_t gid, int nogroup) +{ + static struct ncache { + gid_t gid; + char *name; + } c_gid[NCACHE]; + static int gropen; + static char nbuf[15]; /* 32 bits == 10 digits */ + struct group *gr; + struct ncache *cp; + + cp = c_gid + (gid & MASK); + if (cp->gid != gid || cp->name == NULL) { + if (gropen == 0) { +#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPENT + setgroupent(1); +#endif + gropen = 1; + } + if ((gr = getgrgid(gid)) == NULL) { + if (nogroup) + return (NULL); + (void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%u", gid); + } + cp->gid = gid; + if (cp->name != NULL) + free(cp->name); + cp->name = strdup(gr ? gr->gr_name : nbuf); + } + return (cp->name); +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c b/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff8ff3d --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.26 2016/10/18 12:47:18 millert Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000-2002, 2007, 2010 + * Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects + * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force + * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef TCSASOFT +/* If we don't have TCSASOFT define it so that ORing it it below is a no-op. */ +# define TCSASOFT 0 +#endif + +/* SunOS 4.x which lacks _POSIX_VDISABLE, but has VDISABLE */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_VDISABLE) && defined(VDISABLE) +# define _POSIX_VDISABLE VDISABLE +#endif + +static volatile sig_atomic_t signo[_NSIG]; + +static void handler(int); + +char * +readpassphrase(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags) +{ + ssize_t nr; + int input, output, save_errno, i, need_restart; + char ch, *p, *end; + struct termios term, oterm; + struct sigaction sa, savealrm, saveint, savehup, savequit, saveterm; + struct sigaction savetstp, savettin, savettou, savepipe; + + /* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */ + if (bufsiz == 0) { + errno = EINVAL; + return(NULL); + } + +restart: + for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++) + signo[i] = 0; + nr = -1; + save_errno = 0; + need_restart = 0; + /* + * Read and write to /dev/tty if available. If not, read from + * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required. + */ + if ((flags & RPP_STDIN) || + (input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) { + errno = ENOTTY; + return(NULL); + } + input = STDIN_FILENO; + output = STDERR_FILENO; + } + + /* + * Turn off echo if possible. + * If we are using a tty but are not the foreground pgrp this will + * generate SIGTTOU, so do it *before* installing the signal handlers. + */ + if (input != STDIN_FILENO && tcgetattr(input, &oterm) == 0) { + memcpy(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)); + if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON)) + term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHONL); +#ifdef VSTATUS + if (term.c_cc[VSTATUS] != _POSIX_VDISABLE) + term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = _POSIX_VDISABLE; +#endif + (void)tcsetattr(input, TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT, &term); + } else { + memset(&term, 0, sizeof(term)); + term.c_lflag |= ECHO; + memset(&oterm, 0, sizeof(oterm)); + oterm.c_lflag |= ECHO; + } + + /* + * Catch signals that would otherwise cause the user to end + * up with echo turned off in the shell. Don't worry about + * things like SIGXCPU and SIGVTALRM for now. + */ + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + sa.sa_flags = 0; /* don't restart system calls */ + sa.sa_handler = handler; + (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, &savealrm); + (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &savehup); + (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saveint); + (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, &savepipe); + (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &savequit); + (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &saveterm); + (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &savetstp); + (void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &sa, &savettin); + (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &sa, &savettou); + + if (!(flags & RPP_STDIN)) + (void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt)); + end = buf + bufsiz - 1; + p = buf; + while ((nr = read(input, &ch, 1)) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r') { + if (p < end) { + if ((flags & RPP_SEVENBIT)) + ch &= 0x7f; + if (isalpha((unsigned char)ch)) { + if ((flags & RPP_FORCELOWER)) + ch = (char)tolower((unsigned char)ch); + if ((flags & RPP_FORCEUPPER)) + ch = (char)toupper((unsigned char)ch); + } + *p++ = ch; + } + } + *p = '\0'; + save_errno = errno; + if (!(term.c_lflag & ECHO)) + (void)write(output, "\n", 1); + + /* Restore old terminal settings and signals. */ + if (memcmp(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)) != 0) { + const int sigttou = signo[SIGTTOU]; + + /* Ignore SIGTTOU generated when we are not the fg pgrp. */ + while (tcsetattr(input, TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT, &oterm) == -1 && + errno == EINTR && !signo[SIGTTOU]) + continue; + signo[SIGTTOU] = sigttou; + } + (void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &savealrm, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &savehup, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGINT, &saveint, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &savequit, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &savepipe, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &saveterm, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &savetstp, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &savettin, NULL); + (void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &savettou, NULL); + if (input != STDIN_FILENO) + (void)close(input); + + /* + * If we were interrupted by a signal, resend it to ourselves + * now that we have restored the signal handlers. + */ + for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++) { + if (signo[i]) { + kill(getpid(), i); + switch (i) { + case SIGTSTP: + case SIGTTIN: + case SIGTTOU: + need_restart = 1; + } + } + } + if (need_restart) + goto restart; + + if (save_errno) + errno = save_errno; + return(nr == -1 ? NULL : buf); +} +DEF_WEAK(readpassphrase); + +#if 0 +char * +getpass(const char *prompt) +{ + static char buf[_PASSWORD_LEN + 1]; + + return(readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof(buf), RPP_ECHO_OFF)); +} +#endif + +static void handler(int s) +{ + + signo[s] = 1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h b/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5fd7c5d --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: readpassphrase.h,v 1.5 2003/06/17 21:56:23 millert Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2002 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * + * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects + * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force + * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/readpassphrase.h */ + +#ifndef _READPASSPHRASE_H_ +#define _READPASSPHRASE_H_ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE + +#define RPP_ECHO_OFF 0x00 /* Turn off echo (default). */ +#define RPP_ECHO_ON 0x01 /* Leave echo on. */ +#define RPP_REQUIRE_TTY 0x02 /* Fail if there is no tty. */ +#define RPP_FORCELOWER 0x04 /* Force input to lower case. */ +#define RPP_FORCEUPPER 0x08 /* Force input to upper case. */ +#define RPP_SEVENBIT 0x10 /* Strip the high bit from input. */ +#define RPP_STDIN 0x20 /* Read from stdin, not /dev/tty */ + +char * readpassphrase(const char *, char *, size_t, int); + +#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */ + +#endif /* !_READPASSPHRASE_H_ */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c b/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a52acc --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: reallocarray.c,v 1.2 2014/12/08 03:45:00 bcook Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2008 Otto Moerbeek + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/reallocarray.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include + +/* + * This is sqrt(SIZE_MAX+1), as s1*s2 <= SIZE_MAX + * if both s1 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW and s2 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW + */ +#define MUL_NO_OVERFLOW ((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 4)) + +void * +reallocarray(void *optr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) +{ + if ((nmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) && + nmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return NULL; + } + return realloc(optr, size * nmemb); +} +#endif /* HAVE_REALLOCARRAY */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/realpath.c b/openbsd-compat/realpath.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2f090e --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/realpath.c @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: realpath.c,v 1.20 2015/10/13 20:55:37 millert Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software without specific prior written + * permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/realpath.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX +# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32 +#endif + +/* A slightly modified copy of this file exists in libexec/ld.so */ + +/* + * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]); + * + * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink + * components. Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure, + * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved). + */ +char * +realpath(const char *path, char *resolved) +{ + struct stat sb; + char *p, *q, *s; + size_t left_len, resolved_len; + unsigned symlinks; + int serrno, slen, mem_allocated; + char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX]; + + if (path[0] == '\0') { + errno = ENOENT; + return (NULL); + } + + serrno = errno; + + if (resolved == NULL) { + resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX); + if (resolved == NULL) + return (NULL); + mem_allocated = 1; + } else + mem_allocated = 0; + + symlinks = 0; + if (path[0] == '/') { + resolved[0] = '/'; + resolved[1] = '\0'; + if (path[1] == '\0') + return (resolved); + resolved_len = 1; + left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left)); + } else { + if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) { + if (mem_allocated) + free(resolved); + else + strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX); + return (NULL); + } + resolved_len = strlen(resolved); + left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left)); + } + if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto err; + } + + /* + * Iterate over path components in `left'. + */ + while (left_len != 0) { + /* + * Extract the next path component and adjust `left' + * and its length. + */ + p = strchr(left, '/'); + s = p ? p : left + left_len; + if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto err; + } + memcpy(next_token, left, s - left); + next_token[s - left] = '\0'; + left_len -= s - left; + if (p != NULL) + memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1); + if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') { + if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto err; + } + resolved[resolved_len++] = '/'; + resolved[resolved_len] = '\0'; + } + if (next_token[0] == '\0') + continue; + else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0) + continue; + else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) { + /* + * Strip the last path component except when we have + * single "/" + */ + if (resolved_len > 1) { + resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; + q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1; + *q = '\0'; + resolved_len = q - resolved; + } + continue; + } + + /* + * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If + * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if + * there are no more path components left. + */ + resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX); + if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto err; + } + if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) { + if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) { + errno = serrno; + return (resolved); + } + goto err; + } + if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) { + if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) { + errno = ELOOP; + goto err; + } + slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1); + if (slen < 0) + goto err; + symlink[slen] = '\0'; + if (symlink[0] == '/') { + resolved[1] = 0; + resolved_len = 1; + } else if (resolved_len > 1) { + /* Strip the last path component. */ + resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; + q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1; + *q = '\0'; + resolved_len = q - resolved; + } + + /* + * If there are any path components left, then + * append them to symlink. The result is placed + * in `left'. + */ + if (p != NULL) { + if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') { + if (slen + 1 >= + (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto err; + } + symlink[slen] = '/'; + symlink[slen + 1] = 0; + } + left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink)); + if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) { + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + goto err; + } + } + left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left)); + } + } + + /* + * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname + * is a single "/". + */ + if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/') + resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0'; + return (resolved); + +err: + if (mem_allocated) + free(resolved); + return (NULL); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c b/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e1156c --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: recallocarray.c,v 1.1 2017/03/06 18:44:21 otto Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2008, 2017 Otto Moerbeek + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/recallocarray.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +/* + * This is sqrt(SIZE_MAX+1), as s1*s2 <= SIZE_MAX + * if both s1 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW and s2 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW + */ +#define MUL_NO_OVERFLOW ((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 4)) + +void * +recallocarray(void *ptr, size_t oldnmemb, size_t newnmemb, size_t size) +{ + size_t oldsize, newsize; + void *newptr; + + if (ptr == NULL) + return calloc(newnmemb, size); + + if ((newnmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) && + newnmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / newnmemb < size) { + errno = ENOMEM; + return NULL; + } + newsize = newnmemb * size; + + if ((oldnmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) && + oldnmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / oldnmemb < size) { + errno = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + oldsize = oldnmemb * size; + + /* + * Don't bother too much if we're shrinking just a bit, + * we do not shrink for series of small steps, oh well. + */ + if (newsize <= oldsize) { + size_t d = oldsize - newsize; + + if (d < oldsize / 2 && d < (size_t)getpagesize()) { + memset((char *)ptr + newsize, 0, d); + return ptr; + } + } + + newptr = malloc(newsize); + if (newptr == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (newsize > oldsize) { + memcpy(newptr, ptr, oldsize); + memset((char *)newptr + oldsize, 0, newsize - oldsize); + } else + memcpy(newptr, ptr, newsize); + + explicit_bzero(ptr, oldsize); + free(ptr); + + return newptr; +} +/* DEF_WEAK(recallocarray); */ + +#endif /* HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..529331b --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ +piddir=@piddir@ +srcdir=@srcdir@ +top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ + +VPATH=@srcdir@ +CC=@CC@ +LD=@LD@ +CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ +CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@ +EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ +LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a +LIBS=@LIBS@ +LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT) + +TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \ + strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT) + +all: t-exec ${OTHERTESTS} + +%$(EXEEXT): %.c $(LIBCOMPAT) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS) + +t-exec: $(TESTPROGS) + @echo running compat regress tests + @for TEST in ""$?; do \ + echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ + ./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \ + done + @echo finished compat regress tests + +clean: + rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out + +distclean: clean + rm -f Makefile *~ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..82ffeb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define NUM_OPENS 10 + +int closefrom(int); + +void +fail(char *msg) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "closefrom: %s\n", msg); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(void) +{ + int i, max, fds[NUM_OPENS]; + char buf[512]; + + for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++) + if ((fds[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY)) == -1) + exit(0); /* can't test */ + max = i - 1; + + /* should close last fd only */ + closefrom(fds[max]); + if (close(fds[max]) != -1) + fail("failed to close highest fd"); + + /* make sure we can still use remaining descriptors */ + for (i = 0; i < max; i++) + if (read(fds[i], buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1) + fail("closed descriptors it should not have"); + + /* should close all fds */ + closefrom(fds[0]); + for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++) + if (close(fds[i]) != -1) + fail("failed to close from lowest fd"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d019b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include + +int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long); + +struct version_test { + long headerver; + long libver; + int result; +} version_tests[] = { + /* built with 0.9.8b release headers */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090802fL, 1}, /* exact match */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090804fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090801fL, 1}, /* older library fix version: ok */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090702fL, 0}, /* older library minor version: NO */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090902fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0080802fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x1000100fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */ + + /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000001fL, 0}, /* older library fix version: NO */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1010101fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x0000101fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x2000101fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */ +}; + +void +fail(long hver, long lver, int result) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "opensslver: header %lx library %lx != %d \n", hver, lver, result); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(void) +{ + unsigned int i; + int res; + long hver, lver; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(version_tests) / sizeof(version_tests[0]); i++) { + hver = version_tests[i].headerver; + lver = version_tests[i].libver; + res = version_tests[i].result; + if (ssh_compatible_openssl(hver, lver) != res) + fail(hver, lver, res); + } + exit(0); +} diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ca63e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker + * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#define BUFSZ 2048 + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static int failed = 0; + +static void +fail(const char *m) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "snprintftest: %s\n", m); + failed = 1; +} + +int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + size_t ret; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +main(void) +{ + char b[5]; + char *src; + + snprintf(b,5,"123456789"); + if (b[4] != '\0') + fail("snprintf does not correctly terminate long strings"); + + /* check for read overrun on unterminated string */ + if ((src = malloc(BUFSZ)) == NULL) { + fail("malloc failed"); + } else { + memset(src, 'a', BUFSZ); + snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%.*s", 1, src); + if (strcmp(b, "a") != 0) + fail("failed with length limit '%%.s'"); + } + + /* check that snprintf and vsnprintf return sane values */ + if (snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) + fail("snprintf does not return required length"); + if (x_snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) + fail("vsnprintf does not return required length"); + + return failed; +} diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f6d779 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include + +static int fail = 0; + +void +test(const char *a) +{ + char *b; + + b = strdup(a); + if (b == 0) { + fail = 1; + return; + } + if (strcmp(a, b) != 0) + fail = 1; + free(b); +} + +int +main(void) +{ + test(""); + test("a"); + test("\0"); + test("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"); + return fail; +} diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50ca5bd --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strtonumtest.c,v 1.1 2004/08/03 20:38:36 otto Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004 Otto Moerbeek + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: regress/lib/libc/strtonum/strtonumtest.c */ + +#include +#include +#include + +/* LLONG_MAX is known as LONGLONG_MAX on AIX */ +#if defined(LONGLONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX) +# define LLONG_MAX LONGLONG_MAX +# define LLONG_MIN LONGLONG_MIN +#endif + +/* LLONG_MAX is known as LONG_LONG_MAX on HP-UX */ +#if defined(LONG_LONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX) +# define LLONG_MAX LONG_LONG_MAX +# define LLONG_MIN LONG_LONG_MIN +#endif + +long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **); + +int fail; + +void +test(const char *p, long long lb, long long ub, int ok) +{ + long long val; + const char *q; + + val = strtonum(p, lb, ub, &q); + if (ok && q != NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] ", p, lb, ub); + fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER NOT ACCEPTED %s\n", q); + fail = 1; + } else if (!ok && q == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] %lld ", p, lb, ub, val); + fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER ACCEPTED\n"); + fail = 1; + } +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + test("1", 0, 10, 1); + test("0", -2, 5, 1); + test("0", 2, 5, 0); + test("0", 2, LLONG_MAX, 0); + test("-2", 0, LLONG_MAX, 0); + test("0", -5, LLONG_MAX, 1); + test("-3", -3, LLONG_MAX, 1); + test("-9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1); + test("9223372036854775807", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1); + test("-9223372036854775809", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0); + test("9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0); + test("1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0); + test("-1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0); + test("-2", 10, -1, 0); + test("-2", -10, -1, 1); + test("-20", -10, -1, 0); + test("20", -10, -1, 0); + + return (fail); +} + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c b/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e915141 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c @@ -0,0 +1,378 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +/* + * Preneel, Bosselaers, Dobbertin, "The Cryptographic Hash Function RIPEMD-160", + * RSA Laboratories, CryptoBytes, Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 1997, + * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/cryptobytes/crypto3n2.pdf + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \ + (cp)[7] = (value) >> 56; \ + (cp)[6] = (value) >> 48; \ + (cp)[5] = (value) >> 40; \ + (cp)[4] = (value) >> 32; \ + (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \ + (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \ + (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \ + (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0) + +#define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \ + (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \ + (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \ + (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \ + (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0) + +#define H0 0x67452301U +#define H1 0xEFCDAB89U +#define H2 0x98BADCFEU +#define H3 0x10325476U +#define H4 0xC3D2E1F0U + +#define K0 0x00000000U +#define K1 0x5A827999U +#define K2 0x6ED9EBA1U +#define K3 0x8F1BBCDCU +#define K4 0xA953FD4EU + +#define KK0 0x50A28BE6U +#define KK1 0x5C4DD124U +#define KK2 0x6D703EF3U +#define KK3 0x7A6D76E9U +#define KK4 0x00000000U + +/* rotate x left n bits. */ +#define ROL(n, x) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n)))) + +#define F0(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define F1(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z))) +#define F2(x, y, z) (((x) | (~y)) ^ (z)) +#define F3(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z))) +#define F4(x, y, z) ((x) ^ ((y) | (~z))) + +#define R(a, b, c, d, e, Fj, Kj, sj, rj) \ + do { \ + a = ROL(sj, a + Fj(b,c,d) + X(rj) + Kj) + e; \ + c = ROL(10, c); \ + } while(0) + +#define X(i) x[i] + +static u_int8_t PADDING[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH] = { + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +void +RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *ctx) +{ + ctx->count = 0; + ctx->state[0] = H0; + ctx->state[1] = H1; + ctx->state[2] = H2; + ctx->state[3] = H3; + ctx->state[4] = H4; +} + +void +RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *ctx, const u_int8_t *input, size_t len) +{ + size_t have, off, need; + + have = (ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH; + need = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - have; + ctx->count += 8 * len; + off = 0; + + if (len >= need) { + if (have) { + memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need); + RMD160Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer); + off = need; + have = 0; + } + /* now the buffer is empty */ + while (off + RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH <= len) { + RMD160Transform(ctx->state, input+off); + off += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH; + } + } + if (off < len) + memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input+off, len-off); +} + +void +RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *ctx) +{ + u_int8_t size[8]; + size_t padlen; + + PUT_64BIT_LE(size, ctx->count); + + /* + * pad to RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH byte blocks, at least one byte from + * PADDING plus 8 bytes for the size + */ + padlen = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - ((ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH); + if (padlen < 1 + 8) + padlen += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH; + RMD160Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8); /* padlen - 8 <= 64 */ + RMD160Update(ctx, size, 8); +} + +void +RMD160Final(u_int8_t digest[RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *ctx) +{ + int i; + + RMD160Pad(ctx); + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) + PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i*4, ctx->state[i]); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof (*ctx)); +} + +void +RMD160Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t block[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH]) +{ + u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, t, x[16]; + +#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN + memcpy(x, block, RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH); +#else + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) + x[i] = (u_int32_t)( + (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 0]) | + (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 1]) << 8 | + (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 2]) << 16 | + (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 3]) << 24); +#endif + + a = state[0]; + b = state[1]; + c = state[2]; + d = state[3]; + e = state[4]; + + /* Round 1 */ + R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 11, 0); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 14, 1); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 15, 2); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 12, 3); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 5, 4); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 5); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 7, 6); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 9, 7); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 11, 8); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 13, 9); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 14, 10); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 15, 11); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 6, 12); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 7, 13); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 9, 14); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 15); /* #15 */ + /* Round 2 */ + R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 7, 7); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 6, 4); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 8, 13); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 13, 1); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 11, 10); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 9, 6); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 7, 15); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 15, 3); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 12); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 12, 0); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 15, 9); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 9, 5); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 11, 2); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 14); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 13, 11); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 12, 8); /* #31 */ + /* Round 3 */ + R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 11, 3); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 10); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 6, 14); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 7, 4); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 14, 9); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 9, 15); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 8); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 15, 1); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 14, 2); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 8, 7); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 13, 0); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 6, 6); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 5, 13); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 12, 11); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 7, 5); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 5, 12); /* #47 */ + /* Round 4 */ + R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 11, 1); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 12, 9); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 14, 11); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 15, 10); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 0); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 15, 8); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 9, 12); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 4); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 9, 13); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 3); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 5, 7); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 6, 15); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 14); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 6, 5); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 5, 6); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 12, 2); /* #63 */ + /* Round 5 */ + R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 9, 4); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 15, 0); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 5, 5); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 11, 9); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 6, 7); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 8, 12); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 13, 2); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 12, 10); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 5, 14); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 12, 1); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 13, 3); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 14, 8); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 11, 11); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 8, 6); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 5, 15); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 6, 13); /* #79 */ + + aa = a ; bb = b; cc = c; dd = d; ee = e; + + a = state[0]; + b = state[1]; + c = state[2]; + d = state[3]; + e = state[4]; + + /* Parallel round 1 */ + R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 5); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 9, 14); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 9, 7); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 11, 0); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 13, 9); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 15, 2); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 15, 11); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 5, 4); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 7, 13); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 7, 6); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 15); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 11, 8); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 14, 1); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 14, 10); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 12, 3); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 6, 12); /* #15 */ + /* Parallel round 2 */ + R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 9, 6); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 13, 11); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 15, 3); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 7); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 12, 0); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 8, 13); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 9, 5); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 11, 10); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 14); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 7, 15); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 12, 8); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 7, 12); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 6, 4); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 15, 9); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 13, 1); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 11, 2); /* #31 */ + /* Parallel round 3 */ + R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 9, 15); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 7, 5); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 15, 1); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 11, 3); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 8, 7); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 6, 14); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 6, 6); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 14, 9); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 12, 11); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 13, 8); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 12); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 14, 2); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 13, 10); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 13, 0); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 7, 4); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 13); /* #47 */ + /* Parallel round 4 */ + R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 15, 8); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 5, 6); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 8, 4); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 11, 1); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 14, 3); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 14, 11); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 6, 15); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 14, 0); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 6, 5); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 9, 12); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 12, 2); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 9, 13); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 12, 9); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 5, 7); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 15, 10); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 8, 14); /* #63 */ + /* Parallel round 5 */ + R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 8, 12); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 15); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 12, 10); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 9, 4); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 12, 1); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 5, 5); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 14, 8); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 6, 7); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 8, 6); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 13, 2); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 6, 13); + R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 14); + R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 15, 0); + R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 13, 3); + R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 11, 9); + R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 11, 11); /* #79 */ + + t = state[1] + cc + d; + state[1] = state[2] + dd + e; + state[2] = state[3] + ee + a; + state[3] = state[4] + aa + b; + state[4] = state[0] + bb + c; + state[0] = t; +} + +#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h b/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99c1dcd --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: rmd160.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef _RMD160_H +#define _RMD160_H + +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + +#define RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH 64 +#define RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH 20 +#define RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) + +/* RMD160 context. */ +typedef struct RMD160Context { + u_int32_t state[5]; /* state */ + u_int64_t count; /* number of bits, mod 2^64 */ + u_int8_t buffer[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* input buffer */ +} RMD160_CTX; + +void RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *); +void RMD160Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH]) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH))); +void RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); +void RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *); +void RMD160Final(u_int8_t [RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH))); +char *RMD160End(RMD160_CTX *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *RMD160File(const char *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *RMD160FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *RMD160Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); + +#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ +#endif /* _RMD160_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1cd61e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: rresvport.c,v 1.9 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1998 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/rresvport.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if 0 +int +rresvport(int *alport) +{ + return rresvport_af(alport, AF_INET); +} +#endif + +int +rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage ss; + struct sockaddr *sa; + u_int16_t *portp; + int s; + socklen_t salen; + + memset(&ss, '\0', sizeof ss); + sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss; + + switch (af) { + case AF_INET: + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + portp = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_port; + break; + case AF_INET6: + salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + portp = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_port; + break; + default: + errno = EPFNOSUPPORT; + return (-1); + } + sa->sa_family = af; + + s = socket(af, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (s < 0) + return (-1); + + *portp = htons(*alport); + if (*alport < IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) { + if (bind(s, sa, salen) >= 0) + return (s); + if (errno != EADDRINUSE) { + (void)close(s); + return (-1); + } + } + + *portp = 0; + sa->sa_family = af; + if (bindresvport_sa(s, sa) == -1) { + (void)close(s); + return (-1); + } + *alport = ntohs(*portp); + return (s); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/setenv.c b/openbsd-compat/setenv.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..373b701 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/setenv.c @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: setenv.c,v 1.13 2010/08/23 22:31:50 millert Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1987 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/setenv.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) + +#include +#include +#include + +extern char **environ; +static char **lastenv; /* last value of environ */ + +/* OpenSSH Portable: __findenv is from getenv.c rev 1.8, made static */ +/* + * __findenv -- + * Returns pointer to value associated with name, if any, else NULL. + * Starts searching within the environmental array at offset. + * Sets offset to be the offset of the name/value combination in the + * environmental array, for use by putenv(3), setenv(3) and unsetenv(3). + * Explicitly removes '=' in argument name. + * + * This routine *should* be a static; don't use it. + */ +static char * +__findenv(const char *name, int len, int *offset) +{ + extern char **environ; + int i; + const char *np; + char **p, *cp; + + if (name == NULL || environ == NULL) + return (NULL); + for (p = environ + *offset; (cp = *p) != NULL; ++p) { + for (np = name, i = len; i && *cp; i--) + if (*cp++ != *np++) + break; + if (i == 0 && *cp++ == '=') { + *offset = p - environ; + return (cp); + } + } + return (NULL); +} + +#if 0 /* nothing uses putenv */ +/* + * putenv -- + * Add a name=value string directly to the environmental, replacing + * any current value. + */ +int +putenv(char *str) +{ + char **P, *cp; + size_t cnt; + int offset = 0; + + for (cp = str; *cp && *cp != '='; ++cp) + ; + if (*cp != '=') { + errno = EINVAL; + return (-1); /* missing `=' in string */ + } + + if (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset) != NULL) { + environ[offset++] = str; + /* could be set multiple times */ + while (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset)) { + for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P) + if (!(*P = *(P + 1))) + break; + } + return (0); + } + + /* create new slot for string */ + for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++) + ; + cnt = P - environ; + P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2)); + if (!P) + return (-1); + if (lastenv != environ) + memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *)); + lastenv = environ = P; + environ[cnt] = str; + environ[cnt + 1] = NULL; + return (0); +} + +#endif + +#ifndef HAVE_SETENV +/* + * setenv -- + * Set the value of the environmental variable "name" to be + * "value". If rewrite is set, replace any current value. + */ +int +setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int rewrite) +{ + char *C, **P; + const char *np; + int l_value, offset = 0; + + for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np) + ; +#ifdef notyet + if (*np) { + errno = EINVAL; + return (-1); /* has `=' in name */ + } +#endif + + l_value = strlen(value); + if ((C = __findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) != NULL) { + int tmpoff = offset + 1; + if (!rewrite) + return (0); +#if 0 /* XXX - existing entry may not be writable */ + if (strlen(C) >= l_value) { /* old larger; copy over */ + while ((*C++ = *value++)) + ; + return (0); + } +#endif + /* could be set multiple times */ + while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &tmpoff)) { + for (P = &environ[tmpoff];; ++P) + if (!(*P = *(P + 1))) + break; + } + } else { /* create new slot */ + size_t cnt; + + for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++) + ; + cnt = P - environ; + P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2)); + if (!P) + return (-1); + if (lastenv != environ) + memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *)); + lastenv = environ = P; + offset = cnt; + environ[cnt + 1] = NULL; + } + if (!(environ[offset] = /* name + `=' + value */ + malloc((size_t)((int)(np - name) + l_value + 2)))) + return (-1); + for (C = environ[offset]; (*C = *name++) && *C != '='; ++C) + ; + for (*C++ = '='; (*C++ = *value++); ) + ; + return (0); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_SETENV */ + +#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV +/* + * unsetenv(name) -- + * Delete environmental variable "name". + */ +int +unsetenv(const char *name) +{ + char **P; + const char *np; + int offset = 0; + + if (!name || !*name) { + errno = EINVAL; + return (-1); + } + for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np) + ; + if (*np) { + errno = EINVAL; + return (-1); /* has `=' in name */ + } + + /* could be set multiple times */ + while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) { + for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P) + if (!(*P = *(P + 1))) + break; + } + return (0); +} +#endif /* HAVE_UNSETENV */ + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c b/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dbd1a95 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* Based on conf.c from UCB sendmail 8.8.8 */ + +/* + * Copyright 2003 Damien Miller + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1995-1997 Eric P. Allman + * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H +#include +#endif +#include + +#include + +#define SPT_NONE 0 /* don't use it at all */ +#define SPT_PSTAT 1 /* use pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, ...) */ +#define SPT_REUSEARGV 2 /* cover argv with title information */ + +#ifndef SPT_TYPE +# define SPT_TYPE SPT_NONE +#endif + +#ifndef SPT_PADCHAR +# define SPT_PADCHAR '\0' +#endif + +#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV +static char *argv_start = NULL; +static size_t argv_env_len = 0; +#endif + +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ + +void +compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ +#if !defined(HAVE_SETPROCTITLE) && \ + defined(SPT_TYPE) && SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV + extern char **environ; + char *lastargv = NULL; + char **envp = environ; + int i; + + /* + * NB: This assumes that argv has already been copied out of the + * way. This is true for sshd, but may not be true for other + * programs. Beware. + */ + + if (argc == 0 || argv[0] == NULL) + return; + + /* Fail if we can't allocate room for the new environment */ + for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) + ; + if ((environ = calloc(i + 1, sizeof(*environ))) == NULL) { + environ = envp; /* put it back */ + return; + } + + /* + * Find the last argv string or environment variable within + * our process memory area. + */ + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + if (lastargv == NULL || lastargv + 1 == argv[i]) + lastargv = argv[i] + strlen(argv[i]); + } + for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) { + if (lastargv + 1 == envp[i]) + lastargv = envp[i] + strlen(envp[i]); + } + + argv[1] = NULL; + argv_start = argv[0]; + argv_env_len = lastargv - argv[0] - 1; + + /* + * Copy environment + * XXX - will truncate env on strdup fail + */ + for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) + environ[i] = strdup(envp[i]); + environ[i] = NULL; +#endif /* SPT_REUSEARGV */ +} + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE +void +setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...) +{ +#if SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE + va_list ap; + char buf[1024], ptitle[1024]; + size_t len = 0; + int r; + extern char *__progname; +#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT + union pstun pst; +#endif + +#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV + if (argv_env_len <= 0) + return; +#endif + + strlcpy(buf, __progname, sizeof(buf)); + + r = -1; + va_start(ap, fmt); + if (fmt != NULL) { + len = strlcat(buf, ": ", sizeof(buf)); + if (len < sizeof(buf)) + r = vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof(buf) - len , fmt, ap); + } + va_end(ap); + if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) - len) + return; + strnvis(ptitle, buf, sizeof(ptitle), + VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL); + +#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT + pst.pst_command = ptitle; + pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, pst, strlen(ptitle), 0, 0); +#elif SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV +/* debug("setproctitle: copy \"%s\" into len %d", + buf, argv_env_len); */ + len = strlcpy(argv_start, ptitle, argv_env_len); + for(; len < argv_env_len; len++) + argv_start[len] = SPT_PADCHAR; +#endif + +#endif /* SPT_NONE */ +} + +#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sha1.c b/openbsd-compat/sha1.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b5381f --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/sha1.c @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sha1.c,v 1.23 2014/01/08 06:14:57 tedu Exp $ */ + +/* + * SHA-1 in C + * By Steve Reid + * 100% Public Domain + * + * Test Vectors (from FIPS PUB 180-1) + * "abc" + * A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D + * "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" + * 84983E44 1C3BD26E BAAE4AA1 F95129E5 E54670F1 + * A million repetitions of "a" + * 34AA973C D4C4DAA4 F61EEB2B DBAD2731 6534016F + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include +#include + +#define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits)))) + +/* + * blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand. + * I got the idea of expanding during the round function from SSLeay + */ +#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN +# define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \ + |(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF)) +#else +# define blk0(i) block->l[i] +#endif +#define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \ + ^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1)) + +/* + * (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations (rounds) used in SHA1 + */ +#define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk0(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); +#define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); +#define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0x6ED9EBA1+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); +#define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(((w|x)&y)|(w&x))+blk(i)+0x8F1BBCDC+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); +#define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0xCA62C1D6+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30); + +typedef union { + u_int8_t c[64]; + u_int32_t l[16]; +} CHAR64LONG16; + +/* + * Hash a single 512-bit block. This is the core of the algorithm. + */ +void +SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH]) +{ + u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e; + u_int8_t workspace[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + CHAR64LONG16 *block = (CHAR64LONG16 *)workspace; + + (void)memcpy(block, buffer, SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH); + + /* Copy context->state[] to working vars */ + a = state[0]; + b = state[1]; + c = state[2]; + d = state[3]; + e = state[4]; + + /* 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. */ + R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3); + R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7); + R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11); + R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15); + R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19); + R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23); + R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27); + R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31); + R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35); + R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39); + R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43); + R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47); + R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51); + R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55); + R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59); + R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63); + R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67); + R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71); + R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75); + R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79); + + /* Add the working vars back into context.state[] */ + state[0] += a; + state[1] += b; + state[2] += c; + state[3] += d; + state[4] += e; + + /* Wipe variables */ + a = b = c = d = e = 0; +} + + +/* + * SHA1Init - Initialize new context + */ +void +SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *context) +{ + + /* SHA1 initialization constants */ + context->count = 0; + context->state[0] = 0x67452301; + context->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + context->state[3] = 0x10325476; + context->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; +} + + +/* + * Run your data through this. + */ +void +SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + size_t i, j; + + j = (size_t)((context->count >> 3) & 63); + context->count += (len << 3); + if ((j + len) > 63) { + (void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], data, (i = 64-j)); + SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer); + for ( ; i + 63 < len; i += 64) + SHA1Transform(context->state, (u_int8_t *)&data[i]); + j = 0; + } else { + i = 0; + } + (void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], &data[i], len - i); +} + + +/* + * Add padding and return the message digest. + */ +void +SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *context) +{ + u_int8_t finalcount[8]; + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + finalcount[i] = (u_int8_t)((context->count >> + ((7 - (i & 7)) * 8)) & 255); /* Endian independent */ + } + SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\200", 1); + while ((context->count & 504) != 448) + SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\0", 1); + SHA1Update(context, finalcount, 8); /* Should cause a SHA1Transform() */ +} + +void +SHA1Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *context) +{ + u_int i; + + SHA1Pad(context); + for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) { + digest[i] = (u_int8_t) + ((context->state[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255); + } + memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); +} +#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sha1.h b/openbsd-compat/sha1.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..327d94c --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/sha1.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sha1.h,v 1.24 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * SHA-1 in C + * By Steve Reid + * 100% Public Domain + */ + +#ifndef _SHA1_H +#define _SHA1_H + +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + +#define SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH 64 +#define SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH 20 +#define SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) + +typedef struct { + u_int32_t state[5]; + u_int64_t count; + u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH]; +} SHA1_CTX; + +void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *); +void SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *); +void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH]) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH))); +void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); +void SHA1Final(u_int8_t [SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH))); +char *SHA1End(SHA1_CTX *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA1File(const char *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA1FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA1Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); + +#define HTONDIGEST(x) do { \ + x[0] = htonl(x[0]); \ + x[1] = htonl(x[1]); \ + x[2] = htonl(x[2]); \ + x[3] = htonl(x[3]); \ + x[4] = htonl(x[4]); } while (0) + +#define NTOHDIGEST(x) do { \ + x[0] = ntohl(x[0]); \ + x[1] = ntohl(x[1]); \ + x[2] = ntohl(x[2]); \ + x[3] = ntohl(x[3]); \ + x[4] = ntohl(x[4]); } while (0) + +#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ +#endif /* _SHA1_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sha2.c b/openbsd-compat/sha2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b55ea30 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/sha2.c @@ -0,0 +1,904 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.11 2005/08/08 08:05:35 espie Exp */ + +/* + * FILE: sha2.c + * AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford + * + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $ + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# include +# if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) +# define _NEED_SHA2 1 +# endif +#else +# define _NEED_SHA2 1 +#endif + +#if defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) + +#include + +/* + * UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE: + * You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform + * loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros + * later in this file). Either define on the command line, for example: + * + * cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c + * + * or define below: + * + * #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM + * + */ + +/*** SHA-256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/ +/* + * BYTE_ORDER NOTE: + * + * Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER. If your + * architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines + * LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are + * equivalent. + * + * If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by + * hand like this: + * + * #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234 + * #define BIG_ENDIAN 4321 + * + * And for little-endian machines, add: + * + * #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN + * + * Or for big-endian machines: + * + * #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN + * + * The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER + * appropriately by including (which in turn includes + * where the appropriate definitions are actually + * made). + */ +#if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN) +#error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN +#endif + + +/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/ +/* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */ +#define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8) +#define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16) +#define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16) + +/*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/ +#define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do { \ + (dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) | \ + ((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24); \ +} while(0) + +#define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do { \ + (dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56); \ +} while (0) + +#define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do { \ + (cp)[0] = (src) >> 56; \ + (cp)[1] = (src) >> 48; \ + (cp)[2] = (src) >> 40; \ + (cp)[3] = (src) >> 32; \ + (cp)[4] = (src) >> 24; \ + (cp)[5] = (src) >> 16; \ + (cp)[6] = (src) >> 8; \ + (cp)[7] = (src); \ +} while (0) + +#define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do { \ + (cp)[0] = (src) >> 24; \ + (cp)[1] = (src) >> 16; \ + (cp)[2] = (src) >> 8; \ + (cp)[3] = (src); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the + * unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of + * 64-bit words): + */ +#define ADDINC128(w,n) do { \ + (w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n); \ + if ((w)[0] < (n)) { \ + (w)[1]++; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/ +/* + * Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions: + * + * NOTE: The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and + * S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-256/384/512 description document + * (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this + * same "backwards" definition. + */ +/* Shift-right (used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */ +#define R(b,x) ((x) >> (b)) +/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-256): */ +#define S32(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b)))) +/* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */ +#define S64(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b)))) + +/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */ +#define Ch(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z))) +#define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z))) + +/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-256: */ +#define Sigma0_256(x) (S32(2, (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x))) +#define Sigma1_256(x) (S32(6, (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x))) +#define sigma0_256(x) (S32(7, (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 , (x))) +#define sigma1_256(x) (S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10, (x))) + +/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */ +#define Sigma0_512(x) (S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x))) +#define Sigma1_512(x) (S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x))) +#define sigma0_512(x) (S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7, (x))) +#define sigma1_512(x) (S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6, (x))) + + +/*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/ +/* Hash constant words K for SHA-256: */ +const static u_int32_t K256[64] = { + 0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL, + 0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL, + 0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL, + 0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL, + 0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL, + 0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL, + 0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL, + 0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL, + 0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL, + 0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL, + 0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL, + 0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL, + 0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL, + 0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL, + 0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL, + 0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL +}; + +/* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */ +const static u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = { + 0x6a09e667UL, + 0xbb67ae85UL, + 0x3c6ef372UL, + 0xa54ff53aUL, + 0x510e527fUL, + 0x9b05688cUL, + 0x1f83d9abUL, + 0x5be0cd19UL +}; + +/* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */ +const static u_int64_t K512[80] = { + 0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL, + 0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL, + 0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL, + 0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL, + 0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL, + 0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL, + 0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL, + 0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL, + 0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL, + 0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL, + 0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL, + 0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL, + 0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL, + 0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL, + 0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL, + 0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL, + 0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL, + 0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL, + 0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL, + 0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL, + 0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL, + 0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL, + 0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL, + 0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL, + 0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL, + 0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL, + 0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL, + 0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL, + 0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL, + 0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL, + 0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL, + 0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL, + 0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL, + 0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL, + 0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL, + 0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL, + 0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL, + 0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL, + 0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL, + 0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL +}; + +/* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */ +const static u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = { + 0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL, + 0x629a292a367cd507ULL, + 0x9159015a3070dd17ULL, + 0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL, + 0x67332667ffc00b31ULL, + 0x8eb44a8768581511ULL, + 0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL, + 0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL +}; + +/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */ +const static u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = { + 0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL, + 0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL, + 0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL, + 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL, + 0x510e527fade682d1ULL, + 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL, + 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL, + 0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL +}; + + +/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/ +void +SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *context) +{ + if (context == NULL) + return; + memcpy(context->state, sha256_initial_hash_value, + sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value)); + memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer)); + context->bitcount = 0; +} + +#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM + +/* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */ + +#define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ + BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data); \ + data += 4; \ + T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \ + (d) += T1; \ + (h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ + j++; \ +} while(0) + +#define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ + s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f]; \ + s0 = sigma0_256(s0); \ + s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f]; \ + s1 = sigma1_256(s1); \ + T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + \ + (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \ + (d) += T1; \ + (h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ + j++; \ +} while(0) + +void +SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]) +{ + u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1; + u_int32_t T1, W256[16]; + int j; + + /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */ + a = state[0]; + b = state[1]; + c = state[2]; + d = state[3]; + e = state[4]; + f = state[5]; + g = state[6]; + h = state[7]; + + j = 0; + do { + /* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */ + ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); + ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g); + ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f); + ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e); + ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d); + ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c); + ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b); + ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a); + } while (j < 16); + + /* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */ + do { + ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); + ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g); + ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f); + ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e); + ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d); + ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c); + ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b); + ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a); + } while (j < 64); + + /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */ + state[0] += a; + state[1] += b; + state[2] += c; + state[3] += d; + state[4] += e; + state[5] += f; + state[6] += g; + state[7] += h; + + /* Clean up */ + a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0; +} + +#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */ + +void +SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]) +{ + u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1; + u_int32_t T1, T2, W256[16]; + int j; + + /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */ + a = state[0]; + b = state[1]; + c = state[2]; + d = state[3]; + e = state[4]; + f = state[5]; + g = state[6]; + h = state[7]; + + j = 0; + do { + BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data); + data += 4; + /* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */ + T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j]; + T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c); + h = g; + g = f; + f = e; + e = d + T1; + d = c; + c = b; + b = a; + a = T1 + T2; + + j++; + } while (j < 16); + + do { + /* Part of the message block expansion: */ + s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f]; + s0 = sigma0_256(s0); + s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f]; + s1 = sigma1_256(s1); + + /* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */ + T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + + (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); + T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c); + h = g; + g = f; + f = e; + e = d + T1; + d = c; + c = b; + b = a; + a = T1 + T2; + + j++; + } while (j < 64); + + /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */ + state[0] += a; + state[1] += b; + state[2] += c; + state[3] += d; + state[4] += e; + state[5] += f; + state[6] += g; + state[7] += h; + + /* Clean up */ + a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0; +} + +#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */ + +void +SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + size_t freespace, usedspace; + + /* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */ + if (len == 0) + return; + + usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH; + if (usedspace > 0) { + /* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */ + freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace; + + if (len >= freespace) { + /* Fill the buffer completely and process it */ + memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace); + context->bitcount += freespace << 3; + len -= freespace; + data += freespace; + SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer); + } else { + /* The buffer is not yet full */ + memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len); + context->bitcount += len << 3; + /* Clean up: */ + usedspace = freespace = 0; + return; + } + } + while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) { + /* Process as many complete blocks as we can */ + SHA256_Transform(context->state, data); + context->bitcount += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3; + len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH; + data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH; + } + if (len > 0) { + /* There's left-overs, so save 'em */ + memcpy(context->buffer, data, len); + context->bitcount += len << 3; + } + /* Clean up: */ + usedspace = freespace = 0; +} + +void +SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *context) +{ + unsigned int usedspace; + + usedspace = (context->bitcount >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH; + if (usedspace > 0) { + /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */ + context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80; + + if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) { + /* Set-up for the last transform: */ + memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, + SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace); + } else { + if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) { + memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, + SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace); + } + /* Do second-to-last transform: */ + SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer); + + /* Prepare for last transform: */ + memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH); + } + } else { + /* Set-up for the last transform: */ + memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH); + + /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */ + *context->buffer = 0x80; + } + /* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */ + BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH], + context->bitcount); + + /* Final transform: */ + SHA256_Transform(context->state, context->buffer); + + /* Clean up: */ + usedspace = 0; +} + +void +SHA256_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *context) +{ + SHA256_Pad(context); + + /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */ + if (digest != NULL) { +#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN + int i; + + /* Convert TO host byte order */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state[i]); +#else + memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); +#endif + memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); + } +} + + +/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/ +void +SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *context) +{ + if (context == NULL) + return; + memcpy(context->state, sha512_initial_hash_value, + sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value)); + memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer)); + context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0; +} + +#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM + +/* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */ + +#define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ + BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data); \ + data += 8; \ + T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \ + (d) += T1; \ + (h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ + j++; \ +} while(0) + + +#define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \ + s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f]; \ + s0 = sigma0_512(s0); \ + s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f]; \ + s1 = sigma1_512(s1); \ + T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + \ + (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \ + (d) += T1; \ + (h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \ + j++; \ +} while(0) + +void +SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]) +{ + u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1; + u_int64_t T1, W512[16]; + int j; + + /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */ + a = state[0]; + b = state[1]; + c = state[2]; + d = state[3]; + e = state[4]; + f = state[5]; + g = state[6]; + h = state[7]; + + j = 0; + do { + /* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */ + ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); + ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g); + ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f); + ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e); + ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d); + ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c); + ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b); + ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a); + } while (j < 16); + + /* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */ + do { + ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h); + ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g); + ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f); + ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e); + ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d); + ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c); + ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b); + ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a); + } while (j < 80); + + /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */ + state[0] += a; + state[1] += b; + state[2] += c; + state[3] += d; + state[4] += e; + state[5] += f; + state[6] += g; + state[7] += h; + + /* Clean up */ + a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0; +} + +#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */ + +void +SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]) +{ + u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1; + u_int64_t T1, T2, W512[16]; + int j; + + /* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */ + a = state[0]; + b = state[1]; + c = state[2]; + d = state[3]; + e = state[4]; + f = state[5]; + g = state[6]; + h = state[7]; + + j = 0; + do { + BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data); + data += 8; + /* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */ + T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j]; + T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c); + h = g; + g = f; + f = e; + e = d + T1; + d = c; + c = b; + b = a; + a = T1 + T2; + + j++; + } while (j < 16); + + do { + /* Part of the message block expansion: */ + s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f]; + s0 = sigma0_512(s0); + s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f]; + s1 = sigma1_512(s1); + + /* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */ + T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + + (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); + T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c); + h = g; + g = f; + f = e; + e = d + T1; + d = c; + c = b; + b = a; + a = T1 + T2; + + j++; + } while (j < 80); + + /* Compute the current intermediate hash value */ + state[0] += a; + state[1] += b; + state[2] += c; + state[3] += d; + state[4] += e; + state[5] += f; + state[6] += g; + state[7] += h; + + /* Clean up */ + a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0; +} + +#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */ + +void +SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + size_t freespace, usedspace; + + /* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */ + if (len == 0) + return; + + usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH; + if (usedspace > 0) { + /* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */ + freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace; + + if (len >= freespace) { + /* Fill the buffer completely and process it */ + memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace); + ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3); + len -= freespace; + data += freespace; + SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer); + } else { + /* The buffer is not yet full */ + memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len); + ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3); + /* Clean up: */ + usedspace = freespace = 0; + return; + } + } + while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) { + /* Process as many complete blocks as we can */ + SHA512_Transform(context->state, data); + ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3); + len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH; + data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH; + } + if (len > 0) { + /* There's left-overs, so save 'em */ + memcpy(context->buffer, data, len); + ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3); + } + /* Clean up: */ + usedspace = freespace = 0; +} + +void +SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context) +{ + unsigned int usedspace; + + usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH; + if (usedspace > 0) { + /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */ + context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80; + + if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) { + /* Set-up for the last transform: */ + memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace); + } else { + if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) { + memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace); + } + /* Do second-to-last transform: */ + SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer); + + /* And set-up for the last transform: */ + memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2); + } + } else { + /* Prepare for final transform: */ + memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH); + + /* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */ + *context->buffer = 0x80; + } + /* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */ + BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH], + context->bitcount[1]); + BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8], + context->bitcount[0]); + + /* Final transform: */ + SHA512_Transform(context->state, context->buffer); + + /* Clean up: */ + usedspace = 0; +} + +void +SHA512_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *context) +{ + SHA512_Pad(context); + + /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */ + if (digest != NULL) { +#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN + int i; + + /* Convert TO host byte order */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) + BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]); +#else + memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); +#endif + memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); + } +} + + +/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/ +void +SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *context) +{ + if (context == NULL) + return; + memcpy(context->state, sha384_initial_hash_value, + sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value)); + memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer)); + context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0; +} + +#if 0 +__weak_alias(SHA384_Transform, SHA512_Transform); +__weak_alias(SHA384_Update, SHA512_Update); +__weak_alias(SHA384_Pad, SHA512_Pad); +#endif + +void +SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]) +{ + return SHA512_Transform(state, data); +} + +void +SHA384_Update(SHA512_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + SHA512_Update(context, data, len); +} + +void +SHA384_Pad(SHA512_CTX *context) +{ + SHA512_Pad(context); +} + +void +SHA384_Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *context) +{ + SHA384_Pad(context); + + /* If no digest buffer is passed, we don't bother doing this: */ + if (digest != NULL) { +#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN + int i; + + /* Convert TO host byte order */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) + BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state[i]); +#else + memcpy(digest, context->state, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH); +#endif + } + + /* Zero out state data */ + memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); +} + +#endif /* defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sha2.h b/openbsd-compat/sha2.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6e6c97 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/sha2.h @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.6 2004/06/22 01:57:30 jfb Exp */ + +/* + * FILE: sha2.h + * AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford + * + * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * $From: sha2.h,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:02:01 adg Exp adg $ + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/sha2.h */ + +#ifndef _SSHSHA2_H +#define _SSHSHA2_H + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# include +# if !defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) +# define _NEED_SHA2 1 +# endif +#else +# define _NEED_SHA2 1 +#endif + +#if defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) + +/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/ +#define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH 64 +#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32 +#define SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) +#define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH 128 +#define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH 48 +#define SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) +#define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH 128 +#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH 64 +#define SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1) + + +/*** SHA-256/384/512 Context Structures *******************************/ +typedef struct _SHA256_CTX { + u_int32_t state[8]; + u_int64_t bitcount; + u_int8_t buffer[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]; +} SHA256_CTX; +typedef struct _SHA512_CTX { + u_int64_t state[8]; + u_int64_t bitcount[2]; + u_int8_t buffer[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]; +} SHA512_CTX; + +typedef SHA512_CTX SHA384_CTX; + +void SHA256_Init(SHA256_CTX *); +void SHA256_Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]); +void SHA256_Update(SHA256_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); +void SHA256_Pad(SHA256_CTX *); +void SHA256_Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA256_CTX *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH))); +char *SHA256_End(SHA256_CTX *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA256_File(const char *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA256_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA256_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); + +void SHA384_Init(SHA384_CTX *); +void SHA384_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]); +void SHA384_Update(SHA384_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); +void SHA384_Pad(SHA384_CTX *); +void SHA384_Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA384_CTX *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH))); +char *SHA384_End(SHA384_CTX *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA384_File(const char *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA384_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA384_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); + +void SHA512_Init(SHA512_CTX *); +void SHA512_Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]); +void SHA512_Update(SHA512_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3))); +void SHA512_Pad(SHA512_CTX *); +void SHA512_Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA512_CTX *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH))); +char *SHA512_End(SHA512_CTX *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA512_File(const char *, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA512_FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); +char *SHA512_Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH))); + +#endif /* defined(_NEED_SHA2) && !defined(HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE) */ + +#endif /* _SSHSHA2_H */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sigact.c b/openbsd-compat/sigact.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d67845c --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/sigact.c @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sigaction.c,v 1.4 2001/01/22 18:01:48 millert Exp $ */ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * + * * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a * + * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the * + * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including * + * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, * + * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell * + * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is * + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: * + * * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included * + * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. * + * * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS * + * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF * + * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. * + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, * + * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR * + * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR * + * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. * + * * + * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright * + * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the * + * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written * + * authorization. * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim 1992,1995 * + * and: Eric S. Raymond * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/base/sigaction.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include +#include +#include "sigact.h" + +/* This file provides sigaction() emulation using sigvec() */ +/* Use only if this is non POSIX system */ + +#if !HAVE_SIGACTION && HAVE_SIGVEC + +int +sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact) +{ + return sigvec(sig, sigact ? &sigact->sv : NULL, + osigact ? &osigact->sv : NULL); +} + +int +sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask) +{ + if (!mask) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + *mask = 0; + return 0; +} + +int +sigprocmask (int mode, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask) +{ + sigset_t current = sigsetmask(0); + + if (!mask) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + + if (omask) + *omask = current; + + if (mode == SIG_BLOCK) + current |= *mask; + else if (mode == SIG_UNBLOCK) + current &= ~*mask; + else if (mode == SIG_SETMASK) + current = *mask; + + sigsetmask(current); + return 0; +} + +int +sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask) +{ + if (!mask) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + return sigpause(*mask); +} + +int +sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig) +{ + if (!mask) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + *mask &= ~sigmask(sig); + return 0; +} + +int +sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig) +{ + if (!mask) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + *mask |= sigmask(sig); + return 0; +} + +int +sigismember (sigset_t *mask, int sig) +{ + if (!mask) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } + return (*mask & sigmask(sig)) != 0; +} + +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sigact.h b/openbsd-compat/sigact.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db96d0a --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/sigact.h @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: SigAction.h,v 1.3 2001/01/22 18:01:32 millert Exp $ */ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * + * * + * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a * + * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the * + * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including * + * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, * + * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell * + * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is * + * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: * + * * + * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included * + * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. * + * * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS * + * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF * + * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. * + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, * + * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR * + * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR * + * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. * + * * + * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright * + * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the * + * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written * + * authorization. * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/**************************************************************************** + * Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim 1992,1995 * + * and: Eric S. Raymond * + ****************************************************************************/ + +/* + * $From: SigAction.h,v 1.6 2000/12/10 02:36:10 tom Exp $ + * + * This file exists to handle non-POSIX systems which don't have , + * and usually no sigaction() nor + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/SigAction.h */ + +#ifndef _SIGACTION_H +#define _SIGACTION_H + +#if !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) + +#undef SIG_BLOCK +#define SIG_BLOCK 00 + +#undef SIG_UNBLOCK +#define SIG_UNBLOCK 01 + +#undef SIG_SETMASK +#define SIG_SETMASK 02 + +/* + * is in the Linux 1.2.8 + gcc 2.7.0 configuration, + * and is useful for testing this header file. + */ +#if HAVE_BSD_SIGNAL_H +# include +#endif + +struct sigaction +{ + struct sigvec sv; +}; + +typedef unsigned long sigset_t; + +#undef sa_mask +#define sa_mask sv.sv_mask +#undef sa_handler +#define sa_handler sv.sv_handler +#undef sa_flags +#define sa_flags sv.sv_flags + +int sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact); +int sigprocmask (int how, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask); +int sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask); +int sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask); +int sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig); +int sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig); + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) */ + +#endif /* !defined(_SIGACTION_H) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strcasestr.c b/openbsd-compat/strcasestr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c4d147 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strcasestr.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strcasestr.c,v 1.4 2015/08/31 02:53:57 guenther Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: strcasestr.c,v 1.2 2005/02/09 21:35:47 kleink Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by + * Chris Torek. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strcasestr.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRCASESTR + +#include +#include + +/* + * Find the first occurrence of find in s, ignore case. + */ +char * +strcasestr(const char *s, const char *find) +{ + char c, sc; + size_t len; + + if ((c = *find++) != 0) { + c = (char)tolower((unsigned char)c); + len = strlen(find); + do { + do { + if ((sc = *s++) == 0) + return (NULL); + } while ((char)tolower((unsigned char)sc) != c); + } while (strncasecmp(s, find, len) != 0); + s--; + } + return ((char *)s); +} +DEF_WEAK(strcasestr); + +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c b/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bcc1b61 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strlcat.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcat.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT + +#include +#include + +/* + * Appends src to string dst of size siz (unlike strncat, siz is the + * full size of dst, not space left). At most siz-1 characters + * will be copied. Always NUL terminates (unless siz <= strlen(dst)). + * Returns strlen(src) + MIN(siz, strlen(initial dst)). + * If retval >= siz, truncation occurred. + */ +size_t +strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz) +{ + char *d = dst; + const char *s = src; + size_t n = siz; + size_t dlen; + + /* Find the end of dst and adjust bytes left but don't go past end */ + while (n-- != 0 && *d != '\0') + d++; + dlen = d - dst; + n = siz - dlen; + + if (n == 0) + return(dlen + strlen(s)); + while (*s != '\0') { + if (n != 1) { + *d++ = *s; + n--; + } + s++; + } + *d = '\0'; + + return(dlen + (s - src)); /* count does not include NUL */ +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c b/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4b1b60 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strlcpy.c,v 1.11 2006/05/05 15:27:38 millert Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcpy.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY + +#include +#include + +/* + * Copy src to string dst of size siz. At most siz-1 characters + * will be copied. Always NUL terminates (unless siz == 0). + * Returns strlen(src); if retval >= siz, truncation occurred. + */ +size_t +strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz) +{ + char *d = dst; + const char *s = src; + size_t n = siz; + + /* Copy as many bytes as will fit */ + if (n != 0) { + while (--n != 0) { + if ((*d++ = *s++) == '\0') + break; + } + } + + /* Not enough room in dst, add NUL and traverse rest of src */ + if (n == 0) { + if (siz != 0) + *d = '\0'; /* NUL-terminate dst */ + while (*s++) + ; + } + + return(s - src - 1); /* count does not include NUL */ +} + +#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strmode.c b/openbsd-compat/strmode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a81614 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strmode.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strmode.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strmode.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE + +#include +#include +#include + +/* XXX mode should be mode_t */ + +void +strmode(int mode, char *p) +{ + /* print type */ + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFDIR: /* directory */ + *p++ = 'd'; + break; + case S_IFCHR: /* character special */ + *p++ = 'c'; + break; + case S_IFBLK: /* block special */ + *p++ = 'b'; + break; + case S_IFREG: /* regular */ + *p++ = '-'; + break; + case S_IFLNK: /* symbolic link */ + *p++ = 'l'; + break; +#ifdef S_IFSOCK + case S_IFSOCK: /* socket */ + *p++ = 's'; + break; +#endif +#ifdef S_IFIFO + case S_IFIFO: /* fifo */ + *p++ = 'p'; + break; +#endif + default: /* unknown */ + *p++ = '?'; + break; + } + /* usr */ + if (mode & S_IRUSR) + *p++ = 'r'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + if (mode & S_IWUSR) + *p++ = 'w'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + switch (mode & (S_IXUSR | S_ISUID)) { + case 0: + *p++ = '-'; + break; + case S_IXUSR: + *p++ = 'x'; + break; + case S_ISUID: + *p++ = 'S'; + break; + case S_IXUSR | S_ISUID: + *p++ = 's'; + break; + } + /* group */ + if (mode & S_IRGRP) + *p++ = 'r'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + if (mode & S_IWGRP) + *p++ = 'w'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + switch (mode & (S_IXGRP | S_ISGID)) { + case 0: + *p++ = '-'; + break; + case S_IXGRP: + *p++ = 'x'; + break; + case S_ISGID: + *p++ = 'S'; + break; + case S_IXGRP | S_ISGID: + *p++ = 's'; + break; + } + /* other */ + if (mode & S_IROTH) + *p++ = 'r'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + if (mode & S_IWOTH) + *p++ = 'w'; + else + *p++ = '-'; + switch (mode & (S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX)) { + case 0: + *p++ = '-'; + break; + case S_IXOTH: + *p++ = 'x'; + break; + case S_ISVTX: + *p++ = 'T'; + break; + case S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX: + *p++ = 't'; + break; + } + *p++ = ' '; /* will be a '+' if ACL's implemented */ + *p = '\0'; +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strndup.c b/openbsd-compat/strndup.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30ac6f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strndup.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strndup.c,v 1.2 2015/08/31 02:53:57 guenther Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#if !defined(HAVE_STRNDUP) || defined(BROKEN_STRNDUP) +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +char * +strndup(const char *str, size_t maxlen) +{ + char *copy; + size_t len; + + len = strnlen(str, maxlen); + copy = malloc(len + 1); + if (copy != NULL) { + (void)memcpy(copy, str, len); + copy[len] = '\0'; + } + + return copy; +} +DEF_WEAK(strndup); +#endif /* HAVE_STRNDUP */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c b/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ad3573 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strnlen.c,v 1.3 2010/06/02 12:58:12 millert Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Todd C. Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strnlen.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#if !defined(HAVE_STRNLEN) || defined(BROKEN_STRNLEN) +#include + +#include + +size_t +strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen) +{ + const char *cp; + + for (cp = str; maxlen != 0 && *cp != '\0'; cp++, maxlen--) + ; + + return (size_t)(cp - str); +} +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strptime.c b/openbsd-compat/strptime.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8d83d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strptime.c @@ -0,0 +1,401 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 2008/06/26 05:42:05 ray Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 1998/01/20 21:39:40 mycroft Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This code was contributed to The NetBSD Foundation by Klaus Klein. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS + * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED + * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS + * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN + * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE + * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/time/strptime.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME + +#define TM_YEAR_BASE 1900 /* from tzfile.h */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* #define _ctloc(x) (_CurrentTimeLocale->x) */ + +/* + * We do not implement alternate representations. However, we always + * check whether a given modifier is allowed for a certain conversion. + */ +#define _ALT_E 0x01 +#define _ALT_O 0x02 +#define _LEGAL_ALT(x) { if (alt_format & ~(x)) return (0); } + + +static int _conv_num(const unsigned char **, int *, int, int); +static char *_strptime(const char *, const char *, struct tm *, int); + + +char * +strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm) +{ + return(_strptime(buf, fmt, tm, 1)); +} + +static char * +_strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm, int initialize) +{ + unsigned char c; + const unsigned char *bp; + size_t len; + int alt_format, i; + static int century, relyear; + + if (initialize) { + century = TM_YEAR_BASE; + relyear = -1; + } + + bp = (unsigned char *)buf; + while ((c = *fmt) != '\0') { + /* Clear `alternate' modifier prior to new conversion. */ + alt_format = 0; + + /* Eat up white-space. */ + if (isspace(c)) { + while (isspace(*bp)) + bp++; + + fmt++; + continue; + } + + if ((c = *fmt++) != '%') + goto literal; + + +again: switch (c = *fmt++) { + case '%': /* "%%" is converted to "%". */ +literal: + if (c != *bp++) + return (NULL); + + break; + + /* + * "Alternative" modifiers. Just set the appropriate flag + * and start over again. + */ + case 'E': /* "%E?" alternative conversion modifier. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + alt_format |= _ALT_E; + goto again; + + case 'O': /* "%O?" alternative conversion modifier. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + alt_format |= _ALT_O; + goto again; + + /* + * "Complex" conversion rules, implemented through recursion. + */ +#if 0 + case 'c': /* Date and time, using the locale's format. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); + if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_t_fmt), tm, 0))) + return (NULL); + break; +#endif + case 'D': /* The date as "%m/%d/%y". */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%m/%d/%y", tm, 0))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'R': /* The time as "%H:%M". */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M", tm, 0))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'r': /* The time as "%I:%M:%S %p". */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%I:%M:%S %p", tm, 0))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'T': /* The time as "%H:%M:%S". */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M:%S", tm, 0))) + return (NULL); + break; +#if 0 + case 'X': /* The time, using the locale's format. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); + if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(t_fmt), tm, 0))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'x': /* The date, using the locale's format. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); + if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_fmt), tm, 0))) + return (NULL); + break; +#endif + /* + * "Elementary" conversion rules. + */ +#if 0 + case 'A': /* The day of week, using the locale's form. */ + case 'a': + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { + /* Full name. */ + len = strlen(_ctloc(day[i])); + if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(day[i]), bp, len) == 0) + break; + + /* Abbreviated name. */ + len = strlen(_ctloc(abday[i])); + if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abday[i]), bp, len) == 0) + break; + } + + /* Nothing matched. */ + if (i == 7) + return (NULL); + + tm->tm_wday = i; + bp += len; + break; + + case 'B': /* The month, using the locale's form. */ + case 'b': + case 'h': + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) { + /* Full name. */ + len = strlen(_ctloc(mon[i])); + if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(mon[i]), bp, len) == 0) + break; + + /* Abbreviated name. */ + len = strlen(_ctloc(abmon[i])); + if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abmon[i]), bp, len) == 0) + break; + } + + /* Nothing matched. */ + if (i == 12) + return (NULL); + + tm->tm_mon = i; + bp += len; + break; +#endif + + case 'C': /* The century number. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 99))) + return (NULL); + + century = i * 100; + break; + + case 'd': /* The day of month. */ + case 'e': + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mday, 1, 31))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'k': /* The hour (24-hour clock representation). */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 'H': + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 0, 23))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'l': /* The hour (12-hour clock representation). */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 'I': + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 1, 12))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'j': /* The day of year. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_yday, 1, 366))) + return (NULL); + tm->tm_yday--; + break; + + case 'M': /* The minute. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_min, 0, 59))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'm': /* The month. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mon, 1, 12))) + return (NULL); + tm->tm_mon--; + break; + +#if 0 + case 'p': /* The locale's equivalent of AM/PM. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + /* AM? */ + len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[0])); + if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[0]), bp, len) == 0) { + if (tm->tm_hour > 12) /* i.e., 13:00 AM ?! */ + return (NULL); + else if (tm->tm_hour == 12) + tm->tm_hour = 0; + + bp += len; + break; + } + /* PM? */ + len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[1])); + if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[1]), bp, len) == 0) { + if (tm->tm_hour > 12) /* i.e., 13:00 PM ?! */ + return (NULL); + else if (tm->tm_hour < 12) + tm->tm_hour += 12; + + bp += len; + break; + } + + /* Nothing matched. */ + return (NULL); +#endif + case 'S': /* The seconds. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_sec, 0, 61))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'U': /* The week of year, beginning on sunday. */ + case 'W': /* The week of year, beginning on monday. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); + /* + * XXX This is bogus, as we can not assume any valid + * information present in the tm structure at this + * point to calculate a real value, so just check the + * range for now. + */ + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 53))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'w': /* The day of week, beginning on sunday. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_wday, 0, 6))) + return (NULL); + break; + + case 'Y': /* The year. */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 9999))) + return (NULL); + + relyear = -1; + tm->tm_year = i - TM_YEAR_BASE; + break; + + case 'y': /* The year within the century (2 digits). */ + _LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E | _ALT_O); + if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &relyear, 0, 99))) + return (NULL); + break; + + /* + * Miscellaneous conversions. + */ + case 'n': /* Any kind of white-space. */ + case 't': + _LEGAL_ALT(0); + while (isspace(*bp)) + bp++; + break; + + + default: /* Unknown/unsupported conversion. */ + return (NULL); + } + + + } + + /* + * We need to evaluate the two digit year spec (%y) + * last as we can get a century spec (%C) at any time. + */ + if (relyear != -1) { + if (century == TM_YEAR_BASE) { + if (relyear <= 68) + tm->tm_year = relyear + 2000 - TM_YEAR_BASE; + else + tm->tm_year = relyear + 1900 - TM_YEAR_BASE; + } else { + tm->tm_year = relyear + century - TM_YEAR_BASE; + } + } + + return ((char *)bp); +} + + +static int +_conv_num(const unsigned char **buf, int *dest, int llim, int ulim) +{ + int result = 0; + int rulim = ulim; + + if (**buf < '0' || **buf > '9') + return (0); + + /* we use rulim to break out of the loop when we run out of digits */ + do { + result *= 10; + result += *(*buf)++ - '0'; + rulim /= 10; + } while ((result * 10 <= ulim) && rulim && **buf >= '0' && **buf <= '9'); + + if (result < llim || result > ulim) + return (0); + + *dest = result; + return (1); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_STRPTIME */ + diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strsep.c b/openbsd-compat/strsep.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b36eb8f --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strsep.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strsep.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strsep.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) + +#include +#include + +/* + * Get next token from string *stringp, where tokens are possibly-empty + * strings separated by characters from delim. + * + * Writes NULs into the string at *stringp to end tokens. + * delim need not remain constant from call to call. + * On return, *stringp points past the last NUL written (if there might + * be further tokens), or is NULL (if there are definitely no more tokens). + * + * If *stringp is NULL, strsep returns NULL. + */ +char * +strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim) +{ + char *s; + const char *spanp; + int c, sc; + char *tok; + + if ((s = *stringp) == NULL) + return (NULL); + for (tok = s;;) { + c = *s++; + spanp = delim; + do { + if ((sc = *spanp++) == c) { + if (c == 0) + s = NULL; + else + s[-1] = 0; + *stringp = s; + return (tok); + } + } while (sc != 0); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c b/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f629303 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strtoll.c,v 1.6 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoll.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Convert a string to a long long. + * + * Ignores `locale' stuff. Assumes that the upper and lower case + * alphabets and digits are each contiguous. + */ +long long +strtoll(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base) +{ + const char *s; + long long acc, cutoff; + int c; + int neg, any, cutlim; + + /* + * Skip white space and pick up leading +/- sign if any. + * If base is 0, allow 0x for hex and 0 for octal, else + * assume decimal; if base is already 16, allow 0x. + */ + s = nptr; + do { + c = (unsigned char) *s++; + } while (isspace(c)); + if (c == '-') { + neg = 1; + c = *s++; + } else { + neg = 0; + if (c == '+') + c = *s++; + } + if ((base == 0 || base == 16) && + c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) { + c = s[1]; + s += 2; + base = 16; + } + if (base == 0) + base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10; + + /* + * Compute the cutoff value between legal numbers and illegal + * numbers. That is the largest legal value, divided by the + * base. An input number that is greater than this value, if + * followed by a legal input character, is too big. One that + * is equal to this value may be valid or not; the limit + * between valid and invalid numbers is then based on the last + * digit. For instance, if the range for long longs is + * [-9223372036854775808..9223372036854775807] and the input base + * is 10, cutoff will be set to 922337203685477580 and cutlim to + * either 7 (neg==0) or 8 (neg==1), meaning that if we have + * accumulated a value > 922337203685477580, or equal but the + * next digit is > 7 (or 8), the number is too big, and we will + * return a range error. + * + * Set any if any `digits' consumed; make it negative to indicate + * overflow. + */ + cutoff = neg ? LLONG_MIN : LLONG_MAX; + cutlim = cutoff % base; + cutoff /= base; + if (neg) { + if (cutlim > 0) { + cutlim -= base; + cutoff += 1; + } + cutlim = -cutlim; + } + for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) { + if (isdigit(c)) + c -= '0'; + else if (isalpha(c)) + c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10; + else + break; + if (c >= base) + break; + if (any < 0) + continue; + if (neg) { + if (acc < cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) { + any = -1; + acc = LLONG_MIN; + errno = ERANGE; + } else { + any = 1; + acc *= base; + acc -= c; + } + } else { + if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) { + any = -1; + acc = LLONG_MAX; + errno = ERANGE; + } else { + any = 1; + acc *= base; + acc += c; + } + } + } + if (endptr != 0) + *endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr); + return (acc); +} +#endif /* HAVE_STRTOLL */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c b/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87f2f24 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strtonum.c,v 1.6 2004/08/03 19:38:01 millert Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2004 Ted Unangst and Todd Miller + * All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtonum.c */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM +#include +#include +#include + +#define INVALID 1 +#define TOOSMALL 2 +#define TOOLARGE 3 + +long long +strtonum(const char *numstr, long long minval, long long maxval, + const char **errstrp) +{ + long long ll = 0; + char *ep; + int error = 0; + struct errval { + const char *errstr; + int err; + } ev[4] = { + { NULL, 0 }, + { "invalid", EINVAL }, + { "too small", ERANGE }, + { "too large", ERANGE }, + }; + + ev[0].err = errno; + errno = 0; + if (minval > maxval) + error = INVALID; + else { + ll = strtoll(numstr, &ep, 10); + if (numstr == ep || *ep != '\0') + error = INVALID; + else if ((ll == LLONG_MIN && errno == ERANGE) || ll < minval) + error = TOOSMALL; + else if ((ll == LLONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE) || ll > maxval) + error = TOOLARGE; + } + if (errstrp != NULL) + *errstrp = ev[error].errstr; + errno = ev[error].err; + if (error) + ll = 0; + + return (ll); +} + +#endif /* HAVE_STRTONUM */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c b/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8219c83 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strtoul.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1990 Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoul.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Convert a string to an unsigned long integer. + * + * Ignores `locale' stuff. Assumes that the upper and lower case + * alphabets and digits are each contiguous. + */ +unsigned long +strtoul(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base) +{ + const char *s; + unsigned long acc, cutoff; + int c; + int neg, any, cutlim; + + /* + * See strtol for comments as to the logic used. + */ + s = nptr; + do { + c = (unsigned char) *s++; + } while (isspace(c)); + if (c == '-') { + neg = 1; + c = *s++; + } else { + neg = 0; + if (c == '+') + c = *s++; + } + if ((base == 0 || base == 16) && + c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) { + c = s[1]; + s += 2; + base = 16; + } + if (base == 0) + base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10; + + cutoff = ULONG_MAX / (unsigned long)base; + cutlim = ULONG_MAX % (unsigned long)base; + for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) { + if (isdigit(c)) + c -= '0'; + else if (isalpha(c)) + c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10; + else + break; + if (c >= base) + break; + if (any < 0) + continue; + if (acc > cutoff || acc == cutoff && c > cutlim) { + any = -1; + acc = ULONG_MAX; + errno = ERANGE; + } else { + any = 1; + acc *= (unsigned long)base; + acc += c; + } + } + if (neg && any > 0) + acc = -acc; + if (endptr != 0) + *endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr); + return (acc); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_STRTOUL */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c b/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7c818c --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: strtoull.c,v 1.5 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoull.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Convert a string to an unsigned long long. + * + * Ignores `locale' stuff. Assumes that the upper and lower case + * alphabets and digits are each contiguous. + */ +unsigned long long +strtoull(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base) +{ + const char *s; + unsigned long long acc, cutoff; + int c; + int neg, any, cutlim; + + /* + * See strtoq for comments as to the logic used. + */ + s = nptr; + do { + c = (unsigned char) *s++; + } while (isspace(c)); + if (c == '-') { + neg = 1; + c = *s++; + } else { + neg = 0; + if (c == '+') + c = *s++; + } + if ((base == 0 || base == 16) && + c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) { + c = s[1]; + s += 2; + base = 16; + } + if (base == 0) + base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10; + + cutoff = ULLONG_MAX / (unsigned long long)base; + cutlim = ULLONG_MAX % (unsigned long long)base; + for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) { + if (isdigit(c)) + c -= '0'; + else if (isalpha(c)) + c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10; + else + break; + if (c >= base) + break; + if (any < 0) + continue; + if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) { + any = -1; + acc = ULLONG_MAX; + errno = ERANGE; + } else { + any = 1; + acc *= (unsigned long long)base; + acc += c; + } + } + if (neg && any > 0) + acc = -acc; + if (endptr != 0) + *endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr); + return (acc); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_STRTOULL */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h b/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af93d68 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h @@ -0,0 +1,658 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.36 2012/04/11 13:29:14 naddy Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)queue.h 8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94 + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/queue.h */ + +#ifndef _FAKE_QUEUE_H_ +#define _FAKE_QUEUE_H_ + +/* + * Require for OS/X and other platforms that have old/broken/incomplete + * . + */ +#undef SLIST_HEAD +#undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef SLIST_ENTRY +#undef SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR +#undef SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE +#undef SLIST_FIRST +#undef SLIST_END +#undef SLIST_EMPTY +#undef SLIST_NEXT +#undef SLIST_FOREACH +#undef SLIST_INIT +#undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER +#undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD +#undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD +#undef SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER +#undef SLIST_REMOVE +#undef SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT +#undef LIST_HEAD +#undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef LIST_ENTRY +#undef LIST_FIRST +#undef LIST_END +#undef LIST_EMPTY +#undef LIST_NEXT +#undef LIST_FOREACH +#undef LIST_FOREACH_SAFE +#undef LIST_INIT +#undef LIST_INSERT_AFTER +#undef LIST_INSERT_BEFORE +#undef LIST_INSERT_HEAD +#undef LIST_REMOVE +#undef LIST_REPLACE +#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD +#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef SIMPLEQ_ENTRY +#undef SIMPLEQ_FIRST +#undef SIMPLEQ_END +#undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY +#undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT +#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH +#undef SIMPLEQ_INIT +#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD +#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL +#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER +#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD +#undef TAILQ_HEAD +#undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef TAILQ_ENTRY +#undef TAILQ_FIRST +#undef TAILQ_END +#undef TAILQ_NEXT +#undef TAILQ_LAST +#undef TAILQ_PREV +#undef TAILQ_EMPTY +#undef TAILQ_FOREACH +#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE +#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE +#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE +#undef TAILQ_INIT +#undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD +#undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL +#undef TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER +#undef TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE +#undef TAILQ_REMOVE +#undef TAILQ_REPLACE +#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD +#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER +#undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY +#undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST +#undef CIRCLEQ_LAST +#undef CIRCLEQ_END +#undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT +#undef CIRCLEQ_PREV +#undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY +#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH +#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE +#undef CIRCLEQ_INIT +#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER +#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE +#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD +#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL +#undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE +#undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE + +/* + * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists, + * lists, simple queues, tail queues, and circular queues. + * + * + * A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements + * are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at + * the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be + * added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list. + * Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit + * macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may + * only be traversed in the forward direction. Singly-linked lists are ideal + * for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for + * implementing a LIFO queue. + * + * A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward + * pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked + * so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before + * or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list + * may only be traversed in the forward direction. + * + * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly + * linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the + * head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after + * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the + * list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction. + * + * A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly + * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or + * after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of + * the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction. + * + * A circle queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the + * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly + * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to + * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after + * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the list. + * A circle queue may be traversed in either direction, but has a more + * complex end of list detection. + * + * For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page. + */ + +#if defined(QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG) || (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(DIAGNOSTIC)) +#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) (a) = ((void *)-1) +#else +#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) +#endif + +/* + * Singly-linked List definitions. + */ +#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *slh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL } + +#define SLIST_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *sle_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +/* + * Singly-linked List access methods. + */ +#define SLIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->slh_first) +#define SLIST_END(head) NULL +#define SLIST_EMPTY(head) (SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head)) +#define SLIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sle_next) + +#define SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != SLIST_END(head); \ + (var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field)) + +#define SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +/* + * Singly-linked List functions. + */ +#define SLIST_INIT(head) { \ + SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head); \ +} + +#define SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next; \ + (slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first; \ + (head)->slh_first = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER(elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sle_next = (elm)->field.sle_next->field.sle_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \ + (head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define SLIST_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do { \ + if ((head)->slh_first == (elm)) { \ + SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field); \ + } else { \ + struct type *curelm = (head)->slh_first; \ + \ + while (curelm->field.sle_next != (elm)) \ + curelm = curelm->field.sle_next; \ + curelm->field.sle_next = \ + curelm->field.sle_next->field.sle_next; \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.sle_next); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/* + * List definitions. + */ +#define LIST_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *lh_first; /* first element */ \ +} + +#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL } + +#define LIST_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *le_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type **le_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ +} + +/* + * List access methods + */ +#define LIST_FIRST(head) ((head)->lh_first) +#define LIST_END(head) NULL +#define LIST_EMPTY(head) (LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head)) +#define LIST_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.le_next) + +#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \ + (var)!= LIST_END(head); \ + (var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field)) + +#define LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = LIST_FIRST(head); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = LIST_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +/* + * List functions. + */ +#define LIST_INIT(head) do { \ + LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head); \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \ + (listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ + &(elm)->field.le_next; \ + (listelm)->field.le_next = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev; \ + (elm)->field.le_next = (listelm); \ + *(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL) \ + (head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\ + (head)->lh_first = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do { \ + if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL) \ + (elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ + (elm)->field.le_prev; \ + *(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next; \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev); \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next); \ +} while (0) + +#define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do { \ + if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL) \ + (elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev = \ + &(elm2)->field.le_next; \ + (elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev; \ + *(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2); \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev); \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Simple queue definitions. + */ +#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *sqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type **sqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ +} + +#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL, &(head).sqh_first } + +#define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *sqe_next; /* next element */ \ +} + +/* + * Simple queue access methods. + */ +#define SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->sqh_first) +#define SIMPLEQ_END(head) NULL +#define SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head) (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head)) +#define SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.sqe_next) + +#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head); \ + (var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field)) + +#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) && ((tvar) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +/* + * Simple queue functions. + */ +#define SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do { \ + (head)->sqh_first = NULL; \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL) \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ + (head)->sqh_first = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL; \ + *(head)->sqh_last = (elm); \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ + (listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do { \ + if (((head)->sqh_first = (head)->sqh_first->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (elm)->field.sqe_next->field.sqe_next) \ + == NULL) \ + (head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Tail queue definitions. + */ +#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *tqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type **tqh_last; /* addr of last next element */ \ +} + +#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { NULL, &(head).tqh_first } + +#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *tqe_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type **tqe_prev; /* address of previous next element */ \ +} + +/* + * tail queue access methods + */ +#define TAILQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->tqh_first) +#define TAILQ_END(head) NULL +#define TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.tqe_next) +#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname) \ + (*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last)) +/* XXX */ +#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field) \ + (*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last)) +#define TAILQ_EMPTY(head) \ + (TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \ + (var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != TAILQ_END(head) && \ + ((tvar) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, headname, field) \ + for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \ + (var) != TAILQ_END(head); \ + (var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field)) + +#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname); \ + (var) != TAILQ_END(head) && \ + ((tvar) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +/* + * Tail queue functions. + */ +#define TAILQ_INIT(head) do { \ + (head)->tqh_first = NULL; \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL) \ + (head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = \ + &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + (head)->tqh_first = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL; \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last; \ + *(head)->tqh_last = (elm); \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\ + (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ + &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + (listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm); \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + (elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm); \ + *(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next; \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \ + if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \ + (elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ + (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + *(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next; \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev); \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next); \ +} while (0) + +#define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \ + if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL) \ + (elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev = \ + &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \ + else \ + (head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next; \ + (elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev; \ + *(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2); \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev); \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next); \ +} while (0) + +/* + * Circular queue definitions. + */ +#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *cqh_first; /* first element */ \ + struct type *cqh_last; /* last element */ \ +} + +#define CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head) \ + { CIRCLEQ_END(&head), CIRCLEQ_END(&head) } + +#define CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *cqe_next; /* next element */ \ + struct type *cqe_prev; /* previous element */ \ +} + +/* + * Circular queue access methods + */ +#define CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) ((head)->cqh_first) +#define CIRCLEQ_LAST(head) ((head)->cqh_last) +#define CIRCLEQ_END(head) ((void *)(head)) +#define CIRCLEQ_NEXT(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_next) +#define CIRCLEQ_PREV(elm, field) ((elm)->field.cqe_prev) +#define CIRCLEQ_EMPTY(head) \ + (CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head) == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) + +#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (var) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field)) + +#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_FIRST(head); \ + (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && \ + ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, field) \ + for((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head); \ + (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (var) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, field)) + +#define CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar) \ + for ((var) = CIRCLEQ_LAST(head, headname); \ + (var) != CIRCLEQ_END(head) && \ + ((tvar) = CIRCLEQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1); \ + (var) = (tvar)) + +/* + * Circular queue functions. + */ +#define CIRCLEQ_INIT(head) do { \ + (head)->cqh_first = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (head)->cqh_last = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm)->field.cqe_next; \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm); \ + if ((listelm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ + else \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE(head, listelm, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = (listelm); \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (listelm)->field.cqe_prev; \ + if ((listelm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ + else \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ + (listelm)->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = (head)->cqh_first; \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + if ((head)->cqh_last == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ + else \ + (head)->cqh_first->field.cqe_prev = (elm); \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do { \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next = CIRCLEQ_END(head); \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev = (head)->cqh_last; \ + if ((head)->cqh_first == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm); \ + else \ + (head)->cqh_last->field.cqe_next = (elm); \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do { \ + if ((elm)->field.cqe_next == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_last = (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \ + else \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev; \ + if ((elm)->field.cqe_prev == CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head)->cqh_first = (elm)->field.cqe_next; \ + else \ + (elm)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = \ + (elm)->field.cqe_next; \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev); \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next); \ +} while (0) + +#define CIRCLEQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do { \ + if (((elm2)->field.cqe_next = (elm)->field.cqe_next) == \ + CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head).cqh_last = (elm2); \ + else \ + (elm2)->field.cqe_next->field.cqe_prev = (elm2); \ + if (((elm2)->field.cqe_prev = (elm)->field.cqe_prev) == \ + CIRCLEQ_END(head)) \ + (head).cqh_first = (elm2); \ + else \ + (elm2)->field.cqe_prev->field.cqe_next = (elm2); \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_prev); \ + _Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.cqe_next); \ +} while (0) + +#endif /* !_FAKE_QUEUE_H_ */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h b/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f7546e --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h @@ -0,0 +1,755 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.13 2011/07/09 00:19:45 pirofti Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/tree.h */ + +#include "config.h" +#ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE +# define __attribute__(x) +#endif + +#ifndef _SYS_TREE_H_ +#define _SYS_TREE_H_ + +/* + * This file defines data structures for different types of trees: + * splay trees and red-black trees. + * + * A splay tree is a self-organizing data structure. Every operation + * on the tree causes a splay to happen. The splay moves the requested + * node to the root of the tree and partly rebalances it. + * + * This has the benefit that request locality causes faster lookups as + * the requested nodes move to the top of the tree. On the other hand, + * every lookup causes memory writes. + * + * The Balance Theorem bounds the total access time for m operations + * and n inserts on an initially empty tree as O((m + n)lg n). The + * amortized cost for a sequence of m accesses to a splay tree is O(lg n); + * + * A red-black tree is a binary search tree with the node color as an + * extra attribute. It fulfills a set of conditions: + * - every search path from the root to a leaf consists of the + * same number of black nodes, + * - each red node (except for the root) has a black parent, + * - each leaf node is black. + * + * Every operation on a red-black tree is bounded as O(lg n). + * The maximum height of a red-black tree is 2lg (n+1). + */ + +#define SPLAY_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *sph_root; /* root of the tree */ \ +} + +#define SPLAY_INITIALIZER(root) \ + { NULL } + +#define SPLAY_INIT(root) do { \ + (root)->sph_root = NULL; \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *spe_left; /* left element */ \ + struct type *spe_right; /* right element */ \ +} + +#define SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) (elm)->field.spe_left +#define SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) (elm)->field.spe_right +#define SPLAY_ROOT(head) (head)->sph_root +#define SPLAY_EMPTY(head) (SPLAY_ROOT(head) == NULL) + +/* SPLAY_ROTATE_{LEFT,RIGHT} expect that tmp hold SPLAY_{RIGHT,LEFT} */ +#define SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = tmp; \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = tmp; \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + tmp = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, tmp, field) do { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + tmp = (head)->sph_root; \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ +} while (0) + +#define SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, node, left, right, field) do { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(left, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + SPLAY_LEFT(right, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(node, field); \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(node, field); \ +} while (0) + +/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */ + +#define SPLAY_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp) \ +void name##_SPLAY(struct name *, struct type *); \ +void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *, int); \ +struct type *name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *); \ +struct type *name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *); \ + \ +/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */ \ +static __inline struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) \ + return(NULL); \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) \ + return (head->sph_root); \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +static __inline struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_NEXT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + if (SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) != NULL) { \ + elm = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + while (SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) != NULL) { \ + elm = SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field); \ + } \ + } else \ + elm = NULL; \ + return (elm); \ +} \ + \ +static __inline struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(struct name *head, int val) \ +{ \ + name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(head, val); \ + return (SPLAY_ROOT(head)); \ +} + +/* Main splay operation. + * Moves node close to the key of elm to top + */ +#define SPLAY_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp) \ +struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) { \ + SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL; \ + } else { \ + int __comp; \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + __comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root); \ + if(__comp < 0) { \ + SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL; \ + } else if (__comp > 0) { \ + SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root; \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL; \ + } else \ + return ((head)->sph_root); \ + } \ + (head)->sph_root = (elm); \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +struct type * \ +name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *__tmp; \ + if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) \ + return (NULL); \ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) { \ + if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL) { \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + } else { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + (head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\ + name##_SPLAY(head, elm); \ + SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = __tmp; \ + } \ + return (elm); \ + } \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +void \ +name##_SPLAY(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp; \ + int __comp; \ +\ + SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\ + __left = __right = &__node; \ +\ + while ((__comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root))) { \ + if (__comp < 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) < 0){ \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field); \ + } else if (__comp > 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) > 0){ \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field); \ + } \ + } \ + SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field); \ +} \ + \ +/* Splay with either the minimum or the maximum element \ + * Used to find minimum or maximum element in tree. \ + */ \ +void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *head, int __comp) \ +{ \ + struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp; \ +\ + SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\ + __left = __right = &__node; \ +\ + while (1) { \ + if (__comp < 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if (__comp < 0){ \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field); \ + } else if (__comp > 0) { \ + __tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field); \ + if (__tmp == NULL) \ + break; \ + if (__comp > 0) { \ + SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field); \ + if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\ + break; \ + } \ + SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field); \ + } \ + } \ + SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field); \ +} + +#define SPLAY_NEGINF -1 +#define SPLAY_INF 1 + +#define SPLAY_INSERT(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_INSERT(x, y) +#define SPLAY_REMOVE(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(x, y) +#define SPLAY_FIND(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_FIND(x, y) +#define SPLAY_NEXT(name, x, y) name##_SPLAY_NEXT(x, y) +#define SPLAY_MIN(name, x) (SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL \ + : name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_NEGINF)) +#define SPLAY_MAX(name, x) (SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL \ + : name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_INF)) + +#define SPLAY_FOREACH(x, name, head) \ + for ((x) = SPLAY_MIN(name, head); \ + (x) != NULL; \ + (x) = SPLAY_NEXT(name, head, x)) + +/* Macros that define a red-black tree */ +#define RB_HEAD(name, type) \ +struct name { \ + struct type *rbh_root; /* root of the tree */ \ +} + +#define RB_INITIALIZER(root) \ + { NULL } + +#define RB_INIT(root) do { \ + (root)->rbh_root = NULL; \ +} while (0) + +#define RB_BLACK 0 +#define RB_RED 1 +#define RB_ENTRY(type) \ +struct { \ + struct type *rbe_left; /* left element */ \ + struct type *rbe_right; /* right element */ \ + struct type *rbe_parent; /* parent element */ \ + int rbe_color; /* node color */ \ +} + +#define RB_LEFT(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_left +#define RB_RIGHT(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_right +#define RB_PARENT(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_parent +#define RB_COLOR(elm, field) (elm)->field.rbe_color +#define RB_ROOT(head) (head)->rbh_root +#define RB_EMPTY(head) (RB_ROOT(head) == NULL) + +#define RB_SET(elm, parent, field) do { \ + RB_PARENT(elm, field) = parent; \ + RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL; \ + RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_RED; \ +} while (0) + +#define RB_SET_BLACKRED(black, red, field) do { \ + RB_COLOR(black, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + RB_COLOR(red, field) = RB_RED; \ +} while (0) + +#ifndef RB_AUGMENT +#define RB_AUGMENT(x) do {} while (0) +#endif + +#define RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, elm, tmp, field) do { \ + (tmp) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + if ((RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = RB_LEFT(tmp, field))) { \ + RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = (elm); \ + } \ + RB_AUGMENT(elm); \ + if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) { \ + if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)) \ + RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ + } else \ + (head)->rbh_root = (tmp); \ + RB_LEFT(tmp, field) = (elm); \ + RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp); \ + RB_AUGMENT(tmp); \ + if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field))) \ + RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field)); \ +} while (0) + +#define RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, elm, tmp, field) do { \ + (tmp) = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + if ((RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field))) { \ + RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = (elm); \ + } \ + RB_AUGMENT(elm); \ + if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) { \ + if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)) \ + RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp); \ + } else \ + (head)->rbh_root = (tmp); \ + RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (elm); \ + RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp); \ + RB_AUGMENT(tmp); \ + if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field))) \ + RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field)); \ +} while (0) + +/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */ +#define RB_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp) \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp) \ + RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static) +#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ +attr void name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *); \ +attr void name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *, struct type *);\ +attr struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *); \ +attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *); \ +attr struct type *name##_RB_FIND(struct name *, struct type *); \ +attr struct type *name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *, struct type *); \ +attr struct type *name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *); \ +attr struct type *name##_RB_PREV(struct type *); \ +attr struct type *name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *, int); \ + \ + +/* Main rb operation. + * Moves node close to the key of elm to top + */ +#define RB_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp) \ + RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,) +#define RB_GENERATE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp) \ + RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static) +#define RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr) \ +attr void \ +name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *parent, *gparent, *tmp; \ + while ((parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field)) && \ + RB_COLOR(parent, field) == RB_RED) { \ + gparent = RB_PARENT(parent, field); \ + if (parent == RB_LEFT(gparent, field)) { \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(gparent, field); \ + if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\ + elm = gparent; \ + continue; \ + } \ + if (RB_RIGHT(parent, field) == elm) { \ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + tmp = parent; \ + parent = elm; \ + elm = tmp; \ + } \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field); \ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, gparent, tmp, field); \ + } else { \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(gparent, field); \ + if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\ + elm = gparent; \ + continue; \ + } \ + if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) { \ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + tmp = parent; \ + parent = elm; \ + elm = tmp; \ + } \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field); \ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, gparent, tmp, field); \ + } \ + } \ + RB_COLOR(head->rbh_root, field) = RB_BLACK; \ +} \ + \ +attr void \ +name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *parent, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp; \ + while ((elm == NULL || RB_COLOR(elm, field) == RB_BLACK) && \ + elm != RB_ROOT(head)) { \ + if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) { \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ + if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field); \ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ + } \ + if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\ + (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ + elm = parent; \ + parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + } else { \ + if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\ + struct type *oleft; \ + if ((oleft = RB_LEFT(tmp, field)))\ + RB_COLOR(oleft, field) = RB_BLACK;\ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, oleft, field);\ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field); \ + } \ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\ + RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field)) \ + RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + elm = RB_ROOT(head); \ + break; \ + } \ + } else { \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ + if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) { \ + RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field); \ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ + } \ + if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\ + (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ + elm = parent; \ + parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + } else { \ + if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL || \ + RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\ + struct type *oright; \ + if ((oright = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field)))\ + RB_COLOR(oright, field) = RB_BLACK;\ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED; \ + RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, oright, field);\ + tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field); \ + } \ + RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\ + RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK; \ + if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field)) \ + RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\ + RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\ + elm = RB_ROOT(head); \ + break; \ + } \ + } \ + } \ + if (elm) \ + RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_BLACK; \ +} \ + \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *child, *parent, *old = elm; \ + int color; \ + if (RB_LEFT(elm, field) == NULL) \ + child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + else if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field) == NULL) \ + child = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + else { \ + struct type *left; \ + elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + while ((left = RB_LEFT(elm, field))) \ + elm = left; \ + child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + color = RB_COLOR(elm, field); \ + if (child) \ + RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent; \ + if (parent) { \ + if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) \ + RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child; \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child; \ + RB_AUGMENT(parent); \ + } else \ + RB_ROOT(head) = child; \ + if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) == old) \ + parent = elm; \ + (elm)->field = (old)->field; \ + if (RB_PARENT(old, field)) { \ + if (RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) == old)\ + RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\ + RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(old, field)); \ + } else \ + RB_ROOT(head) = elm; \ + RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(old, field), field) = elm; \ + if (RB_RIGHT(old, field)) \ + RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(old, field), field) = elm; \ + if (parent) { \ + left = parent; \ + do { \ + RB_AUGMENT(left); \ + } while ((left = RB_PARENT(left, field))); \ + } \ + goto color; \ + } \ + parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + color = RB_COLOR(elm, field); \ + if (child) \ + RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent; \ + if (parent) { \ + if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) \ + RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child; \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child; \ + RB_AUGMENT(parent); \ + } else \ + RB_ROOT(head) = child; \ +color: \ + if (color == RB_BLACK) \ + name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(head, parent, child); \ + return (old); \ +} \ + \ +/* Inserts a node into the RB tree */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp; \ + struct type *parent = NULL; \ + int comp = 0; \ + tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + while (tmp) { \ + parent = tmp; \ + comp = (cmp)(elm, parent); \ + if (comp < 0) \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + else if (comp > 0) \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + return (tmp); \ + } \ + RB_SET(elm, parent, field); \ + if (parent != NULL) { \ + if (comp < 0) \ + RB_LEFT(parent, field) = elm; \ + else \ + RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = elm; \ + RB_AUGMENT(parent); \ + } else \ + RB_ROOT(head) = elm; \ + name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(head, elm); \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + int comp; \ + while (tmp) { \ + comp = cmp(elm, tmp); \ + if (comp < 0) \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + else if (comp > 0) \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + return (tmp); \ + } \ + return (NULL); \ +} \ + \ +/* Finds the first node greater than or equal to the search key */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + struct type *res = NULL; \ + int comp; \ + while (tmp) { \ + comp = cmp(elm, tmp); \ + if (comp < 0) { \ + res = tmp; \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + } \ + else if (comp > 0) \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + return (tmp); \ + } \ + return (res); \ +} \ + \ +/* ARGSUSED */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) { \ + elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + while (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) \ + elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + } else { \ + if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ + (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))) \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + else { \ + while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ + (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + } \ + } \ + return (elm); \ +} \ + \ +/* ARGSUSED */ \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_PREV(struct type *elm) \ +{ \ + if (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) { \ + elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field); \ + while (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) \ + elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field); \ + } else { \ + if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ + (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))) \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + else { \ + while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) && \ + (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field); \ + } \ + } \ + return (elm); \ +} \ + \ +attr struct type * \ +name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val) \ +{ \ + struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head); \ + struct type *parent = NULL; \ + while (tmp) { \ + parent = tmp; \ + if (val < 0) \ + tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field); \ + else \ + tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field); \ + } \ + return (parent); \ +} + +#define RB_NEGINF -1 +#define RB_INF 1 + +#define RB_INSERT(name, x, y) name##_RB_INSERT(x, y) +#define RB_REMOVE(name, x, y) name##_RB_REMOVE(x, y) +#define RB_FIND(name, x, y) name##_RB_FIND(x, y) +#define RB_NFIND(name, x, y) name##_RB_NFIND(x, y) +#define RB_NEXT(name, x, y) name##_RB_NEXT(y) +#define RB_PREV(name, x, y) name##_RB_PREV(y) +#define RB_MIN(name, x) name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_NEGINF) +#define RB_MAX(name, x) name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_INF) + +#define RB_FOREACH(x, name, head) \ + for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head); \ + (x) != NULL; \ + (x) = name##_RB_NEXT(x)) + +#define RB_FOREACH_SAFE(x, name, head, y) \ + for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head); \ + ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_NEXT(x), 1); \ + (x) = (y)) + +#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE(x, name, head) \ + for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head); \ + (x) != NULL; \ + (x) = name##_RB_PREV(x)) + +#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(x, name, head, y) \ + for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head); \ + ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_PREV(x), 1); \ + (x) = (y)) + +#endif /* _SYS_TREE_H_ */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c b/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e28c0e --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: timingsafe_bcmp.c,v 1.1 2010/09/24 13:33:00 matthew Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/timingsafe_bcmp.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP + +int +timingsafe_bcmp(const void *b1, const void *b2, size_t n) +{ + const unsigned char *p1 = b1, *p2 = b2; + int ret = 0; + + for (; n > 0; n--) + ret |= *p1++ ^ *p2++; + return (ret != 0); +} + +#endif /* TIMINGSAFE_BCMP */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/vis.c b/openbsd-compat/vis.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e04ed0 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/vis.c @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: vis.c,v 1.25 2015/09/13 11:32:51 guenther Exp $ */ +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/vis.c */ + +#include "includes.h" +#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "vis.h" + +#define isoctal(c) (((u_char)(c)) >= '0' && ((u_char)(c)) <= '7') +#define isvisible(c,flag) \ + (((c) == '\\' || (flag & VIS_ALL) == 0) && \ + (((u_int)(c) <= UCHAR_MAX && isascii((u_char)(c)) && \ + (((c) != '*' && (c) != '?' && (c) != '[' && (c) != '#') || \ + (flag & VIS_GLOB) == 0) && isgraph((u_char)(c))) || \ + ((flag & VIS_SP) == 0 && (c) == ' ') || \ + ((flag & VIS_TAB) == 0 && (c) == '\t') || \ + ((flag & VIS_NL) == 0 && (c) == '\n') || \ + ((flag & VIS_SAFE) && ((c) == '\b' || \ + (c) == '\007' || (c) == '\r' || \ + isgraph((u_char)(c)))))) + +/* + * vis - visually encode characters + */ +char * +vis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc) +{ + if (isvisible(c, flag)) { + if ((c == '"' && (flag & VIS_DQ) != 0) || + (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)) + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = c; + *dst = '\0'; + return (dst); + } + + if (flag & VIS_CSTYLE) { + switch(c) { + case '\n': + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = 'n'; + goto done; + case '\r': + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = 'r'; + goto done; + case '\b': + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = 'b'; + goto done; + case '\a': + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = 'a'; + goto done; + case '\v': + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = 'v'; + goto done; + case '\t': + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = 't'; + goto done; + case '\f': + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = 'f'; + goto done; + case ' ': + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = 's'; + goto done; + case '\0': + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = '0'; + if (isoctal(nextc)) { + *dst++ = '0'; + *dst++ = '0'; + } + goto done; + } + } + if (((c & 0177) == ' ') || (flag & VIS_OCTAL) || + ((flag & VIS_GLOB) && (c == '*' || c == '?' || c == '[' || c == '#'))) { + *dst++ = '\\'; + *dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 6 & 07) + '0'; + *dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 3 & 07) + '0'; + *dst++ = ((u_char)c & 07) + '0'; + goto done; + } + if ((flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0) + *dst++ = '\\'; + if (c & 0200) { + c &= 0177; + *dst++ = 'M'; + } + if (iscntrl((u_char)c)) { + *dst++ = '^'; + if (c == 0177) + *dst++ = '?'; + else + *dst++ = c + '@'; + } else { + *dst++ = '-'; + *dst++ = c; + } +done: + *dst = '\0'; + return (dst); +} +DEF_WEAK(vis); + +/* + * strvis, strnvis, strvisx - visually encode characters from src into dst + * + * Dst must be 4 times the size of src to account for possible + * expansion. The length of dst, not including the trailing NULL, + * is returned. + * + * Strnvis will write no more than siz-1 bytes (and will NULL terminate). + * The number of bytes needed to fully encode the string is returned. + * + * Strvisx encodes exactly len bytes from src into dst. + * This is useful for encoding a block of data. + */ +int +strvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag) +{ + char c; + char *start; + + for (start = dst; (c = *src);) + dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src); + *dst = '\0'; + return (dst - start); +} +DEF_WEAK(strvis); + +int +strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz, int flag) +{ + char *start, *end; + char tbuf[5]; + int c, i; + + i = 0; + for (start = dst, end = start + siz - 1; (c = *src) && dst < end; ) { + if (isvisible(c, flag)) { + if ((c == '"' && (flag & VIS_DQ) != 0) || + (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)) { + /* need space for the extra '\\' */ + if (dst + 1 >= end) { + i = 2; + break; + } + *dst++ = '\\'; + } + i = 1; + *dst++ = c; + src++; + } else { + i = vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf; + if (dst + i <= end) { + memcpy(dst, tbuf, i); + dst += i; + } else { + src--; + break; + } + } + } + if (siz > 0) + *dst = '\0'; + if (dst + i > end) { + /* adjust return value for truncation */ + while ((c = *src)) + dst += vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf; + } + return (dst - start); +} + +int +stravis(char **outp, const char *src, int flag) +{ + char *buf; + int len, serrno; + + buf = reallocarray(NULL, 4, strlen(src) + 1); + if (buf == NULL) + return -1; + len = strvis(buf, src, flag); + serrno = errno; + *outp = realloc(buf, len + 1); + if (*outp == NULL) { + *outp = buf; + errno = serrno; + } + return (len); +} + +int +strvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag) +{ + char c; + char *start; + + for (start = dst; len > 1; len--) { + c = *src; + dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src); + } + if (len) + dst = vis(dst, *src, flag, '\0'); + *dst = '\0'; + return (dst - start); +} + +#endif diff --git a/openbsd-compat/vis.h b/openbsd-compat/vis.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2cdfd36 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/vis.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: vis.h,v 1.15 2015/07/20 01:52:27 millert Exp $ */ +/* $NetBSD: vis.h,v 1.4 1994/10/26 00:56:41 cgd Exp $ */ + +/*- + * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * @(#)vis.h 5.9 (Berkeley) 4/3/91 + */ + +/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/vis.h */ + +#include "includes.h" +#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) + +#ifndef _VIS_H_ +#define _VIS_H_ + +#include +#include + +/* + * to select alternate encoding format + */ +#define VIS_OCTAL 0x01 /* use octal \ddd format */ +#define VIS_CSTYLE 0x02 /* use \[nrft0..] where appropriate */ + +/* + * to alter set of characters encoded (default is to encode all + * non-graphic except space, tab, and newline). + */ +#define VIS_SP 0x04 /* also encode space */ +#define VIS_TAB 0x08 /* also encode tab */ +#define VIS_NL 0x10 /* also encode newline */ +#define VIS_WHITE (VIS_SP | VIS_TAB | VIS_NL) +#define VIS_SAFE 0x20 /* only encode "unsafe" characters */ +#define VIS_DQ 0x200 /* backslash-escape double quotes */ +#define VIS_ALL 0x400 /* encode all characters */ + +/* + * other + */ +#define VIS_NOSLASH 0x40 /* inhibit printing '\' */ +#define VIS_GLOB 0x100 /* encode glob(3) magics and '#' */ + +/* + * unvis return codes + */ +#define UNVIS_VALID 1 /* character valid */ +#define UNVIS_VALIDPUSH 2 /* character valid, push back passed char */ +#define UNVIS_NOCHAR 3 /* valid sequence, no character produced */ +#define UNVIS_SYNBAD -1 /* unrecognized escape sequence */ +#define UNVIS_ERROR -2 /* decoder in unknown state (unrecoverable) */ + +/* + * unvis flags + */ +#define UNVIS_END 1 /* no more characters */ + +char *vis(char *, int, int, int); +int strvis(char *, const char *, int); +int stravis(char **, const char *, int); +int strnvis(char *, const char *, size_t, int) + __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3))); +int strvisx(char *, const char *, size_t, int) + __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3))); +int strunvis(char *, const char *); +int unvis(char *, char, int *, int); +ssize_t strnunvis(char *, const char *, size_t) + __attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3))); + +#endif /* !_VIS_H_ */ + +#endif /* !HAVE_STRNVIS || BROKEN_STRNVIS */ diff --git a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..360b187 --- /dev/null +++ b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +# if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) +# include +# endif + +# ifdef __hpux +# include +# include +# endif + +# ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE +# include +# include +# include +# endif + +# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) +# include +# endif + +# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) +# include +# include +# include +# endif + +# if defined(HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS) && !defined(HAVE_MD5_CRYPT) +# include "md5crypt.h" +# endif + +# if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT) +# include +# define crypt DES_crypt +# endif + +/* + * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running + * system by searching through accounts until we find one that has a valid + * salt. Usually this will be root unless the root account is locked out. + * If we don't find one we return a traditional DES-based salt. + */ +static const char * +pick_salt(void) +{ + struct passwd *pw; + char *passwd, *p; + size_t typelen; + static char salt[32]; + + if (salt[0] != '\0') + return salt; + strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt)); + setpwent(); + while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) { + if ((passwd = shadow_pw(pw)) == NULL) + continue; + if (passwd[0] == '$' && (p = strrchr(passwd+1, '$')) != NULL) { + typelen = p - passwd + 1; + strlcpy(salt, passwd, MIN(typelen, sizeof(salt))); + explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); + goto out; + } + } + out: + endpwent(); + return salt; +} + +char * +xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt) +{ + char *crypted; + + /* + * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for + * for timing purposes. Pick an appropriate salt. + */ + if (salt == NULL) + salt = pick_salt(); + +# ifdef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS + if (is_md5_salt(salt)) + crypted = md5_crypt(password, salt); + else + crypted = crypt(password, salt); +# elif defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) + if (iscomsec()) + crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt); + else + crypted = crypt(password, salt); +# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) + crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt); +# else + crypted = crypt(password, salt); +# endif + + return crypted; +} + +/* + * Handle shadowed password systems in a cleaner way for portable + * version. + */ + +char * +shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *pw_password = pw->pw_passwd; + +# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) + struct spwd *spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); + + if (spw != NULL) + pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp; +# endif + +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF + return(get_iaf_password(pw)); +#endif + +# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) + struct passwd_adjunct *spw; + if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL) + pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd; +# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) + struct pr_passwd *spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name); + + if (spw != NULL) + pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt; +# endif + + return pw_password; +} diff --git a/openssh.xml.in b/openssh.xml.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8afe1d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh.xml.in @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/opensshd.init.in b/opensshd.init.in new file mode 100755 index 0000000..99e5a51 --- /dev/null +++ b/opensshd.init.in @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +#!@STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL@ +# Donated code that was put under PD license. +# +# Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being. + +umask 022 + +CAT=@CAT@ +KILL=@KILL@ + +prefix=@prefix@ +sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ +piddir=@piddir@ + +SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd +PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid +PidFile=`grep "^PidFile" ${sysconfdir}/sshd_config | tr "=" " " | awk '{print $2}'` +[ X$PidFile = X ] || PIDFILE=$PidFile +SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen +HOST_KEY_DSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key +HOST_KEY_RSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key +@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@HOST_KEY_ECDSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +HOST_KEY_ED25519=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ed25519_key + + +checkkeys() { + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then + ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t dsa -f ${HOST_KEY_DSA} -N "" + fi + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then + ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA} -N "" + fi +@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA ]; then +@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ecdsa -f ${HOST_KEY_ECDSA} -N "" +@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ fi + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ED25519 ]; then + ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f ${HOST_KEY_ED25519} -N "" + fi +} + +stop_service() { + if [ -r $PIDFILE -a ! -z ${PIDFILE} ]; then + PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}` + fi + if [ ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a ! "X$PID" = "X " ]; then + ${KILL} ${PID} + else + echo "Unable to read PID file" + fi +} + +start_service() { + # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but + # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal + + # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made + checkkeys + + # Start SSHD + echo "starting $SSHD... \c" ; $SSHD + + sshd_rc=$? + if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then + echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing." + exit $sshd_rc + fi + echo done. +} + +case $1 in + +'start') + start_service + ;; + +'stop') + stop_service + ;; + +'restart') + stop_service + start_service + ;; + +*) + echo "$0: usage: $0 {start|stop|restart}" + ;; +esac diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dcf35e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/packet.c @@ -0,0 +1,2682 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.277 2018/07/16 03:09:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication + * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * + * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Explicitly include OpenSSL before zlib as some versions of OpenSSL have + * "free_func" in their headers, which zlib typedefs. + */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# include +# include +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +# include +# endif +#endif + +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "crc32.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG +#define DBG(x) x +#else +#define DBG(x) +#endif + +#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024) + +struct packet_state { + u_int32_t seqnr; + u_int32_t packets; + u_int64_t blocks; + u_int64_t bytes; +}; + +struct packet { + TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next; + u_char type; + struct sshbuf *payload; +}; + +struct session_state { + /* + * This variable contains the file descriptors used for + * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for + * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same + * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket. + */ + int connection_in; + int connection_out; + + /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */ + u_int remote_protocol_flags; + + /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */ + struct sshcipher_ctx *receive_context; + + /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */ + struct sshcipher_ctx *send_context; + + /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */ + struct sshbuf *input; + + /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */ + struct sshbuf *output; + + /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */ + struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet; + + /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */ + struct sshbuf *incoming_packet; + + /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */ + struct sshbuf *compression_buffer; + + /* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */ + z_stream compression_in_stream; + z_stream compression_out_stream; + int compression_in_started; + int compression_out_started; + int compression_in_failures; + int compression_out_failures; + + /* default maximum packet size */ + u_int max_packet_size; + + /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */ + int initialized; + + /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */ + int interactive_mode; + + /* Set to true if we are the server side. */ + int server_side; + + /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */ + int after_authentication; + + int keep_alive_timeouts; + + /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */ + int packet_timeout_ms; + + /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */ + struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; + struct packet_state p_read, p_send; + + /* Volume-based rekeying */ + u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit; + + /* Time-based rekeying */ + u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */ + time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */ + + /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */ + u_char extra_pad; + + /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */ + u_int packet_discard; + size_t packet_discard_mac_already; + struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac; + + /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */ + u_int packlen; + + /* Used in packet_send2 */ + int rekeying; + + /* Used in ssh_packet_send_mux() */ + int mux; + + /* Used in packet_set_interactive */ + int set_interactive_called; + + /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */ + int set_maxsize_called; + + /* One-off warning about weak ciphers */ + int cipher_warning_done; + + /* Hook for fuzzing inbound packets */ + ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook_in; + void *hook_in_ctx; + + TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; +}; + +struct ssh * +ssh_alloc_session_state(void) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = NULL; + struct session_state *state = NULL; + + if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL || + (state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL || + (state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + goto fail; + TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing); + TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys); + TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys); + state->connection_in = -1; + state->connection_out = -1; + state->max_packet_size = 32768; + state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; + state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0; + state->initialized = 1; + /* + * ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until + * we've done the initial key exchange. + */ + state->rekeying = 1; + ssh->state = state; + return ssh; + fail: + if (state) { + sshbuf_free(state->input); + sshbuf_free(state->output); + sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); + sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); + free(state); + } + free(ssh); + return NULL; +} + +void +ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook, void *ctx) +{ + ssh->state->hook_in = hook; + ssh->state->hook_in_ctx = ctx; +} + +/* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */ +int +ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return ssh->state->rekeying || + (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0); +} + +/* + * Sets the descriptors used for communication. + */ +struct ssh * +ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) +{ + struct session_state *state; + const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); + int r; + + if (none == NULL) { + error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__); + return NULL; + } + if (ssh == NULL) + ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state(); + if (ssh == NULL) { + error("%s: cound not allocate state", __func__); + return NULL; + } + state = ssh->state; + state->connection_in = fd_in; + state->connection_out = fd_out; + if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none, + (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none, + (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) { + error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */ + return NULL; + } + state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; + /* + * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error + * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed. + */ + (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + return ssh; +} + +void +ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + + if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) { + state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; + return; + } + if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout) + state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX; + else + state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000; +} + +void +ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh->state->mux = 1; + ssh->state->rekeying = 0; +} + +int +ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return ssh->state->mux; +} + +int +ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int r; + + free(ssh->log_preamble); + if (fmt == NULL) + ssh->log_preamble = NULL; + else { + va_start(args, fmt); + r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + int r; + + if (state->packet_discard_mac) { + char buf[1024]; + size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE; + + if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already) + dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already; + memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf)); + while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < dlen) + if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf, + sizeof(buf))) != 0) + return r; + (void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac, + state->p_read.seqnr, + sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), dlen, + NULL, 0); + } + logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; +} + +static int +ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, + struct sshmac *mac, size_t mac_already, u_int discard) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + int r; + + if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) { + if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) + return r; + return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; + } + /* + * Record number of bytes over which the mac has already + * been computed in order to minimize timing attacks. + */ + if (mac && mac->enabled) { + state->packet_discard_mac = mac; + state->packet_discard_mac_already = mac_already; + } + if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard) + return ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh); + state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input); + return 0; +} + +/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */ + +int +ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct session_state *state; + struct sockaddr_storage from, to; + socklen_t fromlen, tolen; + + if (ssh == NULL || ssh->state == NULL) + return 0; + + state = ssh->state; + if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1) + return 0; + /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */ + if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) + return 1; + fromlen = sizeof(from); + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, + &fromlen) < 0) + return 0; + tolen = sizeof(to); + memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); + if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, + &tolen) < 0) + return 0; + if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0) + return 0; + if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +void +ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes) +{ + if (ibytes) + *ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes; + if (obytes) + *obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes; +} + +int +ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sockaddr_storage to; + socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to); + + memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); + if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, + &tolen) < 0) + return 0; +#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6 + if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 && + IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr)) + return AF_INET; +#endif + return to.ss_family; +} + +/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */ + +void +ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */ + set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in); + + if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in) + set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out); +} + +/* Returns the socket used for reading. */ + +int +ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return ssh->state->connection_in; +} + +/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */ + +int +ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return ssh->state->connection_out; +} + +/* + * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned + * string must not be freed. + */ + +const char * +ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int sock; + + /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */ + if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) { + if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) { + sock = ssh->state->connection_in; + ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock); + ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock); + ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock); + ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock); + } else { + ssh->remote_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN"); + ssh->remote_port = 65535; + ssh->local_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN"); + ssh->local_port = 65535; + } + } + return ssh->remote_ipaddr; +} + +/* Returns the port number of the remote host. */ + +int +ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ + return ssh->remote_port; +} + +/* + * Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string. The returned + * string must not be freed. + */ + +const char * +ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ + return ssh->local_ipaddr; +} + +/* Returns the port number of the local host. */ + +int +ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */ + return ssh->local_port; +} + +/* Returns the routing domain of the input socket, or NULL if unavailable */ +const char * +ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (ssh->rdomain_in != NULL) + return ssh->rdomain_in; + if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) + return NULL; + ssh->rdomain_in = get_rdomain(ssh->state->connection_in); + return ssh->rdomain_in; +} + +/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ + +static void +ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + u_int mode; + + if (!state->initialized) + return; + state->initialized = 0; + if (do_close) { + if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { + close(state->connection_out); + } else { + close(state->connection_in); + close(state->connection_out); + } + } + sshbuf_free(state->input); + sshbuf_free(state->output); + sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); + sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */ + state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; + ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, mode); /* next keys */ + } + /* compression state is in shared mem, so we can only release it once */ + if (do_close && state->compression_buffer) { + sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer); + if (state->compression_out_started) { + z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream; + debug("compress outgoing: " + "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", + (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, + (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, + stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 : + (double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in); + if (state->compression_out_failures == 0) + deflateEnd(stream); + } + if (state->compression_in_started) { + z_streamp stream = &state->compression_in_stream; + debug("compress incoming: " + "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", + (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, + (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, + stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 : + (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out); + if (state->compression_in_failures == 0) + inflateEnd(stream); + } + } + cipher_free(state->send_context); + cipher_free(state->receive_context); + state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL; + if (do_close) { + free(ssh->local_ipaddr); + ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL; + free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); + ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; + free(ssh->state); + ssh->state = NULL; + } +} + +void +ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1); +} + +void +ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0); +} + +/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ + +void +ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags) +{ + ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags; +} + +/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */ + +u_int +ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags; +} + +/* + * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions. + * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip. + */ + +static int +ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer && + ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; +} + +static int +start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level) +{ + if (level < 1 || level > 9) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level); + if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1) + deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream); + switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) { + case Z_OK: + ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1; + break; + case Z_MEM_ERROR: + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1) + inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream); + switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) { + case Z_OK: + ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1; + break; + case Z_MEM_ERROR: + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +/* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */ +static int +compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) +{ + u_char buf[4096]; + int r, status; + + if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* This case is not handled below. */ + if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0) + return 0; + + /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */ + if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in = + sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); + + /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */ + do { + /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ + ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf; + ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); + + /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */ + status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, + Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); + switch (status) { + case Z_MEM_ERROR: + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + case Z_OK: + /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - + ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0) + return r; + break; + case Z_STREAM_ERROR: + default: + ssh->state->compression_out_failures++; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + } while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0); + return 0; +} + +static int +uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) +{ + u_char buf[4096]; + int r, status; + + if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in = + sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); + + for (;;) { + /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ + ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf; + ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); + + status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream, + Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); + switch (status) { + case Z_OK: + if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - + ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0) + return r; + break; + case Z_BUF_ERROR: + /* + * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling + * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to + * be the error that we get. + */ + return 0; + case Z_DATA_ERROR: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + case Z_MEM_ERROR: + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + case Z_STREAM_ERROR: + default: + ssh->state->compression_in_failures++; + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +void +ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) +{ + if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) { + kex_free_newkeys(ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]); + ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; + } +} + +int +ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + struct sshenc *enc; + struct sshmac *mac; + struct sshcomp *comp; + struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp; + struct packet_state *ps; + u_int64_t *max_blocks; + const char *wmsg; + int r, crypt_type; + + debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode); + + if (mode == MODE_OUT) { + ccp = &state->send_context; + crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT; + ps = &state->p_send; + max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out; + } else { + ccp = &state->receive_context; + crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT; + ps = &state->p_read; + max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in; + } + if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { + debug("set_newkeys: rekeying, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, " + "output %llu bytes %llu blocks", + (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes, + (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks, + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes, + (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks); + cipher_free(*ccp); + *ccp = NULL; + kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); + state->newkeys[mode] = NULL; + } + /* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */ + ps->packets = ps->blocks = 0; + /* move newkeys from kex to state */ + if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; + enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; + mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac; + comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; + if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { + if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0) + return r; + } + mac->enabled = 1; + DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode)); + if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len, + enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0) + return r; + if (!state->cipher_warning_done && + (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) { + error("Warning: %s", wmsg); + state->cipher_warning_done = 1; + } + /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */ + /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size); + explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); + explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */ + if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB || + (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && + state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) { + if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0) + return r; + if (mode == MODE_OUT) { + if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) + return r; + } else { + if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + } + comp->enabled = 1; + } + /* + * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, + * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. + * See RFC4344 section 3.2. + */ + if (enc->block_size >= 16) + *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2); + else + *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size; + if (state->rekey_limit) + *max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks, + state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size); + debug("rekey after %llu blocks", (unsigned long long)*max_blocks); + return 0; +} + +#define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) +static int +ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + u_int32_t out_blocks; + + /* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */ + if (!state->after_authentication) + return 0; + + /* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */ + if (ssh->kex == NULL || ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + return 0; + + /* Peer can't rekey */ + if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) + return 0; + + /* + * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to + * make progress when rekey limits are very small. + */ + if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0) + return 0; + + /* Time-based rekeying */ + if (state->rekey_interval != 0 && + (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) + return 1; + + /* + * Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction + * As per RFC4344 section 3.1 we do this after 2^31 packets. + */ + if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS || + state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) + return 1; + + /* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maximum blocks */ + out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len, + state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size); + return (state->max_blocks_out && + (state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) || + (state->max_blocks_in && + (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in)); +} + +/* + * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication: + * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent, + * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received. + */ +static int +ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; + int r, mode; + + /* + * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying + * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately. + */ + state->after_authentication = 1; + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */ + if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) + continue; + comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; + if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) { + if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + if (mode == MODE_OUT) { + if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) + return r; + } else { + if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + } + comp->enabled = 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */ +int +ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type) +{ + switch (type) { + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: + case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: + return 0; + default: + return 1; + } +} + +/* + * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue) + */ +int +ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + u_char tmp, padlen, pad = 0; + u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0; + u_int len; + struct sshenc *enc = NULL; + struct sshmac *mac = NULL; + struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; + int r, block_size; + + if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) { + enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc; + mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac; + comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp; + /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ + if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) + mac = NULL; + } + block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; + aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; + + type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5]; + if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) + debug3("send packet: type %u", type); +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "plain: "); + sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr); +#endif + + if (comp && comp->enabled) { + len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); + /* skip header, compress only payload */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0) + goto out; + sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); + if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet, + state->compression_buffer)) != 0) + goto out; + sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, + "\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet, + state->compression_buffer)) != 0) + goto out; + DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len, + sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet))); + } + + /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */ + len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); + + /* + * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data, + * minimum padding is 4 bytes + */ + len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */ + padlen = block_size - (len % block_size); + if (padlen < 4) + padlen += block_size; + if (state->extra_pad) { + tmp = state->extra_pad; + state->extra_pad = + ROUNDUP(state->extra_pad, block_size); + /* check if roundup overflowed */ + if (state->extra_pad < tmp) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + tmp = (len + padlen) % state->extra_pad; + /* Check whether pad calculation below will underflow */ + if (tmp > state->extra_pad) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + pad = state->extra_pad - tmp; + DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)", + __func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad)); + tmp = padlen; + padlen += pad; + /* Check whether padlen calculation overflowed */ + if (padlen < tmp) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* overflow */ + state->extra_pad = 0; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + if (enc && !cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) { + /* random padding */ + arc4random_buf(cp, padlen); + } else { + /* clear padding */ + explicit_bzero(cp, padlen); + } + /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */ + len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); + cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); + if (cp == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */ + POKE_U32(cp, len - 4); + cp[4] = padlen; + DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)", + len, padlen, aadlen)); + + /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */ + if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) { + if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, + sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len, + macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) + goto out; + DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr)); + } + /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output, + sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, + sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), + len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) + goto out; + /* append unencrypted MAC */ + if (mac && mac->enabled) { + if (mac->etm) { + /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */ + if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, + cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) + goto out; + DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d", + state->p_send.seqnr)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0) + goto out; + } +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); + sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); +#endif + /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ + if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) + logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); + if (++state->p_send.packets == 0) + if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) + return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; + state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size; + state->p_send.bytes += len; + sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); + + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) + r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); + else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side) + r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); + else + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +/* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */ +static int +ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type) +{ + return + type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN && + type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX && + type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST && + type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT && + type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO; +} + +int +ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + struct packet *p; + u_char type; + int r, need_rekey; + + if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5]; + need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) && + ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)); + + /* + * During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages. + * Queue everything else. + */ + if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) { + if (need_rekey) + debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__); + debug("enqueue packet: %u", type); + p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + if (p == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + p->type = type; + p->payload = state->outgoing_packet; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next); + state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new(); + if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (need_rekey) { + /* + * This packet triggered a rekey, so send the + * KEXINIT now. + * NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex(). + */ + return kex_start_rekex(ssh); + } + return 0; + } + + /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */ + if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) + state->rekeying = 1; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + + /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */ + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) { + state->rekeying = 0; + state->rekey_time = monotime(); + while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) { + type = p->type; + /* + * If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the + * remaining packets in the queue for now. + * NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex. + */ + if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, + sshbuf_len(p->payload))) { + debug3("%s: queued packet triggered rekex", + __func__); + return kex_start_rekex(ssh); + } + debug("dequeue packet: %u", type); + sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); + state->outgoing_packet = p->payload; + TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next); + memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p)); + free(p); + if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that + * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not + * be used during the interactive session. + */ + +int +ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + int len, r, ms_remain; + fd_set *setp; + char buf[8192]; + struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL; + + DBG(debug("packet_read()")); + + setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1, + NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); + if (setp == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* + * Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have + * been sent. + */ + if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ + for (;;) { + /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ + r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); + if (r != 0) + break; + /* If we got a packet, return it. */ + if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) + break; + /* + * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the + * buffer, and try again. + */ + memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1, + NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); + FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp); + + if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { + ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; + timeoutp = &timeout; + } + /* Wait for some data to arrive. */ + for (;;) { + if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { + ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); + monotime_tv(&start); + } + if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp, + NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) + break; + if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && + errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) + continue; + ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); + if (ms_remain <= 0) { + r = 0; + break; + } + } + if (r == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; + goto out; + } + /* Read data from the socket. */ + len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; + goto out; + } + if (len < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + /* Append it to the buffer. */ + if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) + goto out; + } + out: + free(setp); + return r; +} + +int +ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_char type; + int r; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return type; +} + +/* + * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches + * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch. + */ + +int +ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type) +{ + int r; + u_char type; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + if (type != expected_type) { + if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, + "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d", + expected_type, type)) != 0) + return r; + return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + const u_char *cp; + size_t need; + int r; + + if (ssh->kex) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; + cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->input); + if (state->packlen == 0) { + if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 1) + return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ + state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp); + if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 || + state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + } + need = state->packlen + 4; + if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < need) + return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ + sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, cp + 4, + state->packlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, need)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) + return r; + if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep)) + debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, *typep); + /* sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); */ + /* reset for next packet */ + state->packlen = 0; + return r; +} + +int +ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + u_int padlen, need; + u_char *cp; + u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size; + struct sshenc *enc = NULL; + struct sshmac *mac = NULL; + struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; + int r; + + if (state->mux) + return ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); + + *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; + + if (state->packet_discard) + return 0; + + if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) { + enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc; + mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac; + comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp; + /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ + if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) + mac = NULL; + } + maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0; + block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; + aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; + + if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) { + if (cipher_get_length(state->receive_context, + &state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr, + sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0) + return 0; + if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || + state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); +#endif + logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); + if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) + return r; + return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; + } + sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); + } else if (state->packlen == 0) { + /* + * check if input size is less than the cipher block size, + * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet + */ + if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size) + return 0; + sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size, + &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, + state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), + block_size, 0, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)); + if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || + state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "input: \n"); + sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); + fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n"); + sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); +#endif + logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); + return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0, + PACKET_MAX_SIZE); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0) + goto out; + } + DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4)); + + if (aadlen) { + /* only the payload is encrypted */ + need = state->packlen; + } else { + /* + * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we + * have a partial packet of block_size bytes + */ + need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size; + } + DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d," + " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen)); + if (need % block_size != 0) { + logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d", + need, block_size, need % block_size); + return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0, + PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size); + } + /* + * check if the entire packet has been received and + * decrypt into incoming_packet: + * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated. + * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either + * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or + * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code. + */ + if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen) + return 0; /* packet is incomplete */ +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: "); + sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); +#endif + /* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */ + if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) { + if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, + sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need, + sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen, + maclen)) != 0) { + if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) + logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); + goto out; + } + } + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need, + &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp, + sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (mac && mac->enabled) { + /* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */ + if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, + sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), + sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet), + sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) + goto out; + logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); + if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, + sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet), + PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size); + } + /* Remove MAC from input buffer */ + DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr)); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (seqnr_p != NULL) + *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr; + if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) + logit("incoming seqnr wraps around"); + if (++state->p_read.packets == 0) + if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) + return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; + state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size; + state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4; + + /* get padlen */ + padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4]; + DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen)); + if (padlen < 4) { + if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, + "Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; + } + + /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 || + ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0)) + goto out; + + DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd", + sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); + if (comp && comp->enabled) { + sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); + if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet, + state->compression_buffer)) != 0) + goto out; + sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); + if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet, + state->compression_buffer)) != 0) + goto out; + DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd", + sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); + } + /* + * get packet type, implies consume. + * return length of payload (without type field) + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) + goto out; + if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep)) + debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep); + if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) { + if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, + "Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + } + if (state->hook_in != NULL && + (r = state->hook_in(ssh, state->incoming_packet, typep, + state->hook_in_ctx)) != 0) + return r; + if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side) + r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); + else + r = 0; +#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep); + sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); +#endif + /* reset for next packet */ + state->packlen = 0; + + /* do we need to rekey? */ + if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) { + debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__); + if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + } + out: + return r; +} + +int +ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + u_int reason, seqnr; + int r; + u_char *msg; + + for (;;) { + msg = NULL; + r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); + if (r != 0) + return r; + if (*typep) { + state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; + DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); + } + switch (*typep) { + case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: + debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); + break; + case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG: + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + free(msg); + return r; + } + debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); + free(msg); + break; + case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) + return r; + /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ + do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && + reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, + "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" + "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); + free(msg); + return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; + case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) + return r; + debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u", + seqnr); + break; + default: + return 0; + } + } +} + +/* + * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used + * together with packet_read_poll. + */ + +int +ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + int r; + + if (state->packet_discard) { + state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */ + if (len >= state->packet_discard) { + if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + } + state->packet_discard -= len; + return 0; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0) + return r; + + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); +} + +/* + * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message + * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The + * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed + * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging + * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not + * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait. + */ +void +ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) +{ + char buf[1024]; + va_list args; + int r; + + if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG)) + return; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + debug3("sending debug message: %s", buf); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +void +sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l) +{ + snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d", + ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "", + ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); +} + +/* + * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit. + */ +void +sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r) +{ + char remote_id[512]; + + sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); + + switch (r) { + case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); + logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id); + case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); + logdie("Connection %s %s timed out", + ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id); + case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); + logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id); + case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: + if (errno == ECONNRESET) { + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); + logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: + case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: + case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH: + case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: + case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: + if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) { + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); + logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. " + "Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r), + ssh->kex->failed_choice); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); + logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s", + tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "", + ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", + remote_id, ssh_err(r)); + } +} + +/* + * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the + * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message + * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must + * not exceed 1024 bytes. + */ +void +ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) +{ + char buf[1024], remote_id[512]; + va_list args; + static int disconnecting = 0; + int r; + + if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */ + fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively."); + disconnecting = 1; + + /* + * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the + * message is of limited size. + */ + sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + /* Display the error locally */ + logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf); + + /* + * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait + * for it to get sent. + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); + + if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); + + /* Close the connection. */ + ssh_packet_close(ssh); + cleanup_exit(255); +} + +/* + * Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of + * the output. + */ +int +ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + int len = sshbuf_len(state->output); + int r; + + if (len > 0) { + len = write(state->connection_out, + sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len); + if (len == -1) { + if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || + errno == EWOULDBLOCK) + return 0; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + } + if (len == 0) + return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0) + return r; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been + * written. + */ +int +ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + fd_set *setp; + int ret, r, ms_remain = 0; + struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL; + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + + setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1, + NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); + if (setp == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { + free(setp); + return r; + } + while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) { + memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1, + NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); + FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp); + + if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { + ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; + timeoutp = &timeout; + } + for (;;) { + if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { + ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); + monotime_tv(&start); + } + if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1, + NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) + break; + if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && + errno != EWOULDBLOCK) + break; + if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) + continue; + ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); + if (ms_remain <= 0) { + ret = 0; + break; + } + } + if (ret == 0) { + free(setp); + return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; + } + if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { + free(setp); + return r; + } + } + free(setp); + return 0; +} + +/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */ + +int +ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0; +} + +/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */ + +int +ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (ssh->state->interactive_mode) + return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384; + else + return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024; +} + +void +ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos) +{ +#ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN + if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) || tos == INT_MAX) + return; + switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) { +# ifdef IP_TOS + case AF_INET: + debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); + if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in, + IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0) + error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:", + tos, strerror(errno)); + break; +# endif /* IP_TOS */ +# ifdef IPV6_TCLASS + case AF_INET6: + debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); + if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in, + IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0) + error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:", + tos, strerror(errno)); + break; +# endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */ + } +#endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */ +} + +/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */ + +void +ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + + if (state->set_interactive_called) + return; + state->set_interactive_called = 1; + + /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */ + state->interactive_mode = interactive; + + /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */ + if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) + return; + set_nodelay(state->connection_in); + ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive : + qos_bulk); +} + +/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */ + +int +ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return ssh->state->interactive_mode; +} + +int +ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + + if (state->set_maxsize_called) { + logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d", + state->max_packet_size, s); + return -1; + } + if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) { + logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s); + return -1; + } + state->set_maxsize_called = 1; + debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s); + state->max_packet_size = s; + return s; +} + +int +ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts; +} + +void +ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka) +{ + ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka; +} + +u_int +ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return ssh->state->max_packet_size; +} + +void +ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds) +{ + debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes, + (unsigned int)seconds); + ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes; + ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds; +} + +time_t +ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + time_t seconds; + + seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval - + monotime(); + return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds); +} + +void +ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh->state->server_side = 1; +} + +void +ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; +} + +void * +ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return (void *)ssh->state->input; +} + +void * +ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return (void *)ssh->state->output; +} + +/* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ +static int +ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r; + + debug("%s: called", __func__); + /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */ + ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; + ssh->state->rekeying = 0; + if ((r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +/* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */ + +/* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */ +static int +kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id, + kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +/* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */ +static int +newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshcipher_ctx *cc; + struct sshcomp *comp; + struct sshenc *enc; + struct sshmac *mac; + struct newkeys *newkey; + int r; + + if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + enc = &newkey->enc; + mac = &newkey->mac; + comp = &newkey->comp; + cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? ssh->state->send_context : + ssh->state->receive_context; + if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) + return r; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) + goto out; + if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0) + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0) + goto out; + r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b); + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +/* serialize packet state into a blob */ +int +ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + int r; + + if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 || + (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || + (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0) + return r; + + return 0; +} + +/* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */ +static int +newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + struct sshcomp *comp; + struct sshenc *enc; + struct sshmac *mac; + struct newkeys *newkey = NULL; + size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen; + int r; + + if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) + goto out; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + enc = &newkey->enc; + mac = &newkey->mac; + comp = &newkey->comp; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(enc->name)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (maclen > mac->key_len) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + mac->key_len = maclen; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + enc->key_len = keylen; + enc->iv_len = ivlen; + ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey; + newkey = NULL; + r = 0; + out: + free(newkey); + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +/* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */ +static int +kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp) +{ + struct kex *kex; + int r; + + if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(struct kex))) == NULL || + (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->hostkey_alg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->client_version_string, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->server_version_string, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + kex->server = 1; + kex->done = 1; + r = 0; + out: + if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) { + if (kex != NULL) { + sshbuf_free(kex->my); + sshbuf_free(kex->peer); + free(kex); + } + if (kexp != NULL) + *kexp = NULL; + } else { + *kexp = kex; + } + return r; +} + +/* + * Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization). + * Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors. + */ +int +ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + const u_char *input, *output; + size_t ilen, olen; + int r; + + if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 || + (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || + (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) + return r; + /* + * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we + * count from the completion of the authentication. + */ + state->rekey_time = monotime(); + /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */ + if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0) + return r; + + if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + + sshbuf_reset(state->input); + sshbuf_reset(state->output); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0) + return r; + + if (sshbuf_len(m)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + debug3("%s: done", __func__); + return 0; +} + +/* NEW API */ + +/* put data to the outgoing packet */ + +int +sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); +} + +int +sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b); +} + +int +sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val) +{ + return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); +} + +int +sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val) +{ + return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); +} + +int +sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val) +{ + return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); +} + +int +sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); +} + +int +sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); +} + +int +sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +int +sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) +{ + return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g); +} +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + + +int +sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +/* fetch data from the incoming packet */ + +int +sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len) +{ + return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len); +} + +int +sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp) +{ + return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); +} + +int +sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp) +{ + return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); +} + +int +sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp) +{ + return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); +} + +int +sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); +} + +int +sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); +} + +int +sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + return sshbuf_peek_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); +} + +int +sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +int +sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) +{ + return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g); +} +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + + +int +sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v) +{ + return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v); +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +int +sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0) + return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + return 0; +} + +const u_char * +sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp) +{ + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); + return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet); +} + +/* start a new packet */ + +int +sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type) +{ + u_char buf[6]; /* u32 packet length, u8 pad len, u8 type */ + + DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type)); + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = type; + sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet); + return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +static int +ssh_packet_send_mux(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct session_state *state = ssh->state; + u_char type, *cp; + size_t len; + int r; + + if (ssh->kex) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); + if (len < 6) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); + type = cp[5]; + if (ssh_packet_log_type(type)) + debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, type); + /* drop everything, but the connection protocol */ + if (type >= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN && + type <= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX) { + POKE_U32(cp, len - 4); + if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->output, + state->outgoing_packet)) != 0) + return r; + /* sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); */ + } + sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); + return 0; +} + +/* + * 9.2. Ignored Data Message + * + * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE + * string data + * + * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any + * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is + * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional + * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques. + */ +int +sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, u_int nbytes) +{ + u_int32_t rnd = 0; + int r; + u_int i; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0) + return r; + for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) { + if (i % 4 == 0) + rnd = arc4random(); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0) + return r; + rnd >>= 8; + } + return 0; +} + +/* send it */ + +int +sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (ssh->state && ssh->state->mux) + return ssh_packet_send_mux(ssh); + return ssh_packet_send2(ssh); +} + +int +sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) +{ + char buf[1024]; + va_list args; + int r; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +/* roundup current message to pad bytes */ +int +sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad) +{ + ssh->state->extra_pad = pad; + return 0; +} diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..170203c --- /dev/null +++ b/packet.h @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.86 2018/07/09 21:20:26 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Interface for the packet protocol functions. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef PACKET_H +#define PACKET_H + +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# include +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +# include +# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +# define EC_KEY void +# define EC_GROUP void +# define EC_POINT void +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +# define BIGNUM void +# define EC_KEY void +# define EC_GROUP void +# define EC_POINT void +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#include +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +struct kex; +struct sshkey; +struct sshbuf; +struct session_state; /* private session data */ + +#include "dispatch.h" /* typedef, DISPATCH_MAX */ + +struct key_entry { + TAILQ_ENTRY(key_entry) next; + struct sshkey *key; +}; + +struct ssh { + /* Session state */ + struct session_state *state; + + /* Key exchange */ + struct kex *kex; + + /* cached local and remote ip addresses and ports */ + char *remote_ipaddr; + int remote_port; + char *local_ipaddr; + int local_port; + char *rdomain_in; + + /* Optional preamble for log messages (e.g. username) */ + char *log_preamble; + + /* Dispatcher table */ + dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX]; + /* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */ + int dispatch_skip_packets; + + /* datafellows */ + int compat; + + /* Lists for private and public keys */ + TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) private_keys; + TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) public_keys; + + /* Client/Server authentication context */ + void *authctxt; + + /* Channels context */ + struct ssh_channels *chanctxt; + + /* APP data */ + void *app_data; +}; + +typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *, + u_char *, void *); + +struct ssh *ssh_alloc_session_state(void); +struct ssh *ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *, int, int); +void ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *, int, int); +int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *); +void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *); +void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *); +void ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *, ssh_packet_hook_fn *, void *); +void ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *); +void ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *, int); + +int ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *); +void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *, u_int); +u_int ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *); +void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *, int); +void ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *, int, int, int); +int ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *); +void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *); +void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *); +void ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *, const char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); + +int ssh_packet_log_type(u_char); + +int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *); + +int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type); +int ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); +int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len); +int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); +int ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p); + +const void *ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr); +void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))) + __attribute__((noreturn)); +void ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); + +int ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *, int mode); +void ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *, u_int64_t *, u_int64_t *); + +int ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *); + +int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *); + +void ssh_tty_make_modes(struct ssh *, int, struct termios *); +void ssh_tty_parse_modes(struct ssh *, int); + +void ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *, int); +int ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int); +u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *); + +int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); +int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *); + +const char *ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *); +int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *); +const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *); +int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *); +const char *ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *); + +void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, u_int32_t); +time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *); + +void *ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *); +void *ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *); + +/* new API */ +int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type); +int sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh); +int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); +int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *, u_char); +void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r); +int sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *, u_int); + +int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len); +int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b); +int sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val); +int sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val); +int sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val); +int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len); +int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v); +int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v); +int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); +int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v); + +int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len); +int sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp); +int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp); +int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp); +int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); +int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); +int sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); +int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp); +int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); +int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v); +int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh); +void sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l); +const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp); + +/* OLD API */ +extern struct ssh *active_state; +#include "opacket.h" + +#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) +# undef BIGNUM +# undef EC_KEY +# undef EC_GROUP +# undef EC_POINT +#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +# undef EC_KEY +# undef EC_GROUP +# undef EC_POINT +#endif + +#endif /* PACKET_H */ diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb44caa --- /dev/null +++ b/pathnames.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.28 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#define ETCDIR "/etc" + +#ifndef SSHDIR +#define SSHDIR ETCDIR "/ssh" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR +#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run" +#endif + +/* + * System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts. This file should be + * world-readable. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts" +/* backward compat for protocol 2 */ +#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2 SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2" + +/* + * Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config + * should be world-readable. + */ +#define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/sshd_config" +#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_config" +#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key" +#define _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ecdsa_key" +#define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key" +#define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key" +#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key" +#define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli" + +#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM +#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh" +#endif + +/* + * The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to + * make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid" + +/* + * The directory in user's home directory in which the files reside. The + * directory should be world-readable (though not all files are). + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR ".ssh" + +/* + * Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts. This file need not be + * readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not + * contain anything particularly secret. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts" +/* backward compat for protocol 2 */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2 "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts2" + +/* + * Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This + * file should only be readable by the user him/herself. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_dsa" +#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa" +#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_rsa" +#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519" +#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_xmss" + +/* + * Configuration file in user's home directory. This file need not be + * readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything + * particularly secret. If the user's home directory resides on an NFS + * volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/config" + +/* + * File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this + * user. This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself, + * but does not contain anything particularly secret. If the user's home + * directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this + * may need to be world-readable. (This file is read by the daemon which is + * running as root.) + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys" + +/* backward compat for protocol v2 */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys2" + +/* + * Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files. These files are executed with + * /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist. They will be + * passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in + * use. xauth will be run if neither of these exists. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/rc" +#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC SSHDIR "/sshrc" + +/* + * Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv. Additionally, the daemon may use + * ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled. + */ +#define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV SSHDIR "/shosts.equiv" +#define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv" + +/* + * Default location of askpass + */ +#ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT +#define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT "/usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass" +#endif + +/* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */ +#ifndef _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN +#define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN "/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign" +#endif + +/* Location of ssh-pkcs11-helper to support keys in tokens */ +#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER +#define _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper" +#endif + +/* xauth for X11 forwarding */ +#ifndef _PATH_XAUTH +#define _PATH_XAUTH "/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth" +#endif + +/* UNIX domain socket for X11 server; displaynum will replace %u */ +#ifndef _PATH_UNIX_X +#define _PATH_UNIX_X "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u" +#endif + +/* for scp */ +#ifndef _PATH_CP +#define _PATH_CP "cp" +#endif + +/* for sftp */ +#ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER +#define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER "/usr/libexec/sftp-server" +#endif + +/* chroot directory for unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes */ +#ifndef _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR +#define _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR "/var/empty" +#endif + +/* for passwd change */ +#ifndef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG +#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd" +#endif + +#ifndef _PATH_LS +#define _PATH_LS "ls" +#endif + +/* Askpass program define */ +#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM +#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass" +#endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */ diff --git a/pkcs11.h b/pkcs11.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b01d58f --- /dev/null +++ b/pkcs11.h @@ -0,0 +1,1357 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: pkcs11.h,v 1.3 2013/11/26 19:15:09 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* pkcs11.h + Copyright 2006, 2007 g10 Code GmbH + Copyright 2006 Andreas Jellinghaus + + This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives + unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without + modifications, as long as this notice is preserved. + + This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even + the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + PURPOSE. */ + +/* Please submit changes back to the Scute project at + http://www.scute.org/ (or send them to marcus@g10code.com), so that + they can be picked up by other projects from there as well. */ + +/* This file is a modified implementation of the PKCS #11 standard by + RSA Security Inc. It is mostly a drop-in replacement, with the + following change: + + This header file does not require any macro definitions by the user + (like CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION etc). In fact, it defines those macros + for you (if useful, some are missing, let me know if you need + more). + + There is an additional API available that does comply better to the + GNU coding standard. It can be switched on by defining + CRYPTOKI_GNU before including this header file. For this, the + following changes are made to the specification: + + All structure types are changed to a "struct ck_foo" where CK_FOO + is the type name in PKCS #11. + + All non-structure types are changed to ck_foo_t where CK_FOO is the + lowercase version of the type name in PKCS #11. The basic types + (CK_ULONG et al.) are removed without substitute. + + All members of structures are modified in the following way: Type + indication prefixes are removed, and underscore characters are + inserted before words. Then the result is lowercased. + + Note that function names are still in the original case, as they + need for ABI compatibility. + + CK_FALSE, CK_TRUE and NULL_PTR are removed without substitute. Use + . + + If CRYPTOKI_COMPAT is defined before including this header file, + then none of the API changes above take place, and the API is the + one defined by the PKCS #11 standard. */ + +#ifndef PKCS11_H +#define PKCS11_H 1 + +#if defined(__cplusplus) +extern "C" { +#endif + + +/* The version of cryptoki we implement. The revision is changed with + each modification of this file. If you do not use the "official" + version of this file, please consider deleting the revision macro + (you may use a macro with a different name to keep track of your + versions). */ +#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 +#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 +#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_REVISION 6 + + +/* Compatibility interface is default, unless CRYPTOKI_GNU is + given. */ +#ifndef CRYPTOKI_GNU +#ifndef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT +#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT 1 +#endif +#endif + +/* System dependencies. */ + +#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(CRYPTOKI_FORCE_WIN32) + +/* There is a matching pop below. */ +#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) + +#ifdef CRYPTOKI_EXPORTS +#define CK_SPEC __declspec(dllexport) +#else +#define CK_SPEC __declspec(dllimport) +#endif + +#else + +#define CK_SPEC + +#endif + + +#ifdef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT + /* If we are in compatibility mode, switch all exposed names to the + PKCS #11 variant. There are corresponding #undefs below. */ + +#define ck_flags_t CK_FLAGS +#define ck_version _CK_VERSION + +#define ck_info _CK_INFO +#define cryptoki_version cryptokiVersion +#define manufacturer_id manufacturerID +#define library_description libraryDescription +#define library_version libraryVersion + +#define ck_notification_t CK_NOTIFICATION +#define ck_slot_id_t CK_SLOT_ID + +#define ck_slot_info _CK_SLOT_INFO +#define slot_description slotDescription +#define hardware_version hardwareVersion +#define firmware_version firmwareVersion + +#define ck_token_info _CK_TOKEN_INFO +#define serial_number serialNumber +#define max_session_count ulMaxSessionCount +#define session_count ulSessionCount +#define max_rw_session_count ulMaxRwSessionCount +#define rw_session_count ulRwSessionCount +#define max_pin_len ulMaxPinLen +#define min_pin_len ulMinPinLen +#define total_public_memory ulTotalPublicMemory +#define free_public_memory ulFreePublicMemory +#define total_private_memory ulTotalPrivateMemory +#define free_private_memory ulFreePrivateMemory +#define utc_time utcTime + +#define ck_session_handle_t CK_SESSION_HANDLE +#define ck_user_type_t CK_USER_TYPE +#define ck_state_t CK_STATE + +#define ck_session_info _CK_SESSION_INFO +#define slot_id slotID +#define device_error ulDeviceError + +#define ck_object_handle_t CK_OBJECT_HANDLE +#define ck_object_class_t CK_OBJECT_CLASS +#define ck_hw_feature_type_t CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE +#define ck_key_type_t CK_KEY_TYPE +#define ck_certificate_type_t CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE +#define ck_attribute_type_t CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE + +#define ck_attribute _CK_ATTRIBUTE +#define value pValue +#define value_len ulValueLen + +#define ck_date _CK_DATE + +#define ck_mechanism_type_t CK_MECHANISM_TYPE + +#define ck_mechanism _CK_MECHANISM +#define parameter pParameter +#define parameter_len ulParameterLen + +#define ck_mechanism_info _CK_MECHANISM_INFO +#define min_key_size ulMinKeySize +#define max_key_size ulMaxKeySize + +#define ck_rv_t CK_RV +#define ck_notify_t CK_NOTIFY + +#define ck_function_list _CK_FUNCTION_LIST + +#define ck_createmutex_t CK_CREATEMUTEX +#define ck_destroymutex_t CK_DESTROYMUTEX +#define ck_lockmutex_t CK_LOCKMUTEX +#define ck_unlockmutex_t CK_UNLOCKMUTEX + +#define ck_c_initialize_args _CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS +#define create_mutex CreateMutex +#define destroy_mutex DestroyMutex +#define lock_mutex LockMutex +#define unlock_mutex UnlockMutex +#define reserved pReserved + +#endif /* CRYPTOKI_COMPAT */ + + + +typedef unsigned long ck_flags_t; + +struct ck_version +{ + unsigned char major; + unsigned char minor; +}; + + +struct ck_info +{ + struct ck_version cryptoki_version; + unsigned char manufacturer_id[32]; + ck_flags_t flags; + unsigned char library_description[32]; + struct ck_version library_version; +}; + + +typedef unsigned long ck_notification_t; + +#define CKN_SURRENDER (0) + + +typedef unsigned long ck_slot_id_t; + + +struct ck_slot_info +{ + unsigned char slot_description[64]; + unsigned char manufacturer_id[32]; + ck_flags_t flags; + struct ck_version hardware_version; + struct ck_version firmware_version; +}; + + +#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT (1 << 0) +#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE (1 << 1) +#define CKF_HW_SLOT (1 << 2) +#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE (1 << 30) + + +struct ck_token_info +{ + unsigned char label[32]; + unsigned char manufacturer_id[32]; + unsigned char model[16]; + unsigned char serial_number[16]; + ck_flags_t flags; + unsigned long max_session_count; + unsigned long session_count; + unsigned long max_rw_session_count; + unsigned long rw_session_count; + unsigned long max_pin_len; + unsigned long min_pin_len; + unsigned long total_public_memory; + unsigned long free_public_memory; + unsigned long total_private_memory; + unsigned long free_private_memory; + struct ck_version hardware_version; + struct ck_version firmware_version; + unsigned char utc_time[16]; +}; + + +#define CKF_RNG (1 << 0) +#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED (1 << 1) +#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED (1 << 2) +#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED (1 << 3) +#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED (1 << 5) +#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN (1 << 6) +#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH (1 << 8) +#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS (1 << 9) +#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED (1 << 10) +#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION (1 << 11) +#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW (1 << 16) +#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY (1 << 17) +#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED (1 << 18) +#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED (1 << 19) +#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW (1 << 20) +#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY (1 << 21) +#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED (1 << 22) +#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED (1 << 23) + +#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION ((unsigned long) -1) +#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE (0) + + +typedef unsigned long ck_session_handle_t; + +#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE (0) + + +typedef unsigned long ck_user_type_t; + +#define CKU_SO (0) +#define CKU_USER (1) +#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC (2) + + +typedef unsigned long ck_state_t; + +#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION (0) +#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS (1) +#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION (2) +#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS (3) +#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS (4) + + +struct ck_session_info +{ + ck_slot_id_t slot_id; + ck_state_t state; + ck_flags_t flags; + unsigned long device_error; +}; + +#define CKF_RW_SESSION (1 << 1) +#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION (1 << 2) + + +typedef unsigned long ck_object_handle_t; + + +typedef unsigned long ck_object_class_t; + +#define CKO_DATA (0) +#define CKO_CERTIFICATE (1) +#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY (2) +#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY (3) +#define CKO_SECRET_KEY (4) +#define CKO_HW_FEATURE (5) +#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS (6) +#define CKO_MECHANISM (7) +#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) + + +typedef unsigned long ck_hw_feature_type_t; + +#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER (1) +#define CKH_CLOCK (2) +#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE (3) +#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) + + +typedef unsigned long ck_key_type_t; + +#define CKK_RSA (0) +#define CKK_DSA (1) +#define CKK_DH (2) +#define CKK_ECDSA (3) +#define CKK_EC (3) +#define CKK_X9_42_DH (4) +#define CKK_KEA (5) +#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET (0x10) +#define CKK_RC2 (0x11) +#define CKK_RC4 (0x12) +#define CKK_DES (0x13) +#define CKK_DES2 (0x14) +#define CKK_DES3 (0x15) +#define CKK_CAST (0x16) +#define CKK_CAST3 (0x17) +#define CKK_CAST128 (0x18) +#define CKK_RC5 (0x19) +#define CKK_IDEA (0x1a) +#define CKK_SKIPJACK (0x1b) +#define CKK_BATON (0x1c) +#define CKK_JUNIPER (0x1d) +#define CKK_CDMF (0x1e) +#define CKK_AES (0x1f) +#define CKK_BLOWFISH (0x20) +#define CKK_TWOFISH (0x21) +#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) + +typedef unsigned long ck_certificate_type_t; + +#define CKC_X_509 (0) +#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT (1) +#define CKC_WTLS (2) +#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) + + +typedef unsigned long ck_attribute_type_t; + +#define CKA_CLASS (0) +#define CKA_TOKEN (1) +#define CKA_PRIVATE (2) +#define CKA_LABEL (3) +#define CKA_APPLICATION (0x10) +#define CKA_VALUE (0x11) +#define CKA_OBJECT_ID (0x12) +#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE (0x80) +#define CKA_ISSUER (0x81) +#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER (0x82) +#define CKA_AC_ISSUER (0x83) +#define CKA_OWNER (0x84) +#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES (0x85) +#define CKA_TRUSTED (0x86) +#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY (0x87) +#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN (0x88) +#define CKA_URL (0x89) +#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY (0x8a) +#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY (0x8b) +#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE (0x90) +#define CKA_KEY_TYPE (0x100) +#define CKA_SUBJECT (0x101) +#define CKA_ID (0x102) +#define CKA_SENSITIVE (0x103) +#define CKA_ENCRYPT (0x104) +#define CKA_DECRYPT (0x105) +#define CKA_WRAP (0x106) +#define CKA_UNWRAP (0x107) +#define CKA_SIGN (0x108) +#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER (0x109) +#define CKA_VERIFY (0x10a) +#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER (0x10b) +#define CKA_DERIVE (0x10c) +#define CKA_START_DATE (0x110) +#define CKA_END_DATE (0x111) +#define CKA_MODULUS (0x120) +#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS (0x121) +#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT (0x122) +#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT (0x123) +#define CKA_PRIME_1 (0x124) +#define CKA_PRIME_2 (0x125) +#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 (0x126) +#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 (0x127) +#define CKA_COEFFICIENT (0x128) +#define CKA_PRIME (0x130) +#define CKA_SUBPRIME (0x131) +#define CKA_BASE (0x132) +#define CKA_PRIME_BITS (0x133) +#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS (0x134) +#define CKA_VALUE_BITS (0x160) +#define CKA_VALUE_LEN (0x161) +#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE (0x162) +#define CKA_LOCAL (0x163) +#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE (0x164) +#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE (0x165) +#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM (0x166) +#define CKA_MODIFIABLE (0x170) +#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS (0x180) +#define CKA_EC_PARAMS (0x180) +#define CKA_EC_POINT (0x181) +#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH (0x200) +#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS (0x201) +#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE (0x202) +#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED (0x210) +#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE (0x300) +#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT (0x301) +#define CKA_HAS_RESET (0x302) +#define CKA_PIXEL_X (0x400) +#define CKA_PIXEL_Y (0x401) +#define CKA_RESOLUTION (0x402) +#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS (0x403) +#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS (0x404) +#define CKA_COLOR (0x405) +#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL (0x406) +#define CKA_CHAR_SETS (0x480) +#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS (0x481) +#define CKA_MIME_TYPES (0x482) +#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE (0x500) +#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES (0x501) +#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES (0x502) +#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES (0x503) +#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x211) +#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x212) +#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x600) +#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) + + +struct ck_attribute +{ + ck_attribute_type_t type; + void *value; + unsigned long value_len; +}; + + +struct ck_date +{ + unsigned char year[4]; + unsigned char month[2]; + unsigned char day[2]; +}; + + +typedef unsigned long ck_mechanism_type_t; + +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0) +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS (1) +#define CKM_RSA_9796 (2) +#define CKM_RSA_X_509 (3) +#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS (4) +#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS (5) +#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS (6) +#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS (7) +#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS (8) +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP (9) +#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0xa) +#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 (0xb) +#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 (0xc) +#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0xd) +#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0xe) +#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x10) +#define CKM_DSA (0x11) +#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 (0x12) +#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x20) +#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE (0x21) +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x30) +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE (0x31) +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE (0x32) +#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE (0x33) +#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS (0x40) +#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS (0x41) +#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS (0x42) +#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0x43) +#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0x44) +#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS (0x45) +#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN (0x100) +#define CKM_RC2_ECB (0x101) +#define CKM_RC2_CBC (0x102) +#define CKM_RC2_MAC (0x103) +#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL (0x104) +#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD (0x105) +#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN (0x110) +#define CKM_RC4 (0x111) +#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN (0x120) +#define CKM_DES_ECB (0x121) +#define CKM_DES_CBC (0x122) +#define CKM_DES_MAC (0x123) +#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL (0x124) +#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD (0x125) +#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN (0x130) +#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN (0x131) +#define CKM_DES3_ECB (0x132) +#define CKM_DES3_CBC (0x133) +#define CKM_DES3_MAC (0x134) +#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL (0x135) +#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD (0x136) +#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN (0x140) +#define CKM_CDMF_ECB (0x141) +#define CKM_CDMF_CBC (0x142) +#define CKM_CDMF_MAC (0x143) +#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL (0x144) +#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD (0x145) +#define CKM_MD2 (0x200) +#define CKM_MD2_HMAC (0x201) +#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL (0x202) +#define CKM_MD5 (0x210) +#define CKM_MD5_HMAC (0x211) +#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL (0x212) +#define CKM_SHA_1 (0x220) +#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC (0x221) +#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL (0x222) +#define CKM_RIPEMD128 (0x230) +#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC (0x231) +#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL (0x232) +#define CKM_RIPEMD160 (0x240) +#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC (0x241) +#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL (0x242) +#define CKM_SHA256 (0x250) +#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC (0x251) +#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL (0x252) +#define CKM_SHA384 (0x260) +#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC (0x261) +#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL (0x262) +#define CKM_SHA512 (0x270) +#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC (0x271) +#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL (0x272) +#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN (0x300) +#define CKM_CAST_ECB (0x301) +#define CKM_CAST_CBC (0x302) +#define CKM_CAST_MAC (0x303) +#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL (0x304) +#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD (0x305) +#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN (0x310) +#define CKM_CAST3_ECB (0x311) +#define CKM_CAST3_CBC (0x312) +#define CKM_CAST3_MAC (0x313) +#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL (0x314) +#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD (0x315) +#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN (0x320) +#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN (0x320) +#define CKM_CAST5_ECB (0x321) +#define CKM_CAST128_ECB (0x321) +#define CKM_CAST5_CBC (0x322) +#define CKM_CAST128_CBC (0x322) +#define CKM_CAST5_MAC (0x323) +#define CKM_CAST128_MAC (0x323) +#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL (0x324) +#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL (0x324) +#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD (0x325) +#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD (0x325) +#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN (0x330) +#define CKM_RC5_ECB (0x331) +#define CKM_RC5_CBC (0x332) +#define CKM_RC5_MAC (0x333) +#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL (0x334) +#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD (0x335) +#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN (0x340) +#define CKM_IDEA_ECB (0x341) +#define CKM_IDEA_CBC (0x342) +#define CKM_IDEA_MAC (0x343) +#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL (0x344) +#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD (0x345) +#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN (0x350) +#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY (0x360) +#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA (0x362) +#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE (0x363) +#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA (0x364) +#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY (0x365) +#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN (0x370) +#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE (0x371) +#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE (0x372) +#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH (0x373) +#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN (0x374) +#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE (0x375) +#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE (0x376) +#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH (0x377) +#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC (0x380) +#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC (0x381) +#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION (0x390) +#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION (0x391) +#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION (0x392) +#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC (0x3a0) +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC (0x3a1) +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC (0x3a2) +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC (0x3a3) +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC (0x3a4) +#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC (0x3a4) +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC (0x3a5) +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC (0x3a5) +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 (0x3a6) +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 (0x3a7) +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC (0x3a8) +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC (0x3a9) +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC (0x3aa) +#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC (0x3ab) +#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 (0x3b0) +#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC (0x3c0) +#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS (0x400) +#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP (0x401) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN (0x1000) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 (0x1001) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 (0x1002) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 (0x1003) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 (0x1004) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 (0x1005) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 (0x1006) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 (0x1007) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP (0x1008) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP (0x1009) +#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX (0x100a) +#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1010) +#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE (0x1011) +#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP (0x1020) +#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN (0x1030) +#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 (0x1031) +#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 (0x1032) +#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 (0x1033) +#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER (0x1034) +#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE (0x1035) +#define CKM_BATON_WRAP (0x1036) +#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1040) +#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1040) +#define CKM_ECDSA (0x1041) +#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 (0x1042) +#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE (0x1050) +#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE (0x1051) +#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE (0x1052) +#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN (0x1060) +#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 (0x1061) +#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 (0x1062) +#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER (0x1063) +#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE (0x1064) +#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP (0x1065) +#define CKM_FASTHASH (0x1070) +#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN (0x1080) +#define CKM_AES_ECB (0x1081) +#define CKM_AES_CBC (0x1082) +#define CKM_AES_MAC (0x1083) +#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL (0x1084) +#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD (0x1085) +#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN (0x2000) +#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN (0x2001) +#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN (0x2002) +#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) + + +struct ck_mechanism +{ + ck_mechanism_type_t mechanism; + void *parameter; + unsigned long parameter_len; +}; + + +struct ck_mechanism_info +{ + unsigned long min_key_size; + unsigned long max_key_size; + ck_flags_t flags; +}; + +#define CKF_HW (1 << 0) +#define CKF_ENCRYPT (1 << 8) +#define CKF_DECRYPT (1 << 9) +#define CKF_DIGEST (1 << 10) +#define CKF_SIGN (1 << 11) +#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER (1 << 12) +#define CKF_VERIFY (1 << 13) +#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER (1 << 14) +#define CKF_GENERATE (1 << 15) +#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR (1 << 16) +#define CKF_WRAP (1 << 17) +#define CKF_UNWRAP (1 << 18) +#define CKF_DERIVE (1 << 19) +#define CKF_EXTENSION (1U << 31) + + +/* Flags for C_WaitForSlotEvent. */ +#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK (1) + + +typedef unsigned long ck_rv_t; + + +typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_notify_t) (ck_session_handle_t session, + ck_notification_t event, void *application); + +/* Forward reference. */ +struct ck_function_list; + +#define _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(name, args) \ +typedef ck_rv_t (*CK_ ## name) args; \ +ck_rv_t CK_SPEC name args + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Initialize, (void *init_args)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Finalize, (void *reserved)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetInfo, (struct ck_info *info)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetFunctionList, + (struct ck_function_list **function_list)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSlotList, + (unsigned char token_present, ck_slot_id_t *slot_list, + unsigned long *count)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSlotInfo, + (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, struct ck_slot_info *info)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetTokenInfo, + (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, struct ck_token_info *info)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_WaitForSlotEvent, + (ck_flags_t flags, ck_slot_id_t *slot, void *reserved)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetMechanismList, + (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, + ck_mechanism_type_t *mechanism_list, + unsigned long *count)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetMechanismInfo, + (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_mechanism_type_t type, + struct ck_mechanism_info *info)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_InitToken, + (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, unsigned char *pin, + unsigned long pin_len, unsigned char *label)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_InitPIN, + (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *pin, + unsigned long pin_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetPIN, + (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *old_pin, + unsigned long old_len, unsigned char *new_pin, + unsigned long new_len)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_OpenSession, + (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_flags_t flags, + void *application, ck_notify_t notify, + ck_session_handle_t *session)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CloseSession, (ck_session_handle_t session)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CloseAllSessions, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSessionInfo, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_session_info *info)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetOperationState, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *operation_state, + unsigned long *operation_state_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetOperationState, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *operation_state, + unsigned long operation_state_len, + ck_object_handle_t encryption_key, + ck_object_handle_t authentiation_key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Login, + (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_user_type_t user_type, + unsigned char *pin, unsigned long pin_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Logout, (ck_session_handle_t session)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CreateObject, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_attribute *templ, + unsigned long count, ck_object_handle_t *object)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CopyObject, + (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t object, + struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count, + ck_object_handle_t *new_object)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DestroyObject, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + ck_object_handle_t object)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetObjectSize, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + ck_object_handle_t object, + unsigned long *size)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetAttributeValue, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + ck_object_handle_t object, + struct ck_attribute *templ, + unsigned long count)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetAttributeValue, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + ck_object_handle_t object, + struct ck_attribute *templ, + unsigned long count)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjectsInit, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_attribute *templ, + unsigned long count)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjects, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + ck_object_handle_t *object, + unsigned long max_object_count, + unsigned long *object_count)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjectsFinal, + (ck_session_handle_t session)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptInit, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + ck_object_handle_t key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Encrypt, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, + unsigned char *encrypted_data, + unsigned long *encrypted_data_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptUpdate, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len, + unsigned char *encrypted_part, + unsigned long *encrypted_part_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptFinal, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *last_encrypted_part, + unsigned long *last_encrypted_part_len)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptInit, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + ck_object_handle_t key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Decrypt, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *encrypted_data, + unsigned long encrypted_data_len, + unsigned char *data, unsigned long *data_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptUpdate, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *encrypted_part, + unsigned long encrypted_part_len, + unsigned char *part, unsigned long *part_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptFinal, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *last_part, + unsigned long *last_part_len)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestInit, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Digest, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, + unsigned char *digest, + unsigned long *digest_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestUpdate, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestKey, + (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestFinal, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *digest, + unsigned long *digest_len)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignInit, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + ck_object_handle_t key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Sign, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, + unsigned char *signature, + unsigned long *signature_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignUpdate, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignFinal, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *signature, + unsigned long *signature_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignRecoverInit, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + ck_object_handle_t key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignRecover, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, + unsigned char *signature, + unsigned long *signature_len)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyInit, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + ck_object_handle_t key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Verify, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, + unsigned char *signature, + unsigned long signature_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyUpdate, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyFinal, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *signature, + unsigned long signature_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyRecoverInit, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + ck_object_handle_t key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyRecover, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *signature, + unsigned long signature_len, + unsigned char *data, + unsigned long *data_len)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestEncryptUpdate, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len, + unsigned char *encrypted_part, + unsigned long *encrypted_part_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptDigestUpdate, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *encrypted_part, + unsigned long encrypted_part_len, + unsigned char *part, + unsigned long *part_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignEncryptUpdate, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len, + unsigned char *encrypted_part, + unsigned long *encrypted_part_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptVerifyUpdate, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *encrypted_part, + unsigned long encrypted_part_len, + unsigned char *part, + unsigned long *part_len)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateKey, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + struct ck_attribute *templ, + unsigned long count, + ck_object_handle_t *key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateKeyPair, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + struct ck_attribute *public_key_template, + unsigned long public_key_attribute_count, + struct ck_attribute *private_key_template, + unsigned long private_key_attribute_count, + ck_object_handle_t *public_key, + ck_object_handle_t *private_key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_WrapKey, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + ck_object_handle_t wrapping_key, + ck_object_handle_t key, + unsigned char *wrapped_key, + unsigned long *wrapped_key_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_UnwrapKey, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + ck_object_handle_t unwrapping_key, + unsigned char *wrapped_key, + unsigned long wrapped_key_len, + struct ck_attribute *templ, + unsigned long attribute_count, + ck_object_handle_t *key)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DeriveKey, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + struct ck_mechanism *mechanism, + ck_object_handle_t base_key, + struct ck_attribute *templ, + unsigned long attribute_count, + ck_object_handle_t *key)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SeedRandom, + (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *seed, + unsigned long seed_len)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateRandom, + (ck_session_handle_t session, + unsigned char *random_data, + unsigned long random_len)); + +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetFunctionStatus, (ck_session_handle_t session)); +_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CancelFunction, (ck_session_handle_t session)); + + +struct ck_function_list +{ + struct ck_version version; + CK_C_Initialize C_Initialize; + CK_C_Finalize C_Finalize; + CK_C_GetInfo C_GetInfo; + CK_C_GetFunctionList C_GetFunctionList; + CK_C_GetSlotList C_GetSlotList; + CK_C_GetSlotInfo C_GetSlotInfo; + CK_C_GetTokenInfo C_GetTokenInfo; + CK_C_GetMechanismList C_GetMechanismList; + CK_C_GetMechanismInfo C_GetMechanismInfo; + CK_C_InitToken C_InitToken; + CK_C_InitPIN C_InitPIN; + CK_C_SetPIN C_SetPIN; + CK_C_OpenSession C_OpenSession; + CK_C_CloseSession C_CloseSession; + CK_C_CloseAllSessions C_CloseAllSessions; + CK_C_GetSessionInfo C_GetSessionInfo; + CK_C_GetOperationState C_GetOperationState; + CK_C_SetOperationState C_SetOperationState; + CK_C_Login C_Login; + CK_C_Logout C_Logout; + CK_C_CreateObject C_CreateObject; + CK_C_CopyObject C_CopyObject; + CK_C_DestroyObject C_DestroyObject; + CK_C_GetObjectSize C_GetObjectSize; + CK_C_GetAttributeValue C_GetAttributeValue; + CK_C_SetAttributeValue C_SetAttributeValue; + CK_C_FindObjectsInit C_FindObjectsInit; + CK_C_FindObjects C_FindObjects; + CK_C_FindObjectsFinal C_FindObjectsFinal; + CK_C_EncryptInit C_EncryptInit; + CK_C_Encrypt C_Encrypt; + CK_C_EncryptUpdate C_EncryptUpdate; + CK_C_EncryptFinal C_EncryptFinal; + CK_C_DecryptInit C_DecryptInit; + CK_C_Decrypt C_Decrypt; + CK_C_DecryptUpdate C_DecryptUpdate; + CK_C_DecryptFinal C_DecryptFinal; + CK_C_DigestInit C_DigestInit; + CK_C_Digest C_Digest; + CK_C_DigestUpdate C_DigestUpdate; + CK_C_DigestKey C_DigestKey; + CK_C_DigestFinal C_DigestFinal; + CK_C_SignInit C_SignInit; + CK_C_Sign C_Sign; + CK_C_SignUpdate C_SignUpdate; + CK_C_SignFinal C_SignFinal; + CK_C_SignRecoverInit C_SignRecoverInit; + CK_C_SignRecover C_SignRecover; + CK_C_VerifyInit C_VerifyInit; + CK_C_Verify C_Verify; + CK_C_VerifyUpdate C_VerifyUpdate; + CK_C_VerifyFinal C_VerifyFinal; + CK_C_VerifyRecoverInit C_VerifyRecoverInit; + CK_C_VerifyRecover C_VerifyRecover; + CK_C_DigestEncryptUpdate C_DigestEncryptUpdate; + CK_C_DecryptDigestUpdate C_DecryptDigestUpdate; + CK_C_SignEncryptUpdate C_SignEncryptUpdate; + CK_C_DecryptVerifyUpdate C_DecryptVerifyUpdate; + CK_C_GenerateKey C_GenerateKey; + CK_C_GenerateKeyPair C_GenerateKeyPair; + CK_C_WrapKey C_WrapKey; + CK_C_UnwrapKey C_UnwrapKey; + CK_C_DeriveKey C_DeriveKey; + CK_C_SeedRandom C_SeedRandom; + CK_C_GenerateRandom C_GenerateRandom; + CK_C_GetFunctionStatus C_GetFunctionStatus; + CK_C_CancelFunction C_CancelFunction; + CK_C_WaitForSlotEvent C_WaitForSlotEvent; +}; + + +typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_createmutex_t) (void **mutex); +typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_destroymutex_t) (void *mutex); +typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_lockmutex_t) (void *mutex); +typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_unlockmutex_t) (void *mutex); + + +struct ck_c_initialize_args +{ + ck_createmutex_t create_mutex; + ck_destroymutex_t destroy_mutex; + ck_lockmutex_t lock_mutex; + ck_unlockmutex_t unlock_mutex; + ck_flags_t flags; + void *reserved; +}; + + +#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS (1 << 0) +#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK (1 << 1) + +#define CKR_OK (0) +#define CKR_CANCEL (1) +#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY (2) +#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID (3) +#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR (5) +#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED (6) +#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD (7) +#define CKR_NO_EVENT (8) +#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS (9) +#define CKR_CANT_LOCK (0xa) +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY (0x10) +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE (0x11) +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID (0x12) +#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID (0x13) +#define CKR_DATA_INVALID (0x20) +#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE (0x21) +#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR (0x30) +#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY (0x31) +#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED (0x32) +#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID (0x40) +#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE (0x41) +#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED (0x50) +#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL (0x51) +#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED (0x54) +#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID (0x60) +#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE (0x62) +#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT (0x63) +#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED (0x64) +#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED (0x65) +#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED (0x66) +#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE (0x67) +#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED (0x68) +#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE (0x69) +#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE (0x6a) +#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID (0x70) +#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID (0x71) +#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID (0x82) +#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE (0x90) +#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED (0x91) +#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT (0xa0) +#define CKR_PIN_INVALID (0xa1) +#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE (0xa2) +#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED (0xa3) +#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED (0xa4) +#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED (0xb0) +#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT (0xb1) +#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID (0xb3) +#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED (0xb4) +#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY (0xb5) +#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS (0xb6) +#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS (0xb7) +#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS (0xb8) +#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID (0xc0) +#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE (0xc1) +#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE (0xd0) +#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT (0xd1) +#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT (0xe0) +#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED (0xe1) +#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED (0xe2) +#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID (0xf0) +#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE (0xf1) +#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT (0xf2) +#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN (0x100) +#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN (0x101) +#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED (0x102) +#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID (0x103) +#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN (0x104) +#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES (0x105) +#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID (0x110) +#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE (0x112) +#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID (0x113) +#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE (0x114) +#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT (0x115) +#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED (0x120) +#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG (0x121) +#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID (0x130) +#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL (0x150) +#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID (0x160) +#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE (0x170) +#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE (0x180) +#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED (0x190) +#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED (0x191) +#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD (0x1a0) +#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED (0x1a1) +#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED (0x200) +#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED (1U << 31) + + + +/* Compatibility layer. */ + +#ifdef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT + +#undef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION +#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(retval, name) retval CK_SPEC name + +/* For NULL. */ +#include + +typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; +typedef unsigned char CK_CHAR; +typedef unsigned char CK_UTF8CHAR; +typedef unsigned char CK_BBOOL; +typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; +typedef long int CK_LONG; +typedef CK_BYTE *CK_BYTE_PTR; +typedef CK_CHAR *CK_CHAR_PTR; +typedef CK_UTF8CHAR *CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; +typedef CK_ULONG *CK_ULONG_PTR; +typedef void *CK_VOID_PTR; +typedef void **CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; +#define CK_FALSE 0 +#define CK_TRUE 1 +#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE +#ifndef FALSE +#define FALSE 0 +#endif +#ifndef TRUE +#define TRUE 1 +#endif +#endif + +typedef struct ck_version CK_VERSION; +typedef struct ck_version *CK_VERSION_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_info CK_INFO; +typedef struct ck_info *CK_INFO_PTR; + +typedef ck_slot_id_t *CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_slot_info CK_SLOT_INFO; +typedef struct ck_slot_info *CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_token_info CK_TOKEN_INFO; +typedef struct ck_token_info *CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; + +typedef ck_session_handle_t *CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_session_info CK_SESSION_INFO; +typedef struct ck_session_info *CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; + +typedef ck_object_handle_t *CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; + +typedef ck_object_class_t *CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_attribute CK_ATTRIBUTE; +typedef struct ck_attribute *CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_date CK_DATE; +typedef struct ck_date *CK_DATE_PTR; + +typedef ck_mechanism_type_t *CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_mechanism CK_MECHANISM; +typedef struct ck_mechanism *CK_MECHANISM_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_mechanism_info CK_MECHANISM_INFO; +typedef struct ck_mechanism_info *CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_function_list CK_FUNCTION_LIST; +typedef struct ck_function_list *CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; +typedef struct ck_function_list **CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; + +typedef struct ck_c_initialize_args CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; +typedef struct ck_c_initialize_args *CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; + +#define NULL_PTR NULL + +/* Delete the helper macros defined at the top of the file. */ +#undef ck_flags_t +#undef ck_version + +#undef ck_info +#undef cryptoki_version +#undef manufacturer_id +#undef library_description +#undef library_version + +#undef ck_notification_t +#undef ck_slot_id_t + +#undef ck_slot_info +#undef slot_description +#undef hardware_version +#undef firmware_version + +#undef ck_token_info +#undef serial_number +#undef max_session_count +#undef session_count +#undef max_rw_session_count +#undef rw_session_count +#undef max_pin_len +#undef min_pin_len +#undef total_public_memory +#undef free_public_memory +#undef total_private_memory +#undef free_private_memory +#undef utc_time + +#undef ck_session_handle_t +#undef ck_user_type_t +#undef ck_state_t + +#undef ck_session_info +#undef slot_id +#undef device_error + +#undef ck_object_handle_t +#undef ck_object_class_t +#undef ck_hw_feature_type_t +#undef ck_key_type_t +#undef ck_certificate_type_t +#undef ck_attribute_type_t + +#undef ck_attribute +#undef value +#undef value_len + +#undef ck_date + +#undef ck_mechanism_type_t + +#undef ck_mechanism +#undef parameter +#undef parameter_len + +#undef ck_mechanism_info +#undef min_key_size +#undef max_key_size + +#undef ck_rv_t +#undef ck_notify_t + +#undef ck_function_list + +#undef ck_createmutex_t +#undef ck_destroymutex_t +#undef ck_lockmutex_t +#undef ck_unlockmutex_t + +#undef ck_c_initialize_args +#undef create_mutex +#undef destroy_mutex +#undef lock_mutex +#undef unlock_mutex +#undef reserved + +#endif /* CRYPTOKI_COMPAT */ + + +/* System dependencies. */ +#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(CRYPTOKI_FORCE_WIN32) +#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) +#endif + +#if defined(__cplusplus) +} +#endif + +#endif /* PKCS11_H */ diff --git a/platform-misc.c b/platform-misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f39670 --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" + +/* + * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory + * otherwise 0. + */ +int +platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid) +{ + if (uid == 0) + return 1; +#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID + if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID) + return 1; +#endif + return 0; +} diff --git a/platform-pledge.c b/platform-pledge.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a6ec15 --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-pledge.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc + * Author: Alex Wilson + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "platform.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" + +/* + * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup + * operation of ssh-agent + * + * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", ...) + */ +void +platform_pledge_agent(void) +{ +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS + /* + * Note: Solaris priv dropping is closer to tame() than pledge(), but + * we will use what we have. + */ + solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(); +#endif +} + +/* + * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup + * operation of sftp-server + */ +void +platform_pledge_sftp_server(void) +{ +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS + solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(); +#endif +} + +/* + * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for the post-startup + * operation of the SSH client mux + * + * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio proc tty", ...) + */ +void +platform_pledge_mux(void) +{ +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS + solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(); +#endif +} diff --git a/platform-tracing.c b/platform-tracing.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c80a28 --- /dev/null +++ b/platform-tracing.c @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) +#include /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */ +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H +#include /* For setpflags() and __PROC_PROTECT */ +#endif +#include + +#include "log.h" + +void +platform_disable_tracing(int strict) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) + /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */ + if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) != 0 && strict) + fatal("unable to make the process undumpable"); +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_SETPFLAGS) && defined(__PROC_PROTECT) + /* On Solaris, we should make this process untraceable */ + if (setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, 1) != 0 && strict) + fatal("unable to make the process untraceable"); +#endif +#ifdef PT_DENY_ATTACH + /* Mac OS X */ + if (ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0) == -1 && strict) + fatal("unable to set PT_DENY_ATTACH"); +#endif +} diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..41acc93 --- /dev/null +++ b/platform.c @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-pam.h" +#include "platform.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" + +extern int use_privsep; +extern ServerOptions options; + +void +platform_pre_listen(void) +{ +#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST + /* Adjust out-of-memory killer so listening process is not killed */ + oom_adjust_setup(); +#endif +} + +void +platform_pre_fork(void) +{ +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS + solaris_contract_pre_fork(); +#endif +} + +void +platform_pre_restart(void) +{ +#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST + oom_adjust_restore(); +#endif +} + +void +platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid) +{ +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS + solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid); +#endif +} + +void +platform_post_fork_child(void) +{ +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS + solaris_contract_post_fork_child(); +#endif +#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST + oom_adjust_restore(); +#endif +} + +/* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */ +int +platform_privileged_uidswap(void) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */ + return 1; +#else + return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0); +#endif +} + +/* + * This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is + * not running as root. + */ +void +platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) +{ +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + /* Cache selinux status for later use */ + (void)ssh_selinux_enabled(); +#endif + +#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS + /* + * If solaris projects were detected, set the default now, unless + * we are using PAM in which case it is the responsibility of the + * PAM stack. + */ + if (!options.use_pam && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)) + solaris_set_default_project(pw); +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__) + if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) + setpgid(0, 0); +# endif + +#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM) + /* + * If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds + * before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext). + */ + if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { + if (options.use_pam) { + do_pam_setcred(use_privsep); + } + } +# endif /* USE_PAM */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID) + if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { + /* Sets login uid for accounting */ + if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) + error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno)); + } +#endif +} + +/* + * This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only + * called if sshd is running as root. + */ +void +platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw) +{ +#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM) + /* + * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups. + * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call. + * Reestablish them here. + */ + if (options.use_pam) { + do_pam_setcred(use_privsep); + } +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \ + defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)) + irix_setusercontext(pw); +#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */ + +#ifdef _AIX + aix_usrinfo(pw); +#endif /* _AIX */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED + /* + * If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real + * uid which we will need for chroot. If we don't have a + * chroot directory, we don't override anything. + */ + { + char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] = + { "REAL_USER=root", NULL }; + + if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) + creds = chroot_creds; + + if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1) + fatal("Failed to set process credentials"); + } +#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); +#endif +} + +char * +platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name) +{ +#ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME + return aix_krb5_get_principal_name(pw_name); +#else + return NULL; +#endif +} diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea4f9c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/platform.h @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include + +#include + +void platform_pre_listen(void); +void platform_pre_fork(void); +void platform_pre_restart(void); +void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid); +void platform_post_fork_child(void); +int platform_privileged_uidswap(void); +void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *); +void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *); +char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *); +char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *); +int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t); +void platform_disable_tracing(int); + +/* in platform-pledge.c */ +void platform_pledge_agent(void); +void platform_pledge_sftp_server(void); +void platform_pledge_mux(void); diff --git a/poly1305.c b/poly1305.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fd1fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/poly1305.c @@ -0,0 +1,160 @@ +/* + * Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon + * poly1305-donna-unrolled.c from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.c,v 1.3 2013/12/19 22:57:13 djm Exp $ */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif + +#include "poly1305.h" + +#define mul32x32_64(a,b) ((uint64_t)(a) * (b)) + +#define U8TO32_LE(p) \ + (((uint32_t)((p)[0])) | \ + ((uint32_t)((p)[1]) << 8) | \ + ((uint32_t)((p)[2]) << 16) | \ + ((uint32_t)((p)[3]) << 24)) + +#define U32TO8_LE(p, v) \ + do { \ + (p)[0] = (uint8_t)((v)); \ + (p)[1] = (uint8_t)((v) >> 8); \ + (p)[2] = (uint8_t)((v) >> 16); \ + (p)[3] = (uint8_t)((v) >> 24); \ + } while (0) + +void +poly1305_auth(unsigned char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const unsigned char *m, size_t inlen, const unsigned char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) { + uint32_t t0,t1,t2,t3; + uint32_t h0,h1,h2,h3,h4; + uint32_t r0,r1,r2,r3,r4; + uint32_t s1,s2,s3,s4; + uint32_t b, nb; + size_t j; + uint64_t t[5]; + uint64_t f0,f1,f2,f3; + uint32_t g0,g1,g2,g3,g4; + uint64_t c; + unsigned char mp[16]; + + /* clamp key */ + t0 = U8TO32_LE(key+0); + t1 = U8TO32_LE(key+4); + t2 = U8TO32_LE(key+8); + t3 = U8TO32_LE(key+12); + + /* precompute multipliers */ + r0 = t0 & 0x3ffffff; t0 >>= 26; t0 |= t1 << 6; + r1 = t0 & 0x3ffff03; t1 >>= 20; t1 |= t2 << 12; + r2 = t1 & 0x3ffc0ff; t2 >>= 14; t2 |= t3 << 18; + r3 = t2 & 0x3f03fff; t3 >>= 8; + r4 = t3 & 0x00fffff; + + s1 = r1 * 5; + s2 = r2 * 5; + s3 = r3 * 5; + s4 = r4 * 5; + + /* init state */ + h0 = 0; + h1 = 0; + h2 = 0; + h3 = 0; + h4 = 0; + + /* full blocks */ + if (inlen < 16) goto poly1305_donna_atmost15bytes; +poly1305_donna_16bytes: + m += 16; + inlen -= 16; + + t0 = U8TO32_LE(m-16); + t1 = U8TO32_LE(m-12); + t2 = U8TO32_LE(m-8); + t3 = U8TO32_LE(m-4); + + h0 += t0 & 0x3ffffff; + h1 += ((((uint64_t)t1 << 32) | t0) >> 26) & 0x3ffffff; + h2 += ((((uint64_t)t2 << 32) | t1) >> 20) & 0x3ffffff; + h3 += ((((uint64_t)t3 << 32) | t2) >> 14) & 0x3ffffff; + h4 += (t3 >> 8) | (1 << 24); + + +poly1305_donna_mul: + t[0] = mul32x32_64(h0,r0) + mul32x32_64(h1,s4) + mul32x32_64(h2,s3) + mul32x32_64(h3,s2) + mul32x32_64(h4,s1); + t[1] = mul32x32_64(h0,r1) + mul32x32_64(h1,r0) + mul32x32_64(h2,s4) + mul32x32_64(h3,s3) + mul32x32_64(h4,s2); + t[2] = mul32x32_64(h0,r2) + mul32x32_64(h1,r1) + mul32x32_64(h2,r0) + mul32x32_64(h3,s4) + mul32x32_64(h4,s3); + t[3] = mul32x32_64(h0,r3) + mul32x32_64(h1,r2) + mul32x32_64(h2,r1) + mul32x32_64(h3,r0) + mul32x32_64(h4,s4); + t[4] = mul32x32_64(h0,r4) + mul32x32_64(h1,r3) + mul32x32_64(h2,r2) + mul32x32_64(h3,r1) + mul32x32_64(h4,r0); + + h0 = (uint32_t)t[0] & 0x3ffffff; c = (t[0] >> 26); + t[1] += c; h1 = (uint32_t)t[1] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[1] >> 26); + t[2] += b; h2 = (uint32_t)t[2] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[2] >> 26); + t[3] += b; h3 = (uint32_t)t[3] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[3] >> 26); + t[4] += b; h4 = (uint32_t)t[4] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[4] >> 26); + h0 += b * 5; + + if (inlen >= 16) goto poly1305_donna_16bytes; + + /* final bytes */ +poly1305_donna_atmost15bytes: + if (!inlen) goto poly1305_donna_finish; + + for (j = 0; j < inlen; j++) mp[j] = m[j]; + mp[j++] = 1; + for (; j < 16; j++) mp[j] = 0; + inlen = 0; + + t0 = U8TO32_LE(mp+0); + t1 = U8TO32_LE(mp+4); + t2 = U8TO32_LE(mp+8); + t3 = U8TO32_LE(mp+12); + + h0 += t0 & 0x3ffffff; + h1 += ((((uint64_t)t1 << 32) | t0) >> 26) & 0x3ffffff; + h2 += ((((uint64_t)t2 << 32) | t1) >> 20) & 0x3ffffff; + h3 += ((((uint64_t)t3 << 32) | t2) >> 14) & 0x3ffffff; + h4 += (t3 >> 8); + + goto poly1305_donna_mul; + +poly1305_donna_finish: + b = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff; + h1 += b; b = h1 >> 26; h1 = h1 & 0x3ffffff; + h2 += b; b = h2 >> 26; h2 = h2 & 0x3ffffff; + h3 += b; b = h3 >> 26; h3 = h3 & 0x3ffffff; + h4 += b; b = h4 >> 26; h4 = h4 & 0x3ffffff; + h0 += b * 5; b = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff; + h1 += b; + + g0 = h0 + 5; b = g0 >> 26; g0 &= 0x3ffffff; + g1 = h1 + b; b = g1 >> 26; g1 &= 0x3ffffff; + g2 = h2 + b; b = g2 >> 26; g2 &= 0x3ffffff; + g3 = h3 + b; b = g3 >> 26; g3 &= 0x3ffffff; + g4 = h4 + b - (1 << 26); + + b = (g4 >> 31) - 1; + nb = ~b; + h0 = (h0 & nb) | (g0 & b); + h1 = (h1 & nb) | (g1 & b); + h2 = (h2 & nb) | (g2 & b); + h3 = (h3 & nb) | (g3 & b); + h4 = (h4 & nb) | (g4 & b); + + f0 = ((h0 ) | (h1 << 26)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[16]); + f1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[20]); + f2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[24]); + f3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[28]); + + U32TO8_LE(&out[ 0], f0); f1 += (f0 >> 32); + U32TO8_LE(&out[ 4], f1); f2 += (f1 >> 32); + U32TO8_LE(&out[ 8], f2); f3 += (f2 >> 32); + U32TO8_LE(&out[12], f3); +} diff --git a/poly1305.h b/poly1305.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7db5f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/poly1305.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.h,v 1.4 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon + * poly1305-donna-unrolled.c from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna + */ + +#ifndef POLY1305_H +#define POLY1305_H + +#include + +#define POLY1305_KEYLEN 32 +#define POLY1305_TAGLEN 16 + +void poly1305_auth(u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen, + const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, POLY1305_TAGLEN))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 4, POLY1305_KEYLEN))); + +#endif /* POLY1305_H */ diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe9bf52 --- /dev/null +++ b/progressmeter.c @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.45 2016/06/30 05:17:05 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "progressmeter.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80 +#define MAX_WINSIZE 512 +#define PADDING 1 /* padding between the progress indicators */ +#define UPDATE_INTERVAL 1 /* update the progress meter every second */ +#define STALL_TIME 5 /* we're stalled after this many seconds */ + +/* determines whether we can output to the terminal */ +static int can_output(void); + +/* formats and inserts the specified size into the given buffer */ +static void format_size(char *, int, off_t); +static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t); + +/* window resizing */ +static void sig_winch(int); +static void setscreensize(void); + +/* updates the progressmeter to reflect the current state of the transfer */ +void refresh_progress_meter(void); + +/* signal handler for updating the progress meter */ +static void update_progress_meter(int); + +static double start; /* start progress */ +static double last_update; /* last progress update */ +static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */ +static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */ +static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */ +static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */ +static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */ +static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */ +static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */ +static int win_size; /* terminal window size */ +static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */ + +/* units for format_size */ +static const char unit[] = " KMGT"; + +static int +can_output(void) +{ + return (getpgrp() == tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO)); +} + +static void +format_rate(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes) +{ + int i; + + bytes *= 100; + for (i = 0; bytes >= 100*1000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++) + bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024; + if (i == 0) { + i++; + bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024; + } + snprintf(buf, size, "%3lld.%1lld%c%s", + (long long) (bytes + 5) / 100, + (long long) (bytes + 5) / 10 % 10, + unit[i], + i ? "B" : " "); +} + +static void +format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; bytes >= 10000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++) + bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024; + snprintf(buf, size, "%4lld%c%s", + (long long) bytes, + unit[i], + i ? "B" : " "); +} + +void +refresh_progress_meter(void) +{ + char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1]; + off_t transferred; + double elapsed, now; + int percent; + off_t bytes_left; + int cur_speed; + int hours, minutes, seconds; + int i, len; + int file_len; + + transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos); + cur_pos = *counter; + now = monotime_double(); + bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos; + + if (bytes_left > 0) + elapsed = now - last_update; + else { + elapsed = now - start; + /* Calculate true total speed when done */ + transferred = end_pos - start_pos; + bytes_per_second = 0; + } + + /* calculate speed */ + if (elapsed != 0) + cur_speed = (transferred / elapsed); + else + cur_speed = transferred; + +#define AGE_FACTOR 0.9 + if (bytes_per_second != 0) { + bytes_per_second = (bytes_per_second * AGE_FACTOR) + + (cur_speed * (1.0 - AGE_FACTOR)); + } else + bytes_per_second = cur_speed; + + /* filename */ + buf[0] = '\0'; + file_len = win_size - 35; + if (file_len > 0) { + len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file); + if (len < 0) + len = 0; + if (len >= file_len + 1) + len = file_len; + for (i = len; i < file_len; i++) + buf[i] = ' '; + buf[file_len] = '\0'; + } + + /* percent of transfer done */ + if (end_pos == 0 || cur_pos == end_pos) + percent = 100; + else + percent = ((float)cur_pos / end_pos) * 100; + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), + " %3d%% ", percent); + + /* amount transferred */ + format_size(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), + cur_pos); + strlcat(buf, " ", win_size); + + /* bandwidth usage */ + format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), + (off_t)bytes_per_second); + strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size); + + /* ETA */ + if (!transferred) + stalled += elapsed; + else + stalled = 0; + + if (stalled >= STALL_TIME) + strlcat(buf, "- stalled -", win_size); + else if (bytes_per_second == 0 && bytes_left) + strlcat(buf, " --:-- ETA", win_size); + else { + if (bytes_left > 0) + seconds = bytes_left / bytes_per_second; + else + seconds = elapsed; + + hours = seconds / 3600; + seconds -= hours * 3600; + minutes = seconds / 60; + seconds -= minutes * 60; + + if (hours != 0) + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), + "%d:%02d:%02d", hours, minutes, seconds); + else + snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf), + " %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds); + + if (bytes_left > 0) + strlcat(buf, " ETA", win_size); + else + strlcat(buf, " ", win_size); + } + + atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1); + last_update = now; +} + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +update_progress_meter(int ignore) +{ + int save_errno; + + save_errno = errno; + + if (win_resized) { + setscreensize(); + win_resized = 0; + } + if (can_output()) + refresh_progress_meter(); + + signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter); + alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL); + errno = save_errno; +} + +void +start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr) +{ + start = last_update = monotime_double(); + file = f; + start_pos = *ctr; + end_pos = filesize; + cur_pos = 0; + counter = ctr; + stalled = 0; + bytes_per_second = 0; + + setscreensize(); + if (can_output()) + refresh_progress_meter(); + + signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter); + signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch); + alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL); +} + +void +stop_progress_meter(void) +{ + alarm(0); + + if (!can_output()) + return; + + /* Ensure we complete the progress */ + if (cur_pos != end_pos) + refresh_progress_meter(); + + atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1); +} + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +sig_winch(int sig) +{ + win_resized = 1; +} + +static void +setscreensize(void) +{ + struct winsize winsize; + + if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 && + winsize.ws_col != 0) { + if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE) + win_size = MAX_WINSIZE; + else + win_size = winsize.ws_col; + } else + win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE; + win_size += 1; /* trailing \0 */ +} diff --git a/progressmeter.h b/progressmeter.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf179dc --- /dev/null +++ b/progressmeter.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.3 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *); +void stop_progress_meter(void); diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4338115 --- /dev/null +++ b/readconf.c @@ -0,0 +1,2757 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.300 2018/10/05 14:26:09 naddy Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for reading the configuration files. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB +# include +#else +# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) +# include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "digest.h" + +/* Format of the configuration file: + + # Configuration data is parsed as follows: + # 1. command line options + # 2. user-specific file + # 3. system-wide file + # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. + # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the + # configuration file, and defaults at the end. + + # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single + # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order + # that they are given in. + + Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi + User foo + + Host fake.com + HostName another.host.name.real.org + User blaah + Port 34289 + ForwardX11 no + ForwardAgent no + + Host books.com + RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999 + Ciphers 3des-cbc + + Host fascist.blob.com + Port 23123 + User tylonen + PasswordAuthentication no + + Host puukko.hut.fi + User t35124p + ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p + + Host *.fr + PublicKeyAuthentication no + + Host *.su + Ciphers aes128-ctr + PasswordAuthentication no + + Host vpn.fake.com + Tunnel yes + TunnelDevice 3 + + # Defaults for various options + Host * + ForwardAgent no + ForwardX11 no + PasswordAuthentication yes + RSAAuthentication yes + RhostsRSAAuthentication yes + StrictHostKeyChecking yes + TcpKeepAlive no + IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity + Port 22 + EscapeChar ~ + +*/ + +static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, + const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, + int flags, int *activep, int depth); +static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, + const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, + const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int depth); + +/* Keyword tokens. */ + +typedef enum { + oBadOption, + oHost, oMatch, oInclude, + oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout, + oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure, + oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication, + oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation, + oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, + oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent, + oUser, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand, + oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, + oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression, + oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, + oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oMacs, + oPubkeyAuthentication, + oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, + oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, + oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oBindInterface, oPKCS11Provider, + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, + oHashKnownHosts, + oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, + oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, + oVisualHostKey, + oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, + oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, + oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, + oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, + oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes, + oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump, + oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported +} OpCodes; + +/* Textual representations of the tokens. */ + +static struct { + const char *name; + OpCodes opcode; +} keywords[] = { + /* Deprecated options */ + { "protocol", oIgnore }, /* NB. silently ignored */ + { "cipher", oDeprecated }, + { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, + { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, + { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, + { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, + { "useroaming", oDeprecated }, + { "usersh", oDeprecated }, + { "useprivilegedport", oDeprecated }, + + /* Unsupported options */ + { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, + { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, + + /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ +#if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, +# else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, + { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, +# else + { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, + { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, +#endif + { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported }, + + { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, + { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, + { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted }, + { "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout }, + { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure }, + { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation }, + { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts }, + { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, + { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices }, + { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, + { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ + { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication }, + { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, + { "skeyauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ + { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, + { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */ + { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly }, + { "certificatefile", oCertificateFile }, + { "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent }, + { "identityagent", oIdentityAgent }, + { "hostname", oHostName }, + { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, + { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, + { "port", oPort }, + { "ciphers", oCiphers }, + { "macs", oMacs }, + { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward }, + { "localforward", oLocalForward }, + { "user", oUser }, + { "host", oHost }, + { "match", oMatch }, + { "escapechar", oEscapeChar }, + { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile }, + { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, + { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts }, + { "batchmode", oBatchMode }, + { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP }, + { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking }, + { "compression", oCompression }, + { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, + { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */ + { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, + { "syslogfacility", oLogFacility }, + { "loglevel", oLogLevel }, + { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward }, + { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, + { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, + { "casignaturealgorithms", oCASignatureAlgorithms }, + { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, + { "bindinterface", oBindInterface }, + { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, + { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, + { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, + { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost }, + { "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit }, + { "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout }, + { "addressfamily", oAddressFamily }, + { "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval }, + { "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax }, + { "sendenv", oSendEnv }, + { "setenv", oSetEnv }, + { "controlpath", oControlPath }, + { "controlmaster", oControlMaster }, + { "controlpersist", oControlPersist }, + { "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts }, + { "include", oInclude }, + { "tunnel", oTunnel }, + { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice }, + { "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, + { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, + { "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand }, + { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, + { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, + { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, + { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, + { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass }, + { "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains }, + { "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal }, + { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname }, + { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots }, + { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs }, + { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask }, + { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink }, + { "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys }, + { "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash }, + { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys }, + { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes }, + { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes }, + { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, + { "proxyjump", oProxyJump }, + + { NULL, oBadOption } +}; + +/* + * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an + * error. + */ + +void +add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) +{ + struct Forward *fwd; + int i; + + /* Don't add duplicates */ + for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { + if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i)) + return; + } + options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards, + options->num_local_forwards + 1, + sizeof(*options->local_forwards)); + fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++]; + + fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; + fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; + fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; + fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; + fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; + fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; +} + +/* + * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is + * an error. + */ + +void +add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) +{ + struct Forward *fwd; + int i; + + /* Don't add duplicates */ + for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { + if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->remote_forwards + i)) + return; + } + options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards, + options->num_remote_forwards + 1, + sizeof(*options->remote_forwards)); + fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++]; + + fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; + fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; + fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; + fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; + fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; + fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; + fwd->handle = newfwd->handle; + fwd->allocated_port = 0; +} + +static void +clear_forwardings(Options *options) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { + free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host); + free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path); + free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host); + free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path); + } + if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) { + free(options->local_forwards); + options->local_forwards = NULL; + } + options->num_local_forwards = 0; + for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { + free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host); + free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path); + free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host); + free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path); + } + if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) { + free(options->remote_forwards); + options->remote_forwards = NULL; + } + options->num_remote_forwards = 0; + options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; +} + +void +add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided) +{ + int i; + + if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) + fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)", + SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); + + /* Avoid registering duplicates */ + for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) { + if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && + strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) { + debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path); + return; + } + } + + options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] = + userprovided; + options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] = + xstrdup(path); +} + +void +add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename, + int userprovided) +{ + char *path; + int i; + + if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) + fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)", + SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); + + if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */ + path = xstrdup(filename); + else if (xasprintf(&path, "%s%s", dir, filename) >= PATH_MAX) + fatal("Identity file path %s too long", path); + + /* Avoid registering duplicates */ + for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) { + if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && + strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) { + debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path); + free(path); + return; + } + } + + options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] = + userprovided; + options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path; +} + +int +default_ssh_port(void) +{ + static int port; + struct servent *sp; + + if (port == 0) { + sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); + port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + } + return port; +} + +/* + * Execute a command in a shell. + * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit. + */ +static int +execute_in_shell(const char *cmd) +{ + char *shell; + pid_t pid; + int devnull, status; + + if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + /* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */ + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) + fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); + + debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd); + + /* Fork and execute the command. */ + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + char *argv[4]; + + /* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */ + if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) + fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) + fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + + argv[0] = shell; + argv[1] = "-c"; + argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd); + argv[3] = NULL; + + execv(argv[0], argv); + error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno)); + /* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */ + signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); + kill(getpid(), SIGTERM); + _exit(1); + } + /* Parent. */ + if (pid < 0) + fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + + close(devnull); + + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) + fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { + error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd); + return -1; + } + debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); + return WEXITSTATUS(status); +} + +/* + * Parse and execute a Match directive. + */ +static int +match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw, + const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int post_canon, + const char *filename, int linenum) +{ + char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria; + const char *ruser; + int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate; + char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; + char uidstr[32]; + + /* + * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we + * must be prepared to use default values. + */ + port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port; + ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user; + if (post_canon) { + host = xstrdup(options->hostname); + } else if (options->hostname != NULL) { + /* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */ + host = percent_expand(options->hostname, + "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL); + } else { + host = xstrdup(host_arg); + } + + debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s", + cp, host, original_host); + while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { + criteria = NULL; + this_result = 1; + if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!')) + attrib++; + /* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */ + if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { + if (attributes > 1 || + ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { + error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined " + "with other Match attributes", + filename, linenum, oattrib); + result = -1; + goto out; + } + if (result) + result = negate ? 0 : 1; + goto out; + } + attributes++; + if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0) { + r = !!post_canon; /* force bitmask member to boolean */ + if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) + this_result = result = 0; + debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'", + filename, linenum, + this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib); + continue; + } + /* All other criteria require an argument */ + if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { + error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); + result = -1; + goto out; + } + if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { + criteria = xstrdup(host); + r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1; + if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) + this_result = result = 0; + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) { + criteria = xstrdup(original_host); + r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1; + if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) + this_result = result = 0; + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { + criteria = xstrdup(ruser); + r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1; + if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) + this_result = result = 0; + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) { + criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1; + if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) + this_result = result = 0; + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) { + if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) + fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); + strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); + shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; + snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port); + snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", + (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); + + cmd = percent_expand(arg, + "L", shorthost, + "d", pw->pw_dir, + "h", host, + "l", thishost, + "n", original_host, + "p", portstr, + "r", ruser, + "u", pw->pw_name, + "i", uidstr, + (char *)NULL); + if (result != 1) { + /* skip execution if prior predicate failed */ + debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec " + "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd); + free(cmd); + continue; + } + r = execute_in_shell(cmd); + if (r == -1) { + fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec " + "'%.100s' error", filename, + linenum, cmd); + } + criteria = xstrdup(cmd); + free(cmd); + /* Force exit status to boolean */ + r = r == 0; + if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) + this_result = result = 0; + } else { + error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); + result = -1; + goto out; + } + debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ", + filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ", + oattrib, criteria); + free(criteria); + } + if (attributes == 0) { + error("One or more attributes required for Match"); + result = -1; + goto out; + } + out: + if (result != -1) + debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); + *condition = cp; + free(host); + return result; +} + +/* Remove environment variable by pattern */ +static void +rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum) +{ + int i, j; + char *cp; + + /* Remove an environment variable */ + for (i = 0; i < options->num_send_env; ) { + cp = xstrdup(options->send_env[i]); + if (!match_pattern(cp, arg + 1)) { + free(cp); + i++; + continue; + } + debug3("%s line %d: removing environment %s", + filename, linenum, cp); + free(cp); + free(options->send_env[i]); + options->send_env[i] = NULL; + for (j = i; j < options->num_send_env - 1; j++) { + options->send_env[j] = options->send_env[j + 1]; + options->send_env[j + 1] = NULL; + } + options->num_send_env--; + /* NB. don't increment i */ + } +} + +/* + * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. + */ +static OpCodes +parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, + const char *ignored_unknown) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) + if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) + return keywords[i].opcode; + if (ignored_unknown != NULL && + match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1) + return oIgnoredUnknownOption; + error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", + filename, linenum, cp); + return oBadOption; +} + +/* Multistate option parsing */ +struct multistate { + char *key; + int value; +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { + { "true", 1 }, + { "false", 0 }, + { "yes", 1 }, + { "no", 0 }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = { + { "true", 1 }, + { "false", 0 }, + { "yes", 1 }, + { "no", 0 }, + { "ask", 2 }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_strict_hostkey[] = { + { "true", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, + { "false", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, + { "yes", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES }, + { "no", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, + { "ask", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK }, + { "off", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF }, + { "accept-new", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = { + { "true", 1 }, + { "false", 0 }, + { "yes", 1 }, + { "no", 0 }, + { "ask", 2 }, + { "confirm", 3 }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { + { "inet", AF_INET }, + { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, + { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = { + { "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, + { "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, + { "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, + { "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, + { "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO }, + { "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK }, + { "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = { + { "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET }, + { "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT }, + { "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, + { "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, + { "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, + { "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = { + { "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, + { "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, + { "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, + { "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, + { "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE }, + { "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = { + { "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, + { "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, + { "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, + { "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, + { "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; + +/* + * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This + * only sets those values that have not already been set. + */ +int +process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, + const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, + int linenum, int *activep, int flags) +{ + return process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host, + line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, 0); +} + +#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" +static int +process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, + const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, + int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int depth) +{ + char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2; + char **cpptr, fwdarg[256]; + u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0; + int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0; + int remotefwd, dynamicfwd; + LogLevel *log_level_ptr; + SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; + long long val64; + size_t len; + struct Forward fwd; + const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; + struct allowed_cname *cname; + glob_t gl; + const char *errstr; + + if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ + cmdline = 1; + activep = &cmdline; + } + + /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ + if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) + return 0; + for (len--; len > 0; len--) { + if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) + break; + line[len] = '\0'; + } + + s = line; + /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ + if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL) + return 0; + /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ + if (*keyword == '\0') + keyword = strdelim(&s); + if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') + return 0; + /* Match lowercase keyword */ + lowercase(keyword); + + opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, + options->ignored_unknown); + + switch (opcode) { + case oBadOption: + /* don't panic, but count bad options */ + return -1; + case oIgnore: + return 0; + case oIgnoredUnknownOption: + debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"", + filename, linenum, keyword); + return 0; + case oConnectTimeout: + intptr = &options->connection_timeout; +parse_time: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", + filename, linenum); + if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) + value = -1; + else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oForwardAgent: + intptr = &options->forward_agent; + parse_flag: + multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; + parse_multistate: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + value = -1; + for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { + if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { + value = multistate_ptr[i].value; + break; + } + } + if (value == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", + filename, linenum, arg); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oForwardX11: + intptr = &options->forward_x11; + goto parse_flag; + + case oForwardX11Trusted: + intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted; + goto parse_flag; + + case oForwardX11Timeout: + intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout; + goto parse_time; + + case oGatewayPorts: + intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; + goto parse_flag; + + case oExitOnForwardFailure: + intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure; + goto parse_flag; + + case oPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication: + intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oKbdInteractiveDevices: + charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices; + goto parse_string; + + case oPubkeyAuthentication: + intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oHostbasedAuthentication: + intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oChallengeResponseAuthentication: + intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oGssAuthentication: + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case oGssDelegateCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; + + case oCheckHostIP: + intptr = &options->check_host_ip; + goto parse_flag; + + case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: + intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns; + multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; + goto parse_multistate; + + case oStrictHostKeyChecking: + intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking; + multistate_ptr = multistate_strict_hostkey; + goto parse_multistate; + + case oCompression: + intptr = &options->compression; + goto parse_flag; + + case oTCPKeepAlive: + intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; + goto parse_flag; + + case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost: + intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost; + goto parse_flag; + + case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts: + intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts; + goto parse_int; + + case oRekeyLimit: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { + val64 = 0; + } else { + if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", + filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); + if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) + fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", + filename, linenum); + } + if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) + options->rekey_limit = val64; + if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ + if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) { + (void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */ + break; + } + intptr = &options->rekey_interval; + goto parse_time; + } + break; + + case oIdentityFile: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep) { + intptr = &options->num_identity_files; + if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).", + filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); + add_identity_file(options, NULL, + arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); + } + break; + + case oCertificateFile: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep) { + intptr = &options->num_certificate_files; + if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) { + fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate " + "files specified (max %d).", + filename, linenum, + SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES); + } + add_certificate_file(options, arg, + flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); + } + break; + + case oXAuthLocation: + charptr=&options->xauth_location; + goto parse_string; + + case oUser: + charptr = &options->user; +parse_string: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oGlobalKnownHostsFile: + cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles; + uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles; + max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; +parse_char_array: + if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) { + while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries) + fatal("%s line %d: " + "too many authorized keys files.", + filename, linenum); + cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg); + } + } + return 0; + + case oUserKnownHostsFile: + cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles; + uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles; + max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; + goto parse_char_array; + + case oHostName: + charptr = &options->hostname; + goto parse_string; + + case oHostKeyAlias: + charptr = &options->host_key_alias; + goto parse_string; + + case oPreferredAuthentications: + charptr = &options->preferred_authentications; + goto parse_string; + + case oBindAddress: + charptr = &options->bind_address; + goto parse_string; + + case oBindInterface: + charptr = &options->bind_interface; + goto parse_string; + + case oPKCS11Provider: + charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider; + goto parse_string; + + case oProxyCommand: + charptr = &options->proxy_command; + /* Ignore ProxyCommand if ProxyJump already specified */ + if (options->jump_host != NULL) + charptr = &options->jump_host; /* Skip below */ +parse_command: + if (s == NULL) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "="); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(s + len); + return 0; + + case oProxyJump: + if (s == NULL) { + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + } + len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "="); + if (parse_jump(s + len, options, *activep) == -1) { + fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"", + filename, linenum, s + len); + } + return 0; + + case oPort: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + value = a2port(arg); + if (value <= 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad port '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg); + if (*activep && options->port == -1) + options->port = value; + break; + + case oConnectionAttempts: + intptr = &options->connection_attempts; +parse_int: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.", + filename, linenum, errstr); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oCiphers: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) + options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oMacs: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) + options->macs = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oKexAlgorithms: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*arg != '-' && + !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) + options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oHostKeyAlgorithms: + charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; +parse_keytypes: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*arg != '-' && + !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oCASignatureAlgorithms: + charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms; + goto parse_keytypes; + + case oLogLevel: + log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; + arg = strdelim(&s); + value = log_level_number(arg); + if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) + fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) + *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; + break; + + case oLogFacility: + log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; + arg = strdelim(&s); + value = log_facility_number(arg); + if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) + fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) + *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; + break; + + case oLocalForward: + case oRemoteForward: + case oDynamicForward: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.", + filename, linenum); + + remotefwd = (opcode == oRemoteForward); + dynamicfwd = (opcode == oDynamicForward); + + if (!dynamicfwd) { + arg2 = strdelim(&s); + if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') { + if (remotefwd) + dynamicfwd = 1; + else + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target " + "argument.", filename, linenum); + } else { + /* construct a string for parse_forward */ + snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, + arg2); + } + } + if (dynamicfwd) + strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg)); + + if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.", + filename, linenum); + + if (*activep) { + if (remotefwd) { + add_remote_forward(options, &fwd); + } else { + add_local_forward(options, &fwd); + } + } + break; + + case oClearAllForwardings: + intptr = &options->clear_forwardings; + goto parse_flag; + + case oHost: + if (cmdline) + fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " + "option"); + *activep = 0; + arg2 = NULL; + while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0) + break; + negated = *arg == '!'; + if (negated) + arg++; + if (match_pattern(host, arg)) { + if (negated) { + debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host " + "block because of negated match " + "for %.100s", filename, linenum, + arg); + *activep = 0; + break; + } + if (!*activep) + arg2 = arg; /* logged below */ + *activep = 1; + } + } + if (*activep) + debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s", + filename, linenum, arg2); + /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */ + return 0; + + case oMatch: + if (cmdline) + fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " + "option"); + value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host, original_host, + flags & SSHCONF_POSTCANON, filename, linenum); + if (value < 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, + linenum); + *activep = (flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value; + break; + + case oEscapeChar: + intptr = &options->escape_char; + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) + value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; + else if (arg[1] == '\0') + value = (u_char) arg[0]; + else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && + (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128) + value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31; + else { + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.", + filename, linenum); + /* NOTREACHED */ + value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */ + } + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oAddressFamily: + intptr = &options->address_family; + multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; + goto parse_multistate; + + case oEnableSSHKeysign: + intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign; + goto parse_flag; + + case oIdentitiesOnly: + intptr = &options->identities_only; + goto parse_flag; + + case oServerAliveInterval: + intptr = &options->server_alive_interval; + goto parse_time; + + case oServerAliveCountMax: + intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max; + goto parse_int; + + case oSendEnv: + while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", + filename, linenum); + if (!*activep) + continue; + if (*arg == '-') { + /* Removing an env var */ + rm_env(options, arg, filename, linenum); + continue; + } else { + /* Adding an env var */ + if (options->num_send_env >= INT_MAX) + fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.", + filename, linenum); + options->send_env = xrecallocarray( + options->send_env, options->num_send_env, + options->num_send_env + 1, + sizeof(*options->send_env)); + options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] = + xstrdup(arg); + } + } + break; + + case oSetEnv: + value = options->num_setenv; + while ((arg = strdelimw(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: Invalid SetEnv.", + filename, linenum); + if (!*activep || value != 0) + continue; + /* Adding a setenv var */ + if (options->num_setenv >= INT_MAX) + fatal("%s line %d: too many SetEnv.", + filename, linenum); + options->setenv = xrecallocarray( + options->setenv, options->num_setenv, + options->num_setenv + 1, sizeof(*options->setenv)); + options->setenv[options->num_setenv++] = xstrdup(arg); + } + break; + + case oControlPath: + charptr = &options->control_path; + goto parse_string; + + case oControlMaster: + intptr = &options->control_master; + multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster; + goto parse_multistate; + + case oControlPersist: + /* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */ + intptr = &options->control_persist; + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist" + " argument.", filename, linenum); + value = 0; + value2 = 0; /* timeout */ + if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0) + value = 0; + else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0) + value = 1; + else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0) + value = 1; + else + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { + *intptr = value; + options->control_persist_timeout = value2; + } + break; + + case oHashKnownHosts: + intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts; + goto parse_flag; + + case oTunnel: + intptr = &options->tun_open; + multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel; + goto parse_multistate; + + case oTunnelDevice: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + value = a2tun(arg, &value2); + if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep) { + options->tun_local = value; + options->tun_remote = value2; + } + break; + + case oLocalCommand: + charptr = &options->local_command; + goto parse_command; + + case oPermitLocalCommand: + intptr = &options->permit_local_command; + goto parse_flag; + + case oRemoteCommand: + charptr = &options->remote_command; + goto parse_command; + + case oVisualHostKey: + intptr = &options->visual_host_key; + goto parse_flag; + + case oInclude: + if (cmdline) + fatal("Include directive not supported as a " + "command-line option"); + value = 0; + while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + /* + * Ensure all paths are anchored. User configuration + * files may begin with '~/' but system configurations + * must not. If the path is relative, then treat it + * as living in ~/.ssh for user configurations or + * /etc/ssh for system ones. + */ + if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.", + filename, linenum, arg); + if (*arg != '/' && *arg != '~') { + xasprintf(&arg2, "%s/%s", + (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) ? + "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR : SSHDIR, arg); + } else + arg2 = xstrdup(arg); + memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl)); + r = glob(arg2, GLOB_TILDE, NULL, &gl); + if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) { + debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no " + "files",filename, linenum, arg2); + free(arg2); + continue; + } else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.", + filename, linenum, arg2); + free(arg2); + oactive = *activep; + for (i = 0; i < (u_int)gl.gl_pathc; i++) { + debug3("%.200s line %d: Including file %s " + "depth %d%s", filename, linenum, + gl.gl_pathv[i], depth, + oactive ? "" : " (parse only)"); + r = read_config_file_depth(gl.gl_pathv[i], + pw, host, original_host, options, + flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | + (oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH), + activep, depth + 1); + if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) { + fatal("Can't open user config file " + "%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i], + strerror(errno)); + } + /* + * don't let Match in includes clobber the + * containing file's Match state. + */ + *activep = oactive; + if (r != 1) + value = -1; + } + globfree(&gl); + } + if (value != 0) + return value; + break; + + case oIPQoS: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", + filename, linenum, arg); + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (arg == NULL) + value2 = value; + else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", + filename, linenum, arg); + if (*activep) { + options->ip_qos_interactive = value; + options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; + } + break; + + case oRequestTTY: + intptr = &options->request_tty; + multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty; + goto parse_multistate; + + case oIgnoreUnknown: + charptr = &options->ignored_unknown; + goto parse_string; + + case oProxyUseFdpass: + intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass; + goto parse_flag; + + case oCanonicalDomains: + value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0; + while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + if (!valid_domain(arg, 1, &errstr)) { + fatal("%s line %d: %s", filename, linenum, + errstr); + } + if (!*activep || value) + continue; + if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) + fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.", + filename, linenum); + options->canonical_domains[ + options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg); + } + break; + + case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs: + value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0; + while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + /* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */ + if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0) + arg2 = arg; + else { + lowercase(arg); + if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL || + arg2[1] == '\0') { + fatal("%s line %d: " + "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"", + filename, linenum, arg); + } + *arg2 = '\0'; + arg2++; + } + if (!*activep || value) + continue; + if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) + fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.", + filename, linenum); + cname = options->permitted_cnames + + options->num_permitted_cnames++; + cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg); + cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2); + } + break; + + case oCanonicalizeHostname: + intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname; + multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname; + goto parse_multistate; + + case oCanonicalizeMaxDots: + intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots; + goto parse_int; + + case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal: + intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local; + goto parse_flag; + + case oStreamLocalBindMask: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", filename, linenum); + /* Parse mode in octal format */ + value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8); + if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; + break; + + case oStreamLocalBindUnlink: + intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; + goto parse_flag; + + case oRevokedHostKeys: + charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys; + goto parse_string; + + case oFingerprintHash: + intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash; + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", + filename, linenum, arg); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case oUpdateHostkeys: + intptr = &options->update_hostkeys; + multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; + goto parse_multistate; + + case oHostbasedKeyTypes: + charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types; + goto parse_keytypes; + + case oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes: + charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types; + goto parse_keytypes; + + case oAddKeysToAgent: + intptr = &options->add_keys_to_agent; + multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoaskconfirm; + goto parse_multistate; + + case oIdentityAgent: + charptr = &options->identity_agent; + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + /* Extra validation if the string represents an env var. */ + if (arg[0] == '$' && !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) { + fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment name %s.", + filename, linenum, arg); + } + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case oDeprecated: + debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", + filename, linenum, keyword); + return 0; + + case oUnsupported: + error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", + filename, linenum, keyword); + return 0; + + default: + fatal("%s: Unimplemented opcode %d", __func__, opcode); + } + + /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ + if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", + filename, linenum, arg); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options + * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if + * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. + */ +int +read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, + const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags) +{ + int active = 1; + + return read_config_file_depth(filename, pw, host, original_host, + options, flags, &active, 0); +} + +#define READCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16 +static int +read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, + const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, + int flags, int *activep, int depth) +{ + FILE *f; + char *line = NULL; + size_t linesize = 0; + int linenum; + int bad_options = 0; + + if (depth < 0 || depth > READCONF_MAX_DEPTH) + fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes"); + + if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) + return 0; + + if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) { + struct stat sb; + + if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) + fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); + if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || + (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) + fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); + } + + debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); + + /* + * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned + * on/off by Host specifications. + */ + linenum = 0; + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + /* Update line number counter. */ + linenum++; + if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host, + line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, depth) != 0) + bad_options++; + } + free(line); + fclose(f); + if (bad_options > 0) + fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", + filename, bad_options); + return 1; +} + +/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ +int +option_clear_or_none(const char *o) +{ + return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; +} + +/* + * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet + * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options + * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, + * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. + */ + +void +initialize_options(Options * options) +{ + memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options)); + options->forward_agent = -1; + options->forward_x11 = -1; + options->forward_x11_trusted = -1; + options->forward_x11_timeout = -1; + options->stdio_forward_host = NULL; + options->stdio_forward_port = 0; + options->clear_forwardings = -1; + options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1; + options->xauth_location = NULL; + options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; + options->hostbased_authentication = -1; + options->batch_mode = -1; + options->check_host_ip = -1; + options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; + options->compression = -1; + options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; + options->port = -1; + options->address_family = -1; + options->connection_attempts = -1; + options->connection_timeout = -1; + options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; + options->ciphers = NULL; + options->macs = NULL; + options->kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; + options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL; + options->num_identity_files = 0; + options->num_certificate_files = 0; + options->hostname = NULL; + options->host_key_alias = NULL; + options->proxy_command = NULL; + options->jump_user = NULL; + options->jump_host = NULL; + options->jump_port = -1; + options->jump_extra = NULL; + options->user = NULL; + options->escape_char = -1; + options->num_system_hostfiles = 0; + options->num_user_hostfiles = 0; + options->local_forwards = NULL; + options->num_local_forwards = 0; + options->remote_forwards = NULL; + options->num_remote_forwards = 0; + options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; + options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; + options->preferred_authentications = NULL; + options->bind_address = NULL; + options->bind_interface = NULL; + options->pkcs11_provider = NULL; + options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; + options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; + options->identities_only = - 1; + options->rekey_limit = - 1; + options->rekey_interval = -1; + options->verify_host_key_dns = -1; + options->server_alive_interval = -1; + options->server_alive_count_max = -1; + options->send_env = NULL; + options->num_send_env = 0; + options->setenv = NULL; + options->num_setenv = 0; + options->control_path = NULL; + options->control_master = -1; + options->control_persist = -1; + options->control_persist_timeout = 0; + options->hash_known_hosts = -1; + options->tun_open = -1; + options->tun_local = -1; + options->tun_remote = -1; + options->local_command = NULL; + options->permit_local_command = -1; + options->remote_command = NULL; + options->add_keys_to_agent = -1; + options->identity_agent = NULL; + options->visual_host_key = -1; + options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; + options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; + options->request_tty = -1; + options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1; + options->ignored_unknown = NULL; + options->num_canonical_domains = 0; + options->num_permitted_cnames = 0; + options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1; + options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1; + options->canonicalize_hostname = -1; + options->revoked_host_keys = NULL; + options->fingerprint_hash = -1; + options->update_hostkeys = -1; + options->hostbased_key_types = NULL; + options->pubkey_key_types = NULL; +} + +/* + * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options + * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed. + */ +void +fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options) +{ + if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) + options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; + if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) + options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; + if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) + options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; +} + +/* + * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those + * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. + */ +void +fill_default_options(Options * options) +{ + char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig; + int r; + + if (options->forward_agent == -1) + options->forward_agent = 0; + if (options->forward_x11 == -1) + options->forward_x11 = 0; + if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1) + options->forward_x11_trusted = 0; + if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1) + options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200; + /* + * stdio forwarding (-W) changes the default for these but we defer + * setting the values so they can be overridden. + */ + if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1) + options->exit_on_forward_failure = + options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0; + if (options->clear_forwardings == -1) + options->clear_forwardings = + options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0; + if (options->clear_forwardings == 1) + clear_forwardings(options); + + if (options->xauth_location == NULL) + options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH; + if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) + options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; + if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; + if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; + if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) + options->pubkey_authentication = 1; + if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; + if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) + options->hostbased_authentication = 0; + if (options->batch_mode == -1) + options->batch_mode = 0; + if (options->check_host_ip == -1) + options->check_host_ip = 1; + if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1) + options->strict_host_key_checking = SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK; + if (options->compression == -1) + options->compression = 0; + if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) + options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; + if (options->port == -1) + options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */ + if (options->address_family == -1) + options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; + if (options->connection_attempts == -1) + options->connection_attempts = 1; + if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) + options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; + /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ + if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) + options->add_keys_to_agent = 0; + if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { + add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0); + add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0); +#endif + add_identity_file(options, "~/", + _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0); + add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, 0); + } + if (options->escape_char == -1) + options->escape_char = '~'; + if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) { + options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = + xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE); + options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = + xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2); + } + if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) { + options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = + xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); + options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = + xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); + } + if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) + options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) + options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER; + if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1) + options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; + if (options->identities_only == -1) + options->identities_only = 0; + if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1) + options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0; + if (options->rekey_limit == -1) + options->rekey_limit = 0; + if (options->rekey_interval == -1) + options->rekey_interval = 0; + if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) + options->verify_host_key_dns = 0; + if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) + options->server_alive_interval = 0; + if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) + options->server_alive_count_max = 3; + if (options->control_master == -1) + options->control_master = 0; + if (options->control_persist == -1) { + options->control_persist = 0; + options->control_persist_timeout = 0; + } + if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1) + options->hash_known_hosts = 0; + if (options->tun_open == -1) + options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; + if (options->tun_local == -1) + options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY; + if (options->tun_remote == -1) + options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; + if (options->permit_local_command == -1) + options->permit_local_command = 0; + if (options->visual_host_key == -1) + options->visual_host_key = 0; + if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) + options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; + if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) + options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; + if (options->request_tty == -1) + options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO; + if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1) + options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0; + if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) + options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; + if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) + options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; + if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) + options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; + if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) + options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; + if (options->update_hostkeys == -1) + options->update_hostkeys = 0; + + /* Expand KEX name lists */ + all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0); + all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); + all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); + all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); + all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); +#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ + do { \ + if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \ + defaults, all)) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \ + } while (0) + ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); + ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac); + ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex); + ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); + ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); + ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); +#undef ASSEMBLE + free(all_cipher); + free(all_mac); + free(all_kex); + free(all_key); + free(all_sig); + +#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ + do { \ + if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ + free(v); \ + v = NULL; \ + } \ + } while(0) + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->remote_command); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys); + if (options->jump_host != NULL && + strcmp(options->jump_host, "none") == 0 && + options->jump_port == 0 && options->jump_user == NULL) { + free(options->jump_host); + options->jump_host = NULL; + } + /* options->identity_agent distinguishes NULL from 'none' */ + /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */ + /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */ + /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */ + /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */ +} + +struct fwdarg { + char *arg; + int ispath; +}; + +/* + * parse_fwd_field + * parses the next field in a port forwarding specification. + * sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon + * or sets it to NULL at end of string. + * returns 0 on success, else non-zero. + */ +static int +parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd) +{ + char *ep, *cp = *p; + int ispath = 0; + + if (*cp == '\0') { + *p = NULL; + return -1; /* end of string */ + } + + /* + * A field escaped with square brackets is used literally. + * XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash? + */ + if (*cp == '[') { + /* find matching ']' */ + for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) { + if (*ep == '/') + ispath = 1; + } + /* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */ + if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0')) + return -1; + /* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */ + *ep++ = '\0'; + if (*ep != '\0') + *ep++ = '\0'; + fwd->arg = cp + 1; + fwd->ispath = ispath; + *p = ep; + return 0; + } + + for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { + switch (*cp) { + case '\\': + memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1); + if (*cp == '\0') + return -1; + break; + case '/': + ispath = 1; + break; + case ':': + *cp++ = '\0'; + goto done; + } + } +done: + fwd->arg = *p; + fwd->ispath = ispath; + *p = cp; + return 0; +} + +/* + * parse_forward + * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form: + * dynamicfwd == 0 + * [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath + * listenpath:connectpath + * dynamicfwd == 1 + * [listenhost:]listenport + * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error + */ +int +parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd) +{ + struct fwdarg fwdargs[4]; + char *p, *cp; + int i; + + memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd)); + memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs)); + + cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec); + + /* skip leading spaces */ + while (isspace((u_char)*cp)) + cp++; + + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0) + break; + } + + /* Check for trailing garbage */ + if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { + i = 0; /* failure */ + } + + switch (i) { + case 1: + if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { + fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + fwd->listen_host = NULL; + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); + } + fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); + break; + + case 2: + if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) { + fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) { + fwd->listen_host = NULL; + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); + } + break; + + case 3: + if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { + fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); + } else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) { + fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); + fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + fwd->listen_host = NULL; + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); + } + break; + + case 4: + fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); + fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg); + break; + default: + i = 0; /* failure */ + } + + free(p); + + if (dynamicfwd) { + if (!(i == 1 || i == 2)) + goto fail_free; + } else { + if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) { + if (fwd->connect_path == NULL && + fwd->listen_path == NULL) + goto fail_free; + } + if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL) + goto fail_free; + } + + if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) || + (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0)) + goto fail_free; + if (fwd->connect_host != NULL && + strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) + goto fail_free; + /* XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not match this host */ + if (fwd->connect_path != NULL && + strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) + goto fail_free; + if (fwd->listen_host != NULL && + strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) + goto fail_free; + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL && + strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) + goto fail_free; + + return (i); + + fail_free: + free(fwd->connect_host); + fwd->connect_host = NULL; + free(fwd->connect_path); + fwd->connect_path = NULL; + free(fwd->listen_host); + fwd->listen_host = NULL; + free(fwd->listen_path); + fwd->listen_path = NULL; + return (0); +} + +int +parse_jump(const char *s, Options *o, int active) +{ + char *orig, *sdup, *cp; + char *host = NULL, *user = NULL; + int ret = -1, port = -1, first; + + active &= o->proxy_command == NULL && o->jump_host == NULL; + + orig = sdup = xstrdup(s); + first = active; + do { + if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) + break; + if ((cp = strrchr(sdup, ',')) == NULL) + cp = sdup; /* last */ + else + *cp++ = '\0'; + + if (first) { + /* First argument and configuration is active */ + if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, &user, &host, &port) == -1 || + parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0) + goto out; + } else { + /* Subsequent argument or inactive configuration */ + if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) == -1 || + parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0) + goto out; + } + first = 0; /* only check syntax for subsequent hosts */ + } while (cp != sdup); + /* success */ + if (active) { + if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) { + o->jump_host = xstrdup("none"); + o->jump_port = 0; + } else { + o->jump_user = user; + o->jump_host = host; + o->jump_port = port; + o->proxy_command = xstrdup("none"); + user = host = NULL; + if ((cp = strrchr(s, ',')) != NULL && cp != s) { + o->jump_extra = xstrdup(s); + o->jump_extra[cp - s] = '\0'; + } + } + } + ret = 0; + out: + free(orig); + free(user); + free(host); + return ret; +} + +int +parse_ssh_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp) +{ + char *path; + int r; + + r = parse_uri("ssh", uri, userp, hostp, portp, &path); + if (r == 0 && path != NULL) + r = -1; /* path not allowed */ + return r; +} + +/* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */ +static const char * +fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { + if (m[i].value == val) + return m[i].key; + } + return "UNKNOWN"; +} + +static const char * +fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val) +{ + if (val == -1) + return "unset"; + switch (code) { + case oAddressFamily: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); + case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: + case oUpdateHostkeys: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask); + case oStrictHostKeyChecking: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_strict_hostkey); + case oControlMaster: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster); + case oTunnel: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel); + case oRequestTTY: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty); + case oCanonicalizeHostname: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname); + case oAddKeysToAgent: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm); + case oFingerprintHash: + return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); + default: + switch (val) { + case 0: + return "no"; + case 1: + return "yes"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN"; + } + } +} + +static const char * +lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) + if (keywords[i].opcode == code) + return(keywords[i].name); + return "UNKNOWN"; +} + +static void +dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) +{ + printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val) +{ + printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) +{ + if (val == NULL) + return; + printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) + printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) +{ + u_int i; + + printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) + printf(" %s", vals[i]); + printf("\n"); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds) +{ + const struct Forward *fwd; + u_int i; + + /* oDynamicForward */ + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + fwd = &fwds[i]; + if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && + strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0) + continue; + if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && + strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0) + continue; + printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); + if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path); + else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL) + printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port); + else { + printf(" [%s]:%d", + fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); + } + if (code != oDynamicForward) { + if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path); + else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) + printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port); + else { + printf(" [%s]:%d", + fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); + } + } + printf("\n"); + } +} + +void +dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) +{ + int i; + char buf[8], *all_key; + + /* This is normally prepared in ssh_kex2 */ + all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); + if (kex_assemble_names( &o->hostkeyalgorithms, + KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0) + fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__); + free(all_key); + + /* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */ + dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user); + dump_cfg_string(oHostName, host); + dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port); + + /* Flag options */ + dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); +#ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds); +#endif /* GSSAPI */ + dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key); + dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys); + + /* Integer options */ + dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots); + dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts); + dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout); + dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts); + dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max); + dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval); + + /* String options */ + dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address); + dump_cfg_string(oBindInterface, o->bind_interface); + dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT); + dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path); + dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms); + dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias); + dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types); + dump_cfg_string(oIdentityAgent, o->identity_agent); + dump_cfg_string(oIgnoreUnknown, o->ignored_unknown); + dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices); + dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_CLIENT_KEX); + dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms ? o->ca_sign_algorithms : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS); + dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command); + dump_cfg_string(oRemoteCommand, o->remote_command); + dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); + dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider); +#endif + dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications); + dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types); + dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys); + dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); + + /* Forwards */ + dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); + dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); + dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards); + + /* String array options */ + dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files); + dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains); + dump_cfg_strarray(oCertificateFile, o->num_certificate_files, o->certificate_files); + dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles); + dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles); + dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env); + dump_cfg_strarray(oSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); + + /* Special cases */ + + /* oConnectTimeout */ + if (o->connection_timeout == -1) + printf("connecttimeout none\n"); + else + dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout); + + /* oTunnelDevice */ + printf("tunneldevice"); + if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY) + printf(" any"); + else + printf(" %d", o->tun_local); + if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY) + printf(":any"); + else + printf(":%d", o->tun_remote); + printf("\n"); + + /* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */ + if ( o->num_permitted_cnames > 0) { + printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames"); + for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) { + printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list, + o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list); + } + printf("\n"); + } + + /* oControlPersist */ + if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0) + dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist); + else + dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout); + + /* oEscapeChar */ + if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) + printf("escapechar none\n"); + else { + vis(buf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0); + printf("escapechar %s\n", buf); + } + + /* oIPQoS */ + printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); + printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); + + /* oRekeyLimit */ + printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", + (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); + + /* oStreamLocalBindMask */ + printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n", + o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); + + /* oLogFacility */ + printf("syslogfacility %s\n", log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); + + /* oProxyCommand / oProxyJump */ + if (o->jump_host == NULL) + dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command); + else { + /* Check for numeric addresses */ + i = strchr(o->jump_host, ':') != NULL || + strspn(o->jump_host, "1234567890.") == strlen(o->jump_host); + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", o->jump_port); + printf("proxyjump %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + /* optional additional jump spec */ + o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : o->jump_extra, + o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : ",", + /* optional user */ + o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : o->jump_user, + o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : "@", + /* opening [ if hostname is numeric */ + i ? "[" : "", + /* mandatory hostname */ + o->jump_host, + /* closing ] if hostname is numeric */ + i ? "]" : "", + /* optional port number */ + o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : ":", + o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : buf); + } +} diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc7e382 --- /dev/null +++ b/readconf.h @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.128 2018/09/20 03:30:44 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for reading the configuration file. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef READCONF_H +#define READCONF_H + +/* Data structure for representing option data. */ + +#define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32 +#define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32 +#define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path) + +struct allowed_cname { + char *source_list; + char *target_list; +}; + +typedef struct { + int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */ + int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */ + int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */ + int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */ + int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */ + char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */ + struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ + int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ + int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ + int challenge_response_authentication; + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ + char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */ + int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */ + int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */ + int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */ + int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */ + int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ + int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ + int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ + SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ + LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */ + + int port; /* Port to connect. */ + int address_family; + int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before + * giving up */ + int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before + * aborting connection attempt */ + int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password + * prompts. */ + char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */ + char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */ + char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */ + char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ + char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */ + char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */ + char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ + char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ + char *user; /* User to log in as. */ + int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */ + + u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */ + char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; + u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */ + char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; + char *preferred_authentications; + char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */ + char *bind_interface; /* local interface for bind address */ + char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */ + int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */ + + int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */ + char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + + int num_certificate_files; /* Number of extra certificates for ssh. */ + char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + + int add_keys_to_agent; + char *identity_agent; /* Optional path to ssh-agent socket */ + + /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */ + int num_local_forwards; + struct Forward *local_forwards; + + /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */ + int num_remote_forwards; + struct Forward *remote_forwards; + int clear_forwardings; + + /* stdio forwarding (-W) host and port */ + char *stdio_forward_host; + int stdio_forward_port; + + int enable_ssh_keysign; + int64_t rekey_limit; + int rekey_interval; + int no_host_authentication_for_localhost; + int identities_only; + int server_alive_interval; + int server_alive_count_max; + + int num_send_env; + char **send_env; + int num_setenv; + char **setenv; + + char *control_path; + int control_master; + int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */ + int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */ + + int hash_known_hosts; + + int tun_open; /* tun(4) */ + int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */ + int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */ + + char *local_command; + int permit_local_command; + char *remote_command; + int visual_host_key; + + int request_tty; + + int proxy_use_fdpass; + + int num_canonical_domains; + char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; + int canonicalize_hostname; + int canonicalize_max_dots; + int canonicalize_fallback_local; + int num_permitted_cnames; + struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; + + char *revoked_host_keys; + + int fingerprint_hash; + + int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */ + + char *hostbased_key_types; + char *pubkey_key_types; + + char *jump_user; + char *jump_host; + int jump_port; + char *jump_extra; + + char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */ +} Options; + +#define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0 +#define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1 +#define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2 + +#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0 +#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1 +#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2 +#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3 +#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4 + +#define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0 +#define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1 +#define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2 +#define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3 + +#define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */ +#define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */ +#define SSHCONF_POSTCANON 4 /* After hostname canonicalisation */ +#define SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH 8 /* Match/Host never matches; internal only */ + +#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0 +#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1 +#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2 + +#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF 0 +#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW 1 +#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES 2 +#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK 3 + +void initialize_options(Options *); +void fill_default_options(Options *); +void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *); +int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *, + const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int); +int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *, + const char *, Options *, int); +int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int); +int parse_jump(const char *, Options *, int); +int parse_ssh_uri(const char *, char **, char **, int *); +int default_ssh_port(void); +int option_clear_or_none(const char *); +void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host); + +void add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); +void add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); +void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int); +void add_certificate_file(Options *, const char *, int); + +#endif /* READCONF_H */ diff --git a/readpass.c b/readpass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f160f86 --- /dev/null +++ b/readpass.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.52 2018/07/18 11:34:04 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "uidswap.h" + +static char * +ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg) +{ + pid_t pid, ret; + size_t len; + char *pass; + int p[2], status; + char buf[1024]; + void (*osigchld)(int); + + if (fflush(stdout) != 0) + error("ssh_askpass: fflush: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (askpass == NULL) + fatal("internal error: askpass undefined"); + if (pipe(p) < 0) { + error("ssh_askpass: pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { + error("ssh_askpass: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + return NULL; + } + if (pid == 0) { + close(p[0]); + if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); + execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *)NULL); + fatal("ssh_askpass: exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno)); + } + close(p[1]); + + len = 0; + do { + ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len); + + if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR) + continue; + if (r <= 0) + break; + len += r; + } while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0); + buf[len] = '\0'; + + close(p[0]); + while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) < 0) + if (errno != EINTR) + break; + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + return NULL; + } + + buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + pass = xstrdup(buf); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + return pass; +} + +/* + * Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the + * passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If + * RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no + * tty is available + */ +char * +read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags) +{ + char *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024]; + int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd; + + rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF; + if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) + use_askpass = 1; + else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) { + if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { + debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty"); + use_askpass = 1; + } + } else { + rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY; + ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR); + if (ttyfd >= 0) + close(ttyfd); + else { + debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY, + strerror(errno)); + use_askpass = 1; + } + } + + if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL) + return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup(""); + + if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) { + if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV)) + askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV); + else + askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT; + if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt)) == NULL) + if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)) + return xstrdup(""); + return ret; + } + + if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) { + if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) + return NULL; + return xstrdup(""); + } + + ret = xstrdup(buf); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + return ret; +} + +int +ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + char *p, prompt[1024]; + int allowed = 0; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF); + if (p != NULL) { + /* + * Accept empty responses and responses consisting + * of the word "yes" as affirmative. + */ + if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' || + strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0) + allowed = 1; + free(p); + } + + return (allowed); +} diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..647b4a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.97 2018/06/07 04:46:34 djm Exp $ + +REGRESS_TARGETS= unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t-exec +tests: prep $(REGRESS_TARGETS) + +# Interop tests are not run by default +interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop + +prep: + test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out + +clean: + for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done + test -z "${SUDO}" || ${SUDO} rm -f ${SUDO_CLEAN} + rm -rf $(OBJ).putty + +distclean: clean + +LTESTS= connect \ + proxy-connect \ + connect-privsep \ + connect-uri \ + proto-version \ + proto-mismatch \ + exit-status \ + envpass \ + transfer \ + banner \ + rekey \ + stderr-data \ + stderr-after-eof \ + broken-pipe \ + try-ciphers \ + yes-head \ + login-timeout \ + agent \ + agent-getpeereid \ + agent-timeout \ + agent-ptrace \ + keyscan \ + keygen-change \ + keygen-convert \ + keygen-moduli \ + key-options \ + scp \ + scp-uri \ + sftp \ + sftp-chroot \ + sftp-cmds \ + sftp-badcmds \ + sftp-batch \ + sftp-glob \ + sftp-perm \ + sftp-uri \ + reconfigure \ + dynamic-forward \ + forwarding \ + multiplex \ + reexec \ + brokenkeys \ + sshcfgparse \ + cfgparse \ + cfgmatch \ + cfgmatchlisten \ + addrmatch \ + localcommand \ + forcecommand \ + portnum \ + keytype \ + kextype \ + cert-hostkey \ + cert-userkey \ + host-expand \ + keys-command \ + forward-control \ + integrity \ + krl \ + multipubkey \ + limit-keytype \ + hostkey-agent \ + keygen-knownhosts \ + hostkey-rotate \ + principals-command \ + cert-file \ + cfginclude \ + allow-deny-users \ + authinfo + + +# dhgex \ + +INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers +#INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp + +#LTESTS= cipher-speed + +USERNAME= ${LOGNAME} +CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \ + authorized_keys_${USERNAME}.* \ + authorized_principals_${USERNAME} \ + banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \ + copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \ + ed25519-agent.pub ed25519 ed25519.pub empty.in \ + expect failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log \ + hkr.* host.ed25519 host.rsa host.rsa1 host_* \ + host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \ + key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 \ + key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* \ + known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \ + modpipe netcat no_identity_config \ + pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log \ + remote_pid revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub \ + rsa1 rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub rsa1.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \ + rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \ + scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \ + sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \ + ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \ + ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \ + sshd_config.orig sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \ + sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \ + t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \ + t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \ + user_*key* user_ca* user_key* + +SUDO_CLEAN+= /var/run/testdata_${USERNAME} /var/run/keycommand_${USERNAME} + +# Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks +TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=CFGJRSUX" + +TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen + +CPPFLAGS=-I.. + +t1: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv + tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv + awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv + +t2: + cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out + chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub + +t3: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub + +t4: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ + awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok + +t5: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ + awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok + +t6: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1 + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2 + chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1 + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2 + +$(OBJ)/t7.out: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@ + +t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null + +$(OBJ)/t8.out: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@ + +t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null + +$(OBJ)/t9.out: + test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@ + +t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out + test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null + test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null + + +$(OBJ)/t10.out: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@ + +t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null + +t11: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ + awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok + +$(OBJ)/t12.out: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@ + +t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null + +t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh} + @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ + for TEST in ""$?; do \ + echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ + (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ + done + +t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh} + @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ + for TEST in ""$?; do \ + echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ + (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ + done + +# Not run by default +interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS} + +# Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile +unit: + set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \ + V="" ; \ + test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \ + V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ + -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \ + -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/match/test_match ; \ + if test "x${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" = "xyes" ; then \ + $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ; \ + fi \ + fi diff --git a/regress/README.regress b/regress/README.regress new file mode 100644 index 0000000..315fe14 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/README.regress @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +Overview. + +$ ./configure && make tests + +You'll see some progress info. A failure will cause either the make to +abort or the driver script to report a "FATAL" failure. + +The test consists of 2 parts. The first is the file-based tests which is +driven by the Makefile, and the second is a set of network or proxycommand +based tests, which are driven by a driver script (test-exec.sh) which is +called multiple times by the Makefile. + +Failures in the first part will cause the Makefile to return an error. +Failures in the second part will print a "FATAL" message for the failed +test and continue. + +OpenBSD has a system-wide regression test suite. OpenSSH Portable's test +suite is based on OpenBSD's with modifications. + + +Environment variables. + +SKIP_UNIT: Skip unit tests. +SUDO: path to sudo/doas command, if desired. Note that some systems + (notably systems using PAM) require sudo to execute some tests. +LTESTS: Whitespace separated list of tests (filenames without the .sh + extension) to run. +OBJ: used by test scripts to access build dir. +TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts. +TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL: set to "yes" to make any failure abort the test + currently in progress. +TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests. +TEST_SSH_QUIET: set to "yes" to suppress non-fatal output. +TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config + before running each test. +TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to + ssh_config before running each test. +TEST_SSH_TRACE: set to "yes" for verbose output from tests +TEST_SSH_x: path to "ssh" command under test, where x is one of + SSH, SSHD, SSHAGENT, SSHADD, SSHKEYGEN, SSHKEYSCAN, SFTP or + SFTPSERVER +USE_VALGRIND: Run the tests under valgrind memory checker. + + +Individual tests. + +You can run an individual test from the top-level Makefile, eg: +$ make tests LTESTS=agent-timeout + +If you need to manipulate the environment more you can invoke test-exec.sh +directly if you set up the path to find the binaries under test and the +test scripts themselves, for example: + +$ cd regress +$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. TEST_SHELL=/bin/sh sh test-exec.sh `pwd` \ + agent-timeout.sh +ok agent timeout test + + +Files. + +test-exec.sh: the main test driver. Sets environment, creates config files +and keys and runs the specified test. + +At the time of writing, the individual tests are: +agent-timeout.sh: agent timeout test +agent.sh: simple agent test +broken-pipe.sh: broken pipe test +connect-privsep.sh: proxy connect with privsep +connect.sh: simple connect +exit-status.sh: remote exit status +forwarding.sh: local and remote forwarding +keygen-change.sh: change passphrase for key +keyscan.sh: keyscan +proto-mismatch.sh: protocol version mismatch +proto-version.sh: sshd version with different protocol combinations +proxy-connect.sh: proxy connect +sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get +ssh-com-client.sh: connect with ssh.com client +ssh-com-keygen.sh: ssh.com key import +ssh-com-sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server +ssh-com.sh: connect to ssh.com server +stderr-after-eof.sh: stderr data after eof +stderr-data.sh: stderr data transfer +transfer.sh: transfer data +try-ciphers.sh: try ciphers +yes-head.sh: yes pipe head + + +Problems? + +Run the failing test with shell tracing (-x) turned on: +$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. sh -x test-exec.sh `pwd` agent-timeout.sh + +Failed tests can be difficult to diagnose. Suggestions: +- run the individual test via ./test-exec.sh `pwd` [testname] +- set LogLevel to VERBOSE in test-exec.sh and enable syslogging of + auth.debug (eg to /var/log/authlog). + + +Known Issues. + +- Similarly, if you do not have "scp" in your system's $PATH then the + multiplex scp tests will fail (since the system's shell startup scripts + will determine where the shell started by sshd will look for scp). + +- Recent GNU coreutils deprecate "head -[n]": this will cause the yes-head + test to fail. The old behaviour can be restored by setting (and + exporting) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 before running the tests. diff --git a/regress/addrmatch.sh b/regress/addrmatch.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1584bd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/addrmatch.sh @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +# $OpenBSD: addrmatch.sh,v 1.4 2012/05/13 01:42:32 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="address match" + +mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +run_trial() +{ + user="$1"; addr="$2"; host="$3"; laddr="$4"; lport="$5" + expected="$6"; descr="$7" + + verbose "test $descr for $user $addr $host" + result=`${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy -T \ + -C user=${user},addr=${addr},host=${host},laddr=${laddr},lport=${lport} | \ + awk '/^forcecommand/ {print $2}'` + if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then + fail "failed '$descr' expected $expected got $result" + fi +} + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +cat >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy < /dev/null +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" +else + chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK} + + ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then + fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1" + fi + if test -z "$sudo" ; then + # doas + ${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null + else + # sudo + < /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null + fi + r=$? + if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then + fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2" + fi + + trace "kill agent" + ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null +fi + +rm -f ${OBJ}/agent diff --git a/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db3018b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="pkcs11 agent test" + +TEST_SSH_PIN="" +TEST_SSH_PKCS11=/usr/local/lib/soft-pkcs11.so.0.0 + +test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist" + +# setup environment for soft-pkcs11 token +SOFTPKCS11RC=$OBJ/pkcs11.info +export SOFTPKCS11RC +# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass +SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true +export SSH_ASKPASS +unset DISPLAY + +# start command w/o tty, so ssh-add accepts pin from stdin +notty() { + perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid(); + if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@" +} + +trace "start agent" +eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" +else + trace "generating key/cert" + rm -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key $OBJ/pkcs11.crt + openssl genrsa -out $OBJ/pkcs11.key 2048 > /dev/null 2>&1 + chmod 600 $OBJ/pkcs11.key + openssl req -key $OBJ/pkcs11.key -new -x509 \ + -out $OBJ/pkcs11.crt -text -subj '/CN=pkcs11 test' > /dev/null + printf "a\ta\t$OBJ/pkcs11.crt\t$OBJ/pkcs11.key" > $SOFTPKCS11RC + # add to authorized keys + ${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f $OBJ/pkcs11.key > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + + trace "add pkcs11 key to agent" + echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -s ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -s failed: exit code $r" + fi + + trace "pkcs11 list via agent" + ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r" + fi + + trace "pkcs11 connect via agent" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then + fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)" + fi + + trace "remove pkcs11 keys" + echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r" + fi + + trace "kill agent" + ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null +fi diff --git a/regress/agent-ptrace.sh b/regress/agent-ptrace.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d795ee --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/agent-ptrace.sh @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +# $OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.3 2015/09/11 04:55:01 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="disallow agent ptrace attach" + +if have_prog uname ; then + case `uname` in + AIX|CYGWIN*|OSF1) + echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)" + exit 0 + ;; + esac +fi + +if [ "x$USER" = "xroot" ]; then + echo "Skipped: running as root" + exit 0 +fi + +if have_prog gdb ; then + : ok +else + echo "skipped (gdb not found)" + exit 0 +fi + +if $OBJ/setuid-allowed ${SSHAGENT} ; then + : ok +else + echo "skipped (${SSHAGENT} is mounted on a no-setuid filesystem)" + exit 0 +fi + +if test -z "$SUDO" ; then + echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" + exit 0 +else + $SUDO chown 0 ${SSHAGENT} + $SUDO chgrp 0 ${SSHAGENT} + $SUDO chmod 2755 ${SSHAGENT} +fi + +trace "start agent" +eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" +else + # ls -l ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK} + gdb ${SSHAGENT} ${SSH_AGENT_PID} > ${OBJ}/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF + quit +EOF + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "gdb failed: exit code $r" + fi + egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null ${OBJ}/gdb.out + r=$? + rm -f ${OBJ}/gdb.out + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ptrace succeeded?: exit code $r" + fi + + trace "kill agent" + ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null +fi diff --git a/regress/agent-timeout.sh b/regress/agent-timeout.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9598c20 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/agent-timeout.sh @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +# $OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="agent timeout test" + +SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT=10 + +trace "start agent" +eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" +else + trace "add keys with timeout" + for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + ${SSHADD} -t ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} $OBJ/$t > /dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0" + fi + done + n=`${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | wc -l` + trace "agent has $n keys" + if [ $n -ne 2 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -l did not return 2 keys: $n" + fi + trace "sleeping 2*${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} seconds" + sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} + sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} + ${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | grep 'The agent has no identities.' >/dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -l still returns keys after timeout" + fi + + trace "kill agent" + ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null +fi diff --git a/regress/agent.sh b/regress/agent.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7111056 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/agent.sh @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.13 2017/12/19 00:49:30 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="simple agent test" + +SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2" +fi + +trace "start agent" +eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" +fi + +${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1" +fi + +rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key \ + || fatal "ssh-keygen failed" + +trace "overwrite authorized keys" +printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + # generate user key for agent + rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent.pub* + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\ + fatal "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed" + # Make a certificate for each too. + ${SSHKEYGEN} -qs $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "$t cert" \ + -n estragon $OBJ/$t-agent.pub || fatal "ca sign failed" + + # add to authorized keys + cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + # add privat key to agent + ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0" + fi + # Remove private key to ensure that we aren't accidentally using it. + rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent +done + +# Remove explicit identity directives from ssh_proxy +mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak +grep -vi identityfile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak > $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r" +fi +# the same for full pubkey output +${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1 +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r" +fi + +trace "simple connect via agent" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" +fi + +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + trace "connect via agent using $t key" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ + somehost exit 52 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" + fi +done + +trace "agent forwarding" +${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd failed (exit code $r)" +fi +${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \ + "${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52" +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "agent fwd failed (exit code $r)" +fi + +(printf 'cert-authority,principals="estragon" '; cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub) \ + > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + trace "connect via agent using $t key" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub \ + -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub \ + -oIdentitiesOnly=yes somehost exit 52 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)" + fi +done + +trace "delete all agent keys" +${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1 +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r" +fi + +trace "kill agent" +${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null diff --git a/regress/allow-deny-users.sh b/regress/allow-deny-users.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c38951 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/allow-deny-users.sh @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +# Public Domain +# Zev Weiss, 2016 +# $OpenBSD: allow-deny-users.sh,v 1.5 2018/07/13 02:13:50 djm Exp $ + +tid="AllowUsers/DenyUsers" + +me="$LOGNAME" +if [ "x$me" = "x" ]; then + me=`whoami` +fi +other="nobody" + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig + +test_auth() +{ + deny="$1" + allow="$2" + should_succeed="$3" + failmsg="$4" + + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo DenyUsers="$deny" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo AllowUsers="$allow" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + start_sshd -oDenyUsers="$deny" -oAllowUsers="$allow" + + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$me@somehost" true + status=$? + + if (test $status -eq 0 && ! $should_succeed) \ + || (test $status -ne 0 && $should_succeed); then + fail "$failmsg" + fi +} + +# DenyUsers AllowUsers should_succeed failure_message +test_auth "" "" true "user in neither DenyUsers nor AllowUsers denied" +test_auth "$other $me" "" false "user in DenyUsers allowed" +test_auth "$me $other" "" false "user in DenyUsers allowed" +test_auth "" "$other" false "user not in AllowUsers allowed" +test_auth "" "$other $me" true "user in AllowUsers denied" +test_auth "" "$me $other" true "user in AllowUsers denied" +test_auth "$me $other" "$me $other" false "user in both DenyUsers and AllowUsers allowed" +test_auth "$other $me" "$other $me" false "user in both DenyUsers and AllowUsers allowed" diff --git a/regress/authinfo.sh b/regress/authinfo.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..693424a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/authinfo.sh @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# $OpenBSD: authinfo.sh,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:13:27 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="authinfo" + +# Ensure the environment variable doesn't leak when ExposeAuthInfo=no. +verbose "ExposeAuthInfo=no" +env SSH_USER_AUTH=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x \ + 'env | grep SSH_USER_AUTH >/dev/null' && fail "SSH_USER_AUTH present" + +verbose "ExposeAuthInfo=yes" +echo ExposeAuthInfo=yes >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x \ + 'grep ^publickey "$SSH_USER_AUTH" /dev/null >/dev/null' || + fail "ssh with ExposeAuthInfo failed" + +# XXX test multiple auth and key contents diff --git a/regress/banner.sh b/regress/banner.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d9654f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/banner.sh @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +# $OpenBSD: banner.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="banner" +echo "Banner $OBJ/banner.in" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + +rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in +touch $OBJ/empty.in + +trace "test missing banner file" +verbose "test $tid: missing banner file" +( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ + cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \ + fail "missing banner file" + +for s in 0 10 100 1000 10000 100000 ; do + if [ "$s" = "0" ]; then + # create empty banner + touch $OBJ/banner.in + elif [ "$s" = "10" ]; then + # create 10-byte banner file + echo "abcdefghi" >$OBJ/banner.in + else + # increase size 10x + cp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out + for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ; do + cat $OBJ/banner.out >> $OBJ/banner.in + done + fi + + trace "test banner size $s" + verbose "test $tid: size $s" + ( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ + cmp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \ + fail "banner size $s mismatch" +done + +trace "test suppress banner (-q)" +verbose "test $tid: suppress banner (-q)" +( ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \ + cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \ + fail "suppress banner (-q)" + +rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in diff --git a/regress/broken-pipe.sh b/regress/broken-pipe.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c69276e --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/broken-pipe.sh @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +# $OpenBSD: broken-pipe.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="broken pipe test" + +for i in 1 2 3 4; do + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config_config nexthost echo $i 2> /dev/null | true + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "broken pipe returns $r" + fi +done diff --git a/regress/brokenkeys.sh b/regress/brokenkeys.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d5a54f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/brokenkeys.sh @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# $OpenBSD: brokenkeys.sh,v 1.2 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="broken keys" + +KEYS="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}" + +start_sshd + +mv ${KEYS} ${KEYS}.bak + +# Truncated key +echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAIEABTM= bad key" > $KEYS +cat ${KEYS}.bak >> ${KEYS} +cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed" +fi + +mv ${KEYS}.bak ${KEYS} + diff --git a/regress/cert-file.sh b/regress/cert-file.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1157a35 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/cert-file.sh @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.7 2018/04/10 00:14:10 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="ssh with certificates" + +rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* +rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key* + +# Create a CA key +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key1 ||\ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key2 ||\ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" + +# Make some keys and certificates. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" + +# Move the certificate to a different address to better control +# when it is offered. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 || + fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1" +mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 || + fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2" +mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key3 || + fatal "couldn't sign user_key3 with user_ca_key1" +rm $OBJ/user_key3.pub # to test use of private key w/o public half. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key4 || + fatal "couldn't sign user_key4 with user_ca_key1" +rm $OBJ/user_key4 $OBJ/user_key4.pub # to test no matching pub/private key case. + +trace 'try with identity files' +opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes" +opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2" +echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + +# Make a clean config that doesn't have any pre-added identities. +cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy | grep -v IdentityFile > $OBJ/no_identity_config + +# XXX: verify that certificate used was what we expect. Needs exposure of +# keys via environment variable or similar. + + # Key with no .pub should work - finding the equivalent *-cert.pub. +verbose "identity cert with no plain public file" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ + -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52 +[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed" + +# CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work. +verbose "CertificateFile with no plain public file" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \ + -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \ + -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52 +[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed" + +# Just keys should fail +verbose "plain keys" +${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh succeeded with no certs" +fi + +# Keys with untrusted cert should fail. +verbose "untrusted cert" +opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" +${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh succeeded with bad cert" +fi + +# Good cert with bad key should fail. +verbose "good cert, bad key" +opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2" +opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" +${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh succeeded with no matching key" +fi + +# Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed. +verbose "single trusted" +opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" +${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh failed with trusted cert and key" +fi + +# Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed. +verbose "multiple trusted" +opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" +opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" +${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52 +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh failed with multiple certs" +fi + +#next, using an agent in combination with the keys +SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then + fatal "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2" +fi + +trace "start agent" +eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" +fi + +# add private keys to agent +${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key2 > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0" +fi +${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key1 > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0" +fi + +# try ssh with the agent and certificates +opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" +# with no certificates, should fail +${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52 +if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with no cert" +fi + +#with an untrusted certificate, should fail +opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub" +${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52 +if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with bad cert" +fi + +#with an additional trusted certificate, should succeed +opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub" +${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52 +if [ $? -ne 52 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with agent in failed with good cert" +fi + +trace "kill agent" +${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null + +#cleanup +rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* +rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key* diff --git a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2ecd31 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.16 2018/07/03 11:43:49 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="certified host keys" + +rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/host_revoked_* +rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key* $OBJ/host_krl_* + +# Allow all hostkey/pubkey types, prefer certs for the client +types="" +for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do + if [ -z "$types" ]; then + types="$i" + continue + fi + case "$i" in + # Special treatment for RSA keys. + *rsa*cert*) + types="rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,$i,$types" + types="rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,$types";; + *rsa*) + types="$types,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,$i";; + # Prefer certificate to plain keys. + *cert*) types="$i,$types";; + *) types="$types,$i";; + esac +done +( + echo "HostKeyAlgorithms ${types}" + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *" +) >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak +( + echo "HostKeyAlgorithms *" + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *" +) >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +HOSTS='localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1' + +kh_ca() { + for k in "$@" ; do + printf "@cert-authority $HOSTS " + cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k" + done +} +kh_revoke() { + for k in "$@" ; do + printf "@revoked * " + cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k" + done +} + +# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts. Ed25519 chosen for speed. +# RSA for testing RSA/SHA2 signatures. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\ + fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/host_ca_key2 ||\ + fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed" + +kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig +cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert + +# Plain text revocation files +touch $OBJ/host_revoked_empty +touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain +touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert +cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/host_revoked_ca + +PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'` + +if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512" +fi + +# Prepare certificate, plain key and CA KRLs +${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_empty || fatal "KRL init failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_plain || fatal "KRL init failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_cert || fatal "KRL init failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_ca $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub \ + || fatal "KRL init failed" + +# Generate and sign host keys +serial=1 +for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype} cert" + # Generate and sign a host key + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \ + -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_plain \ + $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub || fatal "KRL update failed" + cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_plain + case $ktype in + rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;; + *) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;; + esac + ${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $ca -z $serial $tflag \ + -I "regress host key for $USER" \ + -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || + fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_cert \ + $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub || \ + fatal "KRL update failed" + cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_cert + serial=`expr $serial + 1` +done + +attempt_connect() { + _ident="$1" + _expect_success="$2" + shift; shift + verbose "$tid: $_ident expect success $_expect_success" + cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + "$@" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + _r=$? + if [ "x$_expect_success" = "xyes" ] ; then + if [ $_r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect $_ident failed" + fi + else + if [ $_r -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect $_ident succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + fi +} + +# Basic connect and revocation tests. +for privsep in yes no ; do + for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert connect privsep $privsep" + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} + echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub + echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # test name expect success + attempt_connect "$ktype basic connect" "yes" + attempt_connect "$ktype empty KRL" "yes" \ + -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_empty + attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ plain key revoked" "no" \ + -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_plain + attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ cert revoked" "no" \ + -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_cert + attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ CA revoked" "no" \ + -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_ca + attempt_connect "$ktype empty plaintext revocation" "yes" \ + -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_empty + attempt_connect "$ktype plain key plaintext revocation" "no" \ + -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_plain + attempt_connect "$ktype cert plaintext revocation" "no" \ + -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_cert + attempt_connect "$ktype CA plaintext revocation" "no" \ + -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_ca + done +done + +# Revoked certificates with key present +kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig +for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + test -f "$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub" || fatal "no pubkey" + kh_revoke cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig +done +cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert +for privsep in yes no ; do + for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert privsep $privsep" + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} + echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub + echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + done +done + +# Revoked CA +kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig +kh_revoke host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig +cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert +for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert" + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} + echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi +done + +# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts +kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig +cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert + +test_one() { + ident=$1 + result=$2 + sign_opts=$3 + + for kt in rsa ed25519 ; do + case $ktype in + rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;; + *) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;; + esac + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $ca $tflag -I "regress host key for $USER" \ + $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || + fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}" + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} + echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + rc=$? + if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then + if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly" + fi + else + if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + fi + done +} + +test_one "user-certificate" failure "-n $HOSTS" +test_one "empty principals" success "-h" +test_one "wrong principals" failure "-h -n foo" +test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20200101:20300101" +test_one "cert expired" failure "-h -V19800101:19900101" +test_one "cert valid interval" success "-h -V-1w:+2w" +test_one "cert has constraints" failure "-h -Oforce-command=false" + +# Check downgrade of cert to raw key when no CA found +for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key* + verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} ${v} cert downgrade to raw key" + # Generate and sign a host key + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \ + fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed" + case $ktype in + rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;; + *) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;; + esac + ${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q $tflag -s $ca $tflag \ + -I "regress host key for $USER" \ + -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || + fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}" + ( + printf "$HOSTS " + cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub + ) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} + echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi +done + +# Wrong certificate +kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig +cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert +for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + verbose "$tid: host ${kt} connect wrong cert" + rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key* + # Self-sign key + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${kt} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || \ + fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${kt} failed" + case $kt in + rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $kt" ;; + *) tflag="" ;; + esac + ${SSHKEYGEN} $tflag -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} \ + -I "regress host key for $USER" \ + -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || + fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}" + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} + echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert + ${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly" + fi +done + +rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key* diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30c2c15 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh @@ -0,0 +1,391 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.19 2018/03/12 00:54:04 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="certified user keys" + +rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak +cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + +PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'` +EXTRA_TYPES="" + +if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512" +fi + +kname() { + case $ktype in + rsa-sha2-*) n="$ktype" ;; + # subshell because some seds will add a newline + *) n=$(echo $1 | sed 's/^dsa/ssh-dss/;s/^rsa/ssh-rsa/;s/^ed/ssh-ed/') ;; + esac + echo "$n*,ssh-rsa*,ssh-ed25519*" +} + +# Create a CA key +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\ + fail "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed" + +# Generate and sign user keys +for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES $EXTRA_TYPES ; do + verbose "$tid: sign user ${ktype} cert" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \ + -f $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed" + # Generate RSA/SHA2 certs for rsa-sha2* keys. + case $ktype in + rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype" ;; + *) tflag="" ;; + esac + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -z $$ \ + -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $tflag $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \ + fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}" +done + +# Test explicitly-specified principals +for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + t=$(kname $ktype) + for privsep in yes no ; do + _prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep" + + # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile " \ + "$OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" + echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + ( + cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" + ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy + + # Missing authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals" + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Empty authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals" + echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Wrong authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals" + echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Correct authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals" + echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + + # authorized_principals with bad key option + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt" + echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # authorized_principals with command=false + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false" + echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \ + $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + + # authorized_principals with command=true + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true" + echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \ + $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + + # Setup for principals= key option + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + ( + cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" + ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy + + # Wrong principals list + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option" + ( + printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" ' + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Correct principals list + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option" + ( + printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" ' + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + done +done + +basic_tests() { + auth=$1 + if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then + # Add CA to authorized_keys + ( + printf 'cert-authority ' + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + else + echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + extra_sshd="TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" + fi + + for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + t=$(kname $ktype) + for privsep in yes no ; do + _prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep $auth" + # Simple connect + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} connect" + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" + echo "$extra_sshd" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + ( + cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" + ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy + + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + + # Revoked keys + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked key" + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked" + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" + echo "$extra_sshd" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \ + $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly" + fi + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked via KRL" + rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked + ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \ + $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly" + fi + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + done + + # Revoked CA + verbose "$tid: ${ktype} $auth revoked CA key" + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" + echo "$extra_sshd" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ + somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly" + fi + done + + verbose "$tid: $auth CA does not authenticate" + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}" + echo "$extra_sshd" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + verbose "$tid: ensure CA key does not authenticate user" + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/user_ca_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect with CA key succeeded unexpectedly" + fi +} + +basic_tests authorized_keys +basic_tests TrustedUserCAKeys + +test_one() { + ident=$1 + result=$2 + sign_opts=$3 + auth_choice=$4 + auth_opt=$5 + + if test "x$auth_choice" = "x" ; then + auth_choice="authorized_keys TrustedUserCAKeys" + fi + + for auth in $auth_choice ; do + for ktype in rsa ed25519 ; do + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then + # Add CA to authorized_keys + ( + printf "cert-authority${auth_opt} " + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + else + echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" \ + >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}*" \ + >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + if test "x$auth_opt" != "x" ; then + echo $auth_opt >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + fi + fi + + verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result $ktype" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \ + -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || + fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}" + + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + rc=$? + if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then + if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then + fail "$ident failed unexpectedly" + fi + else + if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then + fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + fi + done + done +} + +test_one "correct principal" success "-n ${USER}" +test_one "host-certificate" failure "-n ${USER} -h" +test_one "wrong principals" failure "-n foo" +test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20200101:20300101" +test_one "cert expired" failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101" +test_one "cert valid interval" success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w" +test_one "wrong source-address" failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8" +test_one "force-command" failure "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" + +# Behaviour is different here: TrustedUserCAKeys doesn't allow empty principals +test_one "empty principals" success "" authorized_keys +test_one "empty principals" failure "" TrustedUserCAKeys + +# Check explicitly-specified principals: an empty principals list in the cert +# should always be refused. + +# AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER +test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \ + TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" +test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile no principals" failure "" \ + TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" + +# principals= key option +rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER +test_one "principals key option principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \ + authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"' +test_one "principals key option no principals" failure "" \ + authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"' + +# command= options vs. force-command in key +test_one "force-command match true" success \ + "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \ + authorized_keys ',command="true"' +test_one "force-command match true" failure \ + "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \ + authorized_keys ',command="false"' +test_one "force-command mismatch 1" failure \ + "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \ + authorized_keys ',command="true"' +test_one "force-command mismatch 2" failure \ + "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \ + authorized_keys ',command="false"' + +# Wrong certificate +cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy +for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do + t=$(kname $ktype) + # Self-sign + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \ + "regress user key for $USER" \ + -n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || + fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}" + verbose "$tid: user ${ktype} connect wrong cert" + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ + somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly" + fi +done + +rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* +rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + diff --git a/regress/cfginclude.sh b/regress/cfginclude.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2fc39ce --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/cfginclude.sh @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.2 2016/05/03 15:30:46 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="config include" + +# to appease StrictModes +umask 022 + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF +Match host a + Hostname aa + +Match host b + Hostname bb + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + +Match host c + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + Hostname cc + +Match host m + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + +Host d + Hostname dd + +Host e + Hostname ee + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + +Host f + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + Hostname ff + +Host n + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* +_EOF + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF +Match host xxxxxx +_EOF + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF +Match host a + Hostname aaa + +Match host b + Hostname bbb + +Match host c + Hostname ccc + +Host d + Hostname ddd + +Host e + Hostname eee + +Host f + Hostname fff +_EOF + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF +Match host a + Hostname aaaa + +Match host b + Hostname bbbb + +Match host c + Hostname cccc + +Host d + Hostname dddd + +Host e + Hostname eeee + +Host f + Hostname ffff + +Match all + Hostname xxxx +_EOF + +trial() { + _host="$1" + _exp="$2" + ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out || + fatal "ssh config parse failed" + _got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'` + if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then + fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got" + fi +} + +trial a aa +trial b bb +trial c ccc +trial d dd +trial e ee +trial f fff +trial m xxxx +trial n xxxx +trial x x + +# Prepare an included config with an error. + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF +Hostname xxxx + Junk +_EOF + +${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \ + fail "ssh include allowed invalid config" + +${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \ + fail "ssh include allowed invalid config" + +rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + +# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal. +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF +Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* +Hostname aa +_EOF + +trial a aa + +# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent. +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF +Match host x +_EOF + +trial a aa + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF +Host x +_EOF + +trial a aa + +# cleanup +rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out +# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.2 2016/05/03 15:30:46 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="config include" + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF +Match host a + Hostname aa + +Match host b + Hostname bb + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + +Match host c + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + Hostname cc + +Match host m + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + +Host d + Hostname dd + +Host e + Hostname ee + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + +Host f + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + Hostname ff + +Host n + Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* +_EOF + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF +Match host xxxxxx +_EOF + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF +Match host a + Hostname aaa + +Match host b + Hostname bbb + +Match host c + Hostname ccc + +Host d + Hostname ddd + +Host e + Hostname eee + +Host f + Hostname fff +_EOF + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF +Match host a + Hostname aaaa + +Match host b + Hostname bbbb + +Match host c + Hostname cccc + +Host d + Hostname dddd + +Host e + Hostname eeee + +Host f + Hostname ffff + +Match all + Hostname xxxx +_EOF + +trial() { + _host="$1" + _exp="$2" + ${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out || + fatal "ssh config parse failed" + _got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'` + if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then + fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got" + fi +} + +trial a aa +trial b bb +trial c ccc +trial d dd +trial e ee +trial f fff +trial m xxxx +trial n xxxx +trial x x + +# Prepare an included config with an error. + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF +Hostname xxxx + Junk +_EOF + +${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \ + fail "ssh include allowed invalid config" + +${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \ + fail "ssh include allowed invalid config" + +rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* + +# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal. +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF +Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* +Hostname aa +_EOF + +trial a aa + +# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent. +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF +Match host x +_EOF + +trial a aa + +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF +Host x +_EOF + +trial a aa + +# Ensure that recursive includes are bounded. +cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF +Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i +_EOF + +${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \ + fail "ssh include allowed infinite recursion?" # or hang... + +# cleanup +rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out diff --git a/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/regress/cfgmatch.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd11e40 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/cfgmatch.sh @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.11 2017/10/04 18:50:23 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sshd_config match" + +pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid +fwdport=3301 +fwd="-L $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT" + +echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config +echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +start_client() +{ + rm -f $pidfile + ${SSH} -q $fwd "$@" somehost \ + exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \ + >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & + client_pid=$! + # Wait for remote end + n=0 + while test ! -f $pidfile ; do + sleep 1 + n=`expr $n + 1` + if test $n -gt 60; then + kill $client_pid + fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh" + fi + done +} + +stop_client() +{ + pid=`cat $pidfile` + if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then + kill $pid + fi + wait +} + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak +echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config +echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config +echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_config + +grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy + +start_sshd + +#set -x + +# Test Match + PermitOpen in sshd_config. This should be permitted +trace "match permitopen localhost" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "match permitopen permit" +stop_client + +# Same but from different source. This should not be permitted +trace "match permitopen proxy" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ + fail "match permitopen deny" +stop_client + +# Retry previous with key option, should also be denied. +cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + printf 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +done +trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ + fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt" +stop_client + +# Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair. +# Should be permitted. +trace "match permitopen localhost" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "match permitopen permit" +stop_client + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy + +# Test that a Match overrides a PermitOpen in the global section +trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \ + fail "match override permitopen" +stop_client + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy + +# Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a +# PermitOpen entry that's not at the start of the list +trace "nomatch permitopen proxy w/key opts" +start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "nomatch override permitopen" +stop_client diff --git a/regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh b/regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a4fd66b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cfgmatchlisten.sh,v 1.3 2018/07/02 14:13:30 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sshd_config matchlisten" + +pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid +fwdport=3301 +fwdspec="localhost:${fwdport}" +fwd="-R $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT" + +echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config +echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +start_client() +{ + rm -f $pidfile + ${SSH} -vvv $fwd "$@" somehost true >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + return $r + fi + ${SSH} -vvv $fwd "$@" somehost \ + exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \ + >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & + client_pid=$! + # Wait for remote end + n=0 + while test ! -f $pidfile ; do + sleep 1 + n=`expr $n + 1` + if test $n -gt 60; then + kill $client_pid + fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh" + fi + done + return $r +} + +expect_client_ok() +{ + start_client "$@" || + fail "client did not start" +} + +expect_client_fail() +{ + local failmsg="$1" + shift + start_client "$@" && + fail $failmsg +} + +stop_client() +{ + pid=`cat $pidfile` + if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then + kill $pid + fi + wait +} + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config +echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 $fwdspec" >>$OBJ/sshd_config + +grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 $fwdspec" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy + +start_sshd + +#set -x + +# Test Match + PermitListen in sshd_config. This should be permitted +trace "match permitlisten localhost" +expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_config +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "match permitlisten permit" +stop_client + +# Same but from different source. This should not be permitted +trace "match permitlisten proxy" +expect_client_fail "match permitlisten deny" \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +# Retry previous with key option, should also be denied. +cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdspec'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +done +trace "match permitlisten proxy w/key opts" +expect_client_fail "match permitlisten deny w/key opt"\ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +# Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair. +# Should be permitted. +trace "match permitlisten localhost" +expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_config +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "match permitlisten permit" +stop_client + +# Test that a bare port number is accepted in PermitListen +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdport 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +trace "match permitlisten bare" +expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_config +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "match permitlisten bare" +stop_client + +# Test that an incorrect bare port number is denied as expected +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 1 2 99" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +trace "match permitlisten bare" +expect_client_fail -F $OBJ/ssh_config + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdspec 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy + +# Test that a Match overrides a PermitListen in the global section +trace "match permitlisten proxy w/key opts" +expect_client_fail "match override permitlisten" \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdspec 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy + +# Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a +# PermitListen entry that's not at the start of the list +trace "nomatch permitlisten proxy w/key opts" +expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "nomatch override permitlisten" +stop_client + +# bind to 127.0.0.1 instead of default localhost +fwdspec2="127.0.0.1:${fwdport}" +fwd="-R ${fwdspec2}:127.0.0.1:$PORT" + +# first try w/ old fwdspec both in server config and key opts +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdspec 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdspec'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +done +trace "nomatch permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config and userkey" +expect_client_fail "nomatch 127.0.0.1 server config and userkey" \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_config + +# correct server config, denied by key opts +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 ${fwdspec2} 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy +trace "nomatch permitlisten 127.0.0.1 w/key opts" +expect_client_fail "nomatch 127.0.0.1 w/key opts" \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_config + +# fix key opts +cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdspec2'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +done +trace "match permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts" +expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "match 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts" +stop_client + +# key opts with bare port number +cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdport'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +done +trace "match permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts (bare)" +expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy +${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \ + fail "match 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts (bare)" +stop_client + +# key opts with incorrect bare port number +cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + printf 'permitlisten="99" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +done +trace "match permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts (wrong bare)" +expect_client_fail "nomatch 127.0.0.1 w/key opts (wrong bare)" \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_config diff --git a/regress/cfgparse.sh b/regress/cfgparse.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9e5c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/cfgparse.sh @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cfgparse.sh,v 1.7 2018/05/11 03:51:06 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sshd config parse" + +# This is a reasonable proxy for IPv6 support. +if ! config_defined HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR ; then + SKIP_IPV6=yes +fi + +# We need to use the keys generated for the regression test because sshd -T +# will fail if we're not running with SUDO (no permissions for real keys) or +# if we are running tests on a system that has never had sshd installed +# because the keys won't exist. + +grep "HostKey " $OBJ/sshd_config > $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal +SSHD_KEYS="`cat $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal`" + +verbose "reparse minimal config" +($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 && + $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config" + +verbose "reparse regress config" +($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 && + $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse regress config" + +verbose "listenaddress order" +# expected output +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <> $OBJ/sshd_config.0 < $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \ + fail "listenaddress order 1" +# test 2: listenaddress first +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \ + fail "listenaddress order 2" + +# cleanup +rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.[012] diff --git a/regress/check-perm.c b/regress/check-perm.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dac307d --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/check-perm.c @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +/* + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H +#include +#endif + +static void +fatal(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); + fputc('\n', stderr); + va_end(args); + exit(1); +} +/* Based on session.c. NB. keep tests in sync */ +static void +safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid) +{ + const char *cp; + char component[PATH_MAX]; + struct stat st; + + if (*path != '/') + fatal("chroot path does not begin at root"); + if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component)) + fatal("chroot path too long"); + + /* + * Descend the path, checking that each component is a + * root-owned directory with strict permissions. + */ + for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) { + if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL) + strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component)); + else { + cp++; + memcpy(component, path, cp - path); + component[cp - path] = '\0'; + } + + /* debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); */ + + if (stat(component, &st) != 0) + fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, + component, strerror(errno)); + if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) + fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot " + "directory %s\"%s\"", + cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); + if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) + fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory", + cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); + + } + + if (chdir(path) == -1) + fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": " + "%s", path, strerror(errno)); +} + +/* from platform.c */ +int +platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid) +{ + if (uid == 0) + return 1; +#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID + if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID) + return 1; +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* from auth.c */ +int +auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, + uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) +{ + char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; + char *cp; + int comparehome = 0; + struct stat st; + + if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, + strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) + comparehome = 1; + + if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); + return -1; + } + if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || + (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", + buf); + return -1; + } + + /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ + for (;;) { + if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { + snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); + return -1; + } + strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); + + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || + (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || + (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { + snprintf(err, errlen, + "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); + return -1; + } + + /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ + if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) + break; + + /* + * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, + * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too + */ + if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "check-perm -m [chroot | keys-command] [path]\n"); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const char *path = "."; + char errmsg[256]; + int ch, mode = -1; + extern char *optarg; + extern int optind; + struct stat st; + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hm:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'm': + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "chroot") == 0) + mode = 1; + else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "keys-command") == 0) + mode = 2; + else { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid -m option\n"), + usage(); + } + break; + default: + usage(); + } + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if (argc > 1) + usage(); + else if (argc == 1) + path = argv[0]; + + if (mode == 1) + safely_chroot(path, getuid()); + else if (mode == 2) { + if (stat(path, &st) < 0) + fatal("Could not stat %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); + if (auth_secure_path(path, &st, NULL, 0, + errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) + fatal("Unsafe %s: %s", path, errmsg); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mode\n"); + usage(); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/regress/cipher-speed.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5da95b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/cipher-speed.sh @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.14 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="cipher speed" + +getbytes () +{ + sed -n -e '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p' \ + -e '/copied/s/.*s, \(.* MB.s\).*/\1/p' +} + +tries="1 2" + +for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do + trace "cipher $c mac $m" + for x in $tries; do + printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:" + ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -m $m -c $c somehost \ + exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \ + < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes + + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed with mac $m cipher $c" + fi + done + # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored. + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + break + fi + n=`expr $n + 1` +done; done diff --git a/regress/conch-ciphers.sh b/regress/conch-ciphers.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..199d863 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/conch-ciphers.sh @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +# $OpenBSD: conch-ciphers.sh,v 1.3 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="conch ciphers" + +if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH" != "xyes" ; then + echo "conch interop tests not enabled" + exit 0 +fi + +start_sshd + +for c in aes256-ctr aes256-cbc aes192-ctr aes192-cbc aes128-ctr aes128-cbc \ + cast128-cbc blowfish 3des-cbc ; do + verbose "$tid: cipher $c" + rm -f ${COPY} + # XXX the 2nd "cat" seems to be needed because of buggy FD handling + # in conch + ${CONCH} --identity $OBJ/rsa --port $PORT --user $USER -e none \ + --known-hosts $OBJ/known_hosts --notty --noagent --nox11 -n \ + 127.0.0.1 "cat ${DATA}" 2>/dev/null | cat > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" +done +rm -f ${COPY} + diff --git a/regress/connect-privsep.sh b/regress/connect-privsep.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b6abb65 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/connect-privsep.sh @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +# $OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.9 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="proxy connect with privsep" + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig +echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect failed" +fi + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + # XXX replace this with fail once sandbox has stabilised + warn "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect failed" +fi + +# Because sandbox is sensitive to changes in libc, especially malloc, retest +# with every malloc.conf option (and none). +if [ -z "TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS" ]; then + mopts="C F G J R S U X < >" +else + mopts=`echo $TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS | sed 's/./& /g'` +fi +for m in '' $mopts ; do + env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect mopt '$m' failed" + fi +done diff --git a/regress/connect-uri.sh b/regress/connect-uri.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f13f15e --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/connect-uri.sh @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# $OpenBSD: connect-uri.sh,v 1.1 2017/10/24 19:33:32 millert Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="uri connect" + +# Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI +cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig +egrep -v '^ +(Port|User) +.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config + +start_sshd + +verbose "$tid: no trailing slash" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config "ssh://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}" true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connection failed" +fi + +verbose "$tid: trailing slash" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config "ssh://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/" true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connection failed" +fi + +verbose "$tid: with path name" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config "ssh://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" true \ + > /dev/null 2>&1 +if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connection succeeded, expected failure" +fi diff --git a/regress/connect.sh b/regress/connect.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b344b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/connect.sh @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="simple connect" + +start_sshd + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed" +fi diff --git a/regress/dhgex.sh b/regress/dhgex.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61fc178 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/dhgex.sh @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.4 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="dhgex" + +LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} +rm -f ${LOG} +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange` + +ssh_test_dhgex() +{ + bits="$1"; shift + cipher="$1"; shift + kex="$1"; shift + + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "KexAlgorithms=$kex" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "Ciphers=$cipher" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + rm -f ${LOG} + opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher" + min=2048 + max=8192 + groupsz="$min<$bits<$max" + verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher" + ${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed ($@)" + fi + # check what we request + grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null + if [ $? != 0 ]; then + got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}` + fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got" + fi + # check what we got (depends on contents of system moduli file) + gotbits="`awk '/bits set:/{print $4}' ${LOG} | head -1 | cut -f2 -d/`" + if [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then + fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits" + fi +} + +check() +{ + bits="$1"; shift + + for c in $@; do + for k in $kexs; do + ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k + done + done +} + +#check 2048 3des-cbc +check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128` +check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192` +check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256` +check 8192 rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com diff --git a/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv b/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c93b403 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ---- +Subject: ssh-keygen test +Comment: "1024-bit dsa, Tue Jan 08 2002 22:00:23 +0100" +P2/56wAAAgIAAAAmZGwtbW9kcHtzaWdue2RzYS1uaXN0LXNoYTF9LGRoe3BsYWlufX0AAA +AEbm9uZQAAAcQAAAHAAAAAAAAABACwUfm3AxZTut3icBmwCcD48nY64HzuELlQ+vEqjIcR +Lo49es/DQTeLNQ+kdKRCfouosGNv0WqxRtF0tUsWdXxS37oHGa4QPugBdHRd7YlZGZv8kg +x7FsoepY7v7E683/97dv2zxL3AGagTEzWr7fl0yPexAaZoDvtQrrjX44BLmwAABACWQkvv +MxnD8eFkS1konFfMJ1CkuRfTN34CBZ6dY7VTSGemy4QwtFdMKmoufD0eKgy3p5WOeWCYKt +F4FhjHKZk/aaxFjjIbtkrnlvXg64QI11dSZyBN6/ViQkHPSkUDF+A6AAEhrNbQbAFSvao1 +kTvNtPCtL0AkUIduEMzGQfLCTAAAAKDeC043YVo9Zo0zAEeIA4uZh4LBCQAAA/9aj7Y5ik +ehygJ4qTDSlVypsPuV+n59tMS0e2pfrSG87yf5r94AKBmJeho5OO6wYaXCxsVB7AFbSUD6 +75AK8mHF4v1/+7SWKk5f8xlMCMSPZ9K0+j/W1d/q2qkhnnDZolOHDomLA+U00i5ya/jnTV +zyDPWLFpWK8u3xGBPAYX324gAAAKDHFvooRnaXdZbeWGTTqmgHB1GU9A== +---- END SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ---- diff --git a/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub b/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..215d73b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ---- +Subject: ssh-keygen test +Comment: "1024-bit dsa, Tue Jan 08 2002 22:00:23 +0100" +AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBALBR+bcDFlO63eJwGbAJwPjydjrgfO4QuVD68SqMhxEujj16z8 +NBN4s1D6R0pEJ+i6iwY2/RarFG0XS1SxZ1fFLfugcZrhA+6AF0dF3tiVkZm/ySDHsWyh6l +ju/sTrzf/3t2/bPEvcAZqBMTNavt+XTI97EBpmgO+1CuuNfjgEubAAAAFQDeC043YVo9Zo +0zAEeIA4uZh4LBCQAAAIEAlkJL7zMZw/HhZEtZKJxXzCdQpLkX0zd+AgWenWO1U0hnpsuE +MLRXTCpqLnw9HioMt6eVjnlgmCrReBYYxymZP2msRY4yG7ZK55b14OuECNdXUmcgTev1Yk +JBz0pFAxfgOgABIazW0GwBUr2qNZE7zbTwrS9AJFCHbhDMxkHywkwAAACAWo+2OYpHocoC +eKkw0pVcqbD7lfp+fbTEtHtqX60hvO8n+a/eACgZiXoaOTjusGGlwsbFQewBW0lA+u+QCv +JhxeL9f/u0lipOX/MZTAjEj2fStPo/1tXf6tqpIZ5w2aJThw6JiwPlNNIucmv4501c8gz1 +ixaVivLt8RgTwGF99uI= +---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ---- diff --git a/regress/dynamic-forward.sh b/regress/dynamic-forward.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..84f8ee1 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/dynamic-forward.sh @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +# $OpenBSD: dynamic-forward.sh,v 1.13 2017/09/21 19:18:12 markus Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="dynamic forwarding" + +FWDPORT=`expr $PORT + 1` + +if have_prog nc && nc -h 2>&1 | grep "proxy address" >/dev/null; then + proxycmd="nc -x 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -X" +elif have_prog connect; then + proxycmd="connect -S 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -" +else + echo "skipped (no suitable ProxyCommand found)" + exit 0 +fi +trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd" + +start_sshd + +for d in D R; do + n=0 + error="1" + trace "start dynamic forwarding, fork to background" + + while [ "$error" -ne 0 -a "$n" -lt 3 ]; do + n=`expr $n + 1` + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f -$d $FWDPORT -q \ + -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost exec sh -c \ + \'"echo \$\$ > $OBJ/remote_pid; exec sleep 444"\' + error=$? + if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then + trace "forward failed attempt $n err $error" + sleep $n + fi + done + if [ "$error" -ne 0 ]; then + fatal "failed to start dynamic forwarding" + fi + + for s in 4 5; do + for h in 127.0.0.1 localhost; do + trace "testing ssh socks version $s host $h (-$d)" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ + -o "ProxyCommand ${proxycmd}${s} $h $PORT" \ + somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + test -f ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}" + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + done + done + + if [ -f $OBJ/remote_pid ]; then + remote=`cat $OBJ/remote_pid` + trace "terminate remote shell, pid $remote" + if [ $remote -gt 1 ]; then + kill -HUP $remote + fi + else + fail "no pid file: $OBJ/remote_pid" + fi + +done diff --git a/regress/envpass.sh b/regress/envpass.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af7eafe --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/envpass.sh @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +# $OpenBSD: envpass.sh,v 1.4 2005/03/04 08:48:46 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="environment passing" + +# NB accepted env vars are in test-exec.sh (_XXX_TEST_* and _XXX_TEST) + +# Prepare a custom config to test for a configuration parsing bug fixed in 4.0 +cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass +Host test-sendenv-confparse-bug + SendEnv * +EOF +cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass + +trace "pass env, don't accept" +verbose "test $tid: pass env, don't accept" +_TEST_ENV=blah ${SSH} -oSendEnv="*" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \ + sh << 'EOF' + test -z "$_TEST_ENV" +EOF +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "environment found" +fi + +trace "don't pass env, accept" +verbose "test $tid: don't pass env, accept" +_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \ + sh << 'EOF' + test -z "$_XXX_TEST_A" && test -z "$_XXX_TEST_B" +EOF +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "environment found" +fi + +trace "pass single env, accept single env" +verbose "test $tid: pass single env, accept single env" +_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass \ + otherhost sh << 'EOF' + test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah" +EOF +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "environment not found" +fi + +trace "pass multiple env, accept multiple env" +verbose "test $tid: pass multiple env, accept multiple env" +_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2 ${SSH} -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST_*" \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \ + sh << 'EOF' + test X"$_XXX_TEST_A" = X"1" -a X"$_XXX_TEST_B" = X"2" +EOF +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "environment not found" +fi + +rm -f $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass diff --git a/regress/exit-status.sh b/regress/exit-status.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aadf99f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/exit-status.sh @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# $OpenBSD: exit-status.sh,v 1.8 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="remote exit status" + +for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do + trace "status $s" + verbose "test $tid: status $s" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exit $s + r=$? + if [ $r -ne $s ]; then + fail "exit code mismatch for: $r != $s" + fi + + # same with early close of stdout/err + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -n otherhost exec \ + sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\' + r=$? + if [ $r -ne $s ]; then + fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for: $r != $s" + fi +done diff --git a/regress/forcecommand.sh b/regress/forcecommand.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e059f1f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/forcecommand.sh @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +# $OpenBSD: forcecommand.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="forced command" + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + printf 'command="true" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +done + +trace "forced command in key option" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key" + +cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + printf 'command="false" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +done + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + +trace "forced command in sshd_config overrides key option" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key" + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "ForceCommand false" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo "Match User $USER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy +echo " ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + +trace "forced command with match" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key" diff --git a/regress/forward-control.sh b/regress/forward-control.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b1f69a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/forward-control.sh @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +# $OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.7 2018/06/07 14:29:43 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sshd control of local and remote forwarding" + +LFWD_PORT=3320 +RFWD_PORT=3321 +CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock +READY=$OBJ/ready + +wait_for_file_to_appear() { + _path=$1 + _n=0 + while test ! -f $_path ; do + test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_path to appear" + _n=`expr $_n + 1` + test $_n -ge 20 && return 1 + sleep 1 + done + return 0 +} + +wait_for_process_to_exit() { + _pid=$1 + _n=0 + while kill -0 $_pid 2>/dev/null ; do + test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_pid to exit" + _n=`expr $_n + 1` + test $_n -ge 20 && return 1 + sleep 1 + done + return 0 +} + +# usage: check_lfwd Y|N message +check_lfwd() { + _expected=$1 + _message=$2 + rm -f $READY + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ + -L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \ + -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \ + >/dev/null 2>&1 & + _sshpid=$! + wait_for_file_to_appear $READY || \ + fatal "check_lfwd ssh fail: $_message" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $LFWD_PORT \ + -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1 + _result=$? + kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null + wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid + if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then + fail "check_lfwd failed (expecting success): $_message" + elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then + fail "check_lfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message" + elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then + fatal "check_lfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\"" + else + verbose "check_lfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message" + fi +} + +# usage: check_rfwd Y|N message +check_rfwd() { + _expected=$1 + _message=$2 + rm -f $READY + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \ + -R127.0.0.1:$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \ + -n host exec sh -c \'"sleep 60 & echo \$! > $READY ; wait "\' \ + >/dev/null 2>&1 & + _sshpid=$! + wait_for_file_to_appear $READY + _result=$? + if test $_result -eq 0 ; then + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $RFWD_PORT \ + -oConnectionAttempts=4 host true >/dev/null 2>&1 + _result=$? + kill $_sshpid `cat $READY` 2>/dev/null + wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid + fi + if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then + fail "check_rfwd failed (expecting success): $_message" + elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then + fail "check_rfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message" + elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then + fatal "check_rfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\"" + else + verbose "check_rfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message" + fi +} + +start_sshd +cp ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak +cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak + +# Sanity check: ensure the default config allows forwarding +check_lfwd Y "default configuration" +check_rfwd Y "default configuration" + +# Usage: lperm_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N +lperm_tests() { + _tcpfwd=$1 + _plain_lfwd=$2 + _plain_rfwd=$3 + _nopermit_lfwd=$4 + _nopermit_rfwd=$5 + _permit_lfwd=$6 + _permit_rfwd=$7 + _badfwd1=127.0.0.1:22 + _badfwd2=127.0.0.2:22 + _goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${PORT} + cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} + _prefix="AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd" + + # No PermitOpen + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix" + check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix" + + # PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; + echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd1 $_badfwd2" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen" + check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen" + # PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; + echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd1 $_goodfwd $_badfwd2" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, PermitOpen" + check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, PermitOpen" + + # permitopen keys option. + # NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same + # success/fail as via sshd_config + # permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match + sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd1\",permitopen=\"$_badfwd2\" /" \ + < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ + > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail" + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen" + check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen" + # permitopen via authorized_keys that does match + sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd1\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \ + < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ + > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail" + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen" + check_rfwd $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen" + + # Check port-forwarding flags in authorized_keys. + # These two should refuse all. + sed "s/^/no-port-forwarding /" \ + < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ + > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 3 fail" + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd N "$_prefix, no-port-forwarding" + check_rfwd N "$_prefix, no-port-forwarding" + sed "s/^/restrict /" \ + < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ + > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 4 fail" + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd N "$_prefix, restrict" + check_rfwd N "$_prefix, restrict" + # This should pass the same cases as _nopermit* + sed "s/^/restrict,port-forwarding /" \ + < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \ + > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 5 fail" + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, restrict,port-forwarding" + check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, restrict,port-forwarding" +} + +# permit-open none mismatch match +# AllowTcpForwarding local remote local remote local remote +lperm_tests yes Y Y N Y Y Y +lperm_tests local Y N N N Y N +lperm_tests remote N Y N Y N Y +lperm_tests no N N N N N N + +# Usage: rperm_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N +rperm_tests() { + _tcpfwd=$1 + _plain_lfwd=$2 + _plain_rfwd=$3 + _nopermit_lfwd=$4 + _nopermit_rfwd=$5 + _permit_lfwd=$6 + _permit_rfwd=$7 + _badfwd1=127.0.0.1:22 + _badfwd2=127.0.0.2:${RFWD_PORT} + _goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${RFWD_PORT} + cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} + _prefix="AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd" + + # PermitListen via sshd_config that doesn't match + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; + echo "PermitListen $_badfwd1 $_badfwd2" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitListen" + check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitListen" + # PermitListen via sshd_config that does match + ( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ; + echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ; + echo "PermitListen $_badfwd1 $_goodfwd $_badfwd2" ) \ + > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy + check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, PermitListen" + check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, PermitListen" +} + +# permit-remote-open none mismatch match +# AllowTcpForwarding local remote local remote local remote +rperm_tests yes Y Y Y N Y Y +rperm_tests local Y N Y N Y N +rperm_tests remote N Y N N N Y +rperm_tests no N N N N N N + diff --git a/regress/forwarding.sh b/regress/forwarding.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d0fae1 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/forwarding.sh @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.20 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="local and remote forwarding" + +DATA=/bin/ls${EXEEXT} + +start_sshd + +base=33 +last=$PORT +fwd="" +make_tmpdir +CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock + +for j in 0 1 2; do + for i in 0 1 2; do + a=$base$j$i + b=`expr $a + 50` + c=$last + # fwd chain: $a -> $b -> $c + fwd="$fwd -L$a:127.0.0.1:$b -R$b:127.0.0.1:$c" + last=$a + done +done + +trace "start forwarding, fork to background" +rm -f $CTL +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10 + +trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ + somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost + +for d in L R; do + trace "exit on -$d forward failure" + + # this one should succeed + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ + -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true + if [ $? != 0 ]; then + fatal "connection failed, should not" + else + # this one should fail + ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ + -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -$d ${base}01:localhost:$PORT \ + -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true + r=$? + if [ $r != 255 ]; then + fail "connection not termintated, but should ($r)" + fi + fi +done + +trace "simple clear forwarding" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true + +trace "clear local forward" +rm -f $CTL +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 +if [ $? != 0 ]; then + fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding" +else + # this one should fail + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ + >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ + fail "local forwarding not cleared" +fi +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost + +trace "clear remote forward" +rm -f $CTL +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 +if [ $? != 0 ]; then + fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding" +else + # this one should fail + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ + >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ + fail "remote forwarding not cleared" +fi +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost + +trace "stdio forwarding" +cmd="${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config" +$cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" somehost true +if [ $? != 0 ]; then + fail "stdio forwarding" +fi + +echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config +echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config + +trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background" +rm -f $CTL +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10 + +trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ + somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost + +trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result" +rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd +rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123] +${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10 +${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10 +${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10 +${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10 +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ + somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost + diff --git a/regress/host-expand.sh b/regress/host-expand.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9444f7f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/host-expand.sh @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# $OpenBSD: host-expand.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="expand %h and %n" + +echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy +printf 'LocalCommand printf "%%%%s\\n" "%%n" "%%h"\n' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +cat >$OBJ/expect <$OBJ/actual +diff $OBJ/expect $OBJ/actual || fail "$tid" + diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..811b6b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# $OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.7 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="hostkey agent" + +rm -f $OBJ/agent-key.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/known_hosts.orig + +trace "start agent" +eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null +r=$? +[ $r -ne 0 ] && fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r" + +grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig +echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig + +trace "load hostkeys" +for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do + ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" + ( + printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' + cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub + ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts.orig + ${SSHADD} $OBJ/agent-key.$k >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ + fatal "couldn't load key $OBJ/agent-key.$k" + echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig + # Remove private key so the server can't use it. + rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k || fatal "couldn't rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k" +done +cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts + +unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK + +for ps in no yes; do + for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do + verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps" + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" + cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts + SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "privsep=$ps failed" + fi + if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then + fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION key type $k privsep=$ps" + fi + done +done + +trace "kill agent" +${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null + diff --git a/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh b/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d69de32 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.5 2015/09/04 04:23:10 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="hostkey rotate" + +# Need full names here since they are used in HostKeyAlgorithms +HOSTKEY_TYPES="ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ssh-ed25519 ssh-rsa ssh-dss" + +rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig + +grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig +echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy +rm $OBJ/known_hosts + +trace "prepare hostkeys" +nkeys=0 +all_algs="" +for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do + ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" + echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig + nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1` + test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs}," + all_algs="${all_algs}$k" +done + +dossh() { + # All ssh should succeed in this test + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed" +} + +expect_nkeys() { + _expected=$1 + _message=$2 + _n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed" + [ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)" +} + +check_key_present() { + _type=$1 + _kfile=$2 + test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub" + _kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \ + fatal "awk failed" + fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null +} + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy + +# Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no +verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no" +>$OBJ/known_hosts +dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-ed25519 -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no +# Verify no additional keys learned +expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys" +check_key_present ssh-ed25519 || fail "unstrict didn't learn key" + +# Connect to sshd as usual +verbose "learn additional hostkeys" +dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs +# Check that other keys learned +expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" +check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn keys" + +# Check each key type +for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do + verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k" + dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs + expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k" + check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k" +done + +# Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn +verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey" +mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old +rm -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa +${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" +dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs +# Check that the key was replaced +expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" +check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present" +check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" + +# Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect +verbose "learn new primary hostkey" +${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" +( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new ) \ + > $OBJ/sshd_proxy +# Check new hostkey added +dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs +expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys" +check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "current key missing" +check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub || fail "new key missing" + +# Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd +verbose "rotate primary hostkey" +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy +mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old +mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub +mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa +# Check old hostkey removed +dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs +expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" +check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present" +check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" + +# Connect again, forcing rotated key +verbose "check rotate primary hostkey" +dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa +expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys" +check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3eda40f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/integrity.sh @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.23 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="integrity" +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets +tries=10 +startoffset=2900 +macs=`${SSH} -Q mac` +# The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are +# handled specially below. +macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`" + +# avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the +# offset into the stream right. +echo "KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" \ + >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +# sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh) +cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" + +for m in $macs; do + trace "test $tid: mac $m" + elen=0 + epad=0 + emac=0 + etmo=0 + ecnt=0 + skip=0 + for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do + skip=`expr $skip - 1` + if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then + # avoid modifying the high bytes of the length + continue + fi + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy + # modify output from sshd at offset $off + pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1" + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + macopt="-c $m" + else + echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr" + fi + verbose "test $tid: $m @$off" + ${SSH} $macopt -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \ + -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \ + 999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off" + fi + ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1` + out=$(egrep -v "^debug" $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | tail -2 | \ + tr -s '\r\n' '.') + case "$out" in + Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;; + Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*) + emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;; + padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;; + *Timeout,?server*) + etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;; + *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";; + esac + done + verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo" + if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then + fail "$m: no mac errors" + fi + expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo` + if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then + fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac" + fi +done diff --git a/regress/kextype.sh b/regress/kextype.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e271899 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/kextype.sh @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/24 20:19:15 markus Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="login with different key exchange algorithms" + +TIME=/usr/bin/time +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak +cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + +# Make server accept all key exchanges. +ALLKEX=`${SSH} -Q kex` +KEXOPT=`echo $ALLKEX | tr ' ' ,` +echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + +tries="1 2 3 4" +for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do + verbose "kex $k" + for i in $tries; do + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh kex $k" + fi + done +done + diff --git a/regress/key-options.sh b/regress/key-options.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..112c9bd --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/key-options.sh @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +# $OpenBSD: key-options.sh,v 1.9 2018/07/03 13:53:26 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="key options" + +origkeys="$OBJ/authkeys_orig" +authkeys="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}" +cp $authkeys $origkeys + +# Test command= forced command +for c in 'command="echo bar"' 'no-pty,command="echo bar"'; do + sed "s/.*/$c &/" $origkeys >$authkeys + verbose "key option $c" + r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost echo foo` + if [ "$r" = "foo" ]; then + fail "key option forced command not restricted" + fi + if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then + fail "key option forced command not executed" + fi +done + +# Test no-pty +expect_pty_succeed() { + which=$1 + opts=$2 + rm -f $OBJ/data + sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys + verbose "key option pty $which" + config_defined HAVE_OPENPTY || verbose "skipped for no openpty(3)" + ${SSH} -ttq -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "tty > $OBJ/data; exit 0" + if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then + fail "key option failed $which" + else + r=`cat $OBJ/data` + case "$r" in + /dev/*) ;; + *) fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" ;; + esac + fi +} +expect_pty_fail() { + which=$1 + opts=$2 + rm -f $OBJ/data + sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys + verbose "key option pty $which" + config_defined HAVE_OPENPTY || verbose "skipped for no openpty(3)" + ${SSH} -ttq -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "tty > $OBJ/data; exit 0" + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + r=`cat $OBJ/data` + if [ -e "$r" ]; then + fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" + fi + case "$r" in + /dev/*) fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" ;; + *) ;; + esac + fi +} +# First ensure that we can allocate a pty by default. +expect_pty_succeed "default" "" +expect_pty_fail "no-pty" "no-pty" +expect_pty_fail "restrict" "restrict" +expect_pty_succeed "restrict,pty" "restrict,pty" + +# Test environment= +# XXX this can fail if ~/.ssh/environment exists for the user running the test +echo 'PermitUserEnvironment yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy +sed 's/.*/environment="FOO=bar" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys +verbose "key option environment" +r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $FOO'` +if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then + fail "key option environment not set" +fi + +# Test from= restriction +start_sshd +for f in 127.0.0.1 '127.0.0.0\/8'; do + cat $origkeys >$authkeys + ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "key option failed without restriction" + fi + + sed 's/.*/from="'"$f"'" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys + from=`head -1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '` + verbose "key option $from" + r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'` + if [ "$r" = "true" ]; then + fail "key option $from not restricted" + fi + + r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost 'echo true'` + if [ "$r" != "true" ]; then + fail "key option $from not allowed but should be" + fi +done + +check_valid_before() { + which=$1 + opts=$2 + expect=$3 + sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys + verbose "key option expiry-time $which" + ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + r=$? + case "$expect" in + fail) test $r -eq 0 && fail "key option succeeded $which" ;; + pass) test $r -ne 0 && fail "key option failed $which" ;; + *) fatal "unknown expectation $expect" ;; + esac +} +check_valid_before "default" "" "pass" +check_valid_before "invalid" 'expiry-time="INVALID"' "fail" +check_valid_before "expired" 'expiry-time="19990101"' "fail" +check_valid_before "valid" 'expiry-time="20380101"' "pass" + diff --git a/regress/keygen-change.sh b/regress/keygen-change.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b8acd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/keygen-change.sh @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="change passphrase for key" + +S1="secret1" +S2="2secret" + +KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain` + +for t in $KEYTYPES; do + # generate user key for agent + trace "generating $t key" + rm -f $OBJ/$t-key + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N ${S1} -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -P ${S1} -N ${S2} -f $OBJ/$t-key > /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-keygen -p failed for $t-key" + fi + else + fail "ssh-keygen for $t-key failed" + fi + rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub +done diff --git a/regress/keygen-convert.sh b/regress/keygen-convert.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad0e9c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/keygen-convert.sh @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +# $OpenBSD: keygen-convert.sh,v 1.1 2009/11/09 04:20:04 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="convert keys" + +for t in rsa dsa; do + # generate user key for agent + trace "generating $t key" + rm -f $OBJ/$t-key + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N "" -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key + + trace "export $t private to rfc4716 public" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc || \ + fail "export $t private to rfc4716 public" + + trace "export $t public to rfc4716 public" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \ + fail "$t public to rfc4716 public" + + cmp $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \ + fail "$t rfc4716 exports differ between public and private" + + trace "import $t rfc4716 public" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -i -f $OBJ/$t-key-rfc >$OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \ + fail "$t import rfc4716 public" + + cut -f1,2 -d " " $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub + cmp $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \ + fail "$t imported differs from original" + + rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub \ + $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub +done diff --git a/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh b/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37af347 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh @@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ +# $OpenBSD: keygen-knownhosts.sh,v 1.4 2018/06/01 03:52:37 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="ssh-keygen known_hosts" + +rm -f $OBJ/kh.* + +# Generate some keys for testing (just ed25519 for speed) and make a hosts file. +for x in host-a host-b host-c host-d host-e host-f host-a2 host-b2; do + ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/kh.$x -C "$x" -N "" || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" + # Add a comment that we expect should be preserved. + echo "# $x" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts + ( + case "$x" in + host-a|host-b) printf "$x " ;; + host-c) printf "@cert-authority $x " ;; + host-d) printf "@revoked $x " ;; + host-e) printf "host-e* " ;; + host-f) printf "host-f,host-g,host-h " ;; + host-a2) printf "host-a " ;; + host-b2) printf "host-b " ;; + esac + cat $OBJ/kh.${x}.pub + # Blank line should be preserved. + echo "" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts + ) >> $OBJ/kh.hosts +done + +# Generate a variant with an invalid line. We'll use this for most tests, +# because keygen should be able to cope and it should be preserved in any +# output file. +cat $OBJ/kh.hosts >> $OBJ/kh.invalid +echo "host-i " >> $OBJ/kh.invalid + +cp $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig +cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig + +expect_key() { + _host=$1 + _hosts=$2 + _key=$3 + _line=$4 + _mark=$5 + _marker="" + test "x$_mark" = "xCA" && _marker="@cert-authority " + test "x$_mark" = "xREVOKED" && _marker="@revoked " + test "x$_line" != "x" && + echo "# Host $_host found: line $_line $_mark" >> $OBJ/kh.expect + printf "${_marker}$_hosts " >> $OBJ/kh.expect + cat $OBJ/kh.${_key}.pub >> $OBJ/kh.expect || + fatal "${_key}.pub missing" +} + +check_find() { + _host=$1 + _name=$2 + shift; shift + ${SSHKEYGEN} "$@" -f $OBJ/kh.invalid -F $_host > $OBJ/kh.result + if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then + fail "didn't find $_name" + fi +} + +check_find_exit_code() { + _host=$1 + _name=$2 + _keygenopt=$3 + _exp_exit_code=$4 + ${SSHKEYGEN} $_keygenopt -f $OBJ/kh.invalid -F $_host > /dev/null + if [ "$?" != "$_exp_exit_code" ] ; then + fail "Unexpected exit code $_name" + fi +} + +# Find key +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-a host-a host-a 2 +expect_key host-a host-a host-a2 20 +check_find host-a "simple find" + +# find CA key +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-c host-c host-c 8 CA +check_find host-c "find CA key" + +# find revoked key +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-d host-d host-d 11 REVOKED +check_find host-d "find revoked key" + +# find key with wildcard +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-e.somedomain "host-e*" host-e 14 +check_find host-e.somedomain "find wildcard key" + +# find key among multiple hosts +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-h "host-f,host-g,host-h " host-f 17 +check_find host-h "find multiple hosts" + +# Check exit code, known host +check_find_exit_code host-a "known host" "-q" "0" + +# Check exit code, unknown host +check_find_exit_code host-aa "unknown host" "-q" "1" + +# Check exit code, the hash mode, known host +check_find_exit_code host-a "known host" "-q -H" "0" + +# Check exit code, the hash mode, unknown host +check_find_exit_code host-aa "unknown host" "-q -H" "1" + +check_hashed_find() { + _host=$1 + _name=$2 + _file=$3 + test "x$_file" = "x" && _file=$OBJ/kh.invalid + ${SSHKEYGEN} -f $_file -HF $_host | grep '|1|' | \ + sed "s/^[^ ]*/$_host/" > $OBJ/kh.result + if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then + fail "didn't find $_name" + fi +} + +# Find key and hash +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-a host-a host-a +expect_key host-a host-a host-a2 +check_hashed_find host-a "find simple and hash" + +# Find CA key and hash +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-c host-c host-c "" CA +# CA key output is not hashed. +check_find host-c "find simple and hash" -Hq + +# Find revoked key and hash +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-d host-d host-d "" REVOKED +# Revoked key output is not hashed. +check_find host-d "find simple and hash" -Hq + +# find key with wildcard and hash +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-e "host-e*" host-e "" +# Key with wildcard hostname should not be hashed. +check_find host-e "find wildcard key" -Hq + +# find key among multiple hosts +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +# Comma-separated hostnames should be expanded and hashed. +expect_key host-f "host-h " host-f +expect_key host-g "host-h " host-f +expect_key host-h "host-h " host-f +check_hashed_find host-h "find multiple hosts" + +# Attempt remove key on invalid file. +cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -R host-a 2>/dev/null +diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "remove on invalid succeeded" + +# Remove key +cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-a 2>/dev/null +grep -v "^host-a " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect +diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove simple" + +# Remove CA key +cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-c 2>/dev/null +# CA key should not be removed. +diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove CA" + +# Remove revoked key +cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-d 2>/dev/null +# revoked key should not be removed. +diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove revoked" + +# Remove wildcard +cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-e.blahblah 2>/dev/null +grep -v "^host-e[*] " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect +diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard" + +# Remove multiple +cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-h 2>/dev/null +grep -v "^host-f," $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect +diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard" + +# Attempt hash on invalid file +cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -H 2>/dev/null && fail "hash invalid succeeded" +diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "invalid file modified" + +# Hash valid file +cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -H 2>/dev/null || fail "hash failed" +diff $OBJ/kh.hosts.old $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "backup differs" +grep "^host-[abfgh]" $OBJ/kh.hosts && fail "original hostnames persist" + +cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig + +# Test lookup +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-a host-a host-a +expect_key host-a host-a host-a2 +check_hashed_find host-a "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts + +# Test multiple expanded +rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect +expect_key host-h host-h host-f +check_hashed_find host-h "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts + +# Test remove +cp $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig $OBJ/kh.hashed +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -R host-a 2>/dev/null +${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -F host-a && fail "found key after hashed remove" diff --git a/regress/keygen-moduli.sh b/regress/keygen-moduli.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d4e7713 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/keygen-moduli.sh @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# $OpenBSD: keygen-moduli.sh,v 1.2 2016/09/14 00:45:31 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="keygen moduli" + +# Try "start at the beginning and stop after 1", "skip 1 then stop after 1" +# and "skip 2 and run to the end with checkpointing". Since our test data +# file has 3 lines, these should always result in 1 line of output. +for i in "-J1" "-j1 -J1" "-j2 -K $OBJ/moduli.ckpt"; do + trace "keygen $i" + rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt + ${SSHKEYGEN} -T $OBJ/moduli.out -f ${SRC}/moduli.in $i 2>/dev/null || \ + fail "keygen screen failed $i" + lines=`wc -l <$OBJ/moduli.out` + test "$lines" -eq "1" || fail "expected 1 line, got $lines" +done + +rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt diff --git a/regress/keys-command.sh b/regress/keys-command.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4029e2c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/keys-command.sh @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.4 2016/09/26 21:34:38 bluhm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="authorized keys from command" + +if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then + echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" + echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" + exit 0 +fi + +rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args + +touch $OBJ/keys-command-args +chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args + +expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/rsa.pub` +expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/rsa.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` + +# Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have +# acceptable directory permissions. +KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}" +cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'" +#!/bin/sh +echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args +echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7 +test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 +if test $# -eq 6 ; then + test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2 + test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3 + test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4 + test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5 + test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6 +fi +exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}" +_EOF +$SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND" + +if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $KEY_COMMAND ; then + echo "skipping: $KEY_COMMAND is unsuitable as AuthorizedKeysCommand" + $SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND + exit 0 +fi + +if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak + + verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments" + ( + grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak + echo AuthorizedKeysFile none + echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah + echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd + env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "connect failed" + fi + + verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments" + # Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed. + ( + grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak + echo AuthorizedKeysFile none + echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND + echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd + env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "connect failed" + fi +else + echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)" +fi + +$SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND diff --git a/regress/keyscan.sh b/regress/keyscan.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3bde121 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/keyscan.sh @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="keyscan" + +# remove DSA hostkey +rm -f ${OBJ}/host.dsa + +start_sshd + +KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain` +for t in $KEYTYPES; do + trace "keyscan type $t" + ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \ + > /dev/null 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh-keyscan -t $t failed with: $r" + fi +done diff --git a/regress/keytype.sh b/regress/keytype.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f78a2c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/keytype.sh @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.7 2018/03/12 00:54:04 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="login with different key types" + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak +cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + +# Traditional and builtin key types. +ktypes="dsa-1024 rsa-2048 rsa-3072 ed25519-512" +# Types not present in all OpenSSL versions. +for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do + case "$i" in + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256" ;; + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-384" ;; + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-521" ;; + esac +done + +for kt in $ktypes; do + rm -f $OBJ/key.$kt + bits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'` + type=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $1}'` + verbose "keygen $type, $bits bits" + ${SSHKEYGEN} -b $bits -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt ||\ + fail "ssh-keygen for type $type, $bits bits failed" +done + +tries="1 2 3" +for ut in $ktypes; do + htypes=$ut + #htypes=$ktypes + for ht in $htypes; do + case $ht in + dsa-1024) t=ssh-dss;; + ecdsa-256) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp256;; + ecdsa-384) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp384;; + ecdsa-521) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp521;; + ed25519-512) t=ssh-ed25519;; + rsa-*) t=rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa;; + esac + trace "ssh connect, userkey $ut, hostkey $ht" + ( + grep -v HostKey $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo HostKey $OBJ/key.$ht + echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t + echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + ( + grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + echo IdentityFile $OBJ/key.$ut + echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t + echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t + ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy + ( + printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' + cat $OBJ/key.$ht.pub + ) > $OBJ/known_hosts + cat $OBJ/key.$ut.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + for i in $tries; do + verbose "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh userkey $ut, hostkey $ht failed" + fi + done + done +done diff --git a/regress/krl.sh b/regress/krl.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a70c79c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/krl.sh @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.7 2018/09/12 01:23:48 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="key revocation lists" + +# If we don't support ecdsa keys then this tell will be much slower. +ECDSA=ecdsa +if test "x$TEST_SSH_ECC" != "xyes"; then + ECDSA=rsa +fi + +# Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd. + +# Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen. +rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-* + +# Generate a CA key +$SSHKEYGEN -t $ECDSA -f $OBJ/revoked-ca -C "" -N "" > /dev/null || + fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed" +$SSHKEYGEN -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca2 -C "" -N "" > /dev/null || + fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA2 failed" + +# A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers +# The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and +# bitmap sections. +cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials +serial: 1-4 +serial: 10 +serial: 15 +serial: 30 +serial: 50 +serial: 999 +# The following sum to 500-799 +serial: 500 +serial: 501 +serial: 502 +serial: 503-600 +serial: 700-797 +serial: 798 +serial: 799 +serial: 599-701 +# Some multiple consecutive serial number ranges +serial: 10000-20000 +serial: 30000-40000 +EOF + +# A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID. +touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid +for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do + test "x$n" = "x499" && continue + # Fill in by-ID revocation spec. + echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid +done + +keygen() { + N=$1 + f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N` + # Vary the keytype. We use mostly ECDSA since this is fastest by far. + keytype=$ECDSA + case $N in + 2 | 10 | 510 | 1001) keytype=rsa;; + 4 | 30 | 520 | 1002) keytype=ed25519;; + esac + $SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \ + || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed" + # Sign cert + $SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed" + echo $f +} + +# Generate some keys. +verbose "$tid: generating test keys" +REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 500 510 520 799 999" +for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do + f=`keygen $n` + RKEYS="$RKEYS ${f}.pub" + RCERTS="$RCERTS ${f}-cert.pub" +done +UNREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 49 51 499 800 1010 1011" +UNREVOKED="" +for n in $UNREVOKED_SERIALS ; do + f=`keygen $n` + UKEYS="$UKEYS ${f}.pub" + UCERTS="$UCERTS ${f}-cert.pub" +done + +# Specifications that revoke keys by hash. +touch $OBJ/revoked-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-hash +for rkey in $RKEYS; do + (printf "sha1: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha1 + (printf "sha256: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha256 + (printf "hash: "; $SSHKEYGEN -lf $rkey | \ + awk '{ print $2 }') >> $OBJ/revoked-hash +done + +genkrls() { + OPTS=$1 +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - /dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $RKEYS \ + >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $RCERTS \ + >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $RKEYS $RCERTS \ + >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \ + >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha1 \ + >/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 \ + >/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-hash $OBJ/revoked-hash \ + >/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +# This should fail as KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified. +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \ + >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \ + >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly" +# These should succeed; they specify an explicit CA key. +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca \ + $OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \ + $OBJ/revoked-keyid >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +# These should succeed; they specify an wildcard CA key. +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-serials \ + >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-keyid \ + >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +# Revoke the same serials with the second CA key to ensure a multi-CA +# KRL is generated. +$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -u -s $OBJ/revoked-ca2 \ + $OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" +} + +## XXX dump with trace and grep for set cert serials +## XXX test ranges near (u64)-1, etc. + +verbose "$tid: generating KRLs" +genkrls + +check_krl() { + KEY=$1 + KRL=$2 + EXPECT_REVOKED=$3 + TAG=$4 + $SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null + result=$? + if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xy" -a $result -eq 0 ; then + fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG" + elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xn" -a $result -ne 0 ; then + fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG" + fi +} +test_rev() { + FILES=$1 + TAG=$2 + KEYS_RESULT=$3 + ALL_RESULT=$4 + HASH_RESULT=$5 + SERIAL_RESULT=$6 + KEYID_RESULT=$7 + CERTS_RESULT=$8 + CA_RESULT=$9 + SERIAL_WRESULT=$10 + KEYID_WRESULT=$11 + verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG" + for f in $FILES ; do + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty no "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys $KEYS_RESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all $ALL_RESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha1 $HASH_RESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha256 $HASH_RESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-hash $HASH_RESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial $SERIAL_RESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid $KEYID_RESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert $CERTS_RESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca $CA_RESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $SERIAL_WRESULT "$TAG" + check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild $KEYID_WRESULT "$TAG" + done +} + +test_all() { + # wildcard + # keys all hash sr# ID cert CA srl ID + test_rev "$RKEYS" "revoked keys" y y y n n n n n n + test_rev "$UKEYS" "unrevoked keys" n n n n n n n n n + test_rev "$RCERTS" "revoked certs" y y y y y y y y y + test_rev "$UCERTS" "unrevoked certs" n n n n n n y n n +} + +test_all + +# Check update. Results should be identical. +verbose "$tid: testing KRL update" +for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \ + $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid \ + $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild; do + cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f + genkrls -u +done + +test_all diff --git a/regress/limit-keytype.sh b/regress/limit-keytype.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04f1197 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/limit-keytype.sh @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +# $OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.5 2018/03/12 00:52:57 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="restrict pubkey type" + +rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* +rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key* + +mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig +mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig + +# Create a CA key +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" + +# Make some keys and a certificate. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key3 || + fatal "couldn't sign user_key1" +# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when +# it is offered. +mv $OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub + +grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes" +certopts="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub" + +echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER +cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + +prepare_config() { + ( + grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig + echo "Protocol 2" + echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey" + echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" + echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" + for x in "$@" ; do + echo "$x" + done + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy +} + +prepare_config + +# Check we can log in with all key types. +${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed" + +# Allow plain Ed25519 and RSA. The certificate should fail. +verbose "allow rsa,ed25519" +prepare_config \ + "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,ssh-rsa,ssh-ed25519" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed" + +# Allow Ed25519 only. +verbose "allow ed25519" +prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-ed25519" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded" + +# Allow all certs. Plain keys should fail. +verbose "allow cert only" +prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *-cert-v01@openssh.com" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded" + +# Allow RSA in main config, Ed25519 for non-existent user. +verbose "match w/ no match" +prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,ssh-rsa" \ + "Match user x$USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-ed25519" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed" + +# Allow only DSA in main config, Ed25519 for user. +verbose "match w/ matching" +prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ssh-dss" \ + "Match user $USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-ed25519" +${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed" +${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key4 proxy true && fatal "key4 succeeded" + diff --git a/regress/localcommand.sh b/regress/localcommand.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5224a16 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/localcommand.sh @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# $OpenBSD: localcommand.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="localcommand" + +echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy +echo 'LocalCommand echo foo' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +verbose "test $tid: proto $p localcommand" +a=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true` +if [ "$a" != "foo" ] ; then + fail "$tid proto $p" +fi diff --git a/regress/login-timeout.sh b/regress/login-timeout.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c2d07d --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/login-timeout.sh @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# $OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.9 2017/08/07 00:53:51 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="connect after login grace timeout" + +trace "test login grace with privsep" +cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig +grep -vi LoginGraceTime $OBJ/sshd_config.orig > $OBJ/sshd_config +echo "LoginGraceTime 10s" >> $OBJ/sshd_config +echo "MaxStartups 1" >> $OBJ/sshd_config +start_sshd + +(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 & +sleep 15 +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed" +fi diff --git a/regress/misc/Makefile b/regress/misc/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..14c0c27 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +SUBDIR= kexfuzz + +.include diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2aa444 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# NB. libssh and libopenbsd-compat should be built with the same sanitizer opts. +CXX=clang++-3.9 +FUZZ_FLAGS=-fsanitize=address,undefined -fsanitize-coverage=edge +FUZZ_LIBS=-lFuzzer + +CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS) +LDFLAGS=-L ../../.. -L ../../../openbsd-compat -g $(FUZZ_FLAGS) +LIBS=-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(FUZZ_LIBS) + +all: pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz authopt_fuzz + +.cc.o: + $(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + +pubkey_fuzz: pubkey_fuzz.o + $(CXX) -o $@ pubkey_fuzz.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) + +sig_fuzz: sig_fuzz.o + $(CXX) -o $@ sig_fuzz.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) + +authopt_fuzz: authopt_fuzz.o + $(CXX) -o $@ authopt_fuzz.o ../../../auth-options.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) + +clean: + -rm -f *.o pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz authopt_fuzz diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae6fbe7 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +This directory contains fuzzing harnesses for use with clang's libfuzzer. diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authopt_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authopt_fuzz.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a76d5a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authopt_fuzz.cc @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern "C" { + +#include "auth-options.h" + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) +{ + char *cp = (char *)malloc(size + 1); + struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL, *merge = NULL, *add = sshauthopt_new(); + + if (cp == NULL || add == NULL) + goto out; + memcpy(cp, data, size); + cp[size] = '\0'; + if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(cp, NULL)) == NULL) + goto out; + if ((merge = sshauthopt_merge(opts, add, NULL)) == NULL) + goto out; + + out: + free(cp); + sshauthopt_free(add); + sshauthopt_free(opts); + sshauthopt_free(merge); + return 0; +} + +} // extern "C" diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8bbc110 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +#include +#include +#include + +extern "C" { + +#include "sshkey.h" + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) +{ + struct sshkey *k = NULL; + int r = sshkey_from_blob(data, size, &k); + if (r == 0) sshkey_free(k); + return 0; +} + +} // extern + diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd1fda0 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// cc_fuzz_target test for public key parsing. + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern "C" { + +#include "includes.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +static struct sshkey *generate_or_die(int type, unsigned bits) { + int r; + struct sshkey *ret; + if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "generate(%d, %u): %s", type, bits, ssh_err(r)); + abort(); + } + return ret; +} + +int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen) +{ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + static struct sshkey *rsa = generate_or_die(KEY_RSA, 2048); + static struct sshkey *dsa = generate_or_die(KEY_DSA, 1024); + static struct sshkey *ecdsa256 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 256); + static struct sshkey *ecdsa384 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 384); + static struct sshkey *ecdsa521 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 521); +#endif + static struct sshkey *ed25519 = generate_or_die(KEY_ED25519, 0); + static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had " + "run away, I don’t know how it would all end"; + static const size_t dlen = strlen(data); + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + sshkey_verify(rsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0); + sshkey_verify(dsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0); + sshkey_verify(ecdsa256, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0); + sshkey_verify(ecdsa384, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0); + sshkey_verify(ecdsa521, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0); +#endif + sshkey_verify(ed25519, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0); + return 0; +} + +} // extern diff --git a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a7bb6b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2017/12/21 05:46:35 djm Exp $ + +.include +.include + +# XXX detect from ssh binary? +SSH1?= no +OPENSSL?= yes + +PROG= kexfuzz +SRCS= kexfuzz.c + +SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh +.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} +# From usr.bin/ssh +SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c +SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c +SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c +SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c +SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c +SRCS+=kex.c kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c +SRCS+=kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c +SRCS+=dh.c compat.c +SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c +SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c +SRCS+=smult_curve25519_ref.c + +SRCS+=digest-openssl.c +#SRCS+=digest-libc.c + +NOMAN= 1 + +.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes") +CFLAGS+= -DWITH_OPENSSL +.else +# SSH v.1 requires OpenSSL. +SSH1= no +.endif + +.if (${SSH1:L} == "yes") +CFLAGS+= -DWITH_SSH1 +.endif + +# enable warnings +WARNINGS=Yes + +DEBUG=-g +CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all +CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wno-unused-parameter +.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3" +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition +.endif + + +CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} + +LDADD+= -lutil -lz +DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL} ${LIBZ} + +.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes") +LDADD+= -lcrypto +DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO} +.endif + +.include + diff --git a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/README b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..504c26f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/README @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +This is a harness to help with fuzzing KEX. + +To use it, you first set it to count packets in each direction: + +./kexfuzz -K diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -k host_ed25519_key -c +S2C: 29 +C2S: 31 + +Then get it to record a particular packet (in this case the 4th +packet from client->server): + +./kexfuzz -K diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -k host_ed25519_key \ + -d -D C2S -i 3 -f packet_3 + +Fuzz the packet somehow: + +dd if=/dev/urandom of=packet_3 bs=32 count=1 # Just for example + +Then re-run the key exchange substituting the modified packet in +its original sequence: + +./kexfuzz -K diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 -k host_ed25519_key \ + -r -D C2S -i 3 -f packet_3 + +A comprehensive KEX fuzz run would fuzz every packet in both +directions for each key exchange type and every hostkey type. +This will take some time. + +Limitations: kexfuzz can't change the ordering of packets at +present. It is limited to replacing individual packets with +fuzzed variants with the same type. It really should allow +insertion, deletion on replacement of packets too. + +$OpenBSD: README,v 1.3 2017/10/20 02:13:41 djm Exp $ diff --git a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e2c481 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c @@ -0,0 +1,459 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: kexfuzz.c,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Fuzz harness for KEX code + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H +# include +#endif + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "ssh_api.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "log.h" + +struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX - needed for linking */ + +void kex_tests(void); +static int do_debug = 0; + +enum direction { S2C, C2S }; + +struct hook_ctx { + struct ssh *client, *server, *server2; + int *c2s, *s2c; + int trigger_direction, packet_index; + const char *dump_path; + struct sshbuf *replace_data; +}; + +static int +packet_hook(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *packet, u_char *typep, void *_ctx) +{ + struct hook_ctx *ctx = (struct hook_ctx *)_ctx; + int mydirection = ssh == ctx->client ? S2C : C2S; + int *packet_count = mydirection == S2C ? ctx->s2c : ctx->c2s; + FILE *dumpfile; + int r; + + if (do_debug) { + printf("%s packet %d type %u:\n", + mydirection == S2C ? "s2c" : "c2s", + *packet_count, *typep); + sshbuf_dump(packet, stdout); + } + if (mydirection == ctx->trigger_direction && + ctx->packet_index == *packet_count) { + if (ctx->replace_data != NULL) { + sshbuf_reset(packet); + /* Type is first byte of packet */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(ctx->replace_data, + typep)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_putb(packet, ctx->replace_data)) != 0) + return r; + if (do_debug) { + printf("***** replaced packet type %u\n", + *typep); + sshbuf_dump(packet, stdout); + } + } else if (ctx->dump_path != NULL) { + if ((dumpfile = fopen(ctx->dump_path, "w+")) == NULL) + err(1, "fopen %s", ctx->dump_path); + /* Write { type, packet } */ + if (fwrite(typep, 1, 1, dumpfile) != 1) + err(1, "fwrite type %s", ctx->dump_path); + if (sshbuf_len(packet) != 0 && + fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(packet), sshbuf_len(packet), + 1, dumpfile) != 1) + err(1, "fwrite body %s", ctx->dump_path); + if (do_debug) { + printf("***** dumped packet type %u len %zu\n", + *typep, sshbuf_len(packet)); + } + fclose(dumpfile); + /* No point in continuing */ + exit(0); + } + } + (*packet_count)++; + return 0; +} + +static int +do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to) +{ + u_char type; + size_t len; + const u_char *buf; + int r; + + for (;;) { + if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "ssh_packet_next: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + return r; + } + + if (type != 0) + return 0; + buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len); + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if ((r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0) { + debug("ssh_input_append: %s", ssh_err(r)); + return r; + } + if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0) { + debug("ssh_output_consume: %s", ssh_err(r)); + return r; + } + } +} + +/* Minimal test_helper.c scaffholding to make this standalone */ +const char *in_test = NULL; +#define TEST_START(a) \ + do { \ + in_test = (a); \ + if (do_debug) \ + fprintf(stderr, "test %s starting\n", in_test); \ + } while (0) +#define TEST_DONE() \ + do { \ + if (do_debug) \ + fprintf(stderr, "test %s done\n", \ + in_test ? in_test : "???"); \ + in_test = NULL; \ + } while(0) +#define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a, b) \ + do { \ + if ((int)(a) != (int)(b)) { \ + fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \ + "%s (%d) != expected %s (%d)\n", \ + in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \ + __func__, __LINE__, #a, (int)(a), #b, (int)(b)); \ + exit(2); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define ASSERT_INT_GE(a, b) \ + do { \ + if ((int)(a) < (int)(b)) { \ + fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \ + "%s (%d) < expected %s (%d)\n", \ + in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \ + __func__, __LINE__, #a, (int)(a), #b, (int)(b)); \ + exit(2); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a, b) \ + do { \ + if ((a) == (b)) { \ + fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \ + "%s (%p) != expected %s (%p)\n", \ + in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \ + __func__, __LINE__, #a, (a), #b, (b)); \ + exit(2); \ + } \ + } while (0) + + +static void +run_kex(struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server) +{ + int r = 0; + + while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) { + if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client)) != 0) { + debug("do_send_and_receive S2C: %s", ssh_err(r)); + break; + } + if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server)) != 0) { + debug("do_send_and_receive C2S: %s", ssh_err(r)); + break; + } + } + if (do_debug) + printf("done: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(server->kex->done, 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(client->kex->done, 1); +} + +static void +do_kex_with_key(const char *kex, struct sshkey *prvkey, int *c2s, int *s2c, + int direction, int packet_index, + const char *dump_path, struct sshbuf *replace_data) +{ + struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL, *server2 = NULL; + struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL; + struct sshbuf *state; + struct kex_params kex_params; + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; + char *keyname = NULL; + struct hook_ctx hook_ctx; + + TEST_START("sshkey_from_private"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(prvkey, &pubkey), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ssh_init"); + memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal)); + if (kex != NULL) + kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = strdup(kex); + keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(prvkey)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL); + kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname; + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server2, 1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(client, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(server, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + hook_ctx.c2s = c2s; + hook_ctx.s2c = s2c; + hook_ctx.trigger_direction = direction; + hook_ctx.packet_index = packet_index; + hook_ctx.dump_path = dump_path; + hook_ctx.replace_data = replace_data; + hook_ctx.client = client; + hook_ctx.server = server; + hook_ctx.server2 = server2; + ssh_packet_set_input_hook(client, packet_hook, &hook_ctx); + ssh_packet_set_input_hook(server, packet_hook, &hook_ctx); + ssh_packet_set_input_hook(server2, packet_hook, &hook_ctx); + + TEST_START("ssh_add_hostkey"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server, prvkey), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(client, pubkey), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("kex"); + run_kex(client, server); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("rekeying client"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0); + run_kex(client, server); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("rekeying server"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server), 0); + run_kex(client, server); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ssh_packet_get_state"); + state = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(state, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_get_state(server, state), 0); + ASSERT_INT_GE(sshbuf_len(state), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ssh_packet_set_state"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server2, prvkey), 0); + kex_free(server2->kex); /* XXX or should ssh_packet_set_state()? */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_set_state(server2, state), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(state), 0); + sshbuf_free(state); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2->kex, NULL); + /* XXX we need to set the callbacks */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server; + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server; + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server; + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; +# endif +#endif + server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; + server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key; + server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key; + server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign; + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("rekeying server2"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server2), 0); + run_kex(client, server2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0); + run_kex(client, server2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("cleanup"); + sshkey_free(pubkey); + ssh_free(client); + ssh_free(server); + ssh_free(server2); + free(keyname); + TEST_DONE(); +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, + "Usage: kexfuzz [-hcdrv] [-D direction] [-f data_file]\n" + " [-K kex_alg] [-k private_key] [-i packet_index]\n" + "\n" + "Options:\n" + " -h Display this help\n" + " -c Count packets sent during KEX\n" + " -d Dump mode: record KEX packet to data file\n" + " -r Replace mode: replace packet with data file\n" + " -v Turn on verbose logging\n" + " -D S2C|C2S Packet direction for replacement or dump\n" + " -f data_file Path to data file for replacement or dump\n" + " -K kex_alg Name of KEX algorithm to test (see below)\n" + " -k private_key Path to private key file\n" + " -i packet_index Index of packet to replace or dump (from 0)\n" + "\n" + "Available KEX algorithms: %s\n", kex_alg_list(' ')); +} + +static void +badusage(const char *bad) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid options\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", bad); + usage(); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ch, fd, r; + int count_flag = 0, dump_flag = 0, replace_flag = 0; + int packet_index = -1, direction = -1; + int s2c = 0, c2s = 0; /* packet counts */ + const char *kex = NULL, *kpath = NULL, *data_path = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + struct sshbuf *replace_data = NULL; + + setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hcdrvD:f:K:k:i:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'h': + usage(); + return 0; + case 'c': + count_flag = 1; + break; + case 'd': + dump_flag = 1; + break; + case 'r': + replace_flag = 1; + break; + case 'v': + do_debug = 1; + break; + + case 'D': + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "s2c") == 0) + direction = S2C; + else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "c2s") == 0) + direction = C2S; + else + badusage("Invalid direction (-D)"); + break; + case 'f': + data_path = optarg; + break; + case 'K': + kex = optarg; + break; + case 'k': + kpath = optarg; + break; + case 'i': + packet_index = atoi(optarg); + if (packet_index < 0) + badusage("Invalid packet index"); + break; + default: + badusage("unsupported flag"); + } + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + log_init(argv[0], do_debug ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + /* Must select a single mode */ + if ((count_flag + dump_flag + replace_flag) != 1) + badusage("Must select one mode: -c, -d or -r"); + /* KEX type is mandatory */ + if (kex == NULL || !kex_names_valid(kex) || strchr(kex, ',') != NULL) + badusage("Missing or invalid kex type (-K flag)"); + /* Valid key is mandatory */ + if (kpath == NULL) + badusage("Missing private key (-k flag)"); + if ((fd = open(kpath, O_RDONLY)) == -1) + err(1, "open %s", kpath); + if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, + &key, NULL)) != 0) + errx(1, "Unable to load key %s: %s", kpath, ssh_err(r)); + close(fd); + /* XXX check that it is a private key */ + /* XXX support certificates */ + if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC) + badusage("Invalid key file (-k flag)"); + + /* Replace (fuzz) mode */ + if (replace_flag) { + if (packet_index == -1 || direction == -1 || data_path == NULL) + badusage("Replace (-r) mode must specify direction " + "(-D) packet index (-i) and data path (-f)"); + if ((fd = open(data_path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) + err(1, "open %s", data_path); + replace_data = sshbuf_new(); + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, replace_data)) != 0) + errx(1, "read %s: %s", data_path, ssh_err(r)); + close(fd); + } + + /* Dump mode */ + if (dump_flag) { + if (packet_index == -1 || direction == -1 || data_path == NULL) + badusage("Dump (-d) mode must specify direction " + "(-D), packet index (-i) and data path (-f)"); + } + + /* Count mode needs no further flags */ + + do_kex_with_key(kex, key, &c2s, &s2c, + direction, packet_index, + dump_flag ? data_path : NULL, + replace_flag ? replace_data : NULL); + sshkey_free(key); + sshbuf_free(replace_data); + + if (count_flag) { + printf("S2C: %d\n", s2c); + printf("C2S: %d\n", c2s); + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/regress/mkdtemp.c b/regress/mkdtemp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a7be1bd --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/mkdtemp.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Colin Watson + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* Roughly equivalent to "mktemp -d -t TEMPLATE", but portable. */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "mkdtemp template\n"); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const char *base; + const char *tmpdir; + char template[PATH_MAX]; + int r; + char *dir; + + if (argc != 2) + usage(); + base = argv[1]; + + if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL) + tmpdir = "/tmp"; + r = snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/%s", tmpdir, base); + if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(template)) + fatal("template string too long"); + dir = mkdtemp(template); + if (dir == NULL) { + perror("mkdtemp"); + exit(1); + } + puts(dir); + return 0; +} diff --git a/regress/modpipe.c b/regress/modpipe.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f4824b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/modpipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H +# include +#endif +#include "openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c" + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: modpipe -w [-m modspec ...] < in > out\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "modspec is one of:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " xor:offset:value - XOR \"value\" at \"offset\"\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " andor:offset:val1:val2 - AND \"val1\" then OR \"val2\" at \"offset\"\n"); + exit(1); +} + +#define MAX_MODIFICATIONS 256 +struct modification { + enum { MOD_XOR, MOD_AND_OR } what; + unsigned long long offset; + u_int8_t m1, m2; +}; + +static void +parse_modification(const char *s, struct modification *m) +{ + char what[16+1]; + int n, m1, m2; + + bzero(m, sizeof(*m)); + if ((n = sscanf(s, "%16[^:]%*[:]%llu%*[:]%i%*[:]%i", + what, &m->offset, &m1, &m2)) < 3) + errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s); + if (strcasecmp(what, "xor") == 0) { + if (n > 3) + errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s); + if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff) + errx(1, "Invalid XOR modification value"); + m->what = MOD_XOR; + m->m1 = m1; + } else if (strcasecmp(what, "andor") == 0) { + if (n != 4) + errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s); + if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff) + errx(1, "Invalid AND modification value"); + if (m2 < 0 || m2 > 0xff) + errx(1, "Invalid OR modification value"); + m->what = MOD_AND_OR; + m->m1 = m1; + m->m2 = m2; + } else + errx(1, "Invalid modification type \"%s\"", what); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ch; + u_char buf[8192]; + size_t total; + ssize_t r, s, o; + struct modification mods[MAX_MODIFICATIONS]; + u_int i, wflag = 0, num_mods = 0; + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "wm:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'm': + if (num_mods >= MAX_MODIFICATIONS) + errx(1, "Too many modifications"); + parse_modification(optarg, &(mods[num_mods++])); + break; + case 'w': + wflag = 1; + break; + default: + usage(); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + } + for (total = 0;;) { + r = s = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (r == 0) + break; + if (r < 0) { + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) + continue; + err(1, "read"); + } + for (i = 0; i < num_mods; i++) { + if (mods[i].offset < total || + mods[i].offset >= total + s) + continue; + switch (mods[i].what) { + case MOD_XOR: + buf[mods[i].offset - total] ^= mods[i].m1; + break; + case MOD_AND_OR: + buf[mods[i].offset - total] &= mods[i].m1; + buf[mods[i].offset - total] |= mods[i].m2; + break; + } + } + for (o = 0; o < s; o += r) { + r = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, s - o); + if (r == 0) + break; + if (r < 0) { + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) + continue; + err(1, "write"); + } + } + total += s; + } + /* Warn if modifications not reached in input stream */ + r = 0; + for (i = 0; wflag && i < num_mods; i++) { + if (mods[i].offset < total) + continue; + r = 1; + fprintf(stderr, "modpipe: warning - mod %u not reached\n", i); + } + return r; +} diff --git a/regress/moduli.in b/regress/moduli.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69c902 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/moduli.in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diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6fad8e --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/multiplex.sh @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.28 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +make_tmpdir +CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock + +tid="connection multiplexing" + +NC=$OBJ/netcat + +trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd" +if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then + echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)" + exit 0 +fi + +P=3301 # test port + +wait_for_mux_master_ready() +{ + for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \ + >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 + sleep $i + done + fatal "mux master never becomes ready" +} + +start_sshd + +start_mux_master() +{ + trace "start master, fork to background" + ${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \ + -E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & + # NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors. + SSH_PID=$! + wait_for_mux_master_ready +} + +start_mux_master + +verbose "test $tid: envpass" +trace "env passing over multiplexed connection" +_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF' + test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah" +EOF +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "environment not found" +fi + +verbose "test $tid: transfer" +rm -f ${COPY} +trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +rm -f ${COPY} +trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +rm -f ${COPY} +trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" +echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \ + ${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 +test -f ${COPY} || fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +rm -f ${COPY} +trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" +${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 +test -f ${COPY} || fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + +rm -f ${COPY} +verbose "test $tid: forward" +trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result" +$NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} > /dev/null & +netcat_pid=$! +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 +$NC 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) < /dev/null > ${COPY} +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" +kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null +rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd + +trace "forward over UNIX and check result" +$NC -N -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} > /dev/null & +netcat_pid=$! +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 +$NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY} 2>/dev/null +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" +kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null +rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd + +for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do + trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection" + verbose "test $tid: status $s" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s + r=$? + if [ $r -ne $s ]; then + fail "exit code mismatch: $r != $s" + fi + + # same with early close of stdout/err + trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection" + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n otherhost \ + exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\' + r=$? + if [ $r -ne $s ]; then + fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch: $r != $s" + fi +done + +verbose "test $tid: cmd check" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ + || fail "check command failed" + +verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "request local forward failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ + || fail "connect to local forward port failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "cancel local forward failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ + && fail "local forward port still listening" + +verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "request remote forward failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ + || fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "cancel remote forward failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ + && fail "remote forward port still listening" + +verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "request local forward failed" +echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "connect to local forward path failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "cancel local forward failed" +N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l) +test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening" +rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd + +verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "request remote forward failed" +echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "cancel remote forward failed" +N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l) +test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening" +rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd + +verbose "test $tid: cmd exit" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ + || fail "send exit command failed" + +# Wait for master to exit +wait $SSH_PID +kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed" + +# Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N +verbose "test $tid: cmd stop" +trace "restart master, fork to background" +start_mux_master + +# start a long-running command then immediately request a stop +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \ + >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & +SLEEP_PID=$! +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ + || fail "send stop command failed" + +# wait until both long-running command and master have exited. +wait $SLEEP_PID +[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command" +wait $SSH_PID +[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop" +kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed" +SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup + diff --git a/regress/multipubkey.sh b/regress/multipubkey.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9d1530 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/multipubkey.sh @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +# $OpenBSD: multipubkey.sh,v 1.1 2014/12/22 08:06:03 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="multiple pubkey" + +rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key* +rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key* + +mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig +mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig + +# Create a CA key +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" + +# Make some keys and a certificate. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key1 || + fail "couldn't sign user_key1" +# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when +# it is offered. +mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1.pub +cp -p $OBJ/user_key1 $OBJ/cert_user_key1 + +grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes" +opts="$opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2" + +for privsep in no yes; do + ( + grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig + echo "Protocol 2" + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey,publickey" + echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" + echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Single key should fail. + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key" + + # Single key with same-public cert should fail. + echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key+cert" + + # Multiple plain keys should succeed. + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub $OBJ/user_key2.pub > \ + $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with multiple keys" + # Cert and different key should succeed + + # Key and different-public cert should succeed. + echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with key/cert" +done + diff --git a/regress/netcat.c b/regress/netcat.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56bd09d --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/netcat.c @@ -0,0 +1,1664 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.126 2014/10/30 16:08:31 tedu Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Eric Jackson + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Re-written nc(1) for OpenBSD. Original implementation by + * *Hobbit* . + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "atomicio.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +#include +#else +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H +# include +# endif +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H +# include +#endif + +/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */ +#define IAC 255 +#define DONT 254 +#define DO 253 +#define WONT 252 +#define WILL 251 + +#ifndef SUN_LEN +#define SUN_LEN(su) \ + (sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path)) +#endif + +#define PORT_MAX 65535 +#define PORT_MAX_LEN 6 +#define UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE 19 + +#define POLL_STDIN 0 +#define POLL_NETOUT 1 +#define POLL_NETIN 2 +#define POLL_STDOUT 3 +#define BUFSIZE 16384 + +/* Command Line Options */ +int dflag; /* detached, no stdin */ +int Fflag; /* fdpass sock to stdout */ +unsigned int iflag; /* Interval Flag */ +int kflag; /* More than one connect */ +int lflag; /* Bind to local port */ +int Nflag; /* shutdown() network socket */ +int nflag; /* Don't do name look up */ +char *Pflag; /* Proxy username */ +char *pflag; /* Localport flag */ +int rflag; /* Random ports flag */ +char *sflag; /* Source Address */ +int tflag; /* Telnet Emulation */ +int uflag; /* UDP - Default to TCP */ +int vflag; /* Verbosity */ +int xflag; /* Socks proxy */ +int zflag; /* Port Scan Flag */ +int Dflag; /* sodebug */ +int Iflag; /* TCP receive buffer size */ +int Oflag; /* TCP send buffer size */ +int Sflag; /* TCP MD5 signature option */ +int Tflag = -1; /* IP Type of Service */ +int rtableid = -1; + +int timeout = -1; +int family = AF_UNSPEC; +char *portlist[PORT_MAX+1]; +char *unix_dg_tmp_socket; + +void atelnet(int, unsigned char *, unsigned int); +void build_ports(char *); +void help(void); +int local_listen(char *, char *, struct addrinfo); +void readwrite(int); +void fdpass(int nfd) __attribute__((noreturn)); +int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo); +int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); +int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, + const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *); +int udptest(int); +int unix_bind(char *); +int unix_connect(char *); +int unix_listen(char *); +void set_common_sockopts(int); +int map_tos(char *, int *); +void report_connect(const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); +void usage(int); +ssize_t drainbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *); +ssize_t fillbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *); + + +int +main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int ch, s, ret, socksv; + char *host, *uport; + struct addrinfo hints; + struct servent *sv; + socklen_t len; + struct sockaddr_storage cliaddr; + char *proxy = NULL; + const char *errstr, *proxyhost = "", *proxyport = NULL; + struct addrinfo proxyhints; + char unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf[UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE]; + + ret = 1; + s = 0; + socksv = 5; + host = NULL; + uport = NULL; + sv = NULL; + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, + "46DdFhI:i:klNnO:P:p:rSs:tT:UuV:vw:X:x:z")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case '4': + family = AF_INET; + break; + case '6': + family = AF_INET6; + break; + case 'U': + family = AF_UNIX; + break; + case 'X': + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "connect") == 0) + socksv = -1; /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */ + else if (strcmp(optarg, "4") == 0) + socksv = 4; /* SOCKS v.4 */ + else if (strcmp(optarg, "5") == 0) + socksv = 5; /* SOCKS v.5 */ + else + errx(1, "unsupported proxy protocol"); + break; + case 'd': + dflag = 1; + break; + case 'F': + Fflag = 1; + break; + case 'h': + help(); + break; + case 'i': + iflag = strtonum(optarg, 0, UINT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) + errx(1, "interval %s: %s", errstr, optarg); + break; + case 'k': + kflag = 1; + break; + case 'l': + lflag = 1; + break; + case 'N': + Nflag = 1; + break; + case 'n': + nflag = 1; + break; + case 'P': + Pflag = optarg; + break; + case 'p': + pflag = optarg; + break; + case 'r': + rflag = 1; + break; + case 's': + sflag = optarg; + break; + case 't': + tflag = 1; + break; + case 'u': + uflag = 1; + break; +#ifdef SO_RTABLE + case 'V': + rtableid = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, + RT_TABLEID_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) + errx(1, "rtable %s: %s", errstr, optarg); + break; +#endif + case 'v': + vflag = 1; + break; + case 'w': + timeout = strtonum(optarg, 0, INT_MAX / 1000, &errstr); + if (errstr) + errx(1, "timeout %s: %s", errstr, optarg); + timeout *= 1000; + break; + case 'x': + xflag = 1; + if ((proxy = strdup(optarg)) == NULL) + errx(1, "strdup"); + break; + case 'z': + zflag = 1; + break; + case 'D': + Dflag = 1; + break; + case 'I': + Iflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) + errx(1, "TCP receive window %s: %s", + errstr, optarg); + break; + case 'O': + Oflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) + errx(1, "TCP send window %s: %s", + errstr, optarg); + break; + case 'S': + Sflag = 1; + break; + case 'T': + errstr = NULL; + errno = 0; + if (map_tos(optarg, &Tflag)) + break; + if (strlen(optarg) > 1 && optarg[0] == '0' && + optarg[1] == 'x') + Tflag = (int)strtol(optarg, NULL, 16); + else + Tflag = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, 255, + &errstr); + if (Tflag < 0 || Tflag > 255 || errstr || errno) + errx(1, "illegal tos value %s", optarg); + break; + default: + usage(1); + } + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + /* Cruft to make sure options are clean, and used properly. */ + if (argv[0] && !argv[1] && family == AF_UNIX) { + host = argv[0]; + uport = NULL; + } else if (argv[0] && !argv[1]) { + if (!lflag) + usage(1); + uport = argv[0]; + host = NULL; + } else if (argv[0] && argv[1]) { + host = argv[0]; + uport = argv[1]; + } else + usage(1); + + if (lflag && sflag) + errx(1, "cannot use -s and -l"); + if (lflag && pflag) + errx(1, "cannot use -p and -l"); + if (lflag && zflag) + errx(1, "cannot use -z and -l"); + if (!lflag && kflag) + errx(1, "must use -l with -k"); + + /* Get name of temporary socket for unix datagram client */ + if ((family == AF_UNIX) && uflag && !lflag) { + if (sflag) { + unix_dg_tmp_socket = sflag; + } else { + strlcpy(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf, "/tmp/nc.XXXXXXXXXX", + UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE); + if (mktemp(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf) == NULL) + err(1, "mktemp"); + unix_dg_tmp_socket = unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf; + } + } + + /* Initialize addrinfo structure. */ + if (family != AF_UNIX) { + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); + hints.ai_family = family; + hints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + if (nflag) + hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST; + } + + if (xflag) { + if (uflag) + errx(1, "no proxy support for UDP mode"); + + if (lflag) + errx(1, "no proxy support for listen"); + + if (family == AF_UNIX) + errx(1, "no proxy support for unix sockets"); + + /* XXX IPv6 transport to proxy would probably work */ + if (family == AF_INET6) + errx(1, "no proxy support for IPv6"); + + if (sflag) + errx(1, "no proxy support for local source address"); + + proxyhost = strsep(&proxy, ":"); + proxyport = proxy; + + memset(&proxyhints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); + proxyhints.ai_family = family; + proxyhints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + proxyhints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; + if (nflag) + proxyhints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST; + } + + if (lflag) { + int connfd; + ret = 0; + + if (family == AF_UNIX) { + if (uflag) + s = unix_bind(host); + else + s = unix_listen(host); + } + + /* Allow only one connection at a time, but stay alive. */ + for (;;) { + if (family != AF_UNIX) + s = local_listen(host, uport, hints); + if (s < 0) + err(1, "local_listen"); + /* + * For UDP and -k, don't connect the socket, let it + * receive datagrams from multiple socket pairs. + */ + if (uflag && kflag) + readwrite(s); + /* + * For UDP and not -k, we will use recvfrom() initially + * to wait for a caller, then use the regular functions + * to talk to the caller. + */ + else if (uflag && !kflag) { + int rv, plen; + char buf[16384]; + struct sockaddr_storage z; + + len = sizeof(z); + plen = 2048; + rv = recvfrom(s, buf, plen, MSG_PEEK, + (struct sockaddr *)&z, &len); + if (rv < 0) + err(1, "recvfrom"); + + rv = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&z, len); + if (rv < 0) + err(1, "connect"); + + if (vflag) + report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&z, len); + + readwrite(s); + } else { + len = sizeof(cliaddr); + connfd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, + &len); + if (connfd == -1) { + /* For now, all errnos are fatal */ + err(1, "accept"); + } + if (vflag) + report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, len); + + readwrite(connfd); + close(connfd); + } + + if (family != AF_UNIX) + close(s); + else if (uflag) { + if (connect(s, NULL, 0) < 0) + err(1, "connect"); + } + + if (!kflag) + break; + } + } else if (family == AF_UNIX) { + ret = 0; + + if ((s = unix_connect(host)) > 0 && !zflag) { + readwrite(s); + close(s); + } else + ret = 1; + + if (uflag) + unlink(unix_dg_tmp_socket); + exit(ret); + + } else { + int i = 0; + + /* Construct the portlist[] array. */ + build_ports(uport); + + /* Cycle through portlist, connecting to each port. */ + for (i = 0; portlist[i] != NULL; i++) { + if (s) + close(s); + + if (xflag) + s = socks_connect(host, portlist[i], hints, + proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints, socksv, + Pflag); + else + s = remote_connect(host, portlist[i], hints); + + if (s < 0) + continue; + + ret = 0; + if (vflag || zflag) { + /* For UDP, make sure we are connected. */ + if (uflag) { + if (udptest(s) == -1) { + ret = 1; + continue; + } + } + + /* Don't look up port if -n. */ + if (nflag) + sv = NULL; + else { + sv = getservbyport( + ntohs(atoi(portlist[i])), + uflag ? "udp" : "tcp"); + } + + fprintf(stderr, + "Connection to %s %s port [%s/%s] " + "succeeded!\n", host, portlist[i], + uflag ? "udp" : "tcp", + sv ? sv->s_name : "*"); + } + if (Fflag) + fdpass(s); + else if (!zflag) + readwrite(s); + } + } + + if (s) + close(s); + + exit(ret); +} + +/* + * unix_bind() + * Returns a unix socket bound to the given path + */ +int +unix_bind(char *path) +{ + struct sockaddr_un sun_sa; + int s; + + /* Create unix domain socket. */ + if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM, + 0)) < 0) + return (-1); + + memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); + sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + + if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >= + sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) { + close(s); + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return (-1); + } + + if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) { + close(s); + return (-1); + } + return (s); +} + +/* + * unix_connect() + * Returns a socket connected to a local unix socket. Returns -1 on failure. + */ +int +unix_connect(char *path) +{ + struct sockaddr_un sun_sa; + int s; + + if (uflag) { + if ((s = unix_bind(unix_dg_tmp_socket)) < 0) + return (-1); + } else { + if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) + return (-1); + } + (void)fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + + memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); + sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + + if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >= + sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) { + close(s); + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return (-1); + } + if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) { + close(s); + return (-1); + } + return (s); + +} + +/* + * unix_listen() + * Create a unix domain socket, and listen on it. + */ +int +unix_listen(char *path) +{ + int s; + if ((s = unix_bind(path)) < 0) + return (-1); + + if (listen(s, 5) < 0) { + close(s); + return (-1); + } + return (s); +} + +/* + * remote_connect() + * Returns a socket connected to a remote host. Properly binds to a local + * port or source address if needed. Returns -1 on failure. + */ +int +remote_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints) +{ + struct addrinfo *res, *res0; + int s, error; +#if defined(SO_RTABLE) || defined(SO_BINDANY) + int on = 1; +#endif + + if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res))) + errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); + + res0 = res; + do { + if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype, + res0->ai_protocol)) < 0) + continue; + +#ifdef SO_RTABLE + if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, + &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1)) + err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE"); +#endif + /* Bind to a local port or source address if specified. */ + if (sflag || pflag) { + struct addrinfo ahints, *ares; + +#ifdef SO_BINDANY + /* try SO_BINDANY, but don't insist */ + setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDANY, &on, sizeof(on)); +#endif + memset(&ahints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); + ahints.ai_family = res0->ai_family; + ahints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + ahints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + ahints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + if ((error = getaddrinfo(sflag, pflag, &ahints, &ares))) + errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); + + if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)ares->ai_addr, + ares->ai_addrlen) < 0) + err(1, "bind failed"); + freeaddrinfo(ares); + } + + set_common_sockopts(s); + + if (timeout_connect(s, res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0) + break; + else if (vflag) + warn("connect to %s port %s (%s) failed", host, port, + uflag ? "udp" : "tcp"); + + close(s); + s = -1; + } while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL); + + freeaddrinfo(res); + + return (s); +} + +int +timeout_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen) +{ + struct pollfd pfd; + socklen_t optlen; + int flags = 0, optval; + int ret; + + if (timeout != -1) { + flags = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0); + if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) + err(1, "set non-blocking mode"); + } + + if ((ret = connect(s, name, namelen)) != 0 && errno == EINPROGRESS) { + pfd.fd = s; + pfd.events = POLLOUT; + if ((ret = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout)) == 1) { + optlen = sizeof(optval); + if ((ret = getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, + &optval, &optlen)) == 0) { + errno = optval; + ret = optval == 0 ? 0 : -1; + } + } else if (ret == 0) { + errno = ETIMEDOUT; + ret = -1; + } else + err(1, "poll failed"); + } + + if (timeout != -1 && fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags) == -1) + err(1, "restoring flags"); + + return (ret); +} + +/* + * local_listen() + * Returns a socket listening on a local port, binds to specified source + * address. Returns -1 on failure. + */ +int +local_listen(char *host, char *port, struct addrinfo hints) +{ + struct addrinfo *res, *res0; + int s, ret, x = 1; + int error; + + /* Allow nodename to be null. */ + hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE; + + /* + * In the case of binding to a wildcard address + * default to binding to an ipv4 address. + */ + if (host == NULL && hints.ai_family == AF_UNSPEC) + hints.ai_family = AF_INET; + + if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res))) + errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); + + res0 = res; + do { + if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype, + res0->ai_protocol)) < 0) + continue; + +#ifdef SO_RTABLE + if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, + &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1)) + err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE"); +#endif +#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT + ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &x, sizeof(x)); + if (ret == -1) + err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEPORT"); +#endif +#ifdef SO_REUSEADDR + ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &x, sizeof(x)); + if (ret == -1) + err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR"); +#endif + set_common_sockopts(s); + + if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)res0->ai_addr, + res0->ai_addrlen) == 0) + break; + + close(s); + s = -1; + } while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL); + + if (!uflag && s != -1) { + if (listen(s, 1) < 0) + err(1, "listen"); + } + + freeaddrinfo(res); + + return (s); +} + +/* + * readwrite() + * Loop that polls on the network file descriptor and stdin. + */ +void +readwrite(int net_fd) +{ + struct pollfd pfd[4]; + int stdin_fd = STDIN_FILENO; + int stdout_fd = STDOUT_FILENO; + unsigned char netinbuf[BUFSIZE]; + size_t netinbufpos = 0; + unsigned char stdinbuf[BUFSIZE]; + size_t stdinbufpos = 0; + int n, num_fds; + ssize_t ret; + + /* don't read from stdin if requested */ + if (dflag) + stdin_fd = -1; + + /* stdin */ + pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = stdin_fd; + pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN; + + /* network out */ + pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = net_fd; + pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0; + + /* network in */ + pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = net_fd; + pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN; + + /* stdout */ + pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = stdout_fd; + pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0; + + while (1) { + /* both inputs are gone, buffers are empty, we are done */ + if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 + && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) { + close(net_fd); + return; + } + /* both outputs are gone, we can't continue */ + if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) { + close(net_fd); + return; + } + /* listen and net in gone, queues empty, done */ + if (lflag && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 + && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) { + close(net_fd); + return; + } + + /* help says -i is for "wait between lines sent". We read and + * write arbitrary amounts of data, and we don't want to start + * scanning for newlines, so this is as good as it gets */ + if (iflag) + sleep(iflag); + + /* poll */ + num_fds = poll(pfd, 4, timeout); + + /* treat poll errors */ + if (num_fds == -1) { + close(net_fd); + err(1, "polling error"); + } + + /* timeout happened */ + if (num_fds == 0) + return; + + /* treat socket error conditions */ + for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) { + if (pfd[n].revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) { + pfd[n].fd = -1; + } + } + /* reading is possible after HUP */ + if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].events & POLLIN && + pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLHUP && + ! (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN)) + pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1; + + if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].events & POLLIN && + pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLHUP && + ! (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN)) + pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; + + if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLHUP) { + if (Nflag) + shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR); + pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1; + } + /* if HUP, stop watching stdout */ + if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLHUP) + pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1; + /* if no net out, stop watching stdin */ + if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1) + pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1; + /* if no stdout, stop watching net in */ + if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) { + if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd != -1) + shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD); + pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; + } + + /* try to read from stdin */ + if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN && stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) { + ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd, stdinbuf, + &stdinbufpos); + /* error or eof on stdin - remove from pfd */ + if (ret == 0 || ret == -1) + pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1; + /* read something - poll net out */ + if (stdinbufpos > 0) + pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = POLLOUT; + /* filled buffer - remove self from polling */ + if (stdinbufpos == BUFSIZE) + pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = 0; + } + /* try to write to network */ + if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLOUT && stdinbufpos > 0) { + ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, stdinbuf, + &stdinbufpos); + if (ret == -1) + pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1; + /* buffer empty - remove self from polling */ + if (stdinbufpos == 0) + pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0; + /* buffer no longer full - poll stdin again */ + if (stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) + pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN; + } + /* try to read from network */ + if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN && netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) { + ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf, + &netinbufpos); + if (ret == -1) + pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; + /* eof on net in - remove from pfd */ + if (ret == 0) { + shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD); + pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; + } + /* read something - poll stdout */ + if (netinbufpos > 0) + pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = POLLOUT; + /* filled buffer - remove self from polling */ + if (netinbufpos == BUFSIZE) + pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = 0; + /* handle telnet */ + if (tflag) + atelnet(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf, + netinbufpos); + } + /* try to write to stdout */ + if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLOUT && netinbufpos > 0) { + ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd, netinbuf, + &netinbufpos); + if (ret == -1) + pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1; + /* buffer empty - remove self from polling */ + if (netinbufpos == 0) + pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0; + /* buffer no longer full - poll net in again */ + if (netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) + pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN; + } + + /* stdin gone and queue empty? */ + if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0) { + if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd != -1 && Nflag) + shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR); + pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1; + } + /* net in gone and queue empty? */ + if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && netinbufpos == 0) { + pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1; + } + } +} + +ssize_t +drainbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos) +{ + ssize_t n; + ssize_t adjust; + + n = write(fd, buf, *bufpos); + /* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */ + if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) + n = -2; + if (n <= 0) + return n; + /* adjust buffer */ + adjust = *bufpos - n; + if (adjust > 0) + memmove(buf, buf + n, adjust); + *bufpos -= n; + return n; +} + + +ssize_t +fillbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos) +{ + size_t num = BUFSIZE - *bufpos; + ssize_t n; + + n = read(fd, buf + *bufpos, num); + /* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */ + if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) + n = -2; + if (n <= 0) + return n; + *bufpos += n; + return n; +} + +/* + * fdpass() + * Pass the connected file descriptor to stdout and exit. + */ +void +fdpass(int nfd) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) + struct msghdr msg; +#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR + union { + struct cmsghdr hdr; + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; + } cmsgbuf; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; +#endif + struct iovec vec; + char ch = '\0'; + struct pollfd pfd; + ssize_t r; + + memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); +#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR + msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&nfd; + msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(nfd); +#else + memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf)); + msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf; + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf); + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); + cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; + cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; + *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = nfd; +#endif + + vec.iov_base = &ch; + vec.iov_len = 1; + msg.msg_iov = &vec; + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; + + bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd)); + pfd.fd = STDOUT_FILENO; + for (;;) { + r = sendmsg(STDOUT_FILENO, &msg, 0); + if (r == -1) { + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) { + pfd.events = POLLOUT; + if (poll(&pfd, 1, -1) == -1) + err(1, "poll"); + continue; + } + err(1, "sendmsg"); + } else if (r == -1) + errx(1, "sendmsg: unexpected return value %zd", r); + else + break; + } + exit(0); +#else + errx(1, "%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__); +#endif +} + +/* Deal with RFC 854 WILL/WONT DO/DONT negotiation. */ +void +atelnet(int nfd, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int size) +{ + unsigned char *p, *end; + unsigned char obuf[4]; + + if (size < 3) + return; + end = buf + size - 2; + + for (p = buf; p < end; p++) { + if (*p != IAC) + continue; + + obuf[0] = IAC; + p++; + if ((*p == WILL) || (*p == WONT)) + obuf[1] = DONT; + else if ((*p == DO) || (*p == DONT)) + obuf[1] = WONT; + else + continue; + + p++; + obuf[2] = *p; + if (atomicio(vwrite, nfd, obuf, 3) != 3) + warn("Write Error!"); + } +} + +/* + * build_ports() + * Build an array of ports in portlist[], listing each port + * that we should try to connect to. + */ +void +build_ports(char *p) +{ + const char *errstr; + char *n; + int hi, lo, cp; + int x = 0; + + if ((n = strchr(p, '-')) != NULL) { + *n = '\0'; + n++; + + /* Make sure the ports are in order: lowest->highest. */ + hi = strtonum(n, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) + errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, n); + lo = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) + errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p); + + if (lo > hi) { + cp = hi; + hi = lo; + lo = cp; + } + + /* Load ports sequentially. */ + for (cp = lo; cp <= hi; cp++) { + portlist[x] = calloc(1, PORT_MAX_LEN); + if (portlist[x] == NULL) + errx(1, "calloc"); + snprintf(portlist[x], PORT_MAX_LEN, "%d", cp); + x++; + } + + /* Randomly swap ports. */ + if (rflag) { + int y; + char *c; + + for (x = 0; x <= (hi - lo); x++) { + y = (arc4random() & 0xFFFF) % (hi - lo); + c = portlist[x]; + portlist[x] = portlist[y]; + portlist[y] = c; + } + } + } else { + hi = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) + errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p); + portlist[0] = strdup(p); + if (portlist[0] == NULL) + errx(1, "strdup"); + } +} + +/* + * udptest() + * Do a few writes to see if the UDP port is there. + * Fails once PF state table is full. + */ +int +udptest(int s) +{ + int i, ret; + + for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) { + if (write(s, "X", 1) == 1) + ret = 1; + else + ret = -1; + } + return (ret); +} + +void +set_common_sockopts(int s) +{ + int x = 1; + +#ifdef TCP_MD5SIG + if (Sflag) { + if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG, + &x, sizeof(x)) == -1) + err(1, "setsockopt"); + } +#endif + if (Dflag) { + if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, + &x, sizeof(x)) == -1) + err(1, "setsockopt"); + } + if (Tflag != -1) { + if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, + &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1) + err(1, "set IP ToS"); + } + if (Iflag) { + if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, + &Iflag, sizeof(Iflag)) == -1) + err(1, "set TCP receive buffer size"); + } + if (Oflag) { + if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, + &Oflag, sizeof(Oflag)) == -1) + err(1, "set TCP send buffer size"); + } +} + +int +map_tos(char *s, int *val) +{ + /* DiffServ Codepoints and other TOS mappings */ + const struct toskeywords { + const char *keyword; + int val; + } *t, toskeywords[] = { + { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, + { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, + { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, + { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 }, + { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 }, + { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 }, + { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 }, + { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 }, + { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 }, + { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 }, + { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 }, + { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 }, + { "critical", IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP }, + { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 }, + { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 }, + { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 }, + { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 }, + { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 }, + { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 }, + { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 }, + { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 }, + { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF }, + { "inetcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL }, + { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY }, + { "netcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL }, + { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY }, + { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT }, + { NULL, -1 }, + }; + + for (t = toskeywords; t->keyword != NULL; t++) { + if (strcmp(s, t->keyword) == 0) { + *val = t->val; + return (1); + } + } + + return (0); +} + +void +report_connect(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen) +{ + char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST]; + char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV]; + int herr; + int flags = NI_NUMERICSERV; + + if (nflag) + flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST; + + if ((herr = getnameinfo(sa, salen, + remote_host, sizeof(remote_host), + remote_port, sizeof(remote_port), + flags)) != 0) { + if (herr == EAI_SYSTEM) + err(1, "getnameinfo"); + else + errx(1, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(herr)); + } + + fprintf(stderr, + "Connection from %s %s " + "received!\n", remote_host, remote_port); +} + +void +help(void) +{ + usage(0); + fprintf(stderr, "\tCommand Summary:\n\ + \t-4 Use IPv4\n\ + \t-6 Use IPv6\n\ + \t-D Enable the debug socket option\n\ + \t-d Detach from stdin\n\ + \t-F Pass socket fd\n\ + \t-h This help text\n\ + \t-I length TCP receive buffer length\n\ + \t-i secs\t Delay interval for lines sent, ports scanned\n\ + \t-k Keep inbound sockets open for multiple connects\n\ + \t-l Listen mode, for inbound connects\n\ + \t-N Shutdown the network socket after EOF on stdin\n\ + \t-n Suppress name/port resolutions\n\ + \t-O length TCP send buffer length\n\ + \t-P proxyuser\tUsername for proxy authentication\n\ + \t-p port\t Specify local port for remote connects\n\ + \t-r Randomize remote ports\n\ + \t-S Enable the TCP MD5 signature option\n\ + \t-s addr\t Local source address\n\ + \t-T toskeyword\tSet IP Type of Service\n\ + \t-t Answer TELNET negotiation\n\ + \t-U Use UNIX domain socket\n\ + \t-u UDP mode\n\ + \t-V rtable Specify alternate routing table\n\ + \t-v Verbose\n\ + \t-w secs\t Timeout for connects and final net reads\n\ + \t-X proto Proxy protocol: \"4\", \"5\" (SOCKS) or \"connect\"\n\ + \t-x addr[:port]\tSpecify proxy address and port\n\ + \t-z Zero-I/O mode [used for scanning]\n\ + Port numbers can be individual or ranges: lo-hi [inclusive]\n"); + exit(1); +} + +void +usage(int ret) +{ + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: nc [-46DdFhklNnrStUuvz] [-I length] [-i interval] [-O length]\n" + "\t [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T ToS]\n" + "\t [-V rtable] [-w timeout] [-X proxy_protocol]\n" + "\t [-x proxy_address[:port]] [destination] [port]\n"); + if (ret) + exit(1); +} + +/* *** src/usr.bin/nc/socks.c *** */ + + +/* $OpenBSD: socks.c,v 1.20 2012/03/08 09:56:28 espie Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define SOCKS_PORT "1080" +#define HTTP_PROXY_PORT "3128" +#define HTTP_MAXHDRS 64 +#define SOCKS_V5 5 +#define SOCKS_V4 4 +#define SOCKS_NOAUTH 0 +#define SOCKS_NOMETHOD 0xff +#define SOCKS_CONNECT 1 +#define SOCKS_IPV4 1 +#define SOCKS_DOMAIN 3 +#define SOCKS_IPV6 4 + +int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo); +int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, + const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, + const char *); + +static int +decode_addrport(const char *h, const char *p, struct sockaddr *addr, + socklen_t addrlen, int v4only, int numeric) +{ + int r; + struct addrinfo hints, *res; + + bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = v4only ? PF_INET : PF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_flags = numeric ? AI_NUMERICHOST : 0; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + r = getaddrinfo(h, p, &hints, &res); + /* Don't fatal when attempting to convert a numeric address */ + if (r != 0) { + if (!numeric) { + errx(1, "getaddrinfo(\"%.64s\", \"%.64s\"): %s", h, p, + gai_strerror(r)); + } + return (-1); + } + if (addrlen < res->ai_addrlen) { + freeaddrinfo(res); + errx(1, "internal error: addrlen < res->ai_addrlen"); + } + memcpy(addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); + freeaddrinfo(res); + return (0); +} + +static int +proxy_read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsz) +{ + size_t off; + + for(off = 0;;) { + if (off >= bufsz) + errx(1, "proxy read too long"); + if (atomicio(read, fd, buf + off, 1) != 1) + err(1, "proxy read"); + /* Skip CR */ + if (buf[off] == '\r') + continue; + if (buf[off] == '\n') { + buf[off] = '\0'; + break; + } + off++; + } + return (off); +} + +static const char * +getproxypass(const char *proxyuser, const char *proxyhost) +{ + char prompt[512]; + static char pw[256]; + + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Proxy password for %s@%s: ", + proxyuser, proxyhost); + if (readpassphrase(prompt, pw, sizeof(pw), RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL) + errx(1, "Unable to read proxy passphrase"); + return (pw); +} + +int +socks_connect(const char *host, const char *port, + struct addrinfo hints __attribute__ ((__unused__)), + const char *proxyhost, const char *proxyport, struct addrinfo proxyhints, + int socksv, const char *proxyuser) +{ + int proxyfd, r, authretry = 0; + size_t hlen, wlen = 0; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + size_t cnt; + struct sockaddr_storage addr; + struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; + struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr; + in_port_t serverport; + const char *proxypass = NULL; + + if (proxyport == NULL) + proxyport = (socksv == -1) ? HTTP_PROXY_PORT : SOCKS_PORT; + + /* Abuse API to lookup port */ + if (decode_addrport("0.0.0.0", port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, + sizeof(addr), 1, 1) == -1) + errx(1, "unknown port \"%.64s\"", port); + serverport = in4->sin_port; + + again: + if (authretry++ > 3) + errx(1, "Too many authentication failures"); + + proxyfd = remote_connect(proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints); + + if (proxyfd < 0) + return (-1); + + if (socksv == 5) { + if (decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, + sizeof(addr), 0, 1) == -1) + addr.ss_family = 0; /* used in switch below */ + + /* Version 5, one method: no authentication */ + buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; + buf[1] = 1; + buf[2] = SOCKS_NOAUTH; + cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, 3); + if (cnt != 3) + err(1, "write failed (%zu/3)", cnt); + + cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 2); + if (cnt != 2) + err(1, "read failed (%zu/3)", cnt); + + if (buf[1] == SOCKS_NOMETHOD) + errx(1, "authentication method negotiation failed"); + + switch (addr.ss_family) { + case 0: + /* Version 5, connect: domain name */ + + /* Max domain name length is 255 bytes */ + hlen = strlen(host); + if (hlen > 255) + errx(1, "host name too long for SOCKS5"); + buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; + buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; + buf[2] = 0; + buf[3] = SOCKS_DOMAIN; + buf[4] = hlen; + memcpy(buf + 5, host, hlen); + memcpy(buf + 5 + hlen, &serverport, sizeof serverport); + wlen = 7 + hlen; + break; + case AF_INET: + /* Version 5, connect: IPv4 address */ + buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; + buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; + buf[2] = 0; + buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV4; + memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr); + memcpy(buf + 8, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port); + wlen = 10; + break; + case AF_INET6: + /* Version 5, connect: IPv6 address */ + buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; + buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; + buf[2] = 0; + buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV6; + memcpy(buf + 4, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof in6->sin6_addr); + memcpy(buf + 20, &in6->sin6_port, + sizeof in6->sin6_port); + wlen = 22; + break; + default: + errx(1, "internal error: silly AF"); + } + + cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen); + if (cnt != wlen) + err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen); + + cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 4); + if (cnt != 4) + err(1, "read failed (%zu/4)", cnt); + if (buf[1] != 0) + errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]); + switch (buf[3]) { + case SOCKS_IPV4: + cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 6); + if (cnt != 6) + err(1, "read failed (%zu/6)", cnt); + break; + case SOCKS_IPV6: + cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 18); + if (cnt != 18) + err(1, "read failed (%zu/18)", cnt); + break; + default: + errx(1, "connection failed, unsupported address type"); + } + } else if (socksv == 4) { + /* This will exit on lookup failure */ + decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, + sizeof(addr), 1, 0); + + /* Version 4 */ + buf[0] = SOCKS_V4; + buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; /* connect */ + memcpy(buf + 2, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port); + memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr); + buf[8] = 0; /* empty username */ + wlen = 9; + + cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen); + if (cnt != wlen) + err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen); + + cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 8); + if (cnt != 8) + err(1, "read failed (%zu/8)", cnt); + if (buf[1] != 90) + errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]); + } else if (socksv == -1) { + /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */ + + /* Disallow bad chars in hostname */ + if (strcspn(host, "\r\n\t []:") != strlen(host)) + errx(1, "Invalid hostname"); + + /* Try to be sane about numeric IPv6 addresses */ + if (strchr(host, ':') != NULL) { + r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "CONNECT [%s]:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n", + host, ntohs(serverport)); + } else { + r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n", + host, ntohs(serverport)); + } + if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf)) + errx(1, "hostname too long"); + r = strlen(buf); + + cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r); + if (cnt != (size_t)r) + err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r); + + if (authretry > 1) { + char resp[1024]; + + proxypass = getproxypass(proxyuser, proxyhost); + r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s:%s", + proxyuser, proxypass); + if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) || + b64_ntop(buf, strlen(buf), resp, + sizeof(resp)) == -1) + errx(1, "Proxy username/password too long"); + r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: " + "Basic %s\r\n", resp); + if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf)) + errx(1, "Proxy auth response too long"); + r = strlen(buf); + if ((cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r)) != (size_t)r) + err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r); + } + + /* Terminate headers */ + if ((r = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, "\r\n", 2)) != 2) + err(1, "write failed (2/%d)", r); + + /* Read status reply */ + proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (proxyuser != NULL && + strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 407 ", 12) == 0) { + if (authretry > 1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Proxy authentication " + "failed\n"); + } + close(proxyfd); + goto again; + } else if (strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 ", 12) != 0 && + strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.1 200 ", 12) != 0) + errx(1, "Proxy error: \"%s\"", buf); + + /* Headers continue until we hit an empty line */ + for (r = 0; r < HTTP_MAXHDRS; r++) { + proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (*buf == '\0') + break; + } + if (*buf != '\0') + errx(1, "Too many proxy headers received"); + } else + errx(1, "Unknown proxy protocol %d", socksv); + + return (proxyfd); +} + diff --git a/regress/portnum.sh b/regress/portnum.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c56b869 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/portnum.sh @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +# $OpenBSD: portnum.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 10:34:30 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="port number parsing" + +badport() { + port=$1 + verbose "$tid: invalid port $port" + if ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -p $port somehost true 2>/dev/null ; then + fail "$tid accepted invalid port $port" + fi +} +goodport() { + port=$1 + verbose "$tid: valid port $port" + if ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -p $port somehost true 2>/dev/null ; then + : + else + fail "$tid rejected valid port $port" + fi +} + +badport 0 +badport 65536 +badport 131073 +badport 2000blah +badport blah2000 + +goodport 1 +goodport 22 +goodport 2222 +goodport 22222 +goodport 65535 + diff --git a/regress/principals-command.sh b/regress/principals-command.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bcc68e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/principals-command.sh @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="authorized principals command" + +rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then + echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" + echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" + exit 0 +fi + +SERIAL=$$ + +# Create a CA key and a user certificate. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "Joanne User" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ + fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key" + +CERT_BODY=`cat $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` +CA_BODY=`cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` +CERT_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` +CA_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` + +# Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have +# acceptable directory permissions. +PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}" +cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND'" +#!/bin/sh +test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 +test "x\$2" != "xssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" && exit 1 +test "x\$3" != "xssh-ed25519" && exit 1 +test "x\$4" != "xJoanne User" && exit 1 +test "x\$5" != "x${SERIAL}" && exit 1 +test "x\$6" != "x${CA_FP}" && exit 1 +test "x\$7" != "x${CERT_FP}" && exit 1 +test "x\$8" != "x${CERT_BODY}" && exit 1 +test "x\$9" != "x${CA_BODY}" && exit 1 +test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" && + exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" +_EOF +test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command" +$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND" + +if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ; then + echo "skipping: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND is unsuitable as " \ + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand" + $SUDO rm -f $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND + exit 0 +fi + +if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then + # Test explicitly-specified principals + for privsep in yes no ; do + _prefix="privsep $privsep" + + # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none" + echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND" \ + "%u %t %T %i %s %F %f %k %K" + echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}" + echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # XXX test missing command + # XXX test failing command + + # Empty authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals" + echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Wrong authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals" + echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Correct authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals" + echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + + # authorized_principals with bad key option + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt" + echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # authorized_principals with command=false + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false" + echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \ + $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # authorized_principals with command=true + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true" + echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \ + $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + + # Setup for principals= key option + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Wrong principals list + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option" + ( + printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" ' + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Correct principals list + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option" + ( + printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" ' + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + done +else + echo "SKIPPED: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND not executable " \ + "(/var/run mounted noexec?)" +fi diff --git a/regress/proto-mismatch.sh b/regress/proto-mismatch.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ab28c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/proto-mismatch.sh @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +# $OpenBSD: proto-mismatch.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="protocol version mismatch" + +mismatch () +{ + client=$2 + banner=`echo ${client} | ${SSHD} -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy` + r=$? + trace "sshd prints ${banner}" + if [ $r -ne 255 ]; then + fail "sshd prints ${banner} but accepts version ${client}" + fi +} + +mismatch SSH-1.5-HALLO diff --git a/regress/proto-version.sh b/regress/proto-version.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f33b1f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/proto-version.sh @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +# $OpenBSD: proto-version.sh,v 1.7 2017/06/07 01:48:15 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sshd version with different protocol combinations" + +# we just start sshd in inetd mode and check the banner +check_version () +{ + expect=$1 + banner=`printf '' | ${SSHD} -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy` + case ${banner} in + SSH-1.99-*) + proto=199 + ;; + SSH-2.0-*) + proto=20 + ;; + SSH-1.5-*) + proto=15 + ;; + *) + proto=0 + ;; + esac + if [ ${expect} -ne ${proto} ]; then + fail "wrong protocol version ${banner}" + fi +} + +check_version 20 diff --git a/regress/proxy-connect.sh b/regress/proxy-connect.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..39bbd3c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/proxy-connect.sh @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.11 2017/09/26 22:39:25 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="proxy connect" + +for c in no yes; do + verbose "plain username comp=$c" + opts="-oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" + SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh proxyconnect comp=$c failed" + fi + if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then + fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION comp=$c: " \ + "$SSH_CONNECTION" + fi +done + +verbose "username with style" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \ + fail "ssh proxyconnect failed" diff --git a/regress/putty-ciphers.sh b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..191a2bd --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.6 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="putty ciphers" + +if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then + echo "putty interop tests not enabled" + exit 0 +fi + +for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr ; do + verbose "$tid: cipher $c" + cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ + ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c + echo "Cipher=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c + + rm -f ${COPY} + env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ + cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" +done +rm -f ${COPY} + diff --git a/regress/putty-kex.sh b/regress/putty-kex.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71c0970 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/putty-kex.sh @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# $OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.4 2016/11/25 03:02:01 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="putty KEX" + +if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then + echo "putty interop tests not enabled" + exit 0 +fi + +for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ; do + verbose "$tid: kex $k" + cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ + ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k + echo "KEX=$k" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k + + env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load kex_$k -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "KEX $k failed" + fi +done + diff --git a/regress/putty-transfer.sh b/regress/putty-transfer.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4928d45 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/putty-transfer.sh @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.6 2018/02/23 03:03:00 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="putty transfer data" + +if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then + echo "putty interop tests not enabled" + exit 0 +fi + +for c in 0 1 ; do + verbose "$tid: compression $c" + rm -f ${COPY} + cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \ + ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c + echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k + env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \ + -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + + for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do + trace "compression $c dd-size ${s}" + rm -f ${COPY} + dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ + env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \ + -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ + "cat > ${COPY}" + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" + fi + cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + done +done +rm -f ${COPY} + diff --git a/regress/reconfigure.sh b/regress/reconfigure.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd15edd --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/reconfigure.sh @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +# $OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="simple connect after reconfigure" + +# we need the full path to sshd for -HUP +if test "x$USE_VALGRIND" = "x" ; then + case $SSHD in + /*) + # full path is OK + ;; + *) + # otherwise make fully qualified + SSHD=$OBJ/$SSHD + esac +fi + +start_sshd + +trace "connect before restart" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed before reconfigure" +fi + +PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` +rm -f $PIDFILE +$SUDO kill -HUP $PID + +trace "wait for sshd to restart" +i=0; +while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do + i=`expr $i + 1` + sleep $i +done + +test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart" + +trace "connect after restart" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect with failed after reconfigure" +fi diff --git a/regress/reexec.sh b/regress/reexec.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2192456 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/reexec.sh @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +# $OpenBSD: reexec.sh,v 1.12 2017/08/07 03:52:55 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="reexec tests" + +SSHD_ORIG=$SSHD +SSHD_COPY=$OBJ/sshd + +# Start a sshd and then delete it +start_sshd_copy () +{ + cp $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY + SSHD=$SSHD_COPY + start_sshd + SSHD=$SSHD_ORIG +} + +# Do basic copy tests +copy_tests () +{ + rm -f ${COPY} + ${SSH} -nq -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost \ + cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + rm -f ${COPY} +} + +verbose "test config passing" + +cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig +start_sshd +echo "InvalidXXX=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config + +copy_tests + +stop_sshd + +cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config + +# cygwin can't fork a deleted binary +if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then + +verbose "test reexec fallback" + +start_sshd_copy +rm -f $SSHD_COPY + +copy_tests + +stop_sshd +fi diff --git a/regress/rekey.sh b/regress/rekey.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd6a02c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/rekey.sh @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.18 2018/04/10 00:14:10 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="rekey" + +LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} + +rm -f ${LOG} +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +# Test rekeying based on data volume only. +# Arguments will be passed to ssh. +ssh_data_rekeying() +{ + _kexopt=$1 ; shift + _opts="$@" + if ! test -z "$_kexopts" ; then + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "$_kexopt" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + _opts="$_opts -o$_kexopt" + fi + rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} + _opts="$_opts -oCompression=no" + ${SSH} <${DATA} $_opts -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}" + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed ($@)" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy ($@)" + n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` + n=`expr $n - 1` + trace "$n rekeying(s)" + if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then + fail "no rekeying occurred ($@)" + fi +} + +increase_datafile_size 300 + +opts="" +for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do + opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i" +done +for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do + opts="$opts Ciphers=$i" +done +for i in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do + opts="$opts MACs=$i" +done + +for opt in $opts; do + verbose "client rekey $opt" + ssh_data_rekeying "$opt" -oRekeyLimit=256k +done + +# AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms +if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do + for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do + verbose "client rekey $c $kex" + ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c + done + done +fi + +for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do + verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}" + ssh_data_rekeying "" -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s +done + +for s in 5 10; do + verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s}" + rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} + ${SSH} < ${DATA} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \ + $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 3" + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` + n=`expr $n - 1` + trace "$n rekeying(s)" + if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then + fail "no rekeying occurred" + fi +done + +for s in 5 10; do + verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s} no data" + rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} + ${SSH} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \ + $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3" + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed" + fi + n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` + n=`expr $n - 1` + trace "$n rekeying(s)" + if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then + fail "no rekeying occurred" + fi +done + +for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do + verbose "server rekeylimit ${s}" + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "rekeylimit ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy + rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} + ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat ${DATA}" \ + > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` + n=`expr $n - 1` + trace "$n rekeying(s)" + if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then + fail "no rekeying occurred" + fi +done + +for s in 5 10; do + verbose "server rekeylimit default ${s} no data" + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "rekeylimit default ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy + rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} + ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3" + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed" + fi + n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` + n=`expr $n - 1` + trace "$n rekeying(s)" + if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then + fail "no rekeying occurred" + fi +done + +verbose "rekeylimit parsing" +for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G 4G 8G; do + for time in 1 1m 1M 1h 1H 1d 1D 1w 1W; do + case $size in + 16) bytes=16 ;; + 1k|1K) bytes=1024 ;; + 1m|1M) bytes=1048576 ;; + 1g|1G) bytes=1073741824 ;; + 4g|4G) bytes=4294967296 ;; + 8g|8G) bytes=8589934592 ;; + esac + case $time in + 1) seconds=1 ;; + 1m|1M) seconds=60 ;; + 1h|1H) seconds=3600 ;; + 1d|1D) seconds=86400 ;; + 1w|1W) seconds=604800 ;; + esac + + b=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \ + awk '/rekeylimit/{print $2}'` + s=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \ + awk '/rekeylimit/{print $3}'` + + if [ "$bytes" != "$b" ]; then + fatal "rekeylimit size: expected $bytes bytes got $b" + fi + if [ "$seconds" != "$s" ]; then + fatal "rekeylimit time: expected $time seconds got $s" + fi + done +done + +rm -f ${COPY} ${DATA} diff --git a/regress/rsa_openssh.prv b/regress/rsa_openssh.prv new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2675555 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/rsa_openssh.prv @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIICWgIBAAKBgQDsilwKcaKN6wSMNd1WgQ9+HRqQEkD0kCTVttrazGu0OhBU3Uko ++dFD1Ip0CxdXmN25JQWxOYF7h/Ocu8P3jzv3RTX87xKR0YzlXTLX+SLtF/ySebS3 +xWPrlfRUDhh03hR5V+8xxvvy9widPYKw/oItwGSueOsEq1LTczCDv2dAjQIDAQAB +An8nH5VzvHkMbSqJ6eOYDsVwomRvYbH5IEaYl1x6VATITNvAu9kUdQ4NsSpuMc+7 +Jj9gKZvmO1y2YCKc0P/iO+i/eV0L+yQh1Rw18jQZll+12T+LZrKRav03YNvMx0gN +wqWY48Kt6hv2/N/ebQzKRe79+D0t2cTh92hT7xENFLIBAkEBGnoGKFjAUkJCwO1V +mzpUqMHpRZVOrqP9hUmPjzNJ5oBPFGe4+h1hoSRFOAzaNuZt8ssbqaLCkzB8bfzj +qhZqAQJBANZekuUpp8iBLeLSagw5FkcPwPzq6zfExbhvsZXb8Bo/4SflNs4JHXwI +7SD9Z8aJLvM4uQ/5M70lblDMQ40i3o0CQQDIJvBYBFL5tlOgakq/O7yi+wt0L5BZ +9H79w5rCSAA0IHRoK/qI1urHiHC3f3vbbLk5UStfrqEaND/mm0shyNIBAkBLsYdC +/ctt5Bc0wUGK4Vl5bBmj9LtrrMJ4FpBpLwj/69BwCuKoK9XKZ0h73p6XHveCEGRg +PIlFX4MtaoLrwgU9AkBV2k4dgIws+X8YX65EsyyFjnlDqX4x0nSOjQB1msIKfHBr +dh5XLDBTTCxnKhMJ0Yx/opgOvf09XHBFwaQntR5i +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/rsa_openssh.pub b/regress/rsa_openssh.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b504730 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/rsa_openssh.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDsilwKcaKN6wSMNd1WgQ9+HRqQEkD0kCTVttrazGu0OhBU3Uko+dFD1Ip0CxdXmN25JQWxOYF7h/Ocu8P3jzv3RTX87xKR0YzlXTLX+SLtF/ySebS3xWPrlfRUDhh03hR5V+8xxvvy9widPYKw/oItwGSueOsEq1LTczCDv2dAjQ== diff --git a/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv b/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ece3d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ---- +Subject: ssh-keygen test +Comment: "1024-bit rsa, Sat Jun 23 2001 12:21:26 -0400" +P2/56wAAAi4AAAA3aWYtbW9kbntzaWdue3JzYS1wa2NzMS1zaGExfSxlbmNyeXB0e3JzYS +1wa2NzMXYyLW9hZXB9fQAAAARub25lAAAB3wAAAdsAAAARAQABAAAD9icflXO8eQxtKonp +45gOxXCiZG9hsfkgRpiXXHpUBMhM28C72RR1Dg2xKm4xz7smP2Apm+Y7XLZgIpzQ/+I76L +95XQv7JCHVHDXyNBmWX7XZP4tmspFq/Tdg28zHSA3CpZjjwq3qG/b8395tDMpF7v34PS3Z +xOH3aFPvEQ0UsgEAAAQA7IpcCnGijesEjDXdVoEPfh0akBJA9JAk1bba2sxrtDoQVN1JKP +nRQ9SKdAsXV5jduSUFsTmBe4fznLvD948790U1/O8SkdGM5V0y1/ki7Rf8knm0t8Vj65X0 +VA4YdN4UeVfvMcb78vcInT2CsP6CLcBkrnjrBKtS03Mwg79nQI0AAAH/VdpOHYCMLPl/GF ++uRLMshY55Q6l+MdJ0jo0AdZrCCnxwa3YeVywwU0wsZyoTCdGMf6KYDr39PVxwRcGkJ7Ue +YgAAAgDWXpLlKafIgS3i0moMORZHD8D86us3xMW4b7GV2/AaP+En5TbOCR18CO0g/WfGiS +7zOLkP+TO9JW5QzEONIt6NAAACAQEaegYoWMBSQkLA7VWbOlSowelFlU6uo/2FSY+PM0nm +gE8UZ7j6HWGhJEU4DNo25m3yyxuposKTMHxt/OOqFmoB +---- END SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ---- +--- diff --git a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59f1ff6 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $OpenBSD: scp-ssh-wrapper.sh,v 1.3 2014/01/26 10:49:17 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +printname () { + NAME=$1 + save_IFS=$IFS + IFS=/ + set -- `echo "$NAME"` + IFS="$save_IFS" + while [ $# -ge 1 ] ; do + if [ "x$1" != "x" ]; then + echo "D0755 0 $1" + fi + shift; + done +} + +# Discard all but last argument. We use arg later. +while test "x$1" != "x"; do + arg="$1" + shift +done + +BAD="../../../../../../../../../../../../../${DIR}/dotpathdir" + +case "$SCPTESTMODE" in +badserver_0) + echo "D0755 0 /${DIR}/rootpathdir" + echo "C755 2 rootpathfile" + echo "X" + ;; +badserver_1) + echo "D0755 0 $BAD" + echo "C755 2 file" + echo "X" + ;; +badserver_2) + echo "D0755 0 $BAD" + echo "C755 2 file" + echo "X" + ;; +badserver_3) + printname $BAD + echo "C755 2 file" + echo "X" + ;; +badserver_4) + printname $BAD + echo "D0755 0 .." + echo "C755 2 file" + echo "X" + ;; +*) + set -- $arg + shift + exec $SCP "$@" + ;; +esac diff --git a/regress/scp-uri.sh b/regress/scp-uri.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c03d8bb --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/scp-uri.sh @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +# $OpenBSD: scp-uri.sh,v 1.2 2017/12/11 11:41:56 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="scp-uri" + +#set -x + +COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2 +DIR=${COPY}.dd +DIR2=${COPY}.dd2 + +SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` +cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp +chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp +scpopts="-q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp" +export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp + +scpclean() { + rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2} + mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2} +} + +# Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI +cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig +egrep -v '^ +(Port|User) +.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config + +verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote file" +scpclean +$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local file" +scpclean +$SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" ${COPY} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote dir" +scpclean +cp ${DATA} ${COPY} +$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local dir" +scpclean +cp ${DATA} ${COPY} +$SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" ${DIR} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to remote dir" +scpclean +rm -rf ${DIR2} +cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy +$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR2}" || fail "copy failed" +for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do + cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy" +done + +verbose "$tid: recursive remote dir to local dir" +scpclean +rm -rf ${DIR2} +cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy +$SCP $scpopts -r "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed" +for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do + cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy" +done + +# TODO: scp -3 + +scpclean +rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.exe diff --git a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57cc770 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/scp.sh @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +# $OpenBSD: scp.sh,v 1.10 2014/01/26 10:49:17 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="scp" + +#set -x + +# Figure out if diff understands "-N" +if diff -N ${SRC}/scp.sh ${SRC}/scp.sh 2>/dev/null; then + DIFFOPT="-rN" +else + DIFFOPT="-r" +fi + +COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2 +DIR=${COPY}.dd +DIR2=${COPY}.dd2 + +SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` +cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp +chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp +scpopts="-q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp" +export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp + +scpclean() { + rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2} + mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2} +} + +verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local file" +scpclean +$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote file" +scpclean +$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} somehost:${COPY} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local file" +scpclean +$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to remote dir" +scpclean +cp ${DATA} ${COPY} +$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} somehost:${DIR} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local dir" +scpclean +cp ${DATA} ${COPY} +$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: simple copy remote file to local dir" +scpclean +cp ${DATA} ${COPY} +$SCP $scpopts somehost:${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to remote dir" +scpclean +rm -rf ${DIR2} +cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy +$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} somehost:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed" +diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: recursive local dir to local dir" +scpclean +rm -rf ${DIR2} +cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy +$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed" +diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: recursive remote dir to local dir" +scpclean +rm -rf ${DIR2} +cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy +$SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed" +diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: shell metacharacters" +scpclean +(cd ${DIR} && \ +touch '`touch metachartest`' && \ +$SCP $scpopts *metachar* ${DIR2} 2>/dev/null; \ +[ ! -f metachartest ] ) || fail "shell metacharacters" + +if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then + verbose "$tid: skipped file after scp -p with failed chown+utimes" + scpclean + cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy + cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy2 + cp ${DATA} ${DIR2}/copy + chmod 660 ${DIR2}/copy + $SUDO chown root ${DIR2}/copy + $SCP -p $scpopts somehost:${DIR}/\* ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>&1 + $SUDO diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy" + $SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy +fi + +for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do + verbose "$tid: disallow bad server #$i" + SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i + export DIR SCPTESTMODE + scpclean + $SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null + [ -d {$DIR}/rootpathdir ] && fail "allows dir relative to root dir" + [ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation in non-recursive mode" + + scpclean + $SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null + [ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir" +done + +verbose "$tid: detect non-directory target" +scpclean +echo a > ${COPY} +echo b > ${COPY2} +$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} ${COPY2} +cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target" + +scpclean +rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp diff --git a/regress/setuid-allowed.c b/regress/setuid-allowed.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d91d9f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/setuid-allowed.c @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* $OpenBSD$ */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "check-setuid [path]\n"); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const char *path = "."; + struct statvfs sb; + + if (argc > 2) + usage(); + else if (argc == 2) + path = argv[1]; + + if (statvfs(path, &sb) != 0) { + /* Don't return an error if the host doesn't support statvfs */ + if (errno == ENOSYS) + return 0; + fprintf(stderr, "statvfs for \"%s\" failed: %s\n", + path, strerror(errno)); + } + return (sb.f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? 1 : 0; +} + + diff --git a/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh b/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f85c4f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sftp-badcmds.sh,v 1.6 2013/05/17 10:26:26 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sftp invalid commands" + +DATA2=/bin/sh${EXEEXT} +NONEXIST=/NONEXIST.$$ +GLOBFILES=`(cd /bin;echo l*)` + +rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd + +rm -f ${COPY} +verbose "$tid: get nonexistent" +echo "get $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get nonexistent failed" +test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent" + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: glob get to nonexistent directory" +echo "get /bin/l* $NONEXIST" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get nonexistent failed" +for x in $GLOBFILES; do + test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent" +done + +rm -f ${COPY} +verbose "$tid: put nonexistent" +echo "put $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "put nonexistent failed" +test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after put nonexistent" + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: glob put to nonexistent directory" +echo "put /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "put nonexistent failed" +for x in $GLOBFILES; do + test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after nonexistent" +done + +rm -f ${COPY} +verbose "$tid: rename nonexistent" +echo "rename $NONEXIST ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "rename nonexist failed" +test -f ${COPY}.1 && fail "file exists after rename nonexistent" + +rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.dd +cp $DATA $COPY +mkdir ${COPY}.dd +verbose "$tid: rename target exists (directory)" +echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "rename target exists (directory) failed" +test -f ${COPY} || fail "oldname missing after rename target exists (directory)" +test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "newname missing after rename target exists (directory)" +cmp $DATA ${COPY} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted oldname after rename target exists (directory)" + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +rm -rf ${COPY} +cp ${DATA2} ${COPY} +verbose "$tid: glob put files to local file" +echo "put /bin/l* $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 +cmp ${DATA2} ${COPY} || fail "put successed when it should have failed" + +rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd + + diff --git a/regress/sftp-batch.sh b/regress/sftp-batch.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4101154 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sftp-batch.sh @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sftp-batch.sh,v 1.5 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sftp batchfile" + +BATCH=${OBJ}/sftp.bb + +rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${BATCH}.* + +cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.pass.1 + get $DATA $COPY + put ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 + rm ${COPY} + -put ${COPY} ${COPY}.2 +EOF + +cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.pass.2 + # This is a comment + + # That was a blank line + ls +EOF + +cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.fail.1 + get $DATA $COPY + put ${COPY} ${COPY}.3 + rm ${COPY}.* + # The next command should fail + put ${COPY}.3 ${COPY}.4 +EOF + +cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.fail.2 + # The next command should fail + jajajajaja +EOF + +verbose "$tid: good commands" +${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.pass.1 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "good commands failed" + +verbose "$tid: bad commands" +${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.fail.1 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + && fail "bad commands succeeded" + +verbose "$tid: comments and blanks" +${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.pass.2 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "comments & blanks failed" + +verbose "$tid: junk command" +${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.fail.2 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + && fail "junk command succeeded" + +rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${BATCH}.* + + diff --git a/regress/sftp-chroot.sh b/regress/sftp-chroot.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba5bd1e --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sftp-chroot.sh @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.6 2018/02/09 03:42:57 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sftp in chroot" + +CHROOT=/var/run +FILENAME=testdata_${USER} +PRIVDATA=${CHROOT}/${FILENAME} + +if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then + echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" + echo SKIPPED + exit 0 +fi + +if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m chroot "$CHROOT" ; then + echo "skipped: $CHROOT is unsuitable as ChrootDirectory" + exit 0 +fi + +$SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \ + fatal "create $PRIVDATA failed" + +start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /" + +verbose "test $tid: get" +${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \ + >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \ + fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed" +cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ" + +$SUDO rm $PRIVDATA diff --git a/regress/sftp-cmds.sh b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aad7fca --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sftp-cmds.sh,v 1.14 2013/06/21 02:26:26 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +# XXX - TODO: +# - chmod / chown / chgrp +# - -p flag for get & put + +tid="sftp commands" + +# test that these files are readable! +for i in `(cd /bin;echo l*)` +do + if [ -r $i ]; then + GLOBFILES="$GLOBFILES $i" + fi +done + +# Path with embedded quote +QUOTECOPY=${COPY}".\"blah\"" +QUOTECOPY_ARG=${COPY}'.\"blah\"' +# File with spaces +SPACECOPY="${COPY} this has spaces.txt" +SPACECOPY_ARG="${COPY}\ this\ has\ spaces.txt" +# File with glob metacharacters +GLOBMETACOPY="${COPY} [metachar].txt" + +rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 +mkdir ${COPY}.dd + +verbose "$tid: lls" +(echo "lcd ${OBJ}" ; echo "lls") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \ + grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls failed" + +verbose "$tid: lls w/path" +echo "lls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \ + grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls w/path failed" + +verbose "$tid: ls" +echo "ls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "ls failed" +# XXX always successful + +verbose "$tid: shell" +echo "!echo hi there" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "shell failed" +# XXX always successful + +verbose "$tid: pwd" +echo "pwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "pwd failed" +# XXX always successful + +verbose "$tid: lpwd" +echo "lpwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "lpwd failed" +# XXX always successful + +verbose "$tid: quit" +echo "quit" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "quit failed" +# XXX always successful + +verbose "$tid: help" +echo "help" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "help failed" +# XXX always successful + +rm -f ${COPY} +verbose "$tid: get" +echo "get $DATA $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get failed" +cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get" + +rm -f ${COPY} +verbose "$tid: get quoted" +echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get failed" +cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get" + +if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then +rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} +cp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} +verbose "$tid: get filename with quotes" +echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get failed" +cmp ${COPY} ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get with quotes" +rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} ${COPY} +fi + +rm -f "$SPACECOPY" ${COPY} +cp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" +verbose "$tid: get filename with spaces" +echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get failed" +cmp ${COPY} "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after get with spaces" + +rm -f "$GLOBMETACOPY" ${COPY} +cp $DATA "$GLOBMETACOPY" +verbose "$tid: get filename with glob metacharacters" +echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | \ + ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "get failed" +cmp ${COPY} "$GLOBMETACOPY" || \ + fail "corrupted copy after get with glob metacharacters" + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: get to directory" +echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get failed" +cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get" + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: glob get to directory" +echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get failed" +for x in $GLOBFILES; do + cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get" +done + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: get to local dir" +(echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get $DATA" ) | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get failed" +cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get" + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: glob get to local dir" +(echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get /bin/l*") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "get failed" +for x in $GLOBFILES; do + cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get" +done + +rm -f ${COPY} +verbose "$tid: put" +echo "put $DATA $COPY" | \ + ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed" +cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put" + +if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then +rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} +verbose "$tid: put filename with quotes" +echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | \ + ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed" +cmp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put with quotes" +fi + +rm -f "$SPACECOPY" +verbose "$tid: put filename with spaces" +echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | \ + ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed" +cmp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after put with spaces" + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: put to directory" +echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "put failed" +cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put" + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: glob put to directory" +echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "put failed" +for x in $GLOBFILES; do + cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put" +done + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: put to local dir" +(echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put $DATA") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "put failed" +cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put" + +rm -f ${COPY}.dd/* +verbose "$tid: glob put to local dir" +(echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put /bin/l?") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "put failed" +for x in $GLOBFILES; do + cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put" +done + +verbose "$tid: rename" +echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "rename failed" +test -f ${COPY}.1 || fail "missing file after rename" +cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted copy after rename" + +verbose "$tid: rename directory" +echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | \ + ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || \ + fail "rename directory failed" +test -d ${COPY}.dd && fail "oldname exists after rename directory" +test -d ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "missing newname after rename directory" + +verbose "$tid: ln" +echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln failed" +test -f ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln" +cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after ln" + +verbose "$tid: ln -s" +rm -f ${COPY}.2 +echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln -s failed" +test -h ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln -s" + +verbose "$tid: mkdir" +echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "mkdir failed" +test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after mkdir" + +# XXX do more here +verbose "$tid: chdir" +echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "chdir failed" + +verbose "$tid: rmdir" +echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "rmdir failed" +test -d ${COPY}.1 && fail "present directory after rmdir" + +verbose "$tid: lmkdir" +echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "lmkdir failed" +test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after lmkdir" + +# XXX do more here +verbose "$tid: lchdir" +echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "lchdir failed" + +rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 +rm -rf ${QUOTECOPY} "$SPACECOPY" "$GLOBMETACOPY" + + diff --git a/regress/sftp-glob.sh b/regress/sftp-glob.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d4df2c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sftp-glob.sh @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.sh,v 1.4 2009/08/13 01:11:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sftp glob" + +config_defined FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH && nobs="not supported on this platform" + +sftp_ls() { + target=$1 + errtag=$2 + expected=$3 + unexpected=$4 + skip=$5 + if test "x$skip" != "x" ; then + verbose "$tid: $errtag (skipped: $skip)" + return + fi + verbose "$tid: $errtag" + printf "ls -l %s" "${target}" | \ + ${SFTP} -b - -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>/dev/null | \ + grep -v "^sftp>" > ${RESULTS} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "$errtag failed" + fi + if test "x$expected" != "x" ; then + if fgrep "$expected" ${RESULTS} >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + : + else + fail "$expected missing from $errtag results" + fi + fi + if test "x$unexpected" != "x" && \ + fgrep "$unexpected" ${RESULTS} >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + fail "$unexpected present in $errtag results" + fi + rm -f ${RESULTS} +} + +BASE=${OBJ}/glob +RESULTS=${OBJ}/results +DIR=${BASE}/dir +DATA=${DIR}/file + +GLOB1="${DIR}/g-wild*" +GLOB2="${DIR}/g-wildx" +QUOTE="${DIR}/g-quote\"" +SLASH="${DIR}/g-sl\\ash" +ESLASH="${DIR}/g-slash\\" +QSLASH="${DIR}/g-qs\\\"" +SPACE="${DIR}/g-q space" + +rm -rf ${BASE} +mkdir -p ${DIR} +touch "${DATA}" "${GLOB1}" "${GLOB2}" "${QUOTE}" "${SPACE}" +test "x$nobs" = "x" && touch "${QSLASH}" "${ESLASH}" "${SLASH}" + +# target message expected unexpected +sftp_ls "${DIR}/fil*" "file glob" "${DATA}" "" +sftp_ls "${BASE}/d*" "dir glob" "`basename ${DATA}`" "" +sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-wild\"*\"" "quoted glob" "g-wild*" "g-wildx" +sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-wild\*" "escaped glob" "g-wild*" "g-wildx" +sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-quote\\\"" "escaped quote" "g-quote\"" "" +sftp_ls "\"${DIR}/g-quote\\\"\"" "quoted quote" "g-quote\"" "" +sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-quote\"'" "single-quoted quote" "g-quote\"" "" +sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-q\\ space" "escaped space" "g-q space" "" +sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-q space'" "quoted space" "g-q space" "" +sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-sl\\\\ash" "escaped slash" "g-sl\\ash" "" "$nobs" +sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-sl\\\\ash'" "quoted slash" "g-sl\\ash" "" "$nobs" +sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-slash\\\\" "escaped slash at EOL" "g-slash\\" "" "$nobs" +sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-slash\\\\'" "quoted slash at EOL" "g-slash\\" "" "$nobs" +sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-qs\\\\\\\"" "escaped slash+quote" "g-qs\\\"" "" "$nobs" +sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-qs\\\\\"'" "quoted slash+quote" "g-qs\\\"" "" "$nobs" + +rm -rf ${BASE} + diff --git a/regress/sftp-perm.sh b/regress/sftp-perm.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..304ca0a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sftp-perm.sh @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sftp-perm.sh,v 1.2 2013/10/17 22:00:18 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sftp permissions" + +SERVER_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp-server.log +CLIENT_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp.log +TEST_SFTP_SERVER=${OBJ}/sftp-server.sh + +prepare_server() { + printf "#!/bin/sh\nexec $SFTPSERVER -el debug3 $* 2>$SERVER_LOG\n" \ + > $TEST_SFTP_SERVER + chmod a+x $TEST_SFTP_SERVER +} + +run_client() { + echo "$@" | ${SFTP} -D ${TEST_SFTP_SERVER} -vvvb - >$CLIENT_LOG 2>&1 +} + +prepare_files() { + _prep="$1" + rm -f ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 + test -d ${COPY}.dd && { rmdir ${COPY}.dd || fatal "rmdir ${COPY}.dd"; } + test -z "$_prep" && return + sh -c "$_prep" || fail "preparation failed: \"$_prep\"" +} + +postcondition() { + _title="$1" + _check="$2" + test -z "$_check" && return + ${TEST_SHELL} -c "$_check" || fail "postcondition check failed: $_title" +} + +ro_test() { + _desc=$1 + _cmd="$2" + _prep="$3" + _expect_success_post="$4" + _expect_fail_post="$5" + verbose "$tid: read-only $_desc" + # Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good) + prepare_files "$_prep" + prepare_server + run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_desc failed" + postcondition "$_desc no-readonly" "$_expect_success_post" + # Read-only enabled + prepare_files "$_prep" + prepare_server -R + run_client "$_cmd" && fail "read-only $_desc succeeded" + postcondition "$_desc readonly" "$_expect_fail_post" +} + +perm_test() { + _op=$1 + _whitelist_ops=$2 + _cmd="$3" + _prep="$4" + _expect_success_post="$5" + _expect_fail_post="$6" + verbose "$tid: explicit $_op" + # Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good) + prepare_files "$_prep" + prepare_server + run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_op failed" + postcondition "$_op no white/blacklists" "$_expect_success_post" + # Whitelist + prepare_files "$_prep" + prepare_server -p $_op,$_whitelist_ops + run_client "$_cmd" || fail "whitelisted $_op failed" + postcondition "$_op whitelisted" "$_expect_success_post" + # Blacklist + prepare_files "$_prep" + prepare_server -P $_op + run_client "$_cmd" && fail "blacklisted $_op succeeded" + postcondition "$_op blacklisted" "$_expect_fail_post" + # Whitelist with op missing. + prepare_files "$_prep" + prepare_server -p $_whitelist_ops + run_client "$_cmd" && fail "no whitelist $_op succeeded" + postcondition "$_op not in whitelist" "$_expect_fail_post" +} + +ro_test \ + "upload" \ + "put $DATA $COPY" \ + "" \ + "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ + "test ! -f $COPY" + +ro_test \ + "setstat" \ + "chmod 0700 $COPY" \ + "touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \ + "test -x $COPY" \ + "test ! -x $COPY" + +ro_test \ + "rm" \ + "rm $COPY" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test ! -f $COPY" \ + "test -f $COPY" + +ro_test \ + "mkdir" \ + "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \ + "" \ + "test -d ${COPY}.dd" \ + "test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" + +ro_test \ + "rmdir" \ + "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \ + "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \ + "test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \ + "test -d ${COPY}.dd" + +ro_test \ + "posix-rename" \ + "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \ + "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1" + +ro_test \ + "oldrename" \ + "rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \ + "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1" + +ro_test \ + "symlink" \ + "ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test -h ${COPY}.1" \ + "test ! -h ${COPY}.1" + +ro_test \ + "hardlink" \ + "ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test -f ${COPY}.1" \ + "test ! -f ${COPY}.1" + +# Test explicit permissions + +perm_test \ + "open" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat,read,close" \ + "get $DATA $COPY" \ + "" \ + "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ + "! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null" + +perm_test \ + "read" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \ + "get $DATA $COPY" \ + "" \ + "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ + "! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null" + +perm_test \ + "write" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \ + "put $DATA $COPY" \ + "" \ + "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ + "! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null" + +perm_test \ + "lstat" \ + "realpath,stat,open,read,close" \ + "get $DATA $COPY" \ + "" \ + "cmp $DATA $COPY" \ + "! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null" + +perm_test \ + "opendir" \ + "realpath,readdir,stat,lstat" \ + "ls -ln $OBJ" + +perm_test \ + "readdir" \ + "realpath,opendir,stat,lstat" \ + "ls -ln $OBJ" + +perm_test \ + "setstat" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat" \ + "chmod 0700 $COPY" \ + "touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \ + "test -x $COPY" \ + "test ! -x $COPY" + +perm_test \ + "remove" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat" \ + "rm $COPY" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test ! -f $COPY" \ + "test -f $COPY" + +perm_test \ + "mkdir" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat" \ + "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \ + "" \ + "test -d ${COPY}.dd" \ + "test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" + +perm_test \ + "rmdir" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat" \ + "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \ + "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \ + "test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \ + "test -d ${COPY}.dd" + +perm_test \ + "posix-rename" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat" \ + "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \ + "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1" + +perm_test \ + "rename" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat" \ + "rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \ + "test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1" + +perm_test \ + "symlink" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat" \ + "ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test -h ${COPY}.1" \ + "test ! -h ${COPY}.1" + +perm_test \ + "hardlink" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat" \ + "ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \ + "touch $COPY" \ + "test -f ${COPY}.1" \ + "test ! -f ${COPY}.1" + +perm_test \ + "statvfs" \ + "realpath,stat,lstat" \ + "df /" + +# XXX need good tests for: +# fstat +# fsetstat +# realpath +# stat +# readlink +# fstatvfs + +rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.dd + diff --git a/regress/sftp-uri.sh b/regress/sftp-uri.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7be104d --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sftp-uri.sh @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sftp-uri.sh,v 1.1 2017/10/24 19:33:32 millert Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="sftp-uri" + +#set -x + +COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2 +DIR=${COPY}.dd +DIR2=${COPY}.dd2 +SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` + +sftpclean() { + rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2} + mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2} +} + +start_sshd -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /" + +# Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI +cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig +egrep -v '^ +(Port|User) +.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config + +verbose "$tid: non-interactive fetch to local file" +sftpclean +${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" ${COPY} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: non-interactive fetch to local dir" +sftpclean +cp ${DATA} ${COPY} +${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" ${DIR} || fail "copy failed" +cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" + +verbose "$tid: put to remote directory (trailing slash)" +sftpclean +${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config -b - \ + "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}/" > /dev/null 2>&1 << EOF + version + put ${DATA} copy +EOF +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "sftp failed with $r" +else + cmp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" +fi + +verbose "$tid: put to remote directory (no slash)" +sftpclean +${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config -b - \ + "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" > /dev/null 2>&1 << EOF + version + put ${DATA} copy +EOF +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "sftp failed with $r" +else + cmp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy" +fi + +sftpclean diff --git a/regress/sftp.sh b/regress/sftp.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a5c88f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sftp.sh @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sftp.sh,v 1.6 2017/10/30 21:59:43 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="basic sftp put/get" + +SFTPCMDFILE=${OBJ}/batch +cat >$SFTPCMDFILE < /dev/null 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "sftp failed with $r" + else + cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 || fail "corrupted copy after get" + cmp $DATA ${COPY}.2 || fail "corrupted copy after put" + fi + done +done +rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 +rm -f $SFTPCMDFILE diff --git a/regress/ssh-com-client.sh b/regress/ssh-com-client.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4f80cf --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/ssh-com-client.sh @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +# $OpenBSD: ssh-com-client.sh,v 1.7 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="connect with ssh.com client" + +#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries +if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then + fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set' +fi + +VERSIONS=" + 2.1.0 + 2.2.0 + 2.3.0 + 2.3.1 + 2.4.0 + 3.0.0 + 3.1.0 + 3.2.0 + 3.2.2 + 3.2.3 + 3.2.5 + 3.2.9 + 3.2.9.1 + 3.3.0" + +# 2.0.10 2.0.12 2.0.13 don't like the test setup + +# setup authorized keys +SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` +cp ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv ${OBJ}/id.com +chmod 600 ${OBJ}/id.com +${SSHKEYGEN} -i -f ${OBJ}/id.com > $OBJ/id.openssh +chmod 600 ${OBJ}/id.openssh +${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f ${OBJ}/id.openssh > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER +${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/id.openssh > $OBJ/id.com.pub +echo IdKey ${OBJ}/id.com > ${OBJ}/id.list + +# we need a DSA host key +t=dsa +rm -f ${OBJ}/$t ${OBJ}/$t.pub +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f ${OBJ}/$t +$SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t +echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config + +# add hostkeys to known hosts +mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER}/hostkeys +HK=${OBJ}/${USER}/hostkeys/key_${PORT}_127.0.0.1 +${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/rsa.pub > ${HK}.ssh-rsa.pub +${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/dsa.pub > ${HK}.ssh-dss.pub + +cat > ${OBJ}/ssh2_config << EOF +*: + QuietMode yes + StrictHostKeyChecking yes + Port ${PORT} + User ${USER} + Host 127.0.0.1 + IdentityFile ${OBJ}/id.list + RandomSeedFile ${OBJ}/random_seed + UserConfigDirectory ${OBJ}/%U + AuthenticationSuccessMsg no + BatchMode yes + ForwardX11 no +EOF + +# we need a real server (no ProxyConnect option) +start_sshd + +# go for it +for v in ${VERSIONS}; do + ssh2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/ssh2 + if [ ! -x ${ssh2} ]; then + continue + fi + verbose "ssh2 ${v}" + key=ssh-dss + skipcat=0 + case $v in + 2.1.*|2.3.0) + skipcat=1 + ;; + 3.0.*) + key=ssh-rsa + ;; + esac + cp ${HK}.$key.pub ${HK}.pub + + # check exit status + ${ssh2} -q -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost exit 42 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 42 ]; then + fail "ssh2 ${v} exit code test failed (got $r, expected 42)" + fi + + # data transfer + rm -f ${COPY} + ${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (receive) failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (receive) data mismatch" + + # data transfer, again + if [ $skipcat -eq 0 ]; then + rm -f ${COPY} + cat ${DATA} | \ + ${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config host "cat > ${COPY}" + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (send) failed" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || \ + fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (send) data mismatch" + fi + + # no stderr after eof + rm -f ${COPY} + ${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost \ + exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 1; echo bla 1>&2; exit 0"\' \ + 2> /dev/null + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh2 ${v} stderr test failed" + fi +done + +rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER} +for i in ssh2_config random_seed dsa.pub dsa host.dsa \ + id.list id.com id.com.pub id.openssh; do + rm -f ${OBJ}/$i +done diff --git a/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh b/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29b02d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +# $OpenBSD: ssh-com-keygen.sh,v 1.4 2004/02/24 17:06:52 markus Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="ssh.com key import" + +#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries +if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then + fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set' +fi + +VERSIONS=" + 2.0.10 + 2.0.12 + 2.0.13 + 2.1.0 + 2.2.0 + 2.3.0 + 2.3.1 + 2.4.0 + 3.0.0 + 3.1.0 + 3.2.0 + 3.2.2 + 3.2.3 + 3.2.5 + 3.2.9 + 3.2.9.1 + 3.3.0" + +COMPRV=${OBJ}/comkey +COMPUB=${COMPRV}.pub +OPENSSHPRV=${OBJ}/opensshkey +OPENSSHPUB=${OPENSSHPRV}.pub + +# go for it +for v in ${VERSIONS}; do + keygen=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/ssh-keygen2 + if [ ! -x ${keygen} ]; then + continue + fi + types="dss" + case $v in + 2.3.1|3.*) + types="$types rsa" + ;; + esac + for t in $types; do + verbose "ssh-keygen $v/$t" + rm -f $COMPRV $COMPUB $OPENSSHPRV $OPENSSHPUB + ${keygen} -q -P -t $t ${COMPRV} > /dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "${keygen} -t $t failed" + continue + fi + ${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${COMPUB} > ${OPENSSHPUB} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "import public key ($v/$t) failed" + continue + fi + ${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${COMPRV} > ${OPENSSHPRV} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "import private key ($v/$t) failed" + continue + fi + chmod 600 ${OPENSSHPRV} + ${SSHKEYGEN} -yf ${OPENSSHPRV} |\ + diff - ${OPENSSHPUB} + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "public keys ($v/$t) differ" + fi + done +done + +rm -f $COMPRV $COMPUB $OPENSSHPRV $OPENSSHPUB diff --git a/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh b/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fabfa49 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +# $OpenBSD: ssh-com-sftp.sh,v 1.7 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server" + +SFTPCMDFILE=${OBJ}/batch + +cat >$SFTPCMDFILE < /dev/null 2>&1 + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "sftp failed with $r" + else + cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 || fail "corrupted copy after get" + cmp $DATA ${COPY}.2 || fail "corrupted copy after put" + fi + done + done +done +rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 +rm -f $SFTPCMDFILE diff --git a/regress/ssh-com.sh b/regress/ssh-com.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1a2505 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/ssh-com.sh @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.10 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="connect to ssh.com server" + +#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries +if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then + fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set' +fi + +VERSIONS=" + 2.0.12 + 2.0.13 + 2.1.0 + 2.2.0 + 2.3.0 + 2.4.0 + 3.0.0 + 3.1.0 + 3.2.0 + 3.2.2 + 3.2.3 + 3.2.5 + 3.2.9 + 3.2.9.1 + 3.3.0" +# 2.0.10 does not support UserConfigDirectory +# 2.3.1 requires a config in $HOME/.ssh2 + +SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` + +# ssh.com +cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd2_config +#*: + # Port and ListenAddress are not used. + QuietMode yes + Port 4343 + ListenAddress 127.0.0.1 + UserConfigDirectory ${OBJ}/%U + Ciphers AnyCipher + PubKeyAuthentication yes + #AllowedAuthentications publickey + AuthorizationFile authorization + HostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv + PublicHostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub + RandomSeedFile ${OBJ}/random_seed + MaxConnections 0 + PermitRootLogin yes + VerboseMode no + CheckMail no + Ssh1Compatibility no +EOF + +# create client config +sed "s/HostKeyAlias.*/HostKeyAlias ssh2-localhost-with-alias/" \ + < $OBJ/ssh_config > $OBJ/ssh_config_com + +# we need a DSA key for +rm -f ${OBJ}/dsa ${OBJ}/dsa.pub +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f ${OBJ}/dsa + +# setup userdir, try rsa first +mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER} +cp /dev/null ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization +for t in rsa dsa; do + ${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/$t.pub > ${OBJ}/${USER}/$t.com + echo Key $t.com >> ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization + echo IdentityFile ${OBJ}/$t >> ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com +done + +# convert and append DSA hostkey +( + printf 'ssh2-localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' + ${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub +) >> $OBJ/known_hosts + +# go for it +for v in ${VERSIONS}; do + sshd2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/sshd2 + if [ ! -x ${sshd2} ]; then + continue + fi + trace "sshd2 ${v}" + PROXY="proxycommand ${sshd2} -qif ${OBJ}/sshd2_config 2> /dev/null" + ${SSH} -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} failed" + fi + + ciphers="3des-cbc" + macs="hmac-md5" + case $v in + 2.4.*) + ciphers="$ciphers cast128-cbc" + macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96" + ;; + 3.*) + ciphers="$ciphers aes128-cbc cast128-cbc" + macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96" + ;; + esac + #ciphers="3des-cbc" + for m in $macs; do + for c in $ciphers; do + trace "sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m" + verbose "test ${tid}: sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m" + ${SSH} -c $c -m $m -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} with $c/$m failed" + fi + done + done +done + +rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER} +for i in sshd_config_proxy ssh_config_proxy random_seed \ + sshd2_config dsa.pub dsa ssh_config_com; do + rm -f ${OBJ}/$i +done diff --git a/regress/ssh2putty.sh b/regress/ssh2putty.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..bcf83af --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/ssh2putty.sh @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/08 07:26:13 djm Exp $ + +if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then + echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key" + exit 1 +fi + +HOST=$1 +PORT=$2 +KEYFILE=$3 + +# XXX - support DSA keys too +if grep "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" $KEYFILE >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + : +else + echo "Unsupported private key format" + exit 1 +fi + +public_exponent=` + openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent | + sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//' +` +test $? -ne 0 && exit 1 + +modulus=` + openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= | + sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z +` +test $? -ne 0 && exit 1 + +echo "rsa2@$PORT:$HOST $public_exponent,$modulus" + diff --git a/regress/sshcfgparse.sh b/regress/sshcfgparse.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0ce568 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sshcfgparse.sh @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sshcfgparse.sh,v 1.4 2018/07/04 13:51:12 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="ssh config parse" + +expect_result_present() { + _str="$1" ; shift + for _expect in "$@" ; do + echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null + if test $? -ne 0 ; then + fail "missing expected \"$_expect\" from \"$_str\"" + fi + done +} +expect_result_absent() { + _str="$1" ; shift + for _expect in "$@" ; do + echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null + if test $? -eq 0 ; then + fail "unexpected \"$_expect\" present in \"$_str\"" + fi + done +} + +verbose "reparse minimal config" +(${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.1 && + ${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config.1 somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/ssh_config.1 $OBJ/ssh_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config" + +verbose "ssh -W opts" +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure default" +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "yes" || fail "exitonforwardfailure enable" +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o exitonforwardfailure=no h | \ + awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure override" + +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings default" +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "yes" || fail "clearallforwardings enable" +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o clearallforwardings=no h | \ + awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings override" + +verbose "user first match" +user=`awk '$1=="User" {print $2}' $OBJ/ssh_config` +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "$user" || fail "user from config, expected '$user' got '$f'" +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "foo" || fail "user first match -oUser, expected 'foo' got '$f' " +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -lbar baz@host user=foo baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "bar" || fail "user first match -l, expected 'bar' got '$f'" +f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config baz@host -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'` +test "$f" = "baz" || fail "user first match user@host, expected 'baz' got '$f'" + +verbose "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes" +# Default set +f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` +expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" +expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss" +# Explicit override +f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=ssh-ed25519 host | \ + awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` +expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" +expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss" +# Removal from default set +f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=-ssh-ed25519-cert* host | \ + awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` +expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" +expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss" +f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=-ssh-ed25519 host | \ + awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` +expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" +expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss" +# Append to default set. +# XXX this will break for !WITH_OPENSSL +f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=+ssh-dss-cert* host | \ + awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` +expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*" +expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss" +f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=+ssh-dss host | \ + awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'` +expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss" +expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*" + +# cleanup +rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.[012] diff --git a/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh b/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..29dc44a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $OpenBSD: sshd-log-wrapper.sh,v 1.4 2016/11/25 02:56:49 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. +# +# simple wrapper for sshd proxy mode to catch stderr output +# sh sshd-log-wrapper.sh /path/to/logfile /path/to/sshd [args...] + +log=$1 +shift + +exec "$@" -E$log diff --git a/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh b/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9065245 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# $OpenBSD: stderr-after-eof.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="stderr data after eof" + +# setup data +rm -f ${DATA} ${COPY} +cp /dev/null ${DATA} +for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6; do + (date;echo $i) | md5 >> ${DATA} +done + +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \ + exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 2; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ + 2> ${COPY} +r=$? +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed with exit code $r" +fi +egrep 'Disconnecting: Received extended_data after EOF' ${COPY} && + fail "ext data received after eof" +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt" + +rm -f ${DATA} ${COPY} diff --git a/regress/stderr-data.sh b/regress/stderr-data.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ceb72b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/stderr-data.sh @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +# $OpenBSD: stderr-data.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="stderr data transfer" + +for n in '' -n; do + verbose "test $tid: ($n)" + ${SSH} $n -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exec \ + sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ + 2> ${COPY} + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed with exit code $r" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt" + rm -f ${COPY} + + ${SSH} $n -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exec \ + sh -c \'"echo a; exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \ + > /dev/null 2> ${COPY} + r=$? + if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed with exit code $r" + fi + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "stderr corrupt" + rm -f ${COPY} +done diff --git a/regress/t11.ok b/regress/t11.ok new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1925bb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/t11.ok @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:4w1rnrek3klTJOTVhwuCIFd5k+pq9Bfo5KTxxb8BqbY diff --git a/regress/t4.ok b/regress/t4.ok new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4631ea8 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/t4.ok @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +MD5:3b:dd:44:e9:49:18:84:95:f1:e7:33:6b:9d:93:b1:36 diff --git a/regress/t5.ok b/regress/t5.ok new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd622f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/t5.ok @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xokes-lylis-byleh-zebib-kalus-bihas-tevah-haroz-suhar-foved-noxex diff --git a/regress/test-exec.sh b/regress/test-exec.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..40d46e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/test-exec.sh @@ -0,0 +1,593 @@ +# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.64 2018/08/10 01:35:49 dtucker Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +#SUDO=sudo + +# Unbreak GNU head(1) +_POSIX2_VERSION=199209 +export _POSIX2_VERSION + +case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in +OSF1*) + BIN_SH=xpg4 + export BIN_SH + ;; +CYGWIN_NT-5.0) + os=cygwin + TEST_SSH_IPV6=no + ;; +CYGWIN*) + os=cygwin + ;; +esac + +if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then + PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT" +else + PORT=4242 +fi + +if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then + USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami` +elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then + USER=`whoami` +elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then + USER=`logname` +else + USER=`id -un` +fi + +OBJ=$1 +if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then + echo '$OBJ not defined' + exit 2 +fi +if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then + echo "not a directory: $OBJ" + exit 2 +fi +SCRIPT=$2 +if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then + echo '$SCRIPT not defined' + exit 2 +fi +if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then + echo "not a file: $SCRIPT" + exit 2 +fi +if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then + true +else + echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT" + exit 2 +fi +unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK + +SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` + +# defaults +SSH=ssh +SSHD=sshd +SSHAGENT=ssh-agent +SSHADD=ssh-add +SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen +SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan +SFTP=sftp +SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server +SCP=scp + +# Set by make_tmpdir() on demand (below). +SSH_REGRESS_TMP= + +# Interop testing +PLINK=plink +PUTTYGEN=puttygen +CONCH=conch + +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then + SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}" +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then + SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then + SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then + SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then + SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then + SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then + SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then + SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then + SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}" +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then + # Find real binary, if it exists + case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in + /*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;; + *) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;; + esac +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then + # Find real binary, if it exists + case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in + /*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;; + *) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;; + esac +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then + # Find real binary, if it exists + case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in + /*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;; + *) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;; + esac +fi + +# Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec +case "$SSHD" in +/*) ;; +*) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;; +esac + +case "$SSHAGENT" in +/*) ;; +*) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;; +esac + +# Record the actual binaries used. +SSH_BIN=${SSH} +SSHD_BIN=${SSHD} +SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT} +SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD} +SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN} +SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN} +SFTP_BIN=${SFTP} +SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER} +SCP_BIN=${SCP} + +if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then + mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out + VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh` + + # Some tests are difficult to fix. + case "$VG_TEST" in + connect-privsep|reexec) + VG_SKIP=1 ;; + esac + + if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then + VG_LEAK="--leak-check=no" + if [ x"$VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS" != "x" ]; then + VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full" + fi + VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*" + VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}." + VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK" + VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes" + VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}" + VG_PATH="valgrind" + if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then + VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH" + fi + VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS" + SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH" + SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD" + SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT" + SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD" + SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN" + SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN" + SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}" + SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP" + cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF +#!/bin/sh +exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@" +EOF + chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh + SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh" + fi +fi + +# Logfiles. +# SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only +# SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only +# REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr +if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then + TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log +fi +if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then + TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log +fi +if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then + TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log +fi + +# truncate logfiles +>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE +>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE +>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE + +# Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..." +# because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments. +SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh +echo "#!/bin/sh" > $SSHLOGWRAP +echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "'"$@"' >>$SSHLOGWRAP + +chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh +REAL_SSH="$SSH" +SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP" + +# Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it. +# The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does +# not exist. Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size +# [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large. +DATANAME=data +DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME} +cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >${DATA} +chmod u+w ${DATA} +COPY=$OBJ/copy +rm -f ${COPY} + +increase_datafile_size() +{ + while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do + cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA} + done +} + +# these should be used in tests +export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP +#echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP + +# Portable specific functions +have_prog() +{ + saved_IFS="$IFS" + IFS=":" + for i in $PATH + do + if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then + IFS="$saved_IFS" + return 0 + fi + done + IFS="$saved_IFS" + return 1 +} + +jot() { + awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }" +} + +# Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h. +config_defined () +{ + str=$1 + while test "x$2" != "x" ; do + str="$str|$2" + shift + done + egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 +} + +md5 () { + if have_prog md5sum; then + md5sum + elif have_prog openssl; then + openssl md5 + elif have_prog cksum; then + cksum + elif have_prog sum; then + sum + else + wc -c + fi +} +# End of portable specific functions + +stop_sshd () +{ + if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then + pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` + if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then + echo no sshd running + else + if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then + echo bad pid for sshd: $pid + else + $SUDO kill $pid + trace "wait for sshd to exit" + i=0; + while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do + i=`expr $i + 1` + sleep $i + done + if test -f $PIDFILE; then + if $SUDO kill -0 $pid; then + echo "sshd didn't exit " \ + "port $PORT pid $pid" + else + echo "sshd died without cleanup" + fi + exit 1 + fi + fi + fi + fi +} + +make_tmpdir () +{ + SSH_REGRESS_TMP="$($OBJ/mkdtemp openssh-XXXXXXXX)" || \ + fatal "failed to create temporary directory" +} + +# helper +cleanup () +{ + if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then + if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then + echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID + else + kill $SSH_PID + fi + fi + if [ "x$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" != "x" ]; then + rm -rf "$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" + fi + stop_sshd +} + +start_debug_log () +{ + echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE + echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE + echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE +} + +save_debug_log () +{ + echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE + echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE + echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE + (cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log + (cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log + (cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log +} + +trace () +{ + start_debug_log $@ + if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then + echo "$@" + fi +} + +verbose () +{ + start_debug_log $@ + if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then + echo "$@" + fi +} + +warn () +{ + echo "WARNING: $@" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE + echo "WARNING: $@" +} + +fail () +{ + save_debug_log "FAIL: $@" + RESULT=1 + echo "$@" + if test "x$TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL" != "x" ; then + cleanup + exit $RESULT + fi +} + +fatal () +{ + save_debug_log "FATAL: $@" + printf "FATAL: " + fail "$@" + cleanup + exit $RESULT +} + +RESULT=0 +PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile + +trap fatal 3 2 + +# create server config +cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config + StrictModes no + Port $PORT + AddressFamily inet + ListenAddress 127.0.0.1 + #ListenAddress ::1 + PidFile $PIDFILE + AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u + LogLevel DEBUG3 + AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_* + AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST + Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER +EOF + +# This may be necessary if /usr/src and/or /usr/obj are group-writable, +# but if you aren't careful with permissions then the unit tests could +# be abused to locally escalate privileges. +if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS" ]; then + echo "StrictModes no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config +fi + +if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then + trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" + echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config +fi + +# server config for proxy connects +cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy + +# allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode +echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + +# create client config +cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config +Host * + Hostname 127.0.0.1 + HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias + Port $PORT + User $USER + GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts + UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts + PubkeyAuthentication yes + ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + HostbasedAuthentication no + PasswordAuthentication no + BatchMode yes + StrictHostKeyChecking yes + LogLevel DEBUG3 +EOF + +if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then + trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" + echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config +fi + +rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + +SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa ed25519" + +trace "generate keys" +for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do + # generate user key + if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then + rm -f $OBJ/$t + ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\ + fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed" + fi + + # known hosts file for client + ( + printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' + cat $OBJ/$t.pub + ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts + + # setup authorized keys + cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config + + # use key as host key, too + $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t + echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config + + # don't use SUDO for proxy connect + echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy +done +chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + +# Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present +REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no +if test -x "$CONCH" ; then + REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes +fi + +# If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and +# configuration +REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no +if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" ; then + REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes +fi +case "$SCRIPT" in +*putty*) ;; +*) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;; +esac + +if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then + mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty + + # Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys + rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 + if ! puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ + --random-device=/dev/urandom \ + --new-passphrase /dev/null < /dev/null > /dev/null; then + echo "Your installed version of PuTTY is too old to support --new-passphrase; trying without (may require manual interaction) ..." >&2 + puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 < /dev/null > /dev/null + fi + puttygen -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ + >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + + # Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format + cp $OBJ/rsa $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt + ${SSHKEYGEN} -p -N '' -m PEM -f $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt >/dev/null + ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt > \ + ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys + ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt >> \ + ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys + rm -f $OBJ/rsa_oldfmt + + # Setup proxied session + mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions + rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy + echo "Protocol=ssh" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy + echo "HostName=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy + echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy + echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy + echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy + echo "ProxyLocalhost=1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy + + PUTTYDIR=${OBJ}/.putty + export PUTTYDIR + + REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes +fi + +# create a proxy version of the client config +( + cat $OBJ/ssh_config + echo proxycommand ${SUDO} sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy +) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy + +# check proxy config +${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken" + +start_sshd () +{ + # start sshd + $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken" + $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE + + trace "wait for sshd" + i=0; + while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do + i=`expr $i + 1` + sleep $i + done + + test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT" +} + +# source test body +. $SCRIPT + +# kill sshd +cleanup +if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then + verbose ok $tid +else + echo failed $tid +fi +exit $RESULT diff --git a/regress/transfer.sh b/regress/transfer.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf174a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/transfer.sh @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# $OpenBSD: transfer.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="transfer data" + +rm -f ${COPY} +${SSH} -n -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" +fi +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" + +for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do + trace "dd-size ${s}" + rm -f ${COPY} + dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \ + ${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}" + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cat $DATA failed" + fi + cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" +done +rm -f ${COPY} diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e04268b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.26 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="try ciphers" + +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do + n=0 + for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do + trace "cipher $c mac $m" + verbose "test $tid: cipher $c mac $m" + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "Ciphers=$c" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -m $m -c $c somehost true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh failed with mac $m cipher $c" + fi + # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they + # are ignored. + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + break + fi + n=`expr $n + 1` + done +done + diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile b/regress/unittests/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e464b08 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.10 2018/03/03 03:16:17 djm Exp $ + +REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes +SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion +SUBDIR+=authopt + +.include diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc b/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b509f44 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.12 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ + +.include +.include + +# enable warnings +WARNINGS=Yes + +DEBUG=-g +CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all +CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wno-unused-parameter +.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3" +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition +.endif + +SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh + +CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} + +.if exists(${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}) +LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir} -ltest_helper +DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}/libtest_helper.a +.else +LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -ltest_helper +DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/libtest_helper.a +.endif + +.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} + +LDADD+= -lcrypto +DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO} diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/all_permit.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/all_permit.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..38ac573 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/all_permit.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/bad_sourceaddr.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/bad_sourceaddr.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9732745 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/bad_sourceaddr.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/force_command.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/force_command.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7af27e --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/force_command.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/host.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/host.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6326d04 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/host.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIFWMw3ftP29RSefnxQwdvK1KiE2G9Y7rPRrJ7ZsrDiOeAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAACAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKTMqwPkaBg23RS7/aj347dc2kY4bWt/sHwzREYSrKRqZ5RNBnSvZOQ8m5euMCEuf92bZ8VJEdF653jRiW6VoBA== user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/mktestdata.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06a24e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/mktestdata.sh @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +#/bin/sh + +set -xe + +rm -f ca_key ca_key.pub +rm -f user_key user_key.pub +rm -f *.cert + +ssh-keygen -q -f ca_key -t ed25519 -C CA -N '' +ssh-keygen -q -f user_key -t ed25519 -C "user key" -N '' + +sign() { + output=$1 + shift + set -xe + ssh-keygen -q -s ca_key -I user -n user \ + -V 19990101:19991231 -z 1 "$@" user_key.pub + mv user_key-cert.pub "$output" +} + +sign all_permit.cert -Opermit-agent-forwarding -Opermit-port-forwarding \ + -Opermit-pty -Opermit-user-rc -Opermit-X11-forwarding +sign no_permit.cert -Oclear + +sign no_agentfwd.cert -Ono-agent-forwarding +sign no_portfwd.cert -Ono-port-forwarding +sign no_pty.cert -Ono-pty +sign no_user_rc.cert -Ono-user-rc +sign no_x11fwd.cert -Ono-X11-forwarding + +sign only_agentfwd.cert -Oclear -Opermit-agent-forwarding +sign only_portfwd.cert -Oclear -Opermit-port-forwarding +sign only_pty.cert -Oclear -Opermit-pty +sign only_user_rc.cert -Oclear -Opermit-user-rc +sign only_x11fwd.cert -Oclear -Opermit-X11-forwarding + +sign force_command.cert -Oforce-command="foo" +sign sourceaddr.cert -Osource-address="127.0.0.1/32,::1/128" + +# ssh-keygen won't permit generation of certs with invalid source-address +# values, so we do it as a custom extension. +sign bad_sourceaddr.cert -Ocritical:source-address=xxxxx + +sign unknown_critical.cert -Ocritical:blah=foo + +sign host.cert -h + +rm -f user_key ca_key user_key.pub ca_key.pub diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_agentfwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_agentfwd.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bfa5c2e --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_agentfwd.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_permit.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_permit.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..351e138 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_permit.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIGVQtVgp9sD4sc8esIhVWbZaM8d0NxpX3UbEVzTHm9feAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAIKlI0TqqraKjYTjIuKhwoxAV/XnzWRJHq8lNs4aj5yDb84un2xXDF/0vXoLjPgVcLgEbksBKKn0i4whp+xn9Ag== user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_portfwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_portfwd.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9457dc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_portfwd.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_pty.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_pty.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8154ec --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_pty.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_user_rc.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_user_rc.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6676a0c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_user_rc.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_x11fwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_x11fwd.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0aff9e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_x11fwd.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_agentfwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_agentfwd.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3cf64b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_agentfwd.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIOvJ28yW5uvA7yxE3ySuyFvPjcRYKAr03CYr4okGTNIFAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAB8AAAAXcGVybWl0LWFnZW50LWZvcndhcmRpbmcAAAAAAAAAAAAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgKFWCzCzQTh9UkoHphbgwaa86Q16Kern0UjqOr7Q+Jk8AAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQEG2uTgmOSk9dJ0s/Ol1EIERXFP9PF6AauF9t5jBMSthNyvSANSrC/1EIaf4TV5kMYfhZxJXoS0XHQjGndcq2AE= user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_portfwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_portfwd.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb09c3a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_portfwd.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIGPoYoExiSyHMyDEvOFgoNZXk5z91u7xq/7357X23TotAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAB4AAAAWcGVybWl0LXBvcnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAHN3YnwipcbDKVn+PObGSoaT9rwlau+yrPYZ50oetvCKng3RMjGaV+roqlv0vjjLcxE9J4Y0ti+9MXtQ0D7beBA== user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_pty.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_pty.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..520c89f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_pty.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAILvocWYto5Lg7P46YLbe7U4/b2h9Lr5rWqMZ4Cj4ra7RAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAABIAAAAKcGVybWl0LXB0eQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABASv2xQvp+Y6E8dCf5pzg3MZaan5bl1ToYXNcmQ3ysGrk9Djkcu8m3TytDpF471KmUejxy/iF4xjs9CDpk7h+SBQ== user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_user_rc.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_user_rc.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb49c35 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_user_rc.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJwsRZQ7kx4A8AQ0q/G/3i6sHM48kr4TxJtTcyy3lZAPAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAABYAAAAOcGVybWl0LXVzZXItcmMAAAAAAAAAAAAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgKFWCzCzQTh9UkoHphbgwaa86Q16Kern0UjqOr7Q+Jk8AAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQDhgEXsvoHr21XrxmiZq/sIjWeYapp11XvEVkkTBPVhBnPwtrrUeJbPmGs3gmJkQdv8BYajYpT7TXEX8GvEeLwU= user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_x11fwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_x11fwd.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6715585 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_x11fwd.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIDAhZFZBl3eu8Qa8I5BaHCz/mpH8xCjaPusBwo1eJ9OGAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAB0AAAAVcGVybWl0LVgxMS1mb3J3YXJkaW5nAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIChVgsws0E4fVJKB6YW4MGmvOkNeinq59FI6jq+0PiZPAAAAUwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAAEDysfgbhniX/zdA8576rrDJpaO2D7QtQse2KWIM9XmREPkLKeP6FKiXKKFcPQiMyV28rptfvK8bBXAiOvITSUgL user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/sourceaddr.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/sourceaddr.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0fcf7b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/sourceaddr.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/unknown_critical.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/unknown_critical.cert new file mode 100644 index 0000000..216960a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/unknown_critical.cert @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIIjs/wRAB/p5QShSfqoU9cWnCLT3lSveUirk61A27KxVAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAEwAAAARibGFoAAAABwAAAANmb28AAACCAAAAFXBlcm1pdC1YMTEtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAXcGVybWl0LWFnZW50LWZvcndhcmRpbmcAAAAAAAAAFnBlcm1pdC1wb3J0LWZvcndhcmRpbmcAAAAAAAAACnBlcm1pdC1wdHkAAAAAAAAADnBlcm1pdC11c2VyLXJjAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIChVgsws0E4fVJKB6YW4MGmvOkNeinq59FI6jq+0PiZPAAAAUwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAAEDix3FV7JIBuHNAwtZOVIqGBq8lqhnEwP51DqPA43qt+Tzynm56EWxuFzgGehBPF3L8gl+fVqxIJmiQ9iHB0LUD user key diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c b/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e8aacb --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,573 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2018/03/03 03:16:17 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Regress test for keys options functions. + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "test_helper.h" + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "log.h" + +static struct sshkey * +load_key(const char *name) +{ + struct sshkey *ret; + int r; + + r = sshkey_load_public(test_data_file(name), &ret, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL); + return ret; +} + +static struct sshauthopt * +default_authkey_opts(void) +{ + struct sshauthopt *ret = sshauthopt_new(); + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL); + ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1; + ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; + ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; + ret->permit_pty_flag = 1; + ret->permit_user_rc = 1; + return ret; +} + +static struct sshauthopt * +default_authkey_restrict_opts(void) +{ + struct sshauthopt *ret = sshauthopt_new(); + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL); + ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0; + ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; + ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; + ret->permit_pty_flag = 0; + ret->permit_user_rc = 0; + ret->restricted = 1; + return ret; +} + +static char ** +commasplit(const char *s, size_t *np) +{ + char *ocp, *cp, *cp2, **ret = NULL; + size_t n; + + ocp = cp = strdup(s); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + for (n = 0; (cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",")) != NULL;) { + ret = recallocarray(ret, n, n + 1, sizeof(*ret)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL); + cp2 = strdup(cp2); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp2, NULL); + ret[n++] = cp2; + } + free(ocp); + *np = n; + return ret; +} + +static void +compare_opts(const struct sshauthopt *opts, + const struct sshauthopt *expected) +{ + size_t i; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(opts, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, opts); /* bozo :) */ + +#define FLAG_EQ(x) ASSERT_INT_EQ(opts->x, expected->x) + FLAG_EQ(permit_port_forwarding_flag); + FLAG_EQ(permit_agent_forwarding_flag); + FLAG_EQ(permit_x11_forwarding_flag); + FLAG_EQ(permit_pty_flag); + FLAG_EQ(permit_user_rc); + FLAG_EQ(restricted); + FLAG_EQ(cert_authority); +#undef FLAG_EQ + +#define STR_EQ(x) \ + do { \ + if (expected->x == NULL) \ + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts->x, expected->x); \ + else \ + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(opts->x, expected->x); \ + } while (0) + STR_EQ(cert_principals); + STR_EQ(force_command); + STR_EQ(required_from_host_cert); + STR_EQ(required_from_host_keys); +#undef STR_EQ + +#define ARRAY_EQ(nx, x) \ + do { \ + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(opts->nx, expected->nx); \ + if (expected->nx == 0) \ + break; \ + for (i = 0; i < expected->nx; i++) \ + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(opts->x[i], expected->x[i]); \ + } while (0) + ARRAY_EQ(nenv, env); + ARRAY_EQ(npermitopen, permitopen); +#undef ARRAY_EQ +} + +static void +test_authkeys_parse(void) +{ + struct sshauthopt *opts, *expected; + const char *errstr; + +#define FAIL_TEST(label, keywords) \ + do { \ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse invalid " label); \ + opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \ + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts, NULL); \ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(errstr, NULL); \ + TEST_DONE(); \ + } while (0) +#define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \ + do { \ + if (errstr != NULL) \ + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \ + compare_opts(opts, expected); \ + sshauthopt_free(expected); \ + sshauthopt_free(opts); \ + } while (0) + + /* Basic tests */ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse empty"); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + opts = sshauthopt_parse("", &errstr); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse trailing whitespace"); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + opts = sshauthopt_parse(" ", &errstr); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse restrict"); + expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); + opts = sshauthopt_parse("restrict", &errstr); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + /* Invalid syntax */ + FAIL_TEST("trailing comma", "restrict,"); + FAIL_TEST("bare comma", ","); + FAIL_TEST("unknown option", "BLAH"); + FAIL_TEST("unknown option with trailing comma", "BLAH,"); + FAIL_TEST("unknown option with trailing whitespace", "BLAH "); + + /* force_tun_device */ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse tunnel explicit"); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->force_tun_device = 1; + opts = sshauthopt_parse("tunnel=\"1\"", &errstr); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse tunnel any"); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->force_tun_device = SSH_TUNID_ANY; + opts = sshauthopt_parse("tunnel=\"any\"", &errstr); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + FAIL_TEST("tunnel", "tunnel=\"blah\""); + + /* Flag options */ +#define FLAG_TEST(keyword, var, val) \ + do { \ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " keyword); \ + expected = default_authkey_opts(); \ + expected->var = val; \ + opts = sshauthopt_parse(keyword, &errstr); \ + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ + expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \ + expected->var = val; \ + opts = sshauthopt_parse("restrict,"keyword, &errstr); \ + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ + TEST_DONE(); \ + } while (0) + /* Positive flags */ + FLAG_TEST("cert-authority", cert_authority, 1); + FLAG_TEST("port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag, 1); + FLAG_TEST("agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag, 1); + FLAG_TEST("x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag, 1); + FLAG_TEST("pty", permit_pty_flag, 1); + FLAG_TEST("user-rc", permit_user_rc, 1); + /* Negative flags */ + FLAG_TEST("no-port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag, 0); + FLAG_TEST("no-agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag, 0); + FLAG_TEST("no-x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag, 0); + FLAG_TEST("no-pty", permit_pty_flag, 0); + FLAG_TEST("no-user-rc", permit_user_rc, 0); +#undef FLAG_TEST + FAIL_TEST("no-cert-authority", "no-cert-authority"); + + /* String options */ +#define STRING_TEST(keyword, var, val) \ + do { \ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " keyword); \ + expected = default_authkey_opts(); \ + expected->var = strdup(val); \ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \ + opts = sshauthopt_parse(keyword "=" #val, &errstr); \ + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ + expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \ + expected->var = strdup(val); \ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \ + opts = sshauthopt_parse( \ + "restrict," keyword "=" #val ",restrict", &errstr); \ + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ + TEST_DONE(); \ + } while (0) + STRING_TEST("command", force_command, "/bin/true"); + STRING_TEST("principals", cert_principals, "gregor,josef,K"); + STRING_TEST("from", required_from_host_keys, "127.0.0.0/8"); +#undef STRING_TEST + FAIL_TEST("unquoted command", "command=oops"); + FAIL_TEST("unquoted principals", "principals=estragon"); + FAIL_TEST("unquoted from", "from=127.0.0.1"); + + /* String array option tests */ +#define ARRAY_TEST(label, keywords, var, nvar, val) \ + do { \ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " label); \ + expected = default_authkey_opts(); \ + expected->var = commasplit(val, &expected->nvar); \ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \ + opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \ + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ + expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \ + expected->var = commasplit(val, &expected->nvar); \ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \ + opts = sshauthopt_parse( \ + "restrict," keywords ",restrict", &errstr); \ + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ + TEST_DONE(); \ + } while (0) + ARRAY_TEST("environment", "environment=\"foo=1\",environment=\"bar=2\"", + env, nenv, "foo=1,bar=2"); + ARRAY_TEST("permitopen", "permitopen=\"foo:123\",permitopen=\"bar:*\"", + permitopen, npermitopen, "foo:123,bar:*"); +#undef ARRAY_TEST + FAIL_TEST("environment", "environment=\",=bah\""); + FAIL_TEST("permitopen port", "foo:bar"); + FAIL_TEST("permitopen missing port", "foo:"); + FAIL_TEST("permitopen missing port specification", "foo"); + FAIL_TEST("permitopen invalid host", "[:"); + +#undef CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP +#undef FAIL_TEST +} + +static void +test_cert_parse(void) +{ + struct sshkey *cert; + struct sshauthopt *opts, *expected; + +#define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \ + do { \ + compare_opts(opts, expected); \ + sshauthopt_free(expected); \ + sshauthopt_free(opts); \ + sshkey_free(cert); \ + } while (0) +#define FLAG_TEST(keybase, var) \ + do { \ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert no_" keybase); \ + cert = load_key("no_" keybase ".cert"); \ + expected = default_authkey_opts(); \ + expected->var = 0; \ + opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \ + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ + TEST_DONE(); \ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert only_" keybase); \ + cert = load_key("only_" keybase ".cert"); \ + expected = sshauthopt_new(); \ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); \ + expected->var = 1; \ + opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \ + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ + TEST_DONE(); \ + } while (0) + FLAG_TEST("agentfwd", permit_agent_forwarding_flag); + FLAG_TEST("portfwd", permit_port_forwarding_flag); + FLAG_TEST("pty", permit_pty_flag); + FLAG_TEST("user_rc", permit_user_rc); + FLAG_TEST("x11fwd", permit_x11_forwarding_flag); +#undef FLAG_TEST + + TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert all permitted"); + cert = load_key("all_permit.cert"); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert nothing permitted"); + cert = load_key("no_permit.cert"); + expected = sshauthopt_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); + opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert force-command"); + cert = load_key("force_command.cert"); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->force_command = strdup("foo"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL); + opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert source-address"); + cert = load_key("sourceaddr.cert"); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL); + opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); +#undef CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP + +#define FAIL_TEST(keybase) \ + do { \ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert " keybase); \ + cert = load_key(keybase ".cert"); \ + opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \ + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts, NULL); \ + sshkey_free(cert); \ + TEST_DONE(); \ + } while (0) + FAIL_TEST("host"); + FAIL_TEST("bad_sourceaddr"); + FAIL_TEST("unknown_critical"); +#undef FAIL_TEST +} + +static void +test_merge(void) +{ + struct sshkey *cert; + struct sshauthopt *key_opts, *cert_opts, *merge_opts, *expected; + const char *errstr; + + /* + * Prepare for a test by making some key and cert options and + * attempting to merge them. + */ +#define PREPARE(label, keyname, keywords) \ + do { \ + expected = NULL; \ + TEST_START("sshauthopt_merge " label); \ + cert = load_key(keyname ".cert"); \ + cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cert_opts, NULL); \ + key_opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \ + if (errstr != NULL) \ + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(key_opts, NULL); \ + merge_opts = sshauthopt_merge(key_opts, \ + cert_opts, &errstr); \ + } while (0) + + /* Cleanup stuff allocated by PREPARE() */ +#define CLEANUP() \ + do { \ + sshauthopt_free(expected); \ + sshauthopt_free(merge_opts); \ + sshauthopt_free(key_opts); \ + sshauthopt_free(cert_opts); \ + sshkey_free(cert); \ + } while (0) + + /* Check the results of PREPARE() against expectation; calls CLEANUP */ +#define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \ + do { \ + if (errstr != NULL) \ + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \ + compare_opts(merge_opts, expected); \ + CLEANUP(); \ + } while (0) + + /* Check a single case of merging of flag options */ +#define FLAG_CASE(keybase, label, keyname, keywords, mostly_off, var, val) \ + do { \ + PREPARE(keybase " " label, keyname, keywords); \ + expected = mostly_off ? \ + sshauthopt_new() : default_authkey_opts(); \ + expected->var = val; \ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); \ + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \ + TEST_DONE(); \ + } while (0) + + /* + * Fairly exhaustive exercise of a flag option. Tests + * option both set and clear in certificate, set and clear in + * authorized_keys and set and cleared via restrict keyword. + */ +#define FLAG_TEST(keybase, keyword, var) \ + do { \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:default,no", \ + "no_" keybase, keyword, 0, var, 0); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:default,no", \ + "no_" keybase, "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 0); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:default,no", \ + "no_" keybase, "no-" keyword, 0, var, 0); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:default,no", \ + "no_" keybase, "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ + \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:-*,yes", \ + "only_" keybase, keyword, 1, var, 1); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:-*,yes", \ + "only_" keybase, "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 1); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:-*,yes", \ + "only_" keybase, "no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:-*,yes", \ + "only_" keybase, "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ + \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:-*", \ + "no_permit", keyword, 1, var, 0); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:-*", \ + "no_permit", "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 0); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:-*", \ + "no_permit", "no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:-*", \ + "no_permit", "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ + \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:*", \ + "all_permit", keyword, 0, var, 1); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:*", \ + "all_permit", "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 1); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:*", \ + "all_permit", "no-" keyword, 0, var, 0); \ + FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:*", \ + "all_permit", "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \ + \ + } while (0) + FLAG_TEST("portfwd", "port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag); + FLAG_TEST("agentfwd", "agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag); + FLAG_TEST("pty", "pty", permit_pty_flag); + FLAG_TEST("user_rc", "user-rc", permit_user_rc); + FLAG_TEST("x11fwd", "x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag); +#undef FLAG_TEST + + PREPARE("source-address both", "sourceaddr", "from=\"127.0.0.1\""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL); + expected->required_from_host_keys = strdup("127.0.0.1"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_keys, NULL); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("source-address none", "all_permit", ""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("source-address keys", "all_permit", "from=\"127.0.0.1\""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->required_from_host_keys = strdup("127.0.0.1"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_keys, NULL); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("source-address cert", "sourceaddr", ""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("force-command both", "force_command", "command=\"foo\""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->force_command = strdup("foo"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("force-command none", "all_permit", ""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("force-command keys", "all_permit", "command=\"bar\""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->force_command = strdup("bar"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("force-command cert", "force_command", ""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->force_command = strdup("foo"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("force-command mismatch", "force_command", "command=\"bar\""); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(merge_opts, NULL); + CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("tunnel", "all_permit", "tunnel=\"6\""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->force_tun_device = 6; + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("permitopen", "all_permit", + "permitopen=\"127.0.0.1:*\",permitopen=\"127.0.0.1:123\""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->permitopen = commasplit("127.0.0.1:*,127.0.0.1:123", + &expected->npermitopen); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); + + PREPARE("environment", "all_permit", + "environment=\"foo=a\",environment=\"bar=b\""); + expected = default_authkey_opts(); + expected->env = commasplit("foo=a,bar=b", &expected->nenv); + CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); + TEST_DONE(); +} + +void +tests(void) +{ + extern char *__progname; + LogLevel ll = test_is_verbose() ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; + + /* test_cert_parse() are a bit spammy to error() by default... */ + log_init(__progname, ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + test_authkeys_parse(); + test_cert_parse(); + test_merge(); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile b/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe30acc --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ + +PROG=test_bitmap +SRCS=tests.c + +# From usr.sbin/ssh +SRCS+=bitmap.c atomicio.c + +REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} + +run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} + env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} + +.include diff --git a/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c b/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23025f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/01/15 07:36:28 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for bitmap.h bitmap API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "bitmap.h" + +#define NTESTS 131 + +void +tests(void) +{ + struct bitmap *b; + BIGNUM *bn; + size_t len; + int i, j, k, n; + u_char bbuf[1024], bnbuf[1024]; + int r; + + TEST_START("bitmap_new"); + b = bitmap_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL); + bn = BN_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("bitmap_set_bit / bitmap_test_bit"); + for (i = -1; i < NTESTS; i++) { + for (j = -1; j < NTESTS; j++) { + for (k = -1; k < NTESTS; k++) { + bitmap_zero(b); + BN_clear(bn); + + test_subtest_info("set %d/%d/%d", i, j, k); + /* Set bits */ + if (i >= 0) { + ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, i), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, i), 1); + } + if (j >= 0) { + ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, j), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, j), 1); + } + if (k >= 0) { + ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, k), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, k), 1); + } + + /* Check perfect match between bitmap and bn */ + test_subtest_info("match %d/%d/%d", i, j, k); + for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) { + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n), + bitmap_test_bit(b, n)); + } + + /* Test length calculations */ + test_subtest_info("length %d/%d/%d", i, j, k); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(bn), + (int)bitmap_nbits(b)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bytes(bn), + (int)bitmap_nbytes(b)); + + /* Test serialisation */ + test_subtest_info("serialise %d/%d/%d", + i, j, k); + len = bitmap_nbytes(b); + memset(bbuf, 0xfc, sizeof(bbuf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_to_string(b, bbuf, + sizeof(bbuf)), 0); + for (n = len; n < (int)sizeof(bbuf); n++) + ASSERT_U8_EQ(bbuf[n], 0xfc); + r = BN_bn2bin(bn, bnbuf); + ASSERT_INT_GE(r, 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, (int)len); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(bbuf, bnbuf, len); + + /* Test deserialisation */ + test_subtest_info("deserialise %d/%d/%d", + i, j, k); + bitmap_zero(b); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_from_string(b, bnbuf, + len), 0); + for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) { + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n), + bitmap_test_bit(b, n)); + } + + /* Test clearing bits */ + test_subtest_info("clear %d/%d/%d", + i, j, k); + for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) { + ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, n), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, n), 1); + } + if (i >= 0) { + bitmap_clear_bit(b, i); + BN_clear_bit(bn, i); + } + if (j >= 0) { + bitmap_clear_bit(b, j); + BN_clear_bit(bn, j); + } + if (k >= 0) { + bitmap_clear_bit(b, k); + BN_clear_bit(bn, k); + } + for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) { + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n), + bitmap_test_bit(b, n)); + } + } + } + } + bitmap_free(b); + BN_free(bn); + TEST_DONE(); +} + diff --git a/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile b/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b2a09c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.2 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ + +PROG=test_conversion +SRCS=tests.c + +# From usr.bin/ssh +SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c +SRCS+=atomicio.c misc.c xmalloc.c log.c uidswap.c cleanup.c fatal.c ssherr.c + +REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} + +run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} + env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} + +.include diff --git a/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c b/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6dd77ef --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2017/03/14 01:20:29 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for conversions + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "misc.h" + +void +tests(void) +{ + char buf[1024]; + + TEST_START("conversion_convtime"); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("0"), 0); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1"), 1); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1S"), 1); + /* from the examples in the comment above the function */ + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("90m"), 5400); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 5400); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("2d"), 172800); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1w"), 604800); + + /* negative time is not allowed */ + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-7"), -1); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("-9d"), -1); + + /* overflow */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX + 1); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1); + + /* overflow with multiplier */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%lluM", (unsigned long long)LONG_MAX/60 + 1); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime(buf), -1); + ASSERT_LONG_EQ(convtime("1000000000000000000000w"), -1); + TEST_DONE(); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3368851 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ + +PROG=test_hostkeys +SRCS=tests.c test_iterate.c + +# From usr.bin/ssh +SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c +SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c +SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c +SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c +SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c hostfile.c +SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c +SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c + +SRCS+=digest-openssl.c +#SRCS+=digest-libc.c + +REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} + +run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} + env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata + +.include diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a46de9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.2 2017/04/30 23:33:48 djm Exp $ + +set -ex + +cd testdata + +rm -f rsa* dsa* ecdsa* ed25519* +rm -f known_hosts* + +gen_all() { + _n=$1 + _ecdsa_bits=256 + test "x$_n" = "x1" && _ecdsa_bits=384 + test "x$_n" = "x2" && _ecdsa_bits=521 + ssh-keygen -qt rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA #$_n" -N "" -f rsa_$_n + ssh-keygen -qt dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA #$_n" -N "" -f dsa_$_n + ssh-keygen -qt ecdsa -b $_ecdsa_bits -C "ECDSA #$_n" -N "" -f ecdsa_$_n + ssh-keygen -qt ed25519 -C "ED25519 #$_n" -N "" -f ed25519_$_n + # Don't need private keys + rm -f rsa_$_n dsa_$_n ecdsa_$_n ed25519_$_n +} + +hentries() { + _preamble=$1 + _kspec=$2 + for k in `ls -1 $_kspec | sort` ; do + printf "$_preamble " + cat $k + done + echo +} + +gen_all 1 +gen_all 2 +gen_all 3 +gen_all 4 +gen_all 5 +gen_all 6 + +# A section of known_hosts with hashed hostnames. +( + hentries "sisyphus.example.com" "*_5.pub" + hentries "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1" "*_6.pub" +) > known_hosts_hash_frag +ssh-keygen -Hf known_hosts_hash_frag +rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag.old + +# Populated known_hosts, including comments, hashed names and invalid lines +( + echo "# Plain host keys, plain host names" + hentries "sisyphus.example.com" "*_1.pub" + + echo "# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses" + hentries "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1" "*_2.pub" + + echo "# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs" + hentries "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*" "*_3.pub" + + echo "# Hashed hostname and address entries" + cat known_hosts_hash_frag + rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag + echo + + echo "# Revoked and CA keys" + printf "@revoked sisyphus.example.com " ; cat ed25519_4.pub + printf "@cert-authority prometheus.example.com " ; cat ecdsa_4.pub + printf "@cert-authority *.example.com " ; cat dsa_4.pub + + printf "\n" + echo "# Some invalid lines" + # Invalid marker + printf "@what sisyphus.example.com " ; cat dsa_1.pub + # Key missing + echo "sisyphus.example.com " + # Key blob missing + echo "prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 " + # Key blob truncated + echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz" + # Invalid type + echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg==" + # Type mismatch with blob + echo "prometheus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg==" +) > known_hosts + +echo OK diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6963bd --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c @@ -0,0 +1,1047 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.6 2018/07/16 03:09:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for hostfile.h hostkeys_foreach() + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "hostfile.h" + +struct expected { + const char *key_file; /* Path for key, NULL for none */ + int no_parse_status; /* Expected status w/o key parsing */ + int no_parse_keytype; /* Expected keytype w/o key parsing */ + int match_host_p; /* Match 'prometheus.example.com' */ + int match_host_s; /* Match 'sisyphus.example.com' */ + int match_ipv4; /* Match '192.0.2.1' */ + int match_ipv6; /* Match '2001:db8::1' */ + int match_flags; /* Expected flags from match */ + struct hostkey_foreach_line l; /* Expected line contents */ +}; + +struct cbctx { + const struct expected *expected; + size_t nexpected; + size_t i; + int flags; + int match_host_p; + int match_host_s; + int match_ipv4; + int match_ipv6; +}; + +/* + * hostkeys_foreach() iterator callback that verifies the line passed + * against an array of expected entries. + */ +static int +check(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) +{ + struct cbctx *ctx = (struct cbctx *)_ctx; + const struct expected *expected; + int parse_key = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0; + const int matching = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0; + u_int expected_status, expected_match; + int expected_keytype; + + test_subtest_info("entry %zu/%zu, file line %ld", + ctx->i + 1, ctx->nexpected, l->linenum); + + for (;;) { + ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(ctx->i, ctx->nexpected); + expected = ctx->expected + ctx->i++; + /* If we are matching host/IP then skip entries that don't */ + if (!matching) + break; + if (ctx->match_host_p && expected->match_host_p) + break; + if (ctx->match_host_s && expected->match_host_s) + break; + if (ctx->match_ipv4 && expected->match_ipv4) + break; + if (ctx->match_ipv6 && expected->match_ipv6) + break; + } + expected_status = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_status < 0) ? + expected->l.status : (u_int)expected->no_parse_status; + expected_match = expected->l.match; +#define UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(x) do { \ + if (ctx->x && expected->x) { \ + expected_match |= expected->x; \ + if (expected_status == HKF_STATUS_OK) \ + expected_status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; \ + } \ + } while (0) + expected_keytype = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_keytype < 0) ? + expected->l.keytype : expected->no_parse_keytype; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA || + expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA) { + expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; + expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; + parse_key = 0; + } +#endif + + UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_p); + UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_s); + UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv4); + UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv6); + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->path, NULL); /* Don't care about path */ + ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(l->linenum, expected->l.linenum); + ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->status, expected_status); + ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->match, expected_match); + /* Not all test entries contain fulltext */ + if (expected->l.line != NULL) + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->line, expected->l.line); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->marker, expected->l.marker); + /* XXX we skip hashed hostnames for now; implement checking */ + if (expected->l.hosts != NULL) + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->hosts, expected->l.hosts); + /* Not all test entries contain raw keys */ + if (expected->l.rawkey != NULL) + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->rawkey, expected->l.rawkey); + /* XXX synthesise raw key for cases lacking and compare */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->keytype, expected_keytype); + if (parse_key) { + if (expected->l.key == NULL) + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(l->key, NULL); + if (expected->l.key != NULL) { + ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->key, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(l->key, expected->l.key), 1); + } + } + if (parse_key && !(l->comment == NULL && expected->l.comment == NULL)) + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->comment, expected->l.comment); + return 0; +} + +/* Loads public keys for a set of expected results */ +static void +prepare_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + if (expected[i].key_file == NULL) + continue; +#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA) + continue; +#endif + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public( + test_data_file(expected[i].key_file), &expected[i].l.key, + NULL), 0); + } +} + +static void +cleanup_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + sshkey_free(expected[i].l.key); + expected[i].l.key = NULL; + } +} + +struct expected expected_full[] = { + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, /* path, don't care */ + 1, /* line number */ + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, /* status */ + 0, /* match flags */ + "# Plain host keys, plain host names", /* full line, optional */ + MRK_NONE, /* marker (CA / revoked) */ + NULL, /* hosts text */ + NULL, /* raw key, optional */ + KEY_UNSPEC, /* key type */ + NULL, /* deserialised key */ + NULL, /* comment */ + } }, + { "dsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 2, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "sisyphus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_DSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "DSA #1", + } }, + { "ecdsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 3, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "sisyphus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ECDSA #1", + } }, + { "ed25519_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 4, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "sisyphus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_ED25519, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ED25519 #1", + } }, + { "rsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 5, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "sisyphus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_RSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "RSA #1", + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 6, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 7, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { "dsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { + NULL, + 8, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", + NULL, + KEY_DSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "DSA #2", + } }, + { "ecdsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { + NULL, + 9, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", + NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ECDSA #2", + } }, + { "ed25519_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { + NULL, + 10, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", + NULL, + KEY_ED25519, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ED25519 #2", + } }, + { "rsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { + NULL, + 11, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", + NULL, + KEY_RSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "RSA #2", + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 12, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 13, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { "dsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { + NULL, + 14, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", + NULL, + KEY_DSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "DSA #3", + } }, + { "ecdsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { + NULL, + 15, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", + NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ECDSA #3", + } }, + { "ed25519_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { + NULL, + 16, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", + NULL, + KEY_ED25519, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ED25519 #3", + } }, + { "rsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { + NULL, + 17, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", + NULL, + KEY_RSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "RSA #3", + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 18, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 19, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "# Hashed hostname and address entries", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { "dsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 20, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_DSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "DSA #5", + } }, + { "ecdsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 21, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ECDSA #5", + } }, + { "ed25519_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 22, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_ED25519, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ED25519 #5", + } }, + { "rsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 23, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_RSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "RSA #5", + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 24, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + /* + * The next series have each key listed multiple times, as the + * hostname and addresses in the pre-hashed known_hosts are split + * to separate lines. + */ + { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 25, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_DSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "DSA #6", + } }, + { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 26, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_DSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "DSA #6", + } }, + { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { + NULL, + 27, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_DSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "DSA #6", + } }, + { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 28, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ECDSA #6", + } }, + { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 29, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ECDSA #6", + } }, + { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { + NULL, + 30, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ECDSA #6", + } }, + { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 31, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_ED25519, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ED25519 #6", + } }, + { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 32, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_ED25519, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ED25519 #6", + } }, + { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { + NULL, + 33, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_ED25519, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ED25519 #6", + } }, + { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 34, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_RSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "RSA #6", + } }, + { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 35, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_RSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "RSA #6", + } }, + { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { + NULL, + 36, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_RSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "RSA #6", + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 37, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 38, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 39, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "# Revoked and CA keys", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { "ed25519_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 40, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_REVOKE, + "sisyphus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_ED25519, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ED25519 #4", + } }, + { "ecdsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 41, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_CA, + "prometheus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "ECDSA #4", + } }, + { "dsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 42, + HKF_STATUS_OK, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_CA, + "*.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_DSA, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + "DSA #4", + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 43, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 44, + HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, + 0, + "# Some invalid lines", + MRK_NONE, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 45, + HKF_STATUS_INVALID, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_ERROR, + NULL, + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 46, + HKF_STATUS_INVALID, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "sisyphus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 47, + HKF_STATUS_INVALID, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "prometheus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 48, + HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "sisyphus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 49, + HKF_STATUS_INVALID, + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "sisyphus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + NULL, + } }, + { NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { + NULL, + 50, + HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ + 0, + NULL, + MRK_NONE, + "prometheus.example.com", + NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, /* filled at runtime */ + NULL, + } }, +}; + +void test_iterate(void); + +void +test_iterate(void) +{ + struct cbctx ctx; + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all with key parse"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all without key parse"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = 0; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 1"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = 0; + ctx.match_host_p = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = 0; + ctx.match_host_s = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; + ctx.match_host_p = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 2"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; + ctx.match_host_s = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host missing"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = 0; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host missing"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv4"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = 0; + ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv6"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = 0; + ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv4"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; + ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv6"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; + ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify addr missing"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = 0; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.168.0.1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match addr missing"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "::1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = 0; + ctx.match_host_s = 1; + ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; + ctx.match_host_p = 1; + ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", + "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4 w/ key parse"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY; + ctx.match_host_s = 1; + ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6 w/ key parse"); + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.expected = expected_full; + ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); + ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY; + ctx.match_host_p = 1; + ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; + prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), + check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", + "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); + cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); + TEST_DONE(); +} + diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56e1e37 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..394e0bf --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA #2 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e506ea4 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA #3 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8552c38 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA #4 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..149e1ef --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA #5 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..edbb976 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16a535b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBF6yQEtD9yBw9gmDRf477WBBzvWhAa0ioBI3nbA4emKykj0RbuQd5C4XdQAEOZGzE7v//FcCjwB2wi+JH5eKkxCtN6CjohDASZ1huoIV2UVyYIicZJEEOg1IWjjphvaxtw== ECDSA #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2bad11 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAB8qVcXwgBM92NCmReQlPrZAoui4Bz/mW0VUBFOpHXXW1n+15b/Y7Pc6UBd/ITTZmaBciXY+PWaSBGdwc5GdqGdLgFyJ/QAGrFMPNpVutm/82gNQzlxpNwjbMcKyiZEXzSgnjS6DzMQ0WuSMdzIBXq8OW/Kafxg4ZkU6YqALUXxlQMZuQ== ECDSA #2 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3ea925 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBIb3BhJZk+vUQPg5TQc1koIzuGqloCq7wjr9LjlhG24IBeiFHLsdWw74HDlH4DrOmlxToVYk2lTdnjARleRByjk= ECDSA #3 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d616f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHZd0OXHIWwK3xnjAdMZ1tojxWycdu38pORO/UX5cqsKMgGCKQVBWWO3TFk1ePkGIE9VMWT1hCGqWRRwYlH+dSE= ECDSA #4 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3df9b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..139f5a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b12efe --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9ks7jkua5YWIwByRnnnc6UPJQWI75O0e/UJdPYU1JI ED25519 #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78e262b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIBp6PVW0z2o9C4Ukv/JOgmK7QMFe1pD1s3ADFF7IQob ED25519 #2 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..64e5f12 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBlYfExtYZAPqYvYdrlpGlSWhh/XNHcH3v3c2JzsVNbB ED25519 #3 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47b6724 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDFP8L9REfN/iYy1KIRtFqSCn3V2+vOCpoZYENFGLdOF ED25519 #4 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..72ccae6 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f71973 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4446f45 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +# Plain host keys, plain host names +sisyphus.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #1 +sisyphus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBF6yQEtD9yBw9gmDRf477WBBzvWhAa0ioBI3nbA4emKykj0RbuQd5C4XdQAEOZGzE7v//FcCjwB2wi+JH5eKkxCtN6CjohDASZ1huoIV2UVyYIicZJEEOg1IWjjphvaxtw== ECDSA #1 +sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9ks7jkua5YWIwByRnnnc6UPJQWI75O0e/UJdPYU1JI ED25519 #1 +sisyphus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDg4hB4vAZHJ0PVRiJajOv/GlytFWNpv5/9xgB9+5BIbvp8LOrFZ5D9K0Gsmwpd4G4rfaAz8j896DhMArg0vtkilIPPGt/6VzWMERgvaIQPJ/IE99X3+fjcAG56oAWwy29JX10lQMzBPU6XJIaN/zqpkb6qUBiAHBdLpxrFBBU0/w== RSA #1 + +# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses +prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-dss 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 DSA #2 +prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAB8qVcXwgBM92NCmReQlPrZAoui4Bz/mW0VUBFOpHXXW1n+15b/Y7Pc6UBd/ITTZmaBciXY+PWaSBGdwc5GdqGdLgFyJ/QAGrFMPNpVutm/82gNQzlxpNwjbMcKyiZEXzSgnjS6DzMQ0WuSMdzIBXq8OW/Kafxg4ZkU6YqALUXxlQMZuQ== ECDSA #2 +prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIBp6PVW0z2o9C4Ukv/JOgmK7QMFe1pD1s3ADFF7IQob ED25519 #2 +prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDmbUhNabB5AmBDX6GNHZ3lbn7pRxqfpW+f53QqNGlK0sLV+0gkMIrOfUp1kdE2ZLE6tfzdicatj/RlH6/wuo4yyYb+Pyx3G0vxdmAIiA4aANq38XweDucBC0TZkRWVHK+Gs5V/uV0z7N0axJvkkJujMLvST3CRiiWwlficBc6yVQ== RSA #2 + +# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs +*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-dss 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 DSA #3 +*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBIb3BhJZk+vUQPg5TQc1koIzuGqloCq7wjr9LjlhG24IBeiFHLsdWw74HDlH4DrOmlxToVYk2lTdnjARleRByjk= ECDSA #3 +*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBlYfExtYZAPqYvYdrlpGlSWhh/XNHcH3v3c2JzsVNbB ED25519 #3 +*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDX8F93W3SH4ZSus4XUQ2cw9dqcuyUETTlKEeGv3zlknV3YCoe2Mp04naDhiuwj8sOsytrZSESzLY1ZEyzrjxE6ZFVv8NKgck/AbRjcwlRFOcx9oKUxOrXRa0IoXlTq0kyjKCJfaHBKnGitZThknCPTbVmpATkm5xx6J0WEDozfoQ== RSA #3 + +# Hashed hostname and address entries +|1|z3xOIdT5ue3Vuf3MzT67kaioqjw=|GZhhe5uwDOBQrC9N4cCjpbLpSn4= ssh-dss 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 DSA #5 +|1|B7t/AYabn8zgwU47Cb4A/Nqt3eI=|arQPZyRphkzisr7w6wwikvhaOyE= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5 +|1|JR81WxEocTP5d7goIRkl8fHBbno=|l6sj6FOsoXxgEZMzn/BnOfPKN68= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5 +|1|W7x4zY6KtTZJgsopyOusJqvVPag=|QauLt7hKezBZFZi2i4Xopho7Nsk= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5 + +|1|mxnU8luzqWLvfVi5qBm5xVIyCRM=|9Epopft7LBd80Bf6RmWPIpwa8yU= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 +|1|klvLmvh2vCpkNMDEjVvrE8SJWTg=|e/dqEEBLnbgqmwEesl4cDRu/7TM= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 +|1|wsk3ddB3UjuxEsoeNCeZjZ6NvZs=|O3O/q2Z/u7DrxoTiIq6kzCevQT0= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6 +|1|B8epmkLSni+vGZDijr/EwxeR2k4=|7ct8yzNOVJhKm3ZD2w0XIT7df8E= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 +|1|JojD885UhYhbCu571rgyM/5PpYU=|BJaU2aE1FebQZy3B5tzTDRWFRG0= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 +|1|5t7UDHDybVrDZVQPCpwdnr6nk4k=|EqJ73W/veIL3H2x+YWHcJxI5ETA= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6 +|1|OCcBfGc/b9+ip+W6Gp+3ftdluO4=|VbrKUdzOOtIBOOmEE+jlK4SD3Xc= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 +|1|9fLN0YdP+BJ25lKuKvYuOdUo93w=|vZyr0rOiX01hv5XbghhHMW+Zb3U= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 +|1|nc9RoaaQ0s5jdPxwlUmluGHU3uk=|un6OsJajokKQ3MgyS9mfDNeyP6U= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6 +|1|rsHB6juT9q6GOY91qOeOwL6TSJE=|ps/vXF9Izuues5PbOn887Gw/2Dg= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 +|1|BsckdLH2aRyWQooRmv+Yo3t4dKg=|Lf3tJc5Iyx0KxNwAG89FsImsfEE= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 +|1|plqkBA4hq7UATyd5+/Xl+zL7ghw=|stacofaUed46666mfqxp9gJFjt4= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 + + +# Revoked and CA keys +@revoked sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDFP8L9REfN/iYy1KIRtFqSCn3V2+vOCpoZYENFGLdOF ED25519 #4 +@cert-authority prometheus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHZd0OXHIWwK3xnjAdMZ1tojxWycdu38pORO/UX5cqsKMgGCKQVBWWO3TFk1ePkGIE9VMWT1hCGqWRRwYlH+dSE= ECDSA #4 +@cert-authority *.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #4 + +# Some invalid lines +@what sisyphus.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #1 +sisyphus.example.com +prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 +sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz +sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg== +prometheus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg== diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..772ce9c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +1024 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78794b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +1024 65537 135970715082947442639683969597180728933388298633245835186618852623800675939308729462220235058285909679252157995530180587329132927339620517781785310829060832352381015614725360278571924286986474946772141568893116432268565829418506866604294073334978275702221949783314402806080929601995102334442541344606109853641 RSA1 #2 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0c035fe --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +1024 65537 125895605498029643697051635076028105429632810811904702876152645261610759866299221305725069141163240694267669117205342283569102183636228981857946763978553664895308762890072813014496700601576921921752482059207749978374872713540759920335553799711267170948655579130584031555334229966603000896364091459595522912269 RSA1 #3 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0006442 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +1024 65537 174143366122697048196335388217056770310345753698079464367148030836533360510864881734142526411160017107552815906024399248049666856133771656680462456979369587903909343046704480897527203474513676654933090991684252819423129896444427656841613263783484827101210734799449281639493127615902427443211183258155381810593 RSA1 #4 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb53c26 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +1024 65537 127931411493401587586867047972295564331543694182352197506125410692673654572057908999642645524647232712160516076508316152810117209181150078352725299319149726341058893406440426414316276977768958023952319602422835879783057966985348561111880658922724668687074412548487722084792283453716871417610020757212399252171 RSA1 #5 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85d6576 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b87885 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDg4hB4vAZHJ0PVRiJajOv/GlytFWNpv5/9xgB9+5BIbvp8LOrFZ5D9K0Gsmwpd4G4rfaAz8j896DhMArg0vtkilIPPGt/6VzWMERgvaIQPJ/IE99X3+fjcAG56oAWwy29JX10lQMzBPU6XJIaN/zqpkb6qUBiAHBdLpxrFBBU0/w== RSA #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33f1fd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDmbUhNabB5AmBDX6GNHZ3lbn7pRxqfpW+f53QqNGlK0sLV+0gkMIrOfUp1kdE2ZLE6tfzdicatj/RlH6/wuo4yyYb+Pyx3G0vxdmAIiA4aANq38XweDucBC0TZkRWVHK+Gs5V/uV0z7N0axJvkkJujMLvST3CRiiWwlficBc6yVQ== RSA #2 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2f6b20 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDX8F93W3SH4ZSus4XUQ2cw9dqcuyUETTlKEeGv3zlknV3YCoe2Mp04naDhiuwj8sOsytrZSESzLY1ZEyzrjxE6ZFVv8NKgck/AbRjcwlRFOcx9oKUxOrXRa0IoXlTq0kyjKCJfaHBKnGitZThknCPTbVmpATkm5xx6J0WEDozfoQ== RSA #3 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..35545a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDI8AdjBAozcdRnIikVlt69iyDHKyrtxmpdkbRy9bWaL86OH+PTmLUk5e+T/ufiakpeE2pm0hkE3e4Sh/FsY+rsQdRoraWVNFfchcMeVlKvuy5RZN0ElvmaQebOJUeNeBn2LLw8aL8bJ4CP/bQRKrmrSSqjz3+4H9YNVyyk1OGBPQ== RSA #4 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..befbaa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..393e116 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6 diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92c7646 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/02/16 22:18:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for known_hosts-related API. + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +void tests(void); +void test_iterate(void); /* test_iterate.c */ + +void +tests(void) +{ + test_iterate(); +} + diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile b/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c61307 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ + +PROG=test_kex +SRCS=tests.c test_kex.c + +# From usr.bin/ssh +SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c +SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c +SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c +SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c +SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c +SRCS+=kex.c kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c +SRCS+=kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c +SRCS+=dh.c compat.c +SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c +SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c +SRCS+=smult_curve25519_ref.c + +SRCS+=digest-openssl.c +#SRCS+=digest-libc.c + +REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} + +run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} + env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} + +.include + +LDADD+=-lz diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e5999b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_kex.c,v 1.2 2015/07/10 06:23:25 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test KEX + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "ssh_api.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "myproposal.h" + +struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX - needed for linking */ + +void kex_tests(void); +static int do_debug = 0; + +static int +do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to) +{ + u_char type; + size_t len; + const u_char *buf; + int r; + + for (;;) { + if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "ssh_packet_next: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + return r; + } + if (type != 0) + return 0; + buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len); + if (do_debug) + printf("%zu", len); + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0) + return r; + } +} + +static void +run_kex(struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server) +{ + int r = 0; + + while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) { + if (do_debug) + printf(" S:"); + if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client))) + break; + if (do_debug) + printf(" C:"); + if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server))) + break; + } + if (do_debug) + printf("done: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(server->kex->done, 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(client->kex->done, 1); +} + +static void +do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits) +{ + struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL, *server2 = NULL; + struct sshkey *private, *public; + struct sshbuf *state; + struct kex_params kex_params; + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; + char *keyname = NULL; + + TEST_START("sshkey_generate"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(keytype, bits, &private), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshkey_from_private"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(private, &public), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ssh_init"); + memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal)); + if (kex != NULL) + kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex; + keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL); + kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname; + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(client, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(server, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ssh_add_hostkey"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server, private), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(client, public), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("kex"); + run_kex(client, server); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("rekeying client"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0); + run_kex(client, server); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("rekeying server"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server), 0); + run_kex(client, server); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ssh_packet_get_state"); + state = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(state, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_get_state(server, state), 0); + ASSERT_INT_GE(sshbuf_len(state), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ssh_packet_set_state"); + server2 = NULL; + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server2, 1, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server2, private), 0); + kex_free(server2->kex); /* XXX or should ssh_packet_set_state()? */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_set_state(server2, state), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(state), 0); + sshbuf_free(state); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2->kex, NULL); + /* XXX we need to set the callbacks */ + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; +#endif + server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; + server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key; + server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key; + server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign; + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("rekeying server2"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server2), 0); + run_kex(client, server2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0); + run_kex(client, server2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("cleanup"); + sshkey_free(private); + sshkey_free(public); + ssh_free(client); + ssh_free(server); + ssh_free(server2); + free(keyname); + TEST_DONE(); +} + +static void +do_kex(char *kex) +{ + do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048); + do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256); +#endif + do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ED25519, 256); +} + +void +kex_tests(void) +{ + do_kex("curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp256"); + do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp384"); + do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp521"); +#endif + do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"); + do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"); + do_kex("diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"); + do_kex("diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c b/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7036ec --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/01/15 23:41:29 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +void kex_tests(void); + +void +tests(void) +{ + kex_tests(); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/match/Makefile b/regress/unittests/match/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87e7582 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/match/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2017/12/21 03:01:49 djm Exp $ + +PROG=test_match +SRCS=tests.c + +# From usr.bin/ssh +SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c +SRCS+=match.c misc.c log.c uidswap.c fatal.c ssherr.c addrmatch.c xmalloc.c +SRCS+=cleanup.c atomicio.c + +REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} + +run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} + env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} + +.include diff --git a/regress/unittests/match/tests.c b/regress/unittests/match/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d9af55 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/match/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.5 2018/07/04 13:51:45 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for matching functions + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "match.h" + +void +tests(void) +{ + TEST_START("match_pattern"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", ""), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "aaa"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", ""), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", "aaaa"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaaa", "aaa"), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("match_pattern wildcard"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "*"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "?"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a?"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "*"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a*"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?*"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "**"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?a"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "*a"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a?"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a*"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "?a"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "*a"), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("match_pattern_list"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "", 0), 0); /* no patterns */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*", 0), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*", 0), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!a,*", 0), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*,!a", 0), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "a,!*", 0), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*,a", 0), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "", 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*", 0), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*", 0), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a", 0), -1); + /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!b", 0), 1); */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a,*", 0), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!a,*", 0), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*,!a", 0), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "*,!a", 0), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!*", 0), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!*", 0), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!a", 0), -1); + /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!a", 0), 1); */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*,a", 0), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!*,a", 0), -1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("match_pattern_list lowercase"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 1), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 1), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("addr_match_list"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1/44"), -2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "127.0.0.1/44"), -2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("a", "*"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "*"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "*"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1"), -1); + /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2"), 1); */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.255", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.1.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.1.0/24"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.0/24"), -1); + /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.1.0/24"), 1); */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.1"), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1,10.0.0.1"), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,127.0.0.2"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 0); + /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.2"), 1); */ + /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 1); */ + TEST_DONE(); + +#define CHECK_FILTER(string,filter,expected) \ + do { \ + char *result = match_filter_blacklist((string), (filter)); \ + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, expected); \ + free(result); \ + } while (0) + + TEST_START("match_filter_list"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "", "a,b,c"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a", "b,c"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b", "a,c"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "c", "a,b"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b", "c"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,c", "b"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b,c", ""); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a"); + CHECK_FILTER("", "a,b,c", ""); + TEST_DONE(); +/* + * XXX TODO + * int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *); + * int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); + * char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *); + * int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *); + */ +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..81d4f27 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.6 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ + +.include + +PROG=test_sshbuf +SRCS=tests.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_misc.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fuzz.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fixed.c + +# From usr.bin/ssh +SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c +SRCS+=atomicio.c + +run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} + env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} + + diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ee77d69 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + const u_char *cdp; + u_char *dp; + size_t sz; + int r; + + TEST_START("allocate sshbuf"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("max size on fresh buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("available on fresh buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("len = 0 on empty buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("set valid max size"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 65536), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 65536); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("available on limited buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 65536); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("free"); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume on empty buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume_end on empty buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("reserve space"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + *dp = 0x11; + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 3, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + *dp++ = 0x22; + *dp++ = 0x33; + *dp++ = 0x44; + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_len on filled buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_ptr on filled buffer"); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x11); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[1], 0x22); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[2], 0x33); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[3], 0x44); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume on filled buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 64); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x22); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 2), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x44); + r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume_end on filled buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 4, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + *dp++ = 0x11; + *dp++ = 0x22; + *dp++ = 0x33; + *dp++ = 0x44; + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 5); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 3), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*cdp, 0x11); + r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fill limited buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume and force compaction"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 223), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 224, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 223, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + memset(dp, 0x7d, 223); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("resize full buffer"); + r = sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1000); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + sz = roundup(1223 + SSHBUF_SIZE_INC * 3, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sz), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - 1223); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223); + TEST_DONE(); + + /* NB. uses sshbuf internals */ + TEST_START("alloc chunking"); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + *dp = 0xff; + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1223, 0xff, 1); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_alloc(p1) % SSHBUF_SIZE_INC, 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("reset buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223); + sshbuf_reset(p1); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df4925f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fixed.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +void sshbuf_fixed(void); + +const u_char test_buf[] = "\x01\x12\x34\x56\x78\x00\x00\x00\x05hello"; + +void +sshbuf_fixed(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1, *p2, *p3; + u_char c; + char *s; + u_int i; + size_t l; + + TEST_START("sshbuf_from"); + p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_check_reserve(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, NULL), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 200), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_from data"); + p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &c), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &i), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 5); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s, &l), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5); + sshbuf_free(p1); + free(s); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_fromb "); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1), 0); + p2 = sshbuf_fromb(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL); + ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 2); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p2), p1); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p2), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p2), NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sshbuf_len(p2)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p2, &c), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p2, &i), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p2, &s, &l), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5); + sshbuf_free(p1); + ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1); + sshbuf_free(p2); + free(s); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_froms"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x01), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(p1, "hello"), 0); + p2 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(test_buf) - 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), sizeof(test_buf) + 4 - 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p3, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p3), NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p3), sizeof(test_buf) - 1); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p3), test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1); + sshbuf_free(p3); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p2, 1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(p3, NULL); + sshbuf_free(p2); + sshbuf_free(p1); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c52376b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fuzz.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#define NUM_FUZZ_TESTS (1 << 18) + +void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + u_char *dp; + size_t sz, sz2, i; + u_int32_t r; + int ret; + + /* NB. uses sshbuf internals */ + TEST_START("fuzz alloc/dealloc"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 16 * 1024), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1)); + for (i = 0; i < NUM_FUZZ_TESTS; i++) { + r = arc4random_uniform(10); + if (r == 0) { + /* 10% chance: small reserve */ + r = arc4random_uniform(10); + fuzz_reserve: + sz = sshbuf_avail(p1); + sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1); + ret = sshbuf_reserve(p1, r, &dp); + if (ret < 0) { + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz, r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2); + } else { + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz, r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 + r); + memset(dp, arc4random_uniform(255) + 1, r); + } + } else if (r < 3) { + /* 20% chance: big reserve */ + r = arc4random_uniform(8 * 1024); + goto fuzz_reserve; + } else if (r == 3) { + /* 10% chance: small consume */ + r = arc4random_uniform(10); + fuzz_consume: + sz = sshbuf_avail(p1); + sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1); + /* 50% change consume from end, otherwise start */ + ret = ((arc4random() & 1) ? + sshbuf_consume : sshbuf_consume_end)(p1, r); + if (ret < 0) { + ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz2, r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2); + } else { + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz2, r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz + r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 - r); + } + } else if (r < 8) { + /* 40% chance: big consume */ + r = arc4random_uniform(2 * 1024); + goto fuzz_consume; + } else if (r == 8) { + /* 10% chance: reset max size */ + r = arc4random_uniform(16 * 1024); + sz = sshbuf_max_size(p1); + if (sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, r) < 0) + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz); + else + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), r); + } else { + if (arc4random_uniform(8192) == 0) { + /* tiny chance: new buffer */ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, + 16 * 1024), 0); + } else { + /* Almost 10%: giant reserve */ + /* use arc4random_buf for r > 2^32 on 64 bit */ + arc4random_buf(&r, sizeof(r)); + while (r < SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 2) { + r <<= 1; + r |= arc4random() & 1; + } + goto fuzz_reserve; + } + } + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 16 * 1024); + } + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..966e843 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c @@ -0,0 +1,484 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1, *p2; + const u_char *cd; + u_char *d, d2[32], x[] = { + 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x00, 0x99 + }; + u_int64_t v64; + u_int32_t v32; + u_int16_t v16; + u_char v8; + size_t s; + char *s2; + int r; + u_char bn1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + u_char bn2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02 }; + u_char bn3[] = { 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 }; + u_char bn_exp1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + u_char bn_exp2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }; + u_char bn_exp3[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 }; + + TEST_START("PEEK_U64"); + ASSERT_U64_EQ(PEEK_U64(x), 0x1122334455667788ULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("PEEK_U32"); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(x), 0x11223344); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("PEEK_U16"); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(x), 0x1122); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("POKE_U64"); + bzero(d2, sizeof(d2)); + POKE_U64(d2, 0x1122334455667788ULL); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 8); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("POKE_U32"); + bzero(d2, sizeof(d2)); + POKE_U32(d2, 0x11223344); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("POKE_U16"); + bzero(d2, sizeof(d2)); + POKE_U16(d2, 0x1122); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5); + cd = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cd, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[0], 0x11); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[1], 0x22); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[2], 0x33); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[3], 0x44); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[4], 0x55); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4), 0); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get truncated"); + r = sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put truncated"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0); + r = sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64), 0); + ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x1122334455667788ULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64 truncated"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + r = sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x11223344); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 6); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x55667788); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32 truncated"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + r = sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 9), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 9); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x1122); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 7); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x3344); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x5566); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x7788); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16 truncated"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + r = sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 2), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x11); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x22); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8 truncated"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + r = sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 exact"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 8), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 limited"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 7), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 exact"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 limited"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 3), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16 limited"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 + 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + free(d); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string exact"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + free(d); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string truncated"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3); + r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string giant"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring giant"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring embedded \\0"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring trailing \\0"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x) - 1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x) - 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 - 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x) - 1); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(s2, x, s); + free(s2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, x, sizeof(x)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string limited"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4 - 1), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string giant"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, (void *)0x01, 0xfffffffc); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_putf"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + r = sshbuf_putf(p1, "%s %d %x", "hello", 23, 0x5f); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 11); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), "hello 23 5f", 11); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_putb"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + p2 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "blahblahblah", 12), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(p2, p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 12); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), "blahblahblah", 12); + sshbuf_free(p2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes empty buf"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, NULL, 0), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes all zeroes"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn1, sizeof(bn1)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes simple"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2+2, sizeof(bn2)-2), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes leading zero"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2, sizeof(bn2)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3+1, sizeof(bn3)-1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg and leading zero"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3, sizeof(bn3)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a68e132 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + BIGNUM *bn, *bn2; + /* This one has num_bits != num_bytes * 8 to test bignum1 encoding */ + const char *hexbn1 = "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10"; + /* This one has MSB set to test bignum2 encoding negative-avoidance */ + const char *hexbn2 = "f0e0d0c0b0a0908070605040302010007fff11"; + u_char expbn1[] = { + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, + 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, + }; + u_char expbn2[] = { + 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80, + 0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00, + 0x7f, 0xff, 0x11 + }; +#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) + const u_char *d; + size_t s; + BIGNUM *bn_x, *bn_y; + int ec256_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + char *ec256_x = "0C828004839D0106AA59575216191357" + "34B451459DADB586677EF9DF55784999"; + char *ec256_y = "4D196B50F0B4E94B3C73E3A9D4CD9DF2" + "C8F9A35E42BDD047550F69D80EC23CD4"; + u_char expec256[] = { + 0x04, + 0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06, + 0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57, + 0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86, + 0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99, + 0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b, + 0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2, + 0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47, + 0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4 + }; + EC_KEY *eck; + EC_POINT *ecp; +#endif + int r; + +#define MKBN(b, bnn) \ + do { \ + bnn = NULL; \ + ASSERT_INT_GT(BN_hex2bn(&bnn, b), 0); \ + } while (0) + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 2); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int16_t)BN_num_bits(bn)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 2, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 limited"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 1), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 bn2"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 2); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int16_t)BN_num_bits(bn)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 2, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 bn2 limited"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 1), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 4); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 limited"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 3), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4 + 1); /* MSB */ + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4), 0x00); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2 limited"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn2) + 3), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 truncated"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1) - 1); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1) - 1); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 giant"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xffff), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, (0xffff + 7) / 8, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + ((0xffff + 7) / 8)); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + ((0xffff + 7) / 8)); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 bn2"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 bn2 truncated"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2) - 1); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2) - 1); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + sizeof(expbn1)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 truncated"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 3); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 giant"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 65536), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 65536, NULL), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 65536 + 4); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0); /* MSB */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + 1 + sizeof(expbn2)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 truncated"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 1 + 4 - 1); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 negative"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_ec"); + eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL); + ecp = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(eck)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ecp, NULL); + MKBN(ec256_x, bn_x); + MKBN(ec256_y, bn_y); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp( + EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), ecp, bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_KEY_set_public_key(eck, ecp), 1); + BN_free(bn_x); + BN_free(bn_y); + EC_POINT_free(ecp); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_eckey(p1, eck), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string_direct(p1, &d, &s), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(expec256)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, expec256, sizeof(expec256)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + EC_KEY_free(eck); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_ec"); + eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, expec256, sizeof(expec256)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expec256) + 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck), 0); + bn_x = BN_new(); + bn_y = BN_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_x, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_y, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp( + EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eck), + bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1); + MKBN(ec256_x, bn); + MKBN(ec256_y, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_x, bn), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_y, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + sshbuf_free(p1); + EC_KEY_free(eck); + BN_free(bn_x); + BN_free(bn_y); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif +} + diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6b5c29 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c,v 1.2 2014/05/02 02:54:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void); + +static void +attempt_parse_blob(u_char *blob, size_t len) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + BIGNUM *bn; +#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) + EC_KEY *eck; +#endif + u_char *s; + size_t l; + u_int8_t u8; + u_int16_t u16; + u_int32_t u32; + u_int64_t u64; + + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, blob, len), 0); + sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &u8); + sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &u16); + sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &u32); + sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &u64); + if (sshbuf_get_string(p1, &s, &l) == 0) { + bzero(s, l); + free(s); + } + bn = BN_new(); + sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn); + BN_clear_free(bn); + bn = BN_new(); + sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn); + BN_clear_free(bn); +#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) + eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL); + sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck); + EC_KEY_free(eck); +#endif + sshbuf_free(p1); +} + + +static void +onerror(void *fuzz) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n"); + fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz); +} + +void +sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void) +{ + u_char blob[] = { + /* u8 */ + 0xd0, + /* u16 */ + 0xc0, 0xde, + /* u32 */ + 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, + /* u64 */ + 0xfe, 0xed, 0xac, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x1c, 0xbe, 0xef, + /* string */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, + 'O', ' ', 'G', 'o', 'r', 'g', 'o', 'n', '!', + /* bignum1 */ + 0x79, + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, + 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, + /* bignum2 */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, + 0x00, + 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80, + 0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00, + 0x7f, 0xff, 0x11, + /* EC point (NIST-256 curve) */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, + 0x04, + 0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06, + 0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57, + 0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86, + 0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99, + 0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b, + 0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2, + 0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47, + 0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4, + }; + struct fuzz *fuzz; + + TEST_START("fuzz blob parsing"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | + FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | + FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, blob, sizeof(blob)); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) + attempt_parse_blob(blob, sizeof(blob)); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + TEST_ONERROR(NULL, NULL); +} + diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..762a6c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_misc.c,v 1.2 2016/05/03 13:48:33 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_misc_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_misc_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + char tmp[512], *p; + FILE *out; + size_t sz; + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dump"); + out = tmpfile(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(out, NULL); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0); + sshbuf_dump(p1, out); + fflush(out); + rewind(out); + sz = fread(tmp, 1, sizeof(tmp), out); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ferror(out), 0); + ASSERT_INT_NE(feof(out), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sz, 0); + tmp[sz] = '\0'; + ASSERT_PTR_NE(strstr(tmp, "12 34 56 78"), NULL); + fclose(out); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob16"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0); + p = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "12345678"); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 1"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0); + p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "EQ=="); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 2"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0); + p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESI="); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 3"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x33), 0); + p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESIz"); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 8191"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 8192, NULL), 0); + bzero(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), 8192); + p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), ((8191 + 2) / 3) * 4); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 1"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A=="), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*sshbuf_ptr(p1), 0xd0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 2"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A8="), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00f); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 4"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A/QDw=="), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00fd00f); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dup_string"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + /* Check empty buffer */ + p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), 0); + free(p); + /* Check buffer with string */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "quad1", strlen("quad1")), 0); + p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), strlen("quad1")); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "quad1"); + free(p); + /* Check buffer with terminating nul */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "\0", 1), 0); + p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), strlen("quad1")); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "quad1"); + free(p); + /* Check buffer with data after nul (expect failure) */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "quad2", strlen("quad2")), 0); + p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(p, NULL); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); +} + diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1557e43 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +void sshbuf_tests(void); +void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void); +void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void); +void sshbuf_misc_tests(void); +void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void); +void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void); +void sshbuf_fixed(void); + +void +tests(void) +{ + sshbuf_tests(); + sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(); + sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(); + sshbuf_misc_tests(); + sshbuf_fuzz_tests(); + sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(); + sshbuf_fixed(); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile b/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c940be --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ + +PROG=test_sshkey +SRCS=tests.c test_sshkey.c test_file.c test_fuzz.c common.c + +# From usr.bin/ssh +SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c +SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c +SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c +SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c +SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c +SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c +SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c + +SRCS+=digest-openssl.c +#SRCS+=digest-libc.c + +REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} + +run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} + env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata + +.include + diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e63465c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: common.c,v 1.3 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Helpers for key API tests + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#include "common.h" + +struct sshbuf * +load_file(const char *name) +{ + int fd; + struct sshbuf *ret; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + ASSERT_INT_NE(fd = open(test_data_file(name), O_RDONLY), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_file(fd, ret), 0); + close(fd); + return ret; +} + +struct sshbuf * +load_text_file(const char *name) +{ + struct sshbuf *ret = load_file(name); + const u_char *p; + + /* Trim whitespace at EOL */ + for (p = sshbuf_ptr(ret); sshbuf_len(ret) > 0;) { + if (p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\r' || + p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\t' || + p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == ' ' || + p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\n') + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(ret, 1), 0); + else + break; + } + /* \0 terminate */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(ret, 0), 0); + return ret; +} + +BIGNUM * +load_bignum(const char *name) +{ + BIGNUM *ret = NULL; + struct sshbuf *buf; + + buf = load_text_file(name); + ASSERT_INT_NE(BN_hex2bn(&ret, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return ret; +} + +const BIGNUM * +rsa_n(struct sshkey *k) +{ + const BIGNUM *n = NULL; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL); + RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL); + return n; +} + +const BIGNUM * +rsa_e(struct sshkey *k) +{ + const BIGNUM *e = NULL; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL); + RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, &e, NULL); + return e; +} + +const BIGNUM * +rsa_p(struct sshkey *k) +{ + const BIGNUM *p = NULL; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL); + RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, NULL); + return p; +} + +const BIGNUM * +rsa_q(struct sshkey *k) +{ + const BIGNUM *q = NULL; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL); + RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, NULL, &q); + return q; +} + +const BIGNUM * +dsa_g(struct sshkey *k) +{ + const BIGNUM *g = NULL; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL); + DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, NULL, NULL, &g); + return g; +} + +const BIGNUM * +dsa_pub_key(struct sshkey *k) +{ + const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL); + DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub_key, NULL); + return pub_key; +} + +const BIGNUM * +dsa_priv_key(struct sshkey *k) +{ + const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL); + DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key); + return priv_key; +} + diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a514fd --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: common.h,v 1.2 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Helpers for key API tests + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +/* Load a binary file into a buffer */ +struct sshbuf *load_file(const char *name); + +/* Load a text file into a buffer */ +struct sshbuf *load_text_file(const char *name); + +/* Load a bignum from a file */ +BIGNUM *load_bignum(const char *name); + +/* Accessors for key components */ +const BIGNUM *rsa_n(struct sshkey *k); +const BIGNUM *rsa_e(struct sshkey *k); +const BIGNUM *rsa_p(struct sshkey *k); +const BIGNUM *rsa_q(struct sshkey *k); +const BIGNUM *dsa_g(struct sshkey *k); +const BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key(struct sshkey *k); +const BIGNUM *dsa_priv_key(struct sshkey *k); + diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..93da34c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.7 2018/09/12 01:36:45 djm Exp $ + +PW=mekmitasdigoat + +rsa_params() { + _in="$1" + _outbase="$2" + set -e + openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^modulus:$/,/^publicExponent:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n + openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^prime1:$/,/^prime2:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.p + openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^prime2:$/,/^exponent1:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.q + for x in n p q ; do + echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x + cat ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ + done +} + +dsa_params() { + _in="$1" + _outbase="$2" + set -e + openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv + openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^pub:/,/^P:/' | #\ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub + openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^G:/,0' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.g + for x in priv pub g ; do + echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x + cat ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ + done +} + +ecdsa_params() { + _in="$1" + _outbase="$2" + set -e + openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv + openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^pub:/,/^ASN1 OID:/' | #\ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub + openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \ + grep "ASN1 OID:" | tr -d '\n' | \ + sed 's/.*: //;s/ *$//' > ${_outbase}.curve + for x in priv pub curve ; do + echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x + cat ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ + done +} + +set -ex + +cd testdata + +rm -f rsa_1 dsa_1 ecdsa_1 ed25519_1 +rm -f rsa_2 dsa_2 ecdsa_2 ed25519_2 +rm -f rsa_n dsa_n ecdsa_n # new-format keys +rm -f rsa_1_pw dsa_1_pw ecdsa_1_pw ed25519_1_pw +rm -f rsa_n_pw dsa_n_pw ecdsa_n_pw +rm -f pw *.pub *.bn.* *.param.* *.fp *.fp.bb + +ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA test key #1" -N "" -f rsa_1 +ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #1" -N "" -f dsa_1 +ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -C "ECDSA test key #1" -N "" -f ecdsa_1 +ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_1 + +ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -C "RSA test key #2" -N "" -f rsa_2 +ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #2" -N "" -f dsa_2 +ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 521 -C "ECDSA test key #2" -N "" -f ecdsa_2 +ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_2 + +cp rsa_1 rsa_n +cp dsa_1 dsa_n +cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n + +cp rsa_1 rsa_1_pw +cp dsa_1 dsa_1_pw +cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1_pw +cp ed25519_1 ed25519_1_pw +cp rsa_1 rsa_n_pw +cp dsa_1 dsa_n_pw +cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n_pw + +ssh-keygen -pf rsa_1_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -pf dsa_1_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_1_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_1_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -opf rsa_n_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -opf dsa_n_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -opf ecdsa_n_pw -N "$PW" + +rsa_params rsa_1 rsa_1.param +rsa_params rsa_2 rsa_2.param +dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param +dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param +ecdsa_params ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1.param +ecdsa_params ecdsa_2 ecdsa_2.param +# XXX ed25519 params + +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 2 dsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 3 ecdsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_1.pub + +# Make a few RSA variant signature too. +cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha1 +cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha512 +cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha1.pub +cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha512.pub +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t ssh-rsa \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha1.pub +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t rsa-sha2-512 \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha512.pub + +ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 5 rsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 6 dsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_1.pub + +ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp +ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp +ssh-keygen -lf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp +ssh-keygen -lf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp + +ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1-cert.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1-cert.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1-cert.fp +ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp + +ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp.bb + +# XXX Extend ssh-keygen to do detached signatures (better to test/fuzz against) + +echo "$PW" > pw diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65610da --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,421 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.8 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "digest.h" + +#include "common.h" + +void sshkey_file_tests(void); + +void +sshkey_file_tests(void) +{ + struct sshkey *k1, *k2; + struct sshbuf *buf, *pw; + BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; + char *cp; + + TEST_START("load passphrase"); + pw = load_text_file("pw"); + TEST_DONE(); + + + TEST_START("parse RSA from private"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n"); + b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p"); + c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q"); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_n(k1), a); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_p(k1), b); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_q(k1), c); + BN_free(a); + BN_free(b); + BN_free(c); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse RSA from private w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format"); + buf = load_file("rsa_n"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("rsa_n_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load RSA from public"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa"); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "rsa-sha2-512"); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load RSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("RSA key hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("RSA cert hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("rsa_1-cert.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("RSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp.bb"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(k1); + + TEST_START("parse DSA from private"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g"); + b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv"); + c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub"); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_g(k1), a); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), b); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_pub_key(k1), c); + BN_free(a); + BN_free(b); + BN_free(c); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse DSA from private w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format"); + buf = load_file("dsa_n"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("dsa_n_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load DSA from public"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load DSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_DSA_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("DSA key hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("DSA cert hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("dsa_1-cert.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("DSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp.bb"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(k1); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.param.curve"); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf), + OBJ_nid2sn(k1->ecdsa_nid)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + a = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.priv"); + b = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.pub"); + c = EC_POINT_point2bn(EC_KEY_get0_group(k1->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k1->ecdsa), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + NULL, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(c, NULL); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), a); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(b, c); + BN_free(a); + BN_free(b); + BN_free(c); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_n"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_n_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load ECDSA from public"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load ECDSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ECDSA key hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ECDSA cert hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1-cert.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ECDSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp.bb"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(k1); +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + + TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519); + /* XXX check key contents */ + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load Ed25519 from public"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load Ed25519 cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("Ed25519 key hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("Ed25519 cert hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1-cert.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("Ed25519 key bubblebabble fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp.bb"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(k1); + + sshbuf_free(pw); + +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3b0c92 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c @@ -0,0 +1,360 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.8 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Fuzz tests for key parsing + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#include "common.h" + +void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void); + +static void +onerror(void *fuzz) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n"); + fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz); +} + +static void +public_fuzz(struct sshkey *k) +{ + struct sshkey *k1; + struct sshbuf *buf; + struct fuzz *fuzz; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(buf = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k, buf), 0); + /* XXX need a way to run the tests in "slow, but complete" mode */ + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */ + FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | */ + FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, + sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), + &k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + if (sshkey_from_blob(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), &k1) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + } + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); +} + +static void +sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k, const char *sig_alg) +{ + struct fuzz *fuzz; + u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed"; + size_t l; + + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), sig_alg, 0), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */ + FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | + FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, sig, l); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0), 0); + free(sig); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + /* Ensure 1-bit difference at least */ + if (fuzz_matches_original(fuzz)) + continue; + ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), + c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0), 0); + } + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); +} + +void +sshkey_fuzz_tests(void) +{ + struct sshkey *k1; + struct sshbuf *buf, *fuzzed; + struct fuzz *fuzz; + int r; + + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA private"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA new-format private"); + buf = load_file("rsa_n"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA private"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA new-format private"); + buf = load_file("dsa_n"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA private"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA new-format private"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_n"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 private"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA public"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA public"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k1), 0); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA public"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k1), 0); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 public"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k1), 0); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa"); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-256"); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA512 sig"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-512"); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 sig"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +/* XXX fuzz decoded new-format blobs too */ + +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47a03fa --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,508 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.17 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ +#include "sshkey.h" + +#include "authfile.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "ssh2.h" + +void sshkey_tests(void); + +static void +put_opt(struct sshbuf *b, const char *name, const char *value) +{ + struct sshbuf *sect; + + sect = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sect, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, name), 0); + if (value != NULL) + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, value), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, sect), 0); + sshbuf_free(sect); +} + +static void +build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, const struct sshkey *k, const char *type, + const struct sshkey *sign_key, const struct sshkey *ca_key, + const char *sig_alg) +{ + struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts; + u_char *sigblob; + size_t siglen; + + ca_buf = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0); + + /* + * Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping + * the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/ + */ + pk = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(pk, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb_plain(k, pk), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0); + + principals = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(principals, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0); + + critopts = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(critopts, NULL); + put_opt(critopts, "force-command", "/usr/local/bin/nethack"); + put_opt(critopts, "source-address", "192.168.0.0/24,127.0.0.1,::1"); + + exts = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(exts, NULL); + put_opt(critopts, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL); + + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */ + + free(sigblob); + sshbuf_free(ca_buf); + sshbuf_free(exts); + sshbuf_free(critopts); + sshbuf_free(principals); + sshbuf_free(pk); +} + +static void +signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg, + const u_char *d, size_t l) +{ + size_t len; + u_char *sig; + + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, 0), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0), 0); + /* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */ + sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10; + ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0), 0); + free(sig); +} + +static void +banana(u_char *s, size_t l) +{ + size_t o; + const u_char the_banana[] = { 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a' }; + + for (o = 0; o < l; o += sizeof(the_banana)) { + if (l - o < sizeof(the_banana)) { + memcpy(s + o, "nanananana", l - o); + break; + } + memcpy(s + o, banana, sizeof(the_banana)); + } +} + +static void +signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg) +{ + u_char i, buf[2049]; + size_t lens[] = { + 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 127, 128, 129, + 255, 256, 257, 1023, 1024, 1025, 2047, 2048, 2049 + }; + + for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(lens)/sizeof(lens[0])); i++) { + test_subtest_info("%s key, banana length %zu", + sshkey_type(k), lens[i]); + banana(buf, lens[i]); + signature_test(k, bad, sig_alg, buf, lens[i]); + } +} + +static struct sshkey * +get_private(const char *n) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshkey *ret; + + b = load_file(n); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &ret, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(b); + return ret; +} + +void +sshkey_tests(void) +{ + struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *k4, *kr, *kd, *kf; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + struct sshkey *ke; +#endif + struct sshbuf *b; + + TEST_START("new invalid"); + k1 = sshkey_new(-42); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL); /* Can't allocate without NID */ + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + /* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */ + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1), + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1), + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1), + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1), + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 767, &kr), + SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(kr), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(kr), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_p(kr), NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(rsa_n(kr)), 1024); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(kd), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_priv_key(kd), NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kr, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(k1), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(k1), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(rsa_p(k1), NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kd, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(k1), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(ke, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kf, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal mismatched key types"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0); +#endif + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal different keys"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); +#endif + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(kr); + sshkey_free(kd); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + sshkey_free(ke); +#endif + sshkey_free(kf); + + TEST_START("certify key"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), + &k1, NULL), 0); + k2 = get_private("ed25519_2"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_certified(k1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert, NULL); + k1->cert->type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; + k1->cert->serial = 1234; + k1->cert->key_id = strdup("estragon"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->key_id, NULL); + k1->cert->principals = calloc(4, sizeof(*k1->cert->principals)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals, NULL); + k1->cert->principals[0] = strdup("estragon"); + k1->cert->principals[1] = strdup("vladimir"); + k1->cert->principals[2] = strdup("pozzo"); + k1->cert->principals[3] = strdup("lucky"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[0], NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[1], NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[2], NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[3], NULL); + k1->cert->nprincipals = 4; + k1->cert->valid_after = 0; + k1->cert->valid_before = (u_int64_t)-1; + sshbuf_free(k1->cert->critical); + k1->cert->critical = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->critical, NULL); + sshbuf_free(k1->cert->extensions); + k1->cert->extensions = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->extensions, NULL); + put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "force-command", "/usr/bin/true"); + put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "source-address", "127.0.0.1"); + put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL); + put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-agent-forwarding", NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(k2, &k1->cert->signature_key), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2, NULL), 0); + b = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k1, b), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k3), 0); + + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + sshkey_free(k3); + sshbuf_reset(b); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sign and verify RSA"); + k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + signature_tests(k1, k2, "ssh-rsa"); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA256"); + k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-256"); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA512"); + k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-512"); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sign and verify DSA"); + k1 = get_private("dsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_2.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("sign and verify ECDSA"); + k1 = get_private("ecdsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_2.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("sign and verify ED25519"); + k1 = get_private("ed25519_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_2.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("nested certificate"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + k3 = get_private("rsa_1"); + build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4), + SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + sshkey_free(k3); + sshbuf_free(b); + TEST_DONE(); + +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3f2482 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBvAIBAAKBgQD6kutNFRsHTwEAv6d39Lhsqy1apdHBZ9c2HfyRr7WmypyGIy2m +Ka43vzXI8CNwmRSYs+A6d0vJC7Pl+f9QzJ/04NWOA+MiwfurwrR3CRe61QRYb8Py +mcHOxueHs95IcjrbIPNn86cjnPP5qvv/guUzCjuww4zBdJOXpligrGt2XwIVAKMD +/50qQy7j8JaMk+1+Xtg1pK01AoGBAO7l9QVVbSSoy5lq6cOtvpf8UlwOa6+zBwbl +o4gmFd1RwX1yWkA8kQ7RrhCSg8Hc6mIGnKRgKRli/3LgbSfZ0obFJehkRtEWtN4P +h8fVUeS74iQbIwFQeKlYHIlNTRoGtAbdi3nHdV+BBkEQc1V3rjqYqhjOoz/yNsgz +LND26HrdAoGBAOdXpyfmobEBaOqZAuvgj1P0uhjG2P31Ufurv22FWPBU3A9qrkxb +OXwE0LwvjCvrsQV/lrYhJz/tiys40VeahulWZE5SAHMXGIf95LiLSgaXMjko7joo +t+LK84ltLymwZ4QMnYjnZSSclf1UuyQMcUtb34+I0u9Ycnyhp2mSFsQtAhRYIbQ5 +KfXsZuBPuWe5FJz3ldaEgw== +-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..75ff0e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:kOLgXSoAT8O5T6r36n5NJUYigbux1d7gdH/rmWiJm6s diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e768db1 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 DSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..75ff0e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:kOLgXSoAT8O5T6r36n5NJUYigbux1d7gdH/rmWiJm6s diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba37776 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xetag-todiz-mifah-torec-mynyv-cyvit-gopon-pygag-rupic-cenav-bexax diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e51c3f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00eee5f505556d24a8cb996ae9c3adbe97fc525c0e6bafb30706e5a3882615dd51c17d725a403c910ed1ae109283c1dcea62069ca460291962ff72e06d27d9d286c525e86446d116b4de0f87c7d551e4bbe2241b23015078a9581c894d4d1a06b406dd8b79c7755f81064110735577ae3a98aa18cea33ff236c8332cd0f6e87add diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f74331 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +5821b43929f5ec66e04fb967b9149cf795d68483 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba0313b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00e757a727e6a1b10168ea9902ebe08f53f4ba18c6d8fdf551fbabbf6d8558f054dc0f6aae4c5b397c04d0bc2f8c2bebb1057f96b621273fed8b2b38d1579a86e956644e520073171887fde4b88b4a0697323928ee3a28b7e2caf3896d2f29b067840c9d88e765249c95fd54bb240c714b5bdf8f88d2ef58727ca1a7699216c42d diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..41cae2f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24c7303 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,BC8386C373B22EB7F00ADC821D5D8BE9 + ++HDV2DQ09sxrIAeXTz9r3YFuPRa2hk1+NGcr3ETkXbC6KiZ14wpTnGTloKwaQjIW +eXTa9mpCOWAoohgvsVb+hOuOlP7AfeHu1IXV4EAS+GDpkiV5UxlCXXwqlD75Buu4 +wwDd/p4SWzILH3WGjDk5JIXoxWNY13LHwC7Q6gtGJx4AicUG7YBRTXMIBDa/Kh77 +6o2rFETKmp4VHBvHbakmiETfptdM8bbWxKWeY2vakThyESgeofsLoTOQCIwlEfJC +s2D/KYL65C8VbHYgIoSLTQnooO45DDyxIuhCqP+H23mhv9vB1Od3nc2atgHj/XFs +dcOPFkF/msDRYqxY3V0AS6+jpKwFodZ7g/hyGcyPxOkzlJVuKoKuH6P5PyQ69Gx0 +iqri0xEPyABr7kGlXNrjjctojX+B4WwSnjg/2euXXWFXCRalIdA7ErATTiQbGOx7 +Vd6Gn8PZbSy1MkqEDrZRip0pfAFJYI/8GXPC75BpnRsrVlfhtrngbW+kBP35LzaN +l2K+RQ3gSB3iFoqNb1Kuu6T5MZlyVl5H2dVlJSeb1euQ2OycXdDoFTyJ4AiyWS7w +Vlh8zeJnso5QRDjMwx99pZilbbuFGSLsahiGEveFc6o= +-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3cc9631 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2 @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBvQIBAAKBgQCbyPXNdHeLsjpobPVCMkfagBkt15Zsltqf/PGNP1y1cuz7rsTX +ZekQwUkSTNm5coqXe+ZOw2O4tjobJDd60I1/VPgaB0NYlQR9Hn87M284WD4f6VY+ +aunHmP134a8ybG5G4NqVNF3ihvxAR2pVITqb7kE46r2uYZNcNlHI8voRCwIVAMcP +bwqFNsQbH5pJyZW30wj4KVZ3AoGBAIK98BVeKQVf8qDFqx9ovMuNgVSxpd+N0Yta +5ZEy1OI2ziu5RhjueIM2K7Gq2Mnp38ob1AM53BUxqlcBJaHEDa6rj6yvuMgW9oCJ +dImBM8sIFxfBbXNbpJiMaDwa6WyT84OkpDE6uuAepTMnWOUWkUVkAiyokHDUGXkG +GyoQblbXAoGBAIsf7TaZ804sUWwRV0wI8DYx+hxD5QdrfYPYMtL2fHn3lICimGt0 +FTtUZ25jKg0E0DMBPdET6ZEHB3ZZkR8hFoUzZhdnyJMu3UjVtgaV88Ue3PrXxchk +0W2jHPaAgQU3JIWzo8HFIFqvC/HEL+EyW3rBTY2uXM3XGI+YcWSA4ZrZAhUAsY2f +bDFNzgZ4DaZ9wLRzTgOswPU= +-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51fbeb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:ecwhWcXgpdBxZ2e+OjpRRY7dqXHHCD62BGtoVQQBwCk diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d908ee --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xeser-megad-pocan-rozit-belup-tapoh-fapif-kyvit-vonav-cehab-naxax diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..77bb555 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA test key #2 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3f2482 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBvAIBAAKBgQD6kutNFRsHTwEAv6d39Lhsqy1apdHBZ9c2HfyRr7WmypyGIy2m +Ka43vzXI8CNwmRSYs+A6d0vJC7Pl+f9QzJ/04NWOA+MiwfurwrR3CRe61QRYb8Py +mcHOxueHs95IcjrbIPNn86cjnPP5qvv/guUzCjuww4zBdJOXpligrGt2XwIVAKMD +/50qQy7j8JaMk+1+Xtg1pK01AoGBAO7l9QVVbSSoy5lq6cOtvpf8UlwOa6+zBwbl +o4gmFd1RwX1yWkA8kQ7RrhCSg8Hc6mIGnKRgKRli/3LgbSfZ0obFJehkRtEWtN4P +h8fVUeS74iQbIwFQeKlYHIlNTRoGtAbdi3nHdV+BBkEQc1V3rjqYqhjOoz/yNsgz +LND26HrdAoGBAOdXpyfmobEBaOqZAuvgj1P0uhjG2P31Ufurv22FWPBU3A9qrkxb +OXwE0LwvjCvrsQV/lrYhJz/tiys40VeahulWZE5SAHMXGIf95LiLSgaXMjko7joo +t+LK84ltLymwZ4QMnYjnZSSclf1UuyQMcUtb34+I0u9Ycnyhp2mSFsQtAhRYIbQ5 +KfXsZuBPuWe5FJz3ldaEgw== +-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24ac299 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABCVs+LsMJ +wnB5zM9U9pTXrGAAAAEAAAAAEAAAGzAAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAPqS600VGwdPAQC/p3f0 +uGyrLVql0cFn1zYd/JGvtabKnIYjLaYprje/NcjwI3CZFJiz4Dp3S8kLs+X5/1DMn/Tg1Y +4D4yLB+6vCtHcJF7rVBFhvw/KZwc7G54ez3khyOtsg82fzpyOc8/mq+/+C5TMKO7DDjMF0 +k5emWKCsa3ZfAAAAFQCjA/+dKkMu4/CWjJPtfl7YNaStNQAAAIEA7uX1BVVtJKjLmWrpw6 +2+l/xSXA5rr7MHBuWjiCYV3VHBfXJaQDyRDtGuEJKDwdzqYgacpGApGWL/cuBtJ9nShsUl +6GRG0Ra03g+Hx9VR5LviJBsjAVB4qVgciU1NGga0Bt2Lecd1X4EGQRBzVXeuOpiqGM6jP/ +I2yDMs0Pboet0AAACBAOdXpyfmobEBaOqZAuvgj1P0uhjG2P31Ufurv22FWPBU3A9qrkxb +OXwE0LwvjCvrsQV/lrYhJz/tiys40VeahulWZE5SAHMXGIf95LiLSgaXMjko7joot+LK84 +ltLymwZ4QMnYjnZSSclf1UuyQMcUtb34+I0u9Ycnyhp2mSFsQtAAAB4HiOcRW4w+sIqBL0 +TPVbf0glN1hUi0rcE63Pqxmvxb8LkldC4IxAUagPrjhNAEW2AY42+CvPrtGB1z7gDADAIW +xZX6wKwIcXP0Qh+xHE12F4u6mwfasssnAp4t1Ki8uCjMjnimgb3KdWpp0kiUV0oR062TXV +PAdfrWjaq4fw0KOqbHIAG/v36AqzuqjSTfDbqvLZM3y0gp2Q1RxaQVJA5ZIKKyqRyFX7sr +BaEIyCgeE3hM0EB7BycY1oIcS/eNxrACBWVJCENl5N7LtEYXNX7TANFniztfXzwaqGTT6A +fCfbW4gz1UKldLUBzbIrPwMWlirAstbHvOf/2Iay2pNAs/SHhI0aF2jsGfvv5/D6N+r9dG +B2SgDKBg7pywMH1DTvg6YT3P4GjCx0GUHqRCFLvD1rDdk4KSjvaRMpVq1PJ0/Wv6UGtsMS +TR0PaEHDRNZqAX4YxqujnWrGKuRJhuz0eUvp7fZvbWHtiAMKV7368kkeUmkOHanb+TS+zs +KINX8ev8zJZ6WVr8Vl+IQavpv0i2bXwS6QqbEuifpv/+uBb7pqRiU4u8en0eMdX1bZoTPM +R6xHCnGD/Jpb3zS91Ya57T6CiXZ12KCaL6nWGnCkZVpzkfJ2HjFklWSWBQ6uyaosDQ== +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80382b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MHcCAQEEIPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMoAoGCCqGSM49 +AwEHoUQDQgAEDFlblkOrW9ydKVhtM+9AY3c9saBE7SG3lFx38nBavkADDaI9jh3/ +kvG/Jt9vpm22qwoklTCGDfzCkXkIKaWlBw== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e48304f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:8ty77fOpABat1y88aNdclQTfU+lVvWe7jYZGw8VYtfg diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..55e2a25 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 ECDSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e48304f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:8ty77fOpABat1y88aNdclQTfU+lVvWe7jYZGw8VYtfg diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa23c33 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xibah-vocun-sogyn-byhen-rivem-hegyh-luneh-dozyr-vatyf-dufid-myxyx diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa04004 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +prime256v1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc908ad --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00f3cdc940278ef16bf9e4ffeedfc8ca3b9041dfda2c589363dd8b07d8088f2acc diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71c9584 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +040c595b9643ab5bdc9d29586d33ef4063773db1a044ed21b7945c77f2705abe40030da23d8e1dff92f1bf26df6fa66db6ab0a249530860dfcc291790829a5a507 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..84a71f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlYbTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvybfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQc= ECDSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c83a65 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,7BA38DE00F67851E4207216809C3BB15 + +8QkFoZHQkj9a2mt032sp+WKaJ1fwteqWDd4RpAW9OzDgqzMx1QO43qJgBDTfhzjt +M2Q8YfiGjfBEYpg4kCbacfcV68DEV4z6Ll7rIzzzO7OfWUNL++brD64vKx4z6f46 ++sn4nbZTXilpkzi/nmPDVzrNmTSywA8T7Yf0QcBUxks= +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f4e844 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MIHcAgEBBEIBqBtN7e6Essd3dlsgISViPCXXC0atlNkGtoMgSQdBTKVUfeJOi4lc +RZaXJdXnqWUqI/KEsH8h8QN4YcB8ugmAcc+gBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAHZ2VNy +oDedBwqsdzY+kkNptc9DrtRCVmO6cULLj+691MhItqVqTMJbTFlI4MnAg9PoGTF/ +0KmLJfy8vSffXGKqqwGKcFNtd1XCo+7Qu9tXbxron9g6Dmu7y8jaLkixcwZwnwLs +6GmA9qZGuiAfOGV0Gf9/u98sr+vikOa4Ow5JFDTw5g== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..581e48a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:ed8YniRHA6qCrErCRnzrWxPHxYuA62a+CAFYUVxJgaI diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1cc664 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xufag-danul-putub-mokin-pugaz-covid-dofag-nihuz-sysab-genar-zaxyx diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve new file mode 100644 index 0000000..617ea2f --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +secp521r1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd898d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +01a81b4dedee84b2c777765b202125623c25d70b46ad94d906b683204907414ca5547de24e8b895c45969725d5e7a9652a23f284b07f21f1037861c07cba098071cf diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94301c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +0401d9d95372a0379d070aac77363e924369b5cf43aed4425663ba7142cb8feebdd4c848b6a56a4cc25b4c5948e0c9c083d3e819317fd0a98b25fcbcbd27df5c62aaab018a70536d7755c2a3eed0bbdb576f1ae89fd83a0e6bbbcbc8da2e48b17306709f02ece86980f6a646ba201f38657419ff7fbbdf2cafebe290e6b83b0e491434f0e6 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be9d84b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAHZ2VNyoDedBwqsdzY+kkNptc9DrtRCVmO6cULLj+691MhItqVqTMJbTFlI4MnAg9PoGTF/0KmLJfy8vSffXGKqqwGKcFNtd1XCo+7Qu9tXbxron9g6Dmu7y8jaLkixcwZwnwLs6GmA9qZGuiAfOGV0Gf9/u98sr+vikOa4Ow5JFDTw5g== ECDSA test key #2 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80382b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MHcCAQEEIPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMoAoGCCqGSM49 +AwEHoUQDQgAEDFlblkOrW9ydKVhtM+9AY3c9saBE7SG3lFx38nBavkADDaI9jh3/ +kvG/Jt9vpm22qwoklTCGDfzCkXkIKaWlBw== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw new file mode 100644 index 0000000..36b7fa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABC4UwEov5 +z0RrCm7AMCxbuiAAAAEAAAAAEAAABoAAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlz +dHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlYbTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvy +bfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQcAAACgbCnAklQTHrf5qiHiMxKYwQJ7k/X9mp4fXD4v +xUbgNZiXSxN26mn8mC2rH+WA6Lk3CexR/hrtLI2ndpBsYu1h6HhVkOwwm3Kd/PMKArCupW +l6sYEabrT0EghXR/3aDEZvj79hgKSdu3RpayLvMdbCR8k1cg0/mDmR9hicWfeJ61n/IH05 +tUR268+0BVRW9kDhh/cuv8tVY4L09jCCQ6CpsA== +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b0ae01 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW +QyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQAAAJjnj4Ao54+A +KAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQ +AAAED3KgoDbjR54V7bdNpfKlQY5m20UK1QaHytkCR+6rZEDFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/Bz +tXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg== +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9674e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:L3k/oJubblSY0lB9Ulsl7emDMnRPKm/8udf2ccwk560 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..649b4e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIIxzuxl4z3uwAIslne8Huft+1n1IhHAlNbWZkQyyECCGAAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAAAAAAAgAAAACAAAABmp1bGl1cwAAABIAAAAFaG9zdDEAAAAFaG9zdDIAAAAANowB8AAAAABNHmBwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABABGTn+Bmz86Ajk+iqKCSdP5NClsYzn4alJd0V5bizhP0Kumc/HbqQfSt684J1WdSzih+EjvnTgBhK9jTBKb90AQ== ED25519 test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9674e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:L3k/oJubblSY0lB9Ulsl7emDMnRPKm/8udf2ccwk560 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..309f2da --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xubop-rekyd-bakal-nubuf-pahaf-gicuh-logeb-gocif-petod-galip-fuxux diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e533059 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZ ED25519 test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c3b7ae7 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABCus+kaow +AUjHphacvRp98dAAAAEAAAAAEAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFv +PwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAoJaqqgiYQuElraJAmYOm7Tb4nJ3eI4oj9mQ52M +/Yd+ION2Ur1v8BDewpDX+LHEYgKHo3Mlmcn2UyF+QJ+7xUCW7QCtk/4szrJzw74DlEl6mH +T8PT/f/av7PpECBD/YD3NoDlB9OWm/Q4sHcxfBEKfTGD7s2Onn71HgrdEOPqd4Sj/IQigR +drfjtXEMlD32k9n3dd2eS9x7AHWYaGFEMkOcY= +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e4aed63 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW +QyNTUxOQAAACDPVKyLnm3eZE0lm0IfM3Uy9AsdGSBtozcoCt21blYBCwAAAJix1mBGsdZg +RgAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDPVKyLnm3eZE0lm0IfM3Uy9AsdGSBtozcoCt21blYBCw +AAAECZEQHXs18o3DKjhUYaTyt+bUbhqfMeqmsKjYyFvzGVgs9UrIuebd5kTSWbQh8zdTL0 +Cx0ZIG2jNygK3bVuVgELAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg== +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0496626 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:vMbaARqVciRgXyZPNHDo+P5p5WK5yWG1Oo6VC35Bomw diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..abba789 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xuces-bapyb-vikob-zesyv-budod-nupip-kebon-tacyc-fofed-lezic-soxax diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af34236 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIM9UrIuebd5kTSWbQh8zdTL0Cx0ZIG2jNygK3bVuVgEL ED25519 test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a1dff9 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +mekmitasdigoat diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..161cc04 Binary files /dev/null and b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1 differ diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21b3d1a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:/kk7K9S9kwYFiFilnZYFwCsQJweI/SGQVR2nIa8VBhE diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62991b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xilil-nabyf-gynih-duheb-gokyp-bofet-nekac-bosod-lozin-kuvyh-poxix diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a2549b --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00ce8ca77a556eba887f9a866c084a6402785354a81c10854d343181fa09351223a65f99915f8433d11a9c41677d307c03c3a39865b83e7172d2c1d878333c980438d6e4462106a0065cd75cfea7ca7f21538bf2f43f2af49cacee51b22e3bdcc5e87b59cc691f7c6942a77ef13bfdfb24300777b727348d0ba7900ba06b886729 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f665b0d --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +1024 65537 145043942670517902781741650890610683756045780348507433188994725700923246927874581962206512480287863636935077725837494808988986557337885675565086448774391442851909709751605441036910145362277967349042489937363543710406342212883803780768870873303921572812138116796733586484633244057911618360651775855949808953129 RSA1 test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e73c679 Binary files /dev/null and b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw differ diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d672dd Binary files /dev/null and b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2 differ diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00516d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:JaOeRCnLl/TLe7vn1+aQ4ONyKZCUhK5x3k4VHilmbpE diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4989a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xipag-zohut-zepuk-pisyv-kamog-pupus-netud-tudis-melup-cynov-gaxox diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25d438d --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n @@ -0,0 +1 @@ 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 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..acab6dd --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +2048 65537 25587207108642486834576012232250034427766229965612147538722032399009467293691448851087324679403117563681753304072089087252850866332601294130674473984011813227791089686736237645788471744456489819306046398653719249100878753563464696688916667605969658659855996383142110932332560049231682024775766802333675397528993897914717996946881193454997890776063024953924432026083898531677702536941151535135950834711001926404724453460085864892836473957600610133803037286539329764689125111700732309717375455919436557475211197800228646235077584780367991159670572954337165006813357814232200750568307753718414790655085790471723847208627 RSA1 test key #2 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5de3f84 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIICXAIBAAKBgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18u +d6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKd +NSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wIDAQAB +AoGAXyj5mpjmbD+YlxGIWz/zrM4hGsWgd4VteKEJxT6MMI4uzCRpkMd0ck8oHiwZ +GAI/SwUzIsgtONQuH3AXVsUgghW4Ynn+8ksEv0IZ918WDMDwqvqkyrVzsOsZzqYj +Pf8DUDKCpwFjnlknJ04yvWBZvVhWtY4OiZ8GV0Ttsu3k+GECQQD1YHfvBb5FdJBv +Uhde2Il+jaFia8mwVVNNaiD2ECxXx6CzGz54ZLEB9NPVfDUZK8lJ4UJDqelWNh3i +PF3RefWDAkEA1CVBzAFL4mNwpleVPzrfy69xP3gWOa26MxM/GE6zx9jC7HgQ3KPa +WKdG/FuHs085aTRDaDLmGcZ8IvMuu7NgKQJAcIOKmxR0Gd8IN7NZugjqixggb0Pj +mLKXXwESGiJyYtHL0zTj4Uqyi6Ya2GJ66o7UXscmnmYz828fJtTtZBdbRwJBALfi +C2QvA32Zv/0PEXibKXy996WSC4G3ShwXZKtHHKHvCxY5BDSbehk59VesZrVPyG2e +NYdOBxD0cIlCzJE56/ECQAndVkxvO8hwyEFGGwF3faHIAe/OxVb+MjaU25//Pe1/ +h/e6tlCk4w9CODpyV685gV394eYwMcGDcIkipTNUDZs= +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79f380a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:l6itGumSMcRBBAFteCgmjQBIXqLK/jFGUH3viHX1RmE diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3bacf3c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 RSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79f380a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:l6itGumSMcRBBAFteCgmjQBIXqLK/jFGUH3viHX1RmE diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45bacd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xosis-fodod-votot-dibum-ryvac-rediz-naruf-votun-kevis-halis-gexux diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4933712 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00cb5799544edec5ac00ec781fc21a1119ce9a288e3116e72f3e78fbcba6998adcc98c235f2e77abf1ce92b76f064b624552c9f2582341e622e1a176eef232b5bac1bf3881babc0b7d57a1ef4439170852e192bc329d3523354a39610eab916e50c507c913a2a5f2c7596aad779c5f297121438bd2313ebb4ad4d7debba43271fb diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4783d21 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00f56077ef05be4574906f52175ed8897e8da1626bc9b055534d6a20f6102c57c7a0b31b3e7864b101f4d3d57c35192bc949e14243a9e956361de23c5dd179f583 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00fc8a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00d42541cc014be26370a657953f3adfcbaf713f781639adba33133f184eb3c7d8c2ec7810dca3da58a746fc5b87b34f396934436832e619c67c22f32ebbb36029 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23ef872 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4c0674 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,0C3F819F6EEA66A471BAEEDDA8171606 + +AhQNxgw7Z2un3dpm6KPHF1u5qVvOczm0yiTyPK4U11B3TTRhXOHdzPLAcKMX71Xq +fmLm2/JIZATUbLTaysLKIQlmAgtpmXoKLv9b90R3AXLophgToZzOLpvlQTCt+y9G +0E3QQZG/LFy9BLNyw6uD5cy0RHT3FQb5VQDwfBvR/I+K3qWBFLlb7Rw9bCujYczu 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+MIICXAIBAAKBgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18u +d6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKd +NSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wIDAQAB +AoGAXyj5mpjmbD+YlxGIWz/zrM4hGsWgd4VteKEJxT6MMI4uzCRpkMd0ck8oHiwZ +GAI/SwUzIsgtONQuH3AXVsUgghW4Ynn+8ksEv0IZ918WDMDwqvqkyrVzsOsZzqYj +Pf8DUDKCpwFjnlknJ04yvWBZvVhWtY4OiZ8GV0Ttsu3k+GECQQD1YHfvBb5FdJBv +Uhde2Il+jaFia8mwVVNNaiD2ECxXx6CzGz54ZLEB9NPVfDUZK8lJ4UJDqelWNh3i +PF3RefWDAkEA1CVBzAFL4mNwpleVPzrfy69xP3gWOa26MxM/GE6zx9jC7HgQ3KPa +WKdG/FuHs085aTRDaDLmGcZ8IvMuu7NgKQJAcIOKmxR0Gd8IN7NZugjqixggb0Pj +mLKXXwESGiJyYtHL0zTj4Uqyi6Ya2GJ66o7UXscmnmYz828fJtTtZBdbRwJBALfi +C2QvA32Zv/0PEXibKXy996WSC4G3ShwXZKtHHKHvCxY5BDSbehk59VesZrVPyG2e +NYdOBxD0cIlCzJE56/ECQAndVkxvO8hwyEFGGwF3faHIAe/OxVb+MjaU25//Pe1/ +h/e6tlCk4w9CODpyV685gV394eYwMcGDcIkipTNUDZs= +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1-cert.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff49d75 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1-cert.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 RSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23ef872 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5de3f84 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIICXAIBAAKBgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18u +d6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKd +NSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wIDAQAB +AoGAXyj5mpjmbD+YlxGIWz/zrM4hGsWgd4VteKEJxT6MMI4uzCRpkMd0ck8oHiwZ +GAI/SwUzIsgtONQuH3AXVsUgghW4Ynn+8ksEv0IZ918WDMDwqvqkyrVzsOsZzqYj +Pf8DUDKCpwFjnlknJ04yvWBZvVhWtY4OiZ8GV0Ttsu3k+GECQQD1YHfvBb5FdJBv +Uhde2Il+jaFia8mwVVNNaiD2ECxXx6CzGz54ZLEB9NPVfDUZK8lJ4UJDqelWNh3i +PF3RefWDAkEA1CVBzAFL4mNwpleVPzrfy69xP3gWOa26MxM/GE6zx9jC7HgQ3KPa +WKdG/FuHs085aTRDaDLmGcZ8IvMuu7NgKQJAcIOKmxR0Gd8IN7NZugjqixggb0Pj +mLKXXwESGiJyYtHL0zTj4Uqyi6Ya2GJ66o7UXscmnmYz828fJtTtZBdbRwJBALfi +C2QvA32Zv/0PEXibKXy996WSC4G3ShwXZKtHHKHvCxY5BDSbehk59VesZrVPyG2e +NYdOBxD0cIlCzJE56/ECQAndVkxvO8hwyEFGGwF3faHIAe/OxVb+MjaU25//Pe1/ +h/e6tlCk4w9CODpyV685gV394eYwMcGDcIkipTNUDZs= +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512-cert.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4745196 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512-cert.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 RSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23ef872 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2441d52 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2 @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA9NEUXp78SAkmL4+eAj4mBzPOjk+ccCPVzkTR+mZJdyTwkJAB +HUN4cn4a2kTmh7Er+N8CXCsiqxIOV1GfH2fwaCiBlOEXeQJi/cMjxr9kVWO4FhC6 +l1UqbvPUdrUCUZjFTA9/Ah9MKgk7qGYq5SjE3p+sn4GLhRKbqmq9LjiHgMmkBuv/ +a1Slit+rXHzO2F8fH5hkjeHivyYVgw45aNvGCe2RRfbpoeW2mRtgIv7y9wSewt6a +mhEDXSo/F6mkqA7xVinzro5NettEXLo91tA9Hb6f6x/Mc/GJDNXTKhpWCGeJ6xeW +nAefDZORWAY7Y9YbuAxhEJVi9QL5NWoFOA0C6wIDAQABAoIBAQDtRGVVfwhKWHOl +zK76xXjdqhwaWJXpKRHiI1jOMawpyKdNtAMgdW+apxUnTXePMurG/HuxEC09VvaH +MhfhvD6G9BsCS1UQdnuyLRnTWVLIXyjeWcA9QtEpTy8vDSb+Je2xVaNmTybl5qTn +BH22Mtj6Wg5XWJn7kplDhMdssGTDLsSCMw/rcxe9iT2qOKyltQal23RHzR7SijGp +QTtBp2SDGhvMZcyGuyMqJ084W8sdJpbyVzdDim2iaZdHlk7uvW2n0HcJ56I6yhIq +2U8wfgEEwydGVGHgmQNJ/n+SiT/hv6g5ebhDS46X9F9m5CHDwhdr0DrhPBVSsdhl +1HeJ0+FhAoGBAPuC3uNHToiJis688juKlwc3SQ6ger5ffAg3yaNhEcpHkvOtdZlF +/CfX94xazMov/YqFwkvpSSdKsX+PeXuaqnb1hPKNYX5t45U9RjB/ox7BIQj/2rPx +Bfs99UFW9HKP4HsVmLu1xeJg1Pc9iylTK/xrnwfYiZ+H7IGVccizjnqHAoGBAPkv +n1flAdxBzJH/O0rXoig2EtZsDRMPY51MGDdqVOW14ZOfTVlmu0OSnkSKQm2twfro +TPDVb2TY3wTRutz8H9yOFW1c1Nz4YOyTb8FmJhE2FWAQ9t8QpwUlhn15if72dS/Y +22+vP+AYu7wfqGL7QVVEXho5hGjXi053iEvfXBl9AoGAeZISpo1LGphRLgkKlVky +E1zXxWgwrGB/FYHRx1UeQkZCc+K+Wy4G6kNr9r3VC04TIafx+Lt0jrd+AIibUfG6 +v/GBJ7TLEU+QmAycJskrUaxMiYsSbbPtDjoumDytv8pn2VbhEqqUUg44IqHu6DS5 +qDNlFWfHbgNHgIN6EmcoUXUCgYEAi2G57X4pRjx/4wIy9jAbggaNDuctgQXQoIGZ +4hVWG49a+CnZKDKweKGgaZI0igjxQhmCQAwC3RP520Y9EbLtV38aOSv93QQJowrt +Le6nSGVKG4whqrAz3EsbKUA8kiLldbgFNjl+ryjmidnjZEpKRxmQ0XZuu/4k6+Us +ldQAPjkCgYBwjSm5eDUtK2eEPaBtbJykV05CTv5rn6CKC9L7ZBTkCcdU1hxeqe99 +wb22decnNawGRP1a5cGwqKJPOfkgybJVkdr6aqQW8ClzdFSaenjzs+nVW+T9JTXf +9lFpIZg5kN/geld3B9B4C99riTM0jg9hbe2RQvpLRTrZbnWMA1XoRw== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4659639 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +SHA256:NoQh0XBUuYUSWqnzOzOBnfpgJTRWLMj7BlWAb8IbjeE diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9d1e4a --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xogit-gupof-mydon-hocep-zuval-feson-rarif-cefar-tobar-ryvap-kuxex diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a669dbf --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n @@ -0,0 +1 @@ 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 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be7c1c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00fb82dee3474e88898acebcf23b8a970737490ea07abe5f7c0837c9a36111ca4792f3ad759945fc27d7f78c5accca2ffd8a85c24be949274ab17f8f797b9aaa76f584f28d617e6de3953d46307fa31ec12108ffdab3f105fb3df54156f4728fe07b1598bbb5c5e260d4f73d8b29532bfc6b9f07d8899f87ec819571c8b38e7a87 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6f2c542 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00f92f9f57e501dc41cc91ff3b4ad7a2283612d66c0d130f639d4c18376a54e5b5e1939f4d5966bb43929e448a426dadc1fae84cf0d56f64d8df04d1badcfc1fdc8e156d5cd4dcf860ec936fc166261136156010f6df10a70525867d7989fef6752fd8db6faf3fe018bbbc1fa862fb4155445e1a398468d78b4e77884bdf5c197d diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3322fbc --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQD00RRenvxICSYvj54CPiYHM86OT5xwI9XORNH6Zkl3JPCQkAEdQ3hyfhraROaHsSv43wJcKyKrEg5XUZ8fZ/BoKIGU4Rd5AmL9wyPGv2RVY7gWELqXVSpu89R2tQJRmMVMD38CH0wqCTuoZirlKMTen6yfgYuFEpuqar0uOIeAyaQG6/9rVKWK36tcfM7YXx8fmGSN4eK/JhWDDjlo28YJ7ZFF9umh5baZG2Ai/vL3BJ7C3pqaEQNdKj8XqaSoDvFWKfOujk1620Rcuj3W0D0dvp/rH8xz8YkM1dMqGlYIZ4nrF5acB58Nk5FYBjtj1hu4DGEQlWL1Avk1agU4DQLr RSA test key #2 diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5de3f84 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIICXAIBAAKBgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18u +d6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKd +NSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wIDAQAB +AoGAXyj5mpjmbD+YlxGIWz/zrM4hGsWgd4VteKEJxT6MMI4uzCRpkMd0ck8oHiwZ +GAI/SwUzIsgtONQuH3AXVsUgghW4Ynn+8ksEv0IZ918WDMDwqvqkyrVzsOsZzqYj +Pf8DUDKCpwFjnlknJ04yvWBZvVhWtY4OiZ8GV0Ttsu3k+GECQQD1YHfvBb5FdJBv +Uhde2Il+jaFia8mwVVNNaiD2ECxXx6CzGz54ZLEB9NPVfDUZK8lJ4UJDqelWNh3i +PF3RefWDAkEA1CVBzAFL4mNwpleVPzrfy69xP3gWOa26MxM/GE6zx9jC7HgQ3KPa +WKdG/FuHs085aTRDaDLmGcZ8IvMuu7NgKQJAcIOKmxR0Gd8IN7NZugjqixggb0Pj +mLKXXwESGiJyYtHL0zTj4Uqyi6Ya2GJ66o7UXscmnmYz828fJtTtZBdbRwJBALfi +C2QvA32Zv/0PEXibKXy996WSC4G3ShwXZKtHHKHvCxY5BDSbehk59VesZrVPyG2e +NYdOBxD0cIlCzJE56/ECQAndVkxvO8hwyEFGGwF3faHIAe/OxVb+MjaU25//Pe1/ +h/e6tlCk4w9CODpyV685gV394eYwMcGDcIkipTNUDZs= +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc18373 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABAFw/Wg/V +I5SAXWj/HJr9qeAAAAEAAAAAEAAACXAAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7F +rADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu +7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylx +IUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wAAAgD1iSGiMlMJt2VH4kx5yr0wCJS+4UOmX0bxKO7UH5Jcul +K5eaSe5ZoKE7hTYBaz0K5dRF/0fqLsvVZlE4quDjFLN6Hyavgn2W/QM7SUqBHgRMal9pgH +LnxX6mFNWJ+4yb7f3bcbVIdgmMm3sT9Xjwaf5xgzNlR2mkUWtFwjyQh6FxUo5apNzqNBwO +l2Q4xfmyZTp1s++pStQ/su6obXpxnE2Nx5G/D84ZL5iWl+njUy/MvJTazHRbiTSyihU+UA +mUr5ZNuP3WUYY+h3KVlHpYHJYB7l3AMTKuPMFLhY9V7BJ+DuKPaqBgX4hvRzY0eVQiFr61 +ovjWjvfu1ulx550JqdYCgH2PpP0E89OQne35Cxs9QPThfe8DKojC9YquYh9zmVTvr7kNiE +Soluk/7oKpQIDaC+/SRk7AJ2e3Cbt1lXyGNn37PuqaaC/apaF/DOD6Yig9aClS7jOUrT96 +56trFAYfHEIKbRCUSMCiM1+x6HOLYf5ROrGE9KxT3kUD9XMsMpTva+cPpHUpbGpXcYE10N +MyYDz+V5M2/ZoIdEhscJNQ3UnhaZpeEaqcOyNyo90n3Dnaw/WpMDD/kNMGfm8daTaYInnQ +QnwA2gwlYfpTAqxE71oXgOuGmtA0yqJB4778Xq26Pb+B7/mZZZe6n0FVmiNC+ZG37ZGOw/ +iGL9e2Sxzw== +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13f265c --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +void sshkey_tests(void); +void sshkey_file_tests(void); +void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void); + +void +tests(void) +{ + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(); + + sshkey_tests(); + sshkey_file_tests(); + sshkey_fuzz_tests(); +} diff --git a/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile b/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78026e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2016/07/04 18:01:44 guenther Exp $ + +LIB= test_helper +SRCS= test_helper.c fuzz.c + +NOPROFILE= yes +NOPIC= yes + +# Hack to allow building with SUBDIR in ../../Makefile +regress: all + +install: + @echo -n + +.include diff --git a/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78b3665 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c @@ -0,0 +1,438 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: fuzz.c,v 1.8 2015/03/03 20:42:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* Utility functions/framework for fuzz tests */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "test_helper.h" +#include "atomicio.h" + +/* #define FUZZ_DEBUG */ + +#ifdef FUZZ_DEBUG +# define FUZZ_DBG(x) do { \ + printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \ + printf x; \ + printf("\n"); \ + fflush(stdout); \ + } while (0) +#else +# define FUZZ_DBG(x) +#endif + +/* For brevity later */ +typedef unsigned long long fuzz_ullong; + +/* For base-64 fuzzing */ +static const char fuzz_b64chars[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; + +struct fuzz { + /* Fuzz method currently in use */ + int strategy; + + /* Fuzz methods remaining */ + int strategies; + + /* Original seed data blob */ + void *seed; + size_t slen; + + /* Current working copy of seed with fuzz mutations applied */ + u_char *fuzzed; + + /* Used by fuzz methods */ + size_t o1, o2; +}; + +static const char * +fuzz_ntop(u_int n) +{ + switch (n) { + case 0: + return "NONE"; + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + return "FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP"; + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + return "FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP"; + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + return "FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP"; + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + return "FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP"; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START"; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END"; + case FUZZ_BASE64: + return "FUZZ_BASE64"; + default: + abort(); + } +} + +static int +fuzz_fmt(struct fuzz *fuzz, char *s, size_t n) +{ + if (fuzz == NULL) + return -1; + + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (bit: %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen * 8, fuzz->o1); + return 0; + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (bits: %zu, %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen * 8) + fuzz->o1, + ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen * 8) * fuzz->slen * 8, + fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2); + return 0; + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (byte: %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1); + return 0; + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (bytes: %zu, %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen) + fuzz->o1, + ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen) * fuzz->slen, + fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2); + return 0; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1); + return 0; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1); + return 0; + case FUZZ_BASE64: + assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1); + snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (offset: %zu char: %c)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (fuzz->o1 * (fuzz_ullong)64) + fuzz->o2, + fuzz->slen * (fuzz_ullong)64, fuzz->o1, + fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2]); + return 0; + default: + return -1; + abort(); + } +} + +static void +dump(u_char *p, size_t len) +{ + size_t i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { + fprintf(stderr, "%.4zd: ", i); + for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { + if (j < len) + fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", p[j]); + else + fprintf(stderr, " "); + } + fprintf(stderr, " "); + for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { + if (j < len) { + if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j])) + fprintf(stderr, "%c", p[j]); + else + fprintf(stderr, "."); + } + } + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } +} + +void +fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + char buf[256]; + + if (fuzz_fmt(fuzz, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: fuzz invalid\n", __func__); + abort(); + } + fputs(buf, stderr); + fprintf(stderr, "fuzz original %p len = %zu\n", fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + dump(fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fprintf(stderr, "fuzz context %p len = %zu\n", fuzz, fuzz_len(fuzz)); + dump(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); +} + +static struct fuzz *last_fuzz; + +static void +siginfo(int unused __attribute__((__unused__))) +{ + char buf[256]; + + test_info(buf, sizeof(buf)); + atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf)); + if (last_fuzz != NULL) { + fuzz_fmt(last_fuzz, buf, sizeof(buf)); + atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf)); + } +} + +struct fuzz * +fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l) +{ + struct fuzz *ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1); + + assert(p != NULL); + assert(ret != NULL); + ret->seed = malloc(l); + assert(ret->seed != NULL); + memcpy(ret->seed, p, l); + ret->slen = l; + ret->strategies = strategies; + + assert(ret->slen < SIZE_MAX / 8); + assert(ret->strategies <= (FUZZ_MAX|(FUZZ_MAX-1))); + + FUZZ_DBG(("begin, ret = %p", ret)); + + fuzz_next(ret); + + last_fuzz = ret; +#ifdef SIGINFO + signal(SIGINFO, siginfo); +#endif + signal(SIGUSR1, siginfo); + + return ret; +} + +void +fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + FUZZ_DBG(("cleanup, fuzz = %p", fuzz)); + last_fuzz = NULL; +#ifdef SIGINFO + signal(SIGINFO, SIG_DFL); +#endif + signal(SIGUSR1, SIG_DFL); + assert(fuzz != NULL); + assert(fuzz->seed != NULL); + assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); + free(fuzz->seed); + free(fuzz->fuzzed); + free(fuzz); +} + +static int +fuzz_strategy_done(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", + fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen)); + + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8; + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen * 8; + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen; + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + case FUZZ_BASE64: + return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen; + default: + abort(); + } +} + +void +fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + u_int i; + + FUZZ_DBG(("start, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, " + "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen)); + + if (fuzz->strategy == 0 || fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz)) { + /* If we are just starting out, we need to allocate too */ + if (fuzz->fuzzed == NULL) { + FUZZ_DBG(("alloc")); + fuzz->fuzzed = calloc(fuzz->slen, 1); + } + /* Pick next strategy */ + FUZZ_DBG(("advance")); + for (i = 1; i <= FUZZ_MAX; i <<= 1) { + if ((fuzz->strategies & i) != 0) { + fuzz->strategy = i; + break; + } + } + FUZZ_DBG(("selected = %u", fuzz->strategy)); + if (fuzz->strategy == 0) { + FUZZ_DBG(("done, no more strategies")); + return; + } + fuzz->strategies &= ~(fuzz->strategy); + fuzz->o1 = fuzz->o2 = 0; + } + + assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); + + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8); + fuzz->o1++; + break; + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen); + assert(fuzz->o2 / 8 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o2 % 8); + fuzz->o1++; + if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8) { + fuzz->o1 = 0; + fuzz->o2++; + } + break; + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff; + fuzz->o1++; + break; + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); + assert(fuzz->o2 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff; + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2] ^= 0xff; + fuzz->o1++; + if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen) { + fuzz->o1 = 0; + fuzz->o2++; + } + break; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->o1++; + break; + case FUZZ_BASE64: + assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); + assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] = fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2]; + fuzz->o2++; + if (fuzz->o2 >= sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1) { + fuzz->o2 = 0; + fuzz->o1++; + } + break; + default: + abort(); + } + + FUZZ_DBG(("done, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, " + "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen)); +} + +int +fuzz_matches_original(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + if (fuzz_len(fuzz) != fuzz->slen) + return 0; + return memcmp(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen) == 0; +} + +int +fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategies = 0x%lx", fuzz, + (u_long)fuzz->strategies)); + + return fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz) && fuzz->strategies == 0; +} + +size_t +fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_BASE64: + return fuzz->slen; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen); + return fuzz->slen - fuzz->o1; + default: + abort(); + } +} + +u_char * +fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_BASE64: + return fuzz->fuzzed; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen); + return fuzz->fuzzed + fuzz->o1; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen); + return fuzz->fuzzed; + default: + abort(); + } +} + diff --git a/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4cc7085 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c @@ -0,0 +1,548 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.8 2018/02/08 08:46:20 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) +# include +#endif + +#include "test_helper.h" +#include "atomicio.h" + +#define TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred) do { \ + switch (pred) { \ + case TEST_EQ: \ + if (r == 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_NE: \ + if (r != 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_LT: \ + if (r < 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_LE: \ + if (r <= 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_GT: \ + if (r > 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_GE: \ + if (r >= 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + default: \ + abort(); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define TEST_CHECK(x1, x2, pred) do { \ + switch (pred) { \ + case TEST_EQ: \ + if (x1 == x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_NE: \ + if (x1 != x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_LT: \ + if (x1 < x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_LE: \ + if (x1 <= x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_GT: \ + if (x1 > x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_GE: \ + if (x1 >= x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + default: \ + abort(); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +extern char *__progname; + +static int verbose_mode = 0; +static int quiet_mode = 0; +static char *active_test_name = NULL; +static u_int test_number = 0; +static test_onerror_func_t *test_onerror = NULL; +static void *onerror_ctx = NULL; +static const char *data_dir = NULL; +static char subtest_info[512]; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ch; + + /* Handle systems without __progname */ + if (__progname == NULL) { + __progname = strrchr(argv[0], '/'); + if (__progname == NULL || __progname[1] == '\0') + __progname = argv[0]; + else + __progname++; + if ((__progname = strdup(__progname)) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "strdup failed\n"); + exit(1); + } + } + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vqd:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'd': + data_dir = optarg; + break; + case 'q': + verbose_mode = 0; + quiet_mode = 1; + break; + case 'v': + verbose_mode = 1; + quiet_mode = 0; + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognised command line option\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname); + exit(1); + } + } + setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); + if (!quiet_mode) + printf("%s: ", __progname); + if (verbose_mode) + printf("\n"); + + tests(); + + if (!quiet_mode) + printf(" %u tests ok\n", test_number); + return 0; +} + +int +test_is_verbose() +{ + return verbose_mode; +} + +int +test_is_quiet() +{ + return quiet_mode; +} + +const char * +test_data_file(const char *name) +{ + static char ret[PATH_MAX]; + + if (data_dir != NULL) + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", data_dir, name); + else + strlcpy(ret, name, sizeof(ret)); + if (access(ret, F_OK) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Cannot access data file %s: %s\n", + ret, strerror(errno)); + exit(1); + } + return ret; +} + +void +test_info(char *s, size_t len) +{ + snprintf(s, len, "In test %u: \"%s\"%s%s\n", test_number, + active_test_name == NULL ? "" : active_test_name, + *subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info); +} + +static void +siginfo(int unused __attribute__((__unused__))) +{ + char buf[256]; + + test_info(buf, sizeof(buf)); + atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf)); +} + +void +test_start(const char *n) +{ + assert(active_test_name == NULL); + assert((active_test_name = strdup(n)) != NULL); + *subtest_info = '\0'; + if (verbose_mode) + printf("test %u - \"%s\": ", test_number, active_test_name); + test_number++; +#ifdef SIGINFO + signal(SIGINFO, siginfo); +#endif + signal(SIGUSR1, siginfo); +} + +void +set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx) +{ + test_onerror = f; + onerror_ctx = ctx; +} + +void +test_done(void) +{ + *subtest_info = '\0'; + assert(active_test_name != NULL); + free(active_test_name); + active_test_name = NULL; + if (verbose_mode) + printf("OK\n"); + else if (!quiet_mode) { + printf("."); + fflush(stdout); + } +} + +void +test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + vsnprintf(subtest_info, sizeof(subtest_info), fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); +} + +void +ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line) +{ + long openssl_error = ERR_get_error(); + + if (openssl_error == 0) + return; + + fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d: uncaught OpenSSL error: %s", + file, line, ERR_error_string(openssl_error, NULL)); + abort(); +} + +static const char * +pred_name(enum test_predicate p) +{ + switch (p) { + case TEST_EQ: + return "EQ"; + case TEST_NE: + return "NE"; + case TEST_LT: + return "LT"; + case TEST_LE: + return "LE"; + case TEST_GT: + return "GT"; + case TEST_GE: + return "GE"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN"; + } +} + +static void +test_die(void) +{ + if (test_onerror != NULL) + test_onerror(onerror_ctx); + abort(); +} + +static void +test_header(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const char *name, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d test #%u \"%s\"%s%s\n", + file, line, test_number, active_test_name, + *subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info); + fprintf(stderr, "ASSERT_%s_%s(%s%s%s) failed:\n", + name, pred_name(pred), a1, + a2 != NULL ? ", " : "", a2 != NULL ? a2 : ""); +} + +void +assert_bignum(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + int r = BN_cmp(aa1, aa2); + + TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "BIGNUM", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a1, BN_bn2hex(aa1)); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a2, BN_bn2hex(aa2)); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_string(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + int r; + + /* Verify pointers are not NULL */ + assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE); + assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE); + + r = strcmp(aa1, aa2); + TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1, strlen(aa1)); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, aa2, strlen(aa2)); + test_die(); +} + +static char * +tohex(const void *_s, size_t l) +{ + u_int8_t *s = (u_int8_t *)_s; + size_t i, j; + const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef"; + char *r = malloc((l * 2) + 1); + + assert(r != NULL); + for (i = j = 0; i < l; i++) { + r[j++] = hex[(s[i] >> 4) & 0xf]; + r[j++] = hex[s[i] & 0xf]; + } + r[j] = '\0'; + return r; +} + +void +assert_mem(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + int r; + + if (l == 0) + return; + /* If length is >0, then verify pointers are not NULL */ + assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE); + assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE); + + r = memcmp(aa1, aa2, l); + TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 256)), l); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, tohex(aa2, MIN(l, 256)), l); + test_die(); +} + +static int +memvalcmp(const u_int8_t *s, u_char v, size_t l, size_t *where) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { + if (s[i] != v) { + *where = i; + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +void +assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, + const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + size_t where = -1; + int r; + char tmp[64]; + + if (l == 0) + return; + /* If length is >0, then verify the pointer is not NULL */ + assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE); + + r = memvalcmp(aa1, v, l, &where); + TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, NULL, "MEM_ZERO", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%20s = %s%s (len %zu)\n", a1, + tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 20)), l > 20 ? "..." : "", l); + snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "(%s)[%zu]", a1, where); + fprintf(stderr, "%20s = 0x%02x (expected 0x%02x)\n", tmp, + ((u_char *)aa1)[where], v); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "INT", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_size_t(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "SIZE_T", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U_INT", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG LONG", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_char(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + char buf[8]; + + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "CHAR", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1, + vis(buf, aa1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1, + vis(buf, aa2, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u8(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U8", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u16(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U16", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u32(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U32", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u64(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U64", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a1, + (unsigned long long)aa1, (unsigned long long)aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a2, + (unsigned long long)aa2, (unsigned long long)aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_ptr(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "PTR", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + diff --git a/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6da0066 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.8 2018/02/08 08:46:20 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */ + +#ifndef _TEST_HELPER_H +#define _TEST_HELPER_H + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include + +enum test_predicate { + TEST_EQ, TEST_NE, TEST_LT, TEST_LE, TEST_GT, TEST_GE +}; +typedef void (test_onerror_func_t)(void *); + +/* Supplied by test suite */ +void tests(void); + +const char *test_data_file(const char *name); +void test_start(const char *n); +void test_info(char *s, size_t len); +void set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx); +void test_done(void); +int test_is_verbose(void); +int test_is_quiet(void); +void test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +void ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line); +void assert_bignum(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_string(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_mem(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, + const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_int(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_long(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_char(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_ptr(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u8(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u16(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u32(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u64(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); + +#define TEST_START(n) test_start(n) +#define TEST_DONE() test_done() +#define TEST_ONERROR(f, c) set_onerror_func(f, c) +#define SSL_ERR_CHECK() ssl_err_check(__FILE__, __LINE__) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_MEM_EQ(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(a1, c, l) \ + assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, c, l, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_EQ(a1, l) \ + assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U8_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U16_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U32_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U64_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_STRING_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_MEM_NE(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(a1, l) \ + assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_INT_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U8_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U16_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U32_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U64_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_STRING_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_MEM_LT(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_INT_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_PTR_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U8_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U16_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U32_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U64_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_STRING_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_MEM_LE(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_INT_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_PTR_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U8_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U16_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U32_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U64_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_STRING_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_MEM_GT(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_INT_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_PTR_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U8_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U16_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U32_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U64_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_STRING_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_MEM_GE(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_INT_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_PTR_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U8_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U16_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U32_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U64_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) + +/* Fuzzing support */ + +struct fuzz; +#define FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP 0x00000001 /* Flip one bit at a time */ +#define FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP 0x00000002 /* Flip two bits at a time */ +#define FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP 0x00000004 /* Flip one byte at a time */ +#define FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP 0x00000008 /* Flip two bytes at a time */ +#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START 0x00000010 /* Truncate from beginning */ +#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END 0x00000020 /* Truncate from end */ +#define FUZZ_BASE64 0x00000040 /* Try all base64 chars */ +#define FUZZ_MAX FUZZ_BASE64 + +/* Start fuzzing a blob of data with selected strategies (bitmask) */ +struct fuzz *fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l); + +/* Free a fuzz context */ +void fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +/* Prepare the next fuzz case in the series */ +void fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +/* + * Check whether this fuzz case is identical to the original + * This is slow, but useful if the caller needs to ensure that all tests + * generated change the input (e.g. when fuzzing signatures). + */ +int fuzz_matches_original(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +/* Determine whether the current fuzz sequence is exhausted (nonzero = yes) */ +int fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +/* Return the length and a pointer to the current fuzzed case */ +size_t fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz); +u_char *fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +/* Dump the current fuzz case to stderr */ +void fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +#endif /* _TEST_HELPER_H */ diff --git a/regress/unittests/utf8/Makefile b/regress/unittests/utf8/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f8eec04 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/utf8/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $ + +PROG=test_utf8 +SRCS=tests.c + +# From usr.bin/ssh +SRCS+=utf8.c atomicio.c + +REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} + +run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} + env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} + +.include diff --git a/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c b/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f0bbca5 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/19 00:11:29 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for the utf8.h *mprintf() API + * + * Written by Ingo Schwarze in 2016 + * and placed in the public domain. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "utf8.h" + +static void +badarg(void) +{ + char buf[16]; + int len, width; + + width = 1; + TEST_START("utf8_badarg"); + len = snmprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), &width, "\377"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(len, -1); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(buf, ""); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(width, 0); + TEST_DONE(); +} + +static void +one(int utf8, const char *name, const char *mbs, int width, + int wantwidth, int wantlen, const char *wants) +{ + char buf[16]; + int *wp; + int len; + + if (wantlen == -2) + wantlen = strlen(wants); + (void)strlcpy(buf, utf8 ? "utf8_" : "c_", sizeof(buf)); + (void)strlcat(buf, name, sizeof(buf)); + TEST_START(buf); + wp = wantwidth == -2 ? NULL : &width; + len = snmprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), wp, "%s", mbs); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(len, wantlen); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(buf, wants); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(width, wantwidth); + TEST_DONE(); +} + +void +tests(void) +{ + char *loc; + + TEST_START("utf8_setlocale"); + loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + badarg(); + one(1, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, ""); + one(1, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x"); + one(1, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb"); + one(1, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb"); + one(1, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb"); + one(1, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x"); + one(1, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x"); + one(1, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x"); + one(1, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b"); + one(1, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345"); + one(1, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012"); + one(1, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12"); + one(1, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a"); + one(1, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201"); + one(1, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201"); + + TEST_START("C_setlocale"); + loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C"); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + badarg(); + one(0, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, ""); + one(0, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x"); + one(0, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb"); + one(0, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb"); + one(0, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb"); + one(0, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x"); + one(0, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x"); + one(0, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x"); + one(0, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b"); + one(0, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345"); + one(0, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012"); + one(0, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12"); + one(0, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a"); + one(0, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 7, 5, -1, "a\\343"); + one(0, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 13, 13, 13, "a\\343\\201\\201"); +} diff --git a/regress/valgrind-unit.sh b/regress/valgrind-unit.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..4143ead --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/valgrind-unit.sh @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +UNIT_BINARY="$1" +shift +UNIT_ARGS="$@" + +test "x$OBJ" = "x" && OBJ=$PWD + +# This mostly replicates the logic in test-exec.sh for running the +# regress tests under valgrind, except that we unconditionally enable +# leak checking because the unit tests should be clean. +VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full" +VG_TEST=`basename $UNIT_BINARY` +VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}.%p" +VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK --log-file=${VG_LOG}" +VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes" +VG_PATH="valgrind" +if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then + VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH" +fi + +exec $VG_PATH $VG_OPTS $UNIT_BINARY $UNIT_ARGS diff --git a/regress/yes-head.sh b/regress/yes-head.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2759eb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/regress/yes-head.sh @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# $OpenBSD: yes-head.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="yes pipe head" + +lines=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)` +if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "yes|head test failed" + lines = 0; +fi +if [ $lines -ne 2000 ]; then + fail "yes|head returns $lines lines instead of 2000" +fi diff --git a/rijndael.c b/rijndael.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..40ab7b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/rijndael.c @@ -0,0 +1,1129 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.20 2015/03/16 11:09:52 djm Exp $ */ + +/** + * rijndael-alg-fst.c + * + * @version 3.0 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen + * @author Antoon Bosselaers + * @author Paulo Barreto + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "rijndael.h" + +#undef FULL_UNROLL + +/* +Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; +Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; +Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01]; +Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02]; + +Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; +Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d]; +Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09]; +Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e]; +Td4[x] = Si[x].[01]; +*/ + +static const u32 Te0[256] = { + 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU, + 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U, + 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU, + 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU, + 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U, + 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU, + 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU, + 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU, + 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU, + 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU, + 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U, + 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU, + 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU, + 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U, + 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU, + 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU, + 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU, + 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU, + 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU, + 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U, + 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU, + 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU, + 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU, + 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU, + 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U, + 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U, + 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U, + 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U, + 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU, + 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U, + 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U, + 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU, + 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU, + 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U, + 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U, + 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U, + 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU, + 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U, + 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU, + 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U, + 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU, + 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U, + 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U, + 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU, + 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U, + 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U, + 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U, + 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U, + 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U, + 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U, + 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U, + 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U, + 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU, + 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U, + 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U, + 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U, + 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U, + 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U, + 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U, + 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU, + 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U, + 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U, + 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U, + 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU, +}; +static const u32 Te1[256] = { + 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU, + 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U, + 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU, + 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U, + 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU, + 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U, + 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU, + 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U, + 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U, + 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU, + 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U, + 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U, + 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U, + 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU, + 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U, + 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U, + 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU, + 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U, + 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U, + 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U, + 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU, + 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU, + 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U, + 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU, + 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU, + 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U, + 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU, + 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U, + 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU, + 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U, + 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U, + 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U, + 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU, + 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U, + 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU, + 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U, + 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU, + 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U, + 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U, + 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU, + 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU, + 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU, + 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U, + 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U, + 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU, + 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U, + 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU, + 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U, + 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU, + 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U, + 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU, + 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU, + 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U, + 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU, + 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U, + 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU, + 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U, + 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U, + 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U, + 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU, + 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU, + 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U, + 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU, + 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U, +}; +static const u32 Te2[256] = { + 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU, + 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U, + 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU, + 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U, + 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU, + 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U, + 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU, + 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U, + 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U, + 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU, + 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U, + 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U, + 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U, + 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU, + 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U, + 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U, + 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU, + 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U, + 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U, + 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U, + 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU, + 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU, + 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U, + 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU, + 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU, + 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U, + 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU, + 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U, + 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU, + 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U, + 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U, + 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U, + 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU, + 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U, + 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU, + 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U, + 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU, + 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U, + 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U, + 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU, + 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU, + 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU, + 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U, + 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U, + 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU, + 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U, + 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU, + 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U, + 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU, + 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U, + 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU, + 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU, + 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U, + 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU, + 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U, + 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU, + 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U, + 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U, + 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U, + 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU, + 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU, + 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U, + 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU, + 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U, +}; +static const u32 Te3[256] = { + 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U, + 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U, + 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U, + 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU, + 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU, + 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU, + 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U, + 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU, + 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU, + 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U, + 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U, + 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU, + 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU, + 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU, + 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU, + 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU, + 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U, + 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU, + 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU, + 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U, + 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U, + 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U, + 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U, + 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U, + 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU, + 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U, + 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU, + 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU, + 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U, + 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U, + 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U, + 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU, + 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U, + 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU, + 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU, + 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U, + 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U, + 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU, + 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U, + 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU, + 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U, + 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U, + 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U, + 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U, + 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU, + 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U, + 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU, + 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U, + 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU, + 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U, + 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU, + 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU, + 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU, + 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU, + 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U, + 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U, + 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U, + 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U, + 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U, + 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U, + 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU, + 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U, + 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU, + 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU, +}; +#if 0 +static const u32 Td0[256] = { + 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U, + 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U, + 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U, + 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU, + 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U, + 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U, + 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU, + 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U, + 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU, + 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U, + 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U, + 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U, + 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U, + 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU, + 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U, + 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU, + 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U, + 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU, + 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U, + 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U, + 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U, + 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU, + 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U, + 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU, + 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U, + 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU, + 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U, + 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU, + 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU, + 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U, + 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU, + 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U, + 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU, + 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U, + 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U, + 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U, + 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU, + 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U, + 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U, + 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU, + 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U, + 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U, + 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U, + 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U, + 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U, + 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU, + 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U, + 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U, + 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U, + 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U, + 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U, + 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU, + 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU, + 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU, + 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU, + 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U, + 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U, + 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU, + 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU, + 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U, + 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU, + 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U, + 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U, + 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U, +}; +static const u32 Td1[256] = { + 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU, + 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U, + 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU, + 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U, + 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U, + 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U, + 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U, + 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U, + 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U, + 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU, + 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU, + 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU, + 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U, + 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU, + 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U, + 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U, + 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U, + 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU, + 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU, + 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U, + 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU, + 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U, + 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU, + 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU, + 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U, + 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U, + 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U, + 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU, + 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U, + 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU, + 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U, + 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U, + 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U, + 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU, + 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U, + 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U, + 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U, + 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U, + 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U, + 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U, + 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU, + 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU, + 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U, + 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU, + 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U, + 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU, + 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU, + 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U, + 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU, + 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U, + 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U, + 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U, + 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U, + 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U, + 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U, + 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U, + 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU, + 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U, + 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U, + 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU, + 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U, + 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U, + 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U, + 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U, +}; +static const u32 Td2[256] = { + 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U, + 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U, + 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U, + 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U, + 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU, + 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U, + 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U, + 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U, + 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U, + 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU, + 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U, + 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U, + 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU, + 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U, + 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U, + 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U, + 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U, + 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U, + 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U, + 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU, + 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U, + 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U, + 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U, + 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U, + 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U, + 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU, + 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU, + 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U, + 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU, + 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U, + 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU, + 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU, + 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU, + 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU, + 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U, + 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U, + 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U, + 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U, + 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U, + 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U, + 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U, + 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU, + 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU, + 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U, + 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U, + 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU, + 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU, + 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U, + 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U, + 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U, + 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U, + 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U, + 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U, + 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U, + 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU, + 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U, + 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U, + 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U, + 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U, + 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U, + 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U, + 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU, + 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U, + 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U, +}; +static const u32 Td3[256] = { + 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU, + 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU, + 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U, + 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U, + 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU, + 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU, + 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U, + 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU, + 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U, + 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU, + 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U, + 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U, + 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U, + 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U, + 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U, + 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU, + 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU, + 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U, + 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U, + 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU, + 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU, + 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U, + 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U, + 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U, + 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U, + 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU, + 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U, + 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U, + 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU, + 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU, + 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U, + 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U, + 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U, + 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU, + 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U, + 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U, + 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U, + 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U, + 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U, + 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U, + 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U, + 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU, + 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U, + 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U, + 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU, + 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU, + 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U, + 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU, + 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U, + 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U, + 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U, + 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U, + 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U, + 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U, + 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU, + 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU, + 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU, + 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU, + 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U, + 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U, + 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U, + 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU, + 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U, + 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U, +}; +static const u8 Td4[256] = { + 0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U, + 0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU, + 0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U, + 0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU, + 0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU, + 0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU, + 0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U, + 0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U, + 0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U, + 0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U, + 0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU, + 0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U, + 0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU, + 0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U, + 0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U, + 0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU, + 0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU, + 0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U, + 0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U, + 0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU, + 0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U, + 0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU, + 0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U, + 0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U, + 0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U, + 0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU, + 0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU, + 0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU, + 0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U, + 0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U, + 0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U, + 0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU, +}; +#endif +static const u32 rcon[] = { + 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, + 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000, + 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */ +}; + +#define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3])) +#define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); } + +/** + * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. + * + * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. + */ +int +rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) +{ + int i = 0; + u32 temp; + + rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey ); + rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4); + rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8); + rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12); + if (keyBits == 128) { + for (;;) { + temp = rk[3]; + rk[4] = rk[0] ^ + (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rcon[i]; + rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; + rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; + rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6]; + if (++i == 10) { + return 10; + } + rk += 4; + } + } + rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16); + rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20); + if (keyBits == 192) { + for (;;) { + temp = rk[ 5]; + rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ + (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rcon[i]; + rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; + rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; + rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8]; + if (++i == 8) { + return 12; + } + rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9]; + rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10]; + rk += 6; + } + } + rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24); + rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28); + if (keyBits == 256) { + for (;;) { + temp = rk[ 7]; + rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ + (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rcon[i]; + rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; + rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; + rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10]; + if (++i == 7) { + return 14; + } + temp = rk[11]; + rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ + (Te2[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te3[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te0[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te1[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); + rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; + rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; + rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; + rk += 8; + } + } + return 0; +} + +#if 0 +/** + * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. + * + * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. + */ +int +rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) +{ + int Nr, i, j; + u32 temp; + + /* expand the cipher key: */ + Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits); + + /* invert the order of the round keys: */ + for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) { + temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp; + temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp; + temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp; + temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp; + } + /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */ + for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) { + rk += 4; + rk[0] = + Td0[Te1[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te1[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te1[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te1[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + rk[1] = + Td0[Te1[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te1[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te1[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te1[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + rk[2] = + Td0[Te1[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te1[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te1[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te1[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + rk[3] = + Td0[Te1[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ + Td1[Te1[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td2[Te1[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ + Td3[Te1[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; + } + return Nr; +} +#endif + +void +rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], + u8 ct[16]) +{ + u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; +#ifndef FULL_UNROLL + int r; +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + + /* + * map byte array block to cipher state + * and add initial round key: + */ + s0 = GETU32(pt ) ^ rk[0]; + s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1]; + s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2]; + s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3]; +#ifdef FULL_UNROLL + /* round 1: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; + /* round 2: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; + /* round 3: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; + /* round 4: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; + /* round 5: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; + /* round 6: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; + /* round 7: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; + /* round 8: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; + /* round 9: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; + if (Nr > 10) { + /* round 10: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; + /* round 11: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; + if (Nr > 12) { + /* round 12: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; + /* round 13: */ + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; + } + } + rk += Nr << 2; +#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * Nr - 1 full rounds: + */ + r = Nr >> 1; + for (;;) { + t0 = + Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[4]; + t1 = + Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[5]; + t2 = + Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[6]; + t3 = + Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[7]; + + rk += 8; + if (--r == 0) { + break; + } + + s0 = + Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[0]; + s1 = + Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[1]; + s2 = + Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[2]; + s3 = + Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ + Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[3]; + } +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * apply last round and + * map cipher state to byte array block: + */ + s0 = + (Te2[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te3[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te0[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te1[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[0]; + PUTU32(ct , s0); + s1 = + (Te2[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te3[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te0[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te1[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[1]; + PUTU32(ct + 4, s1); + s2 = + (Te2[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te3[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te0[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te1[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[2]; + PUTU32(ct + 8, s2); + s3 = + (Te2[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Te3[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Te0[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Te1[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[3]; + PUTU32(ct + 12, s3); +} + +#if 0 +static void +rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], + u8 pt[16]) +{ + u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; +#ifndef FULL_UNROLL + int r; +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + + /* + * map byte array block to cipher state + * and add initial round key: + */ + s0 = GETU32(ct ) ^ rk[0]; + s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1]; + s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2]; + s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3]; +#ifdef FULL_UNROLL + /* round 1: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; + /* round 2: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; + /* round 3: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; + /* round 4: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; + /* round 5: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; + /* round 6: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; + /* round 7: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; + /* round 8: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; + /* round 9: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; + if (Nr > 10) { + /* round 10: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; + /* round 11: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; + if (Nr > 12) { + /* round 12: */ + s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; + s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; + s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; + s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; + /* round 13: */ + t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; + t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; + t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; + t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; + } + } + rk += Nr << 2; +#else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * Nr - 1 full rounds: + */ + r = Nr >> 1; + for (;;) { + t0 = + Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[4]; + t1 = + Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[5]; + t2 = + Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[6]; + t3 = + Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[7]; + + rk += 8; + if (--r == 0) { + break; + } + + s0 = + Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[0]; + s1 = + Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[1]; + s2 = + Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[2]; + s3 = + Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ + Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ + Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ + Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ + rk[3]; + } +#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ + /* + * apply last round and + * map cipher state to byte array block: + */ + s0 = + (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff]) ^ + rk[0]; + PUTU32(pt , s0); + s1 = + (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff]) ^ + rk[1]; + PUTU32(pt + 4, s1); + s2 = + (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff]) ^ + rk[2]; + PUTU32(pt + 8, s2); + s3 = + (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ + (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ + (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ + (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff]) ^ + rk[3]; + PUTU32(pt + 12, s3); +} +#endif diff --git a/rijndael.h b/rijndael.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53e74e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/rijndael.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.14 2014/04/29 15:42:07 markus Exp $ */ + +/** + * rijndael-alg-fst.h + * + * @version 3.0 (December 2000) + * + * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) + * + * @author Vincent Rijmen + * @author Antoon Bosselaers + * @author Paulo Barreto + * + * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS + * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF + * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, + * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE + * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, + * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H +#define _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H + +#define AES_MAXKEYBITS (256) +#define AES_MAXKEYBYTES (AES_MAXKEYBITS/8) +/* for 256-bit keys, fewer for less */ +#define AES_MAXROUNDS 14 + +typedef unsigned char u8; +typedef unsigned short u16; +typedef unsigned int u32; + +int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(unsigned int [], const unsigned char [], int); +void rijndaelEncrypt(const unsigned int [], int, const unsigned char [], + unsigned char []); + +/* The structure for key information */ +typedef struct { + int decrypt; + int Nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */ + u32 ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */ + u32 dk[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* decrypt key schedule */ +} rijndael_ctx; + +void rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, int, int); +void rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *); +void rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *); + +#endif /* _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H */ diff --git a/sandbox-capsicum.c b/sandbox-capsicum.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e10bad7 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-capsicum.c @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Dag-Erling Smorgrav + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "monitor.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* + * Capsicum sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits, + * limits rights on stdout, stdin, stderr, monitor and switches to + * capability mode. + */ + +struct ssh_sandbox { + struct monitor *monitor; + pid_t child_pid; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + /* + * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need + * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. + */ + debug3("%s: preparing capsicum sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + box->monitor = monitor; + box->child_pid = 0; + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + struct rlimit rl_zero; + cap_rights_t rights; + + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +#ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +#endif + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + + cap_rights_init(&rights); + + if (cap_rights_limit(STDIN_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) + fatal("can't limit stdin: %m"); + if (cap_rights_limit(STDOUT_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) + fatal("can't limit stdout: %m"); + if (cap_rights_limit(STDERR_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) + fatal("can't limit stderr: %m"); + + cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE); + if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_recvfd, &rights) < 0 && + errno != ENOSYS) + fatal("%s: failed to limit the network socket", __func__); + cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_WRITE); + if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_log_sendfd, &rights) < 0 && + errno != ENOSYS) + fatal("%s: failed to limit the logging socket", __func__); + if (cap_enter() < 0 && errno != ENOSYS) + fatal("%s: failed to enter capability mode", __func__); + +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + box->child_pid = child_pid; +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_CAPSICUM */ diff --git a/sandbox-darwin.c b/sandbox-darwin.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a61de74 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-darwin.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_DARWIN + +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "sandbox.h" +#include "monitor.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* Darwin/OS X sandbox */ + +struct ssh_sandbox { + pid_t child_pid; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + /* + * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need + * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. + */ + debug3("%s: preparing Darwin sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + box->child_pid = 0; + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + char *errmsg; + struct rlimit rl_zero; + + debug3("%s: starting Darwin sandbox", __func__); + if (sandbox_init(kSBXProfilePureComputation, SANDBOX_NAMED, + &errmsg) == -1) + fatal("%s: sandbox_init: %s", __func__, errmsg); + + /* + * The kSBXProfilePureComputation still allows sockets, so + * we must disable these using rlimit. + */ + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + box->child_pid = child_pid; +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_DARWIN */ diff --git a/sandbox-null.c b/sandbox-null.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d4cb918 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-null.c @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/* $OpenBSD$ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_NULL + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* dummy sandbox */ + +struct ssh_sandbox { + int junk; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + /* + * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need + * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. + */ + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + /* Nothing to do here */ +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + free(box); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + /* Nothing to do here */ +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_NULL */ diff --git a/sandbox-pledge.c b/sandbox-pledge.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d28fc27 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-pledge.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-pledge.c,v 1.1 2015/10/09 01:37:08 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Theo de Raadt + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_PLEDGE + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +struct ssh_sandbox { + pid_t child_pid; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *m) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + debug3("%s: preparing pledge sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + box->child_pid = 0; + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s: pledge()", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + box->child_pid = child_pid; + /* Nothing to do here */ +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_PLEDGE */ diff --git a/sandbox-rlimit.c b/sandbox-rlimit.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0bff3df --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-rlimit.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-rlimit.c,v 1.4 2016/09/12 01:22:38 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_RLIMIT + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* Minimal sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits */ + +struct ssh_sandbox { + pid_t child_pid; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + /* + * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need + * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. + */ + debug3("%s: preparing rlimit sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + box->child_pid = 0; + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + struct rlimit rl_zero; + + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + +#ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +#endif +#ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +#endif +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + box->child_pid = child_pid; +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_RLIMIT */ diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5edbc69 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c @@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose + * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production, + * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context. + * + * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures. + * E.g. + * auditctl -a task,always -F uid= + */ +/* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */ + +/* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */ + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG +/* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */ +# include +# define __have_siginfo_t 1 +# define __have_sigval_t 1 +# define __have_sigevent_t 1 +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#ifdef __s390__ +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include /* for offsetof */ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */ +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL + +/* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */ +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG +# undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL +# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ + +#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN +# define ARG_LO_OFFSET 0 +# define ARG_HI_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t) +#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN +# define ARG_LO_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t) +# define ARG_HI_OFFSET 0 +#else +#error "Unknown endianness" +#endif + +/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */ +#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)) +#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) +#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \ + /* load and test first syscall argument, low word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \ + ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \ + /* load and test first syscall argument, high word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \ + (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ + /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) + +/* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */ +static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)), + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0), + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), + /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), + + /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */ +#ifdef __NR_lstat + SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_lstat64 + SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_fstat + SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_fstat64 + SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_open + SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_openat + SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_newfstatat + SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_stat + SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_stat64 + SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES), +#endif + + /* Syscalls to permit */ +#ifdef __NR_brk + SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime + SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_close + SC_ALLOW(__NR_close), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_exit + SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_exit_group + SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_futex + SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_geteuid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_geteuid32 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getpgid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getpid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getrandom + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday + SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getuid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getuid32 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_madvise + SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_mmap + SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_mmap2 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap2), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_mremap + SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_munmap + SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_nanosleep + SC_ALLOW(__NR_nanosleep), +#endif +#ifdef __NR__newselect + SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_poll + SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_pselect6 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_read + SC_ALLOW(__NR_read), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask + SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_select + SC_ALLOW(__NR_select), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_shutdown + SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask + SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_time + SC_ALLOW(__NR_time), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_write + SC_ALLOW(__NR_write), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_socketcall + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), + SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES), +#endif +#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__) + /* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */ + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK), + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO), + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT), +#endif +#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT) + /* + * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the + * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g. + * https://bugs.debian.org/849923 + */ + SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT), +#endif + + /* Default deny */ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), +}; + +static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = { + .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])), + .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns, +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox { + pid_t child_pid; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + /* + * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need + * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. + */ + debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + box->child_pid = 0; + + return box; +} + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG +extern struct monitor *pmonitor; +void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx); + +static void +ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) +{ + char msg[256]; + + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), + "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)", + __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr); + mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor); + _exit(1); +} + +static void +ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void) +{ + struct sigaction act; + sigset_t mask; + + debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__); + memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); + sigemptyset(&mask); + sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); + + act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation; + act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; + if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +} +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + struct rlimit rl_zero; + int nnp_failed = 0; + + /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */ + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG + ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(); +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ + + debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__); + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) { + debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + nnp_failed = 1; + } + debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__); + if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1) + debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + else if (nnp_failed) + fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but " + "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + box->child_pid = child_pid; +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ diff --git a/sandbox-solaris.c b/sandbox-solaris.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56ddb9a --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-solaris.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc + * Author: Alex Wilson + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SOLARIS +#ifndef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS +# error "--with-solaris-privs must be used with the Solaris sandbox" +#endif + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H +# include +#endif + +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +struct ssh_sandbox { + priv_set_t *pset; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; + + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + + /* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */ + box->pset = solaris_basic_privset(); + + if (box->pset == NULL) { + free(box); + return NULL; + } + + /* Drop everything except the ability to use already-opened files */ + if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 || +#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif +#ifdef PRIV_DAX_ACCESS + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_DAX_ACCESS) != 0 || +#endif +#ifdef PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO) != 0 || +#endif + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 || + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 || + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 || + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) { + free(box); + return NULL; + } + + /* These may not be available on older Solaris-es */ +# if defined(PRIV_FILE_READ) && defined(PRIV_FILE_WRITE) + if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_READ) != 0 || + priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_WRITE) != 0) { + free(box); + return NULL; + } +# endif + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, box->pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, box->pset) != 0 || + setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, box->pset) != 0) + fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno)); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + priv_freeset(box->pset); + box->pset = NULL; + free(box); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + /* Nothing to do here */ +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_SOLARIS */ diff --git a/sandbox-systrace.c b/sandbox-systrace.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..add4c46 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-systrace.c @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.18 2015/10/02 01:39:26 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +struct sandbox_policy { + int syscall; + int action; +}; + +/* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */ +static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = { + { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#ifdef SYS_kbind + { SYS_kbind, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#endif + + { SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_nanosleep, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + +#ifdef SYS_getentropy + /* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */ + { SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#else + /* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */ + { SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#endif +#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog + { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#endif + + { SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + + { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + + { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER }, + + { -1, -1 } +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox { + int systrace_fd; + pid_t child_pid; + void (*osigchld)(int); +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + box->systrace_fd = -1; + box->child_pid = 0; + box->osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + debug3("%s: ready", __func__); + signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); + if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0) + fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid()); + debug3("%s: started", __func__); +} + +static void +ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid, + const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls) +{ + int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status; + pid_t pid; + struct systrace_policy policy; + + /* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */ + debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); + do { + pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED); + } while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR); + signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); + if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) { + if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) + fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d", + __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); + if (WIFEXITED(status)) + fatal("%s: child exited with status %d", + __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); + fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__); + } + debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid); + box->child_pid = child_pid; + + /* Set up systracing of child */ + if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1) + fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__, + dev_systrace, strerror(errno)); + close(dev_systrace); + debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd); + if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__, + box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno)); + + /* Allocate and assign policy */ + memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy)); + policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW; + policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL; + if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__, + box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); + + policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN; + policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid; + if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s", + __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); + + /* Set per-syscall policy */ + for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) { + found = 0; + for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) { + if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY; + policy.strp_code = i; + policy.strp_policy = found ? + allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL; + if (found) + debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i); + if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s", + __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); + } + + /* Signal the child to start running */ + debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); + if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0) + fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + /* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */ + close(box->systrace_fd); + + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy); +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */ diff --git a/sc25519.c b/sc25519.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1568d9a --- /dev/null +++ b/sc25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,308 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sc25519.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, + * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. + * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.c + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "sc25519.h" + +/*Arithmetic modulo the group order m = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 = 7237005577332262213973186563042994240857116359379907606001950938285454250989 */ + +static const crypto_uint32 m[32] = {0xED, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x5C, 0x1A, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xD6, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0x14, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10}; + +static const crypto_uint32 mu[33] = {0x1B, 0x13, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0x9C, 0xED, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x63, 0x08, 0x5D, 0x21, 0x06, 0x21, + 0xEB, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x0F}; + +static crypto_uint32 lt(crypto_uint32 a,crypto_uint32 b) /* 16-bit inputs */ +{ + unsigned int x = a; + x -= (unsigned int) b; /* 0..65535: no; 4294901761..4294967295: yes */ + x >>= 31; /* 0: no; 1: yes */ + return x; +} + +/* Reduce coefficients of r before calling reduce_add_sub */ +static void reduce_add_sub(sc25519 *r) +{ + crypto_uint32 pb = 0; + crypto_uint32 b; + crypto_uint32 mask; + int i; + unsigned char t[32]; + + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + { + pb += m[i]; + b = lt(r->v[i],pb); + t[i] = r->v[i]-pb+(b<<8); + pb = b; + } + mask = b - 1; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + r->v[i] ^= mask & (r->v[i] ^ t[i]); +} + +/* Reduce coefficients of x before calling barrett_reduce */ +static void barrett_reduce(sc25519 *r, const crypto_uint32 x[64]) +{ + /* See HAC, Alg. 14.42 */ + int i,j; + crypto_uint32 q2[66]; + crypto_uint32 *q3 = q2 + 33; + crypto_uint32 r1[33]; + crypto_uint32 r2[33]; + crypto_uint32 carry; + crypto_uint32 pb = 0; + crypto_uint32 b; + + for (i = 0;i < 66;++i) q2[i] = 0; + for (i = 0;i < 33;++i) r2[i] = 0; + + for(i=0;i<33;i++) + for(j=0;j<33;j++) + if(i+j >= 31) q2[i+j] += mu[i]*x[j+31]; + carry = q2[31] >> 8; + q2[32] += carry; + carry = q2[32] >> 8; + q2[33] += carry; + + for(i=0;i<33;i++)r1[i] = x[i]; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + for(j=0;j<33;j++) + if(i+j < 33) r2[i+j] += m[i]*q3[j]; + + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + { + carry = r2[i] >> 8; + r2[i+1] += carry; + r2[i] &= 0xff; + } + + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + { + pb += r2[i]; + b = lt(r1[i],pb); + r->v[i] = r1[i]-pb+(b<<8); + pb = b; + } + + /* XXX: Can it really happen that r<0?, See HAC, Alg 14.42, Step 3 + * If so: Handle it here! + */ + + reduce_add_sub(r); + reduce_add_sub(r); +} + +void sc25519_from32bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]) +{ + int i; + crypto_uint32 t[64]; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) t[i] = x[i]; + for(i=32;i<64;++i) t[i] = 0; + barrett_reduce(r, t); +} + +void shortsc25519_from16bytes(shortsc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[16]) +{ + int i; + for(i=0;i<16;i++) r->v[i] = x[i]; +} + +void sc25519_from64bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[64]) +{ + int i; + crypto_uint32 t[64]; + for(i=0;i<64;i++) t[i] = x[i]; + barrett_reduce(r, t); +} + +void sc25519_from_shortsc(sc25519 *r, const shortsc25519 *x) +{ + int i; + for(i=0;i<16;i++) + r->v[i] = x->v[i]; + for(i=0;i<16;i++) + r->v[16+i] = 0; +} + +void sc25519_to32bytes(unsigned char r[32], const sc25519 *x) +{ + int i; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) r[i] = x->v[i]; +} + +int sc25519_iszero_vartime(const sc25519 *x) +{ + int i; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + if(x->v[i] != 0) return 0; + return 1; +} + +int sc25519_isshort_vartime(const sc25519 *x) +{ + int i; + for(i=31;i>15;i--) + if(x->v[i] != 0) return 0; + return 1; +} + +int sc25519_lt_vartime(const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y) +{ + int i; + for(i=31;i>=0;i--) + { + if(x->v[i] < y->v[i]) return 1; + if(x->v[i] > y->v[i]) return 0; + } + return 0; +} + +void sc25519_add(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y) +{ + int i, carry; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = x->v[i] + y->v[i]; + for(i=0;i<31;i++) + { + carry = r->v[i] >> 8; + r->v[i+1] += carry; + r->v[i] &= 0xff; + } + reduce_add_sub(r); +} + +void sc25519_sub_nored(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y) +{ + crypto_uint32 b = 0; + crypto_uint32 t; + int i; + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + { + t = x->v[i] - y->v[i] - b; + r->v[i] = t & 255; + b = (t >> 8) & 1; + } +} + +void sc25519_mul(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y) +{ + int i,j,carry; + crypto_uint32 t[64]; + for(i=0;i<64;i++)t[i] = 0; + + for(i=0;i<32;i++) + for(j=0;j<32;j++) + t[i+j] += x->v[i] * y->v[j]; + + /* Reduce coefficients */ + for(i=0;i<63;i++) + { + carry = t[i] >> 8; + t[i+1] += carry; + t[i] &= 0xff; + } + + barrett_reduce(r, t); +} + +void sc25519_mul_shortsc(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const shortsc25519 *y) +{ + sc25519 t; + sc25519_from_shortsc(&t, y); + sc25519_mul(r, x, &t); +} + +void sc25519_window3(signed char r[85], const sc25519 *s) +{ + char carry; + int i; + for(i=0;i<10;i++) + { + r[8*i+0] = s->v[3*i+0] & 7; + r[8*i+1] = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 3) & 7; + r[8*i+2] = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 6) & 7; + r[8*i+2] ^= (s->v[3*i+1] << 2) & 7; + r[8*i+3] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 1) & 7; + r[8*i+4] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 4) & 7; + r[8*i+5] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 7) & 7; + r[8*i+5] ^= (s->v[3*i+2] << 1) & 7; + r[8*i+6] = (s->v[3*i+2] >> 2) & 7; + r[8*i+7] = (s->v[3*i+2] >> 5) & 7; + } + r[8*i+0] = s->v[3*i+0] & 7; + r[8*i+1] = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 3) & 7; + r[8*i+2] = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 6) & 7; + r[8*i+2] ^= (s->v[3*i+1] << 2) & 7; + r[8*i+3] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 1) & 7; + r[8*i+4] = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 4) & 7; + + /* Making it signed */ + carry = 0; + for(i=0;i<84;i++) + { + r[i] += carry; + r[i+1] += r[i] >> 3; + r[i] &= 7; + carry = r[i] >> 2; + r[i] -= carry<<3; + } + r[84] += carry; +} + +void sc25519_window5(signed char r[51], const sc25519 *s) +{ + char carry; + int i; + for(i=0;i<6;i++) + { + r[8*i+0] = s->v[5*i+0] & 31; + r[8*i+1] = (s->v[5*i+0] >> 5) & 31; + r[8*i+1] ^= (s->v[5*i+1] << 3) & 31; + r[8*i+2] = (s->v[5*i+1] >> 2) & 31; + r[8*i+3] = (s->v[5*i+1] >> 7) & 31; + r[8*i+3] ^= (s->v[5*i+2] << 1) & 31; + r[8*i+4] = (s->v[5*i+2] >> 4) & 31; + r[8*i+4] ^= (s->v[5*i+3] << 4) & 31; + r[8*i+5] = (s->v[5*i+3] >> 1) & 31; + r[8*i+6] = (s->v[5*i+3] >> 6) & 31; + r[8*i+6] ^= (s->v[5*i+4] << 2) & 31; + r[8*i+7] = (s->v[5*i+4] >> 3) & 31; + } + r[8*i+0] = s->v[5*i+0] & 31; + r[8*i+1] = (s->v[5*i+0] >> 5) & 31; + r[8*i+1] ^= (s->v[5*i+1] << 3) & 31; + r[8*i+2] = (s->v[5*i+1] >> 2) & 31; + + /* Making it signed */ + carry = 0; + for(i=0;i<50;i++) + { + r[i] += carry; + r[i+1] += r[i] >> 5; + r[i] &= 31; + carry = r[i] >> 4; + r[i] -= carry<<5; + } + r[50] += carry; +} + +void sc25519_2interleave2(unsigned char r[127], const sc25519 *s1, const sc25519 *s2) +{ + int i; + for(i=0;i<31;i++) + { + r[4*i] = ( s1->v[i] & 3) ^ (( s2->v[i] & 3) << 2); + r[4*i+1] = ((s1->v[i] >> 2) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[i] >> 2) & 3) << 2); + r[4*i+2] = ((s1->v[i] >> 4) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[i] >> 4) & 3) << 2); + r[4*i+3] = ((s1->v[i] >> 6) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[i] >> 6) & 3) << 2); + } + r[124] = ( s1->v[31] & 3) ^ (( s2->v[31] & 3) << 2); + r[125] = ((s1->v[31] >> 2) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[31] >> 2) & 3) << 2); + r[126] = ((s1->v[31] >> 4) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[31] >> 4) & 3) << 2); +} diff --git a/sc25519.h b/sc25519.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2c15d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/sc25519.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sc25519.h,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain, Authors: Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, + * Peter Schwabe, Bo-Yin Yang. + * Copied from supercop-20130419/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.h + */ + +#ifndef SC25519_H +#define SC25519_H + +#include "crypto_api.h" + +#define sc25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519 +#define shortsc25519 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519 +#define sc25519_from32bytes crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes +#define shortsc25519_from16bytes crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes +#define sc25519_from64bytes crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes +#define sc25519_from_shortsc crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc +#define sc25519_to32bytes crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes +#define sc25519_iszero_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime +#define sc25519_isshort_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime +#define sc25519_lt_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime +#define sc25519_add crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add +#define sc25519_sub_nored crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored +#define sc25519_mul crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul +#define sc25519_mul_shortsc crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc +#define sc25519_window3 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3 +#define sc25519_window5 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5 +#define sc25519_2interleave2 crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2 + +typedef struct +{ + crypto_uint32 v[32]; +} +sc25519; + +typedef struct +{ + crypto_uint32 v[16]; +} +shortsc25519; + +void sc25519_from32bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]); + +void shortsc25519_from16bytes(shortsc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[16]); + +void sc25519_from64bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[64]); + +void sc25519_from_shortsc(sc25519 *r, const shortsc25519 *x); + +void sc25519_to32bytes(unsigned char r[32], const sc25519 *x); + +int sc25519_iszero_vartime(const sc25519 *x); + +int sc25519_isshort_vartime(const sc25519 *x); + +int sc25519_lt_vartime(const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y); + +void sc25519_add(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y); + +void sc25519_sub_nored(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y); + +void sc25519_mul(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y); + +void sc25519_mul_shortsc(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const shortsc25519 *y); + +/* Convert s into a representation of the form \sum_{i=0}^{84}r[i]2^3 + * with r[i] in {-4,...,3} + */ +void sc25519_window3(signed char r[85], const sc25519 *s); + +/* Convert s into a representation of the form \sum_{i=0}^{50}r[i]2^5 + * with r[i] in {-16,...,15} + */ +void sc25519_window5(signed char r[51], const sc25519 *s); + +void sc25519_2interleave2(unsigned char r[127], const sc25519 *s1, const sc25519 *s2); + +#endif diff --git a/scp.0 b/scp.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..03157e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/scp.0 @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +SCP(1) General Commands Manual SCP(1) + +NAME + scp M-bM-^@M-^S secure copy (remote file copy program) + +SYNOPSIS + scp [-346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] + [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target + +DESCRIPTION + scp copies files between hosts on a network. It uses ssh(1) for data + transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security + as ssh(1). scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed + for authentication. + + The source and target may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host + with optional path in the form [user@]host:[path], or a URI in the form + scp://[user@]host[:port][/path]. Local file names can be made explicit + using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file names + containing M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y as host specifiers. + + When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a port + may only be specified on the target if the -3 option is used. + + The options are as follows: + + -3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local + host. Without this option the data is copied directly between + the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the + progress meter. + + -4 Forces scp to use IPv4 addresses only. + + -6 Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only. + + -B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or + passphrases). + + -C Compression enable. Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable + compression. + + -c cipher + Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This + option is directly passed to ssh(1). + + -F ssh_config + Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh. + This option is directly passed to ssh(1). + + -i identity_file + Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public + key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to + ssh(1). + + -l limit + Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. + + -o ssh_option + Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in + ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which + there is no separate scp command-line flag. For full details of + the options listed below, and their possible values, see + ssh_config(5). + + AddressFamily + BatchMode + BindAddress + BindInterface + CanonicalDomains + CanonicalizeFallbackLocal + CanonicalizeHostname + CanonicalizeMaxDots + CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs + CASignatureAlgorithms + CertificateFile + ChallengeResponseAuthentication + CheckHostIP + Ciphers + Compression + ConnectionAttempts + ConnectTimeout + ControlMaster + ControlPath + ControlPersist + GlobalKnownHostsFile + GSSAPIAuthentication + GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + HashKnownHosts + Host + HostbasedAuthentication + HostbasedKeyTypes + HostKeyAlgorithms + HostKeyAlias + HostName + IdentitiesOnly + IdentityAgent + IdentityFile + IPQoS + KbdInteractiveAuthentication + KbdInteractiveDevices + KexAlgorithms + LogLevel + MACs + NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost + NumberOfPasswordPrompts + PasswordAuthentication + PKCS11Provider + Port + PreferredAuthentications + ProxyCommand + ProxyJump + PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes + PubkeyAuthentication + RekeyLimit + SendEnv + ServerAliveInterval + ServerAliveCountMax + SetEnv + StrictHostKeyChecking + TCPKeepAlive + UpdateHostKeys + User + UserKnownHostsFile + VerifyHostKeyDNS + + -P port + Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that + this option is written with a capital M-bM-^@M-^XPM-bM-^@M-^Y, because -p is already + reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file. + + -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the + original file. + + -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and + diagnostic messages from ssh(1). + + -r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that scp follows + symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. + + -S program + Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. The program + must understand ssh(1) options. + + -v Verbose mode. Causes scp and ssh(1) to print debugging messages + about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, + authentication, and configuration problems. + +EXIT STATUS + The scp utility exitsM-BM- 0 on success, andM-BM- >0 if an error occurs. + +SEE ALSO + sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), + sshd(8) + +HISTORY + scp is based on the rcp program in BSD source code from the Regents of + the University of California. + +AUTHORS + Timo Rinne + Tatu Ylonen + +OpenBSD 6.4 September 20, 2018 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e5cc1b --- /dev/null +++ b/scp.1 @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +.\" +.\" scp.1 +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo +.\" +.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.81 2018/09/20 06:58:48 jmc Exp $ +.\" +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 20 2018 $ +.Dt SCP 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm scp +.Nd secure copy (remote file copy program) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm scp +.Op Fl 346BCpqrv +.Op Fl c Ar cipher +.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config +.Op Fl i Ar identity_file +.Op Fl l Ar limit +.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option +.Op Fl P Ar port +.Op Fl S Ar program +.Ar source ... target +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +copies files between hosts on a network. +It uses +.Xr ssh 1 +for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the +same security as +.Xr ssh 1 . +.Nm +will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for +authentication. +.Pp +The +.Ar source +and +.Ar target +may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host with optional path +in the form +.Sm off +.Oo user @ Oc host : Op path , +.Sm on +or a URI in the form +.Sm off +.No scp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path . +.Sm on +Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames +to avoid +.Nm +treating file names containing +.Sq :\& +as host specifiers. +.Pp +When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a +.Ar port +may only be specified on the +.Ar target +if the +.Fl 3 +option is used. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl 3 +Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host. +Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote +hosts. +Note that this option disables the progress meter. +.It Fl 4 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv4 addresses only. +.It Fl 6 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv6 addresses only. +.It Fl B +Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases). +.It Fl C +Compression enable. +Passes the +.Fl C +flag to +.Xr ssh 1 +to enable compression. +.It Fl c Ar cipher +Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl F Ar ssh_config +Specifies an alternative +per-user configuration file for +.Nm ssh . +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl i Ar identity_file +Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key +authentication is read. +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl l Ar limit +Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. +.It Fl o Ar ssh_option +Can be used to pass options to +.Nm ssh +in the format used in +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +This is useful for specifying options +for which there is no separate +.Nm scp +command-line flag. +For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact +.It AddressFamily +.It BatchMode +.It BindAddress +.It BindInterface +.It CanonicalDomains +.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal +.It CanonicalizeHostname +.It CanonicalizeMaxDots +.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs +.It CASignatureAlgorithms +.It CertificateFile +.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication +.It CheckHostIP +.It Ciphers +.It Compression +.It ConnectionAttempts +.It ConnectTimeout +.It ControlMaster +.It ControlPath +.It ControlPersist +.It GlobalKnownHostsFile +.It GSSAPIAuthentication +.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials +.It HashKnownHosts +.It Host +.It HostbasedAuthentication +.It HostbasedKeyTypes +.It HostKeyAlgorithms +.It HostKeyAlias +.It HostName +.It IdentitiesOnly +.It IdentityAgent +.It IdentityFile +.It IPQoS +.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication +.It KbdInteractiveDevices +.It KexAlgorithms +.It LogLevel +.It MACs +.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost +.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts +.It PasswordAuthentication +.It PKCS11Provider +.It Port +.It PreferredAuthentications +.It ProxyCommand +.It ProxyJump +.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +.It PubkeyAuthentication +.It RekeyLimit +.It SendEnv +.It ServerAliveInterval +.It ServerAliveCountMax +.It SetEnv +.It StrictHostKeyChecking +.It TCPKeepAlive +.It UpdateHostKeys +.It User +.It UserKnownHostsFile +.It VerifyHostKeyDNS +.El +.It Fl P Ar port +Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. +Note that this option is written with a capital +.Sq P , +because +.Fl p +is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file. +.It Fl p +Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the +original file. +.It Fl q +Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic +messages from +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl r +Recursively copy entire directories. +Note that +.Nm +follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. +.It Fl S Ar program +Name of +.Ar program +to use for the encrypted connection. +The program must understand +.Xr ssh 1 +options. +.It Fl v +Verbose mode. +Causes +.Nm +and +.Xr ssh 1 +to print debugging messages about their progress. +This is helpful in +debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. +.El +.Sh EXIT STATUS +.Ex -std scp +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr sftp 1 , +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr ssh_config 5 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Sh HISTORY +.Nm +is based on the rcp program in +.Bx +source code from the Regents of the University of California. +.Sh AUTHORS +.An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi +.An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60682c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/scp.c @@ -0,0 +1,1425 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.197 2018/06/01 04:31:48 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which + * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). + * + * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to + * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.) + * + * 1995 Timo Rinne , Tatu Ylonen + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Parts from: + * + * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 + * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors + * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software + * without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +#include +#else +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H +# include +# endif +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) +#include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "progressmeter.h" +#include "utf8.h" + +extern char *__progname; + +#define COPY_BUFLEN 16384 + +int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout); +int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout); + +/* Struct for addargs */ +arglist args; +arglist remote_remote_args; + +/* Bandwidth limit */ +long long limit_kbps = 0; +struct bwlimit bwlimit; + +/* Name of current file being transferred. */ +char *curfile; + +/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */ +int verbose_mode = 0; + +/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */ +int showprogress = 1; + +/* + * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped + * through this process. + */ +int throughlocal = 0; + +/* Non-standard port to use for the ssh connection or -1. */ +int sshport = -1; + +/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ +char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; + +/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */ +pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1; + +static void +killchild(int signo) +{ + if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { + kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); + waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); + } + + if (signo) + _exit(1); + exit(1); +} + +static void +suspchild(int signo) +{ + int status; + + if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { + kill(do_cmd_pid, signo); + while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 && + errno == EINTR) + ; + kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); + } +} + +static int +do_local_cmd(arglist *a) +{ + u_int i; + int status; + pid_t pid; + + if (a->num == 0) + fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments"); + + if (verbose_mode) { + fprintf(stderr, "Executing:"); + for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) + fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } + if ((pid = fork()) == -1) + fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (pid == 0) { + execvp(a->list[0], a->list); + perror(a->list[0]); + exit(1); + } + + do_cmd_pid = pid; + signal(SIGTERM, killchild); + signal(SIGINT, killchild); + signal(SIGHUP, killchild); + + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); + + do_cmd_pid = -1; + + if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) + return (-1); + + return (0); +} + +/* + * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the + * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This + * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success. + */ + +int +do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) +{ + int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2]; + + if (verbose_mode) + fmprintf(stderr, + "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", + ssh_program, host, + remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); + + if (port == -1) + port = sshport; + + /* + * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get + * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below. + */ + if (pipe(reserved) < 0) + fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */ + if (pipe(pin) < 0) + fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (pipe(pout) < 0) + fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Free the reserved descriptors. */ + close(reserved[0]); + close(reserved[1]); + + signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); + signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); + signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); + + /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ + do_cmd_pid = fork(); + if (do_cmd_pid == 0) { + /* Child. */ + close(pin[1]); + close(pout[0]); + dup2(pin[0], 0); + dup2(pout[1], 1); + close(pin[0]); + close(pout[1]); + + replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); + if (port != -1) { + addargs(&args, "-p"); + addargs(&args, "%d", port); + } + if (remuser != NULL) { + addargs(&args, "-l"); + addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); + } + addargs(&args, "--"); + addargs(&args, "%s", host); + addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); + + execvp(ssh_program, args.list); + perror(ssh_program); + exit(1); + } else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) { + fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ + close(pin[0]); + *fdout = pin[1]; + close(pout[1]); + *fdin = pout[0]; + signal(SIGTERM, killchild); + signal(SIGINT, killchild); + signal(SIGHUP, killchild); + return 0; +} + +/* + * This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the + * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd(). + * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected. + */ +int +do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout) +{ + pid_t pid; + int status; + + if (verbose_mode) + fmprintf(stderr, + "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", + ssh_program, host, + remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); + + if (port == -1) + port = sshport; + + /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ + pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + dup2(fdin, 0); + dup2(fdout, 1); + + replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); + if (port != -1) { + addargs(&args, "-p"); + addargs(&args, "%d", port); + } + if (remuser != NULL) { + addargs(&args, "-l"); + addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); + } + addargs(&args, "--"); + addargs(&args, "%s", host); + addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); + + execvp(ssh_program, args.list); + perror(ssh_program); + exit(1); + } else if (pid == -1) { + fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; +} + +typedef struct { + size_t cnt; + char *buf; +} BUF; + +BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int); +void lostconn(int); +int okname(char *); +void run_err(const char *,...); +void verifydir(char *); + +struct passwd *pwd; +uid_t userid; +int errs, remin, remout; +int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; + +#define CMDNEEDS 64 +char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ + +int response(void); +void rsource(char *, struct stat *); +void sink(int, char *[]); +void source(int, char *[]); +void tolocal(int, char *[]); +void toremote(int, char *[]); +void usage(void); + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n; + char **newargv; + const char *errstr; + extern char *optarg; + extern int optind; + + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + msetlocale(); + + /* Copy argv, because we modify it */ + newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv)); + for (n = 0; n < argc; n++) + newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]); + argv = newargv; + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + + memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); + memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args)); + args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL; + addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); + addargs(&args, "-x"); + addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no"); + addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no"); + addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); + addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none"); + addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no"); + + fflag = tflag = 0; + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) + switch (ch) { + /* User-visible flags. */ + case '1': + fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); + break; + case '2': + /* Ignored */ + break; + case '4': + case '6': + case 'C': + addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); + addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); + break; + case '3': + throughlocal = 1; + break; + case 'o': + case 'c': + case 'i': + case 'F': + addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); + addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); + addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); + addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); + break; + case 'P': + sshport = a2port(optarg); + if (sshport <= 0) + fatal("bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg); + break; + case 'B': + addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); + addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); + break; + case 'l': + limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, + &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) + usage(); + limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ + bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN); + break; + case 'p': + pflag = 1; + break; + case 'r': + iamrecursive = 1; + break; + case 'S': + ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 'v': + addargs(&args, "-v"); + addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v"); + verbose_mode = 1; + break; + case 'q': + addargs(&args, "-q"); + addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q"); + showprogress = 0; + break; + + /* Server options. */ + case 'd': + targetshouldbedirectory = 1; + break; + case 'f': /* "from" */ + iamremote = 1; + fflag = 1; + break; + case 't': /* "to" */ + iamremote = 1; + tflag = 1; +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + setmode(0, O_BINARY); +#endif + break; + default: + usage(); + } + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + + if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) + fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid); + + if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO)) + showprogress = 0; + + if (pflag) { + /* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */ + } else { + if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec", + NULL) == -1) { + perror("pledge"); + exit(1); + } + } + + remin = STDIN_FILENO; + remout = STDOUT_FILENO; + + if (fflag) { + /* Follow "protocol", send data. */ + (void) response(); + source(argc, argv); + exit(errs != 0); + } + if (tflag) { + /* Receive data. */ + sink(argc, argv); + exit(errs != 0); + } + if (argc < 2) + usage(); + if (argc > 2) + targetshouldbedirectory = 1; + + remin = remout = -1; + do_cmd_pid = -1; + /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ + (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", + verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", + iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", + targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); + + (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); + + if (colon(argv[argc - 1])) /* Dest is remote host. */ + toremote(argc, argv); + else { + if (targetshouldbedirectory) + verifydir(argv[argc - 1]); + tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */ + } + /* + * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked + * and no error has occurred yet + */ + if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) { + if (remin != -1) + (void) close(remin); + if (remout != -1) + (void) close(remout); + if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1) + errs = 1; + else { + if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) + errs = 1; + } + } + exit(errs != 0); +} + +/* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */ +static int +scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s) +{ + off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt; + + *cnt += s; + if (limit_kbps > 0) + bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s); + return 0; +} + +static int +do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb) +{ + /* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */ + char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2]; + + (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n", + (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime), + (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime)); + if (verb) { + fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n", + (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime); + fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf); + } + (void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf)); + return (response()); +} + +static int +parse_scp_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp, + char **pathp) +{ + int r; + + r = parse_uri("scp", uri, userp, hostp, portp, pathp); + if (r == 0 && *pathp == NULL) + *pathp = xstrdup("."); + return r; +} + +void +toremote(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *suser = NULL, *host = NULL, *src = NULL; + char *bp, *tuser, *thost, *targ; + int sport = -1, tport = -1; + arglist alist; + int i, r; + u_int j; + + memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); + alist.list = NULL; + + /* Parse target */ + r = parse_scp_uri(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &tport, &targ); + if (r == -1) { + fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[argc - 1]); + ++errs; + goto out; + } + if (r != 0) { + if (parse_user_host_path(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, + &targ) == -1) { + fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target\n", argv[argc - 1]); + ++errs; + goto out; + } + } + if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) { + ++errs; + goto out; + } + + /* Parse source files */ + for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { + free(suser); + free(host); + free(src); + r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src); + if (r == -1) { + fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]); + ++errs; + continue; + } + if (r != 0) { + parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src); + } + if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) { + ++errs; + continue; + } + if (host && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */ + xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, + *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); + if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) + exit(1); + free(bp); + xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, + *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); + if (do_cmd2(thost, tuser, tport, bp, remin, remout) < 0) + exit(1); + free(bp); + (void) close(remin); + (void) close(remout); + remin = remout = -1; + } else if (host) { /* standard remote to remote */ + if (tport != -1 && tport != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { + /* This would require the remote support URIs */ + fatal("target port not supported with two " + "remote hosts without the -3 option"); + } + + freeargs(&alist); + addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); + addargs(&alist, "-x"); + addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); + addargs(&alist, "-n"); + for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { + addargs(&alist, "%s", + remote_remote_args.list[j]); + } + + if (sport != -1) { + addargs(&alist, "-p"); + addargs(&alist, "%d", sport); + } + if (suser) { + addargs(&alist, "-l"); + addargs(&alist, "%s", suser); + } + addargs(&alist, "--"); + addargs(&alist, "%s", host); + addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd); + addargs(&alist, "%s", src); + addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s", + tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", + thost, targ); + if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0) + errs = 1; + } else { /* local to remote */ + if (remin == -1) { + xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, + *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); + if (do_cmd(thost, tuser, tport, bp, &remin, + &remout) < 0) + exit(1); + if (response() < 0) + exit(1); + free(bp); + } + source(1, argv + i); + } + } +out: + free(tuser); + free(thost); + free(targ); + free(suser); + free(host); + free(src); +} + +void +tolocal(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char *bp, *host = NULL, *src = NULL, *suser = NULL; + arglist alist; + int i, r, sport = -1; + + memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); + alist.list = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { + free(suser); + free(host); + free(src); + r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src); + if (r == -1) { + fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]); + ++errs; + continue; + } + if (r != 0) + parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src); + if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) { + ++errs; + continue; + } + if (!host) { /* Local to local. */ + freeargs(&alist); + addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP); + if (iamrecursive) + addargs(&alist, "-r"); + if (pflag) + addargs(&alist, "-p"); + addargs(&alist, "--"); + addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]); + addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]); + if (do_local_cmd(&alist)) + ++errs; + continue; + } + /* Remote to local. */ + xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", + cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); + if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) { + free(bp); + ++errs; + continue; + } + free(bp); + sink(1, argv + argc - 1); + (void) close(remin); + remin = remout = -1; + } + free(suser); + free(host); + free(src); +} + +void +source(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct stat stb; + static BUF buffer; + BUF *bp; + off_t i, statbytes; + size_t amt, nr; + int fd = -1, haderr, indx; + char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX]; + int len; + + for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { + name = argv[indx]; + statbytes = 0; + len = strlen(name); + while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/') + name[--len] = '\0'; + if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0) + goto syserr; + if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) { + strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL); + name = encname; + } + if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { +syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); + goto next; + } + if (stb.st_size < 0) { + run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size"); + goto next; + } + unset_nonblock(fd); + switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFREG: + break; + case S_IFDIR: + if (iamrecursive) { + rsource(name, &stb); + goto next; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + run_err("%s: not a regular file", name); + goto next; + } + if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL) + last = name; + else + ++last; + curfile = last; + if (pflag) { + if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0) + goto next; + } +#define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", + (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), + (long long)stb.st_size, last); + if (verbose_mode) + fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf); + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); + if (response() < 0) + goto next; + if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { +next: if (fd != -1) { + (void) close(fd); + fd = -1; + } + continue; + } + if (showprogress) + start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes); + set_nonblock(remout); + for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { + amt = bp->cnt; + if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size) + amt = stb.st_size - i; + if (!haderr) { + if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd, + bp->buf, amt)) != amt) { + haderr = errno; + memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr); + } + } + /* Keep writing after error to retain sync */ + if (haderr) { + (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt); + memset(bp->buf, 0, amt); + continue; + } + if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio, + &statbytes) != amt) + haderr = errno; + } + unset_nonblock(remout); + + if (fd != -1) { + if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr) + haderr = errno; + fd = -1; + } + if (!haderr) + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + else + run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr)); + (void) response(); + if (showprogress) + stop_progress_meter(); + } +} + +void +rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) +{ + DIR *dirp; + struct dirent *dp; + char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX]; + + if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) { + run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); + return; + } + last = strrchr(name, '/'); + if (last == NULL) + last = name; + else + last++; + if (pflag) { + if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) { + closedir(dirp); + return; + } + } + (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n", + (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last); + if (verbose_mode) + fmprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path); + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path)); + if (response() < 0) { + closedir(dirp); + return; + } + while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { + if (dp->d_ino == 0) + continue; + if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, "..")) + continue; + if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) { + run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name); + continue; + } + (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name); + vect[0] = path; + source(1, vect); + } + (void) closedir(dirp); + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2); + (void) response(); +} + +#define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \ + ((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \ + (sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \ + (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8)) + +void +sink(int argc, char **argv) +{ + static BUF buffer; + struct stat stb; + enum { + YES, NO, DISPLAYED + } wrerr; + BUF *bp; + off_t i; + size_t j, count; + int amt, exists, first, ofd; + mode_t mode, omode, mask; + off_t size, statbytes; + unsigned long long ull; + int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; + char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048]; + struct timeval tv[2]; + +#define atime tv[0] +#define mtime tv[1] +#define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } + + if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0)) + SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size"); + + setimes = targisdir = 0; + mask = umask(0); + if (!pflag) + (void) umask(mask); + if (argc != 1) { + run_err("ambiguous target"); + exit(1); + } + targ = *argv; + if (targetshouldbedirectory) + verifydir(targ); + + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) + targisdir = 1; + for (first = 1;; first = 0) { + cp = buf; + if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) + return; + if (*cp++ == '\n') + SCREWUP("unexpected "); + do { + if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) + SCREWUP("lost connection"); + *cp++ = ch; + } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); + *cp = 0; + if (verbose_mode) + fmprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf); + + if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') { + if (iamremote == 0) { + (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf), + NULL, "%s", buf + 1); + (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, + visbuf, strlen(visbuf)); + } + if (buf[0] == '\02') + exit(1); + ++errs; + continue; + } + if (buf[0] == 'E') { + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + return; + } + if (ch == '\n') + *--cp = 0; + + cp = buf; + if (*cp == 'T') { + setimes++; + cp++; + if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) + SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present"); + ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); + if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) + setimes = 0; /* out of range */ + mtime.tv_sec = ull; + mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 || + mtime.tv_usec > 999999) + SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited"); + if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) + SCREWUP("atime.sec not present"); + ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); + if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull)) + setimes = 0; /* out of range */ + atime.tv_sec = ull; + atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 || + atime.tv_usec > 999999) + SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + continue; + } + if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { + /* + * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". + * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned + * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is + * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't + * followed. + */ + if (first) { + run_err("%s", cp); + exit(1); + } + SCREWUP("expected control record"); + } + mode = 0; + for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { + if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') + SCREWUP("bad mode"); + mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0'); + } + if (!pflag) + mode &= ~mask; + if (*cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); + + if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) + SCREWUP("size not present"); + ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); + if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') + SCREWUP("size not delimited"); + if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull)) + SCREWUP("size out of range"); + size = (off_t)ull; + + if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) { + run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); + exit(1); + } + if (targisdir) { + static char *namebuf; + static size_t cursize; + size_t need; + + need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250; + if (need > cursize) { + free(namebuf); + namebuf = xmalloc(need); + cursize = need; + } + (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ, + strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp); + np = namebuf; + } else + np = targ; + curfile = cp; + exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0; + if (buf[0] == 'D') { + int mod_flag = pflag; + if (!iamrecursive) + SCREWUP("received directory without -r"); + if (exists) { + if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) { + errno = ENOTDIR; + goto bad; + } + if (pflag) + (void) chmod(np, mode); + } else { + /* Handle copying from a read-only + directory */ + mod_flag = 1; + if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0) + goto bad; + } + vect[0] = xstrdup(np); + sink(1, vect); + if (setimes) { + setimes = 0; + if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0) + run_err("%s: set times: %s", + vect[0], strerror(errno)); + } + if (mod_flag) + (void) chmod(vect[0], mode); + free(vect[0]); + continue; + } + omode = mode; + mode |= S_IWUSR; + if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) { +bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { + (void) close(ofd); + continue; + } + cp = bp->buf; + wrerr = NO; + + statbytes = 0; + if (showprogress) + start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes); + set_nonblock(remin); + for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) { + amt = bp->cnt; + if (i + amt > size) + amt = size - i; + count += amt; + do { + j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt, + scpio, &statbytes); + if (j == 0) { + run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ? + strerror(errno) : + "dropped connection"); + exit(1); + } + amt -= j; + cp += j; + } while (amt > 0); + + if (count == bp->cnt) { + /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */ + if (wrerr == NO) { + if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, + count) != count) { + wrerr = YES; + wrerrno = errno; + } + } + count = 0; + cp = bp->buf; + } + } + unset_nonblock(remin); + if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO && + atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { + wrerr = YES; + wrerrno = errno; + } + if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) && + ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) { + run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); + wrerr = DISPLAYED; + } + if (pflag) { + if (exists || omode != mode) +#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD + if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) { +#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + if (chmod(np, omode)) { +#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + run_err("%s: set mode: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + wrerr = DISPLAYED; + } + } else { + if (!exists && omode != mode) +#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD + if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) { +#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) { +#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + run_err("%s: set mode: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + wrerr = DISPLAYED; + } + } + if (close(ofd) == -1) { + wrerr = YES; + wrerrno = errno; + } + (void) response(); + if (showprogress) + stop_progress_meter(); + if (setimes && wrerr == NO) { + setimes = 0; + if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) { + run_err("%s: set times: %s", + np, strerror(errno)); + wrerr = DISPLAYED; + } + } + switch (wrerr) { + case YES: + run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno)); + break; + case NO: + (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); + break; + case DISPLAYED: + break; + } + } +screwup: + run_err("protocol error: %s", why); + exit(1); +} + +int +response(void) +{ + char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048], visbuf[2048]; + + if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp)) + lostconn(0); + + cp = rbuf; + switch (resp) { + case 0: /* ok */ + return (0); + default: + *cp++ = resp; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */ + case 2: /* fatal error, "" */ + do { + if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) + lostconn(0); + *cp++ = ch; + } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); + + if (!iamremote) { + cp[-1] = '\0'; + (void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf), + NULL, "%s\n", rbuf); + (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, + visbuf, strlen(visbuf)); + } + ++errs; + if (resp == 1) + return (-1); + exit(1); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +void +usage(void) +{ + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "usage: scp [-346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" + " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n"); + exit(1); +} + +void +run_err(const char *fmt,...) +{ + static FILE *fp; + va_list ap; + + ++errs; + if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) { + (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01); + (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: "); + va_start(ap, fmt); + (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + (void) fprintf(fp, "\n"); + (void) fflush(fp); + } + + if (!iamremote) { + va_start(ap, fmt); + vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } +} + +void +verifydir(char *cp) +{ + struct stat stb; + + if (!stat(cp, &stb)) { + if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) + return; + errno = ENOTDIR; + } + run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno)); + killchild(0); +} + +int +okname(char *cp0) +{ + int c; + char *cp; + + cp = cp0; + do { + c = (int)*cp; + if (c & 0200) + goto bad; + if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) { + switch (c) { + case '\'': + case '"': + case '`': + case ' ': + case '#': + goto bad; + default: + break; + } + } + } while (*++cp); + return (1); + +bad: fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0); + return (0); +} + +BUF * +allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize) +{ + size_t size; +#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE + struct stat stb; + + if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { + run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno)); + return (0); + } + size = ROUNDUP(stb.st_blksize, blksize); + if (size == 0) + size = blksize; +#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ + size = blksize; +#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ + if (bp->cnt >= size) + return (bp); + bp->buf = xrecallocarray(bp->buf, bp->cnt, size, 1); + bp->cnt = size; + return (bp); +} + +void +lostconn(int signo) +{ + if (!iamremote) + (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16); + if (signo) + _exit(1); + else + exit(1); +} diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..932d363 --- /dev/null +++ b/servconf.c @@ -0,0 +1,2690 @@ + +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.342 2018/09/20 23:40:16 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "groupaccess.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "digest.h" + +static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, + const char *, int); +static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, + const char *, int); + +/* Use of privilege separation or not */ +extern int use_privsep; +extern struct sshbuf *cfg; + +/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */ + +void +initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) +{ + memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options)); + + /* Portable-specific options */ + options->use_pam = -1; + + /* Standard Options */ + options->num_ports = 0; + options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; + options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; + options->num_queued_listens = 0; + options->listen_addrs = NULL; + options->num_listen_addrs = 0; + options->address_family = -1; + options->routing_domain = NULL; + options->num_host_key_files = 0; + options->num_host_cert_files = 0; + options->host_key_agent = NULL; + options->pid_file = NULL; + options->login_grace_time = -1; + options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET; + options->ignore_rhosts = -1; + options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1; + options->print_motd = -1; + options->print_lastlog = -1; + options->x11_forwarding = -1; + options->x11_display_offset = -1; + options->x11_use_localhost = -1; + options->permit_tty = -1; + options->permit_user_rc = -1; + options->xauth_location = NULL; + options->strict_modes = -1; + options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; + options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; + options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; + options->hostbased_authentication = -1; + options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1; + options->hostbased_key_types = NULL; + options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->pubkey_key_types = NULL; + options->kerberos_authentication = -1; + options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; + options->gss_authentication=-1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; + options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; + options->permit_user_env = -1; + options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL; + options->compression = -1; + options->rekey_limit = -1; + options->rekey_interval = -1; + options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1; + options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1; + options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1; + options->num_allow_users = 0; + options->num_deny_users = 0; + options->num_allow_groups = 0; + options->num_deny_groups = 0; + options->ciphers = NULL; + options->macs = NULL; + options->kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL; + options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; + options->num_subsystems = 0; + options->max_startups_begin = -1; + options->max_startups_rate = -1; + options->max_startups = -1; + options->max_authtries = -1; + options->max_sessions = -1; + options->banner = NULL; + options->use_dns = -1; + options->client_alive_interval = -1; + options->client_alive_count_max = -1; + options->num_authkeys_files = 0; + options->num_accept_env = 0; + options->num_setenv = 0; + options->permit_tun = -1; + options->permitted_opens = NULL; + options->permitted_listens = NULL; + options->adm_forced_command = NULL; + options->chroot_directory = NULL; + options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; + options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL; + options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; + options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; + options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; + options->authorized_principals_command = NULL; + options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL; + options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; + options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; + options->version_addendum = NULL; + options->fingerprint_hash = -1; + options->disable_forwarding = -1; + options->expose_userauth_info = -1; +} + +/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ +static int +option_clear_or_none(const char *o) +{ + return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; +} + +static void +assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o) +{ + char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig; + int r; + + all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0); + all_mac = mac_alg_list(','); + all_kex = kex_alg_list(','); + all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); + all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ','); +#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \ + do { \ + if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \ + } while (0) + ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher); + ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac); + ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex); + ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); + ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); + ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key); + ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig); +#undef ASSEMBLE + free(all_cipher); + free(all_mac); + free(all_kex); + free(all_key); + free(all_sig); +} + +static void +array_append(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive, + char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s) +{ + + if (*lp >= INT_MAX) + fatal("%s line %d: Too many %s entries", file, line, directive); + + *array = xrecallocarray(*array, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**array)); + (*array)[*lp] = xstrdup(s); + (*lp)++; +} + +void +servconf_add_hostkey(const char *file, const int line, + ServerOptions *options, const char *path) +{ + char *apath = derelativise_path(path); + + array_append(file, line, "HostKey", + &options->host_key_files, &options->num_host_key_files, apath); + free(apath); +} + +void +servconf_add_hostcert(const char *file, const int line, + ServerOptions *options, const char *path) +{ + char *apath = derelativise_path(path); + + array_append(file, line, "HostCertificate", + &options->host_cert_files, &options->num_host_cert_files, apath); + free(apath); +} + +void +fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) +{ + u_int i; + + /* Portable-specific options */ + if (options->use_pam == -1) + options->use_pam = 0; + + /* Standard Options */ + if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { + /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ + servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options, + _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options, + _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE); +#endif + servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options, + _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE); +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options, + _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE); +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + } + /* No certificates by default */ + if (options->num_ports == 0) + options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + if (options->address_family == -1) + options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; + if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) + add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0); + if (options->pid_file == NULL) + options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE); + if (options->login_grace_time == -1) + options->login_grace_time = 120; + if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) + options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD; + if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) + options->ignore_rhosts = 1; + if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) + options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0; + if (options->print_motd == -1) + options->print_motd = 1; + if (options->print_lastlog == -1) + options->print_lastlog = 1; + if (options->x11_forwarding == -1) + options->x11_forwarding = 0; + if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) + options->x11_display_offset = 10; + if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1) + options->x11_use_localhost = 1; + if (options->xauth_location == NULL) + options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH); + if (options->permit_tty == -1) + options->permit_tty = 1; + if (options->permit_user_rc == -1) + options->permit_user_rc = 1; + if (options->strict_modes == -1) + options->strict_modes = 1; + if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) + options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; + if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) + options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; + if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) + options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) + options->hostbased_authentication = 0; + if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1) + options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0; + if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) + options->pubkey_authentication = 1; + if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1) + options->kerberos_authentication = 0; + if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1) + options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1; + if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1) + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; + if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; + if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) + options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; + if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) + options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; + if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; + if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) + options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; + if (options->permit_user_env == -1) { + options->permit_user_env = 0; + options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL; + } + if (options->compression == -1) + options->compression = COMP_DELAYED; + if (options->rekey_limit == -1) + options->rekey_limit = 0; + if (options->rekey_interval == -1) + options->rekey_interval = 0; + if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1) + options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; + if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1) + options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; + if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1) + options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1; + if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) + options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; + if (options->max_startups == -1) + options->max_startups = 100; + if (options->max_startups_rate == -1) + options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */ + if (options->max_startups_begin == -1) + options->max_startups_begin = 10; + if (options->max_authtries == -1) + options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX; + if (options->max_sessions == -1) + options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX; + if (options->use_dns == -1) + options->use_dns = 0; + if (options->client_alive_interval == -1) + options->client_alive_interval = 0; + if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1) + options->client_alive_count_max = 3; + if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { + array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles", + &options->authorized_keys_files, + &options->num_authkeys_files, + _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS); + array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles", + &options->authorized_keys_files, + &options->num_authkeys_files, + _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2); + } + if (options->permit_tun == -1) + options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; + if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) + options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21; + if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) + options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1; + if (options->version_addendum == NULL) + options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); + if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; + if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; + if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) + options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; + if (options->disable_forwarding == -1) + options->disable_forwarding = 0; + if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1) + options->expose_userauth_info = 0; + + assemble_algorithms(options); + + /* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */ + if (use_privsep == -1) + use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON; + +#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ + do { \ + if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ + free(v); \ + v = NULL; \ + } \ + } while(0) + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain); + for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++) + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]); + for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++) + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]); +#undef CLEAR_ON_NONE + + /* Similar handling for AuthenticationMethods=any */ + if (options->num_auth_methods == 1 && + strcmp(options->auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) { + free(options->auth_methods[0]); + options->auth_methods[0] = NULL; + options->num_auth_methods = 0; + } + +#ifndef HAVE_MMAP + if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) { + error("This platform does not support both privilege " + "separation and compression"); + error("Compression disabled"); + options->compression = 0; + } +#endif + +} + +/* Keyword tokens. */ +typedef enum { + sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ + /* Portable-specific options */ + sUsePAM, + /* Standard Options */ + sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime, + sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, + sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, + sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, + sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, + sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, + sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, + sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, + sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, + sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, + sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, + sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, + sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile, + sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, + sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, + sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, + sHostKeyAlgorithms, + sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, + sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, + sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, + sHostCertificate, + sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, + sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, + sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, + sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, + sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, + sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, + sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding, + sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, + sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported +} ServerOpCodes; + +#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */ +#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */ +#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH) + +/* Textual representation of the tokens. */ +static struct { + const char *name; + ServerOpCodes opcode; + u_int flags; +} keywords[] = { + /* Portable-specific options */ +#ifdef USE_PAM + { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#else + { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#endif + { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + /* Standard Options */ + { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ + { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "serverkeybits", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "keyregenerationinterval", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "rsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ +#ifdef KRB5 + { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#ifdef USE_AFS + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#else + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#endif +#else + { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#endif + { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#ifdef GSSAPI + { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#endif + { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "skeyauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG + { "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#else + { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +#endif + { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */ + { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "protocol", sIgnore, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, + { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "setenv", sSetEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } +}; + +static struct { + int val; + char *text; +} tunmode_desc[] = { + { SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" }, + { SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" }, + { SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" }, + { SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" }, + { -1, NULL } +}; + +/* Returns an opcode name from its number */ + +static const char * +lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) + if (keywords[i].opcode == code) + return(keywords[i].name); + return "UNKNOWN"; +} + + +/* + * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption. + */ + +static ServerOpCodes +parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, + int linenum, u_int *flags) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) + if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) { + *flags = keywords[i].flags; + return keywords[i].opcode; + } + + error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", + filename, linenum, cp); + return sBadOption; +} + +char * +derelativise_path(const char *path) +{ + char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX]; + + if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0) + return xstrdup("none"); + expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid()); + if (*expanded == '/') + return expanded; + if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded); + free(expanded); + return ret; +} + +static void +add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, + const char *rdomain, int port) +{ + u_int i; + + if (port > 0) + add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, port); + else { + for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) { + add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, + options->ports[i]); + } + } +} + +static void +add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, + const char *rdomain, int port) +{ + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int gaierr; + u_int i; + + /* Find listen_addrs entry for this rdomain */ + for (i = 0; i < options->num_listen_addrs; i++) { + if (rdomain == NULL && options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL) + break; + if (rdomain == NULL || options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL) + continue; + if (strcmp(rdomain, options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain) == 0) + break; + } + if (i >= options->num_listen_addrs) { + /* No entry for this rdomain; allocate one */ + if (i >= INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: too many listen addresses", __func__); + options->listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(options->listen_addrs, + options->num_listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs + 1, + sizeof(*options->listen_addrs)); + i = options->num_listen_addrs++; + if (rdomain != NULL) + options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain = xstrdup(rdomain); + } + /* options->listen_addrs[i] points to the addresses for this rdomain */ + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = options->address_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) + fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)", + addr ? addr : "", + ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); + for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next) + ; + ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs[i].addrs; + options->listen_addrs[i].addrs = aitop; +} + +/* Returns nonzero if the routing domain name is valid */ +static int +valid_rdomain(const char *name) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN) + return sys_valid_rdomain(name); +#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) + const char *errstr; + long long num; + struct rt_tableinfo info; + int mib[6]; + size_t miblen = sizeof(mib); + + if (name == NULL) + return 1; + + num = strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) + return 0; + + /* Check whether the table actually exists */ + memset(mib, 0, sizeof(mib)); + mib[0] = CTL_NET; + mib[1] = PF_ROUTE; + mib[4] = NET_RT_TABLE; + mib[5] = (int)num; + if (sysctl(mib, 6, &info, &miblen, NULL, 0) == -1) + return 0; + + return 1; +#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ + error("Routing domains are not supported on this platform"); + return 0; +#endif +} + +/* + * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports + * and AddressFamily options. + */ +static void +queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr, + const char *rdomain, int port) +{ + struct queued_listenaddr *qla; + + options->queued_listen_addrs = xrecallocarray( + options->queued_listen_addrs, + options->num_queued_listens, options->num_queued_listens + 1, + sizeof(*options->queued_listen_addrs)); + qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens++]; + qla->addr = xstrdup(addr); + qla->port = port; + qla->rdomain = rdomain == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(rdomain); +} + +/* + * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries. + */ +static void +process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options) +{ + u_int i; + struct queued_listenaddr *qla; + + if (options->num_ports == 0) + options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + if (options->address_family == -1) + options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; + + for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) { + qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[i]; + add_listen_addr(options, qla->addr, qla->rdomain, qla->port); + free(qla->addr); + free(qla->rdomain); + } + free(options->queued_listen_addrs); + options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; + options->num_queued_listens = 0; +} + +/* + * Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding + * direction (local/remote). + */ +static void +process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOpCodes opcode, + char **opens, u_int num_opens) +{ + u_int i; + int port; + char *host, *arg, *oarg; + int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE; + const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode); + + channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where); + if (num_opens == 0) + return; /* permit any */ + + /* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */ + if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0) + return; + if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) { + channel_disable_admin(ssh, where); + return; + } + /* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */ + for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) { + oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]); + host = hpdelim(&arg); + if (host == NULL) + fatal("%s: missing host in %s", __func__, what); + host = cleanhostname(host); + if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) + fatal("%s: bad port number in %s", __func__, what); + /* Send it to channels layer */ + channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, + where, host, port); + free(oarg); + } +} + +/* + * Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration. + */ +void +process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options) +{ + process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitOpen, + options->permitted_opens, options->num_permitted_opens); + process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitListen, + options->permitted_listens, + options->num_permitted_listens); +} + +struct connection_info * +get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + static struct connection_info ci; + + if (!populate) + return &ci; + ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns); + ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh); + ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh); + ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh); + return &ci; +} + +/* + * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice. + * + * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the + * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a + * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are + * checked for syntax only. + * + * The second time is after a connection has been established but before + * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives + * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a + * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives + * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any + * options set are copied into the main server config. + * + * Potential additions/improvements: + * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg. Ciphers. + * + * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg: + * Match Address 192.168.0.* + * Tag trusted + * Match Group wheel + * Tag trusted + * Match Tag trusted + * AllowTcpForwarding yes + * GatewayPorts clientspecified + * [...] + * + * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive + * Match Group shell + * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip + */ + +static int +match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user) +{ + int result = 0; + struct passwd *pw; + + if (user == NULL) + goto out; + + if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { + debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does " + "not exist", line, user); + } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { + debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group " + "at line %d", user, line); + } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) { + debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d", + user, grps, line); + } else { + debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user, + grps, line); + result = 1; + } +out: + ga_free(); + return result; +} + +static void +match_test_missing_fatal(const char *criteria, const char *attrib) +{ + fatal("'Match %s' in configuration but '%s' not in connection " + "test specification.", criteria, attrib); +} + +/* + * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need + * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does + * not match. + */ +static int +match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) +{ + int result = 1, attributes = 0, port; + char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition; + + if (ci == NULL) + debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp); + else + debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s " + "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)", + ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)", + ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)", + ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport); + + while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { + attributes++; + if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { + if (attributes != 1 || + ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { + error("'all' cannot be combined with other " + "Match attributes"); + return -1; + } + *condition = cp; + return 1; + } + if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { + error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); + return -1; + } + if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { + if (ci == NULL) { + result = 0; + continue; + } + if (ci->user == NULL) + match_test_missing_fatal("User", "user"); + if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, 0) != 1) + result = 0; + else + debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at " + "line %d", ci->user, arg, line); + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) { + if (ci == NULL) { + result = 0; + continue; + } + if (ci->user == NULL) + match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user"); + switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) { + case -1: + return -1; + case 0: + result = 0; + } + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { + if (ci == NULL) { + result = 0; + continue; + } + if (ci->host == NULL) + match_test_missing_fatal("Host", "host"); + if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1) + result = 0; + else + debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host " + "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line); + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) { + if (ci == NULL) { + result = 0; + continue; + } + if (ci->address == NULL) + match_test_missing_fatal("Address", "addr"); + switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) { + case 1: + debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address " + "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line); + break; + case 0: + case -1: + result = 0; + break; + case -2: + return -1; + } + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){ + if (ci == NULL) { + result = 0; + continue; + } + if (ci->laddress == NULL) + match_test_missing_fatal("LocalAddress", + "laddr"); + switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) { + case 1: + debug("connection from %.100s matched " + "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d", + ci->laddress, arg, line); + break; + case 0: + case -1: + result = 0; + break; + case -2: + return -1; + } + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) { + if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) { + error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line", + arg); + return -1; + } + if (ci == NULL) { + result = 0; + continue; + } + if (ci->lport == 0) + match_test_missing_fatal("LocalPort", "lport"); + /* TODO support port lists */ + if (port == ci->lport) + debug("connection from %.100s matched " + "'LocalPort %d' at line %d", + ci->laddress, port, line); + else + result = 0; + } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) { + if (ci == NULL || ci->rdomain == NULL) { + result = 0; + continue; + } + if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1) + result = 0; + else + debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at " + "line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line); + } else { + error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); + return -1; + } + } + if (attributes == 0) { + error("One or more attributes required for Match"); + return -1; + } + if (ci != NULL) + debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); + *condition = cp; + return result; +} + +#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" + +/* Multistate option parsing */ +struct multistate { + char *key; + int value; +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { + { "yes", 1 }, + { "no", 0 }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { + { "inet", AF_INET }, + { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, + { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = { + { "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, + { "prohibit-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, + { "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY }, + { "yes", PERMIT_YES }, + { "no", PERMIT_NO }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { + { "yes", COMP_DELAYED }, + { "delayed", COMP_DELAYED }, + { "no", COMP_NONE }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = { + { "clientspecified", 2 }, + { "yes", 1 }, + { "no", 0 }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; +static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = { + { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW }, + { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW }, + { "no", FORWARD_DENY }, + { "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE }, + { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; + +int +process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, + const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, + struct connection_info *connectinfo) +{ + char *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p; + int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port; + SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; + LogLevel *log_level_ptr; + ServerOpCodes opcode; + u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, flags = 0; + size_t len; + long long val64; + const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; + const char *errstr; + + /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ + if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) + return 0; + for (len--; len > 0; len--) { + if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) + break; + line[len] = '\0'; + } + + cp = line; + if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) + return 0; + /* Ignore leading whitespace */ + if (*arg == '\0') + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') + return 0; + intptr = NULL; + charptr = NULL; + opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags); + + if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ + cmdline = 1; + activep = &cmdline; + } + if (*activep && opcode != sMatch) + debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp); + if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) { + if (connectinfo == NULL) { + fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed " + "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg); + } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */ + while (arg) + arg = strdelim(&cp); + return 0; + } + } + + switch (opcode) { + /* Portable-specific options */ + case sUsePAM: + intptr = &options->use_pam; + goto parse_flag; + + /* Standard Options */ + case sBadOption: + return -1; + case sPort: + /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ + if (options->ports_from_cmdline) + return 0; + if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) + fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.", + filename, linenum); + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.", + filename, linenum); + options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg); + if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0) + fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.", + filename, linenum); + break; + + case sLoginGraceTime: + intptr = &options->login_grace_time; + parse_time: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", + filename, linenum); + if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case sListenAddress: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing address", + filename, linenum); + /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */ + if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL + && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) { + port = 0; + p = arg; + } else { + p = hpdelim(&arg); + if (p == NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage", + filename, linenum); + p = cleanhostname(p); + if (arg == NULL) + port = 0; + else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0) + fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", + filename, linenum); + } + /* Optional routing table */ + arg2 = NULL; + if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL) { + if (strcmp(arg, "rdomain") != 0 || + (arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: bad ListenAddress syntax", + filename, linenum); + if (!valid_rdomain(arg2)) + fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain", + filename, linenum); + } + + queue_listen_addr(options, p, arg2, port); + + break; + + case sAddressFamily: + intptr = &options->address_family; + multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; + parse_multistate: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + value = -1; + for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { + if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { + value = multistate_ptr[i].value; + break; + } + } + if (value == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", + filename, linenum, arg); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case sHostKeyFile: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep) + servconf_add_hostkey(filename, linenum, options, arg); + break; + + case sHostKeyAgent: + charptr = &options->host_key_agent; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ? + xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); + break; + + case sHostCertificate: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep) + servconf_add_hostcert(filename, linenum, options, arg); + break; + + case sPidFile: + charptr = &options->pid_file; + parse_filename: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { + *charptr = derelativise_path(arg); + /* increase optional counter */ + if (intptr != NULL) + *intptr = *intptr + 1; + } + break; + + case sPermitRootLogin: + intptr = &options->permit_root_login; + multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin; + goto parse_multistate; + + case sIgnoreRhosts: + intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts; + parse_flag: + multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; + goto parse_multistate; + + case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts: + intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts; + goto parse_flag; + + case sHostbasedAuthentication: + intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly: + intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; + goto parse_flag; + + case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes: + charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types; + parse_keytypes: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*arg != '-' && + !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sHostKeyAlgorithms: + charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; + goto parse_keytypes; + + case sCASignatureAlgorithms: + charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms; + goto parse_keytypes; + + case sPubkeyAuthentication: + intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes: + charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types; + goto parse_keytypes; + + case sKerberosAuthentication: + intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd: + intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd; + goto parse_flag; + + case sKerberosTicketCleanup: + intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup; + goto parse_flag; + + case sKerberosGetAFSToken: + intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; + goto parse_flag; + + case sGssAuthentication: + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sGssCleanupCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; + goto parse_flag; + + case sGssStrictAcceptor: + intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; + goto parse_flag; + + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication: + intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sChallengeResponseAuthentication: + intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + + case sPrintMotd: + intptr = &options->print_motd; + goto parse_flag; + + case sPrintLastLog: + intptr = &options->print_lastlog; + goto parse_flag; + + case sX11Forwarding: + intptr = &options->x11_forwarding; + goto parse_flag; + + case sX11DisplayOffset: + intptr = &options->x11_display_offset; + parse_int: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.", + filename, linenum, errstr); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case sX11UseLocalhost: + intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost; + goto parse_flag; + + case sXAuthLocation: + charptr = &options->xauth_location; + goto parse_filename; + + case sPermitTTY: + intptr = &options->permit_tty; + goto parse_flag; + + case sPermitUserRC: + intptr = &options->permit_user_rc; + goto parse_flag; + + case sStrictModes: + intptr = &options->strict_modes; + goto parse_flag; + + case sTCPKeepAlive: + intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; + goto parse_flag; + + case sEmptyPasswd: + intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd; + goto parse_flag; + + case sPermitUserEnvironment: + intptr = &options->permit_user_env; + charptr = &options->permit_user_env_whitelist; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + value = 0; + p = NULL; + if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0) + value = 1; + else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0) + value = 0; + else { + /* Pattern-list specified */ + value = 1; + p = xstrdup(arg); + } + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { + *intptr = value; + *charptr = p; + p = NULL; + } + free(p); + break; + + case sCompression: + intptr = &options->compression; + multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; + goto parse_multistate; + + case sRekeyLimit: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { + val64 = 0; + } else { + if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", + filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); + if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) + fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", + filename, linenum); + } + if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) + options->rekey_limit = val64; + if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ + if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) { + (void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */ + break; + } + intptr = &options->rekey_interval; + goto parse_time; + } + break; + + case sGatewayPorts: + intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; + multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports; + goto parse_multistate; + + case sUseDNS: + intptr = &options->use_dns; + goto parse_flag; + + case sLogFacility: + log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + value = log_facility_number(arg); + if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) + fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) + *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; + break; + + case sLogLevel: + log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + value = log_level_number(arg); + if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) + fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == -1) + *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; + break; + + case sAllowTcpForwarding: + intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding; + multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; + goto parse_multistate; + + case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: + intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding; + multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; + goto parse_multistate; + + case sAllowAgentForwarding: + intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding; + goto parse_flag; + + case sDisableForwarding: + intptr = &options->disable_forwarding; + goto parse_flag; + + case sAllowUsers: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: invalid AllowUsers pattern: " + "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg); + if (!*activep) + continue; + array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowUsers", + &options->allow_users, &options->num_allow_users, + arg); + } + break; + + case sDenyUsers: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: invalid DenyUsers pattern: " + "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg); + if (!*activep) + continue; + array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyUsers", + &options->deny_users, &options->num_deny_users, + arg); + } + break; + + case sAllowGroups: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (!*activep) + continue; + array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowGroups", + &options->allow_groups, &options->num_allow_groups, + arg); + } + break; + + case sDenyGroups: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (!*activep) + continue; + array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyGroups", + &options->deny_groups, &options->num_deny_groups, + arg); + } + break; + + case sCiphers: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (options->ciphers == NULL) + options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sMacs: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (options->macs == NULL) + options->macs = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sKexAlgorithms: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*arg != '-' && + !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", + filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); + if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) + options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sSubsystem: + if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) { + fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.", + filename, linenum); + } + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", + filename, linenum); + if (!*activep) { + arg = strdelim(&cp); + break; + } + for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) + if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) + fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.", + filename, linenum, arg); + options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.", + filename, linenum); + options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); + + /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */ + p = xstrdup(arg); + len = strlen(p) + 1; + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { + len += 1 + strlen(arg); + p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len); + strlcat(p, " ", len); + strlcat(p, arg, len); + } + options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p; + options->num_subsystems++; + break; + + case sMaxStartups: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.", + filename, linenum); + if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d", + &options->max_startups_begin, + &options->max_startups_rate, + &options->max_startups)) == 3) { + if (options->max_startups_begin > + options->max_startups || + options->max_startups_rate > 100 || + options->max_startups_rate < 1) + fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", + filename, linenum); + } else if (n != 1) + fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", + filename, linenum); + else + options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin; + break; + + case sMaxAuthTries: + intptr = &options->max_authtries; + goto parse_int; + + case sMaxSessions: + intptr = &options->max_sessions; + goto parse_int; + + case sBanner: + charptr = &options->banner; + goto parse_filename; + + /* + * These options can contain %X options expanded at + * connect time, so that you can specify paths like: + * + * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u + */ + case sAuthorizedKeysFile: + if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + arg = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); + array_append(filename, linenum, + "AuthorizedKeysFile", + &options->authorized_keys_files, + &options->num_authkeys_files, arg); + free(arg); + } + } + return 0; + + case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile: + charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { + *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); + /* increase optional counter */ + if (intptr != NULL) + *intptr = *intptr + 1; + } + break; + + case sClientAliveInterval: + intptr = &options->client_alive_interval; + goto parse_time; + + case sClientAliveCountMax: + intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max; + goto parse_int; + + case sAcceptEnv: + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", + filename, linenum); + if (!*activep) + continue; + array_append(filename, linenum, "AcceptEnv", + &options->accept_env, &options->num_accept_env, + arg); + } + break; + + case sSetEnv: + uvalue = options->num_setenv; + while ((arg = strdelimw(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) + fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment.", + filename, linenum); + if (!*activep || uvalue != 0) + continue; + array_append(filename, linenum, "SetEnv", + &options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg); + } + break; + + case sPermitTunnel: + intptr = &options->permit_tun; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/" + "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum); + value = -1; + for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) + if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) { + value = tunmode_desc[i].val; + break; + } + if (value == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/" + "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) + *intptr = value; + break; + + case sMatch: + if (cmdline) + fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line " + "option"); + value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo); + if (value < 0) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, + linenum); + *activep = value; + break; + + case sPermitListen: + case sPermitOpen: + if (opcode == sPermitListen) { + uintptr = &options->num_permitted_listens; + chararrayptr = &options->permitted_listens; + } else { + uintptr = &options->num_permitted_opens; + chararrayptr = &options->permitted_opens; + } + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing %s specification", + filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); + uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */ + if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { + if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { + *uintptr = 1; + *chararrayptr = xcalloc(1, + sizeof(**chararrayptr)); + (*chararrayptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg); + } + break; + } + for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) { + if (opcode == sPermitListen && + strchr(arg, ':') == NULL) { + /* + * Allow bare port number for PermitListen + * to indicate a wildcard listen host. + */ + xasprintf(&arg2, "*:%s", arg); + } else { + arg2 = xstrdup(arg); + p = hpdelim(&arg); + if (p == NULL) { + fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s", + filename, linenum, + lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); + } + p = cleanhostname(p); + } + if (arg == NULL || + ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) { + fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in %s", + filename, linenum, + lookup_opcode_name(opcode)); + } + if (*activep && uvalue == 0) { + array_append(filename, linenum, + lookup_opcode_name(opcode), + chararrayptr, uintptr, arg2); + } + free(arg2); + } + break; + + case sForceCommand: + if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL) + options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len); + return 0; + + case sChrootDirectory: + charptr = &options->chroot_directory; + + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sTrustedUserCAKeys: + charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys; + goto parse_filename; + + case sRevokedKeys: + charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file; + goto parse_filename; + + case sIPQoS: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", + filename, linenum, arg); + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (arg == NULL) + value2 = value; + else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", + filename, linenum, arg); + if (*activep) { + options->ip_qos_interactive = value; + options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; + } + break; + + case sVersionAddendum: + if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { + if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0) + options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); + else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument", + filename, linenum); + else + options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len); + } + return 0; + + case sAuthorizedKeysCommand: + if (cp == NULL) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) { + if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand " + "must be an absolute path", + filename, linenum); + options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len); + } + return 0; + + case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser: + charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user; + + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing AuthorizedKeysCommandUser " + "argument.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand: + if (cp == NULL) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + if (*activep && + options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) { + if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be " + "an absolute path", filename, linenum); + options->authorized_principals_command = + xstrdup(cp + len); + } + return 0; + + case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser: + charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user; + + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sAuthenticationMethods: + if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) { + value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */ + value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */ + while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { + if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) { + if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) { + fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" " + "must appear alone in " + "AuthenticationMethods", + filename, linenum); + } + value = 1; + } else if (value) { + fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear " + "alone in AuthenticationMethods", + filename, linenum); + } else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) { + fatal("%s line %d: invalid " + "authentication method list.", + filename, linenum); + } + value2 = 1; + if (!*activep) + continue; + array_append(filename, linenum, + "AuthenticationMethods", + &options->auth_methods, + &options->num_auth_methods, arg); + } + if (value2 == 0) { + fatal("%s line %d: no AuthenticationMethods " + "specified", filename, linenum); + } + } + return 0; + + case sStreamLocalBindMask: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask " + "argument.", filename, linenum); + /* Parse mode in octal format */ + value = strtol(arg, &p, 8); + if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); + if (*activep) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; + break; + + case sStreamLocalBindUnlink: + intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; + goto parse_flag; + + case sFingerprintHash: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", + filename, linenum, arg); + if (*activep) + options->fingerprint_hash = value; + break; + + case sExposeAuthInfo: + intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info; + goto parse_flag; + + case sRDomain: + charptr = &options->routing_domain; + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") != 0 && strcmp(arg, "%D") != 0 && + !valid_rdomain(arg)) + fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + + case sDeprecated: + case sIgnore: + case sUnsupported: + do_log2(opcode == sIgnore ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, + "%s line %d: %s option %s", filename, linenum, + opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated", arg); + while (arg) + arg = strdelim(&cp); + break; + + default: + fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)", + filename, linenum, arg, opcode); + } + if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", + filename, linenum, arg); + return 0; +} + +/* Reads the server configuration file. */ + +void +load_server_config(const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf) +{ + char *line = NULL, *cp; + size_t linesize = 0; + FILE *f; + int r, lineno = 0; + + debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename); + if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) { + perror(filename); + exit(1); + } + sshbuf_reset(conf); + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + lineno++; + /* + * Trim out comments and strip whitespace + * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce + * line numbers later for error messages + */ + if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL) + memcpy(cp, "\n", 2); + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r"); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, strlen(cp))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + free(line); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(conf, 0)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fclose(f); + debug2("%s: done config len = %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(conf)); +} + +void +parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, + struct connection_info *connectinfo) +{ + ServerOptions mo; + + initialize_server_options(&mo); + parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, connectinfo); + copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0); +} + +int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec) +{ + char *p; + + while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') { + if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) { + ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5); + } else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) { + ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5); + } else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) { + ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5); + } else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) { + ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6); + } else if (strncmp(p, "rdomain=", 8) == 0) { + ci->rdomain = xstrdup(p + 8); + } else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) { + ci->lport = a2port(p + 6); + if (ci->lport == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode" + " specification %s\n", p+6, p); + return -1; + } + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n", + p); + return -1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Copy any supported values that are set. + * + * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or + * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we + * do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow(). + */ +void +copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) +{ +#define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\ + if (src->n != -1) \ + dst->n = src->n; \ +} while (0) + + M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); + M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login); + M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd); + + M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding); + M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding); + M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding); + M_CP_INTOPT(disable_forwarding); + M_CP_INTOPT(expose_userauth_info); + M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun); + M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports); + M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); + M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset); + M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding); + M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost); + M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty); + M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc); + M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions); + M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); + M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_count_max); + M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); + M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); + M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); + M_CP_INTOPT(log_level); + + /* + * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use + * M_CP_INTOPT - it does a signed comparison that causes compiler + * warnings. + */ + if (src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask != (mode_t)-1) { + dst->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = + src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask; + } + + /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */ +#define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\ + if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \ + free(dst->n); \ + dst->n = src->n; \ + } \ +} while(0) +#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(s, num_s) do {\ + u_int i; \ + if (src->num_s != 0) { \ + for (i = 0; i < dst->num_s; i++) \ + free(dst->s[i]); \ + free(dst->s); \ + dst->s = xcalloc(src->num_s, sizeof(*dst->s)); \ + for (i = 0; i < src->num_s; i++) \ + dst->s[i] = xstrdup(src->s[i]); \ + dst->num_s = src->num_s; \ + } \ +} while(0) + + /* See comment in servconf.h */ + COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); + + /* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */ + assemble_algorithms(dst); + + /* + * The only things that should be below this point are string options + * which are only used after authentication. + */ + if (preauth) + return; + + /* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */ + M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command); + if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) { + free(dst->adm_forced_command); + dst->adm_forced_command = NULL; + } + M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory); + if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) { + free(dst->chroot_directory); + dst->chroot_directory = NULL; + } +} + +#undef M_CP_INTOPT +#undef M_CP_STROPT +#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT + +void +parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, + struct sshbuf *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo) +{ + int active, linenum, bad_options = 0; + char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf; + + debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf)); + + if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); + active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1; + linenum = 1; + while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) { + if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename, + linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0) + bad_options++; + } + free(obuf); + if (bad_options > 0) + fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", + filename, bad_options); + process_queued_listen_addrs(options); +} + +static const char * +fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { + if (m[i].value == val) + return m[i].key; + } + return "UNKNOWN"; +} + +static const char * +fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val) +{ + if (val == -1) + return "unset"; + switch (code) { + case sAddressFamily: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); + case sPermitRootLogin: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin); + case sGatewayPorts: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports); + case sCompression: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression); + case sAllowTcpForwarding: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); + case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); + case sFingerprintHash: + return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); + default: + switch (val) { + case 0: + return "no"; + case 1: + return "yes"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN"; + } + } +} + +static void +dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val) +{ + printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val) +{ + printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val) +{ + printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val) +{ + printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), + val == NULL ? "none" : val); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) + printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); +} + +static void +dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) +{ + u_int i; + + if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods) + return; + printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) + printf(" %s", vals[i]); + if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0) + printf(" any"); + printf("\n"); +} + +static char * +format_listen_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) +{ + int r; + struct addrinfo *ai; + char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV]; + char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL; + + /* + * ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes + * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to + * print these in reverse order. + */ + for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if ((r = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr, + sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { + error("getnameinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); + continue; + } + laddr2 = laddr1; + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) { + xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s%s%s\n%s", + addr, port, + la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", + la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain, + laddr2); + } else { + xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s%s%s\n%s", + addr, port, + la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", + la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain, + laddr2); + } + free(laddr2); + } + return laddr1; +} + +void +dump_config(ServerOptions *o) +{ + char *s; + u_int i; + + /* these are usually at the top of the config */ + for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++) + printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family); + + for (i = 0; i < o->num_listen_addrs; i++) { + s = format_listen_addrs(&o->listen_addrs[i]); + printf("%s", s); + free(s); + } + + /* integer arguments */ +#ifdef USE_PAM + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); +#endif + dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); + dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); + dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); + dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); + dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); + dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max); + dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); + + /* formatted integer arguments */ + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, + o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); +#ifdef KRB5 + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup); +# ifdef USE_AFS + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); +# endif +#endif +#ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); +#endif + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, + o->kbd_interactive_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication, + o->challenge_response_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd); +#ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog); +#endif + dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info); + + /* string arguments */ + dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); + dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); + dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT); + dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC); + dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); + dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); + dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); + dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); + dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file); + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, + o->authorized_principals_file); + dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0' + ? "none" : o->version_addendum); + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command); + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user); + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command); + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user); + dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent); + dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, + o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX); + dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms ? + o->ca_sign_algorithms : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS); + dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types ? + o->hostbased_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); + dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms ? + o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); + dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ? + o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); + dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain); + + /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ + dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); + dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); + + /* string array arguments */ + dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files, + o->authorized_keys_files); + dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files, + o->host_key_files); + dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files, + o->host_cert_files); + dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users); + dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users); + dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups); + dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups); + dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env); + dump_cfg_strarray(sSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv); + dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods, + o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods); + + /* other arguments */ + for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++) + printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i], + o->subsystem_args[i]); + + printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin, + o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups); + + s = NULL; + for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) { + if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) { + s = tunmode_desc[i].text; + break; + } + } + dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s); + + printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); + printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); + + printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, + o->rekey_interval); + + printf("permitopen"); + if (o->num_permitted_opens == 0) + printf(" any"); + else { + for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_opens; i++) + printf(" %s", o->permitted_opens[i]); + } + printf("\n"); + printf("permitlisten"); + if (o->num_permitted_listens == 0) + printf(" any"); + else { + for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_listens; i++) + printf(" %s", o->permitted_listens[i]); + } + printf("\n"); + + if (o->permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL) { + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env); + } else { + printf("permituserenvironment %s\n", + o->permit_user_env_whitelist); + } + +} diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0175e00 --- /dev/null +++ b/servconf.h @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.137 2018/09/20 03:28:06 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#ifndef SERVCONF_H +#define SERVCONF_H + +#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */ + +#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */ + +/* permit_root_login */ +#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1 +#define PERMIT_NO 0 +#define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1 +#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2 +#define PERMIT_YES 3 + +/* use_privsep */ +#define PRIVSEP_OFF 0 +#define PRIVSEP_ON 1 +#define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2 + +/* PermitOpen */ +#define PERMITOPEN_ANY 0 +#define PERMITOPEN_NONE -2 + +#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */ +#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */ + +/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */ +#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp" + +struct ssh; +struct fwd_perm_list; + +/* + * Used to store addresses from ListenAddr directives. These may be + * incomplete, as they may specify addresses that need to be merged + * with any ports requested by ListenPort. + */ +struct queued_listenaddr { + char *addr; + int port; /* <=0 if unspecified */ + char *rdomain; +}; + +/* Resolved listen addresses, grouped by optional routing domain */ +struct listenaddr { + char *rdomain; + struct addrinfo *addrs; +}; + +typedef struct { + u_int num_ports; + u_int ports_from_cmdline; + int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */ + struct queued_listenaddr *queued_listen_addrs; + u_int num_queued_listens; + struct listenaddr *listen_addrs; + u_int num_listen_addrs; + int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */ + + char *routing_domain; /* Bind session to routing domain */ + + char **host_key_files; /* Files containing host keys. */ + u_int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */ + char **host_cert_files; /* Files containing host certs. */ + u_int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */ + + char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */ + char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */ + int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time + * (sec). */ + int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */ + int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */ + int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts + * for RhostsRsaAuth */ + int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */ + int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */ + int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */ + int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start + * searching at */ + int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */ + char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */ + int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */ + int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */ + int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */ + int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ + int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ + int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ + char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */ + char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */ + char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ + struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ + SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ + LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */ + int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */ + int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */ + char *hostbased_key_types; /* Key types allowed for hostbased */ + char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types */ + char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */ + int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ + char *pubkey_key_types; /* Key types allowed for public key */ + int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos + * authentication. */ + int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos + * and any other password + * authentication mechanism, + * such as SecurID or + * /etc/passwd */ + int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket + * file on logout. */ + int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ + int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ + int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ + int challenge_response_authentication; + int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty + * passwords. */ + int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */ + char *permit_user_env_whitelist; /* pattern-list whitelist */ + int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */ + int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */ + int allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */ + int allow_agent_forwarding; + int disable_forwarding; + u_int num_allow_users; + char **allow_users; + u_int num_deny_users; + char **deny_users; + u_int num_allow_groups; + char **allow_groups; + u_int num_deny_groups; + char **deny_groups; + + u_int num_subsystems; + char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; + char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; + char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; + + u_int num_accept_env; + char **accept_env; + u_int num_setenv; + char **setenv; + + int max_startups_begin; + int max_startups_rate; + int max_startups; + int max_authtries; + int max_sessions; + char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */ + int use_dns; + int client_alive_interval; /* + * poke the client this often to + * see if it's still there + */ + int client_alive_count_max; /* + * If the client is unresponsive + * for this many intervals above, + * disconnect the session + */ + + u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */ + char **authorized_keys_files; + + char *adm_forced_command; + + int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */ + + int permit_tun; + + char **permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */ + u_int num_permitted_opens; + char **permitted_listens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */ + u_int num_permitted_listens; + + char *chroot_directory; + char *revoked_keys_file; + char *trusted_user_ca_keys; + char *authorized_keys_command; + char *authorized_keys_command_user; + char *authorized_principals_file; + char *authorized_principals_command; + char *authorized_principals_command_user; + + int64_t rekey_limit; + int rekey_interval; + + char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */ + + u_int num_auth_methods; + char **auth_methods; + + int fingerprint_hash; + int expose_userauth_info; + u_int64_t timing_secret; +} ServerOptions; + +/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */ +struct connection_info { + const char *user; + const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */ + const char *address; /* remote address */ + const char *laddress; /* local address */ + int lport; /* local port */ + const char *rdomain; /* routing domain if available */ +}; + + +/* + * These are string config options that must be copied between the + * Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the + * privsep slave to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all + * the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order. + * + * NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or + * COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both. + */ +#define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \ + M_CP_STROPT(banner); \ + M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \ + M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \ + M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \ + M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \ + M_CP_STROPT(ca_sign_algorithms); \ + M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \ + M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_whitelist); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens); \ + M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_listens, num_permitted_listens); \ + } while (0) + +struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int); +void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *); +void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *); +int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int, + int *, struct connection_info *); +void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options); +void load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *); +void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *, + struct connection_info *); +void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *); +int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *); +int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *); +void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int); +void dump_config(ServerOptions *); +char *derelativise_path(const char *); +void servconf_add_hostkey(const char *, const int, + ServerOptions *, const char *path); +void servconf_add_hostcert(const char *, const int, + ServerOptions *, const char *path); + +#endif /* SERVCONF_H */ diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7be83e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/serverloop.c @@ -0,0 +1,921 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.209 2018/07/27 05:13:02 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Server main loop for handling the interactive session. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "serverloop.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* XXX */ +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; +extern int use_privsep; + +static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */ + +/* + * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server + * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated. + */ + +static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */ + +/* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */ +static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; + +/* prototypes */ +static void server_init_dispatch(void); + +/* requested tunnel forwarding interface(s), shared with session.c */ +char *tun_fwd_ifnames = NULL; + +/* returns 1 if bind to specified port by specified user is permitted */ +static int +bind_permitted(int port, uid_t uid) +{ + if (use_privsep) + return 1; /* allow system to decide */ + if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && uid != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid + * the race between select() and child_terminated + */ +static int notify_pipe[2]; +static void +notify_setup(void) +{ + if (pipe(notify_pipe) < 0) { + error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno)); + } else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) || + (fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) { + error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno)); + close(notify_pipe[0]); + close(notify_pipe[1]); + } else { + set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]); + set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]); + return; + } + notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */ + notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */ +} +static void +notify_parent(void) +{ + if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) + (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); +} +static void +notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) +{ + if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) + FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); +} +static void +notify_done(fd_set *readset) +{ + char c; + + if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) + while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) + debug2("%s: reading", __func__); +} + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +sigchld_handler(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + child_terminated = 1; + notify_parent(); + errno = save_errno; +} + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +sigterm_handler(int sig) +{ + received_sigterm = sig; +} + +static void +client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int channel_id; + char remote_id[512]; + + /* timeout, check to see how many we have had */ + if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.client_alive_count_max) { + sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); + logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + + /* + * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply", + * we should get back a failure + */ + if ((channel_id = channel_find_open(ssh)) == -1) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com"); + packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ + } else { + channel_request_start(ssh, channel_id, + "keepalive@openssh.com", 1); + } + packet_send(); +} + +/* + * Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the + * select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors + * have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified + * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite). + */ +static void +wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, + int connection_in, int connection_out, + fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, + u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms) +{ + struct timeval tv, *tvp; + int ret; + time_t minwait_secs = 0; + int client_alive_scheduled = 0; + static time_t last_client_time; + + /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */ + channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, + nallocp, &minwait_secs); + + /* XXX need proper deadline system for rekey/client alive */ + if (minwait_secs != 0) + max_time_ms = MINIMUM(max_time_ms, (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000); + + /* + * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly, + * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client + * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag. + * + * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic + * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet. + */ + if (options.client_alive_interval) { + uint64_t keepalive_ms = + (uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000; + + client_alive_scheduled = 1; + if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms) + max_time_ms = keepalive_ms; + } + +#if 0 + /* wrong: bad condition XXX */ + if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) +#endif + FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); + notify_prepare(*readsetp); + + /* + * If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that + * descriptor. + */ + if (packet_have_data_to_write()) + FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); + + /* + * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read + * from it, then read as much as is available and exit. + */ + if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) + if (max_time_ms == 0 || client_alive_scheduled) + max_time_ms = 100; + + if (max_time_ms == 0) + tvp = NULL; + else { + tv.tv_sec = max_time_ms / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_ms % 1000); + tvp = &tv; + } + + /* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */ + ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); + + if (ret == -1) { + memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); + memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); + if (errno != EINTR) + error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } else if (client_alive_scheduled) { + time_t now = monotime(); + + if (ret == 0) { /* timeout */ + client_alive_check(ssh); + } else if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, *readsetp)) { + last_client_time = now; + } else if (last_client_time != 0 && last_client_time + + options.client_alive_interval <= now) { + client_alive_check(ssh); + last_client_time = now; + } + } + + notify_done(*readsetp); +} + +/* + * Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored + * in buffers and processed later. + */ +static int +process_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, int connection_in) +{ + int len; + char buf[16384]; + + /* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */ + if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { + len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (len == 0) { + verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + return -1; + } else if (len < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN && + errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { + verbose("Read error from remote host " + "%.100s port %d: %.100s", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + } else { + /* Buffer any received data. */ + packet_process_incoming(buf, len); + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin. + */ +static void +process_output(fd_set *writeset, int connection_out) +{ + /* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */ + if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) + packet_write_poll(); +} + +static void +process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL); +} + +static void +collect_children(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + pid_t pid; + sigset_t oset, nset; + int status; + + /* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */ + sigemptyset(&nset); + sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD); + sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset); + if (child_terminated) { + debug("Received SIGCHLD."); + while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || + (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) + if (pid > 0) + session_close_by_pid(ssh, pid, status); + child_terminated = 0; + } + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); +} + +void +server_loop2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; + int max_fd; + u_int nalloc = 0, connection_in, connection_out; + u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0; + + debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2."); + + signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); + child_terminated = 0; + connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); + connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); + + if (!use_privsep) { + signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); + signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler); + signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); + } + + notify_setup(); + + max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out); + max_fd = MAXIMUM(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]); + + server_init_dispatch(); + + for (;;) { + process_buffered_input_packets(ssh); + + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) && + packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) + channel_output_poll(ssh); + if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + rekey_timeout_ms = packet_get_rekey_timeout() * 1000; + else + rekey_timeout_ms = 0; + + wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, connection_in, connection_out, + &readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms); + + if (received_sigterm) { + logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm); + /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */ + cleanup_exit(255); + } + + collect_children(ssh); + if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) + channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset); + if (process_input(ssh, readset, connection_in) < 0) + break; + process_output(writeset, connection_out); + } + collect_children(ssh); + + free(readset); + free(writeset); + + /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */ + channel_free_all(ssh); + + /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */ + session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL); +} + +static int +server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq); + /* + * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client. + * even if this was generated by something other than + * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives. + */ + packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); + return 0; +} + +static Channel * +server_request_direct_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int *reason, const char **errmsg) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *target, *originator; + u_short target_port, originator_port; + + target = packet_get_string(NULL); + target_port = packet_get_int(); + originator = packet_get_string(NULL); + originator_port = packet_get_int(); + packet_check_eom(); + + debug("%s: originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", __func__, + originator, originator_port, target, target_port); + + /* XXX fine grained permissions */ + if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && + auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag && + !options.disable_forwarding) { + c = channel_connect_to_port(ssh, target, target_port, + "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg); + } else { + logit("refused local port forward: " + "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", + originator, originator_port, target, target_port); + if (reason != NULL) + *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; + } + + free(originator); + free(target); + + return c; +} + +static Channel * +server_request_direct_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *target, *originator; + u_short originator_port; + struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; + + if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) + fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__); + + target = packet_get_string(NULL); + originator = packet_get_string(NULL); + originator_port = packet_get_int(); + packet_check_eom(); + + debug("%s: originator %s port %d, target %s", __func__, + originator, originator_port, target); + + /* XXX fine grained permissions */ + if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && + auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag && + !options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) { + c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target, + "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal"); + } else { + logit("refused streamlocal port forward: " + "originator %s port %d, target %s", + originator, originator_port, target); + } + + free(originator); + free(target); + + return c; +} + +static Channel * +server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + int mode, tun, sock; + char *tmp, *ifname = NULL; + + mode = packet_get_int(); + switch (mode) { + case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT: + case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET: + break; + default: + packet_send_debug("Unsupported tunnel device mode."); + return NULL; + } + if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) { + packet_send_debug("Server has rejected tunnel device " + "forwarding"); + return NULL; + } + + tun = packet_get_int(); + if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) { + if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && auth_opts->force_tun_device != tun) + goto done; + tun = auth_opts->force_tun_device; + } + sock = tun_open(tun, mode, &ifname); + if (sock < 0) + goto done; + debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname); + + c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); + c->datagram = 1; +#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) + if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) + channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter, + sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); +#endif + + /* + * Update the list of names exposed to the session + * XXX remove these if the tunnels are closed (won't matter + * much if they are already in the environment though) + */ + tmp = tun_fwd_ifnames; + xasprintf(&tun_fwd_ifnames, "%s%s%s", + tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : tun_fwd_ifnames, + tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : ",", + ifname); + free(tmp); + free(ifname); + + done: + if (c == NULL) + packet_send_debug("Failed to open the tunnel device."); + return c; +} + +static Channel * +server_request_session(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c; + + debug("input_session_request"); + packet_check_eom(); + + if (no_more_sessions) { + packet_disconnect("Possible attack: attempt to open a session " + "after additional sessions disabled"); + } + + /* + * A server session has no fd to read or write until a + * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to + * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all + * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered. + */ + c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, + -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "server-session", 1); + if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) { + debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self); + channel_free(ssh, c); + return NULL; + } + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0); + return c; +} + +static int +server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *ctype; + const char *errmsg = NULL; + int rchan, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; + u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len; + + ctype = packet_get_string(&len); + rchan = packet_get_int(); + rwindow = packet_get_int(); + rmaxpack = packet_get_int(); + + debug("%s: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", __func__, + ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); + + if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) { + c = server_request_session(ssh); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { + c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ssh, &reason, &errmsg); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(ssh); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) { + c = server_request_tun(ssh); + } + if (c != NULL) { + debug("%s: confirm %s", __func__, ctype); + c->remote_id = rchan; + c->have_remote_id = 1; + c->remote_window = rwindow; + c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; + if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_put_int(c->self); + packet_put_int(c->local_window); + packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); + packet_send(); + } + } else { + debug("%s: failure %s", __func__, ctype); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(rchan); + packet_put_int(reason); + packet_put_cstring(errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed"); + packet_put_cstring(""); + packet_send(); + } + free(ctype); + return 0; +} + +static int +server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp) +{ + struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; + struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL; + int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0; + const u_char *blob; + u_char *sig = 0; + size_t blen, slen; + + if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + + kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain( + sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)); + while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { + sshkey_free(key); + key = NULL; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't parse key: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + /* + * Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys + * before attempting to sign anything with it. + */ + if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) { + error("%s: unknown host %s key", + __func__, sshkey_type(key)); + goto out; + } + /* + * XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather + * than passing in public and private keys + */ + if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL && + (key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) { + error("%s: can't retrieve hostkey %d", __func__, ndx); + goto out; + } + sshbuf_reset(sigbuf); + free(sig); + sig = NULL; + /* + * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated + * during KEX to the default (SHA1). + */ + use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA && + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, + "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, + ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 || + (r = ssh->kex->sign(key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen, + sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), + use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + } + /* Success */ + *respp = resp; + resp = NULL; /* don't free it */ + success = 1; + out: + free(sig); + sshbuf_free(resp); + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + sshkey_free(key); + return success; +} + +static int +server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + char *rtype; + int want_reply; + int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0; + struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; + struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; + + if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) + fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__); + + rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); + want_reply = packet_get_char(); + debug("%s: rtype %s want_reply %d", __func__, rtype, want_reply); + + /* -R style forwarding */ + if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) { + struct Forward fwd; + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL); + fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); + debug("%s: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d", __func__, + fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port); + + /* check permissions */ + if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 || + !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag || + options.disable_forwarding || + (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) || + (fwd.listen_port != 0 && + !bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) { + success = 0; + packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding."); + } else { + /* Start listening on the port */ + success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd, + &allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts); + } + free(fwd.listen_host); + if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + if (allocated_listen_port != 0 && + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u32: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) { + struct Forward fwd; + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL); + fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); + debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__, + fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port); + + success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd); + free(fwd.listen_host); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { + struct Forward fwd; + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); + debug("%s: streamlocal-forward listen path %s", __func__, + fwd.listen_path); + + /* check permissions */ + if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 + || !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag || + options.disable_forwarding || + (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) { + success = 0; + packet_send_debug("Server has disabled " + "streamlocal forwarding."); + } else { + /* Start listening on the socket */ + success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, + &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts); + } + free(fwd.listen_path); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { + struct Forward fwd; + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); + debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__, + fwd.listen_path); + + success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd); + free(fwd.listen_path); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) { + no_more_sessions = 1; + success = 1; + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) { + success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp); + } + if (want_reply) { + packet_start(success ? + SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); + if (success && resp != NULL) + ssh_packet_put_raw(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(resp), + sshbuf_len(resp)); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); + } + free(rtype); + sshbuf_free(resp); + return 0; +} + +static int +server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c; + int id, reply, success = 0; + char *rtype; + + id = packet_get_int(); + rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); + reply = packet_get_char(); + + debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %d request %s reply %d", + id, rtype, reply); + + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) + packet_disconnect("server_input_channel_req: " + "unknown channel %d", id); + if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) { + packet_check_eom(); + chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c); + } else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || + c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0) + success = session_input_channel_req(ssh, c, rtype); + if (reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { + if (!c->have_remote_id) + fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id", + __func__, c->self); + packet_start(success ? + SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); + packet_put_int(c->remote_id); + packet_send(); + } + free(rtype); + return 0; +} + +static void +server_init_dispatch(void) +{ + debug("server_init_dispatch"); + dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request); + /* client_alive */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); + /* rekeying */ + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); +} diff --git a/serverloop.h b/serverloop.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd2cf63 --- /dev/null +++ b/serverloop.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.8 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between + * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and + * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to stdin + * (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the child + * program). + */ +#ifndef SERVERLOOP_H +#define SERVERLOOP_H + +struct ssh; + +void server_loop2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); + +#endif diff --git a/session.c b/session.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d0958d --- /dev/null +++ b/session.c @@ -0,0 +1,2714 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.307 2018/10/04 00:10:11 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "sshlogin.h" +#include "serverloop.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "sftp.h" +#include "atomicio.h" + +#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +#include +#endif + +#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \ + (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \ + (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \ + c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \ + c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t')) + +/* func */ + +Session *session_new(void); +void session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int); +void session_pty_cleanup(Session *); +void session_proctitle(Session *); +int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *); +int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); +int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); +int do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); +void do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); +void do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *); +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +static void do_pre_login(Session *s); +#endif +void do_motd(void); +int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *); + +static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); + +static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *); + +/* import */ +extern ServerOptions options; +extern char *__progname; +extern int debug_flag; +extern u_int utmp_len; +extern int startup_pipe; +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; +extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; +char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */ + +/* original command from peer. */ +const char *original_command = NULL; + +/* data */ +static int sessions_first_unused = -1; +static int sessions_nalloc = 0; +static Session *sessions = NULL; + +#define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0 +#define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1 +#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2 +#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3 + +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP +login_cap_t *lc; +#endif + +static int is_child = 0; +static int in_chroot = 0; + +/* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */ +static char *auth_info_file = NULL; + +/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ +static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; +static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; + +/* removes the agent forwarding socket */ + +static void +auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw) +{ + if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + unlink(auth_sock_name); + rmdir(auth_sock_dir); + auth_sock_name = NULL; + restore_uid(); + } +} + +static int +auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw) +{ + Channel *nc; + int sock = -1; + + if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { + error("authentication forwarding requested twice."); + return 0; + } + + /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */ + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */ + auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX"); + + /* Create private directory for socket */ + if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) { + packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: " + "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + free(auth_sock_dir); + auth_sock_dir = NULL; + goto authsock_err; + } + + xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld", + auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid()); + + /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */ + sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); + + /* Restore the privileged uid. */ + restore_uid(); + + /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */ + if (sock < 0) + goto authsock_err; + + /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ + nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket", + SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "auth socket", 1); + nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name); + return 1; + + authsock_err: + free(auth_sock_name); + if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) { + rmdir(auth_sock_dir); + free(auth_sock_dir); + } + if (sock != -1) + close(sock); + auth_sock_name = NULL; + auth_sock_dir = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static void +display_loginmsg(void) +{ + int r; + + if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) == 0) + return; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(loginmsg, 0)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + printf("%s", (char *)sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg)); + sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); +} + +static void +prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info) +{ + int fd = -1, success = 0; + + if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL) + return; + + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"); + if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) { + error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info), + sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) { + error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + if (close(fd) != 0) { + error("%s: close: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + success = 1; + out: + if (!success) { + if (fd != -1) + close(fd); + free(auth_info_file); + auth_info_file = NULL; + } + restore_uid(); +} + +static void +set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts) +{ + char *tmp, *cp, *host; + int port; + size_t i; + + if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) { + channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL); + for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) { + tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]); + /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */ + if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__); + host = cleanhostname(host); + if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0) + fatal("%s: internal error: permitopen port", + __func__); + channel_add_permission(ssh, + FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host, port); + free(tmp); + } + } + if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0) { + channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE); + for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitlisten; i++) { + tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitlisten[i]); + /* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */ + if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__); + host = cleanhostname(host); + if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0) + fatal("%s: internal error: permitlisten port", + __func__); + channel_add_permission(ssh, + FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE, host, port); + free(tmp); + } + } +} + +void +do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name); + + auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0); + + /* setup the channel layer */ + /* XXX - streamlocal? */ + set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts); + + if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag || + options.disable_forwarding) { + channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL); + channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE); + } else { + if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0) + channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL); + else + channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL); + if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0) + channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE); + else + channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE); + } + auth_debug_send(); + + prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info); + + do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt); + + do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt); +} + +/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */ +static int +xauth_valid_string(const char *s) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) && + s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' && + s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_') + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +#define USE_PIPES 1 +/* + * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This + * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after + * setting up file descriptors and such. + */ +int +do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) +{ + pid_t pid; +#ifdef USE_PIPES + int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2]; + + if (s == NULL) + fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); + + /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */ + if (pipe(pin) < 0) { + error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (pipe(pout) < 0) { + error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(pin[0]); + close(pin[1]); + return -1; + } + if (pipe(perr) < 0) { + error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + close(pin[0]); + close(pin[1]); + close(pout[0]); + close(pout[1]); + return -1; + } +#else + int inout[2], err[2]; + + if (s == NULL) + fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); + + /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */ + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) { + error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) { + error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + close(inout[0]); + close(inout[1]); + return -1; + } +#endif + + session_proctitle(s); + + /* Fork the child. */ + switch ((pid = fork())) { + case -1: + error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); +#ifdef USE_PIPES + close(pin[0]); + close(pin[1]); + close(pout[0]); + close(pout[1]); + close(perr[0]); + close(perr[1]); +#else + close(inout[0]); + close(inout[1]); + close(err[0]); + close(err[1]); +#endif + return -1; + case 0: + is_child = 1; + + /* + * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD + * setlogin() affects the entire process group. + */ + if (setsid() < 0) + error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + +#ifdef USE_PIPES + /* + * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket + * pair, and make the child side the standard input. + */ + close(pin[1]); + if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdin"); + close(pin[0]); + + /* Redirect stdout. */ + close(pout[0]); + if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdout"); + close(pout[1]); + + /* Redirect stderr. */ + close(perr[0]); + if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0) + perror("dup2 stderr"); + close(perr[1]); +#else + /* + * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will + * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist) + * seem to depend on it. + */ + close(inout[1]); + close(err[1]); + if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */ + perror("dup2 stdin"); + if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout (same as stdin) */ + perror("dup2 stdout"); + close(inout[0]); + if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */ + perror("dup2 stderr"); + close(err[0]); +#endif + + /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ + do_child(ssh, s, command); + /* NOTREACHED */ + default: + break; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); +#endif + + s->pid = pid; + /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */ + packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL, + options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); + + /* + * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display + * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate + * multiple copies of the login messages. + */ + sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); + +#ifdef USE_PIPES + /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */ + close(pin[0]); + close(pout[1]); + close(perr[1]); + + session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], + s->is_subsystem, 0); +#else + /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */ + close(inout[0]); + close(err[0]); + + /* + * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to + * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same. + */ + session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1], + s->is_subsystem, 0); +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This + * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after + * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp, + * lastlog, and other such operations. + */ +int +do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) +{ + int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; + pid_t pid; + + if (s == NULL) + fatal("do_exec_pty: no session"); + ptyfd = s->ptyfd; + ttyfd = s->ttyfd; + + /* + * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the + * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this + * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional. + * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to + * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions. + */ + if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) { + error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(ttyfd); + close(ptyfd); + return -1; + } + /* we keep a reference to the pty master */ + if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) { + error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(ttyfd); + close(ptyfd); + close(fdout); + return -1; + } + + /* Fork the child. */ + switch ((pid = fork())) { + case -1: + error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(fdout); + close(ptymaster); + close(ttyfd); + close(ptyfd); + return -1; + case 0: + is_child = 1; + + close(fdout); + close(ptymaster); + + /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ + close(ptyfd); + + /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */ + pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty); + + /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */ + if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0) + error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0) + error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0) + error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ + close(ttyfd); + + /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ +#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA + do_login(ssh, s, command); +#endif + /* + * Do common processing for the child, such as execing + * the command. + */ + do_child(ssh, s, command); + /* NOTREACHED */ + default: + break; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); +#endif + + s->pid = pid; + + /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ + close(ttyfd); + + /* Enter interactive session. */ + s->ptymaster = ptymaster; + packet_set_interactive(1, + options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); + session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +static void +do_pre_login(Session *s) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + socklen_t fromlen; + struct sockaddr_storage from; + pid_t pid = getpid(); + + /* + * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let + * the address be 0.0.0.0. + */ + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + fromlen = sizeof(from); + if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { + if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + } + + record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name, + session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); +} +#endif + +/* + * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is + * to be forced, execute that instead. + */ +int +do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) +{ + int ret; + const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL; + char session_type[1024]; + + if (options.adm_forced_command) { + original_command = command; + command = options.adm_forced_command; + forced = "(config)"; + } else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) { + original_command = command; + command = auth_opts->force_command; + forced = "(key-option)"; + } + s->forced = 0; + if (forced != NULL) { + s->forced = 1; + if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) { + s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ? + SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR; + } else if (s->is_subsystem) + s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; + snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), + "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command); + } else if (s->is_subsystem) { + snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), + "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys); + } else if (command == NULL) { + snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell"); + } else { + /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */ + snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command"); + } + + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + tty = s->tty; + if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) + tty += 5; + } + + verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d", + session_type, + tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", + tty == NULL ? "" : tty, + s->pw->pw_name, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), + s->self); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (command != NULL) + PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); + else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { + char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; + + if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ + shell =_PATH_BSHELL; + PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); + } +#endif + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command); + else + ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command); + + original_command = NULL; + + /* + * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display + * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate + * multiple copies of the login messages. + */ + sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); + + return ret; +} + +/* administrative, login(1)-like work */ +void +do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) +{ + socklen_t fromlen; + struct sockaddr_storage from; + struct passwd * pw = s->pw; + pid_t pid = getpid(); + + /* + * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let + * the address be 0.0.0.0. + */ + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + fromlen = sizeof(from); + if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { + if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { + debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + } + + /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ + if (!use_privsep) + record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, + session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, + options.use_dns), + (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + /* + * If password change is needed, do it now. + * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check. + */ + if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { + display_loginmsg(); + do_pam_chauthtok(); + s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0; + /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */ + } +#endif + + if (check_quietlogin(s, command)) + return; + + display_loginmsg(); + + do_motd(); +} + +/* + * Display the message of the day. + */ +void +do_motd(void) +{ + FILE *f; + char buf[256]; + + if (options.print_motd) { +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd", + "/etc/motd"), "r"); +#else + f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"); +#endif + if (f) { + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) + fputs(buf, stdout); + fclose(f); + } + } +} + + +/* + * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given. + */ +int +check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command) +{ + char buf[256]; + struct passwd *pw = s->pw; + struct stat st; + + /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */ + if (command != NULL) + return 1; + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0) + return 1; +#else + if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) + return 1; +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them + * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing. + * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#') + * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed. + * If whitelist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and + * only variable names that match it will be accepted. + */ +static void +read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize, + const char *filename, const char *whitelist) +{ + FILE *f; + char *line = NULL, *cp, *value; + size_t linesize = 0; + u_int lineno = 0; + + f = fopen(filename, "r"); + if (!f) + return; + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + if (++lineno > 1000) + fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename); + for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') + continue; + + cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; + + value = strchr(cp, '='); + if (value == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno, + filename); + continue; + } + /* + * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to + * the value string. + */ + *value = '\0'; + value++; + if (whitelist != NULL && + match_pattern_list(cp, whitelist, 0) != 1) + continue; + child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value); + } + free(line); + fclose(f); +} + +#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN +/* + * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present. + */ +static char * +child_get_env(char **env, const char *name) +{ + int i; + size_t len; + + len = strlen(name); + for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++) + if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=') + return(env[i] + len + 1); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Read /etc/default/login. + * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK. + */ +static void +read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid) +{ + char **tmpenv = NULL, *var; + u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0; + u_long mask; + + /* + * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment, + * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're + * interested in. + */ + read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login", + options.permit_user_env_whitelist); + + if (tmpenv == NULL) + return; + + if (uid == 0) + var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH"); + else + var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH"); + if (var != NULL) + child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var); + + if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL) + if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1) + umask((mode_t)mask); + + for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++) + free(tmpenv[i]); + free(tmpenv); +} +#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ + +static void +copy_environment_blacklist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize, + const char *blacklist) +{ + char *var_name, *var_val; + int i; + + if (source == NULL) + return; + + for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) { + var_name = xstrdup(source[i]); + if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) { + free(var_name); + continue; + } + *var_val++ = '\0'; + + if (blacklist == NULL || + match_pattern_list(var_name, blacklist, 0) != 1) { + debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); + child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); + } + + free(var_name); + } +} + +void +copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) +{ + copy_environment_blacklist(source, env, envsize, NULL); +} + +static char ** +do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) +{ + char buf[256]; + size_t n; + u_int i, envsize; + char *ocp, *cp, *value, **env, *laddr; + struct passwd *pw = s->pw; +#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN) + char *path = NULL; +#endif + + /* Initialize the environment. */ + envsize = 100; + env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *)); + env[0] = NULL; + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* + * The Windows environment contains some setting which are + * important for a running system. They must not be dropped. + */ + { + char **p; + + p = fetch_windows_environment(); + copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); + free_windows_environment(p); + } +#endif + +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter + * the childs environment as they see fit + */ + ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); +#endif + + /* Set basic environment. */ + for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val); + + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); +#ifdef _AIX + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name); +#endif + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); + else + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH")); +#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ +# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + /* + * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains + * important components pointing to the system directories, + * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better + * remains intact here. + */ +# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN + read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid); + path = child_get_env(env, "PATH"); +# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ + if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", + s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH); + } +# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ +#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ + + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); + + /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */ + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell); + + if (getenv("TZ")) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); + if (s->term) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term); + if (s->display) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display); + + /* + * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it + * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or + * SIA), so copy it to the child. + */ + { + char *cp; + + if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp); + } + +#ifdef _AIX + { + char *cp; + + if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp); + read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment", + options.permit_user_env_whitelist); + } +#endif +#ifdef KRB5 + if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", + s->authctxt->krb5_ccname); +#endif + if (auth_sock_name != NULL) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, + auth_sock_name); + + + /* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */ + if (options.permit_user_env) { + for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) { + ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]); + cp = strchr(ocp, '='); + if (*cp == '=') { + *cp = '\0'; + /* Apply PermitUserEnvironment whitelist */ + if (options.permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL || + match_pattern_list(ocp, + options.permit_user_env_whitelist, 0) == 1) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, + ocp, cp + 1); + } + free(ocp); + } + } + + /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */ + if (options.permit_user_env) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment", + pw->pw_dir); + read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf, + options.permit_user_env_whitelist); + } + +#ifdef USE_PAM + /* + * Pull in any environment variables that may have + * been set by PAM. + */ + if (options.use_pam) { + char **p; + + /* + * Don't allow SSH_AUTH_INFO variables posted to PAM to leak + * back into the environment. + */ + p = fetch_pam_child_environment(); + copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, "SSH_AUTH_INFO*"); + free_pam_environment(p); + + p = fetch_pam_environment(); + copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize, "SSH_AUTH_INFO*"); + free_pam_environment(p); + } +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + + /* Environment specified by admin */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) { + cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]); + if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) { + /* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */ + fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]); + } + *value++ = '\0'; + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value); + } + + /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), + ssh_local_port(ssh)); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf); + + laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), + laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh)); + free(laddr); + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf); + + if (tun_fwd_ifnames != NULL) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TUNNEL", tun_fwd_ifnames); + if (auth_info_file != NULL) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); + if (original_command) + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", + original_command); + + if (debug_flag) { + /* dump the environment */ + fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n"); + for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) + fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]); + } + return env; +} + +/* + * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found + * first in this order). + */ +static void +do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) +{ + FILE *f = NULL; + char cmd[1024]; + int do_xauth; + struct stat st; + + do_xauth = + s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL; + + /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */ + if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL && + auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc && + stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) { + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", + shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); + if (debug_flag) + fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd); + f = popen(cmd, "w"); + if (f) { + if (do_xauth) + fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, + s->auth_data); + pclose(f); + } else + fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", + _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); + } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) { + if (debug_flag) + fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL, + _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); + f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w"); + if (f) { + if (do_xauth) + fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, + s->auth_data); + pclose(f); + } else + fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", + _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); + } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) { + /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */ + if (debug_flag) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n", + options.xauth_location, s->auth_display); + fprintf(stderr, + "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n", + options.xauth_location, s->auth_display, + s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); + } + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -", + options.xauth_location); + f = popen(cmd, "w"); + if (f) { + fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", + s->auth_display); + fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", + s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, + s->auth_data); + pclose(f); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", + cmd); + } + } +} + +static void +do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) +{ + FILE *f = NULL; + char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN; + struct stat sb; + +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0) + return; + nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl); +#else + if (pw->pw_uid == 0) + return; + nl = def_nl; +#endif + if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) { + if (nl != def_nl) + free(nl); + return; + } + + /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */ + logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl); + if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) { + while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) + fputs(buf, stderr); + fclose(f); + } + exit(254); +} + +/* + * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components + * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions. + */ +static void +safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid) +{ + const char *cp; + char component[PATH_MAX]; + struct stat st; + + if (*path != '/') + fatal("chroot path does not begin at root"); + if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component)) + fatal("chroot path too long"); + + /* + * Descend the path, checking that each component is a + * root-owned directory with strict permissions. + */ + for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) { + if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL) + strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component)); + else { + cp++; + memcpy(component, path, cp - path); + component[cp - path] = '\0'; + } + + debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); + + if (stat(component, &st) != 0) + fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, + component, strerror(errno)); + if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) + fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot " + "directory %s\"%s\"", + cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); + if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) + fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory", + cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); + + } + + if (chdir(path) == -1) + fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": " + "%s", path, strerror(errno)); + if (chroot(path) == -1) + fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno)); + if (chdir("/") == -1) + fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path); +} + +/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ +void +do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) +{ + char uidstr[32], *chroot_path, *tmp; + + platform_setusercontext(pw); + + if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, + (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { + perror("unable to set user context"); + exit(1); + } +#else + if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) + error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { + perror("setgid"); + exit(1); + } + /* Initialize the group list. */ + if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { + perror("initgroups"); + exit(1); + } + endgrent(); +#endif + + platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw); + + if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory, + pw->pw_uid); + snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", + (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); + chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, + "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); + safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); + free(tmp); + free(chroot_path); + /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */ + free(options.chroot_directory); + options.chroot_directory = NULL; + in_chroot = 1; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) { + perror("unable to set user context (setuser)"); + exit(1); + } + /* + * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's + * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID. + */ + (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK); +#else +# ifdef USE_LIBIAF + /* + * In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail; + * typically because of the lack of necessary authentication + * services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so, + * ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the + * internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but + * permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest. + */ + if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) + fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name); +# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ + /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ + permanently_set_uid(pw); +#endif + } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { + fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); + } + + if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) + fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid); +} + +static void +do_pwchange(Session *s) +{ + fflush(NULL); + fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n"); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + fprintf(stderr, + "You must change your password now and login again!\n"); +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + setexeccon(NULL); +#endif +#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME + execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name, + (char *)NULL); +#else + execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL); +#endif + perror("passwd"); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, + "Password change required but no TTY available.\n"); + } + exit(1); +} + +static void +child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + extern int auth_sock; + + if (auth_sock != -1) { + close(auth_sock); + auth_sock = -1; + } + + if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out()) + close(packet_get_connection_in()); + else { + close(packet_get_connection_in()); + close(packet_get_connection_out()); + } + /* + * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain + * open in the parent. + */ + /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */ + channel_close_all(ssh); + + /* + * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be + * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later. + */ + endpwent(); + + /* + * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them + * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after + * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file + * descriptors open. + */ + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); +} + +/* + * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the + * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group + * ids, and executing the command or shell. + */ +#define ARGV_MAX 10 +void +do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command) +{ + extern char **environ; + char **env; + char *argv[ARGV_MAX]; + const char *shell, *shell0; + struct passwd *pw = s->pw; + int r = 0; + + /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ + destroy_sensitive_data(); + packet_clear_keys(); + + /* Force a password change */ + if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { + do_setusercontext(pw); + child_close_fds(ssh); + do_pwchange(s); + exit(1); + } + + /* + * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" + * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA + session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty); + if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) + do_motd(); +#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ + /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */ + if (!options.use_pam) + do_nologin(pw); + do_setusercontext(pw); + /* + * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have + * generated messages, so if this in an interactive + * login then display them too. + */ + if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) + display_loginmsg(); +#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) { + debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting"); + display_loginmsg(); + exit(254); + } +#endif + + /* + * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is + * legal, and means /bin/sh. + */ + shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; + + /* + * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, + * even if shell is overridden from login.conf + */ + env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell); + +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); +#endif + + /* + * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and + * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important + * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be + * closed before building the environment, as we call + * ssh_remote_ipaddr there. + */ + child_close_fds(ssh); + + /* + * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, + * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment. + */ + environ = env; + +#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) + /* + * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have + * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see + * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If + * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's + * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable. + */ + + if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() && + (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) { + char cell[64]; + + debug("Getting AFS token"); + + k_setpag(); + + if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) + krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, + s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL); + + krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, + s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir); + } +#endif + + /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */ + if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) { + /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */ +#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP + r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0); +#endif + if (r || !in_chroot) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home " + "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir, + strerror(errno)); + } + if (r) + exit(1); + } + + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + + do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell); + + /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); + + if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) { + printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n"); + fflush(NULL); + exit(1); + } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) { + extern int optind, optreset; + int i; + char *p, *args; + + setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME); + args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server"); + for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " "))) + if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1) + argv[i++] = p; + argv[i] = NULL; + optind = optreset = 1; + __progname = argv[0]; +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); +#endif + exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); + } + + fflush(NULL); + + /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ + if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL) + shell0++; + else + shell0 = shell; + + /* + * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell + * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that + * this is a login shell. + */ + if (!command) { + char argv0[256]; + + /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */ + argv0[0] = '-'; + + if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1) + >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) { + errno = EINVAL; + perror(shell); + exit(1); + } + + /* Execute the shell. */ + argv[0] = argv0; + argv[1] = NULL; + execve(shell, argv, env); + + /* Executing the shell failed. */ + perror(shell); + exit(1); + } + /* + * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c + * option to execute the command. + */ + argv[0] = (char *) shell0; + argv[1] = "-c"; + argv[2] = (char *) command; + argv[3] = NULL; + execve(shell, argv, env); + perror(shell); + exit(1); +} + +void +session_unused(int id) +{ + debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id); + if (id >= options.max_sessions || + id >= sessions_nalloc) { + fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)", + __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); + } + memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions)); + sessions[id].self = id; + sessions[id].used = 0; + sessions[id].chanid = -1; + sessions[id].ptyfd = -1; + sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; + sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; + sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; + sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; + sessions_first_unused = id; +} + +Session * +session_new(void) +{ + Session *s, *tmp; + + if (sessions_first_unused == -1) { + if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions) + return NULL; + debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)", + __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions); + tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc, + sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions", + __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1); + return NULL; + } + sessions = tmp; + session_unused(sessions_nalloc++); + } + + if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc || + sessions_first_unused < 0) { + fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d", + __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions, + sessions_nalloc); + } + + s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused]; + if (s->used) { + fatal("%s: session %d already used", + __func__, sessions_first_unused); + } + sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused; + s->used = 1; + s->next_unused = -1; + debug("session_new: session %d", s->self); + + return s; +} + +static void +session_dump(void) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + + debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p " + "channel %d pid %ld", + s->used, + s->next_unused, + s->self, + s, + s->chanid, + (long)s->pid); + } +} + +int +session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) +{ + Session *s = session_new(); + debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid); + if (s == NULL) { + error("no more sessions"); + return 0; + } + s->authctxt = authctxt; + s->pw = authctxt->pw; + if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid) + fatal("no user for session %d", s->self); + debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid); + s->chanid = chanid; + return 1; +} + +Session * +session_by_tty(char *tty) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) { + debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty); + return s; + } + } + debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + +static Session * +session_by_channel(int id) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used && s->chanid == id) { + debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d", + i, id); + return s; + } + } + debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + +static Session * +session_by_x11_channel(int id) +{ + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + + if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used) + continue; + for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) { + if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) { + debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d " + "channel %d", s->self, id); + return s; + } + } + } + debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + +static Session * +session_by_pid(pid_t pid) +{ + int i; + debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid); + for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used && s->pid == pid) + return s; + } + error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + +static int +session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + s->col = packet_get_int(); + s->row = packet_get_int(); + s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); + s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); + packet_check_eom(); + pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); + return 1; +} + +static int +session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + u_int len; + + if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) { + debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection."); + return 0; + } + if (s->ttyfd != -1) { + packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty."); + return 0; + } + + s->term = packet_get_string(&len); + s->col = packet_get_int(); + s->row = packet_get_int(); + s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); + s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); + + if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) { + free(s->term); + s->term = NULL; + } + + /* Allocate a pty and open it. */ + debug("Allocating pty."); + if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, + sizeof(s->tty)))) { + free(s->term); + s->term = NULL; + s->ptyfd = -1; + s->ttyfd = -1; + error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self); + return 0; + } + debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty); + + ssh_tty_parse_modes(ssh, s->ttyfd); + + if (!use_privsep) + pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty); + + /* Set window size from the packet. */ + pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); + + packet_check_eom(); + session_proctitle(s); + return 1; +} + +static int +session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + struct stat st; + u_int len; + int success = 0; + char *prog, *cmd; + u_int i; + + s->subsys = packet_get_string(&len); + packet_check_eom(); + debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys, + s->pw->pw_name); + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) { + if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) { + prog = options.subsystem_command[i]; + cmd = options.subsystem_args[i]; + if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) { + s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP; + debug("subsystem: %s", prog); + } else { + if (stat(prog, &st) < 0) + debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", + prog, strerror(errno)); + s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; + debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); + } + success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0; + break; + } + } + + if (!success) + logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, " + "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); + + return success; +} + +static int +session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + int success; + + if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) { + error("session_x11_req: session %d: " + "x11 forwarding already active", s->self); + return 0; + } + s->single_connection = packet_get_char(); + s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL); + s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL); + s->screen = packet_get_int(); + packet_check_eom(); + + if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) && + xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data)) + success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s); + else { + success = 0; + error("Invalid X11 forwarding data"); + } + if (!success) { + free(s->auth_proto); + free(s->auth_data); + s->auth_proto = NULL; + s->auth_data = NULL; + } + return success; +} + +static int +session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + packet_check_eom(); + return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0; +} + +static int +session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + u_int len, success; + + char *command = packet_get_string(&len); + packet_check_eom(); + success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0; + free(command); + return success; +} + +static int +session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + + packet_get_int(); /* ignored */ + packet_check_eom(); + + if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) < 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static int +session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + char *name, *val; + u_int name_len, val_len, i; + + name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len); + val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len); + packet_check_eom(); + + /* Don't set too many environment variables */ + if (s->num_env > 128) { + debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name); + goto fail; + } + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) { + if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) { + debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val); + s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env, + s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env)); + s->env[s->num_env].name = name; + s->env[s->num_env].val = val; + s->num_env++; + return (1); + } + } + debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name); + + fail: + free(name); + free(val); + return (0); +} + +/* + * Conversion of signals from ssh channel request names. + * Subset of signals from RFC 4254 section 6.10C, with SIGINFO as + * local extension. + */ +static int +name2sig(char *name) +{ +#define SSH_SIG(x) if (strcmp(name, #x) == 0) return SIG ## x + SSH_SIG(HUP); + SSH_SIG(INT); + SSH_SIG(KILL); + SSH_SIG(QUIT); + SSH_SIG(TERM); + SSH_SIG(USR1); + SSH_SIG(USR2); +#undef SSH_SIG +#ifdef SIGINFO + if (strcmp(name, "INFO@openssh.com") == 0) + return SIGINFO; +#endif + return -1; +} + +static int +session_signal_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + char *signame = NULL; + int r, sig, success = 0; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &signame, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { + error("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if ((sig = name2sig(signame)) == -1) { + error("%s: unsupported signal \"%s\"", __func__, signame); + goto out; + } + if (s->pid <= 0) { + error("%s: no pid for session %d", __func__, s->self); + goto out; + } + if (s->forced || s->is_subsystem) { + error("%s: refusing to send signal %s to %s session", __func__, + signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem"); + goto out; + } + if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) { + error("%s: session signalling requires privilege separation", + __func__); + goto out; + } + + debug("%s: signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", __func__, signame, + (long)s->pid, sig); + temporarily_use_uid(s->pw); + r = killpg(s->pid, sig); + restore_uid(); + if (r != 0) { + error("%s: killpg(%ld, %d): %s", __func__, (long)s->pid, + sig, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + /* success */ + success = 1; + out: + free(signame); + return success; +} + +static int +session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + static int called = 0; + + packet_check_eom(); + if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag || + !options.allow_agent_forwarding) { + debug("%s: agent forwarding disabled", __func__); + return 0; + } + if (called) { + return 0; + } else { + called = 1; + return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw); + } +} + +int +session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype) +{ + int success = 0; + Session *s; + + if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) { + logit("%s: no session %d req %.100s", __func__, c->self, rtype); + return 0; + } + debug("%s: session %d req %s", __func__, s->self, rtype); + + /* + * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command + * or a subsystem is executed + */ + if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { + if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) { + success = session_shell_req(ssh, s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) { + success = session_exec_req(ssh, s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) { + success = session_pty_req(ssh, s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) { + success = session_x11_req(ssh, s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) { + success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { + success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) { + success = session_env_req(ssh, s); + } + } + if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) { + success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) { + success = session_break_req(ssh, s); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "signal") == 0) { + success = session_signal_req(ssh, s); + } + + return success; +} + +void +session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, + int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty) +{ + /* + * now that have a child and a pipe to the child, + * we can activate our channel and register the fd's + */ + if (s->chanid == -1) + fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); + channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid, + fdout, fdin, fderr, + ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, + 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT); +} + +/* + * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally + * (e.g., due to a dropped connection). + */ +void +session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) +{ + if (s == NULL) { + error("%s: no session", __func__); + return; + } + if (s->ttyfd == -1) + return; + + debug("%s: session %d release %s", __func__, s->self, s->tty); + + /* Record that the user has logged out. */ + if (s->pid != 0) + record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name); + + /* Release the pseudo-tty. */ + if (getuid() == 0) + pty_release(s->tty); + + /* + * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after + * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty + * while we're still cleaning up. + */ + if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0) + error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", + s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); + + /* unlink pty from session */ + s->ttyfd = -1; +} + +void +session_pty_cleanup(Session *s) +{ + PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s)); +} + +static char * +sig2name(int sig) +{ +#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x + SSH_SIG(ABRT); + SSH_SIG(ALRM); + SSH_SIG(FPE); + SSH_SIG(HUP); + SSH_SIG(ILL); + SSH_SIG(INT); + SSH_SIG(KILL); + SSH_SIG(PIPE); + SSH_SIG(QUIT); + SSH_SIG(SEGV); + SSH_SIG(TERM); + SSH_SIG(USR1); + SSH_SIG(USR2); +#undef SSH_SIG + return "SIG@openssh.com"; +} + +static void +session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id) +{ + Channel *c; + + if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) { + debug("%s: x11 channel %d missing", __func__, id); + } else { + /* Detach X11 listener */ + debug("%s: detach x11 channel %d", __func__, id); + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); + if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) + chan_mark_dead(ssh, c); + } +} + +static void +session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) +{ + Session *s; + u_int i; + + debug3("%s: channel %d", __func__, id); + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id); + if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: no x11 channel %d", __func__, id); + for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { + debug("%s: session %d: closing channel %d", + __func__, s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]); + /* + * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we + * close all of its siblings. + */ + if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id) + session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]); + } + free(s->x11_chanids); + s->x11_chanids = NULL; + free(s->display); + s->display = NULL; + free(s->auth_proto); + s->auth_proto = NULL; + free(s->auth_data); + s->auth_data = NULL; + free(s->auth_display); + s->auth_display = NULL; +} + +static void +session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status) +{ + Channel *c; + + if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: session %d: no channel %d", + __func__, s->self, s->chanid); + debug("%s: session %d channel %d pid %ld", + __func__, s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); + + if (WIFEXITED(status)) { + channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0); + packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status)); + packet_send(); + } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); + packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status))); +#ifdef WCOREDUMP + packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0); +#else /* WCOREDUMP */ + packet_put_char(0); +#endif /* WCOREDUMP */ + packet_put_cstring(""); + packet_put_cstring(""); + packet_send(); + } else { + /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ + packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status); + } + + /* disconnect channel */ + debug("%s: release channel %d", __func__, s->chanid); + + /* + * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when + * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed + * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds. + */ + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1); + + /* + * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be + * interested in data we write. + * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could + * be some more data waiting in the pipe. + */ + if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) + chan_write_failed(ssh, c); +} + +void +session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + u_int i; + + verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d", + s->pw->pw_name, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), + ssh_remote_port(ssh), + s->self); + + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + session_pty_cleanup(s); + free(s->term); + free(s->display); + free(s->x11_chanids); + free(s->auth_display); + free(s->auth_data); + free(s->auth_proto); + free(s->subsys); + if (s->env != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) { + free(s->env[i].name); + free(s->env[i].val); + } + free(s->env); + } + session_proctitle(s); + session_unused(s->self); +} + +void +session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status) +{ + Session *s = session_by_pid(pid); + if (s == NULL) { + debug("%s: no session for pid %ld", __func__, (long)pid); + return; + } + if (s->chanid != -1) + session_exit_message(ssh, s, status); + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + session_pty_cleanup(s); + s->pid = 0; +} + +/* + * this is called when a channel dies before + * the session 'child' itself dies + */ +void +session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) +{ + Session *s = session_by_channel(id); + u_int i; + + if (s == NULL) { + debug("%s: no session for id %d", __func__, id); + return; + } + debug("%s: channel %d child %ld", __func__, id, (long)s->pid); + if (s->pid != 0) { + debug("%s: channel %d: has child, ttyfd %d", + __func__, id, s->ttyfd); + /* + * delay detach of session, but release pty, since + * the fd's to the child are already closed + */ + if (s->ttyfd != -1) + session_pty_cleanup(s); + return; + } + /* detach by removing callback */ + channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid); + + /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */ + if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) { + for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { + session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]); + s->x11_chanids[i] = -1; + } + } + + s->chanid = -1; + session_close(ssh, s); +} + +void +session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *)) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used) { + if (closefunc != NULL) + closefunc(s); + else + session_close(ssh, s); + } + } +} + +static char * +session_tty_list(void) +{ + static char buf[1024]; + int i; + char *cp; + + buf[0] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { + Session *s = &sessions[i]; + if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) { + + if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) { + cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/'); + cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1; + } else + cp = s->tty + 5; + + if (buf[0] != '\0') + strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); + strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf); + } + } + if (buf[0] == '\0') + strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf); + return buf; +} + +void +session_proctitle(Session *s) +{ + if (s->pw == NULL) + error("no user for session %d", s->self); + else + setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list()); +} + +int +session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s) +{ + struct stat st; + char display[512], auth_display[512]; + char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; + u_int i; + + if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) { + packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled by key options."); + return 0; + } + if (!options.x11_forwarding) { + debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file."); + return 0; + } + if (options.xauth_location == NULL || + (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) { + packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward X11."); + return 0; + } + if (s->display != NULL) { + debug("X11 display already set."); + return 0; + } + if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset, + options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, + &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { + debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i], + session_close_single_x11, 0); + } + + /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */ + if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) + fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + /* + * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the + * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be + * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays. + */ + if (options.x11_use_localhost) { + snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u", + s->display_number, s->screen); + snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u", + s->display_number, s->screen); + s->display = xstrdup(display); + s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display); + } else { +#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY + struct hostent *he; + struct in_addr my_addr; + + he = gethostbyname(hostname); + if (he == NULL) { + error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); + packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); + return 0; + } + memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)); + snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr), + s->display_number, s->screen); +#else + snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname, + s->display_number, s->screen); +#endif + s->display = xstrdup(display); + s->auth_display = xstrdup(display); + } + + return 1; +} + +static void +do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + server_loop2(ssh, authctxt); +} + +void +do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + static int called = 0; + + debug("do_cleanup"); + + /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */ + if (is_child) + return; + + /* avoid double cleanup */ + if (called) + return; + called = 1; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + return; + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { + sshpam_cleanup(); + sshpam_thread_cleanup(); + } +#endif + + if (!authctxt->authenticated) + return; + +#ifdef KRB5 + if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && + authctxt->krb5_ctx) + krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); +#endif + +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_cleanup_creds) + ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(); +#endif + + /* remove agent socket */ + auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); + + /* remove userauth info */ + if (auth_info_file != NULL) { + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + unlink(auth_info_file); + restore_uid(); + free(auth_info_file); + auth_info_file = NULL; + } + + /* + * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled, + * or if running in monitor. + */ + if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) + session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2); +} + +/* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */ + +const char * +session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns) +{ + const char *remote = ""; + + if (utmp_size > 0) + remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns); + if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size) + remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + return remote; +} + diff --git a/session.h b/session.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce59dab --- /dev/null +++ b/session.h @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.36 2018/10/02 12:40:07 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef SESSION_H +#define SESSION_H + +#define TTYSZ 64 +typedef struct Session Session; +struct Session { + int used; + int self; + int next_unused; + struct passwd *pw; + Authctxt *authctxt; + pid_t pid; + int forced; + + /* tty */ + char *term; + int ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; + u_int row, col, xpixel, ypixel; + char tty[TTYSZ]; + + /* X11 */ + u_int display_number; + char *display; + u_int screen; + char *auth_display; + char *auth_proto; + char *auth_data; + int single_connection; + + int chanid; + int *x11_chanids; + int is_subsystem; + char *subsys; + u_int num_env; + struct { + char *name; + char *val; + } *env; +}; + +void do_authenticated(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); +void do_cleanup(struct ssh *, Authctxt *); + +int session_open(Authctxt *, int); +void session_unused(int); +int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *); +void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int); +void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *); +void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *)); +void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); + +Session *session_new(void); +Session *session_by_tty(char *); +void session_close(struct ssh *, Session *); +void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); + +const char *session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int); + +#endif diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4986d6d --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp-client.c @@ -0,0 +1,1920 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.130 2018/07/31 03:07:24 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* XXX: memleaks */ +/* XXX: signed vs unsigned */ +/* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */ +/* XXX: copy between two remote sites */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "progressmeter.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "utf8.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" +#include "sftp-client.h" + +extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted; +extern int showprogress; + +/* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */ +#define MIN_READ_SIZE 512 + +/* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */ +#define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64 + +/* Directory separator characters */ +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN +# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/\\" +#else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ +# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS "/" +#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ + +struct sftp_conn { + int fd_in; + int fd_out; + u_int transfer_buflen; + u_int num_requests; + u_int version; + u_int msg_id; +#define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001 +#define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002 +#define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004 +#define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008 +#define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010 + u_int exts; + u_int64_t limit_kbps; + struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out; +}; + +static u_char * +get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, + const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5))); + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount) +{ + struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit; + + bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount); + return 0; +} + +static void +send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_char mlen[4]; + struct iovec iov[2]; + + if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) + fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m)); + + /* Send length first */ + put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m)); + iov[0].iov_base = mlen; + iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen); + iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m); + iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m); + + if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, + conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_out) != + sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen)) + fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno)); + + sshbuf_reset(m); +} + +static void +get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial) +{ + u_int msg_len; + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, + conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) { + if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET) + fatal("Connection closed"); + else + fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { + do_log2(initial ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, + "Received message too long %u", msg_len); + fatal("Ensure the remote shell produces no output " + "for non-interactive sessions."); + } + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, + conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) + != msg_len) { + if (errno == EPIPE) + fatal("Connection closed"); + else + fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); + } +} + +static void +get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) +{ + get_msg_extended(conn, m, 0); +} + +static void +send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s, + u_int len) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +static void +send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, + const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 || + (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +static u_int +get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_char type; + u_int id, status; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + get_msg(conn, msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); + if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u", + SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(msg); + + debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); + + return status; +} + +static u_char * +get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, + const char *errfmt, ...) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int id, status; + u_char type; + u_char *handle; + char errmsg[256]; + va_list args; + int r; + + va_start(args, errfmt); + if (errfmt != NULL) + vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args); + va_end(args); + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + get_msg(conn, msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)", + errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id); + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (errfmt != NULL) + error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status)); + sshbuf_free(msg); + return(NULL); + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE) + fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u", + errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(msg); + + return handle; +} + +static Attrib * +get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int id; + u_char type; + int r; + static Attrib a; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + get_msg(conn, msg); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + u_int status; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (quiet) + debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); + else + error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); + sshbuf_free(msg); + return(NULL); + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) { + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u", + SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type); + } + if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(msg); + return NULL; + } + sshbuf_free(msg); + + return &a; +} + +static int +get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st, + u_int expected_id, int quiet) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_char type; + u_int id; + u_int64_t flag; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + get_msg(conn, msg); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + u_int status; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (quiet) + debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); + else + error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); + sshbuf_free(msg); + return -1; + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) { + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", + SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); + } + + memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0; + st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0; + + sshbuf_free(msg); + + return 0; +} + +struct sftp_conn * +do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests, + u_int64_t limit_kbps) +{ + u_char type; + struct sshbuf *msg; + struct sftp_conn *ret; + int r; + + ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); + ret->msg_id = 1; + ret->fd_in = fd_in; + ret->fd_out = fd_out; + ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen; + ret->num_requests = num_requests; + ret->exts = 0; + ret->limit_kbps = 0; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(ret, msg); + + sshbuf_reset(msg); + + get_msg_extended(ret, msg, 1); + + /* Expecting a VERSION reply */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) { + error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)", + type); + sshbuf_free(msg); + free(ret); + return(NULL); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version); + + /* Check for extensions */ + while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) { + char *name; + u_char *value; + size_t vlen; + int known = 0; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 && + strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { + ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME; + known = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && + strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { + ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS; + known = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && + strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { + ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS; + known = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 && + strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { + ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK; + known = 1; + } else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 && + strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { + ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC; + known = 1; + } + if (known) { + debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s", + name, value); + } else { + debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name); + } + free(name); + free(value); + } + + sshbuf_free(msg); + + /* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */ + if (ret->version == 0) + ret->transfer_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480); + + ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps; + if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) { + bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps, + ret->transfer_buflen); + bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps, + ret->transfer_buflen); + } + + return ret; +} + +u_int +sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn) +{ + return conn->version; +} + +int +do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) +{ + u_int id, status; + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + id = conn->msg_id++; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id); + + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status)); + + sshbuf_free(msg); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + + +static int +do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag, + SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0; + size_t handle_len; + u_char type, *handle; + int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + int r; + + if (dir) + *dir = NULL; + + id = conn->msg_id++; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + + handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, + "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path); + if (handle == NULL) { + sshbuf_free(msg); + return -1; + } + + if (dir) { + ents = 0; + *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); + (*dir)[0] = NULL; + } + + for (; !interrupted;) { + id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++; + + debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id); + + sshbuf_reset(msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + + sshbuf_reset(msg); + + get_msg(conn, msg); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); + + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + u_int rstatus; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus); + if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF) + break; + error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus)); + goto out; + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", + SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) + fatal("%s: nonsensical number of entries", __func__); + if (count == 0) + break; + debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + char *filename, *longname; + Attrib a; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, + NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, + NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(filename); + free(longname); + sshbuf_free(msg); + return -1; + } + + if (print_flag) + mprintf("%s\n", longname); + + /* + * Directory entries should never contain '/' + * These can be used to attack recursive ops + * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd') + */ + if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) { + error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" " + "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path); + } else if (dir) { + *dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); + (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir)); + (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename); + (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname); + memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a)); + (*dir)[++ents] = NULL; + } + free(filename); + free(longname); + } + } + status = 0; + + out: + sshbuf_free(msg); + do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); + free(handle); + + if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) { + /* Don't return results on error */ + free_sftp_dirents(*dir); + *dir = NULL; + } else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) { + /* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */ + free_sftp_dirents(*dir); + *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); + **dir = NULL; + } + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +int +do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) +{ + return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); +} + +void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) +{ + int i; + + if (s == NULL) + return; + for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) { + free(s[i]->filename); + free(s[i]->longname); + free(s[i]); + } + free(s); +} + +int +do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) +{ + u_int status, id; + + debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path); + + id = conn->msg_id++; + send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path)); + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status)); + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +int +do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) +{ + u_int status, id; + + id = conn->msg_id++; + send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path, + strlen(path), a); + + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag) + error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +int +do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) +{ + u_int status, id; + + id = conn->msg_id++; + send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path, + strlen(path)); + + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +Attrib * +do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) +{ + u_int id; + + id = conn->msg_id++; + + send_string_request(conn, id, + conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT, + path, strlen(path)); + + return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); +} + +Attrib * +do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) +{ + u_int id; + + if (conn->version == 0) { + if (quiet) + debug("Server version does not support lstat operation"); + else + logit("Server version does not support lstat operation"); + return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet)); + } + + id = conn->msg_id++; + send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path, + strlen(path)); + + return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); +} + +#ifdef notyet +Attrib * +do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, + int quiet) +{ + u_int id; + + id = conn->msg_id++; + send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle, + handle_len); + + return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); +} +#endif + +int +do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) +{ + u_int status, id; + + id = conn->msg_id++; + send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path, + strlen(path), a); + + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path, + fx2txt(status)); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +int +do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, + Attrib *a) +{ + u_int status, id; + + id = conn->msg_id++; + send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle, + handle_len, a); + + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status)); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +char * +do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int expected_id, count, id; + char *filename, *longname; + Attrib a; + u_char type; + int r; + + expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; + send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path, + strlen(path)); + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + get_msg(conn, msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); + + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + u_int status; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status)); + sshbuf_free(msg); + return NULL; + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", + SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (count != 1) + fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s size %lu", path, filename, + (unsigned long)a.size); + + free(longname); + + sshbuf_free(msg); + + return(filename); +} + +int +do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath, + int force_legacy) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int status, id; + int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + /* Send rename request */ + id = conn->msg_id++; + if (use_ext) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, + "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", + use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" : + "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath); + sshbuf_free(msg); + + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, + newpath, fx2txt(status)); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +int +do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int status, id; + int r; + + if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) { + error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension"); + return -1; + } + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + /* Send link request */ + id = conn->msg_id++; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", + oldpath, newpath); + sshbuf_free(msg); + + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, + newpath, fx2txt(status)); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +int +do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int status, id; + int r; + + if (conn->version < 3) { + error("This server does not support the symlink operation"); + return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); + } + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + /* Send symlink request */ + id = conn->msg_id++; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, + newpath); + sshbuf_free(msg); + + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, + newpath, fx2txt(status)); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +int +do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int status, id; + int r; + + /* Silently return if the extension is not supported */ + if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0) + return -1; + + /* Send fsync request */ + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + id = conn->msg_id++; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id); + sshbuf_free(msg); + + status = get_status(conn, id); + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status)); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +#ifdef notyet +char * +do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int expected_id, count, id; + char *filename, *longname; + Attrib a; + u_char type; + int r; + + expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; + send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path)); + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + get_msg(conn, msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (id != expected_id) + fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); + + if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { + u_int status; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status)); + sshbuf_free(msg); + return(NULL); + } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", + SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (count != 1) + fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename); + + free(longname); + + sshbuf_free(msg); + + return filename; +} +#endif + +int +do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st, + int quiet) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int id; + int r; + + if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) { + error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension"); + return -1; + } + + id = conn->msg_id++; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + sshbuf_reset(msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); + + return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); +} + +#ifdef notyet +int +do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, + struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int id; + + if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) { + error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension"); + return -1; + } + + id = conn->msg_id++; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + sshbuf_reset(msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); + + return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); +} +#endif + +static void +send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, + u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + sshbuf_reset(msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +int +do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, + const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, + int fsync_flag) +{ + Attrib junk; + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_char *handle; + int local_fd = -1, write_error; + int read_error, write_errno, reordered = 0, r; + u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater; + u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK; + off_t progress_counter; + size_t handle_len; + struct stat st; + struct request { + u_int id; + size_t len; + u_int64_t offset; + TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq; + }; + TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests; + struct request *req; + u_char type; + + TAILQ_INIT(&requests); + + if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) + return -1; + + /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */ + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) + mode = a->perm & 0777; + else + mode = 0666; + + if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && + (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) { + error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path); + return(-1); + } + + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) + size = a->size; + else + size = 0; + + buflen = conn->transfer_buflen; + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */ + + /* Send open request */ + id = conn->msg_id++; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_READ)) != 0 || + (r = encode_attrib(msg, &junk)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); + + handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, + "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); + if (handle == NULL) { + sshbuf_free(msg); + return(-1); + } + + local_fd = open(local_path, + O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR); + if (local_fd == -1) { + error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s", + local_path, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + offset = highwater = 0; + if (resume_flag) { + if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) { + error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s", + local_path, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + if (st.st_size < 0) { + error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path); + goto fail; + } + if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) { + error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " + "local file is larger than remote", local_path); + fail: + do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); + sshbuf_free(msg); + free(handle); + if (local_fd != -1) + close(local_fd); + return -1; + } + offset = highwater = st.st_size; + } + + /* Read from remote and write to local */ + write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0; + max_req = 1; + progress_counter = offset; + + if (showprogress && size != 0) + start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter); + + while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) { + u_char *data; + size_t len; + + /* + * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and + * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully + */ + if (interrupted) { + if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */ + break; + max_req = 0; + } + + /* Send some more requests */ + while (num_req < max_req) { + debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)", + (unsigned long long)offset, + (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1, + num_req, max_req); + req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req)); + req->id = conn->msg_id++; + req->len = buflen; + req->offset = offset; + offset += buflen; + num_req++; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq); + send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, + req->len, handle, handle_len); + } + + sshbuf_reset(msg); + get_msg(conn, msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req); + + /* Find the request in our queue */ + for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests); + req != NULL && req->id != id; + req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq)) + ; + if (req == NULL) + fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id); + + switch (type) { + case SSH2_FXP_STATUS: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF) + read_error = 1; + max_req = 0; + TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); + free(req); + num_req--; + break; + case SSH2_FXP_DATA: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu", + (unsigned long long)req->offset, + (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1); + if (len > req->len) + fatal("Received more data than asked for " + "%zu > %zu", len, req->len); + if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 || + atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) && + !write_error) { + write_errno = errno; + write_error = 1; + max_req = 0; + } + else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater) + highwater = req->offset + len; + else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater) + reordered = 1; + progress_counter += len; + free(data); + + if (len == req->len) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); + free(req); + num_req--; + } else { + /* Resend the request for the missing data */ + debug3("Short data block, re-requesting " + "%llu -> %llu (%2d)", + (unsigned long long)req->offset + len, + (unsigned long long)req->offset + + req->len - 1, num_req); + req->id = conn->msg_id++; + req->len -= len; + req->offset += len; + send_read_request(conn, req->id, + req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); + /* Reduce the request size */ + if (len < buflen) + buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len); + } + if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */ + if (size > 0 && offset > size) { + /* Only one request at a time + * after the expected EOF */ + debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)", + (unsigned long long)offset, + num_req); + max_req = 1; + } else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) { + ++max_req; + } + } + break; + default: + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u", + SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); + } + } + + if (showprogress && size) + stop_progress_meter(); + + /* Sanity check */ + if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL) + fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue"); + /* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */ + if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) { + if (reordered && resume_flag) { + error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " + "server reordered requests", local_path); + } + debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater); + if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1) + error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); + } + if (read_error) { + error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s", + remote_path, fx2txt(status)); + status = -1; + do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); + } else if (write_error) { + error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(write_errno)); + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); + } else { + if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted) + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + else + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ +#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD + if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1) +#else + if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1) +#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ + error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); + if (preserve_flag && + (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) { + struct timeval tv[2]; + tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; + tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; + tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; + if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1) + error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", + local_path, strerror(errno)); + } + if (fsync_flag) { + debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path); + if (fsync(local_fd) == -1) + error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s", + local_path, strerror(errno)); + } + } + close(local_fd); + sshbuf_free(msg); + free(handle); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +static int +download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, + int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries; + char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL; + mode_t mode = 0777; + + if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { + error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); + return -1; + } + + if (dirattrib == NULL && + (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) { + error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src); + return -1; + } + if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { + error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); + return -1; + } + if (print_flag) + mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", src); + + if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) + mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777; + else { + debug("Server did not send permissions for " + "directory \"%s\"", dst); + } + + if (mkdir(dst, mode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) { + error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) { + error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src); + return -1; + } + + for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) { + free(new_dst); + free(new_src); + + filename = dir_entries[i]->filename; + new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); + new_src = path_append(src, filename); + + if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) { + if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || + strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) + continue; + if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, + depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, + print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) + ret = -1; + } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ) { + if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst, + &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, + resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) { + error("Download of file %s to %s failed", + new_src, new_dst); + ret = -1; + } + } else + logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src); + + } + free(new_dst); + free(new_src); + + if (preserve_flag) { + if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + struct timeval tv[2]; + tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime; + tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime; + tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; + if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1) + error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", + dst, strerror(errno)); + } else + debug("Server did not send times for directory " + "\"%s\"", dst); + } + + free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries); + + return ret; +} + +int +download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, + int fsync_flag) +{ + char *src_canon; + int ret; + + if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) { + error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src); + return -1; + } + + ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0, + dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag); + free(src_canon); + return ret; +} + +int +do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, + const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) +{ + int r, local_fd; + u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK; + u_int id; + u_char type; + off_t offset, progress_counter; + u_char *handle, *data; + struct sshbuf *msg; + struct stat sb; + Attrib a, *c = NULL; + u_int32_t startid; + u_int32_t ackid; + struct outstanding_ack { + u_int id; + u_int len; + off_t offset; + TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq; + }; + TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks; + struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL; + size_t handle_len; + + TAILQ_INIT(&acks); + + if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) { + error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s", + local_path, strerror(errno)); + return(-1); + } + if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) { + error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s", + local_path, strerror(errno)); + close(local_fd); + return(-1); + } + if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { + error("%s is not a regular file", local_path); + close(local_fd); + return(-1); + } + stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); + + a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; + a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; + a.perm &= 0777; + if (!preserve_flag) + a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; + + if (resume) { + /* Get remote file size if it exists */ + if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) { + close(local_fd); + return -1; + } + + if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) { + error("destination file bigger or same size as " + "source file"); + close(local_fd); + return -1; + } + + if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) { + close(local_fd); + return -1; + } + } + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + /* Send open request */ + id = conn->msg_id++; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT| + (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC))) != 0 || + (r = encode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); + + sshbuf_reset(msg); + + handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, + "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); + if (handle == NULL) { + close(local_fd); + sshbuf_free(msg); + return -1; + } + + startid = ackid = id + 1; + data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen); + + /* Read from local and write to remote */ + offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0); + if (showprogress) + start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size, + &progress_counter); + + for (;;) { + int len; + + /* + * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF, + * thus losing the last block of the file. + * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the + * server to drain. + */ + if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK) + len = 0; + else do + len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen); + while ((len == -1) && + (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); + + if (len == -1) + fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); + + if (len != 0) { + ack = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ack)); + ack->id = ++id; + ack->offset = offset; + ack->len = len; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq); + + sshbuf_reset(msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, + handle_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(conn, msg); + debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u", + id, (unsigned long long)offset, len); + } else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL) + break; + + if (ack == NULL) + fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id); + + if (id == startid || len == 0 || + id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) { + u_int rid; + + sshbuf_reset(msg); + get_msg(conn, msg); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) + fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, " + "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); + + /* Find the request in our queue */ + for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks); + ack != NULL && ack->id != rid; + ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq)) + ; + if (ack == NULL) + fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid); + TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq); + debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld", + ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset); + ++ackid; + progress_counter += ack->len; + free(ack); + } + offset += len; + if (offset < 0) + fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__); + } + sshbuf_free(msg); + + if (showprogress) + stop_progress_meter(); + free(data); + + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { + error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s", + remote_path, fx2txt(status)); + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + } + + if (close(local_fd) == -1) { + error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + } + + /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ + if (preserve_flag) + do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a); + + if (fsync_flag) + (void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len); + + if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0) + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + free(handle); + + return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; +} + +static int +upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) +{ + int ret = 0; + DIR *dirp; + struct dirent *dp; + char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL; + struct stat sb; + Attrib a, *dirattrib; + + if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { + error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); + return -1; + } + + if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) { + error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s", + src, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { + error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); + return -1; + } + if (print_flag) + mprintf("Entering %s\n", src); + + attrib_clear(&a); + stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); + a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; + a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; + a.perm &= 01777; + if (!preserve_flag) + a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; + + /* + * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST, + * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether + * the path already existed and is a directory. + */ + if (do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0) != 0) { + if ((dirattrib = do_stat(conn, dst, 0)) == NULL) + return -1; + if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { + error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", dst); + return -1; + } + } + + if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) { + error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) { + if (dp->d_ino == 0) + continue; + free(new_dst); + free(new_src); + filename = dp->d_name; + new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); + new_src = path_append(src, filename); + + if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) { + logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename, + strerror(errno)); + ret = -1; + } else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { + if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || + strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) + continue; + + if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, + depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, + fsync_flag) == -1) + ret = -1; + } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { + if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst, + preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) { + error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!", + new_src, new_dst); + ret = -1; + } + } else + logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename); + } + free(new_dst); + free(new_src); + + do_setstat(conn, dst, &a); + + (void) closedir(dirp); + return ret; +} + +int +upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) +{ + char *dst_canon; + int ret; + + if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) { + error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst); + return -1; + } + + ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag, + print_flag, resume, fsync_flag); + + free(dst_canon); + return ret; +} + +char * +path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2) +{ + char *ret; + size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; + + ret = xmalloc(len); + strlcpy(ret, p1, len); + if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/') + strlcat(ret, "/", len); + strlcat(ret, p2, len); + + return(ret); +} + diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..14a3b81 --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp-client.h @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.27 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */ + +#ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H +#define _SFTP_CLIENT_H + +#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB +# include +#else +# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h" +#endif + +typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT; + +struct SFTP_DIRENT { + char *filename; + char *longname; + Attrib a; +}; + +/* + * Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the + * server's native format may be larger than the client's. + */ +struct sftp_statvfs { + u_int64_t f_bsize; + u_int64_t f_frsize; + u_int64_t f_blocks; + u_int64_t f_bfree; + u_int64_t f_bavail; + u_int64_t f_files; + u_int64_t f_ffree; + u_int64_t f_favail; + u_int64_t f_fsid; + u_int64_t f_flag; + u_int64_t f_namemax; +}; + +/* + * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or + * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success. + */ +struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t); + +u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *); + +/* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ +int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int); + +/* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ +int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); + +/* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */ +void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **); + +/* Delete file 'path' */ +int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); + +/* Create directory 'path' */ +int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int); + +/* Remove directory 'path' */ +int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); + +/* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */ +Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); + +/* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */ +Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); + +/* Set file attributes of 'path' */ +int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *); + +/* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */ +int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *); + +/* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ +char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); + +/* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */ +int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int); + +/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int force_legacy); + +/* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); + +/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ +int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); + +/* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */ +int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int); + +/* + * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times + * if 'pflag' is set + */ +int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, + Attrib *, int, int, int); + +/* + * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve + * times if 'pflag' is set + */ +int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, + Attrib *, int, int, int, int); + +/* + * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times + * if 'pflag' is set + */ +int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int); + +/* + * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve + * times if 'pflag' is set + */ +int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int, + int); + +/* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */ +char *path_append(const char *, const char *); + +#endif diff --git a/sftp-common.c b/sftp-common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d743d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp-common.c @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.31 2018/09/13 15:23:32 millert Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" + +/* Clear contents of attributes structure */ +void +attrib_clear(Attrib *a) +{ + a->flags = 0; + a->size = 0; + a->uid = 0; + a->gid = 0; + a->perm = 0; + a->atime = 0; + a->mtime = 0; +} + +/* Convert from struct stat to filexfer attribs */ +void +stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *st, Attrib *a) +{ + attrib_clear(a); + a->flags = 0; + a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; + a->size = st->st_size; + a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; + a->uid = st->st_uid; + a->gid = st->st_gid; + a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; + a->perm = st->st_mode; + a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; + a->atime = st->st_atime; + a->mtime = st->st_mtime; +} + +/* Convert from filexfer attribs to struct stat */ +void +attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *a, struct stat *st) +{ + memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); + + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) + st->st_size = a->size; + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + st->st_uid = a->uid; + st->st_gid = a->gid; + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) + st->st_mode = a->perm; + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + st->st_atime = a->atime; + st->st_mtime = a->mtime; + } +} + +/* Decode attributes in buffer */ +int +decode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, Attrib *a) +{ + int r; + + attrib_clear(a); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->flags)) != 0) + return r; + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &a->size)) != 0) + return r; + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->uid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->gid)) != 0) + return r; + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->perm)) != 0) + return r; + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->atime)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->mtime)) != 0) + return r; + } + /* vendor-specific extensions */ + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) { + char *type; + u_char *data; + size_t dlen; + u_int i, count; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &count)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0) + return r; + debug3("Got file attribute \"%.100s\" len %zu", + type, dlen); + free(type); + free(data); + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* Encode attributes to buffer */ +int +encode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, const Attrib *a) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->flags)) != 0) + return r; + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(b, a->size)) != 0) + return r; + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->uid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->gid)) != 0) + return r; + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->perm)) != 0) + return r; + } + if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->atime)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->mtime)) != 0) + return r; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Convert from SSH2_FX_ status to text error message */ +const char * +fx2txt(int status) +{ + switch (status) { + case SSH2_FX_OK: + return("No error"); + case SSH2_FX_EOF: + return("End of file"); + case SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE: + return("No such file or directory"); + case SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED: + return("Permission denied"); + case SSH2_FX_FAILURE: + return("Failure"); + case SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE: + return("Bad message"); + case SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION: + return("No connection"); + case SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST: + return("Connection lost"); + case SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED: + return("Operation unsupported"); + default: + return("Unknown status"); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +/* + * drwxr-xr-x 5 markus markus 1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh + */ +char * +ls_file(const char *name, const struct stat *st, int remote, int si_units) +{ + int ulen, glen, sz = 0; + struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime); + const char *user, *group; + char buf[1024], lc[8], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1]; + char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; + time_t now; + + strmode(st->st_mode, mode); + if (remote) { + snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid); + user = ubuf; + snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid); + group = gbuf; + strlcpy(lc, "?", sizeof(lc)); + } else { + user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0); + group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0); + snprintf(lc, sizeof(lc), "%u", (u_int)st->st_nlink); + } + if (ltime != NULL) { + now = time(NULL); + if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime && + now >= st->st_mtime) + sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime); + else + sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %Y", ltime); + } + if (sz == 0) + tbuf[0] = '\0'; + ulen = MAXIMUM(strlen(user), 8); + glen = MAXIMUM(strlen(group), 8); + if (si_units) { + fmt_scaled((long long)st->st_size, sbuf); + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8s %s %s", + mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group, + sbuf, tbuf, name); + } else { + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s", + mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group, + (unsigned long long)st->st_size, tbuf, name); + } + return xstrdup(buf); +} diff --git a/sftp-common.h b/sftp-common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e778a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp-common.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.12 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* Maximum packet that we are willing to send/accept */ +#define SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH (256 * 1024) + +struct sshbuf; +typedef struct Attrib Attrib; + +/* File attributes */ +struct Attrib { + u_int32_t flags; + u_int64_t size; + u_int32_t uid; + u_int32_t gid; + u_int32_t perm; + u_int32_t atime; + u_int32_t mtime; +}; + +void attrib_clear(Attrib *); +void stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *, Attrib *); +void attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *, struct stat *); +int decode_attrib(struct sshbuf *, Attrib *); +int encode_attrib(struct sshbuf *, const Attrib *); +char *ls_file(const char *, const struct stat *, int, int); + +const char *fx2txt(int); diff --git a/sftp-glob.c b/sftp-glob.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43a1beb --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp-glob.c @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.27 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" +#include "sftp-client.h" + +int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, + int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); + +struct SFTP_OPENDIR { + SFTP_DIRENT **dir; + int offset; +}; + +static struct { + struct sftp_conn *conn; +} cur; + +static void * +fudge_opendir(const char *path) +{ + struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r; + + r = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*r)); + + if (do_readdir(cur.conn, (char *)path, &r->dir)) { + free(r); + return(NULL); + } + + r->offset = 0; + + return((void *)r); +} + +static struct dirent * +fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od) +{ + /* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */ + static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN]; + struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf; +#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__ + static int inum = 1; +#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */ + + if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL) + return(NULL); + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + /* + * Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects + * you to hack around it. + */ +#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME + strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN); +#else + strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, + sizeof(ret->d_name)); +#endif +#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__ + /* + * Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with + * ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the + * source... Fake an inode number to appease it. + */ + ret->d_ino = inum++; + if (!inum) + inum = 1; +#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */ + + return(ret); +} + +static void +fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od) +{ + free_sftp_dirents(od->dir); + free(od); +} + +static int +fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st) +{ + Attrib *a; + + if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1))) + return(-1); + + attrib_to_stat(a, st); + + return(0); +} + +static int +fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st) +{ + Attrib *a; + + if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1))) + return(-1); + + attrib_to_stat(a, st); + + return(0); +} + +int +remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *pattern, int flags, + int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob) +{ + pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir; + pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir; + pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir; + pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat; + pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat; + + memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur)); + cur.conn = conn; + + return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob)); +} diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6ccd62 --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp-server-main.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.5 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "sftp.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +void +cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct passwd *user_pw; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n", + (u_long)getuid()); + return 1; + } + + return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw)); +} diff --git a/sftp-server.0 b/sftp-server.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c42b26 --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp-server.0 @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +SFTP-SERVER(8) System Manager's Manual SFTP-SERVER(8) + +NAME + sftp-server M-bM-^@M-^S SFTP server subsystem + +SYNOPSIS + sftp-server [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level] + [-P blacklisted_requests] [-p whitelisted_requests] + [-u umask] + sftp-server -Q protocol_feature + +DESCRIPTION + sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to + stdout and expects client requests from stdin. sftp-server is not + intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem + option. + + Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem + declaration. See sshd_config(5) for more information. + + Valid options are: + + -d start_directory + specifies an alternate starting directory for users. The + pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at + runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %d is replaced by the + home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is + replaced by the username of that user. The default is to use the + user's home directory. This option is useful in conjunction with + the sshd_config(5) ChrootDirectory option. + + -e Causes sftp-server to print logging information to stderr instead + of syslog for debugging. + + -f log_facility + Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages + from sftp-server. The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, + LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. + The default is AUTH. + + -h Displays sftp-server usage information. + + -l log_level + Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server. The + possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, + DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions + that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and + DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher + levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR. + + -P blacklisted_requests + Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are + banned by the server. sftp-server will reply to any blacklisted + request with a failure. The -Q flag can be used to determine the + supported request types. If both a blacklist and a whitelist are + specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist. + + -p whitelisted_requests + Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are + permitted by the server. All request types that are not on the + whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message. + + Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that + requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted. + + -Q protocol_feature + Query protocol features supported by sftp-server. At present the + only feature that may be queried is M-bM-^@M-^\requestsM-bM-^@M-^], which may be used + for black or whitelisting (flags -P and -p respectively). + + -R Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode. + Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations + that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied. + + -u umask + Sets an explicit umask(2) to be applied to newly-created files + and directories, instead of the user's default mask. + + On some systems, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log for logging + to work, and use of sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore + requires that syslogd(8) establish a logging socket inside the chroot + directory. + +SEE ALSO + sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8) + + T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh- + filexfer-02.txt, October 2001, work in progress material. + +HISTORY + sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8. + +AUTHORS + Markus Friedl + +OpenBSD 6.4 December 11, 2014 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c117398 --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp-server.8 @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.27 2014/12/11 04:16:14 djm Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd $Mdocdate: December 11 2014 $ +.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm sftp-server +.Nd SFTP server subsystem +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm sftp-server +.Bk -words +.Op Fl ehR +.Op Fl d Ar start_directory +.Op Fl f Ar log_facility +.Op Fl l Ar log_level +.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests +.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests +.Op Fl u Ar umask +.Ek +.Nm +.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol +to stdout and expects client requests from stdin. +.Nm +is not intended to be called directly, but from +.Xr sshd 8 +using the +.Cm Subsystem +option. +.Pp +Command-line flags to +.Nm +should be specified in the +.Cm Subsystem +declaration. +See +.Xr sshd_config 5 +for more information. +.Pp +Valid options are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl d Ar start_directory +specifies an alternate starting directory for users. +The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime: +%% is replaced by a literal '%', +%d is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, +and %u is replaced by the username of that user. +The default is to use the user's home directory. +This option is useful in conjunction with the +.Xr sshd_config 5 +.Cm ChrootDirectory +option. +.It Fl e +Causes +.Nm +to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging. +.It Fl f Ar log_facility +Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from +.Nm . +The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, +LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. +The default is AUTH. +.It Fl h +Displays +.Nm +usage information. +.It Fl l Ar log_level +Specifies which messages will be logged by +.Nm . +The possible values are: +QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. +INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that +.Nm +performs on behalf of the client. +DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. +DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. +The default is ERROR. +.It Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests +Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by +the server. +.Nm +will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure. +The +.Fl Q +flag can be used to determine the supported request types. +If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is +applied before the whitelist. +.It Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests +Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted +by the server. +All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied +to with a failure message. +.Pp +Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made +implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted. +.It Fl Q Ar protocol_feature +Query protocol features supported by +.Nm . +At present the only feature that may be queried is +.Dq requests , +which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags +.Fl P +and +.Fl p +respectively). +.It Fl R +Places this instance of +.Nm +into a read-only mode. +Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change +the state of the filesystem, will be denied. +.It Fl u Ar umask +Sets an explicit +.Xr umask 2 +to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the +user's default mask. +.El +.Pp +On some systems, +.Nm +must be able to access +.Pa /dev/log +for logging to work, and use of +.Nm +in a chroot configuration therefore requires that +.Xr syslogd 8 +establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr sftp 1 , +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr sshd_config 5 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A S. Lehtinen +.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol" +.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt +.%D October 2001 +.%O work in progress material +.Re +.Sh HISTORY +.Nm +first appeared in +.Ox 2.8 . +.Sh AUTHORS +.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab1b063 --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp-server.c @@ -0,0 +1,1710 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.112 2018/06/01 03:33:53 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "uidswap.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" + +/* Our verbosity */ +static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; + +/* Our client */ +static struct passwd *pw = NULL; +static char *client_addr = NULL; + +/* input and output queue */ +struct sshbuf *iqueue; +struct sshbuf *oqueue; + +/* Version of client */ +static u_int version; + +/* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */ +static int init_done; + +/* Disable writes */ +static int readonly; + +/* Requests that are allowed/denied */ +static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist; + +/* portable attributes, etc. */ +typedef struct Stat Stat; + +struct Stat { + char *name; + char *long_name; + Attrib attrib; +}; + +/* Packet handlers */ +static void process_open(u_int32_t id); +static void process_close(u_int32_t id); +static void process_read(u_int32_t id); +static void process_write(u_int32_t id); +static void process_stat(u_int32_t id); +static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id); +static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id); +static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id); +static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id); +static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id); +static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id); +static void process_remove(u_int32_t id); +static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id); +static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id); +static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id); +static void process_rename(u_int32_t id); +static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id); +static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id); +static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id); +static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id); +static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id); +static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id); +static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id); +static void process_extended(u_int32_t id); + +struct sftp_handler { + const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */ + const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */ + u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */ + void (*handler)(u_int32_t); + int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */ +}; + +struct sftp_handler handlers[] = { + /* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */ + { "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 }, + { "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 }, + { "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 }, + { "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 }, + { "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 }, + { "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 }, + { "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 }, + { "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 }, + { "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 }, + { "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 }, + { "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 }, + { "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 }, + { "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 }, + { "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 }, + { "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 }, + { "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 }, + { "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 }, + { "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 }, + { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } +}; + +/* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */ +struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = { + { "posix-rename", "posix-rename@openssh.com", 0, + process_extended_posix_rename, 1 }, + { "statvfs", "statvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 }, + { "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 }, + { "hardlink", "hardlink@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 }, + { "fsync", "fsync@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 }, + { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } +}; + +static int +request_permitted(struct sftp_handler *h) +{ + char *result; + + if (readonly && h->does_write) { + verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name); + return 0; + } + if (request_blacklist != NULL && + ((result = match_list(h->name, request_blacklist, NULL))) != NULL) { + free(result); + verbose("Refusing blacklisted %s request", h->name); + return 0; + } + if (request_whitelist != NULL && + ((result = match_list(h->name, request_whitelist, NULL))) != NULL) { + free(result); + debug2("Permitting whitelisted %s request", h->name); + return 1; + } + if (request_whitelist != NULL) { + verbose("Refusing non-whitelisted %s request", h->name); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static int +errno_to_portable(int unixerrno) +{ + int ret = 0; + + switch (unixerrno) { + case 0: + ret = SSH2_FX_OK; + break; + case ENOENT: + case ENOTDIR: + case EBADF: + case ELOOP: + ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; + break; + case EPERM: + case EACCES: + case EFAULT: + ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; + break; + case ENAMETOOLONG: + case EINVAL: + ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE; + break; + case ENOSYS: + ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; + break; + default: + ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + break; + } + return ret; +} + +static int +flags_from_portable(int pflags) +{ + int flags = 0; + + if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) && + (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) { + flags = O_RDWR; + } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) { + flags = O_RDONLY; + } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) { + flags = O_WRONLY; + } + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) + flags |= O_APPEND; + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) + flags |= O_CREAT; + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) + flags |= O_TRUNC; + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) + flags |= O_EXCL; + return flags; +} + +static const char * +string_from_portable(int pflags) +{ + static char ret[128]; + + *ret = '\0'; + +#define PAPPEND(str) { \ + if (*ret != '\0') \ + strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \ + strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \ + } + + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) + PAPPEND("READ") + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) + PAPPEND("WRITE") + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) + PAPPEND("APPEND") + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) + PAPPEND("CREATE") + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) + PAPPEND("TRUNCATE") + if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) + PAPPEND("EXCL") + + return ret; +} + +/* handle handles */ + +typedef struct Handle Handle; +struct Handle { + int use; + DIR *dirp; + int fd; + int flags; + char *name; + u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write; + int next_unused; +}; + +enum { + HANDLE_UNUSED, + HANDLE_DIR, + HANDLE_FILE +}; + +Handle *handles = NULL; +u_int num_handles = 0; +int first_unused_handle = -1; + +static void handle_unused(int i) +{ + handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED; + handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle; + first_unused_handle = i; +} + +static int +handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp) +{ + int i; + + if (first_unused_handle == -1) { + if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles) + return -1; + num_handles++; + handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle)); + handle_unused(num_handles - 1); + } + + i = first_unused_handle; + first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused; + + handles[i].use = use; + handles[i].dirp = dirp; + handles[i].fd = fd; + handles[i].flags = flags; + handles[i].name = xstrdup(name); + handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0; + + return i; +} + +static int +handle_is_ok(int i, int type) +{ + return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type; +} + +static int +handle_to_string(int handle, u_char **stringp, int *hlenp) +{ + if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL) + return -1; + *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t)); + put_u32(*stringp, handle); + *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t); + return 0; +} + +static int +handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen) +{ + int val; + + if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t)) + return -1; + val = get_u32(handle); + if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) || + handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR)) + return val; + return -1; +} + +static char * +handle_to_name(int handle) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)|| + handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) + return handles[handle].name; + return NULL; +} + +static DIR * +handle_to_dir(int handle) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) + return handles[handle].dirp; + return NULL; +} + +static int +handle_to_fd(int handle) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) + return handles[handle].fd; + return -1; +} + +static int +handle_to_flags(int handle) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) + return handles[handle].flags; + return 0; +} + +static void +handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) + handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes; +} + +static void +handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) + handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes; +} + +static u_int64_t +handle_bytes_read(int handle) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) + return (handles[handle].bytes_read); + return 0; +} + +static u_int64_t +handle_bytes_write(int handle) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) + return (handles[handle].bytes_write); + return 0; +} + +static int +handle_close(int handle) +{ + int ret = -1; + + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { + ret = close(handles[handle].fd); + free(handles[handle].name); + handle_unused(handle); + } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) { + ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp); + free(handles[handle].name); + handle_unused(handle); + } else { + errno = ENOENT; + } + return ret; +} + +static void +handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg) +{ + if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { + logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu", + emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", + handle_to_name(handle), + (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle), + (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle)); + } else { + logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"", + emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", + handle_to_name(handle)); + } +} + +static void +handle_log_exit(void) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++) + if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED) + handle_log_close(i, "forced"); +} + +static int +get_handle(struct sshbuf *queue, int *hp) +{ + u_char *handle; + int r; + size_t hlen; + + *hp = -1; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(queue, &handle, &hlen)) != 0) + return r; + if (hlen < 256) + *hp = handle_from_string(handle, hlen); + free(handle); + return 0; +} + +/* send replies */ + +static void +send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_reset(m); +} + +static const char * +status_to_message(u_int32_t status) +{ + const char *status_messages[] = { + "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */ + "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */ + "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */ + "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */ + "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */ + "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */ + "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */ + "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */ + "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */ + "Unknown error" /* Others */ + }; + return (status_messages[MINIMUM(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]); +} + +static void +send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status); + if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE || + (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF)) + logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status)); + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, status)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (version >= 3) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, + status_to_message(status))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} +static void +send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, dlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +static void +send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) +{ + debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen); + send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen); +} + +static void +send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle) +{ + u_char *string; + int hlen; + + handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen); + debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle); + send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen); + free(string); +} + +static void +send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int i, r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, count)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].long_name)) != 0 || + (r = encode_attrib(msg, &stats[i].attrib)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +static void +send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags); + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +static void +send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + u_int64_t flag; + int r; + + flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0; + flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bsize)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_frsize)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_blocks)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bfree)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bavail)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_files)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_ffree)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_favail)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, flag)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_namemax)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +/* parse incoming */ + +static void +process_init(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &version)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + verbose("received client version %u", version); + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0 || + /* POSIX rename extension */ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */ + /* statvfs extension */ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */ + /* fstatvfs extension */ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */ + /* hardlink extension */ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */ + /* fsync extension */ + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0) /* version */ + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +static void +process_open(u_int32_t id) +{ + u_int32_t pflags; + Attrib a; + char *name; + int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */ + (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags); + flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); + mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666; + logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", + name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); + if (readonly && + ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY || + (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) { + verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode"); + status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; + } else { + fd = open(name, flags, mode); + if (fd < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL); + if (handle < 0) { + close(fd); + } else { + send_handle(id, handle); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + } + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); + free(name); +} + +static void +process_close(u_int32_t id) +{ + int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle); + handle_log_close(handle, NULL); + ret = handle_close(handle); + status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); +} + +static void +process_read(u_int32_t id) +{ + u_char buf[64*1024]; + u_int32_t len; + int r, handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + u_int64_t off; + + if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d", + id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); + if (len > sizeof buf) { + len = sizeof buf; + debug2("read change len %d", len); + } + fd = handle_to_fd(handle); + if (fd >= 0) { + if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + error("process_read: seek failed"); + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + ret = read(fd, buf, len); + if (ret < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else if (ret == 0) { + status = SSH2_FX_EOF; + } else { + send_data(id, buf, ret); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + handle_update_read(handle, ret); + } + } + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); +} + +static void +process_write(u_int32_t id) +{ + u_int64_t off; + size_t len; + int r, handle, fd, ret, status; + u_char *data; + + if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %zu", + id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); + fd = handle_to_fd(handle); + + if (fd < 0) + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + else { + if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) && + lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + error("process_write: seek failed"); + } else { +/* XXX ATOMICIO ? */ + ret = write(fd, data, len); + if (ret < 0) { + error("process_write: write failed"); + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else if ((size_t)ret == len) { + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + handle_update_write(handle, ret); + } else { + debug2("nothing at all written"); + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + } + } + } + send_status(id, status); + free(data); +} + +static void +process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat) +{ + Attrib a; + struct stat st; + char *name; + int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : ""); + verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name); + r = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st); + if (r < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); + send_attrib(id, &a); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); + free(name); +} + +static void +process_stat(u_int32_t id) +{ + process_do_stat(id, 0); +} + +static void +process_lstat(u_int32_t id) +{ + process_do_stat(id, 1); +} + +static void +process_fstat(u_int32_t id) +{ + Attrib a; + struct stat st; + int fd, r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)", + id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); + fd = handle_to_fd(handle); + if (fd >= 0) { + r = fstat(fd, &st); + if (r < 0) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); + send_attrib(id, &a); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); +} + +static struct timeval * +attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a) +{ + static struct timeval tv[2]; + + tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; + tv[0].tv_usec = 0; + tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; + tv[1].tv_usec = 0; + return tv; +} + +static void +process_setstat(u_int32_t id) +{ + Attrib a; + char *name; + int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name); + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { + logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", + name, (unsigned long long)a.size); + r = truncate(name, a.size); + if (r == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { + logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); + r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); + if (r == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + char buf[64]; + time_t t = a.mtime; + + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", + localtime(&t)); + logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); + r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); + if (r == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, + (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); + r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); + if (r == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + send_status(id, status); + free(name); +} + +static void +process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id) +{ + Attrib a; + int handle, fd, r; + int status = SSH2_FX_OK; + + if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || + (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle); + fd = handle_to_fd(handle); + if (fd < 0) + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + else { + char *name = handle_to_name(handle); + + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { + logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", + name, (unsigned long long)a.size); + r = ftruncate(fd, a.size); + if (r == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { + logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); +#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD + r = fchmod(fd, a.perm & 07777); +#else + r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); +#endif + if (r == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { + char buf[64]; + time_t t = a.mtime; + + strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", + localtime(&t)); + logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); +#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES + r = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(&a)); +#else + r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); +#endif + if (r == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { + logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, + (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); +#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN + r = fchown(fd, a.uid, a.gid); +#else + r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); +#endif + if (r == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + } + send_status(id, status); +} + +static void +process_opendir(u_int32_t id) +{ + DIR *dirp = NULL; + char *path; + int r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: opendir", id); + logit("opendir \"%s\"", path); + dirp = opendir(path); + if (dirp == NULL) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } else { + handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp); + if (handle < 0) { + closedir(dirp); + } else { + send_handle(id, handle); + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + + } + if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) + send_status(id, status); + free(path); +} + +static void +process_readdir(u_int32_t id) +{ + DIR *dirp; + struct dirent *dp; + char *path; + int r, handle; + + if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id, + handle_to_name(handle), handle); + dirp = handle_to_dir(handle); + path = handle_to_name(handle); + if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) { + send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); + } else { + struct stat st; + char pathname[PATH_MAX]; + Stat *stats; + int nstats = 10, count = 0, i; + + stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat)); + while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { + if (count >= nstats) { + nstats *= 2; + stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat)); + } +/* XXX OVERFLOW ? */ + snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path, + strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name); + if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0) + continue; + stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib)); + stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name); + stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0); + count++; + /* send up to 100 entries in one message */ + /* XXX check packet size instead */ + if (count == 100) + break; + } + if (count > 0) { + send_names(id, count, stats); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + free(stats[i].name); + free(stats[i].long_name); + } + } else { + send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF); + } + free(stats); + } +} + +static void +process_remove(u_int32_t id) +{ + char *name; + int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: remove", id); + logit("remove name \"%s\"", name); + r = unlink(name); + status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); + free(name); +} + +static void +process_mkdir(u_int32_t id) +{ + Attrib a; + char *name; + int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? + a.perm & 07777 : 0777; + debug3("request %u: mkdir", id); + logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode); + r = mkdir(name, mode); + status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); + free(name); +} + +static void +process_rmdir(u_int32_t id) +{ + char *name; + int r, status; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: rmdir", id); + logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name); + r = rmdir(name); + status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); + free(name); +} + +static void +process_realpath(u_int32_t id) +{ + char resolvedname[PATH_MAX]; + char *path; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (path[0] == '\0') { + free(path); + path = xstrdup("."); + } + debug3("request %u: realpath", id); + verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path); + if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) { + send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); + } else { + Stat s; + attrib_clear(&s.attrib); + s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname; + send_names(id, 1, &s); + } + free(path); +} + +static void +process_rename(u_int32_t id) +{ + char *oldpath, *newpath; + int r, status; + struct stat sb; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: rename", id); + logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); + status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; + if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { + /* Race-free rename of regular files */ + if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) { + if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS +#ifdef EXDEV + || errno == EXDEV +#endif +#ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO + || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO +#endif + ) { + struct stat st; + + /* + * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to + * stat+rename. This is racy. + */ + if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) { + if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) + status = + errno_to_portable(errno); + else + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + } else { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + } + } else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) { + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + /* clean spare link */ + unlink(newpath); + } else + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) { + if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) + status = errno_to_portable(errno); + else + status = SSH2_FX_OK; + } + send_status(id, status); + free(oldpath); + free(newpath); +} + +static void +process_readlink(u_int32_t id) +{ + int r, len; + char buf[PATH_MAX]; + char *path; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: readlink", id); + verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path); + if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1) + send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); + else { + Stat s; + + buf[len] = '\0'; + attrib_clear(&s.attrib); + s.name = s.long_name = buf; + send_names(id, 1, &s); + } + free(path); +} + +static void +process_symlink(u_int32_t id) +{ + char *oldpath, *newpath; + int r, status; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: symlink", id); + logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); + /* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */ + r = symlink(oldpath, newpath); + status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); + free(oldpath); + free(newpath); +} + +static void +process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id) +{ + char *oldpath, *newpath; + int r, status; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id); + logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); + r = rename(oldpath, newpath); + status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); + free(oldpath); + free(newpath); +} + +static void +process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id) +{ + char *path; + struct statvfs st; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug3("request %u: statvfs", id); + logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path); + + if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0) + send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); + else + send_statvfs(id, &st); + free(path); +} + +static void +process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id) +{ + int r, handle, fd; + struct statvfs st; + + if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)", + id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); + if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) { + send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); + return; + } + if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0) + send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); + else + send_statvfs(id, &st); +} + +static void +process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id) +{ + char *oldpath, *newpath; + int r, status; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + debug3("request %u: hardlink", id); + logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); + r = link(oldpath, newpath); + status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + send_status(id, status); + free(oldpath); + free(newpath); +} + +static void +process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id) +{ + int handle, fd, r, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; + + if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle); + verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle)); + if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) + status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; + else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { + r = fsync(fd); + status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; + } + send_status(id, status); +} + +static void +process_extended(u_int32_t id) +{ + char *request; + int i, r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { + if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) { + if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i])) + send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); + else + extended_handlers[i].handler(id); + break; + } + } + if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { + error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request); + send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */ + } + free(request); +} + +/* stolen from ssh-agent */ + +static void +process(void) +{ + u_int msg_len; + u_int buf_len; + u_int consumed; + u_char type; + const u_char *cp; + int i, r; + u_int32_t id; + + buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue); + if (buf_len < 5) + return; /* Incomplete message. */ + cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue); + msg_len = get_u32(cp); + if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { + error("bad message from %s local user %s", + client_addr, pw->pw_name); + sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11); + } + if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) + return; + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + buf_len -= 4; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + switch (type) { + case SSH2_FXP_INIT: + process_init(); + init_done = 1; + break; + case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED: + if (!init_done) + fatal("Received extended request before init"); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + process_extended(id); + break; + default: + if (!init_done) + fatal("Received %u request before init", type); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { + if (type == handlers[i].type) { + if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) { + send_status(id, + SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); + } else { + handlers[i].handler(id); + } + break; + } + } + if (handlers[i].handler == NULL) + error("Unknown message %u", type); + } + /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ + if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) { + error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); + sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); + } + consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue); + if (msg_len < consumed) { + error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed); + sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); + } + if (msg_len > consumed && + (r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +/* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */ +void +sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) { + handle_log_exit(); + logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]", + pw->pw_name, client_addr); + } + _exit(i); +} + +static void +sftp_server_usage(void) +{ + extern char *__progname; + + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] " + "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] " + "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n" + " %s -Q protocol_feature\n", + __progname, __progname); + exit(1); +} + +int +sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) +{ + fd_set *rset, *wset; + int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; + ssize_t len, olen, set_size; + SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; + char *cp, *homedir = NULL, uidstr[32], buf[4*4096]; + long mask; + + extern char *optarg; + extern char *__progname; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); + + pw = pwcopy(user_pw); + + while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, + "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'Q': + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n"); + exit(1); + } + for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) + printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name); + for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) + printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name); + exit(0); + break; + case 'R': + readonly = 1; + break; + case 'c': + /* + * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a + * shell using "sftp-server -c command" + */ + skipargs = 1; + break; + case 'e': + log_stderr = 1; + break; + case 'l': + log_level = log_level_number(optarg); + if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) + error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg); + break; + case 'f': + log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg); + if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) + error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg); + break; + case 'd': + cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid); + snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", + (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); + homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir, + "u", user_pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL); + free(cp); + break; + case 'p': + if (request_whitelist != NULL) + fatal("Permitted requests already set"); + request_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 'P': + if (request_blacklist != NULL) + fatal("Refused requests already set"); + request_blacklist = xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 'u': + errno = 0; + mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8); + if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' || + cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0)) + fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); + (void)umask((mode_t)mask); + break; + case 'h': + default: + sftp_server_usage(); + } + } + + log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); + + /* + * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps} + * available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically + * imply arbitrary code execution access that will break + * restricted configurations. + */ + platform_disable_tracing(1); /* strict */ + + /* Drop any fine-grained privileges we don't need */ + platform_pledge_sftp_server(); + + if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) { + client_addr = xstrdup(cp); + if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) { + error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"", + getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")); + sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); + } + *cp = '\0'; + } else + client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); + + logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]", + pw->pw_name, client_addr); + + in = STDIN_FILENO; + out = STDOUT_FILENO; + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + setmode(in, O_BINARY); + setmode(out, O_BINARY); +#endif + + max = 0; + if (in > max) + max = in; + if (out > max) + max = out; + + if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + rset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); + wset = xcalloc(howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); + + if (homedir != NULL) { + if (chdir(homedir) != 0) { + error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir, + strerror(errno)); + } + } + + set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); + for (;;) { + memset(rset, 0, set_size); + memset(wset, 0, set_size); + + /* + * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle + * the worst-case length packet it can generate, + * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 && + (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, + SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) + FD_SET(in, rset); + else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue); + if (olen > 0) + FD_SET(out, wset); + + if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + error("select: %s", strerror(errno)); + sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2); + } + + /* copy stdin to iqueue */ + if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { + len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); + if (len == 0) { + debug("read eof"); + sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0); + } else if (len < 0) { + error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); + sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + /* send oqueue to stdout */ + if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { + len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen); + if (len < 0) { + error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); + sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + + /* + * Process requests from client if we can fit the results + * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input + * and let the output queue drain. + */ + r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH); + if (r == 0) + process(); + else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } +} diff --git a/sftp.0 b/sftp.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed98400 --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp.0 @@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ +SFTP(1) General Commands Manual SFTP(1) + +NAME + sftp M-bM-^@M-^S secure file transfer program + +SYNOPSIS + sftp [-46aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher] + [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-l limit] + [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] [-S program] + [-s subsystem | sftp_server] destination + +DESCRIPTION + sftp is a file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which performs all + operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport. It may also use many + features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compression. + + The destination may be specified either as [user@]host[:path] or as a URI + in the form sftp://[user@]host[:port][/path]. + + If the destination includes a path and it is not a directory, sftp will + retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive authentication method + is used; otherwise it will do so after successful interactive + authentication. + + If no path is specified, or if the path is a directory, sftp will log in + to the specified host and enter interactive command mode, changing to the + remote directory if one was specified. An optional trailing slash can be + used to force the path to be interpreted as a directory. + + Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host names + from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in + square brackets to avoid ambiguity. + + The options are as follows: + + -4 Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only. + + -6 Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only. + + -a Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting + existing partial or complete copies of files. If the partial + contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant + file is likely to be corrupt. + + -B buffer_size + Specify the size of the buffer that sftp uses when transferring + files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of + higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes. + + -b batchfile + Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile + instead of stdin. Since it lacks user interaction it should be + used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication to + obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see + sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details). A batchfile of M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y may + be used to indicate standard input. sftp will abort if any of + the following commands fail: get, put, reget, reput, rename, ln, + rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, chmod, chown, chgrp, lpwd, df, + symlink, and lmkdir. Termination on error can be suppressed on a + command by command basis by prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y + character (for example, -rm /tmp/blah*). + + -C Enables compression (via ssh's -C flag). + + -c cipher + Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers. + This option is directly passed to ssh(1). + + -D sftp_server_path + Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via ssh(1)). + This option may be useful in debugging the client and server. + + -F ssh_config + Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh(1). + This option is directly passed to ssh(1). + + -f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after + transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if + the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. + + -i identity_file + Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public + key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to + ssh(1). + + -l limit + Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. + + -o ssh_option + Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in + ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which + there is no separate sftp command-line flag. For example, to + specify an alternate port use: sftp -oPort=24. For full details + of the options listed below, and their possible values, see + ssh_config(5). + + AddressFamily + BatchMode + BindAddress + BindInterface + CanonicalDomains + CanonicalizeFallbackLocal + CanonicalizeHostname + CanonicalizeMaxDots + CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs + CASignatureAlgorithms + CertificateFile + ChallengeResponseAuthentication + CheckHostIP + Ciphers + Compression + ConnectionAttempts + ConnectTimeout + ControlMaster + ControlPath + ControlPersist + GlobalKnownHostsFile + GSSAPIAuthentication + GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + HashKnownHosts + Host + HostbasedAuthentication + HostbasedKeyTypes + HostKeyAlgorithms + HostKeyAlias + HostName + IdentitiesOnly + IdentityAgent + IdentityFile + IPQoS + KbdInteractiveAuthentication + KbdInteractiveDevices + KexAlgorithms + LogLevel + MACs + NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost + NumberOfPasswordPrompts + PasswordAuthentication + PKCS11Provider + Port + PreferredAuthentications + ProxyCommand + ProxyJump + PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes + PubkeyAuthentication + RekeyLimit + SendEnv + ServerAliveInterval + ServerAliveCountMax + SetEnv + StrictHostKeyChecking + TCPKeepAlive + UpdateHostKeys + User + UserKnownHostsFile + VerifyHostKeyDNS + + -P port + Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. + + -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the + original files transferred. + + -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and + diagnostic messages from ssh(1). + + -R num_requests + Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time. + Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will + increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests. + + -r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and + downloading. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links + encountered in the tree traversal. + + -S program + Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection. The + program must understand ssh(1) options. + + -s subsystem | sftp_server + Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on + the remote host. A path is useful when the remote sshd(8) does + not have an sftp subsystem configured. + + -v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh. + +INTERACTIVE COMMANDS + Once in interactive mode, sftp understands a set of commands similar to + those of ftp(1). Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain + spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained + within pathnames that are recognized by glob(3) must be escaped with + backslashes (M-bM-^@M-^X\M-bM-^@M-^Y). + + bye Quit sftp. + + cd [path] + Change remote directory to path. If path is not specified, then + change directory to the one the session started in. + + chgrp grp path + Change group of file path to grp. path may contain glob(7) + characters and may match multiple files. grp must be a numeric + GID. + + chmod mode path + Change permissions of file path to mode. path may contain + glob(7) characters and may match multiple files. + + chown own path + Change owner of file path to own. path may contain glob(7) + characters and may match multiple files. own must be a numeric + UID. + + df [-hi] [path] + Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current + directory (or path if specified). If the -h flag is specified, + the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable" + suffixes. The -i flag requests display of inode information in + addition to capacity information. This command is only supported + on servers that implement the M-bM-^@M-^\statvfs@openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] extension. + + exit Quit sftp. + + get [-afPpr] remote-path [local-path] + Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine. If + the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name + it has on the remote machine. remote-path may contain glob(7) + characters and may match multiple files. If it does and + local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a + directory. + + If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial + transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that + any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If + the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then + the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. + + If the -f flag is specified, then fsync(2) will be called after + the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk. + + If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file + permissions and access times are copied too. + + If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied + recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when + performing recursive transfers. + + help Display help text. + + lcd [path] + Change local directory to path. If path is not specified, then + change directory to the local user's home directory. + + lls [ls-options [path]] + Display local directory listing of either path or current + directory if path is not specified. ls-options may contain any + flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command. path may + contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files. + + lmkdir path + Create local directory specified by path. + + ln [-s] oldpath newpath + Create a link from oldpath to newpath. If the -s flag is + specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a + hard link. + + lpwd Print local working directory. + + ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] + Display a remote directory listing of either path or the current + directory if path is not specified. path may contain glob(7) + characters and may match multiple files. + + The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of ls + accordingly: + + -1 Produce single columnar output. + + -a List files beginning with a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y). + + -f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is + lexicographical. + + -h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: + Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, + and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to + four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024, + M=1048576, etc.). + + -l Display additional details including permissions and + ownership information. + + -n Produce a long listing with user and group information + presented numerically. + + -r Reverse the sort order of the listing. + + -S Sort the listing by file size. + + -t Sort the listing by last modification time. + + lumask umask + Set local umask to umask. + + mkdir path + Create remote directory specified by path. + + progress + Toggle display of progress meter. + + put [-afPpr] local-path [remote-path] + Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the + remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it + has on the local machine. local-path may contain glob(7) + characters and may match multiple files. If it does and + remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a + directory. + + If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial + transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that + any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy. If + the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then + the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. + + If the -f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the + server to call fsync(2) after the file has been transferred. + Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the + "fsync@openssh.com" extension. + + If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file + permissions and access times are copied too. + + If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied + recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when + performing recursive transfers. + + pwd Display remote working directory. + + quit Quit sftp. + + reget [-Ppr] remote-path [local-path] + Resume download of remote-path. Equivalent to get with the -a + flag set. + + reput [-Ppr] [local-path] remote-path + Resume upload of [local-path]. Equivalent to put with the -a + flag set. + + rename oldpath newpath + Rename remote file from oldpath to newpath. + + rm path + Delete remote file specified by path. + + rmdir path + Remove remote directory specified by path. + + symlink oldpath newpath + Create a symbolic link from oldpath to newpath. + + version + Display the sftp protocol version. + + !command + Execute command in local shell. + + ! Escape to local shell. + + ? Synonym for help. + +SEE ALSO + ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), + glob(7), sftp-server(8), sshd(8) + + T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh- + filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material. + +OpenBSD 6.4 September 20, 2018 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/sftp.1 b/sftp.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0fd54ca --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp.1 @@ -0,0 +1,631 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.120 2018/09/20 06:58:48 jmc Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 20 2018 $ +.Dt SFTP 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm sftp +.Nd secure file transfer program +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm sftp +.Op Fl 46aCfpqrv +.Op Fl B Ar buffer_size +.Op Fl b Ar batchfile +.Op Fl c Ar cipher +.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path +.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config +.Op Fl i Ar identity_file +.Op Fl l Ar limit +.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option +.Op Fl P Ar port +.Op Fl R Ar num_requests +.Op Fl S Ar program +.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server +.Ar destination +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a file transfer program, similar to +.Xr ftp 1 , +which performs all operations over an encrypted +.Xr ssh 1 +transport. +It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and +compression. +.Pp +The +.Ar destination +may be specified either as +.Sm off +.Oo user @ Oc host Op : path +.Sm on +or as a URI in the form +.Sm off +.No sftp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path . +.Sm on +.Pp +If the +.Ar destination +includes a +.Ar path +and it is not a directory, +.Nm +will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive +authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after +successful interactive authentication. +.Pp +If no +.Ar path +is specified, or if the +.Ar path +is a directory, +.Nm +will log in to the specified +.Ar host +and enter interactive command mode, changing to the remote directory +if one was specified. +An optional trailing slash can be used to force the +.Ar path +to be interpreted as a directory. +.Pp +Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host +names from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be +enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl 4 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv4 addresses only. +.It Fl 6 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv6 addresses only. +.It Fl a +Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting +existing partial or complete copies of files. +If the partial contents differ from those being transferred, +then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. +.It Fl B Ar buffer_size +Specify the size of the buffer that +.Nm +uses when transferring files. +Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher +memory consumption. +The default is 32768 bytes. +.It Fl b Ar batchfile +Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input +.Ar batchfile +instead of +.Em stdin . +Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with +non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password +at connection time (see +.Xr sshd 8 +and +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +for details). +A +.Ar batchfile +of +.Sq \- +may be used to indicate standard input. +.Nm +will abort if any of the following +commands fail: +.Ic get , put , reget , reput, rename , ln , +.Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls , +.Ic lchdir , chmod , chown , +.Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink , +and +.Ic lmkdir . +Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by +prefixing the command with a +.Sq \- +character (for example, +.Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) . +.It Fl C +Enables compression (via ssh's +.Fl C +flag). +.It Fl c Ar cipher +Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers. +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path +Connect directly to a local sftp server +(rather than via +.Xr ssh 1 ) . +This option may be useful in debugging the client and server. +.It Fl F Ar ssh_config +Specifies an alternative +per-user configuration file for +.Xr ssh 1 . +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl f +Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer. +When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server +implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. +.It Fl i Ar identity_file +Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key +authentication is read. +This option is directly passed to +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl l Ar limit +Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. +.It Fl o Ar ssh_option +Can be used to pass options to +.Nm ssh +in the format used in +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +This is useful for specifying options +for which there is no separate +.Nm sftp +command-line flag. +For example, to specify an alternate port use: +.Ic sftp -oPort=24 . +For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact +.It AddressFamily +.It BatchMode +.It BindAddress +.It BindInterface +.It CanonicalDomains +.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal +.It CanonicalizeHostname +.It CanonicalizeMaxDots +.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs +.It CASignatureAlgorithms +.It CertificateFile +.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication +.It CheckHostIP +.It Ciphers +.It Compression +.It ConnectionAttempts +.It ConnectTimeout +.It ControlMaster +.It ControlPath +.It ControlPersist +.It GlobalKnownHostsFile +.It GSSAPIAuthentication +.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials +.It HashKnownHosts +.It Host +.It HostbasedAuthentication +.It HostbasedKeyTypes +.It HostKeyAlgorithms +.It HostKeyAlias +.It HostName +.It IdentitiesOnly +.It IdentityAgent +.It IdentityFile +.It IPQoS +.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication +.It KbdInteractiveDevices +.It KexAlgorithms +.It LogLevel +.It MACs +.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost +.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts +.It PasswordAuthentication +.It PKCS11Provider +.It Port +.It PreferredAuthentications +.It ProxyCommand +.It ProxyJump +.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +.It PubkeyAuthentication +.It RekeyLimit +.It SendEnv +.It ServerAliveInterval +.It ServerAliveCountMax +.It SetEnv +.It StrictHostKeyChecking +.It TCPKeepAlive +.It UpdateHostKeys +.It User +.It UserKnownHostsFile +.It VerifyHostKeyDNS +.El +.It Fl P Ar port +Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. +.It Fl p +Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the +original files transferred. +.It Fl q +Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and +diagnostic messages from +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Fl R Ar num_requests +Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time. +Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed +but will increase memory usage. +The default is 64 outstanding requests. +.It Fl r +Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading. +Note that +.Nm +does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. +.It Fl S Ar program +Name of the +.Ar program +to use for the encrypted connection. +The program must understand +.Xr ssh 1 +options. +.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server +Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server +on the remote host. +A path is useful when the remote +.Xr sshd 8 +does not have an sftp subsystem configured. +.It Fl v +Raise logging level. +This option is also passed to ssh. +.El +.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS +Once in interactive mode, +.Nm +understands a set of commands similar to those of +.Xr ftp 1 . +Commands are case insensitive. +Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes. +Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by +.Xr glob 3 +must be escaped with backslashes +.Pq Sq \e . +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ic bye +Quit +.Nm sftp . +.It Ic cd Op Ar path +Change remote directory to +.Ar path . +If +.Ar path +is not specified, then change directory to the one the session started in. +.It Ic chgrp Ar grp Ar path +Change group of file +.Ar path +to +.Ar grp . +.Ar path +may contain +.Xr glob 7 +characters and may match multiple files. +.Ar grp +must be a numeric GID. +.It Ic chmod Ar mode Ar path +Change permissions of file +.Ar path +to +.Ar mode . +.Ar path +may contain +.Xr glob 7 +characters and may match multiple files. +.It Ic chown Ar own Ar path +Change owner of file +.Ar path +to +.Ar own . +.Ar path +may contain +.Xr glob 7 +characters and may match multiple files. +.Ar own +must be a numeric UID. +.It Xo Ic df +.Op Fl hi +.Op Ar path +.Xc +Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory +(or +.Ar path +if specified). +If the +.Fl h +flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using +"human-readable" suffixes. +The +.Fl i +flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information. +This command is only supported on servers that implement the +.Dq statvfs@openssh.com +extension. +.It Ic exit +Quit +.Nm sftp . +.It Xo Ic get +.Op Fl afPpr +.Ar remote-path +.Op Ar local-path +.Xc +Retrieve the +.Ar remote-path +and store it on the local machine. +If the local +path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the +remote machine. +.Ar remote-path +may contain +.Xr glob 7 +characters and may match multiple files. +If it does and +.Ar local-path +is specified, then +.Ar local-path +must specify a directory. +.Pp +If the +.Fl a +flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files. +Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches +the remote copy. +If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the +resultant file is likely to be corrupt. +.Pp +If the +.Fl f +flag is specified, then +.Xr fsync 2 +will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file +to disk. +.Pp +If either the +.Fl P +or +.Fl p +flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are +copied too. +.Pp +If the +.Fl r +flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. +Note that +.Nm +does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. +.It Ic help +Display help text. +.It Ic lcd Op Ar path +Change local directory to +.Ar path . +If +.Ar path +is not specified, then change directory to the local user's home directory. +.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path +Display local directory listing of either +.Ar path +or current directory if +.Ar path +is not specified. +.Ar ls-options +may contain any flags supported by the local system's +.Xr ls 1 +command. +.Ar path +may contain +.Xr glob 7 +characters and may match multiple files. +.It Ic lmkdir Ar path +Create local directory specified by +.Ar path . +.It Xo Ic ln +.Op Fl s +.Ar oldpath +.Ar newpath +.Xc +Create a link from +.Ar oldpath +to +.Ar newpath . +If the +.Fl s +flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is +a hard link. +.It Ic lpwd +Print local working directory. +.It Xo Ic ls +.Op Fl 1afhlnrSt +.Op Ar path +.Xc +Display a remote directory listing of either +.Ar path +or the current directory if +.Ar path +is not specified. +.Ar path +may contain +.Xr glob 7 +characters and may match multiple files. +.Pp +The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of +.Ic ls +accordingly: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl 1 +Produce single columnar output. +.It Fl a +List files beginning with a dot +.Pq Sq \&. . +.It Fl f +Do not sort the listing. +The default sort order is lexicographical. +.It Fl h +When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte, +Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce +the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024, +M=1048576, etc.). +.It Fl l +Display additional details including permissions +and ownership information. +.It Fl n +Produce a long listing with user and group information presented +numerically. +.It Fl r +Reverse the sort order of the listing. +.It Fl S +Sort the listing by file size. +.It Fl t +Sort the listing by last modification time. +.El +.It Ic lumask Ar umask +Set local umask to +.Ar umask . +.It Ic mkdir Ar path +Create remote directory specified by +.Ar path . +.It Ic progress +Toggle display of progress meter. +.It Xo Ic put +.Op Fl afPpr +.Ar local-path +.Op Ar remote-path +.Xc +Upload +.Ar local-path +and store it on the remote machine. +If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has +on the local machine. +.Ar local-path +may contain +.Xr glob 7 +characters and may match multiple files. +If it does and +.Ar remote-path +is specified, then +.Ar remote-path +must specify a directory. +.Pp +If the +.Fl a +flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial +transfers of existing files. +Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file +matches the local copy. +If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then +the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. +.Pp +If the +.Fl f +flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call +.Xr fsync 2 +after the file has been transferred. +Note that this is only supported by servers that implement +the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. +.Pp +If either the +.Fl P +or +.Fl p +flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are +copied too. +.Pp +If the +.Fl r +flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. +Note that +.Nm +does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. +.It Ic pwd +Display remote working directory. +.It Ic quit +Quit +.Nm sftp . +.It Xo Ic reget +.Op Fl Ppr +.Ar remote-path +.Op Ar local-path +.Xc +Resume download of +.Ar remote-path . +Equivalent to +.Ic get +with the +.Fl a +flag set. +.It Xo Ic reput +.Op Fl Ppr +.Op Ar local-path +.Ar remote-path +.Xc +Resume upload of +.Op Ar local-path . +Equivalent to +.Ic put +with the +.Fl a +flag set. +.It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath +Rename remote file from +.Ar oldpath +to +.Ar newpath . +.It Ic rm Ar path +Delete remote file specified by +.Ar path . +.It Ic rmdir Ar path +Remove remote directory specified by +.Ar path . +.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath +Create a symbolic link from +.Ar oldpath +to +.Ar newpath . +.It Ic version +Display the +.Nm +protocol version. +.It Ic \&! Ns Ar command +Execute +.Ar command +in local shell. +.It Ic \&! +Escape to local shell. +.It Ic \&? +Synonym for help. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ftp 1 , +.Xr ls 1 , +.Xr scp 1 , +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr ssh_config 5 , +.Xr glob 7 , +.Xr sftp-server 8 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A S. Lehtinen +.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol" +.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt +.%D January 2001 +.%O work in progress material +.Re diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7db86c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp.c @@ -0,0 +1,2567 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.186 2018/09/07 04:26:56 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H +#include +#endif + +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H +#include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT +#include +#else +typedef void EditLine; +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "utf8.h" + +#include "sftp.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sftp-common.h" +#include "sftp-client.h" + +#define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */ +#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */ + +/* File to read commands from */ +FILE* infile; + +/* Are we in batchfile mode? */ +int batchmode = 0; + +/* PID of ssh transport process */ +static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1; + +/* Suppress diagnositic messages */ +int quiet = 0; + +/* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */ +int showprogress = 1; + +/* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */ +int global_rflag = 0; + +/* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */ +int global_aflag = 0; + +/* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */ +int global_pflag = 0; + +/* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */ +int global_fflag = 0; + +/* SIGINT received during command processing */ +volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0; + +/* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/ +int sort_flag; +glob_t *sort_glob; + +/* Context used for commandline completion */ +struct complete_ctx { + struct sftp_conn *conn; + char **remote_pathp; +}; + +int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, + int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */ + +extern char *__progname; + +/* Separators for interactive commands */ +#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" + +/* ls flags */ +#define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */ +#define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */ +#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */ +#define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */ +#define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */ +#define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */ +#define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */ +#define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */ +#define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */ + +#define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS) +#define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT) + +/* Commands for interactive mode */ +enum sftp_command { + I_CHDIR = 1, + I_CHGRP, + I_CHMOD, + I_CHOWN, + I_DF, + I_GET, + I_HELP, + I_LCHDIR, + I_LINK, + I_LLS, + I_LMKDIR, + I_LPWD, + I_LS, + I_LUMASK, + I_MKDIR, + I_PUT, + I_PWD, + I_QUIT, + I_REGET, + I_RENAME, + I_REPUT, + I_RM, + I_RMDIR, + I_SHELL, + I_SYMLINK, + I_VERSION, + I_PROGRESS, +}; + +struct CMD { + const char *c; + const int n; + const int t; +}; + +/* Type of completion */ +#define NOARGS 0 +#define REMOTE 1 +#define LOCAL 2 + +static const struct CMD cmds[] = { + { "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, + { "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, + { "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, + { "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE }, + { "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE }, + { "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE }, + { "df", I_DF, REMOTE }, + { "dir", I_LS, REMOTE }, + { "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, + { "get", I_GET, REMOTE }, + { "help", I_HELP, NOARGS }, + { "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, + { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, + { "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL }, + { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL }, + { "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE }, + { "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL }, + { "ls", I_LS, REMOTE }, + { "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS }, + { "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE }, + { "mget", I_GET, REMOTE }, + { "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL }, + { "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS }, + { "put", I_PUT, LOCAL }, + { "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE }, + { "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, + { "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE }, + { "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE }, + { "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL }, + { "rm", I_RM, REMOTE }, + { "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE }, + { "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE }, + { "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS }, + { "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS }, + { "?", I_HELP, NOARGS }, + { NULL, -1, -1 } +}; + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void +killchild(int signo) +{ + if (sshpid > 1) { + kill(sshpid, SIGTERM); + waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); + } + + _exit(1); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void +suspchild(int signo) +{ + if (sshpid > 1) { + kill(sshpid, signo); + while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) + continue; + } + kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static void +cmd_interrupt(int signo) +{ + const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n"; + int olderrno = errno; + + (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); + interrupted = 1; + errno = olderrno; +} + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +sigchld_handler(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + pid_t pid; + const char msg[] = "\rConnection closed. \n"; + + /* Report if ssh transport process dies. */ + while ((pid = waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WNOHANG)) == -1 && errno == EINTR) + continue; + if (pid == sshpid) { + (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); + sshpid = -1; + } + + errno = save_errno; +} + +static void +help(void) +{ + printf("Available commands:\n" + "bye Quit sftp\n" + "cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n" + "chgrp grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n" + "chmod mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n" + "chown own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n" + "df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n" + " filesystem containing 'path'\n" + "exit Quit sftp\n" + "get [-afPpRr] remote [local] Download file\n" + "reget [-fPpRr] remote [local] Resume download file\n" + "reput [-fPpRr] [local] remote Resume upload file\n" + "help Display this help text\n" + "lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n" + "lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n" + "lmkdir path Create local directory\n" + "ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n" + "lpwd Print local working directory\n" + "ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n" + "lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n" + "mkdir path Create remote directory\n" + "progress Toggle display of progress meter\n" + "put [-afPpRr] local [remote] Upload file\n" + "pwd Display remote working directory\n" + "quit Quit sftp\n" + "rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n" + "rm path Delete remote file\n" + "rmdir path Remove remote directory\n" + "symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n" + "version Show SFTP version\n" + "!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n" + "! Escape to local shell\n" + "? Synonym for help\n"); +} + +static void +local_do_shell(const char *args) +{ + int status; + char *shell; + pid_t pid; + + if (!*args) + args = NULL; + + if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + if ((pid = fork()) == -1) + fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (pid == 0) { + /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */ + if (args) { + debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); + execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); + } else { + debug3("Executing %s", shell); + execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL); + } + fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (!WIFEXITED(status)) + error("Shell exited abnormally"); + else if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) + error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); +} + +static void +local_do_ls(const char *args) +{ + if (!args || !*args) + local_do_shell(_PATH_LS); + else { + int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1; + char *buf = xmalloc(len); + + /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */ + snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args); + local_do_shell(buf); + free(buf); + } +} + +/* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ +static char * +path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip) +{ + size_t len; + + if (strip == NULL) + return (xstrdup(path)); + + len = strlen(strip); + if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) { + if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/') + len++; + return (xstrdup(path + len)); + } + + return (xstrdup(path)); +} + +static char * +make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd) +{ + char *abs_str; + + /* Derelativise */ + if (p && p[0] != '/') { + abs_str = path_append(pwd, p); + free(p); + return(abs_str); + } else + return(p); +} + +static int +parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, + int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag) +{ + extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; + int ch; + + optind = optreset = 1; + opterr = 0; + + *aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0; + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'a': + *aflag = 1; + break; + case 'f': + *fflag = 1; + break; + case 'p': + case 'P': + *pflag = 1; + break; + case 'r': + case 'R': + *rflag = 1; + break; + default: + error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); + return -1; + } + } + + return optind; +} + +static int +parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag) +{ + extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; + int ch; + + optind = optreset = 1; + opterr = 0; + + *sflag = 0; + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 's': + *sflag = 1; + break; + default: + error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); + return -1; + } + } + + return optind; +} + +static int +parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) +{ + extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; + int ch; + + optind = optreset = 1; + opterr = 0; + + *lflag = 0; + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'l': + *lflag = 1; + break; + default: + error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); + return -1; + } + } + + return optind; +} + +static int +parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) +{ + extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; + int ch; + + optind = optreset = 1; + opterr = 0; + + *lflag = LS_NAME_SORT; + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case '1': + *lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS; + *lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW; + break; + case 'S': + *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; + *lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT; + break; + case 'a': + *lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL; + break; + case 'f': + *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; + break; + case 'h': + *lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS; + break; + case 'l': + *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; + *lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW; + break; + case 'n': + *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; + *lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW; + break; + case 'r': + *lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT; + break; + case 't': + *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; + *lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT; + break; + default: + error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt); + return -1; + } + } + + return optind; +} + +static int +parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag) +{ + extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; + int ch; + + optind = optreset = 1; + opterr = 0; + + *hflag = *iflag = 0; + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'h': + *hflag = 1; + break; + case 'i': + *iflag = 1; + break; + default: + error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); + return -1; + } + } + + return optind; +} + +static int +parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc) +{ + extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; + int ch; + + optind = optreset = 1; + opterr = 0; + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + default: + error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); + return -1; + } + } + + return optind; +} + +static int +is_dir(const char *path) +{ + struct stat sb; + + /* XXX: report errors? */ + if (stat(path, &sb) == -1) + return(0); + + return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)); +} + +static int +remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) +{ + Attrib *a; + + /* XXX: report errors? */ + if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL) + return(0); + if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) + return(0); + return(S_ISDIR(a->perm)); +} + +/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */ +static int +pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname) +{ + size_t l = strlen(pathname); + + return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/'; +} + +static int +process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) +{ + char *abs_src = NULL; + char *abs_dst = NULL; + glob_t g; + char *filename, *tmp=NULL; + int i, r, err = 0; + + abs_src = xstrdup(src); + abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd); + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + + debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src); + if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { + if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { + error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src); + } else { + error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); + } + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + /* + * If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or + * unspecified. + */ + if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !is_dir(dst)) { + error("Multiple source paths, but destination " + "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst); + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { + tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); + if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { + error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); + free(tmp); + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) { + if (is_dir(dst)) { + abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); + } else { + abs_dst = xstrdup(dst); + } + } else if (dst) { + abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); + } else { + abs_dst = xstrdup(filename); + } + free(tmp); + + resume |= global_aflag; + if (!quiet && resume) + mprintf("Resuming %s to %s\n", + g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); + else if (!quiet && !resume) + mprintf("Fetching %s to %s\n", + g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); + if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { + if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, + pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, + fflag || global_fflag) == -1) + err = -1; + } else { + if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, + pflag || global_pflag, resume, + fflag || global_fflag) == -1) + err = -1; + } + free(abs_dst); + abs_dst = NULL; + } + +out: + free(abs_src); + globfree(&g); + return(err); +} + +static int +process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, + const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) +{ + char *tmp_dst = NULL; + char *abs_dst = NULL; + char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL; + glob_t g; + int err = 0; + int i, dst_is_dir = 1; + struct stat sb; + + if (dst) { + tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst); + tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd); + } + + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + debug3("Looking up %s", src); + if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) { + error("File \"%s\" not found.", src); + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + /* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */ + if (tmp_dst != NULL) + dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst); + + /* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */ + if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) { + error("Multiple paths match, but destination " + "\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst); + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { + if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) { + err = -1; + error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + + tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); + if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { + error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); + free(tmp); + err = -1; + goto out; + } + + if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) { + /* If directory specified, append filename */ + if (dst_is_dir) + abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); + else + abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst); + } else if (tmp_dst) { + abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); + } else { + abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd); + } + free(tmp); + + resume |= global_aflag; + if (!quiet && resume) + mprintf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n", + g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); + else if (!quiet && !resume) + mprintf("Uploading %s to %s\n", + g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); + if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { + if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, + pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, + fflag || global_fflag) == -1) + err = -1; + } else { + if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, + pflag || global_pflag, resume, + fflag || global_fflag) == -1) + err = -1; + } + } + +out: + free(abs_dst); + free(tmp_dst); + globfree(&g); + return(err); +} + +static int +sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) +{ + SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa; + SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb; + int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; + +#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) + if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) + return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename)); + else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) + return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime)); + else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) + return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size)); + + fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); +} + +/* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ +static int +do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, + const char *strip_path, int lflag) +{ + int n; + u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1; + SFTP_DIRENT **d; + + if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0) + return (n); + + if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { + u_int m = 0, width = 80; + struct winsize ws; + char *tmp; + + /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ + for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) { + if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) + m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(d[n]->filename)); + } + + /* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */ + tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path); + m += strlen(tmp); + free(tmp); + + if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) + width = ws.ws_col; + + columns = width / (m + 2); + columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); + colspace = width / columns; + colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width); + } + + if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { + for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) + ; /* count entries */ + sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); + qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp); + } + + for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) { + char *tmp, *fname; + + if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) + continue; + + tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename); + fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path); + free(tmp); + + if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { + if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) { + char *lname; + struct stat sb; + + memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); + attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb); + lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1, + (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); + mprintf("%s\n", lname); + free(lname); + } else + mprintf("%s\n", d[n]->longname); + } else { + mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname); + if (c >= columns) { + printf("\n"); + c = 1; + } else + c++; + } + + free(fname); + } + + if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) + printf("\n"); + + free_sftp_dirents(d); + return (0); +} + +static int +sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) +{ + u_int a = *(const u_int *)aa; + u_int b = *(const u_int *)bb; + const char *ap = sort_glob->gl_pathv[a]; + const char *bp = sort_glob->gl_pathv[b]; + const struct stat *as = sort_glob->gl_statv[a]; + const struct stat *bs = sort_glob->gl_statv[b]; + int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; + +#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) + if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) + return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp)); + else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) { +#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM) + return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <)); +#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME) + return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime)); +#else + return rmul * 1; +#endif + } else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) + return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_size, bs->st_size)); + + fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); +} + +/* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ +static int +do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, + const char *strip_path, int lflag) +{ + char *fname, *lname; + glob_t g; + int err, r; + struct winsize ws; + u_int i, j, nentries, *indices = NULL, c = 1; + u_int colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80; + + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + + if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path, + GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT, + NULL, &g)) != 0 || + (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) { + if (g.gl_pathc) + globfree(&g); + if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { + error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path); + } else { + error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path); + } + return -1; + } + + if (interrupted) + goto out; + + /* + * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory, + * then just list its contents. + */ + if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL && + S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) { + err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag); + globfree(&g); + return err; + } + + if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) + width = ws.ws_col; + + if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { + /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ + for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) + m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i])); + + columns = width / (m + 2); + columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); + colspace = width / columns; + } + + /* + * Sorting: rather than mess with the contents of glob_t, prepare + * an array of indices into it and sort that. For the usual + * unsorted case, the indices are just the identity 1=1, 2=2, etc. + */ + for (nentries = 0; g.gl_pathv[nentries] != NULL; nentries++) + ; /* count entries */ + indices = calloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices)); + for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++) + indices[i] = i; + + if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { + sort_glob = &g; + sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); + qsort(indices, nentries, sizeof(*indices), sglob_comp); + sort_glob = NULL; + } + + for (j = 0; j < nentries && !interrupted; j++) { + i = indices[j]; + fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path); + if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { + if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) { + error("no stat information for %s", fname); + continue; + } + lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1, + (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); + mprintf("%s\n", lname); + free(lname); + } else { + mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname); + if (c >= columns) { + printf("\n"); + c = 1; + } else + c++; + } + free(fname); + } + + if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) + printf("\n"); + + out: + if (g.gl_pathc) + globfree(&g); + free(indices); + + return 0; +} + +static int +do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag) +{ + struct sftp_statvfs st; + char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; + char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; + char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16]; + + if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1) + return -1; + if (st.f_files == 0) + strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity)); + else { + snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%", + (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / + st.f_files)); + } + if (st.f_blocks == 0) + strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity)); + else { + snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%", + (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / + st.f_blocks)); + } + if (iflag) { + printf(" Inodes Used Avail " + "(root) %%Capacity\n"); + printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %s\n", + (unsigned long long)st.f_files, + (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree), + (unsigned long long)st.f_favail, + (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity); + } else if (hflag) { + strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used)); + strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail)); + strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root)); + strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total)); + fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used); + fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail); + fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root); + fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total); + printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n"); + printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %s\n", + s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity); + } else { + printf(" Size Used Avail " + "(root) %%Capacity\n"); + printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %s\n", + (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024), + (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * + (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024), + (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024), + (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024), + s_dcapacity); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping + * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that + * does not glob it. + */ +static void +undo_glob_escape(char *s) +{ + size_t i, j; + + for (i = j = 0;;) { + if (s[i] == '\0') { + s[j] = '\0'; + return; + } + if (s[i] != '\\') { + s[j++] = s[i++]; + continue; + } + /* s[i] == '\\' */ + ++i; + switch (s[i]) { + case '?': + case '[': + case '*': + case '\\': + s[j++] = s[i++]; + break; + case '\0': + s[j++] = '\\'; + s[j] = '\0'; + return; + default: + s[j++] = '\\'; + s[j++] = s[i++]; + break; + } + } +} + +/* + * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting, + * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3) + * wildcards. + * The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for + * use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion. + * + * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments. + * + * If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last + * argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\""). + * + * If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the + * last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise. + * This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set. + */ +#define MAXARGS 128 +#define MAXARGLEN 8192 +static char ** +makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote, + u_int *terminated) +{ + int argc, quot; + size_t i, j; + static char argvs[MAXARGLEN]; + static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1]; + enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q; + + *argcp = argc = 0; + if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) { + args_too_longs: + error("string too long"); + return NULL; + } + if (terminated != NULL) + *terminated = 1; + if (lastquote != NULL) + *lastquote = '\0'; + state = MA_START; + i = j = 0; + for (;;) { + if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){ + error("Too many arguments."); + return NULL; + } + if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) { + if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { + /* Terminate current argument */ + argvs[j++] = '\0'; + argc++; + state = MA_START; + } else if (state != MA_START) + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + } else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') { + q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE; + if (state == MA_START) { + argv[argc] = argvs + j; + state = q; + if (lastquote != NULL) + *lastquote = arg[i]; + } else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) + state = q; + else if (state == q) + state = MA_UNQUOTED; + else + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + } else if (arg[i] == '\\') { + if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { + quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"'; + /* Unescape quote we are in */ + /* XXX support \n and friends? */ + if (arg[i + 1] == quot) { + i++; + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + } else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || + arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') { + /* + * Special case for sftp: append + * double-escaped glob sequence - + * glob will undo one level of + * escaping. NB. string can grow here. + */ + if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5) + goto args_too_longs; + argvs[j++] = '\\'; + argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; + argvs[j++] = '\\'; + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + } else { + argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + } + } else { + if (state == MA_START) { + argv[argc] = argvs + j; + state = MA_UNQUOTED; + if (lastquote != NULL) + *lastquote = '\0'; + } + if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || + arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') { + /* + * Special case for sftp: append + * escaped glob sequence - + * glob will undo one level of + * escaping. + */ + argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + } else { + /* Unescape everything */ + /* XXX support \n and friends? */ + i++; + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + } + } + } else if (arg[i] == '#') { + if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + else + goto string_done; + } else if (arg[i] == '\0') { + if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { + if (sloppy) { + state = MA_UNQUOTED; + if (terminated != NULL) + *terminated = 0; + goto string_done; + } + error("Unterminated quoted argument"); + return NULL; + } + string_done: + if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { + argvs[j++] = '\0'; + argc++; + } + break; + } else { + if (state == MA_START) { + argv[argc] = argvs + j; + state = MA_UNQUOTED; + if (lastquote != NULL) + *lastquote = '\0'; + } + if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) && + (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) { + /* + * Special case for sftp: escape quoted + * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow + * here. + */ + if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3) + goto args_too_longs; + argvs[j++] = '\\'; + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + } else + argvs[j++] = arg[i]; + } + i++; + } + *argcp = argc; + return argv; +} + +static int +parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *aflag, + int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag, + int *rflag, int *sflag, + unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2) +{ + const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp; + char *cp2, **argv; + int base = 0; + long l; + int path1_mandatory = 0, i, cmdnum, optidx, argc; + + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + + /* Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) */ + *ignore_errors = 0; + if (*cp == '-') { + *ignore_errors = 1; + cp++; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + } + + /* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */ + if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#') + return (0); + + if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) + return -1; + + /* Figure out which command we have */ + for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) { + if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0) + break; + } + cmdnum = cmds[i].n; + cmd = cmds[i].c; + + /* Special case */ + if (*cp == '!') { + cp++; + cmdnum = I_SHELL; + } else if (cmdnum == -1) { + error("Invalid command."); + return -1; + } + + /* Get arguments and parse flags */ + *aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0; + *rflag = *sflag = 0; + *path1 = *path2 = NULL; + optidx = 1; + switch (cmdnum) { + case I_GET: + case I_REGET: + case I_REPUT: + case I_PUT: + if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc, + aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1) + return -1; + /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */ + if (argc - optidx < 1) { + error("You must specify at least one path after a " + "%s command.", cmd); + return -1; + } + *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); + /* Get second pathname (optional) */ + if (argc - optidx > 1) { + *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); + /* Destination is not globbed */ + undo_glob_escape(*path2); + } + break; + case I_LINK: + if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1) + return -1; + goto parse_two_paths; + case I_RENAME: + if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) + return -1; + goto parse_two_paths; + case I_SYMLINK: + if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) + return -1; + parse_two_paths: + if (argc - optidx < 2) { + error("You must specify two paths after a %s " + "command.", cmd); + return -1; + } + *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); + *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); + /* Paths are not globbed */ + undo_glob_escape(*path1); + undo_glob_escape(*path2); + break; + case I_RM: + case I_MKDIR: + case I_RMDIR: + case I_LMKDIR: + path1_mandatory = 1; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case I_CHDIR: + case I_LCHDIR: + if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) + return -1; + /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ + if (argc - optidx < 1) { + if (!path1_mandatory) + break; /* return a NULL path1 */ + error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", + cmd); + return -1; + } + *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); + /* Only "rm" globs */ + if (cmdnum != I_RM) + undo_glob_escape(*path1); + break; + case I_DF: + if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag, + iflag)) == -1) + return -1; + /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ + if (argc - optidx < 1) + *path1 = NULL; + else { + *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); + undo_glob_escape(*path1); + } + break; + case I_LS: + if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) + return(-1); + /* Path is optional */ + if (argc - optidx > 0) + *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); + break; + case I_LLS: + /* Skip ls command and following whitespace */ + cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + case I_SHELL: + /* Uses the rest of the line */ + break; + case I_LUMASK: + case I_CHMOD: + base = 8; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case I_CHOWN: + case I_CHGRP: + if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) + return -1; + /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */ + if (argc - optidx < 1) + goto need_num_arg; + errno = 0; + l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base); + if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' || + ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) || + l < 0) { + need_num_arg: + error("You must supply a numeric argument " + "to the %s command.", cmd); + return -1; + } + *n_arg = l; + if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK) + break; + /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ + if (argc - optidx < 2) { + error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", + cmd); + return -1; + } + *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); + break; + case I_QUIT: + case I_PWD: + case I_LPWD: + case I_HELP: + case I_VERSION: + case I_PROGRESS: + if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) + return -1; + break; + default: + fatal("Command not implemented"); + } + + *cpp = cp; + return(cmdnum); +} + +static int +parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd, + const char *startdir, int err_abort) +{ + char *path1, *path2, *tmp; + int ignore_errors = 0, aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, + iflag = 0; + int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0; + int cmdnum, i; + unsigned long n_arg = 0; + Attrib a, *aa; + char path_buf[PATH_MAX]; + int err = 0; + glob_t g; + + path1 = path2 = NULL; + cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &aflag, &fflag, &hflag, + &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2); + if (ignore_errors != 0) + err_abort = 0; + + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + + /* Perform command */ + switch (cmdnum) { + case 0: + /* Blank line */ + break; + case -1: + /* Unrecognized command */ + err = -1; + break; + case I_REGET: + aflag = 1; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case I_GET: + err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, + rflag, aflag, fflag); + break; + case I_REPUT: + aflag = 1; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case I_PUT: + err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, + rflag, aflag, fflag); + break; + case I_RENAME: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); + err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag); + break; + case I_SYMLINK: + sflag = 1; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case I_LINK: + if (!sflag) + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); + err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2); + break; + case I_RM: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); + for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { + if (!quiet) + mprintf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); + err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]); + if (err != 0 && err_abort) + break; + } + break; + case I_MKDIR: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + attrib_clear(&a); + a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; + a.perm = 0777; + err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1); + break; + case I_RMDIR: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + err = do_rmdir(conn, path1); + break; + case I_CHDIR: + if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0') + path1 = xstrdup(startdir); + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) { + err = 1; + break; + } + if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) { + free(tmp); + err = 1; + break; + } + if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) { + error("Can't change directory: Can't check target"); + free(tmp); + err = 1; + break; + } + if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) { + error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not " + "a directory", tmp); + free(tmp); + err = 1; + break; + } + free(*pwd); + *pwd = tmp; + break; + case I_LS: + if (!path1) { + do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag); + break; + } + + /* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */ + tmp = NULL; + if (*path1 != '/') + tmp = *pwd; + + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag); + break; + case I_DF: + /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ + if (path1 == NULL) + path1 = xstrdup(*pwd); + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag); + break; + case I_LCHDIR: + if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0') + path1 = xstrdup("~"); + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid()); + free(path1); + path1 = tmp; + if (chdir(path1) == -1) { + error("Couldn't change local directory to " + "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); + err = 1; + } + break; + case I_LMKDIR: + if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) { + error("Couldn't create local directory " + "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); + err = 1; + } + break; + case I_LLS: + local_do_ls(cmd); + break; + case I_SHELL: + local_do_shell(cmd); + break; + case I_LUMASK: + umask(n_arg); + printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg); + break; + case I_CHMOD: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + attrib_clear(&a); + a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; + a.perm = n_arg; + remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); + for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { + if (!quiet) + mprintf("Changing mode on %s\n", + g.gl_pathv[i]); + err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a); + if (err != 0 && err_abort) + break; + } + break; + case I_CHOWN: + case I_CHGRP: + path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); + remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); + for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { + if (!(aa = do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) { + if (err_abort) { + err = -1; + break; + } else + continue; + } + if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) { + error("Can't get current ownership of " + "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]); + if (err_abort) { + err = -1; + break; + } else + continue; + } + aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; + if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) { + if (!quiet) + mprintf("Changing owner on %s\n", + g.gl_pathv[i]); + aa->uid = n_arg; + } else { + if (!quiet) + mprintf("Changing group on %s\n", + g.gl_pathv[i]); + aa->gid = n_arg; + } + err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa); + if (err != 0 && err_abort) + break; + } + break; + case I_PWD: + mprintf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd); + break; + case I_LPWD: + if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) { + error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno)); + err = -1; + break; + } + mprintf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf); + break; + case I_QUIT: + /* Processed below */ + break; + case I_HELP: + help(); + break; + case I_VERSION: + printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn)); + break; + case I_PROGRESS: + showprogress = !showprogress; + if (showprogress) + printf("Progress meter enabled\n"); + else + printf("Progress meter disabled\n"); + break; + default: + fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum); + } + + if (g.gl_pathc) + globfree(&g); + free(path1); + free(path2); + + /* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */ + if (err_abort && err != 0) + return (-1); + else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT) + return (1); + + return (0); +} + +#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT +static char * +prompt(EditLine *el) +{ + return ("sftp> "); +} + +/* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */ +static void +complete_display(char **list, u_int len) +{ + u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen; + struct winsize ws; + char *tmp; + + /* Count entries for sort and find longest */ + for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) + m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(list[y])); + + if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) + width = ws.ws_col; + + m = m > len ? m - len : 0; + columns = width / (m + 2); + columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1); + colspace = width / columns; + colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width); + + printf("\n"); + m = 1; + for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) { + llen = strlen(list[y]); + tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : ""; + mprintf("%-*s", colspace, tmp); + if (m >= columns) { + printf("\n"); + m = 1; + } else + m++; + } + printf("\n"); +} + +/* + * Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word", + * attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next + * characters common to all entries in "list". + */ +static char * +complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count) +{ + if (word == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (count > 0) { + u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]); + + /* Find length of common stem */ + for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) { + u_int x; + + for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++) + if (list[0][x] != list[y][x]) + break; + + matchlen = x; + } + + if (matchlen > strlen(word)) { + char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]); + + tmp[matchlen] = '\0'; + return tmp; + } + } + + return xstrdup(word); +} + +/* Autocomplete a sftp command */ +static int +complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote, + int terminated) +{ + u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen; + char *tmp, **list, argterm[3]; + const LineInfo *lf; + + list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *)); + + /* No command specified: display all available commands */ + if (cmd == NULL) { + for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) + list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); + + list[count] = NULL; + complete_display(list, 0); + + for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++) + free(list[y]); + free(list); + return count; + } + + /* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */ + cmdlen = strlen(cmd); + for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) { + if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen)) + list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); + } + list[count] = NULL; + + if (count == 0) { + free(list); + return 0; + } + + /* Complete ambiguous command */ + tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count); + if (count > 1) + complete_display(list, 0); + + for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) + free(list[y]); + free(list); + + if (tmp != NULL) { + tmplen = strlen(tmp); + cmdlen = strlen(cmd); + /* If cmd may be extended then do so */ + if (tmplen > cmdlen) + if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1) + fatal("el_insertstr failed."); + lf = el_line(el); + /* Terminate argument cleanly */ + if (count == 1) { + y = 0; + if (!terminated) + argterm[y++] = quote; + if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ') + argterm[y++] = ' '; + argterm[y] = '\0'; + if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1) + fatal("el_insertstr failed."); + } + free(tmp); + } + + return count; +} + +/* + * Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any) + * represent local or remote files. + */ +static int +complete_is_remote(char *cmd) { + int i; + + if (cmd == NULL) + return -1; + + for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) { + if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c))) + return cmds[i].t; + } + + return -1; +} + +/* Autocomplete a filename "file" */ +static int +complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, + char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) +{ + glob_t g; + char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8]; + u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs; + int clen; + const LineInfo *lf; + + /* Glob from "file" location */ + if (file == NULL) + tmp = xstrdup("*"); + else + xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file); + + /* Check if the path is absolute. */ + isabs = tmp[0] == '/'; + + memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); + if (remote != LOCAL) { + tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path); + remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); + } else + glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); + + /* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */ + for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) { + /* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */ + if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') { + if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') + hadglob = 1; + break; + } + if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') + tmplen++; + if (tmp[tmplen] == '/') + pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */ + } + free(tmp); + tmp = NULL; + + if (g.gl_matchc == 0) + goto out; + + if (g.gl_matchc > 1) + complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen); + + /* Don't try to extend globs */ + if (file == NULL || hadglob) + goto out; + + tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc); + tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path); + free(tmp2); + + if (tmp == NULL) + goto out; + + tmplen = strlen(tmp); + filelen = strlen(file); + + /* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */ + cesc = isesc = 0; + for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) { + if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){ + isesc = 1; + cesc++; + } else + isesc = 0; + } + + if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) { + tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc; + len = strlen(tmp2); + /* quote argument on way out */ + for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) { + if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 || + (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2) + fatal("invalid multibyte character"); + ins[0] = '\\'; + memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen); + ins[clen + 1] = '\0'; + switch (tmp2[i]) { + case '\'': + case '"': + case '\\': + case '\t': + case '[': + case ' ': + case '#': + case '*': + if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) { + if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) + fatal("el_insertstr " + "failed."); + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1) + fatal("el_insertstr failed."); + break; + } + } + } + + lf = el_line(el); + if (g.gl_matchc == 1) { + i = 0; + if (!terminated && quote != '\0') + ins[i++] = quote; + if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' && + (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')) + ins[i++] = ' '; + ins[i] = '\0'; + if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) + fatal("el_insertstr failed."); + } + free(tmp); + + out: + globfree(&g); + return g.gl_matchc; +} + +/* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */ +static unsigned char +complete(EditLine *el, int ch) +{ + char **argv, *line, quote; + int argc, carg; + u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR; + const LineInfo *lf; + struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx; + + lf = el_line(el); + if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0) + fatal("%s: el_get failed", __func__); + + /* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */ + cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer; + line = xmalloc(cursor + 1); + memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor); + line[cursor] = '\0'; + argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, "e, &terminated); + free(line); + + /* Get all the arguments on the line */ + len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer; + line = xmalloc(len + 1); + memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len); + line[len] = '\0'; + argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL); + + /* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */ + if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' && + line[cursor] != '\n') { + free(line); + return ret; + } + + if (carg == 0) { + /* Show all available commands */ + complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1); + ret = CC_REDISPLAY; + } else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') { + /* Handle the command parsing */ + if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg, + quote, terminated) != 0) + ret = CC_REDISPLAY; + } else if (carg >= 1) { + /* Handle file parsing */ + int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]); + char *filematch = NULL; + + if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ') + filematch = argv[carg - 1]; + + if (remote != 0 && + complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn, + *complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch, + remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0) + ret = CC_REDISPLAY; + } + + free(line); + return ret; +} +#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ + +static int +interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2) +{ + char *remote_path; + char *dir = NULL, *startdir = NULL; + char cmd[2048]; + int err, interactive; + EditLine *el = NULL; +#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT + History *hl = NULL; + HistEvent hev; + extern char *__progname; + struct complete_ctx complete_ctx; + + if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { + if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL) + fatal("Couldn't initialise editline"); + if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL) + fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history"); + history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100); + el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl); + + el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt); + el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs"); + el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL); + el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1); + el_source(el, NULL); + + /* Tab Completion */ + el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete", + "Context sensitive argument completion", complete); + complete_ctx.conn = conn; + complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path; + el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx); + el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL); + /* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */ + el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL); + el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[5C", "em-next-word", NULL); + el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); + el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); + /* make ^w match ksh behaviour */ + el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL); + } +#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ + + remote_path = do_realpath(conn, "."); + if (remote_path == NULL) + fatal("Need cwd"); + startdir = xstrdup(remote_path); + + if (file1 != NULL) { + dir = xstrdup(file1); + dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path); + + if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) { + if (!quiet) + mprintf("Changing to: %s\n", dir); + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir); + if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, + &remote_path, startdir, 1) != 0) { + free(dir); + free(startdir); + free(remote_path); + free(conn); + return (-1); + } + } else { + /* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */ + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s", + global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir, + file2 == NULL ? "" : " ", + file2 == NULL ? "" : file2); + err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, + &remote_path, startdir, 1); + free(dir); + free(startdir); + free(remote_path); + free(conn); + return (err); + } + free(dir); + } + + setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); + setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); + + interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO); + err = 0; + for (;;) { + char *cp; + + signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + + if (el == NULL) { + if (interactive) + printf("sftp> "); + if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) { + if (interactive) + printf("\n"); + break; + } + if (!interactive) { /* Echo command */ + mprintf("sftp> %s", cmd); + if (strlen(cmd) > 0 && + cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] != '\n') + printf("\n"); + } + } else { +#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT + const char *line; + int count = 0; + + if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL || + count <= 0) { + printf("\n"); + break; + } + history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line); + if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n"); + continue; + } +#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ + } + + cp = strrchr(cmd, '\n'); + if (cp) + *cp = '\0'; + + /* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */ + interrupted = 0; + signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt); + + err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, + startdir, batchmode); + if (err != 0) + break; + } + signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + free(remote_path); + free(startdir); + free(conn); + +#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT + if (el != NULL) + el_end(el); +#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ + + /* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */ + return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1); +} + +static void +connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out) +{ + int c_in, c_out; + +#ifdef USE_PIPES + int pin[2], pout[2]; + + if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1)) + fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + *in = pin[0]; + *out = pout[1]; + c_in = pout[0]; + c_out = pin[1]; +#else /* USE_PIPES */ + int inout[2]; + + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) + fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); + *in = *out = inout[0]; + c_in = c_out = inout[1]; +#endif /* USE_PIPES */ + + if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1) + fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + else if (sshpid == 0) { + if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || + (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { + fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + close(*in); + close(*out); + close(c_in); + close(c_out); + + /* + * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must + * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands, + * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and + * kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the + * underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal. + */ + signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); + execvp(path, args); + fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + + signal(SIGTERM, killchild); + signal(SIGINT, killchild); + signal(SIGHUP, killchild); + signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); + signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); + signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); + signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); + close(c_in); + close(c_out); +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + extern char *__progname; + + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: %s [-46aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n" + " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] " + "[-i identity_file] [-l limit]\n" + " [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] " + "[-S program]\n" + " [-s subsystem | sftp_server] destination\n", + __progname); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int in, out, ch, err, tmp, port = -1; + char *host = NULL, *user, *cp, *file2 = NULL; + int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2; + char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL; + char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL; + const char *errstr; + LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + arglist args; + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + struct sftp_conn *conn; + size_t copy_buffer_len = DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN; + size_t num_requests = DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS; + long long limit_kbps = 0; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + msetlocale(); + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); + args.list = NULL; + addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); + addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no"); + addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no"); + addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no"); + addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes"); + + ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + infile = stdin; + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, + "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + /* Passed through to ssh(1) */ + case '4': + case '6': + case 'C': + addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); + break; + /* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */ + case 'F': + case 'c': + case 'i': + case 'o': + addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); + addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); + break; + case 'q': + ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; + quiet = 1; + showprogress = 0; + addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); + break; + case 'P': + port = a2port(optarg); + if (port <= 0) + fatal("Bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg); + break; + case 'v': + if (debug_level < 3) { + addargs(&args, "-v"); + ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level; + } + debug_level++; + break; + case '1': + sshver = 1; + if (sftp_server == NULL) + sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER; + break; + case '2': + sshver = 2; + break; + case 'a': + global_aflag = 1; + break; + case 'B': + copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); + if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0') + fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg); + break; + case 'b': + if (batchmode) + fatal("Batch file already specified."); + + /* Allow "-" as stdin */ + if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 && + (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg); + showprogress = 0; + quiet = batchmode = 1; + addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes"); + break; + case 'f': + global_fflag = 1; + break; + case 'p': + global_pflag = 1; + break; + case 'D': + sftp_direct = optarg; + break; + case 'l': + limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, + &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) + usage(); + limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ + break; + case 'r': + global_rflag = 1; + break; + case 'R': + num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); + if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0') + fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"", + optarg); + break; + case 's': + sftp_server = optarg; + break; + case 'S': + ssh_program = optarg; + replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); + break; + case 'h': + default: + usage(); + } + } + + if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) + showprogress = 0; + + log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + if (sftp_direct == NULL) { + if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2)) + usage(); + argv += optind; + + switch (parse_uri("sftp", *argv, &user, &host, &tmp, &file1)) { + case -1: + usage(); + break; + case 0: + if (tmp != -1) + port = tmp; + break; + default: + if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host, + &file1) == -1) { + /* Treat as a plain hostname. */ + host = xstrdup(*argv); + host = cleanhostname(host); + } + break; + } + file2 = *(argv + 1); + + if (!*host) { + fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n"); + usage(); + } + + if (port != -1) + addargs(&args, "-oPort %d", port); + if (user != NULL) { + addargs(&args, "-l"); + addargs(&args, "%s", user); + } + addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver); + + /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */ + if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL) + addargs(&args, "-s"); + + addargs(&args, "--"); + addargs(&args, "%s", host); + addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ? + sftp_server : "sftp")); + + connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out); + } else { + args.list = NULL; + addargs(&args, "sftp-server"); + + connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out); + } + freeargs(&args); + + conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps); + if (conn == NULL) + fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server"); + + if (!quiet) { + if (sftp_direct == NULL) + fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host); + else + fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct); + } + + err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2); + +#if !defined(USE_PIPES) + shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR); + shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR); +#endif + + close(in); + close(out); + if (batchmode) + fclose(infile); + + while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1 && sshpid > 1) + if (errno != EINTR) + fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s", + strerror(errno)); + + exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1); +} diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bde8bb --- /dev/null +++ b/sftp.h @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp.h,v 1.9 2008/06/13 00:12:02 dtucker Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-01.txt + */ + +/* version */ +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION 3 + +/* client to server */ +#define SSH2_FXP_INIT 1 +#define SSH2_FXP_OPEN 3 +#define SSH2_FXP_CLOSE 4 +#define SSH2_FXP_READ 5 +#define SSH2_FXP_WRITE 6 +#define SSH2_FXP_LSTAT 7 +#define SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 7 +#define SSH2_FXP_FSTAT 8 +#define SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT 9 +#define SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT 10 +#define SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR 11 +#define SSH2_FXP_READDIR 12 +#define SSH2_FXP_REMOVE 13 +#define SSH2_FXP_MKDIR 14 +#define SSH2_FXP_RMDIR 15 +#define SSH2_FXP_REALPATH 16 +#define SSH2_FXP_STAT 17 +#define SSH2_FXP_RENAME 18 +#define SSH2_FXP_READLINK 19 +#define SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK 20 + +/* server to client */ +#define SSH2_FXP_VERSION 2 +#define SSH2_FXP_STATUS 101 +#define SSH2_FXP_HANDLE 102 +#define SSH2_FXP_DATA 103 +#define SSH2_FXP_NAME 104 +#define SSH2_FXP_ATTRS 105 + +#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED 200 +#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY 201 + +/* attributes */ +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE 0x00000001 +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID 0x00000002 +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS 0x00000004 +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME 0x00000008 +#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED 0x80000000 + +/* portable open modes */ +#define SSH2_FXF_READ 0x00000001 +#define SSH2_FXF_WRITE 0x00000002 +#define SSH2_FXF_APPEND 0x00000004 +#define SSH2_FXF_CREAT 0x00000008 +#define SSH2_FXF_TRUNC 0x00000010 +#define SSH2_FXF_EXCL 0x00000020 + +/* statvfs@openssh.com f_flag flags */ +#define SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x00000001 +#define SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x00000002 + +/* status messages */ +#define SSH2_FX_OK 0 +#define SSH2_FX_EOF 1 +#define SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE 2 +#define SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED 3 +#define SSH2_FX_FAILURE 4 +#define SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE 5 +#define SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION 6 +#define SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST 7 +#define SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED 8 +#define SSH2_FX_MAX 8 + +struct passwd; + +int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *); +void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn)); diff --git a/smult_curve25519_ref.c b/smult_curve25519_ref.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e69934 --- /dev/null +++ b/smult_curve25519_ref.c @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: smult_curve25519_ref.c,v 1.2 2013/11/02 22:02:14 markus Exp $ */ +/* +version 20081011 +Matthew Dempsky +Public domain. +Derived from public domain code by D. J. Bernstein. +*/ + +int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *); + +static void add(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32],const unsigned int b[32]) +{ + unsigned int j; + unsigned int u; + u = 0; + for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j] + b[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } + u += a[31] + b[31]; out[31] = u; +} + +static void sub(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32],const unsigned int b[32]) +{ + unsigned int j; + unsigned int u; + u = 218; + for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { + u += a[j] + 65280 - b[j]; + out[j] = u & 255; + u >>= 8; + } + u += a[31] - b[31]; + out[31] = u; +} + +static void squeeze(unsigned int a[32]) +{ + unsigned int j; + unsigned int u; + u = 0; + for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j]; a[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } + u += a[31]; a[31] = u & 127; + u = 19 * (u >> 7); + for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j]; a[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } + u += a[31]; a[31] = u; +} + +static const unsigned int minusp[32] = { + 19, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 128 +} ; + +static void freeze(unsigned int a[32]) +{ + unsigned int aorig[32]; + unsigned int j; + unsigned int negative; + + for (j = 0;j < 32;++j) aorig[j] = a[j]; + add(a,a,minusp); + negative = -((a[31] >> 7) & 1); + for (j = 0;j < 32;++j) a[j] ^= negative & (aorig[j] ^ a[j]); +} + +static void mult(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32],const unsigned int b[32]) +{ + unsigned int i; + unsigned int j; + unsigned int u; + + for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) { + u = 0; + for (j = 0;j <= i;++j) u += a[j] * b[i - j]; + for (j = i + 1;j < 32;++j) u += 38 * a[j] * b[i + 32 - j]; + out[i] = u; + } + squeeze(out); +} + +static void mult121665(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32]) +{ + unsigned int j; + unsigned int u; + + u = 0; + for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += 121665 * a[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } + u += 121665 * a[31]; out[31] = u & 127; + u = 19 * (u >> 7); + for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += out[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; } + u += out[j]; out[j] = u; +} + +static void square(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32]) +{ + unsigned int i; + unsigned int j; + unsigned int u; + + for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) { + u = 0; + for (j = 0;j < i - j;++j) u += a[j] * a[i - j]; + for (j = i + 1;j < i + 32 - j;++j) u += 38 * a[j] * a[i + 32 - j]; + u *= 2; + if ((i & 1) == 0) { + u += a[i / 2] * a[i / 2]; + u += 38 * a[i / 2 + 16] * a[i / 2 + 16]; + } + out[i] = u; + } + squeeze(out); +} + +static void select(unsigned int p[64],unsigned int q[64],const unsigned int r[64],const unsigned int s[64],unsigned int b) +{ + unsigned int j; + unsigned int t; + unsigned int bminus1; + + bminus1 = b - 1; + for (j = 0;j < 64;++j) { + t = bminus1 & (r[j] ^ s[j]); + p[j] = s[j] ^ t; + q[j] = r[j] ^ t; + } +} + +static void mainloop(unsigned int work[64],const unsigned char e[32]) +{ + unsigned int xzm1[64]; + unsigned int xzm[64]; + unsigned int xzmb[64]; + unsigned int xzm1b[64]; + unsigned int xznb[64]; + unsigned int xzn1b[64]; + unsigned int a0[64]; + unsigned int a1[64]; + unsigned int b0[64]; + unsigned int b1[64]; + unsigned int c1[64]; + unsigned int r[32]; + unsigned int s[32]; + unsigned int t[32]; + unsigned int u[32]; + unsigned int j; + unsigned int b; + int pos; + + for (j = 0;j < 32;++j) xzm1[j] = work[j]; + xzm1[32] = 1; + for (j = 33;j < 64;++j) xzm1[j] = 0; + + xzm[0] = 1; + for (j = 1;j < 64;++j) xzm[j] = 0; + + for (pos = 254;pos >= 0;--pos) { + b = e[pos / 8] >> (pos & 7); + b &= 1; + select(xzmb,xzm1b,xzm,xzm1,b); + add(a0,xzmb,xzmb + 32); + sub(a0 + 32,xzmb,xzmb + 32); + add(a1,xzm1b,xzm1b + 32); + sub(a1 + 32,xzm1b,xzm1b + 32); + square(b0,a0); + square(b0 + 32,a0 + 32); + mult(b1,a1,a0 + 32); + mult(b1 + 32,a1 + 32,a0); + add(c1,b1,b1 + 32); + sub(c1 + 32,b1,b1 + 32); + square(r,c1 + 32); + sub(s,b0,b0 + 32); + mult121665(t,s); + add(u,t,b0); + mult(xznb,b0,b0 + 32); + mult(xznb + 32,s,u); + square(xzn1b,c1); + mult(xzn1b + 32,r,work); + select(xzm,xzm1,xznb,xzn1b,b); + } + + for (j = 0;j < 64;++j) work[j] = xzm[j]; +} + +static void recip(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int z[32]) +{ + unsigned int z2[32]; + unsigned int z9[32]; + unsigned int z11[32]; + unsigned int z2_5_0[32]; + unsigned int z2_10_0[32]; + unsigned int z2_20_0[32]; + unsigned int z2_50_0[32]; + unsigned int z2_100_0[32]; + unsigned int t0[32]; + unsigned int t1[32]; + int i; + + /* 2 */ square(z2,z); + /* 4 */ square(t1,z2); + /* 8 */ square(t0,t1); + /* 9 */ mult(z9,t0,z); + /* 11 */ mult(z11,z9,z2); + /* 22 */ square(t0,z11); + /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ mult(z2_5_0,t0,z9); + + /* 2^6 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_5_0); + /* 2^7 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^8 - 2^3 */ square(t0,t1); + /* 2^9 - 2^4 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^10 - 2^5 */ square(t0,t1); + /* 2^10 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_10_0,t0,z2_5_0); + + /* 2^11 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_10_0); + /* 2^12 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); } + /* 2^20 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_20_0,t1,z2_10_0); + + /* 2^21 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_20_0); + /* 2^22 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 2;i < 20;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); } + /* 2^40 - 2^0 */ mult(t0,t1,z2_20_0); + + /* 2^41 - 2^1 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^42 - 2^2 */ square(t0,t1); + /* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { square(t1,t0); square(t0,t1); } + /* 2^50 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_50_0,t0,z2_10_0); + + /* 2^51 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_50_0); + /* 2^52 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); } + /* 2^100 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_100_0,t1,z2_50_0); + + /* 2^101 - 2^1 */ square(t1,z2_100_0); + /* 2^102 - 2^2 */ square(t0,t1); + /* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 2;i < 100;i += 2) { square(t1,t0); square(t0,t1); } + /* 2^200 - 2^0 */ mult(t1,t0,z2_100_0); + + /* 2^201 - 2^1 */ square(t0,t1); + /* 2^202 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^250 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); } + /* 2^250 - 2^0 */ mult(t0,t1,z2_50_0); + + /* 2^251 - 2^1 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^252 - 2^2 */ square(t0,t1); + /* 2^253 - 2^3 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^254 - 2^4 */ square(t0,t1); + /* 2^255 - 2^5 */ square(t1,t0); + /* 2^255 - 21 */ mult(out,t1,z11); +} + +int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(unsigned char *q, + const unsigned char *n, + const unsigned char *p) +{ + unsigned int work[96]; + unsigned char e[32]; + unsigned int i; + for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) e[i] = n[i]; + e[0] &= 248; + e[31] &= 127; + e[31] |= 64; + for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) work[i] = p[i]; + mainloop(work,e); + recip(work + 32,work + 32); + mult(work + 64,work,work + 32); + freeze(work + 64); + for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) q[i] = work[64 + i]; + return 0; +} diff --git a/ssh-add.0 b/ssh-add.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d60ae71 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-add.0 @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +SSH-ADD(1) General Commands Manual SSH-ADD(1) + +NAME + ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the authentication agent + +SYNOPSIS + ssh-add [-cDdkLlqXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [file ...] + ssh-add -s pkcs11 + ssh-add -e pkcs11 + +DESCRIPTION + ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent, + ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files + ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519. + After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding + certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub + to the name of the private key file. Alternative file names can be given + on the command line. + + If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from + the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries + the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given. + + The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK + environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to + work. + + The options are as follows: + + -c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation + before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed + by ssh-askpass(1). Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero + exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into + the requester. + + -D Deletes all identities from the agent. + + -d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent. + If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the + default identities and their corresponding certificates will be + removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a + list of paths to public key files to specify keys and + certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is + found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry. + + -E fingerprint_hash + Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key + fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The + default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. + + -e pkcs11 + Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. + + -k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process + plain private keys only and skip certificates. + + -L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently + represented by the agent. + + -l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the + agent. + + -q Be quiet after a successful operation. + + -s pkcs11 + Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. + + -t life + Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The + lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format + specified in sshd_config(5). + + -X Unlock the agent. + + -x Lock the agent with a password. + +ENVIRONMENT + DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS + If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from + the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh-add + does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and + SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by + SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to + read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling + ssh-add from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some + machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null + to make this work.) + + SSH_AUTH_SOCK + Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate + with the agent. + +FILES + ~/.ssh/id_dsa + Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user. + + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa + Contains the ECDSA authentication identity of the user. + + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 + Contains the Ed25519 authentication identity of the user. + + ~/.ssh/id_rsa + Contains the RSA authentication identity of the user. + + Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that + ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others. + +EXIT STATUS + Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if + ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent. + +SEE ALSO + ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) + +AUTHORS + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by + Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo + de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and + created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol + versions 1.5 and 2.0. + +OpenBSD 6.4 August 29, 2017 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d5da927 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-add.1 @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.66 2017/08/29 13:05:58 jmc Exp $ +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd $Mdocdate: August 29 2017 $ +.Dt SSH-ADD 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-add +.Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ssh-add +.Op Fl cDdkLlqXx +.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash +.Op Fl t Ar life +.Op Ar +.Nm ssh-add +.Fl s Ar pkcs11 +.Nm ssh-add +.Fl e Ar pkcs11 +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +adds private key identities to the authentication agent, +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +When run without arguments, it adds the files +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa , +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , +and +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 . +After loading a private key, +.Nm +will try to load corresponding certificate information from the +filename obtained by appending +.Pa -cert.pub +to the name of the private key file. +Alternative file names can be given on the command line. +.Pp +If any file requires a passphrase, +.Nm +asks for the passphrase from the user. +The passphrase is read from the user's tty. +.Nm +retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given. +.Pp +The authentication agent must be running and the +.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK +environment variable must contain the name of its socket for +.Nm +to work. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl c +Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before +being used for authentication. +Confirmation is performed by +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 . +Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 , +rather than text entered into the requester. +.It Fl D +Deletes all identities from the agent. +.It Fl d +Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent. +If +.Nm +has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and +their corresponding certificates will be removed. +Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to +public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent. +If no public key is found at a given path, +.Nm +will append +.Pa .pub +and retry. +.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash +Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. +Valid options are: +.Dq md5 +and +.Dq sha256 . +The default is +.Dq sha256 . +.It Fl e Ar pkcs11 +Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library +.Ar pkcs11 . +.It Fl k +When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private +keys only and skip certificates. +.It Fl L +Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented +by the agent. +.It Fl l +Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. +.It Fl q +Be quiet after a successful operation. +.It Fl s Ar pkcs11 +Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library +.Ar pkcs11 . +.It Fl t Ar life +Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. +The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format +specified in +.Xr sshd_config 5 . +.It Fl X +Unlock the agent. +.It Fl x +Lock the agent with a password. +.El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS" +If +.Nm +needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current +terminal if it was run from a terminal. +If +.Nm +does not have a terminal associated with it but +.Ev DISPLAY +and +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +are set, it will execute the program specified by +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +(by default +.Dq ssh-askpass ) +and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. +This is particularly useful when calling +.Nm +from a +.Pa .xsession +or related script. +(Note that on some machines it +may be necessary to redirect the input from +.Pa /dev/null +to make this work.) +.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK +Identifies the path of a +.Ux Ns -domain +socket used to communicate with the agent. +.El +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa +Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user. +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa +Contains the ECDSA authentication identity of the user. +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 +Contains the Ed25519 authentication identity of the user. +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa +Contains the RSA authentication identity of the user. +.El +.Pp +Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. +Note that +.Nm +ignores identity files if they are accessible by others. +.Sh EXIT STATUS +Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, +and 2 if +.Nm +is unable to contact the authentication agent. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Sh AUTHORS +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt and Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH +protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..627c029 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-add.c @@ -0,0 +1,699 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.136 2018/09/19 02:03:02 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 implementation, + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "digest.h" + +/* argv0 */ +extern char *__progname; + +/* Default files to add */ +static char *default_files[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, + _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, +#endif +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, + _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, + NULL +}; + +static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; + +/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */ +static int lifetime = 0; + +/* User has to confirm key use */ +static int confirm = 0; + +/* Maximum number of signatures (XMSS) */ +static u_int maxsign = 0; +static u_int minleft = 0; + +/* we keep a cache of one passphrase */ +static char *pass = NULL; +static void +clear_pass(void) +{ + if (pass) { + explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); + free(pass); + pass = NULL; + } +} + +static int +delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag) +{ + struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL; + char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL; + int r, ret = -1; + + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) { + printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) { + if (!qflag) { + fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", + filename, comment); + } + ret = 0; + } else + fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", + filename, ssh_err(r)); + + if (key_only) + goto out; + + /* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */ + free(comment); + comment = NULL; + xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) + error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s", + certpath, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + + if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public)) + fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", + certpath, filename); + + if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) == 0) { + if (!qflag) { + fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", + certpath, comment); + } + ret = 0; + } else + fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", + certpath, ssh_err(r)); + + out: + sshkey_free(cert); + sshkey_free(public); + free(certpath); + free(comment); + + return ret; +} + +/* Send a request to remove all identities. */ +static int +delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag) +{ + int ret = -1; + + /* + * Since the agent might be forwarded, old or non-OpenSSH, when asked + * to remove all keys, attempt to remove both protocol v.1 and v.2 + * keys. + */ + if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0) + ret = 0; + /* ignore error-code for ssh1 */ + ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1); + + if (ret != 0) + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n"); + else if (!qflag) + fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n"); + + return ret; +} + +static int +add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag) +{ + struct sshkey *private, *cert; + char *comment = NULL; + char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL; + int r, fd, ret = -1; + size_t i; + u_int32_t left; + struct sshbuf *keyblob; + struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; + + if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) { + fd = STDIN_FILENO; + filename = "(stdin)"; + } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { + perror(filename); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors + * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong. + */ + if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) { + if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { + close(fd); + return -1; + } + } + if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, keyblob)) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", + filename, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(keyblob); + close(fd); + return -1; + } + close(fd); + + /* At first, try empty passphrase */ + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", &private, + &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", + filename, ssh_err(r)); + goto fail_load; + } + /* try last */ + if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) { + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private, + &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", + filename, ssh_err(r)); + goto fail_load; + } + } + if (private == NULL) { + /* clear passphrase since it did not work */ + clear_pass(); + snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %s%s: ", + filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); + for (;;) { + pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) + goto fail_load; + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, + &private, &comment)) == 0) + break; + else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", + filename, ssh_err(r)); + fail_load: + clear_pass(); + sshbuf_free(keyblob); + return -1; + } + clear_pass(); + snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, + "Bad passphrase, try again for %s%s: ", filename, + confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); + } + } + if (comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') + comment = xstrdup(filename); + sshbuf_free(keyblob); + + /* For XMSS */ + if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(private, filename)) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not add filename to private key: %s (%s)\n", + filename, comment); + goto out; + } + if (maxsign && minleft && + (r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) { + for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { + if (!sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], private)) + continue; + left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]); + if (left < minleft) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Only %d signatures left.\n", left); + break; + } + fprintf(stderr, "Skipping update: "); + if (left == minleft) { + fprintf(stderr, + "required signatures left (%d).\n", left); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, + "more signatures left (%d) than" + " required (%d).\n", left, minleft); + } + ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); + goto out; + } + ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); + } + + if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, + lifetime, confirm, maxsign)) == 0) { + ret = 0; + if (!qflag) { + fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", + filename, comment); + if (lifetime != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); + } + if (confirm != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm " + "each use of the key\n"); + } + } + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n", + filename, ssh_err(r)); + } + + /* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */ + if (key_only) + goto out; + + /* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */ + xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) + error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s", + certpath, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + + if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) { + error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", + certpath, filename); + sshkey_free(cert); + goto out; + } + + /* Graft with private bits */ + if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshkey_free(cert); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshkey_free(cert); + goto out; + } + sshkey_free(cert); + + if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, + lifetime, confirm, maxsign)) != 0) { + error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed: %s", certpath, + private->cert->key_id, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + /* success */ + if (!qflag) { + fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath, + private->cert->key_id); + if (lifetime != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", + lifetime); + } + if (confirm != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use " + "of the key\n"); + } + } + + out: + free(certpath); + free(comment); + sshkey_free(private); + + return ret; +} + +static int +update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag) +{ + char *pin = NULL; + int r, ret = -1; + + if (add) { + if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) + return -1; + } + + if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin, + lifetime, confirm)) == 0) { + ret = 0; + if (!qflag) { + fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n", + add ? "added" : "removed", id); + } + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n", + add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r)); + ret = -1; + } + free(pin); + return ret; +} + +static int +list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp) +{ + char *fp; + int r; + struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; + u_int32_t left; + size_t i; + + if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) + fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities: %s\n", + ssh_err(r)); + else + printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); + return -1; + } + for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { + if (do_fp) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i], + fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]), + fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i], + sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i])); + free(fp); + } else { + if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n", + ssh_err(r)); + continue; + } + fprintf(stdout, " %s", idlist->comments[i]); + left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]); + if (left > 0) + fprintf(stdout, + " [signatures left %d]", left); + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + } + } + ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); + return 0; +} + +static int +lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock) +{ + char prompt[100], *p1, *p2; + int r, passok = 1, ret = -1; + + strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt)); + p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + if (lock) { + strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt); + p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n"); + passok = 0; + } + explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2)); + free(p2); + } + if (passok) { + if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un"); + ret = 0; + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n", + lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r)); + } + } + explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1)); + free(p1); + return (ret); +} + +static int +do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag) +{ + if (deleting) { + if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1) + return -1; + } else { + if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1) + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname); + fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -E hash Specify hash algorithm used for fingerprints.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -k Load only keys and not certificates.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -c Require confirmation to sign using identities\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -m minleft Maxsign is only changed if less than minleft are left (for XMSS)\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -M maxsign Maximum number of signatures allowed (for XMSS)\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -q Be quiet after a successful operation.\n"); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + extern char *optarg; + extern int optind; + int agent_fd; + char *pkcs11provider = NULL; + int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0; + int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0, qflag = 0; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + seed_rng(); + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +#endif + + setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); + + /* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */ + switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) { + case 0: + break; + case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT: + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your " + "authentication agent.\n"); + exit(2); + default: + fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + exit(2); + } + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXE:e:M:m:qs:t:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'E': + fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); + if (fingerprint_hash == -1) + fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); + break; + case 'k': + key_only = 1; + break; + case 'l': + case 'L': + if (lflag != 0) + fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag); + lflag = ch; + break; + case 'x': + case 'X': + if (xflag != 0) + fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag); + xflag = ch; + break; + case 'c': + confirm = 1; + break; + case 'm': + minleft = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL); + if (minleft == 0) { + usage(); + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + break; + case 'M': + maxsign = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL); + if (maxsign == 0) { + usage(); + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + break; + case 'd': + deleting = 1; + break; + case 'D': + Dflag = 1; + break; + case 's': + pkcs11provider = optarg; + break; + case 'e': + deleting = 1; + pkcs11provider = optarg; + break; + case 't': + if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + break; + case 'q': + qflag = 1; + break; + default: + usage(); + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + } + + if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1) + fatal("Invalid combination of actions"); + else if (xflag) { + if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1) + ret = 1; + goto done; + } else if (lflag) { + if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1) + ret = 1; + goto done; + } else if (Dflag) { + if (delete_all(agent_fd, qflag) == -1) + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + + argc -= optind; + argv += optind; + if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { + if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider, + qflag) == -1) + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + if (argc == 0) { + char buf[PATH_MAX]; + struct passwd *pw; + struct stat st; + int count = 0; + + if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n", + (u_int)getuid()); + ret = 1; + goto done; + } + + for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) { + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, + default_files[i]); + if (stat(buf, &st) < 0) + continue; + if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf, + qflag) == -1) + ret = 1; + else + count++; + } + if (count == 0) + ret = 1; + } else { + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, + argv[i], qflag) == -1) + ret = 1; + } + } + clear_pass(); + +done: + ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd); + return ret; +} diff --git a/ssh-agent.0 b/ssh-agent.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f4575d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-agent.0 @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +SSH-AGENT(1) General Commands Manual SSH-AGENT(1) + +NAME + ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S authentication agent + +SYNOPSIS + ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] + [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]] + ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k + +DESCRIPTION + ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key + authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519). ssh-agent is usually started + in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other + windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program. + Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and + automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines + using ssh(1). + + The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using + ssh(1) (see AddKeysToAgent in ssh_config(5) for details) or ssh-add(1). + Multiple identities may be stored in ssh-agent concurrently and ssh(1) + will automatically use them if present. ssh-add(1) is also used to + remove keys from ssh-agent and to query the keys that are held in one. + + The options are as follows: + + -a bind_address + Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The + default is $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.. + + -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if + SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. + + -D Foreground mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will + not fork. + + -d Debug mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not + fork and will write debug information to standard error. + + -E fingerprint_hash + Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key + fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The + default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. + + -k Kill the current agent (given by the SSH_AGENT_PID environment + variable). + + -P pkcs11_whitelist + Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 shared + libraries that may be added using the -s option to ssh-add(1). + The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from + M-bM-^@M-^\/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*M-bM-^@M-^]. PKCS#11 libraries that do not + match the whitelist will be refused. See PATTERNS in + ssh_config(5) for a description of pattern-list syntax. + + -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout. This is the default if + SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell. + + -t life + Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added + to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a + time format specified in sshd_config(5). A lifetime specified + for an identity with ssh-add(1) overrides this value. Without + this option the default maximum lifetime is forever. + + If a command line is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the + agent. When the command dies, so does the agent. + + The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or + terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine, + and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the + connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user + can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the + network in a secure way. + + There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the + agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are + exported, eg ssh-agent xterm &. The second is that the agent prints the + needed shell commands (either sh(1) or csh(1) syntax can be generated) + which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg eval `ssh-agent -s` for + Bourne-type shells such as sh(1) or ksh(1) and eval `ssh-agent -c` for + csh(1) and derivatives. + + Later ssh(1) looks at these variables and uses them to establish a + connection to the agent. + + The agent will never send a private key over its request channel. + Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the + agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way, + private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent. + + A UNIX-domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in + the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible + only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or + another instance of the same user. + + The SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID. + + The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line + terminates. + +FILES + $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent. + UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the + authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by + the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the + agent exits. + +SEE ALSO + ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) + +AUTHORS + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by + Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo + de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and + created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol + versions 1.5 and 2.0. + +OpenBSD 6.4 November 30, 2016 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83b2b41 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-agent.1 @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.64 2016/11/30 06:54:26 jmc Exp $ +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $ +.Dt SSH-AGENT 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-agent +.Nd authentication agent +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ssh-agent +.Op Fl c | s +.Op Fl \&Dd +.Op Fl a Ar bind_address +.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash +.Op Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist +.Op Fl t Ar life +.Op Ar command Op Ar arg ... +.Nm ssh-agent +.Op Fl c | s +.Fl k +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication +(RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519). +.Nm +is usually started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and +all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent +program. +Through use of environment variables the agent can be located +and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other +machines using +.Xr ssh 1 . +.Pp +The agent initially does not have any private keys. +Keys are added using +.Xr ssh 1 +(see +.Cm AddKeysToAgent +in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for details) +or +.Xr ssh-add 1 . +Multiple identities may be stored in +.Nm +concurrently and +.Xr ssh 1 +will automatically use them if present. +.Xr ssh-add 1 +is also used to remove keys from +.Nm +and to query the keys that are held in one. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl a Ar bind_address +Bind the agent to the +.Ux Ns -domain +socket +.Ar bind_address . +The default is +.Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt . +.It Fl c +Generate C-shell commands on +.Dv stdout . +This is the default if +.Ev SHELL +looks like it's a csh style of shell. +.It Fl D +Foreground mode. +When this option is specified +.Nm +will not fork. +.It Fl d +Debug mode. +When this option is specified +.Nm +will not fork and will write debug information to standard error. +.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash +Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. +Valid options are: +.Dq md5 +and +.Dq sha256 . +The default is +.Dq sha256 . +.It Fl k +Kill the current agent (given by the +.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID +environment variable). +.It Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist +Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 shared libraries +that may be added using the +.Fl s +option to +.Xr ssh-add 1 . +The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from +.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* . +PKCS#11 libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused. +See PATTERNS in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for a description of pattern-list syntax. +.It Fl s +Generate Bourne shell commands on +.Dv stdout . +This is the default if +.Ev SHELL +does not look like it's a csh style of shell. +.It Fl t Ar life +Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent. +The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in +.Xr sshd_config 5 . +A lifetime specified for an identity with +.Xr ssh-add 1 +overrides this value. +Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever. +.El +.Pp +If a command line is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. +When the command dies, so does the agent. +.Pp +The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or +terminal. +Authentication data need not be stored on any other +machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network. +However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH +remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the +identities anywhere in the network in a secure way. +.Pp +There are two main ways to get an agent set up: +The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment +variables are exported, eg +.Cm ssh-agent xterm & . +The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either +.Xr sh 1 +or +.Xr csh 1 +syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg +.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s` +for Bourne-type shells such as +.Xr sh 1 +or +.Xr ksh 1 +and +.Cm eval `ssh-agent -c` +for +.Xr csh 1 +and derivatives. +.Pp +Later +.Xr ssh 1 +looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent. +.Pp +The agent will never send a private key over its request channel. +Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed +by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. +This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent. +.Pp +A +.Ux Ns -domain +socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the +.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK +environment +variable. +The socket is made accessible only to the current user. +This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same +user. +.Pp +The +.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID +environment variable holds the agent's process ID. +.Pp +The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command +line terminates. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent. +.Ux Ns -domain +sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. +These sockets should only be readable by the owner. +The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Sh AUTHORS +.An -nosplit +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by +.An Tatu Ylonen . +.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt +and +.An Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. +.An Markus Friedl +contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d8a8260 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-agent.c @@ -0,0 +1,1339 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.231 2018/05/11 03:38:51 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * The authentication agent program. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H +# include +#endif +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "match.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +#endif + +#ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST +# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*" +#endif + +/* Maximum accepted message length */ +#define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024) + +typedef enum { + AUTH_UNUSED, + AUTH_SOCKET, + AUTH_CONNECTION +} sock_type; + +typedef struct { + int fd; + sock_type type; + struct sshbuf *input; + struct sshbuf *output; + struct sshbuf *request; +} SocketEntry; + +u_int sockets_alloc = 0; +SocketEntry *sockets = NULL; + +typedef struct identity { + TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; + struct sshkey *key; + char *comment; + char *provider; + time_t death; + u_int confirm; +} Identity; + +struct idtable { + int nentries; + TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist; +}; + +/* private key table */ +struct idtable *idtab; + +int max_fd = 0; + +/* pid of shell == parent of agent */ +pid_t parent_pid = -1; +time_t parent_alive_interval = 0; + +/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */ +pid_t cleanup_pid = 0; + +/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */ +char socket_name[PATH_MAX]; +char socket_dir[PATH_MAX]; + +/* PKCS#11 path whitelist */ +static char *pkcs11_whitelist; + +/* locking */ +#define LOCK_SIZE 32 +#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16 +#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1 +int locked = 0; +u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE]; +u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE]; + +extern char *__progname; + +/* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */ +static long lifetime = 0; + +static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; + +static void +close_socket(SocketEntry *e) +{ + close(e->fd); + e->fd = -1; + e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; + sshbuf_free(e->input); + sshbuf_free(e->output); + sshbuf_free(e->request); +} + +static void +idtab_init(void) +{ + idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab)); + TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist); + idtab->nentries = 0; +} + +static void +free_identity(Identity *id) +{ + sshkey_free(id->key); + free(id->provider); + free(id->comment); + free(id); +} + +/* return matching private key for given public key */ +static Identity * +lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key) +{ + Identity *id; + + TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) { + if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) + return (id); + } + return (NULL); +} + +/* Check confirmation of keysign request */ +static int +confirm_key(Identity *id) +{ + char *p; + int ret = -1; + + p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + if (p != NULL && + ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", + id->comment, p)) + ret = 0; + free(p); + + return (ret); +} + +static void +send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ? + SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */ +static void +process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e) +{ + Identity *id; + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, idtab->nentries)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) { + if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, msg, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)) + != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) { + error("%s: put key/comment: %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + continue; + } + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + + +static char * +agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags) +{ + if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { + if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256) + return "rsa-sha2-256"; + else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512) + return "rsa-sha2-512"; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* ssh2 only */ +static void +process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) +{ + const u_char *data; + u_char *signature = NULL; + size_t dlen, slen = 0; + u_int compat = 0, flags; + int r, ok = -1; + struct sshbuf *msg; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + struct identity *id; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) { + error("%s: couldn't parse request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto send; + } + + if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) { + verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); + goto send; + } + if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) { + verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__); + goto send; + } + if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, + data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags), compat)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto send; + } + /* Success */ + ok = 0; + send: + sshkey_free(key); + if (ok == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + sshbuf_free(msg); + free(signature); +} + +/* shared */ +static void +process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e) +{ + int r, success = 0; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + Identity *id; + + if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: get key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto done; + } + if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) { + debug("%s: key not found", __func__); + goto done; + } + /* We have this key, free it. */ + if (idtab->nentries < 1) + fatal("%s: internal error: nentries %d", + __func__, idtab->nentries); + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + idtab->nentries--; + sshkey_free(key); + success = 1; + done: + send_status(e, success); +} + +static void +process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e) +{ + Identity *id; + + /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; + id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + } + + /* Mark that there are no identities. */ + idtab->nentries = 0; + + /* Send success. */ + send_status(e, 1); +} + +/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */ +static time_t +reaper(void) +{ + time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime(); + Identity *id, *nxt; + + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { + nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); + if (id->death == 0) + continue; + if (now >= id->death) { + debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment); + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + idtab->nentries--; + } else + deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death : + MINIMUM(deadline, id->death); + } + if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now) + return 0; + else + return (deadline - now); +} + +static void +process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e) +{ + Identity *id; + int success = 0, confirm = 0; + u_int seconds, maxsign; + char *comment = NULL; + time_t death = 0; + struct sshkey *k = NULL; + u_char ctype; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 || + k == NULL || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) { + error("%s: decode private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto err; + } + + while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &ctype)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto err; + } + switch (ctype) { + case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) { + error("%s: bad lifetime constraint: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto err; + } + death = monotime() + seconds; + break; + case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: + confirm = 1; + break; + case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &maxsign)) != 0) { + error("%s: bad maxsign constraint: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto err; + } + if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) { + error("%s: cannot enable maxsign: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto err; + } + break; + default: + error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype); + err: + sshbuf_reset(e->request); + free(comment); + sshkey_free(k); + goto send; + } + } + + success = 1; + if (lifetime && !death) + death = monotime() + lifetime; + if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) { + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + /* Increment the number of identities. */ + idtab->nentries++; + } else { + /* key state might have been updated */ + sshkey_free(id->key); + free(id->comment); + } + id->key = k; + id->comment = comment; + id->death = death; + id->confirm = confirm; +send: + send_status(e, success); +} + +/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */ +static void +process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) +{ + int r, success = 0, delay; + char *passwd; + u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE]; + static u_int fail_count = 0; + size_t pwlen; + + /* + * This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock, + * but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to + * do is abort. + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (pwlen == 0) { + debug("empty password not supported"); + } else if (locked && !lock) { + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), + passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) + fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) { + debug("agent unlocked"); + locked = 0; + fail_count = 0; + explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash)); + success = 1; + } else { + /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */ + if (fail_count < 100) + fail_count++; + delay = 100000 * fail_count; + debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds", + (double)delay/1000000); + usleep(delay); + } + explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash)); + } else if (!locked && lock) { + debug("agent locked"); + locked = 1; + arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt)); + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), + lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) + fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); + success = 1; + } + explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen); + free(passwd); + send_status(e, success); +} + +static void +no_identities(SocketEntry *e) +{ + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +static void +process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) +{ + char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; + int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; + u_int seconds; + time_t death = 0; + u_char type; + struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k; + Identity *id; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto send; + } + + while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto send; + } + switch (type) { + case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto send; + } + death = monotime() + seconds; + break; + case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: + confirm = 1; + break; + default: + error("%s: Unknown constraint type %d", __func__, type); + goto send; + } + } + if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { + verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", + provider, strerror(errno)); + goto send; + } + if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) { + verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": " + "provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider); + goto send; + } + debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider); + if (lifetime && !death) + death = monotime() + lifetime; + + count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + k = keys[i]; + if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) { + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); + id->key = k; + id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider); + id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */ + id->death = death; + id->confirm = confirm; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + idtab->nentries++; + success = 1; + } else { + sshkey_free(k); + } + keys[i] = NULL; + } +send: + free(pin); + free(provider); + free(keys); + send_status(e, success); +} + +static void +process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) +{ + char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX]; + int r, success = 0; + Identity *id, *nxt; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto send; + } + free(pin); + + if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) { + verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s", + provider, strerror(errno)); + goto send; + } + + debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider); + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { + nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); + /* Skip file--based keys */ + if (id->provider == NULL) + continue; + if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next); + free_identity(id); + idtab->nentries--; + } + } + if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0) + success = 1; + else + error("%s: pkcs11_del_provider failed", __func__); +send: + free(provider); + send_status(e, success); +} +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + +/* dispatch incoming messages */ + +static int +process_message(u_int socknum) +{ + u_int msg_len; + u_char type; + const u_char *cp; + int r; + SocketEntry *e; + + if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) { + fatal("%s: socket number %u >= allocated %u", + __func__, socknum, sockets_alloc); + } + e = &sockets[socknum]; + + if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5) + return 0; /* Incomplete message header. */ + cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input); + msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp); + if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) { + debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u", + __func__, socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN); + return -1; + } + if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4) + return 0; /* Incomplete message body. */ + + /* move the current input to e->request */ + sshbuf_reset(e->request); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) { + if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE || + r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) { + debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", __func__, socknum, e->fd, type); + + /* check whether agent is locked */ + if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) { + sshbuf_reset(e->request); + switch (type) { + case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: + /* send empty lists */ + no_identities(e); + break; + default: + /* send a fail message for all other request types */ + send_status(e, 0); + } + return 0; + } + + switch (type) { + case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK: + case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK: + process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES: + process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */ + break; + /* ssh2 */ + case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: + process_sign_request2(e); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: + process_request_identities(e); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY: + case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED: + process_add_identity(e); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY: + process_remove_identity(e); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: + process_remove_all_identities(e); + break; +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: + case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED: + process_add_smartcard_key(e); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: + process_remove_smartcard_key(e); + break; +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + default: + /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ + error("Unknown message %d", type); + sshbuf_reset(e->request); + send_status(e, 0); + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) +{ + u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc; + + set_nonblock(fd); + + if (fd > max_fd) + max_fd = fd; + + for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) + if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) { + sockets[i].fd = fd; + if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + sockets[i].type = type; + return; + } + old_alloc = sockets_alloc; + new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10; + sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); + for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++) + sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; + sockets_alloc = new_alloc; + sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd; + if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + sockets[old_alloc].type = type; +} + +static int +handle_socket_read(u_int socknum) +{ + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + socklen_t slen; + uid_t euid; + gid_t egid; + int fd; + + slen = sizeof(sunaddr); + fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen); + if (fd < 0) { + error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) < 0) { + error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + return -1; + } + if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { + error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", + (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid()); + close(fd); + return -1; + } + new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd); + return 0; +} + +static int +handle_conn_read(u_int socknum) +{ + char buf[1024]; + ssize_t len; + int r; + + if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) { + if (len == -1) { + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) + return 0; + error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s", + __func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, + strerror(errno)); + } + return -1; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + process_message(socknum); + return 0; +} + +static int +handle_conn_write(u_int socknum) +{ + ssize_t len; + int r; + + if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0) + return 0; /* shouldn't happen */ + if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd, + sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output), + sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) { + if (len == -1) { + if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) + return 0; + error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s", + __func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, + strerror(errno)); + } + return -1; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return 0; +} + +static void +after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd, u_int maxfds) +{ + size_t i; + u_int socknum, activefds = npfd; + + for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) { + if (pfd[i].revents == 0) + continue; + /* Find sockets entry */ + for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) { + if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET && + sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION) + continue; + if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd) + break; + } + if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) { + error("%s: no socket for fd %d", __func__, pfd[i].fd); + continue; + } + /* Process events */ + switch (sockets[socknum].type) { + case AUTH_SOCKET: + if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) == 0) + break; + if (npfd > maxfds) { + debug3("out of fds (active %u >= limit %u); " + "skipping accept", activefds, maxfds); + break; + } + if (handle_socket_read(socknum) == 0) + activefds++; + break; + case AUTH_CONNECTION: + if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0 && + handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0) { + goto close_sock; + } + if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 && + handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) { + close_sock: + if (activefds == 0) + fatal("activefds == 0 at close_sock"); + close_socket(&sockets[socknum]); + activefds--; + break; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + } +} + +static int +prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, int *timeoutp, u_int maxfds) +{ + struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp; + size_t i, j, npfd = 0; + time_t deadline; + + /* Count active sockets */ + for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { + switch (sockets[i].type) { + case AUTH_SOCKET: + case AUTH_CONNECTION: + npfd++; + break; + case AUTH_UNUSED: + break; + default: + fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type); + break; + } + } + if (npfd != *npfdp && + (pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL) + fatal("%s: recallocarray failed", __func__); + *pfdp = pfd; + *npfdp = npfd; + + for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { + switch (sockets[i].type) { + case AUTH_SOCKET: + if (npfd > maxfds) { + debug3("out of fds (active %zu >= limit %u); " + "skipping arming listener", npfd, maxfds); + break; + } + pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd; + pfd[j].revents = 0; + pfd[j].events = POLLIN; + j++; + break; + case AUTH_CONNECTION: + pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd; + pfd[j].revents = 0; + /* XXX backoff when input buffer full */ + pfd[j].events = POLLIN; + if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0) + pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT; + j++; + break; + default: + break; + } + } + deadline = reaper(); + if (parent_alive_interval != 0) + deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval : + MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval); + if (deadline == 0) { + *timeoutp = -1; /* INFTIM */ + } else { + if (deadline > INT_MAX / 1000) + *timeoutp = INT_MAX / 1000; + else + *timeoutp = deadline * 1000; + } + return (1); +} + +static void +cleanup_socket(void) +{ + if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid) + return; + debug("%s: cleanup", __func__); + if (socket_name[0]) + unlink(socket_name); + if (socket_dir[0]) + rmdir(socket_dir); +} + +void +cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + cleanup_socket(); + _exit(i); +} + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +cleanup_handler(int sig) +{ + cleanup_socket(); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_terminate(); +#endif + _exit(2); +} + +static void +check_parent_exists(void) +{ + /* + * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1, + * so testing for that should be safe. + */ + if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) { + /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */ + cleanup_socket(); + _exit(2); + } +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n" + " [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n" + " ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n"); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int ac, char **av) +{ + int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; + int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno; + char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL; +#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT + struct rlimit rlim; +#endif + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + pid_t pid; + char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; + size_t len; + mode_t prev_mask; + int timeout = -1; /* INFTIM */ + struct pollfd *pfd = NULL; + size_t npfd = 0; + u_int maxfds; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + /* drop */ + setegid(getgid()); + setgid(getgid()); + + platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */ + + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) == -1) + fatal("%s: getrlimit: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +#endif + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); + seed_rng(); + + while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'E': + fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); + if (fingerprint_hash == -1) + fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); + break; + case 'c': + if (s_flag) + usage(); + c_flag++; + break; + case 'k': + k_flag++; + break; + case 'P': + if (pkcs11_whitelist != NULL) + fatal("-P option already specified"); + pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 's': + if (c_flag) + usage(); + s_flag++; + break; + case 'd': + if (d_flag || D_flag) + usage(); + d_flag++; + break; + case 'D': + if (d_flag || D_flag) + usage(); + D_flag++; + break; + case 'a': + agentsocket = optarg; + break; + case 't': + if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); + usage(); + } + break; + default: + usage(); + } + } + ac -= optind; + av += optind; + + if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag)) + usage(); + + if (pkcs11_whitelist == NULL) + pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST); + + if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) { + shell = getenv("SHELL"); + if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 && + strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0) + c_flag = 1; + } + if (k_flag) { + const char *errstr = NULL; + + pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); + if (pidstr == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n", + SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); + exit(1); + } + pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) { + fprintf(stderr, + "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n", + SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr); + exit(1); + } + if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) { + perror("kill"); + exit(1); + } + format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n"; + printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); + printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid); + exit(0); + } + + /* + * Minimum file descriptors: + * stdio (3) + listener (1) + syslog (1 maybe) + connection (1) + + * a few spare for libc / stack protectors / sanitisers, etc. + */ +#define SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS (3+1+1+1+4) + if (rlim.rlim_cur < SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS) + fatal("%s: file descriptior rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)", + __progname, (long long)rlim.rlim_cur, SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS); + maxfds = rlim.rlim_cur - SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS; + + parent_pid = getpid(); + + if (agentsocket == NULL) { + /* Create private directory for agent socket */ + mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir)); + if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) { + perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir"); + exit(1); + } + snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir, + (long)parent_pid); + } else { + /* Try to use specified agent socket */ + socket_dir[0] = '\0'; + strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name); + } + + /* + * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from + * the parent. + */ + prev_mask = umask(0177); + sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); + if (sock < 0) { + /* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */ + *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */ + cleanup_exit(1); + } + umask(prev_mask); + + /* + * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present + * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent. + */ + if (D_flag || d_flag) { + log_init(__progname, + d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); + format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; + printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, + SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid); + fflush(stdout); + goto skip; + } + pid = fork(); + if (pid == -1) { + perror("fork"); + cleanup_exit(1); + } + if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */ + close(sock); + snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid); + if (ac == 0) { + format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; + printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, + SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, + SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); + printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid); + exit(0); + } + if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 || + setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) { + perror("setenv"); + exit(1); + } + execvp(av[0], av); + perror(av[0]); + exit(1); + } + /* child */ + log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); + + if (setsid() == -1) { + error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(1); + } + + (void)chdir("/"); + if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { + /* XXX might close listen socket */ + (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); + (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); + (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); + if (fd > 2) + close(fd); + } + +#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT + /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */ + rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) { + error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(1); + } +#endif + +skip: + + cleanup_pid = getpid(); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_init(0); +#endif + new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock); + if (ac > 0) + parent_alive_interval = 10; + idtab_init(); + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler); + signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler); + + if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); + platform_pledge_agent(); + + while (1) { + prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout, maxfds); + result = poll(pfd, npfd, timeout); + saved_errno = errno; + if (parent_alive_interval != 0) + check_parent_exists(); + (void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */ + if (result < 0) { + if (saved_errno == EINTR) + continue; + fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno)); + } else if (result > 0) + after_poll(pfd, npfd, maxfds); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a23c383 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-dss.c @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.37 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "digest.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#define INTBLOB_LEN 20 +#define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) + +int +ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) +{ + DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; + const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; + size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); + rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r); + slen = BN_num_bytes(sig_s); + if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); + BN_bn2bin(sig_r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); + BN_bn2bin(sig_s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-dss")) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN)) != 0) + goto out; + + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if (sigp != NULL) { + if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + ret = 0; + out: + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + DSA_SIG_free(sig); + sshbuf_free(b); + return ret; +} + +int +ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) +{ + DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; + BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL; + size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *ktype = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || + signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* fetch signature */ + if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; + } + + if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* parse signature */ + if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || + (sig_r = BN_new()) == NULL || + (sig_s = BN_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_r) == NULL) || + (BN_bin2bn(sigblob + INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_s) == NULL)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (!DSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ + + /* sha1 the data */ + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; + + switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) { + case 1: + ret = 0; + break; + case 0: + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + out: + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + DSA_SIG_free(sig); + BN_clear_free(sig_r); + BN_clear_free(sig_s); + sshbuf_free(b); + free(ktype); + if (sigblob != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); + free(sigblob); + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f55317 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,202 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.14 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "digest.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) +{ + ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; + const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s; + int hash_alg; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t len, dlen; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || + (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_r)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_s)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if (sigp != NULL) { + if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + ret = 0; + out: + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + sshbuf_free(b); + sshbuf_free(bb); + ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); + return ret; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) +{ + ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; + BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL; + int hash_alg; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t dlen; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; + char *ktype = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA || + signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || + (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* fetch signature */ + if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || + sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; + } + + /* parse signature */ + if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || + (sig_r = BN_new()) == NULL || + (sig_s = BN_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig_r) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig_s) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */ + + if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; + + switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) { + case 1: + ret = 0; + break; + case 0: + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + out: + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + sshbuf_free(b); + ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); + BN_clear_free(sig_r); + BN_clear_free(sig_s); + free(ktype); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5163e02 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-ed25519.c @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.7 2016/04/21 06:08:02 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "crypto_api.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "ssh.h" + +int +ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) +{ + u_char *sig = NULL; + size_t slen = 0, len; + unsigned long long smlen; + int r, ret; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 || + key->ed25519_sk == NULL || + datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES; + if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, data, datalen, + key->ed25519_sk)) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */ + goto out; + } + /* encode signature */ + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-ed25519")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if (sigp != NULL) { + if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + if (sig != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sig, slen); + free(sig); + } + + return r; +} + +int +ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *ktype = NULL; + const u_char *sigblob; + u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL; + size_t len; + unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0; + int r, ret; + + if (key == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 || + key->ed25519_pk == NULL || + datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES || + signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0) + goto out; + if (strcmp("ssh-ed25519", ktype) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; + } + if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + smlen = len + datalen; + mlen = smlen; + if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(sm, sigblob, len); + memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen); + if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen, + key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) { + debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d", + __func__, ret); + } + if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + /* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */ + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + if (sm != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sm, smlen); + free(sm); + } + if (m != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */ + free(m); + } + sshbuf_free(b); + free(ktype); + return r; +} diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..36180d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-gss.h @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.14 2018/07/10 09:13:30 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#ifndef _SSH_GSS_H +#define _SSH_GSS_H + +#ifdef GSSAPI + +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H +#include +#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) +#include +#endif + +#ifdef KRB5 +# ifndef HEIMDAL +# ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H +# include +# elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H) +# include +# endif + +/* Old MIT Kerberos doesn't seem to define GSS_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */ + +# if !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE +# define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name +# endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */ + +# endif /* !HEIMDAL */ +#endif /* KRB5 */ + +/* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */ +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE 60 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN 61 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE 63 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR 64 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK 65 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC 66 + +#define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 + +typedef struct { + char *filename; + char *envvar; + char *envval; + void *data; +} ssh_gssapi_ccache; + +typedef struct { + gss_buffer_desc displayname; + gss_buffer_desc exportedname; + gss_cred_id_t creds; + struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; +} ssh_gssapi_client; + +typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { + char *enc_name; + char *name; + gss_OID_desc oid; + int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *); + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); + void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); +} ssh_gssapi_mech; + +typedef struct { + OM_uint32 major; /* both */ + OM_uint32 minor; /* both */ + gss_ctx_id_t context; /* both */ + gss_name_t name; /* both */ + gss_OID oid; /* client */ + gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ + gss_name_t client; /* server */ + gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ +} Gssctxt; + +extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; + +int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *, gss_OID); +void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *); +ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *); +void ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void); +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *); + +struct sshbuf; +int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *); + +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *); +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *, ssh_gssapi_client *); +void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *); +char *ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *, OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32 *); +void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); +void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); +void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *, + const char *, const char *); +int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); + +/* In the server */ +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); +OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); +void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); +void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); +void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); +const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void); + +#endif /* GSSAPI */ + +#endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ diff --git a/ssh-keygen.0 b/ssh-keygen.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..906a338 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keygen.0 @@ -0,0 +1,585 @@ +SSH-KEYGEN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYGEN(1) + +NAME + ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S authentication key generation, management and conversion + +SYNOPSIS + ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa] + [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] + ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile] + ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile] + ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile] + ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile] + ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] + ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile] + ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile] + ssh-keygen -D pkcs11 + ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l] + ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file] + ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file] + ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g] + ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point] + ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines] + [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator] + ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-U] + [-D pkcs11_provider] [-n principals] [-O option] + [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ... + ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile] + ssh-keygen -A [-f prefix_path] + ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number] + file ... + ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ... + +DESCRIPTION + ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for + ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. + + The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option. If + invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key. + + ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman + group exchange (DH-GEX). See the MODULI GENERATION section for details. + + Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation + Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the + KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. + + Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs + this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa, + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, the + system administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in + /etc/rc. + + Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to + store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same + name but M-bM-^@M-^\.pubM-bM-^@M-^] appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The + passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an + empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A + passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a + series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of + characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not + simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only + 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases), + and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non- + alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using + the -p option. + + There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost + or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public + key copied to other machines. + + For keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format, there is also a comment + field in the key file that is only for convenience to the user to help + identify the key. The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever + is useful. The comment is initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user@hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the key is + created, but can be changed using the -c option. + + After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should + be placed to be activated. + + The options are as follows: + + -A For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which + host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default + key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key + type, and default comment. If -f has also been specified, its + argument is used as a prefix to the default path for the + resulting host key files. This is used by /etc/rc to generate + new host keys. + + -a rounds + When saving a private key this option specifies the number of KDF + (key derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result in + slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to brute- + force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). + + When screening DH-GEX candidates (using the -T command). This + option specifies the number of primality tests to perform. + + -B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key + file. + + -b bits + Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys, + the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 2048 bits. + Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be + exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys, + the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of + three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to + use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will + fail. Ed25519 keys have a fixed length and the -b flag will be + ignored. + + -C comment + Provides a new comment. + + -c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key + files. The program will prompt for the file containing the + private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the + new comment. + + -D pkcs11 + Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared + library pkcs11. When used in combination with -s, this option + indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the + CERTIFICATES section for details). + + -E fingerprint_hash + Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key + fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The + default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. + + -e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and + print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the -m + option. The default export format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. This option + allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, + including several commercial SSH implementations. + + -F hostname + Search for the specified hostname in a known_hosts file, listing + any occurrences found. This option is useful to find hashed host + names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the + -H option to print found keys in a hashed format. + + -f filename + Specifies the filename of the key file. + + -G output_file + Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX. These primes must be + screened for safety (using the -T option) before use. + + -g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records + using the -r command. + + -H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and + addresses with hashed representations within the specified file; + the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix. + These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do + not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be + disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames + and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non- + hashed names. + + -h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user + certificate. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. + + -I certificate_identity + Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see + the CERTIFICATES section for details. + + -i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file + in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH + compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows + importing keys from other software, including several commercial + SSH implementations. The default import format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. + + -J num_lines + Exit after screening the specified number of lines while + performing DH candidate screening using the -T option. + + -j start_line + Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH + candidate screening using the -T option. + + -K checkpt + Write the last line processed to the file checkpt while + performing DH candidate screening using the -T option. This will + be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been + processed if the job is restarted. + + -k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a + KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes + every key or certificate presented on the command line. + Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key + file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS + section. + + -L Prints the contents of one or more certificates. + + -l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. For RSA and DSA + keys ssh-keygen tries to find the matching public key file and + prints its fingerprint. If combined with -v, a visual ASCII art + representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint. + + -M memory + Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when + generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. + + -m key_format + Specify a key format for the -i (import) or -e (export) + conversion options. The supported key formats are: M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^] + (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), M-bM-^@M-^\PKCS8M-bM-^@M-^] (PEM PKCS8 public + key) or M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] (PEM public key). The default conversion format is + M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. Setting a format of M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] when generating or updating + a supported private key type will cause the key to be stored in + the legacy PEM private key format. + + -N new_passphrase + Provides the new passphrase. + + -n principals + Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be + included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple + principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the + CERTIFICATES section for details. + + -O option + Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may + be specified multiple times. See also the CERTIFICATES section + for further details. + + At present, no standard options are valid for host keys. The + options that are valid for user certificates are: + + clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for + clearing the default set of permissions so permissions + may be added individually. + + critical:name[=contents] + extension:name[=contents] + Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or + extension. The specified name should include a domain + suffix, e.g. M-bM-^@M-^\name@example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. If contents is + specified then it is included as the contents of the + extension/option encoded as a string, otherwise the + extension/option is created with no contents (usually + indicating a flag). Extensions may be ignored by a + client or server that does not recognise them, whereas + unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be + refused. + + force-command=command + Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or + command specified by the user when the certificate is + used for authentication. + + no-agent-forwarding + Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default). + + no-port-forwarding + Disable port forwarding (permitted by default). + + no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default). + + no-user-rc + Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by + default). + + no-x11-forwarding + Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default). + + permit-agent-forwarding + Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding. + + permit-port-forwarding + Allows port forwarding. + + permit-pty + Allows PTY allocation. + + permit-user-rc + Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8). + + permit-X11-forwarding + Allows X11 forwarding. + + source-address=address_list + Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate + is considered valid. The address_list is a comma- + separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in + CIDR format. + + -P passphrase + Provides the (old) passphrase. + + -p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of + creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file + containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for + the new passphrase. + + -Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. + + -q Silence ssh-keygen. + + -R hostname + Removes all keys belonging to hostname from a known_hosts file. + This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option + above). + + -r hostname + Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for + the specified public key file. + + -S start + Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for + DH-GEX. + + -s ca_key + Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please + see the CERTIFICATES section for details. + + When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key + file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial + number. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. + + -T output_file + Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the -G + option) for safety. + + -t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa + Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are + M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^]. + + -U When used in combination with -s, this option indicates that a CA + key resides in a ssh-agent(1). See the CERTIFICATES section for + more information. + + -u Update a KRL. When specified with -k, keys listed via the + command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL + being created. + + -V validity_interval + Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A + validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that + the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, + or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an + explicit time interval. + + The start time may be specified as the string M-bM-^@M-^\alwaysM-bM-^@M-^] to + indicate the certificate has no specified start time, a date in + YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format, a relative + time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by + an interval in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section + of sshd_config(5). + + The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a + YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time, a relative time starting with a plus + character or the string M-bM-^@M-^\foreverM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate that the + certificate has no expirty date. + + For example: M-bM-^@M-^\+52w1dM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day + from now), M-bM-^@M-^\-4w:+4wM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks + from now), M-bM-^@M-^\20100101123000:20110101123000M-bM-^@M-^] (valid from 12:30 PM, + January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), M-bM-^@M-^\-1d:20110101M-bM-^@M-^] + (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011). + M-bM-^@M-^\-1m:foreverM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from one minute ago and never expiring). + + -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages + about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli + generation. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The + maximum is 3. + + -W generator + Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH- + GEX. + + -y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an + OpenSSH public key to stdout. + + -z serial_number + Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to + distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. The + default serial number is zero. + + When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL + version number. + +MODULI GENERATION + ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group + Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step + process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory + intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for + suitability (a CPU-intensive process). + + Generation of primes is performed using the -G option. The desired + length of the primes may be specified by the -b option. For example: + + # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048 + + By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired + length range. This may be overridden using the -S option, which + specifies a different start point (in hex). + + Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for + suitability. This may be performed using the -T option. In this mode + ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified + using the -f option). For example: + + # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates + + By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests. + This may be overridden using the -a option. The DH generator value will + be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific + generator is desired, it may be requested using the -W option. Valid + generator values are 2, 3, and 5. + + Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli. It is important that + this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of + a connection share common moduli. + +CERTIFICATES + ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be + used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public + key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host) + names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority + (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify + its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys. + Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format + to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8). + + ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User + certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates + authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate: + + $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub + + The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub. + A host certificate requires the -h option: + + $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub + + The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub. + + It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by + providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by + providing its public half as an argument to -s: + + $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub + + Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a ssh-agent(1). + This is indicated by the -U flag and, again, the CA key must be + identified by its public half. + + $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub + + In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server + when the certificate is used for authentication. + + Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal + (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all + users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of + principals: + + $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub + $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub + + Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may + be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may + disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented + from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific + command. For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation + for the -O option above. + + Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The -V + option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A + certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be + considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from UNIX Epoch to + the distant future. + + For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA + public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Please refer to those + manual pages for details. + +KEY REVOCATION LISTS + ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). + These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a + compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are + being revoked by serial number. + + KRLs may be generated using the -k flag. This option reads one or more + files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may + either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one + per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or + contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID + (if the serial is zero or not available). + + Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the + types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke + certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete + original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines + containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some + directive-specific information. + + serial: serial_number[-serial_number] + Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial + numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be + expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are + specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers + including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been + specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option. + + id: key_id + Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA + key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using + the -s option. + + key: public_key + Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it + is revoked as a plain public key. + + sha1: public_key + Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL. + + sha256: public_key + Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the + KRL. KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by + OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9. + + hash: fingerprint + Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a + sshd(8) authentication log message or the ssh-keygen -l flag. + Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs + are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9. + + KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k. When this + option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the + KRL, adding to those already there. + + It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular + key (or keys). The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key + specified on the command line. If any key listed on the command line has + been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a + non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key + was revoked. + +FILES + ~/.ssh/id_dsa + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 + ~/.ssh/id_rsa + Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity + of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the + user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the + key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of + this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically + accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for + the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt + is made. + + ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub + ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub + Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA public key for + authentication. The contents of this file should be added to + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to + log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep + the contents of this file secret. + + /etc/moduli + Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format + is described in moduli(5). + +SEE ALSO + ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8) + + The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006. + +AUTHORS + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by + Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo + de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and + created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol + versions 1.5 and 2.0. + +OpenBSD 6.4 September 12, 2018 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bfa2eb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keygen.1 @@ -0,0 +1,904 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.150 2018/09/12 06:18:59 djm Exp $ +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 12 2018 $ +.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Bk -words +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Op Fl q +.Op Fl b Ar bits +.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa +.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase +.Op Fl C Ar comment +.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl p +.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase +.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase +.Op Fl f Ar keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl i +.Op Fl m Ar key_format +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl e +.Op Fl m Ar key_format +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl y +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl c +.Op Fl P Ar passphrase +.Op Fl C Ar comment +.Op Fl f Ar keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl l +.Op Fl v +.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl B +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl D Ar pkcs11 +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl F Ar hostname +.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file +.Op Fl l +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl H +.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl R Ar hostname +.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl r Ar hostname +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Op Fl g +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl G Ar output_file +.Op Fl v +.Op Fl b Ar bits +.Op Fl M Ar memory +.Op Fl S Ar start_point +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl T Ar output_file +.Fl f Ar input_file +.Op Fl v +.Op Fl a Ar rounds +.Op Fl J Ar num_lines +.Op Fl j Ar start_line +.Op Fl K Ar checkpt +.Op Fl W Ar generator +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl s Ar ca_key +.Fl I Ar certificate_identity +.Op Fl h +.Op Fl U +.Op Fl D Ar pkcs11_provider +.Op Fl n Ar principals +.Op Fl O Ar option +.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval +.Op Fl z Ar serial_number +.Ar +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl L +.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl A +.Op Fl f Ar prefix_path +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl k +.Fl f Ar krl_file +.Op Fl u +.Op Fl s Ar ca_public +.Op Fl z Ar version_number +.Ar +.Nm ssh-keygen +.Fl Q +.Fl f Ar krl_file +.Ar +.Ek +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +generates, manages and converts authentication keys for +.Xr ssh 1 . +.Nm +can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. +.Pp +The type of key to be generated is specified with the +.Fl t +option. +If invoked without any arguments, +.Nm +will generate an RSA key. +.Pp +.Nm +is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group +exchange (DH-GEX). +See the +.Sx MODULI GENERATION +section for details. +.Pp +Finally, +.Nm +can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether +given keys have been revoked by one. +See the +.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS +section for details. +.Pp +Normally each user wishing to use SSH +with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication +key in +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 +or +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . +Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys, +as seen in +.Pa /etc/rc . +.Pp +Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which +to store the private key. +The public key is stored in a file with the same name but +.Dq .pub +appended. +The program also asks for a passphrase. +The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase +(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of +arbitrary length. +A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a +series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of +characters you want. +Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are +not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English +prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad +passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, +numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters. +The passphrase can be changed later by using the +.Fl p +option. +.Pp +There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. +If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated +and the corresponding public key copied to other machines. +.Pp +For keys stored in the newer OpenSSH format, +there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for +convenience to the user to help identify the key. +The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful. +The comment is initialized to +.Dq user@host +when the key is created, but can be changed using the +.Fl c +option. +.Pp +After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys +should be placed to be activated. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl A +For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) +for which host keys +do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path, +an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment. +If +.Fl f +has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the +default path for the resulting host key files. +This is used by +.Pa /etc/rc +to generate new host keys. +.It Fl a Ar rounds +When saving a private key this option specifies the number of KDF +(key derivation function) rounds used. +Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased +resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). +.Pp +When screening DH-GEX candidates (using the +.Fl T +command). +This option specifies the number of primality tests to perform. +.It Fl B +Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file. +.It Fl b Ar bits +Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. +For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 2048 bits. +Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient. +DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. +For ECDSA keys, the +.Fl b +flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic +curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. +Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys +will fail. +Ed25519 keys have a fixed length and the +.Fl b +flag will be ignored. +.It Fl C Ar comment +Provides a new comment. +.It Fl c +Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. +The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for +the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. +.It Fl D Ar pkcs11 +Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library +.Ar pkcs11 . +When used in combination with +.Fl s , +this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details). +.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash +Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. +Valid options are: +.Dq md5 +and +.Dq sha256 . +The default is +.Dq sha256 . +.It Fl e +This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and +print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the +.Fl m +option. +The default export format is +.Dq RFC4716 . +This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including +several commercial SSH implementations. +.It Fl F Ar hostname +Search for the specified +.Ar hostname +in a +.Pa known_hosts +file, listing any occurrences found. +This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be +used in conjunction with the +.Fl H +option to print found keys in a hashed format. +.It Fl f Ar filename +Specifies the filename of the key file. +.It Fl G Ar output_file +Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX. +These primes must be screened for +safety (using the +.Fl T +option) before use. +.It Fl g +Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the +.Fl r +command. +.It Fl H +Hash a +.Pa known_hosts +file. +This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations +within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with +a .old suffix. +These hashes may be used normally by +.Nm ssh +and +.Nm sshd , +but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents +be disclosed. +This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe +to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names. +.It Fl h +When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user +certificate. +Please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details. +.It Fl I Ar certificate_identity +Specify the key identity when signing a public key. +Please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details. +.It Fl i +This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file +in the format specified by the +.Fl m +option and print an OpenSSH compatible private +(or public) key to stdout. +This option allows importing keys from other software, including several +commercial SSH implementations. +The default import format is +.Dq RFC4716 . +.It Fl J Ar num_lines +Exit after screening the specified number of lines +while performing DH candidate screening using the +.Fl T +option. +.It Fl j Ar start_line +Start screening at the specified line number +while performing DH candidate screening using the +.Fl T +option. +.It Fl K Ar checkpt +Write the last line processed to the file +.Ar checkpt +while performing DH candidate screening using the +.Fl T +option. +This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been +processed if the job is restarted. +.It Fl k +Generate a KRL file. +In this mode, +.Nm +will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the +.Fl f +flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line. +Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or +using the format described in the +.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS +section. +.It Fl L +Prints the contents of one or more certificates. +.It Fl l +Show fingerprint of specified public key file. +For RSA and DSA keys +.Nm +tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. +If combined with +.Fl v , +a visual ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the +fingerprint. +.It Fl M Ar memory +Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating +candidate moduli for DH-GEX. +.It Fl m Ar key_format +Specify a key format for the +.Fl i +(import) or +.Fl e +(export) conversion options. +The supported key formats are: +.Dq RFC4716 +(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), +.Dq PKCS8 +(PEM PKCS8 public key) +or +.Dq PEM +(PEM public key). +The default conversion format is +.Dq RFC4716 . +Setting a format of +.Dq PEM +when generating or updating a supported private key type will cause the +key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format. +.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase +Provides the new passphrase. +.It Fl n Ar principals +Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in +a certificate when signing a key. +Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas. +Please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details. +.It Fl O Ar option +Specify a certificate option when signing a key. +This option may be specified multiple times. +See also the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for further details. +.Pp +At present, no standard options are valid for host keys. +The options that are valid for user certificates are: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.It Ic clear +Clear all enabled permissions. +This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may +be added individually. +.Pp +.It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents +.It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents +Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension. +The specified +.Ar name +should include a domain suffix, e.g.\& +.Dq name@example.com . +If +.Ar contents +is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option +encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no +contents (usually indicating a flag). +Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them, +whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused. +.Pp +.It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command +Forces the execution of +.Ar command +instead of any shell or command specified by the user when +the certificate is used for authentication. +.Pp +.It Ic no-agent-forwarding +Disable +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +forwarding (permitted by default). +.Pp +.It Ic no-port-forwarding +Disable port forwarding (permitted by default). +.Pp +.It Ic no-pty +Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default). +.Pp +.It Ic no-user-rc +Disable execution of +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +by +.Xr sshd 8 +(permitted by default). +.Pp +.It Ic no-x11-forwarding +Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default). +.Pp +.It Ic permit-agent-forwarding +Allows +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +forwarding. +.Pp +.It Ic permit-port-forwarding +Allows port forwarding. +.Pp +.It Ic permit-pty +Allows PTY allocation. +.Pp +.It Ic permit-user-rc +Allows execution of +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +by +.Xr sshd 8 . +.Pp +.It Ic permit-X11-forwarding +Allows X11 forwarding. +.Pp +.It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list +Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid. +The +.Ar address_list +is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR +format. +.El +.It Fl P Ar passphrase +Provides the (old) passphrase. +.It Fl p +Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of +creating a new private key. +The program will prompt for the file +containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the +new passphrase. +.It Fl Q +Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. +.It Fl q +Silence +.Nm ssh-keygen . +.It Fl R Ar hostname +Removes all keys belonging to +.Ar hostname +from a +.Pa known_hosts +file. +This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the +.Fl H +option above). +.It Fl r Ar hostname +Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named +.Ar hostname +for the specified public key file. +.It Fl S Ar start +Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. +.It Fl s Ar ca_key +Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. +Please see the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for details. +.Pp +When generating a KRL, +.Fl s +specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly +by key ID or serial number. +See the +.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS +section for details. +.It Fl T Ar output_file +Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the +.Fl G +option) for safety. +.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa +Specifies the type of key to create. +The possible values are +.Dq dsa , +.Dq ecdsa , +.Dq ed25519 , +or +.Dq rsa . +.It Fl U +When used in combination with +.Fl s , +this option indicates that a CA key resides in a +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +See the +.Sx CERTIFICATES +section for more information. +.It Fl u +Update a KRL. +When specified with +.Fl k , +keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than +a new KRL being created. +.It Fl V Ar validity_interval +Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. +A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the +certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist +of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval. +.Pp +The start time may be specified as the string +.Dq always +to indicate the certificate has no specified start time, +a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format, +a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by +an interval in the format described in the +TIME FORMATS section of +.Xr sshd_config 5 . +.Pp +The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time, +a relative time starting with a plus character or the string +.Dq forever +to indicate that the certificate has no expirty date. +.Pp +For example: +.Dq +52w1d +(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now), +.Dq -4w:+4w +(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now), +.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000 +(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), +.Dq -1d:20110101 +(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011). +.Dq -1m:forever +(valid from one minute ago and never expiring). +.It Fl v +Verbose mode. +Causes +.Nm +to print debugging messages about its progress. +This is helpful for debugging moduli generation. +Multiple +.Fl v +options increase the verbosity. +The maximum is 3. +.It Fl W Ar generator +Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX. +.It Fl y +This option will read a private +OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout. +.It Fl z Ar serial_number +Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish +this certificate from others from the same CA. +The default serial number is zero. +.Pp +When generating a KRL, the +.Fl z +flag is used to specify a KRL version number. +.El +.Sh MODULI GENERATION +.Nm +may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange +(DH-GEX) protocol. +Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate +primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process. +These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive +process). +.Pp +Generation of primes is performed using the +.Fl G +option. +The desired length of the primes may be specified by the +.Fl b +option. +For example: +.Pp +.Dl # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048 +.Pp +By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the +desired length range. +This may be overridden using the +.Fl S +option, which specifies a different start point (in hex). +.Pp +Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for +suitability. +This may be performed using the +.Fl T +option. +In this mode +.Nm +will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the +.Fl f +option). +For example: +.Pp +.Dl # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates +.Pp +By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests. +This may be overridden using the +.Fl a +option. +The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the +prime under consideration. +If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the +.Fl W +option. +Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5. +.Pp +Screened DH groups may be installed in +.Pa /etc/moduli . +It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and +that both ends of a connection share common moduli. +.Sh CERTIFICATES +.Nm +supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for +user or host authentication. +Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or +more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that +are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key. +Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature +on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys. +Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to +the X.509 certificates used in +.Xr ssl 8 . +.Pp +.Nm +supports two types of certificates: user and host. +User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates +authenticate server hosts to users. +To generate a user certificate: +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub +.Pp +The resultant certificate will be placed in +.Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub . +A host certificate requires the +.Fl h +option: +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub +.Pp +The host certificate will be output to +.Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub . +.Pp +It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by +providing the token library using +.Fl D +and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument +to +.Fl s : +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub +.Pp +Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +This is indicated by the +.Fl U +flag and, again, the CA key must be identified by its public half. +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub +.Pp +In all cases, +.Ar key_id +is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate +is used for authentication. +.Pp +Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host) +names. +By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts. +To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals: +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub +.Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub" +.Pp +Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may +be specified through certificate options. +A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be +valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may +force the use of a specific command. +For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the +.Fl O +option above. +.Pp +Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. +The +.Fl V +option allows specification of certificate start and end times. +A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be +considered valid. +By default, certificates are valid from +.Ux +Epoch to the distant future. +.Pp +For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA +public key must be trusted by +.Xr sshd 8 +or +.Xr ssh 1 . +Please refer to those manual pages for details. +.Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS +.Nm +is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). +These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a +compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being +revoked by serial number. +.Pp +KRLs may be generated using the +.Fl k +flag. +This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new +KRL. +The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, +listed one per line. +Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and +certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or +not available). +.Pp +Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the +types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke +certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original +certificate on hand. +A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives +followed by a colon and some directive-specific information. +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number +Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. +Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed +in decimal, hex or octal. +If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range +of serial numbers including and between each is revoked. +The CA key must have been specified on the +.Nm +command line using the +.Fl s +option. +.It Cm id : Ar key_id +Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. +The CA key must have been specified on the +.Nm +command line using the +.Fl s +option. +.It Cm key : Ar public_key +Revokes the specified key. +If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key. +.It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key +Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL. +.It Cm sha256 : Ar public_key +Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the KRL. +KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by OpenSSH versions +prior to 7.9. +.It Cm hash : Ar fingerprint +Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a +.Xr sshd 8 +authentication log message or the +.Nm +.Fl l +flag. +Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs are +not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9. +.El +.Pp +KRLs may be updated using the +.Fl u +flag in addition to +.Fl k . +When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into +the KRL, adding to those already there. +.Pp +It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key +(or keys). +The +.Fl Q +flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line. +If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered) +then +.Nm +will exit with a non-zero exit status. +A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa +Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA +authentication identity of the user. +This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. +It is possible to +specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be +used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. +This file is not automatically accessed by +.Nm +but it is offered as the default file for the private key. +.Xr ssh 1 +will read this file when a login attempt is made. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub +Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA +public key for authentication. +The contents of this file should be added to +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +on all machines +where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. +There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/moduli +Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. +The file format is described in +.Xr moduli 5 . +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr moduli 5 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Rs +.%R RFC 4716 +.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format" +.%D 2006 +.Re +.Sh AUTHORS +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt and Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH +protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..46b3af5 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -0,0 +1,2945 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.322 2018/09/14 04:17:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Identity and host key generation and maintenance. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "uuencode.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "dns.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "krl.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "utf8.h" +#include "authfd.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" +#else +# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" +#endif + +/* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */ +#define DEFAULT_BITS 2048 +#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 +#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256 +u_int32_t bits = 0; + +/* + * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase. This can be + * set on the command line. + */ +int change_passphrase = 0; + +/* + * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment. This can be set + * on the command line. + */ +int change_comment = 0; + +int quiet = 0; + +int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + +/* Flag indicating that we want to hash a known_hosts file */ +int hash_hosts = 0; +/* Flag indicating that we want lookup a host in known_hosts file */ +int find_host = 0; +/* Flag indicating that we want to delete a host from a known_hosts file */ +int delete_host = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that we want to show the contents of a certificate */ +int show_cert = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ +int print_fingerprint = 0; +int print_bubblebabble = 0; + +/* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */ +int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; + +/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */ +char identity_file[1024]; +int have_identity = 0; + +/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */ +char *identity_passphrase = NULL; + +/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */ +char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; + +/* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */ +char *identity_comment = NULL; + +/* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */ +char *ca_key_path = NULL; + +/* Prefer to use agent keys for CA signing */ +int prefer_agent = 0; + +/* Certificate serial number */ +unsigned long long cert_serial = 0; + +/* Key type when certifying */ +u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; + +/* "key ID" of signed key */ +char *cert_key_id = NULL; + +/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */ +char *cert_principals = NULL; + +/* Validity period for certificates */ +u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0; +u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL; + +/* Certificate options */ +#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1) +#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1) +#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2) +#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3) +#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4) +#define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \ + CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC) +u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT; +char *certflags_command = NULL; +char *certflags_src_addr = NULL; + +/* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */ +struct cert_userext { + char *key; + char *val; + int crit; +}; +struct cert_userext *cert_userext; +size_t ncert_userext; + +/* Conversion to/from various formats */ +int convert_to = 0; +int convert_from = 0; +enum { + FMT_RFC4716, + FMT_PKCS8, + FMT_PEM +} convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; +int print_public = 0; +int print_generic = 0; + +char *key_type_name = NULL; + +/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */ +char *pkcs11provider = NULL; + +/* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */ +int use_new_format = 1; + +/* Cipher for new-format private keys */ +char *new_format_cipher = NULL; + +/* + * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys / + * number of primality trials when screening moduli. + */ +int rounds = 0; + +/* argv0 */ +extern char *__progname; + +char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +/* moduli.c */ +int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); +int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, + unsigned long); +#endif + +static void +type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) +{ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + u_int maxbits, nid; +#endif + + if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) + fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); + if (*bitsp == 0) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (type == KEY_DSA) + *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA; + else if (type == KEY_ECDSA) { + if (name != NULL && + (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0) + *bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); + if (*bitsp == 0) + *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA; + } else +#endif + *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS; + } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ? + OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS; + if (*bitsp > maxbits) + fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits); + switch (type) { + case KEY_DSA: + if (*bitsp != 1024) + fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits"); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits", + SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) + fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are " + "256, 384 or 521 bits"); + } +#endif +} + +static void +ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) +{ + char buf[1024]; + char *name = NULL; + + if (key_type_name == NULL) + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; + else { + switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA; + break; +#endif + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; + break; + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; + break; + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS; + break; + default: + fatal("bad key type"); + } + } + snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), + "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); + printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); + fflush(stdout); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + exit(1); + buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; + if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0) + strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file)); + have_identity = 1; +} + +static struct sshkey * +load_identity(char *filename) +{ + char *pass; + struct sshkey *prv; + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, NULL)) == 0) + return prv; + if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); + if (identity_passphrase) + pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else + pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, NULL); + explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); + free(pass); + if (r != 0) + fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); + return prv; +} + +#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" +#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" +#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----" +#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +static void +do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k) +{ + size_t len; + u_char *blob; + char comment[61]; + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0) + fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ + snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), + "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", + sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k), + pw->pw_name, hostname); + + fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); + fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n", comment); + dump_base64(stdout, blob, len); + fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); + sshkey_free(k); + free(blob); + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { + case KEY_RSA: + if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed"); + break; + case KEY_DSA: + if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); + break; +#endif + default: + fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); + } + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { + case KEY_RSA: + if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed"); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); + } + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct sshkey *k; + struct stat st; + int r; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0) + k = load_identity(identity_file); + switch (convert_format) { + case FMT_RFC4716: + do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k); + break; + case FMT_PKCS8: + do_convert_to_pkcs8(k); + break; + case FMT_PEM: + do_convert_to_pem(k); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); + } + exit(0); +} + +/* + * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length + * instead of 16. + */ +static void +buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value) +{ + u_int bytes, bignum_bits; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8; + if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes) + fatal("%s: input buffer too small: need %d have %zu", + __func__, bytes, sshbuf_len(b)); + if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL) + fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static struct sshkey * +do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + char *type, *cipher; + u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345"; + int r, rlen, ktype; + u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4; + size_t slen; + u_long e; + BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL; + BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL; + BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL; + BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL; + if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) { + error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, + SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC); + sshbuf_free(b); + return NULL; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4); + if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) { + error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher); + free(cipher); + sshbuf_free(b); + free(type); + return NULL; + } + free(cipher); + + if (strstr(type, "dsa")) { + ktype = KEY_DSA; + } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) { + ktype = KEY_RSA; + } else { + sshbuf_free(b); + free(type); + return NULL; + } + if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + free(type); + + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_DSA: + if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key); + if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) + fatal("%s: DSA_set0_pqg failed", __func__); + dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ + if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key)) + fatal("%s: DSA_set0_key failed", __func__); + dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */ + break; + case KEY_RSA: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 || + (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) || + (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0)) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + e = e1; + debug("e %lx", e); + if (e < 30) { + e <<= 8; + e += e2; + debug("e %lx", e); + e <<= 8; + e += e3; + debug("e %lx", e); + } + if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); + if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) { + BN_clear_free(rsa_e); + sshbuf_free(b); + sshkey_free(key); + return NULL; + } + if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p); + if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d)) + fatal("%s: RSA_set0_key failed", __func__); + rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ + if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) + fatal("%s: RSA_set0_factors failed", __func__); + rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ + if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) + fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); + break; + } + rlen = sshbuf_len(b); + if (rlen != 0) + error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: " + "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); + sshbuf_free(b); + + /* try the key */ + if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0) != 0 || + sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0) != 0) { + sshkey_free(key); + free(sig); + return NULL; + } + free(sig); + return key; +} + +static int +get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len) +{ + int c; + size_t pos = 0; + + line[0] = '\0'; + while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) { + if (pos >= len - 1) + fatal("input line too long."); + switch (c) { + case '\r': + c = fgetc(fp); + if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) + fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno)); + return pos; + case '\n': + return pos; + } + line[pos++] = c; + line[pos] = '\0'; + } + /* We reached EOF */ + return -1; +} + +static void +do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private) +{ + int r, blen, escaped = 0; + u_int len; + char line[1024]; + u_char blob[8096]; + char encoded[8096]; + FILE *fp; + + if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + encoded[0] = '\0'; + while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) { + if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\') + escaped++; + if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 || + strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) { + if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL) + *private = 1; + if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) { + break; + } + /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */ + continue; + } + if (escaped) { + escaped--; + /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */ + continue; + } + strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded)); + } + len = strlen(encoded); + if (((len % 4) == 3) && + (encoded[len-1] == '=') && + (encoded[len-2] == '=') && + (encoded[len-3] == '=')) + encoded[len-3] = '\0'; + blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob)); + if (blen < 0) + fatal("uudecode failed."); + if (*private) + *k = do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen); + else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0) + fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + fclose(fp); +} + +static void +do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pubkey; + FILE *fp; + + if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { + fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__, + identity_file); + } + fclose(fp); + switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) { + case EVP_PKEY_RSA: + if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; + (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey); + break; + case EVP_PKEY_DSA: + if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; + (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey); + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case EVP_PKEY_EC: + if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA; + (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey); + (*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa); + break; +#endif + default: + fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__, + EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)); + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); + return; +} + +static void +do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private) +{ + FILE *fp; + RSA *rsa; + + if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { + if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; + (*k)->rsa = rsa; + fclose(fp); + return; + } + fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__); +} + +static void +do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct sshkey *k = NULL; + int r, private = 0, ok = 0; + struct stat st; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + + switch (convert_format) { + case FMT_RFC4716: + do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private); + break; + case FMT_PKCS8: + do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private); + break; + case FMT_PEM: + do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); + } + + if (!private) { + if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0) + ok = 1; + if (ok) + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + } else { + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_DSA: + ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, + NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL, + NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + break; +#endif + case KEY_RSA: + ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, + NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + break; + default: + fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, + sshkey_type(k)); + } + } + + if (!ok) + fatal("key write failed"); + sshkey_free(k); + exit(0); +} +#endif + +static void +do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct sshkey *prv; + struct stat st; + int r; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + prv = load_identity(identity_file); + if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0) + error("sshkey_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + sshkey_free(prv); + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_download(struct passwd *pw) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + struct sshkey **keys = NULL; + int i, nkeys; + enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; + int fptype; + char *fp, *ra; + + fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; + + pkcs11_init(0); + nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys); + if (nkeys <= 0) + fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if (print_fingerprint) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); + printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]), + fp, sshkey_type(keys[i])); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); + } else { + (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + } + sshkey_free(keys[i]); + } + free(keys); + pkcs11_terminate(); + exit(0); +#else + fatal("no pkcs11 support"); +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +} + +static struct sshkey * +try_read_key(char **cpp) +{ + struct sshkey *ret; + int r; + + if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0) + return ret; + /* Not a key */ + sshkey_free(ret); + return NULL; +} + +static void +fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment) +{ + char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; + enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; + int fptype; + + fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, + comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public)); + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); +} + +static void +fingerprint_private(const char *path) +{ + struct stat st; + char *comment = NULL; + struct sshkey *public = NULL; + int r; + + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, &comment)) != 0) { + debug("load public \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL, + &public, &comment)) != 0) { + debug("load private \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r)); + fatal("%s is not a key file.", path); + } + } + + fingerprint_one_key(public, comment); + sshkey_free(public); + free(comment); +} + +static void +do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) +{ + FILE *f; + struct sshkey *public = NULL; + char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; + size_t linesize = 0; + int i, invalid = 1; + const char *path; + u_long lnum = 0; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + path = identity_file; + + if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) { + f = stdin; + path = "(stdin)"; + } else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno)); + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + lnum++; + cp = line; + cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; + /* Trim leading space and comments */ + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') + continue; + + /* + * Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys + * or known_hosts. + */ + + /* + * Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if + * "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're + * not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin). + */ + if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && + strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) { + free(line); + fclose(f); + fingerprint_private(path); + exit(0); + } + + /* + * If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to + * accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options. + * Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff. + */ + if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { + i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); + if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || + (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { + int quoted = 0; + + comment = cp; + for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && + *cp != '\t')); cp++) { + if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') + cp++; /* Skip both */ + else if (*cp == '"') + quoted = !quoted; + } + if (!*cp) + continue; + *cp++ = '\0'; + } + } + /* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */ + if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { + debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum); + continue; + } + + /* Find trailing comment, if any */ + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#') + comment = cp; + + fingerprint_one_key(public, comment); + sshkey_free(public); + invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */ + } + fclose(f); + free(line); + + if (invalid) + fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path); + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct { + char *key_type; + char *key_type_display; + char *path; + } key_types[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, + { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE }, +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + { "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE }, +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + { NULL, NULL, NULL } + }; + + int first = 0; + struct stat st; + struct sshkey *private, *public; + char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file; + int i, type, fd, r; + FILE *f; + + for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { + public = private = NULL; + prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL; + + xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + + /* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */ + if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) { + if (st.st_size != 0) + goto next; + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, + strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + + /* + * Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with + * key generation. + */ + xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + + if (first == 0) { + first = 1; + printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); + } + printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); + fflush(stdout); + type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); + if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { + error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", + prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to generate/reserve a name */ + bits = 0; + type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits); + if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { + error("sshkey_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + goto failnext; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) + fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, + hostname); + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "", + comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", + prv_tmp, ssh_err(r)); + goto failnext; + } + if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) { + error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", + pub_tmp, strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + (void)fchmod(fd, 0644); + f = fdopen(fd, "w"); + if (f == NULL) { + error("fdopen %s failed: %s", pub_tmp, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + goto failnext; + } + if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) { + error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + fclose(f); + goto failnext; + } + fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); + if (ferror(f) != 0) { + error("write key failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + fclose(f); + goto failnext; + } + if (fclose(f) != 0) { + error("key close failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + + /* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */ + if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) { + error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", + pub_file, strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) { + error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", + key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); + failnext: + first = 0; + goto next; + } + next: + sshkey_free(private); + sshkey_free(public); + free(prv_tmp); + free(pub_tmp); + free(prv_file); + free(pub_file); + } + if (first != 0) + printf("\n"); +} + +struct known_hosts_ctx { + const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */ + FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */ + int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */ + int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */ + int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */ +}; + +static int +known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) +{ + struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; + char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts; + int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts); + int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM; + + switch (l->status) { + case HKF_STATUS_OK: + case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED: + /* + * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard + * characters or a CA/revocation marker. + */ + if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) { + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + if (has_wild && !find_host) { + logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name " + "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path, + l->linenum, l->hosts); + } + return 0; + } + /* + * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list, + * hash and store separately. + */ + ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts); + while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') { + lowercase(cp); + if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL) + fatal("hash_host failed"); + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey); + ctx->has_unhashed = 1; + } + free(ohosts); + return 0; + case HKF_STATUS_INVALID: + /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */ + ctx->invalid = 1; + logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + return 0; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ + return -1; +} + +static int +known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) +{ + struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; + enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; + int fptype; + char *fp; + + fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; + + if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { + if (delete_host) { + if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { + /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + } else { + /* + * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke + * marker, delete it by *not* writing the + * line to ctx->out. + */ + ctx->found_key = 1; + if (!quiet) + printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n", + ctx->host, l->linenum); + } + return 0; + } else if (find_host) { + ctx->found_key = 1; + if (!quiet) { + printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n", + ctx->host, + l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" : + (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : "")); + } + if (hash_hosts) + known_hosts_hash(l, ctx); + else if (print_fingerprint) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep); + mprintf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host, + sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment); + free(fp); + } else + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + return 0; + } + } else if (delete_host) { + /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */ + if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { + ctx->invalid = 1; + logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); + } + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + } + return 0; +} + +static void +do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) +{ + char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX]; + int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0; + struct known_hosts_ctx ctx; + u_int foreach_options; + + if (!have_identity) { + cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); + if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >= + sizeof(identity_file)) + fatal("Specified known hosts path too long"); + free(cp); + have_identity = 1; + } + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.out = stdout; + ctx.host = name; + + /* + * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place + * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout + */ + if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) { + if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || + strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || + strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) || + strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old)) + fatal("known_hosts path too long"); + umask(077); + if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) + fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno)); + if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { + oerrno = errno; + unlink(tmp); + fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno)); + } + inplace = 1; + } + /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */ + foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0; + foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0; + if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ? + known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL, + foreach_options)) != 0) { + if (inplace) + unlink(tmp); + fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + if (inplace) + fclose(ctx.out); + + if (ctx.invalid) { + error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file); + if (inplace) { + error("Not replacing existing known_hosts " + "file because of errors"); + unlink(tmp); + } + exit(1); + } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) { + logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file); + if (inplace) + unlink(tmp); + } else if (inplace) { + /* Backup existing file */ + if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) + fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno)); + if (link(identity_file, old) == -1) + fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old, + strerror(errno)); + /* Move new one into place */ + if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) { + error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file, + strerror(errno)); + unlink(tmp); + unlink(old); + exit(1); + } + + printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file); + printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old); + if (ctx.has_unhashed) { + logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old); + logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy " + "of hostnames"); + } + } + + exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key); +} + +/* + * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure + * for the current user. + */ +static void +do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *comment; + char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2; + struct stat st; + struct sshkey *private; + int r; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ + r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment); + if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { + if (identity_passphrase) + old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else + old_passphrase = + read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase, + &private, &comment); + explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase)); + free(old_passphrase); + if (r != 0) + goto badkey; + } else if (r != 0) { + badkey: + fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); + } + if (comment) + mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); + + /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */ + if (identity_new_passphrase) { + passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); + passphrase2 = NULL; + } else { + passphrase1 = + read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no " + "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + + /* Verify that they are the same. */ + if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { + explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); + free(passphrase1); + free(passphrase2); + printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n"); + exit(1); + } + /* Destroy the other copy. */ + explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); + free(passphrase2); + } + + /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, + comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.", + identity_file, ssh_err(r)); + explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + free(passphrase1); + sshkey_free(private); + free(comment); + exit(1); + } + /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */ + explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + free(passphrase1); + sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */ + free(comment); + + printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n"); + exit(0); +} + +/* + * Print the SSHFP RR. + */ +static int +do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname) +{ + struct sshkey *public; + char *comment = NULL; + struct stat st; + int r; + + if (fname == NULL) + fatal("%s: no filename", __func__); + if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) { + if (errno == ENOENT) + return 0; + fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); + } + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) + fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.", + fname, ssh_err(r)); + export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic); + sshkey_free(public); + free(comment); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Change the comment of a private key file. + */ +static void +do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) +{ + char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase; + struct sshkey *private; + struct sshkey *public; + struct stat st; + FILE *f; + int r, fd; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", + &private, &comment)) == 0) + passphrase = xstrdup(""); + else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", + identity_file, ssh_err(r)); + else { + if (identity_passphrase) + passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else if (identity_new_passphrase) + passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); + else + passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + /* Try to load using the passphrase. */ + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, + &private, &comment)) != 0) { + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + free(passphrase); + fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", + identity_file, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + + if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS && + !use_new_format) { + error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in " + "the new format (-o)."); + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + sshkey_free(private); + exit(1); + } + if (comment) + printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment); + else + printf("Key now has no comment\n"); + + if (identity_comment) { + strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment)); + } else { + printf("Enter new comment: "); + fflush(stdout); + if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) { + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + sshkey_free(private); + exit(1); + } + new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0'; + } + + /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, + new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", + identity_file, ssh_err(r)); + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + free(passphrase); + sshkey_free(private); + free(comment); + exit(1); + } + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + free(passphrase); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) + fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + sshkey_free(private); + + strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); + fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); + if (fd == -1) + fatal("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file); + f = fdopen(fd, "w"); + if (f == NULL) + fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) + fatal("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + sshkey_free(public); + fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment); + fclose(f); + + free(comment); + + printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n"); + exit(0); +} + +static void +add_flag_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name) +{ + int r; + + debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static void +add_string_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name, const char *value) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + int r; + + debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, value)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + sshbuf_free(b); +} + +#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 +#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 +static void +prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which) +{ + size_t i; + + sshbuf_reset(c); + if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && + certflags_command != NULL) + add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command); + if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && + (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0) + add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding"); + if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && + (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0) + add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding"); + if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && + (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0) + add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding"); + if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && + (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0) + add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty"); + if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && + (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0) + add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc"); + if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && + certflags_src_addr != NULL) + add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr); + for (i = 0; i < ncert_userext; i++) { + if ((cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) || + (!cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL))) + continue; + if (cert_userext[i].val == NULL) + add_flag_option(c, cert_userext[i].key); + else { + add_string_option(c, cert_userext[i].key, + cert_userext[i].val); + } + } +} + +static struct sshkey * +load_pkcs11_key(char *path) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL; + int r, i, nkeys; + + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\": %s", + path, ssh_err(r)); + + nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys); + debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys); + if (nkeys <= 0) + fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) { + private = keys[i]; + continue; + } + sshkey_free(keys[i]); + } + free(keys); + sshkey_free(public); + return private; +#else + fatal("no pkcs11 support"); +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +} + +/* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */ +static int +agent_signer(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *alg, u_int compat, void *ctx) +{ + int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx; + + return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp, + data, datalen, alg, compat); +} + +static void +do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int r, i, fd, found, agent_fd = -1; + u_int n; + struct sshkey *ca, *public; + char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL; + FILE *f; + struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids; + size_t j; + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_init(1); +#endif + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); + if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { + /* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */ + if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL) + fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path); + } else if (prefer_agent) { + /* + * Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making + * sure the public key specified is actually present in the + * agent. + */ + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s", + tmp, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) + fatal("Cannot use public key for CA signature: %s", + ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0) + fatal("Retrieve agent key list: %s", ssh_err(r)); + found = 0; + for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) { + if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) + fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp); + ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids); + ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; + } else { + /* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */ + ca = load_identity(tmp); + } + free(tmp); + + if (key_type_name != NULL && + sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) { + fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s", + sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name); + } + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + /* Split list of principals */ + n = 0; + if (cert_principals != NULL) { + otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); + plist = NULL; + for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { + plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); + if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') + fatal("Empty principal name"); + } + free(otmp); + } + if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) + fatal("Too many certificate principals specified"); + + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0) + fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\": %s", + __func__, tmp, ssh_err(r)); + if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA && + public->type != KEY_ECDSA && public->type != KEY_ED25519 && + public->type != KEY_XMSS) + fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified", + __func__, tmp, sshkey_type(public)); + + /* Prepare certificate to sign */ + if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0) + fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate: %s", + tmp, ssh_err(r)); + public->cert->type = cert_key_type; + public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial; + public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id); + public->cert->nprincipals = n; + public->cert->principals = plist; + public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from; + public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to; + prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL); + prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions, + OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca, + &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0) + fatal("sshkey_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r)); + + if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) { + if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca, + key_type_name, agent_signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't certify key %s via agent: %s", + tmp, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name)) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't certify key %s: %s", + tmp, ssh_err(r)); + } + + if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) + *cp = '\0'; + xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp); + free(tmp); + + if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) + fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out, + strerror(errno)); + if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) + fatal("Could not write certified key to %s: %s", + out, ssh_err(r)); + fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); + fclose(f); + + if (!quiet) { + sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert, + valid, sizeof(valid)); + logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s " + "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public), + out, public->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial, + cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", + cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", + valid); + } + + sshkey_free(public); + free(out); + } +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_terminate(); +#endif + exit(0); +} + +static u_int64_t +parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now) +{ + int64_t mul, secs; + + mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1; + + if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1) + fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s); + if (mul == -1 && secs > now) + fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); + return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul); +} + +static void +parse_cert_times(char *timespec) +{ + char *from, *to; + time_t now = time(NULL); + int64_t secs; + + /* +timespec relative to now */ + if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) { + if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1) + fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec); + cert_valid_to = now + secs; + /* + * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts + * with poorly-synchronised clocks. + */ + cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60; + return; + } + + /* + * from:to, where + * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "always" + * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "forever" + */ + from = xstrdup(timespec); + to = strchr(from, ':'); + if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') + fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec); + *to++ = '\0'; + + if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') + cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now); + else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0) + cert_valid_from = 0; + else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0) + fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from); + + if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') + cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now); + else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0) + cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0; + else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0) + fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to); + + if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from) + fatal("Empty certificate validity interval"); + free(from); +} + +static void +add_cert_option(char *opt) +{ + char *val, *cp; + int iscrit = 0; + + if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0) + certflags_flags = 0; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC; + else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) { + val = opt + 14; + if (*val == '\0') + fatal("Empty force-command option"); + if (certflags_command != NULL) + fatal("force-command already specified"); + certflags_command = xstrdup(val); + } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) { + val = opt + 15; + if (*val == '\0') + fatal("Empty source-address option"); + if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) + fatal("source-address already specified"); + if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) + fatal("Invalid source-address list"); + certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val); + } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 || + (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) { + val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1); + if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL) + *cp++ = '\0'; + cert_userext = xreallocarray(cert_userext, ncert_userext + 1, + sizeof(*cert_userext)); + cert_userext[ncert_userext].key = val; + cert_userext[ncert_userext].val = cp == NULL ? + NULL : xstrdup(cp); + cert_userext[ncert_userext].crit = iscrit; + ncert_userext++; + } else + fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt); +} + +static void +show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical) +{ + char *name, *arg; + struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL; + int r; + + if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__); + while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(option); + option = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + printf(" %s", name); + if (!in_critical && + (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0)) + printf("\n"); + else if (in_critical && + (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + printf(" %s\n", arg); + free(arg); + } else { + printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %zu)\n", + sshbuf_len(option)); + sshbuf_reset(option); + } + free(name); + if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0) + fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end"); + } + sshbuf_free(option); + sshbuf_free(options); +} + +static void +print_cert(struct sshkey *key) +{ + char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp; + u_int i; + + key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, + fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); + sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); + + printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key), + sshkey_cert_type(key)); + printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp); + printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n", + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp); + printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); + printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial); + printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid); + printf(" Principals: "); + if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0) + printf("(none)\n"); + else { + for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++) + printf("\n %s", + key->cert->principals[i]); + printf("\n"); + } + printf(" Critical Options: "); + if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0) + printf("(none)\n"); + else { + printf("\n"); + show_options(key->cert->critical, 1); + } + printf(" Extensions: "); + if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0) + printf("(none)\n"); + else { + printf("\n"); + show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0); + } +} + +static void +do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + struct stat st; + int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0; + FILE *f; + char *cp, *line = NULL; + const char *path; + size_t linesize = 0; + u_long lnum = 0; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + + path = identity_file; + if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { + f = stdin; + path = "(stdin)"; + is_stdin = 1; + } else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + lnum++; + sshkey_free(key); + key = NULL; + /* Trim leading space and comments */ + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') + continue; + if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new"); + if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) { + error("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path, + lnum, ssh_err(r)); + continue; + } + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum); + continue; + } + ok = 1; + if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1) + printf("%s:\n", path); + else + printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum); + print_cert(key); + } + free(line); + sshkey_free(key); + fclose(f); + exit(ok ? 0 : 1); +} + +static void +load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp) +{ + struct sshbuf *krlbuf; + int r, fd; + + if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) + fatal("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) + fatal("Unable to load KRL: %s", ssh_err(r)); + close(fd); + /* XXX check sigs */ + if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 || + *krlp == NULL) + fatal("Invalid KRL file: %s", ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(krlbuf); +} + +static void +hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, + const char *file, u_long lnum) +{ + char *tmp; + size_t tlen; + struct sshbuf *b; + int r; + + if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0) + fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum); + cp += 7; + + /* + * OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '=' + * characters; put them back for decode. + */ + tlen = strlen(cp); + tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1); + strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1); + while ((tlen % 4) != 0) { + tmp[tlen++] = '='; + tmp[tlen] = '\0'; + } + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0) + fatal("%s:%lu: decode hash failed: %s", file, lnum, ssh_err(r)); + free(tmp); + *lenp = sshbuf_len(b); + *blobp = xmalloc(*lenp); + memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp); + sshbuf_free(b); +} + +static void +update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca, + const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl) +{ + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + u_long lnum = 0; + char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; + u_char *blob = NULL; + size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0; + unsigned long long serial, serial2; + int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r; + FILE *krl_spec; + + path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid); + if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { + krl_spec = stdin; + free(path); + path = xstrdup("(standard input)"); + } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); + + if (!quiet) + printf("Revoking from %s\n", path); + while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) { + lnum++; + was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0; + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); + /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */ + for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) { + if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') { + cp[i] = '\0'; + break; + } + if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') { + /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */ + if (r == -1) + r = i; + } else + r = -1; + } + if (r != -1) + cp[r] = '\0'; + if (*cp == '\0') + continue; + if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) { + if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { + fatal("revoking certificates by serial number " + "requires specification of a CA key"); + } + cp += 7; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + errno = 0; + serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); + if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-')) + fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", + path, lnum, cp); + if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX) + fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", + path, lnum); + serial2 = serial; + if (*ep == '-') { + cp = ep + 1; + errno = 0; + serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); + if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0') + fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", + path, lnum, cp); + if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX) + fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", + path, lnum); + if (serial2 <= serial) + fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range " + "%llu:%llu", path, lnum, + (unsigned long long)serial, + (unsigned long long)serial2); + } + if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, + ca, serial, serial2) != 0) { + fatal("%s: revoke serial failed", + __func__); + } + } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) { + if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { + fatal("revoking certificates by key ID " + "requires specification of a CA key"); + } + cp += 3; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0) + fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__); + } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) { + cp += 5; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum); + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); + } else { + if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { + cp += 4; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + was_explicit_key = 1; + } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) { + cp += 5; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + was_sha1 = 1; + } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) { + cp += 7; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + was_sha256 = 1; + /* + * Just try to process the line as a key. + * Parsing will fail if it isn't. + */ + } + if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new"); + if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) + fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", + path, lnum, ssh_err(r)); + if (was_explicit_key) + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); + else if (was_sha1) { + if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, + SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) { + fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", + file, lnum); + } + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen); + } else if (was_sha256) { + if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, + SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) { + fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", + file, lnum); + } + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); + } else + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key); + if (r != 0) + fatal("%s: revoke key failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + freezero(blob, blen); + blob = NULL; + blen = 0; + sshkey_free(key); + } + } + if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0) + fclose(krl_spec); + free(line); + free(path); +} + +static void +do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct ssh_krl *krl; + struct stat sb; + struct sshkey *ca = NULL; + int fd, i, r, wild_ca = 0; + char *tmp; + struct sshbuf *kbuf; + + if (*identity_file == '\0') + fatal("KRL generation requires an output file"); + if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) { + if (errno != ENOENT) + fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s", + identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if (updating) + fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file); + } + if (ca_key_path != NULL) { + if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0) + wild_ca = 1; + else { + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s", + tmp, ssh_err(r)); + free(tmp); + } + } + + if (updating) + load_krl(identity_file, &krl); + else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) + fatal("couldn't create KRL"); + + if (cert_serial != 0) + ssh_krl_set_version(krl, cert_serial); + if (identity_comment != NULL) + ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, identity_comment); + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl); + + if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); + if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't generate KRL"); + if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) + fatal("open %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kbuf), sshbuf_len(kbuf)) != + sshbuf_len(kbuf)) + fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + close(fd); + sshbuf_free(kbuf); + ssh_krl_free(krl); + sshkey_free(ca); +} + +static void +do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, r, ret = 0; + char *comment; + struct ssh_krl *krl; + struct sshkey *k; + + if (*identity_file == '\0') + fatal("KRL checking requires an input file"); + load_krl(identity_file, &krl); + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0) + fatal("Cannot load public key %s: %s", + argv[i], ssh_err(r)); + r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k); + printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i], + *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "", + r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED"); + if (r != 0) + ret = 1; + sshkey_free(k); + free(comment); + } + ssh_krl_free(krl); + exit(ret); +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa]\n" + " [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n"); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + fprintf(stderr, + " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n"); +#endif + fprintf(stderr, + " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]\n" + " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n" + " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n" + " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]\n" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + " ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]\n" + " ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n" + " [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n" +#endif + " ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-U]\n" + " [-D pkcs11_provider] [-n principals] [-O option]\n" + " [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n" + " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -A\n" + " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n" + " file ...\n" + " ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...\n"); + exit(1); +} + +/* + * Main program for key management. + */ +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2; + char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; + struct sshkey *private, *public; + struct passwd *pw; + struct stat st; + int r, opt, type, fd; + int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; + FILE *f; + const char *errstr; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* Moduli generation/screening */ + char out_file[PATH_MAX], *checkpoint = NULL; + u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0; + int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0; + unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0; + BIGNUM *start = NULL; +#endif + + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +#endif + log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + seed_rng(); + + msetlocale(); + + /* we need this for the home * directory. */ + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + if (!pw) + fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); + if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) + fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Remaining characters: Ydw */ + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQUXceghiklopquvxy" + "C:D:E:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:Z:" + "a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case 'A': + gen_all_hostkeys = 1; + break; + case 'b': + bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 10, 32768, &errstr); + if (errstr) + fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)", + optarg, errstr); + break; + case 'E': + fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); + if (fingerprint_hash == -1) + fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); + break; + case 'F': + find_host = 1; + rr_hostname = optarg; + break; + case 'H': + hash_hosts = 1; + break; + case 'I': + cert_key_id = optarg; + break; + case 'R': + delete_host = 1; + rr_hostname = optarg; + break; + case 'L': + show_cert = 1; + break; + case 'l': + print_fingerprint = 1; + break; + case 'B': + print_bubblebabble = 1; + break; + case 'm': + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 || + strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) { + convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; + break; + } + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) { + convert_format = FMT_PKCS8; + break; + } + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) { + convert_format = FMT_PEM; + use_new_format = 0; + break; + } + fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg); + case 'n': + cert_principals = optarg; + break; + case 'o': + /* no-op; new format is already the default */ + break; + case 'p': + change_passphrase = 1; + break; + case 'c': + change_comment = 1; + break; + case 'f': + if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, + sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) + fatal("Identity filename too long"); + have_identity = 1; + break; + case 'g': + print_generic = 1; + break; + case 'P': + identity_passphrase = optarg; + break; + case 'N': + identity_new_passphrase = optarg; + break; + case 'Q': + check_krl = 1; + break; + case 'O': + add_cert_option(optarg); + break; + case 'Z': + new_format_cipher = optarg; + break; + case 'C': + identity_comment = optarg; + break; + case 'q': + quiet = 1; + break; + case 'e': + case 'x': + /* export key */ + convert_to = 1; + break; + case 'h': + cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST; + certflags_flags = 0; + break; + case 'k': + gen_krl = 1; + break; + case 'i': + case 'X': + /* import key */ + convert_from = 1; + break; + case 'y': + print_public = 1; + break; + case 's': + ca_key_path = optarg; + break; + case 't': + key_type_name = optarg; + break; + case 'D': + pkcs11provider = optarg; + break; + case 'U': + prefer_agent = 1; + break; + case 'u': + update_krl = 1; + break; + case 'v': + if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) + log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + else { + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 && + log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) + log_level++; + } + break; + case 'r': + rr_hostname = optarg; + break; + case 'a': + rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) + fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", + optarg, errstr); + break; + case 'V': + parse_cert_times(optarg); + break; + case 'z': + errno = 0; + cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); + if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || + (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) + fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); + break; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* Moduli generation/screening */ + case 'G': + do_gen_candidates = 1; + if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >= + sizeof(out_file)) + fatal("Output filename too long"); + break; + case 'J': + lines_to_process = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); + break; + case 'j': + start_lineno = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); + break; + case 'K': + if (strlen(optarg) >= PATH_MAX) + fatal("Checkpoint filename too long"); + checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 'M': + memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, + &errstr); + if (errstr) + fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg); + break; + case 'S': + /* XXX - also compare length against bits */ + if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0) + fatal("Invalid start point."); + break; + case 'T': + do_screen_candidates = 1; + if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >= + sizeof(out_file)) + fatal("Output filename too long"); + break; + case 'W': + generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, + UINT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) + fatal("Desired generator invalid: %s (%s)", + optarg, errstr); + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case '?': + default: + usage(); + } + } + + /* reinit */ + log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + argv += optind; + argc -= optind; + + if (ca_key_path != NULL) { + if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) { + error("Too few arguments."); + usage(); + } + } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) { + error("Too many arguments."); + usage(); + } + if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { + error("Can only have one of -p and -c."); + usage(); + } + if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) { + error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R."); + usage(); + } + if (gen_krl) { + do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, argc, argv); + return (0); + } + if (check_krl) { + do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv); + return (0); + } + if (ca_key_path != NULL) { + if (cert_key_id == NULL) + fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); + do_ca_sign(pw, argc, argv); + } + if (show_cert) + do_show_cert(pw); + if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) + do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname); + if (pkcs11provider != NULL) + do_download(pw); + if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) + do_fingerprint(pw); + if (change_passphrase) + do_change_passphrase(pw); + if (change_comment) + do_change_comment(pw); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (convert_to) + do_convert_to(pw); + if (convert_from) + do_convert_from(pw); +#endif + if (print_public) + do_print_public(pw); + if (rr_hostname != NULL) { + unsigned int n = 0; + + if (have_identity) { + n = do_print_resource_record(pw, + identity_file, rr_hostname); + if (n == 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + exit(0); + } else { + + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); + if (n == 0) + fatal("no keys found."); + exit(0); + } + } + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (do_gen_candidates) { + FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w"); + + if (out == NULL) { + error("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s", + out_file, strerror(errno)); + return (1); + } + if (bits == 0) + bits = DEFAULT_BITS; + if (gen_candidates(out, memory, bits, start) != 0) + fatal("modulus candidate generation failed"); + + return (0); + } + + if (do_screen_candidates) { + FILE *in; + FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "a"); + + if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) { + if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) { + fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate " + "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file, + strerror(errno)); + } + } else + in = stdin; + + if (out == NULL) { + fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s", + out_file, strerror(errno)); + } + if (prime_test(in, out, rounds == 0 ? 100 : rounds, + generator_wanted, checkpoint, + start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0) + fatal("modulus screening failed"); + return (0); + } +#endif + + if (gen_all_hostkeys) { + do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); + return (0); + } + + if (key_type_name == NULL) + key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; + + type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); + type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); + + if (!quiet) + printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", + key_type_name); + if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) + fatal("sshkey_generate failed"); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) + fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); + + /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */ + snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s", + pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); + if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) { + if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) { + if (errno != ENOENT) { + error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir, + strerror(errno)); + } else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0) { + error("Could not create directory '%s': %s", + dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); + } else if (!quiet) + printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir); + } + } + /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ + if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) { + char yesno[3]; + printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file); + printf("Overwrite (y/n)? "); + fflush(stdout); + if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) + exit(1); + if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') + exit(1); + } + /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */ + if (identity_passphrase) + passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else if (identity_new_passphrase) + passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); + else { +passphrase_again: + passphrase1 = + read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no " + "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { + /* + * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and + * retry. + */ + explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); + free(passphrase1); + free(passphrase2); + printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n"); + goto passphrase_again; + } + /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */ + explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); + free(passphrase2); + } + + if (identity_comment) { + strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment)); + } else { + /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */ + snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); + } + + /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, + comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", + identity_file, ssh_err(r)); + explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + free(passphrase1); + exit(1); + } + /* Clear the passphrase. */ + explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + free(passphrase1); + + /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */ + sshkey_free(private); + + if (!quiet) + printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file); + + strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); + if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) + fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s", + identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) + fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) + error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); + if (ferror(f) || fclose(f) != 0) + fatal("write public failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + + if (!quiet) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", + identity_file); + printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); + printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); + printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); + } + + sshkey_free(public); + exit(0); +} diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.0 b/ssh-keyscan.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..497ac0d --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keyscan.0 @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +SSH-KEYSCAN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYSCAN(1) + +NAME + ssh-keyscan M-bM-^@M-^S gather SSH public keys + +SYNOPSIS + ssh-keyscan [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type] + [host | addrlist namelist] + +DESCRIPTION + ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a + number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying + ssh_known_hosts files, the format of which is documented in sshd(8). + ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and + perl scripts. + + ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as + possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of + 1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those + hosts are down or do not run sshd(8). For scanning, one does not need + login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the + scanning process involve any encryption. + + The options are as follows: + + -4 Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv4 addresses only. + + -6 Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only. + + -c Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys. + + -D Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records. The default is to print + keys in a format usable as a ssh(1) known_hosts file. + + -f file + Read hosts or M-bM-^@M-^\addrlist namelistM-bM-^@M-^] pairs from file, one per line. + If M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will read + from the standard input. Input is expected in the format: + + 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 + + -H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may + be used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal + identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. + + -p port + Connect to port on the remote host. + + -T timeout + Set the timeout for connection attempts. If timeout seconds have + elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the + last time anything was read from that host, the connection is + closed and the host in question considered unavailable. The + default is 5 seconds. + + -t type + Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The + possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^]. + Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. + The default is to fetch M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] keys. + + -v Verbose mode: print debugging messages about progress. + + If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without + verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle + attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, + ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the + middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was + created. + +FILES + /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts + +EXAMPLES + Print the RSA host key for machine hostname: + + $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname + + Find all hosts from the file ssh_hosts which have new or different keys + from those in the sorted file ssh_known_hosts: + + $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \ + sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts - + +SEE ALSO + ssh(1), sshd(8) + + Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC + 4255, 2006. + +AUTHORS + David Mazieres wrote the initial version, and Wayne + Davison added support for protocol version + 2. + +OpenBSD 6.4 March 5, 2018 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.1 b/ssh-keyscan.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3d7a40 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keyscan.1 @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.44 2018/03/05 07:03:18 jmc Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . +.\" +.\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is +.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the +.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. +.\" +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 5 2018 $ +.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-keyscan +.Nd gather SSH public keys +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ssh-keyscan +.Op Fl 46cDHv +.Op Fl f Ar file +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl T Ar timeout +.Op Fl t Ar type +.Op Ar host | addrlist namelist +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a number of +hosts. +It was designed to aid in building and verifying +.Pa ssh_known_hosts +files, +the format of which is documented in +.Xr sshd 8 . +.Nm +provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl +scripts. +.Pp +.Nm +uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in +parallel, so it is very efficient. +The keys from a domain of 1,000 +hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those +hosts are down or do not run +.Xr sshd 8 . +For scanning, one does not need +login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the +scanning process involve any encryption. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl 4 +Force +.Nm +to use IPv4 addresses only. +.It Fl 6 +Force +.Nm +to use IPv6 addresses only. +.It Fl c +Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys. +.It Fl D +Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records. +The default is to print keys in a format usable as a +.Xr ssh 1 +.Pa known_hosts +file. +.It Fl f Ar file +Read hosts or +.Dq addrlist namelist +pairs from +.Ar file , +one per line. +If +.Sq - +is supplied instead of a filename, +.Nm +will read from the standard input. +Input is expected in the format: +.Bd -literal +1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 +.Ed +.It Fl H +Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. +Hashed names may be used normally by +.Xr ssh 1 +and +.Xr sshd 8 , +but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents +be disclosed. +.It Fl p Ar port +Connect to +.Ar port +on the remote host. +.It Fl T Ar timeout +Set the timeout for connection attempts. +If +.Ar timeout +seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the +last time anything was read from that host, the connection is +closed and the host in question considered unavailable. +The default is 5 seconds. +.It Fl t Ar type +Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. +The possible values are +.Dq dsa , +.Dq ecdsa , +.Dq ed25519 , +or +.Dq rsa . +Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. +The default is to fetch +.Dq rsa , +.Dq ecdsa , +and +.Dq ed25519 +keys. +.It Fl v +Verbose mode: +print debugging messages about progress. +.El +.Pp +If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using +.Nm +without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to +.Em man in the middle +attacks. +On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, +.Nm +can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle +attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created. +.Sh FILES +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts +.Sh EXAMPLES +Print the RSA host key for machine +.Ar hostname : +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname +.Pp +Find all hosts from the file +.Pa ssh_hosts +which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file +.Pa ssh_known_hosts : +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \e + sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts - +.Ed +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Rs +.%D 2006 +.%R RFC 4255 +.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints +.Re +.Sh AUTHORS +.An -nosplit +.An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm@lcs.mit.edu +wrote the initial version, and +.An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned@users.sourceforge.net +added support for protocol version 2. diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..38b1c54 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keyscan.c @@ -0,0 +1,807 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.120 2018/06/06 18:29:18 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . + * + * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is + * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the + * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "ssh_api.h" +#include "dns.h" + +/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. + Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */ +int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; + +int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + +#define KT_DSA (1) +#define KT_RSA (1<<1) +#define KT_ECDSA (1<<2) +#define KT_ED25519 (1<<3) +#define KT_XMSS (1<<4) + +#define KT_MIN KT_DSA +#define KT_MAX KT_XMSS + +int get_cert = 0; +int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519; + +int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */ + +int print_sshfp = 0; /* Print SSHFP records instead of known_hosts */ + +#define MAXMAXFD 256 + +/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */ +int timeout = 5; + +int maxfd; +#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10) + +extern char *__progname; +fd_set *read_wait; +size_t read_wait_nfdset; +int ncon; + +struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */ + +/* + * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state + * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n]. + */ +typedef struct Connection { + u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */ +#define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */ +#define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */ +#define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */ +#define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */ + int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */ + int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */ + int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */ + int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */ + int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_* */ + sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */ + char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */ + char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */ + char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */ + char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */ + char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */ + struct ssh *c_ssh; /* SSH-connection */ + struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */ + TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */ +} con; + +TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */ +con *fdcon; + +static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key); + +static int +fdlim_get(int hard) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) + struct rlimit rlfd; + + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) + return (-1); + if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY) + return SSH_SYSFDMAX; + else + return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur; +#else + return SSH_SYSFDMAX; +#endif +} + +static int +fdlim_set(int lim) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) + struct rlimit rlfd; +#endif + + if (lim <= 0) + return (-1); +#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) + return (-1); + rlfd.rlim_cur = lim; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) + return (-1); +#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE) + setdtablesize(lim); +#endif + return (0); +} + +/* + * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent + * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the + * one in the GNU libc. + */ +static char * +xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim) +{ + char *s, *e; + + if (!**str) + return (NULL); + + s = *str; + e = s + strcspn(s, delim); + + if (*e != '\0') + *e++ = '\0'; + *str = e; + + return (s); +} + +/* + * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a + * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop. + */ +static char * +strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim) +{ + char *tok; + + do { + tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim); + } while (tok && *tok == '\0'); + return (tok); +} + + +static int +key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + con *c; + + if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL) + keyprint(c, hostkey); + /* always abort key exchange */ + return -1; +} + +static int +ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor) +{ + switch (remote_major) { + case 1: + if (remote_minor == 99) + return 1; + break; + case 2: + return 1; + default: + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +keygrab_ssh2(con *c) +{ + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; + int r; + + switch (c->c_keytype) { + case KT_DSA: + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? + "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-dss"; + break; + case KT_RSA: + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? + "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-rsa"; + break; + case KT_ED25519: + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? + "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-ed25519"; + break; + case KT_XMSS: + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? + "ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-xmss@openssh.com"; + break; + case KT_ECDSA: + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ? + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" : + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," + "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"; + break; + default: + fatal("unknown key type %d", c->c_keytype); + break; + } + if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) { + free(c->c_ssh); + fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + exit(1); + } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; + c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; + c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client; + c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client; + c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client; + c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; + c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; +# endif +#endif + c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; + ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper); + /* + * do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until + * the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done. + */ + ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done); +} + +static void +keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key) +{ + char *hostport; + const char *known_host, *hashed; + + if (print_sshfp) { + export_dns_rr(host, key, stdout, 0); + return; + } + + hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port); + lowercase(hostport); + if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) + fatal("host_hash failed"); + known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport; + if (!get_cert) + fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host); + sshkey_write(key, stdout); + fputs("\n", stdout); + free(hostport); +} + +static void +keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key) +{ + char *hosts = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name; + char *host, *ohosts; + + if (key == NULL) + return; + if (get_cert || (!hash_hosts && ssh_port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)) { + keyprint_one(hosts, key); + return; + } + ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(hosts); + while ((host = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL) + keyprint_one(host, key); + free(ohosts); +} + +static int +tcpconnect(char *host) +{ + struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + int gaierr, s = -1; + + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port); + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { + error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return -1; + } + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); + if (s < 0) { + error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (set_nonblock(s) == -1) + fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s); + if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 && + errno != EINPROGRESS) + error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno)); + else + break; + close(s); + s = -1; + } + freeaddrinfo(aitop); + return s; +} + +static int +conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype) +{ + char *namebase, *name, *namelist; + int s; + + namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname); + + do { + name = xstrsep(&namelist, ","); + if (!name) { + free(namebase); + return (-1); + } + } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0); + + if (s >= maxfd) + fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s); + if (fdcon[s].c_status) + fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s); + + debug3("%s: oname %s kt %d", __func__, oname, keytype); + fdcon[s].c_fd = s; + fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON; + fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase; + fdcon[s].c_name = name; + fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist; + fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname); + fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen; + fdcon[s].c_len = 4; + fdcon[s].c_off = 0; + fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype; + monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv); + fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); + FD_SET(s, read_wait); + ncon++; + return (s); +} + +static void +confree(int s) +{ + if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED) + fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s); + free(fdcon[s].c_namebase); + free(fdcon[s].c_output_name); + if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS) + free(fdcon[s].c_data); + fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED; + fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0; + if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) { + ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh); + free(fdcon[s].c_ssh); + fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL; + } else + close(s); + TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); + FD_CLR(s, read_wait); + ncon--; +} + +static void +contouch(int s) +{ + TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); + monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv); + fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); +} + +static int +conrecycle(int s) +{ + con *c = &fdcon[s]; + int ret; + + ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype); + confree(s); + return (ret); +} + +static void +congreet(int s) +{ + int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0; + char buf[256], *cp; + char remote_version[sizeof buf]; + size_t bufsiz; + con *c = &fdcon[s]; + + /* send client banner */ + n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", + PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); + if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) { + error("snprintf: buffer too small"); + confree(s); + return; + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) { + error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); + confree(s); + return; + } + + for (;;) { + memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); + bufsiz = sizeof(buf); + cp = buf; + while (bufsiz-- && + (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') { + if (*cp == '\r') + *cp = '\n'; + cp++; + } + if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) + break; + } + if (n == 0) { + switch (errno) { + case EPIPE: + error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name); + break; + case ECONNREFUSED: + break; + default: + error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); + break; + } + conrecycle(s); + return; + } + if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { + error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name); + confree(s); + return; + } + *cp = '\0'; + if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL) + fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed"); + ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1); + ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c); /* back link */ + if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", + &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3) + c->c_ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); + else + c->c_ssh->compat = 0; + if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) { + debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name); + confree(s); + return; + } + fprintf(stderr, "%c %s:%d %s\n", print_sshfp ? ';' : '#', + c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf)); + keygrab_ssh2(c); + confree(s); +} + +static void +conread(int s) +{ + con *c = &fdcon[s]; + size_t n; + + if (c->c_status == CS_CON) { + congreet(s); + return; + } + n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off); + if (n == 0) { + error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); + confree(s); + return; + } + c->c_off += n; + + if (c->c_off == c->c_len) + switch (c->c_status) { + case CS_SIZE: + c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen); + c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7); + c->c_off = 0; + c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len); + c->c_status = CS_KEYS; + break; + default: + fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status); + break; + } + + contouch(s); +} + +static void +conloop(void) +{ + struct timeval seltime, now; + fd_set *r, *e; + con *c; + int i; + + monotime_tv(&now); + c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); + + if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec || + (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) { + seltime = c->c_tv; + seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec; + seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec; + if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) { + seltime.tv_usec += 1000000; + seltime.tv_sec--; + } + } else + timerclear(&seltime); + + r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); + memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); + + while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 && + (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) + ; + + for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) { + if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) { + error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name); + confree(i); + } else if (FD_ISSET(i, r)) + conread(i); + } + free(r); + free(e); + + c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); + while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec || + (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) { + int s = c->c_fd; + + c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link); + conrecycle(s); + } +} + +static void +do_host(char *host) +{ + char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n"); + int j; + + if (name == NULL) + return; + for (j = KT_MIN; j <= KT_MAX; j *= 2) { + if (get_keytypes & j) { + while (ncon >= MAXCON) + conloop(); + conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j); + } + } +} + +void +fatal(const char *fmt,...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + exit(255); +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: %s [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n" + "\t\t [host | addrlist namelist]\n", + __progname); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + int opt, fopt_count = 0, j; + char *tname, *cp, *line = NULL; + size_t linesize = 0; + FILE *fp; + + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + seed_rng(); + TAILQ_INIT(&tq); + + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + if (argc <= 1) + usage(); + + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cDHv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case 'H': + hash_hosts = 1; + break; + case 'c': + get_cert = 1; + break; + case 'D': + print_sshfp = 1; + break; + case 'p': + ssh_port = a2port(optarg); + if (ssh_port <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'T': + timeout = convtime(optarg); + if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg); + usage(); + } + break; + case 'v': + if (!debug_flag) { + debug_flag = 1; + log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + } + else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) + log_level++; + else + fatal("Too high debugging level."); + break; + case 'f': + if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0) + optarg = NULL; + argv[fopt_count++] = optarg; + break; + case 't': + get_keytypes = 0; + tname = strtok(optarg, ","); + while (tname) { + int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); + + switch (type) { + case KEY_DSA: + get_keytypes |= KT_DSA; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA; + break; + case KEY_RSA: + get_keytypes |= KT_RSA; + break; + case KEY_ED25519: + get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519; + break; + case KEY_XMSS: + get_keytypes |= KT_XMSS; + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + default: + fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname); + } + tname = strtok(NULL, ","); + } + break; + case '4': + IPv4or6 = AF_INET; + break; + case '6': + IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; + break; + case '?': + default: + usage(); + } + } + if (optind == argc && !fopt_count) + usage(); + + log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + maxfd = fdlim_get(1); + if (maxfd < 0) + fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname); + if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD) + maxfd = MAXMAXFD; + if (MAXCON <= 0) + fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname); + if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0)) + fdlim_set(maxfd); + fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); + + read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS); + read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + + for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) { + if (argv[j] == NULL) + fp = stdin; + else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], + strerror(errno)); + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) { + /* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */ + if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL) + cp = line + strlen(line) - 1; + while (cp >= line) { + if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' || + *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') + *cp-- = '\0'; + else + break; + } + + /* Skip empty lines */ + if (*line == '\0') + continue; + + do_host(line); + } + + if (ferror(fp)) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], + strerror(errno)); + + fclose(fp); + } + free(line); + + while (optind < argc) + do_host(argv[optind++]); + + while (ncon > 0) + conloop(); + + return (0); +} diff --git a/ssh-keysign.0 b/ssh-keysign.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db4355d --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keysign.0 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +SSH-KEYSIGN(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-KEYSIGN(8) + +NAME + ssh-keysign M-bM-^@M-^S ssh helper program for host-based authentication + +SYNOPSIS + ssh-keysign + +DESCRIPTION + ssh-keysign is used by ssh(1) to access the local host keys and generate + the digital signature required during host-based authentication. + + ssh-keysign is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global + client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting EnableSSHKeysign + to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. + + ssh-keysign is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh(1). + See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based + authentication. + +FILES + /etc/ssh/ssh_config + Controls whether ssh-keysign is enabled. + + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key + These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to + generate the digital signature. They should be owned by root, + readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Since they + are readable only by root, ssh-keysign must be set-uid root if + host-based authentication is used. + + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub + If these files exist they are assumed to contain public + certificate information corresponding with the private keys + above. + +SEE ALSO + ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8) + +HISTORY + ssh-keysign first appeared in OpenBSD 3.2. + +AUTHORS + Markus Friedl + +OpenBSD 6.4 February 17, 2016 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..19b0dbc --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keysign.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.15 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $ +.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-keysign +.Nd ssh helper program for host-based authentication +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is used by +.Xr ssh 1 +to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature +required during host-based authentication. +.Pp +.Nm +is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the +global client configuration file +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +by setting +.Cm EnableSSHKeysign +to +.Dq yes . +.Pp +.Nm +is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from +.Xr ssh 1 . +See +.Xr ssh 1 +and +.Xr sshd 8 +for more information about host-based authentication. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +Controls whether +.Nm +is enabled. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to +generate the digital signature. +They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not +accessible to others. +Since they are readable only by root, +.Nm +must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub +If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate +information corresponding with the private keys above. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr ssh_config 5 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Sh HISTORY +.Nm +first appeared in +.Ox 3.2 . +.Sh AUTHORS +.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org diff --git a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..744ecb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keysign.c @@ -0,0 +1,303 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.55 2018/07/27 05:34:42 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "msg.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */ + +extern char *__progname; + +static int +valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, + u_char *data, size_t datalen) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + u_char type, *pkblob; + char *p; + size_t blen, len; + char *pkalg, *luser; + int r, pktype, fail; + + if (ret != NULL) + *ret = NULL; + fail = 0; + + if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); + + /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (len != 20 && len != 32) + fail++; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) + fail++; + + /* server user */ + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* service */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0) + fail++; + free(p); + + /* method */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0) + fail++; + free(p); + + /* pubkey */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); + if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) + fail++; + else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + error("%s: bad key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fail++; + } else if (key->type != pktype) + fail++; + free(pkalg); + free(pkblob); + + /* client host name, handle trailing dot */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + debug2("%s: check expect chost %s got %s", __func__, host, p); + if (strlen(host) != len - 1) + fail++; + else if (p[len - 1] != '.') + fail++; + else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0) + fail++; + free(p); + + /* local user */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &luser, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, luser) != 0) + fail++; + free(luser); + + /* end of message */ + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) + fail++; + sshbuf_free(b); + + debug3("%s: fail %d", __func__, fail); + + if (fail) + sshkey_free(key); + else if (ret != NULL) + *ret = key; + + return (fail ? -1 : 0); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + Options options; +#define NUM_KEYTYPES 5 + struct sshkey *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL; + struct passwd *pw; + int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd; + u_char *signature, *data, rver; + char *host, *fp; + size_t slen, dlen; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + u_int32_t rnd[256]; +#endif + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0) + fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); + + /* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */ + if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2) + exit(1); + /* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */ + if (fd > 2) + close(fd); + + i = 0; + /* XXX This really needs to read sshd_config for the paths */ + key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); + key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); + key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); + key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); + key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); + + if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) + fatal("getpwuid failed"); + pw = pwcopy(pw); + + permanently_set_uid(pw); + + seed_rng(); + +#ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN + log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); +#endif + + /* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */ + initialize_options(&options); + (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "", &options, 0); + fill_default_options(&options); + if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1) + fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s", + _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE); + + for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { + if (key_fd[i] != -1) + found = 1; + } + if (found == 0) + fatal("could not open any host key"); + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); +#endif + + found = 0; + for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { + keys[i] = NULL; + if (key_fd[i] == -1) + continue; + r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC, + NULL, &key, NULL); + close(key_fd[i]); + if (r != 0) + debug("parse key %d: %s", i, ssh_err(r)); + else if (key != NULL) { + keys[i] = key; + found = 1; + } + } + if (!found) + fatal("no hostkey found"); + + if (pledge("stdio dns", NULL) != 0) + fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno)); + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname); + if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, b) < 0) + fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rver)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); + if (rver != version) + fatal("bad version: received %d, expected %d", rver, version); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&fd)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); + if (fd < 0 || fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO) + fatal("bad fd"); + if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL) + fatal("cannot get local name for fd"); + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); + if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0) + fatal("not a valid request"); + free(host); + + found = 0; + for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { + if (keys[i] != NULL && + sshkey_equal_public(key, keys[i])) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname); + fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s", + sshkey_type(key), fp ? fp : ""); + } + + if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen, NULL, 0)) + != 0) + fatal("sshkey_sign failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + free(data); + + /* send reply */ + sshbuf_reset(b); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r)); + if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, b) == -1) + fatal("ssh_msg_send failed"); + + return (0); +} diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1241ce --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.10 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ + +int fd = -1; +pid_t pid = -1; + +static void +send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_char buf[4]; + size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m); + int r; + + POKE_U32(buf, mlen); + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 || + atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), + sshbuf_len(m)) != sshbuf_len(m)) + error("write to helper failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(m, mlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static int +recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m) +{ + u_int l, len; + u_char c, buf[1024]; + int r; + + if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) { + error("read from helper failed: %u", len); + return (0); /* XXX */ + } + len = PEEK_U32(buf); + if (len > 256 * 1024) + fatal("response too long: %u", len); + /* read len bytes into m */ + sshbuf_reset(m); + while (len > 0) { + l = len; + if (l > sizeof(buf)) + l = sizeof(buf); + if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) { + error("response from helper failed."); + return (0); /* XXX */ + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, buf, l)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + len -= l; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &c)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return c; +} + +int +pkcs11_init(int interactive) +{ + return (0); +} + +void +pkcs11_terminate(void) +{ + if (fd >= 0) + close(fd); +} + +static int +pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, + int padding) +{ + struct sshkey key; /* XXX */ + u_char *blob, *signature = NULL; + size_t blen, slen = 0; + int r, ret = -1; + struct sshbuf *msg; + + if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) + return (-1); + key.type = KEY_RSA; + key.rsa = rsa; + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(&key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, from, flen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(blob); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_reset(msg); + + if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (slen <= (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) { + memcpy(to, signature, slen); + ret = slen; + } + free(signature); + } + sshbuf_free(msg); + return (ret); +} + +/* redirect the private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ +static int +wrap_key(RSA *rsa) +{ + static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa; + + if ((helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL) + fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__); + if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper") || + !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt)) + fatal("%s: failed to prepare method", __func__); + RSA_set_method(rsa, helper_rsa); + return (0); +} + +static int +pkcs11_start_helper(void) +{ + int pair[2]; + + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) { + error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } + if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { + error("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); + return (-1); + } else if (pid == 0) { + if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || + (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { + fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + close(pair[0]); + close(pair[1]); + execlp(_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, + (char *)NULL); + fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + close(pair[1]); + fd = pair[0]; + return (0); +} + +int +pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp) +{ + struct sshkey *k; + int r; + u_char *blob; + size_t blen; + u_int nkeys, i; + struct sshbuf *msg; + + if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0) + return (-1); + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_reset(msg); + + if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + /* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(msg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &k)) != 0) + fatal("%s: bad key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + wrap_key(k->rsa); + (*keysp)[i] = k; + free(blob); + } + } else { + nkeys = -1; + } + sshbuf_free(msg); + return (nkeys); +} + +int +pkcs11_del_provider(char *name) +{ + int r, ret = -1; + struct sshbuf *msg; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_reset(msg); + + if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) + ret = 0; + sshbuf_free(msg); + return (ret); +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d5c984 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) + +NAME + ssh-pkcs11-helper M-bM-^@M-^S ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support + +SYNOPSIS + ssh-pkcs11-helper + +DESCRIPTION + ssh-pkcs11-helper is used by ssh-agent(1) to access keys provided by a + PKCS#11 token. + + ssh-pkcs11-helper is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from + ssh-agent(1). + +SEE ALSO + ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1) + +HISTORY + ssh-pkcs11-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 4.7. + +AUTHORS + Markus Friedl + +OpenBSD 6.4 July 16, 2013 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3728c4e --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.8,v 1.4 2013/07/16 00:07:52 schwarze Exp $ +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any +.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above +.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. +.\" +.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES +.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR +.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES +.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN +.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF +.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. +.\" +.Dd $Mdocdate: July 16 2013 $ +.Dt SSH-PKCS11-HELPER 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh-pkcs11-helper +.Nd ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +is used by +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +to access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token. +.Pp +.Nm +is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +.Sh HISTORY +.Nm +first appeared in +.Ox 4.7 . +.Sh AUTHORS +.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6301033 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c @@ -0,0 +1,402 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.14 2018/01/08 15:18:46 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + +/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ + +struct pkcs11_keyinfo { + struct sshkey *key; + char *providername; + TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next; +}; + +TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist; + +#define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 10240 /*XXX*/ + +/* input and output queue */ +struct sshbuf *iqueue; +struct sshbuf *oqueue; + +static void +add_key(struct sshkey *k, char *name) +{ + struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; + + ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki)); + ki->providername = xstrdup(name); + ki->key = k; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); +} + +static void +del_keys_by_name(char *name) +{ + struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt; + + for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) { + nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next); + if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); + free(ki->providername); + sshkey_free(ki->key); + free(ki); + } + } +} + +/* lookup matching 'private' key */ +static struct sshkey * +lookup_key(struct sshkey *k) +{ + struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; + + TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) { + debug("check %p %s", ki, ki->providername); + if (sshkey_equal(k, ki->key)) + return (ki->key); + } + return (NULL); +} + +static void +send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static void +process_add(void) +{ + char *name, *pin; + struct sshkey **keys; + int r, i, nkeys; + u_char *blob; + size_t blen; + struct sshbuf *msg; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys)) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, + SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, nkeys)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen)) != 0) { + debug("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + continue; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(blob); + add_key(keys[i], name); + } + free(keys); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + free(pin); + free(name); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +static void +process_del(void) +{ + char *name, *pin; + struct sshbuf *msg; + int r; + + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + del_keys_by_name(name); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0 ? + SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(pin); + free(name); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +static void +process_sign(void) +{ + u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; + size_t blen, dlen, slen = 0; + int r, ok = -1; + struct sshkey *key, *found; + struct sshbuf *msg; + + /* XXX support SHA2 signature flags */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &dlen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) + error("%s: sshkey_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + else { + if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + int ret; + + slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); + signature = xmalloc(slen); + if ((ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature, + found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) != -1) { + slen = ret; + ok = 0; + } +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + } + sshkey_free(key); + } + if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if (ok == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + free(data); + free(blob); + free(signature); + send_msg(msg); + sshbuf_free(msg); +} + +static void +process(void) +{ + u_int msg_len; + u_int buf_len; + u_int consumed; + u_char type; + const u_char *cp; + int r; + + buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue); + if (buf_len < 5) + return; /* Incomplete message. */ + cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue); + msg_len = get_u32(cp); + if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { + error("bad message len %d", msg_len); + cleanup_exit(11); + } + if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) + return; + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + buf_len -= 4; + switch (type) { + case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: + debug("process_add"); + process_add(); + break; + case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: + debug("process_del"); + process_del(); + break; + case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: + debug("process_sign"); + process_sign(); + break; + default: + error("Unknown message %d", type); + break; + } + /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ + if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) { + error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue); + if (msg_len < consumed) { + error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + if (msg_len > consumed) { + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } +} + +void +cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + /* XXX */ + _exit(i); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + fd_set *rset, *wset; + int r, in, out, max, log_stderr = 0; + ssize_t len, olen, set_size; + SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; + LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; + char buf[4*4096]; + + extern char *__progname; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist); + pkcs11_init(0); + + seed_rng(); + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + + log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); + + in = STDIN_FILENO; + out = STDOUT_FILENO; + + max = 0; + if (in > max) + max = in; + if (out > max) + max = out; + + if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); + rset = xmalloc(set_size); + wset = xmalloc(set_size); + + for (;;) { + memset(rset, 0, set_size); + memset(wset, 0, set_size); + + /* + * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle + * the worst-case length packet it can generate, + * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 && + (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) + FD_SET(in, rset); + else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue); + if (olen > 0) + FD_SET(out, wset); + + if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + error("select: %s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(2); + } + + /* copy stdin to iqueue */ + if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { + len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); + if (len == 0) { + debug("read eof"); + cleanup_exit(0); + } else if (len < 0) { + error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(1); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + /* send oqueue to stdout */ + if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { + len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen); + if (len < 0) { + error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); + cleanup_exit(1); + } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + + /* + * Process requests from client if we can fit the results + * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input + * and let the output queue drain. + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) + process(); + else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } +} +#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + extern char *__progname; + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); + fatal("PKCS#11 support disabled at compile time"); +} +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..775de96 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c @@ -0,0 +1,732 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.26 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +#include + +#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT +#include "pkcs11.h" + +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +struct pkcs11_slotinfo { + CK_TOKEN_INFO token; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + int logged_in; +}; + +struct pkcs11_provider { + char *name; + void *handle; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; + CK_INFO info; + CK_ULONG nslots; + CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist; + struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; + int valid; + int refcount; + TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; +}; + +TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers; + +struct pkcs11_key { + struct pkcs11_provider *provider; + CK_ULONG slotidx; + int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa); + RSA_METHOD *rsa_method; + char *keyid; + int keyid_len; +}; + +int pkcs11_interactive = 0; + +int +pkcs11_init(int interactive) +{ + pkcs11_interactive = interactive; + TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers); + return (0); +} + +/* + * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable. + * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, + * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). + * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. + */ +static void +pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) +{ + CK_RV rv; + CK_ULONG i; + + debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d", + p, p->refcount, p->valid); + if (!p->valid) + return; + for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { + if (p->slotinfo[i].session && + (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( + p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); + } + if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); + p->valid = 0; + p->function_list = NULL; + dlclose(p->handle); +} + +/* + * remove a reference to the provider. + * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered. + */ +static void +pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) +{ + debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount); + if (--p->refcount <= 0) { + if (p->valid) + error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p); + free(p->slotlist); + free(p->slotinfo); + free(p); + } +} + +/* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */ +void +pkcs11_terminate(void) +{ + struct pkcs11_provider *p; + + while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); + pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); + pkcs11_provider_unref(p); + } +} + +/* lookup provider by name */ +static struct pkcs11_provider * +pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) +{ + struct pkcs11_provider *p; + + TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { + debug("check %p %s", p, p->name); + if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name)) + return (p); + } + return (NULL); +} + +/* unregister provider by name */ +int +pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) +{ + struct pkcs11_provider *p; + + if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); + pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); + pkcs11_provider_unref(p); + return (0); + } + return (-1); +} + +/* openssl callback for freeing an RSA key */ +static int +pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) +{ + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + int rv = -1; + + if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) != NULL) { + if (k11->orig_finish) + rv = k11->orig_finish(rsa); + if (k11->provider) + pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); + RSA_meth_free(k11->rsa_method); + free(k11->keyid); + free(k11); + } + return (rv); +} + +/* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */ +static int +pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, + CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) +{ + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_ULONG nfound = 0; + CK_RV rv; + int ret = -1; + + f = p->function_list; + session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv); + return (-1); + } + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || + nfound != 1) { + debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu", + nfound, nattr, rv); + } else + ret = 0; + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); + return (ret); +} + +/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ +static int +pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, + int padding) +{ + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; + CK_ULONG tlen = 0; + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; + CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE; + CK_MECHANISM mech = { + CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 + }; + CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[] = { + {CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(private_key_class) }, + {CKA_ID, NULL, 0}, + {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) } + }; + char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024]; + int rval = -1; + + key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class; + key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val; + + if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) == NULL) { + error("RSA_get_app_data failed for rsa %p", rsa); + return (-1); + } + if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { + error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for rsa %p", rsa); + return (-1); + } + f = k11->provider->function_list; + si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; + if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { + if (!pkcs11_interactive) { + error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags & + CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ? + " on reader keypad" : ""); + return (-1); + } + if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) + verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad."); + else { + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label); + pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); + if (pin == NULL) + return (-1); /* bail out */ + } + rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, + (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); + if (pin != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(pin, strlen(pin)); + free(pin); + } + if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { + error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); + return (-1); + } + si->logged_in = 1; + } + key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; + key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len; + /* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */ + if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 && + pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) { + error("cannot find private key"); + } else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv); + } else { + /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ + tlen = RSA_size(rsa); + rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen); + if (rv == CKR_OK) + rval = tlen; + else + error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); + } + return (rval); +} + +static int +pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, + int padding) +{ + return (-1); +} + +/* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ +static int +pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) +{ + struct pkcs11_key *k11; + const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method(); + + k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); + k11->provider = provider; + provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */ + k11->slotidx = slotidx; + /* identify key object on smartcard */ + k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; + if (k11->keyid_len > 0) { + k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); + memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); + } + k11->rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(def); + if (k11->rsa_method == NULL) + fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__); + k11->orig_finish = RSA_meth_get_finish(def); + if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(k11->rsa_method, "pkcs11") || + !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(k11->rsa_method, + pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) || + !RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(k11->rsa_method, + pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt) || + !RSA_meth_set_finish(k11->rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_finish)) + fatal("%s: setup pkcs11 method failed", __func__); + RSA_set_method(rsa, k11->rsa_method); + RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11); + return (0); +} + +/* remove trailing spaces */ +static void +rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + + if (!len) + return; + for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--) + if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ') + buf[i] = '\0'; + else + break; +} + +/* + * open a pkcs11 session and login if required. + * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use + */ +static int +pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin) +{ + CK_RV rv; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + int login_required; + + f = p->function_list; + login_required = p->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; + if (pin && login_required && !strlen(pin)) { + error("pin required"); + return (-1); + } + if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| + CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); + return (-1); + } + if (login_required && pin) { + rv = f->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, + (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin)); + if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { + error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); + if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); + return (-1); + } + p->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1; + } + p->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session; + return (0); +} + +/* + * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx, + * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys. + * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. + */ +static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *, CK_ULONG, + CK_ATTRIBUTE [], CK_ATTRIBUTE [3], struct sshkey ***, int *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,4, 3 * sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)))); + +static int +pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys) +{ + CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS cert_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = { + { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) } + }; + CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_filter[] = { + { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(cert_class) } + }; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_attribs[] = { + { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, + { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 }, + { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 } + }; + CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attribs[] = { + { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, + { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 }, + { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 } + }; + pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class; + cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class; + + if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, pubkey_attribs, + keysp, nkeys) < 0 || + pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, cert_attribs, + keysp, nkeys) < 0) + return (-1); + return (0); +} + +static int +pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++) + if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i])) + return (1); + return (0); +} + +static int +have_rsa_key(const RSA *rsa) +{ + const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; + + RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); + return rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL; +} + +static int +pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, + CK_ATTRIBUTE filter[], CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[3], + struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys) +{ + struct sshkey *key; + RSA *rsa; + X509 *x509; + EVP_PKEY *evp; + int i; + const u_char *cp; + CK_RV rv; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; + CK_ULONG nfound; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; + + f = p->function_list; + session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; + /* setup a filter the looks for public keys */ + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, filter, 1)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); + return (-1); + } + while (1) { + /* XXX 3 attributes in attribs[] */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + attribs[i].pValue = NULL; + attribs[i].ulValueLen = 0; + } + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK + || nfound == 0) + break; + /* found a key, so figure out size of the attributes */ + if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + continue; + } + /* + * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but + * ensure that none of the others are zero length. + * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first. + */ + if (attribs[1].ulValueLen == 0 || + attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0) { + continue; + } + /* allocate buffers for attributes */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + if (attribs[i].ulValueLen > 0) { + attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc( + attribs[i].ulValueLen); + } + } + + /* + * retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key, + * or ID, subject and value for certificates. + */ + rsa = NULL; + if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); + } else if (attribs[1].type == CKA_MODULUS ) { + if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { + error("RSA_new failed"); + } else { + BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; + + rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue, + attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL); + rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue, + attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL); + if (rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL) { + if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, + rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) + fatal("%s: set key", __func__); + rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */ + } + BN_free(rsa_n); + BN_free(rsa_e); + } + } else { + cp = attribs[2].pValue; + if ((x509 = X509_new()) == NULL) { + error("X509_new failed"); + } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[2].ulValueLen) + == NULL) { + error("d2i_X509 failed"); + } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL || + EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) != EVP_PKEY_RSA || + EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) { + debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa"); + } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup( + EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp))) == NULL) { + error("RSAPublicKey_dup"); + } + X509_free(x509); + } + if (rsa && have_rsa_key(rsa) && + pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) { + if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + key->rsa = rsa; + key->type = KEY_RSA; + key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; + if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) { + sshkey_free(key); + } else { + /* expand key array and add key */ + *keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys, + *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; + *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; + debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); + } + } else if (rsa) { + RSA_free(rsa); + } + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) + free(attribs[i].pValue); + } + if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); + return (0); +} + +/* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists */ +int +pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp) +{ + int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; + struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; + void *handle = NULL; + CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **); + CK_RV rv; + CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; + CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; + CK_ULONG i; + + *keyp = NULL; + if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { + debug("%s: provider already registered: %s", + __func__, provider_id); + goto fail; + } + /* open shared pkcs11-libarary */ + if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { + error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); + goto fail; + } + if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { + error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); + goto fail; + } + p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); + p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); + p->handle = handle; + /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ + if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu", + provider_id, rv); + goto fail; + } + p->function_list = f; + if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu", + provider_id, rv); + goto fail; + } + need_finalize = 1; + if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu", + provider_id, rv); + goto fail; + } + rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID)); + rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription)); + debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" + " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d", + provider_id, + p->info.manufacturerID, + p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, + p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, + p->info.libraryDescription, + p->info.libraryVersion.major, + p->info.libraryVersion.minor); + if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); + goto fail; + } + if (p->nslots == 0) { + debug("%s: provider %s returned no slots", __func__, + provider_id); + goto fail; + } + p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); + if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu", + provider_id, rv); + goto fail; + } + p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); + p->valid = 1; + nkeys = 0; + for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { + token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; + if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) + != CKR_OK) { + error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu " + "failed: %lu", provider_id, (unsigned long)i, rv); + continue; + } + if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) { + debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in " + "provider %s slot %lu", __func__, + provider_id, (unsigned long)i); + continue; + } + rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label)); + rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID)); + rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model)); + rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber)); + debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> " + "model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx", + provider_id, (unsigned long)i, + token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, + token->serialNumber, token->flags); + /* open session, login with pin and retrieve public keys */ + if (pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0) + pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys); + } + if (nkeys > 0) { + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); + p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ + return (nkeys); + } + debug("%s: provider %s returned no keys", __func__, provider_id); + /* don't add the provider, since it does not have any keys */ +fail: + if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) + error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu", + provider_id, rv); + if (p) { + free(p->slotlist); + free(p->slotinfo); + free(p); + } + if (handle) + dlclose(handle); + return (-1); +} + +#else + +int +pkcs11_init(int interactive) +{ + return (0); +} + +void +pkcs11_terminate(void) +{ + return; +} + +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ced74f --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-pkcs11.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.4 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ +int pkcs11_init(int); +void pkcs11_terminate(void); +int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***); +int pkcs11_del_provider(char *); + +#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) +#undef ENABLE_PKCS11 +#endif diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9b14f9a --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,449 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.67 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + +#include + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "log.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *); + +static const char * +rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg) +{ + switch (hash_alg) { + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: + return "ssh-rsa"; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: + return "rsa-sha2-256"; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: + return "rsa-sha2-512"; + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Returns the hash algorithm ID for a given algorithm identifier as used + * inside the signature blob, + */ +static int +rsa_hash_id_from_ident(const char *ident) +{ + if (strcmp(ident, "ssh-rsa") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; + return -1; +} + +/* + * Return the hash algorithm ID for the specified key name. This includes + * all the cases of rsa_hash_id_from_ident() but also the certificate key + * types. + */ +static int +rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(alg)) != -1) + return r; + if (strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; + return -1; +} + +static int +rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: + return NID_sha1; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: + return NID_sha256; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: + return NID_sha512; + default: + return -1; + } +} + +int +ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp) +{ + const BIGNUM *rsa_p, *rsa_q, *rsa_d; + BIGNUM *aux = NULL, *d_consttime = NULL; + BIGNUM *rsa_dmq1 = NULL, *rsa_dmp1 = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int r; + + if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d); + RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q); + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((d_consttime = BN_dup(rsa_d)) == NULL || + (rsa_iqmp = BN_dup(iqmp)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + BN_set_flags(aux, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(d_consttime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa_q, BN_value_one()) == 0) || + (BN_mod(rsa_dmq1, d_consttime, aux, ctx) == 0) || + (BN_sub(aux, rsa_p, BN_value_one()) == 0) || + (BN_mod(rsa_dmp1, d_consttime, aux, ctx) == 0)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (!RSA_set0_crt_params(key->rsa, rsa_dmp1, rsa_dmq1, rsa_iqmp)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rsa_dmp1 = rsa_dmq1 = rsa_iqmp = NULL; /* transferred */ + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + BN_clear_free(aux); + BN_clear_free(d_consttime); + BN_clear_free(rsa_dmp1); + BN_clear_free(rsa_dmq1); + BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + return r; +} + +/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ +int +ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident) +{ + const BIGNUM *rsa_n; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL; + size_t slen = 0; + u_int dlen, len; + int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + + if (alg_ident == NULL || strlen(alg_ident) == 0) + hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + else + hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident); + if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); + if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); + if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + /* hash the data */ + nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg); + if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (len < slen) { + size_t diff = slen - len; + memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); + explicit_bzero(sig, diff); + } else if (len > slen) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + /* encode signature */ + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, rsa_hash_alg_ident(hash_alg))) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, slen)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if (sigp != NULL) { + if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + ret = 0; + out: + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + freezero(sig, slen); + sshbuf_free(b); + return ret; +} + +int +ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *alg) +{ + const BIGNUM *rsa_n; + char *sigtype = NULL; + int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || + sig == NULL || siglen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); + if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + + if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(sigtype)) == -1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + /* + * Allow ssh-rsa-cert-v01 certs to generate SHA2 signatures for + * legacy reasons, but otherwise the signature type should match. + */ + if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") != 0) { + if ((want_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg)) == -1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if (hash_alg != want_alg) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + } + if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; + } + /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */ + modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa); + if (len > modlen) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } else if (len < modlen) { + diff = modlen - len; + osigblob = sigblob; + if ((sigblob = realloc(sigblob, modlen)) == NULL) { + sigblob = osigblob; /* put it back for clear/free */ + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len); + explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff); + len = modlen; + } + if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; + + ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, + key->rsa); + out: + freezero(sigblob, len); + free(sigtype); + sshbuf_free(b); + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * See: + * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/ + * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn + */ + +/* + * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) + * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } + */ +static const u_char id_sha1[] = { + 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */ + 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ + 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ + 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */ + 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ + 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */ +}; + +/* + * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html + * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) + * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) + * id-sha256(1) } + */ +static const u_char id_sha256[] = { + 0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */ + 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ + 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ + 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */ + 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ + 0x04, 0x20 /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */ +}; + +/* + * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html + * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) + * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2) + * id-sha256(3) } + */ +static const u_char id_sha512[] = { + 0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */ + 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */ + 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */ + 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */ + 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ + 0x04, 0x40 /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */ +}; + +static int +rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp) +{ + switch (hash_alg) { + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: + *oidp = id_sha1; + *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1); + break; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256: + *oidp = id_sha256; + *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256); + break; + case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512: + *oidp = id_sha512; + *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512); + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen, + u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) +{ + size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; + int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch; + const u_char *oid = NULL; + u_char *decrypted = NULL; + + if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0) + return ret; + ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); + if (hashlen != hlen) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto done; + } + rsasize = RSA_size(rsa); + if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM || + siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto done; + } + if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa, + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto done; + } + if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto done; + } + oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0; + hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0; + if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto done; + } + ret = 0; +done: + freezero(decrypted, rsasize); + return ret; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ diff --git a/ssh-sandbox.h b/ssh-sandbox.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd5fd83 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-sandbox.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sandbox.h,v 1.1 2011/06/23 09:34:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +struct monitor; +struct ssh_sandbox; + +struct ssh_sandbox *ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *); +void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *); +void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *); +void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *, pid_t); diff --git a/ssh-xmss.c b/ssh-xmss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c734fd --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-xmss.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-xmss.c,v 1.1 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $*/ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Stefan-Lukas Gazdag. + * Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshkey-xmss.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "ssh.h" + +#include "xmss_fast.h" + +int +ssh_xmss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) +{ + u_char *sig = NULL; + size_t slen = 0, len = 0, required_siglen; + unsigned long long smlen; + int r, ret; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + + if (key == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_XMSS || + key->xmss_sk == NULL || + sshkey_xmss_params(key) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(key, &required_siglen)) != 0) + return r; + if (datalen >= INT_MAX - required_siglen) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + smlen = slen = datalen + required_siglen; + if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(key, error)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((ret = xmss_sign(key->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(key), sig, &smlen, + data, datalen, sshkey_xmss_params(key))) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */ + goto out; + } + /* encode signature */ + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-xmss@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if (sigp != NULL) { + if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_update_state(key, error)) != 0) { + /* discard signature since we cannot update the state */ + if (r == 0 && sigp != NULL && *sigp != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(*sigp, len); + free(*sigp); + } + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + r = ret; + } + sshbuf_free(b); + if (sig != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sig, slen); + free(sig); + } + + return r; +} + +int +ssh_xmss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *ktype = NULL; + const u_char *sigblob; + u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL; + size_t len, required_siglen; + unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0; + int r, ret; + + if (key == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_XMSS || + key->xmss_pk == NULL || + sshkey_xmss_params(key) == NULL || + signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(key, &required_siglen)) != 0) + return r; + if (datalen >= INT_MAX - required_siglen) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0) + goto out; + if (strcmp("ssh-xmss@openssh.com", ktype) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; + } + if (len != required_siglen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + smlen = len + datalen; + mlen = smlen; + if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(sm, sigblob, len); + memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen); + if ((ret = xmss_sign_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen, + key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_params(key))) != 0) { + debug2("%s: crypto_sign_xmss_open failed: %d", + __func__, ret); + } + if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + /* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */ + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + if (sm != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sm, smlen); + free(sm); + } + if (m != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */ + free(m); + } + sshbuf_free(b); + free(ktype); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/ssh.0 b/ssh.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d8994f --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh.0 @@ -0,0 +1,982 @@ +SSH(1) General Commands Manual SSH(1) + +NAME + ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program) + +SYNOPSIS + ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface] [-b bind_address] + [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] + [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file] + [-J destination] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] + [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q query_option] [-R address] + [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination + [command] + +DESCRIPTION + ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for + executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to provide secure + encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure + network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and UNIX-domain sockets + can also be forwarded over the secure channel. + + ssh connects and logs into the specified destination, which may be + specified as either [user@]hostname or a URI of the form + ssh://[user@]hostname[:port]. The user must prove his/her identity to + the remote machine using one of several methods (see below). + + If a command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a + login shell. + + The options are as follows: + + -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only. + + -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only. + + -A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This + can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration + file. + + Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the + ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the + agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through + the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material + from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys + that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into + the agent. + + -a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. + + -B bind_interface + Bind to the address of bind_interface before attempting to + connect to the destination host. This is only useful on systems + with more than one address. + + -b bind_address + Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of + the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one + address. + + -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, + stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain + connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by + gzip(1). Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow + connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. + The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the + configuration files; see the Compression option. + + -c cipher_spec + Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. + cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order + of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more + information. + + -D [bind_address:]port + Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding. + This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local + side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a + connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over + the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to + determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently + the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act + as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. + Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the + configuration file. + + IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in + square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged + ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with + the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may + be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The + bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be + bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates + that the port should be available from all interfaces. + + -E log_file + Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error. + + -e escape_char + Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). + The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a + line. The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the + connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and + followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the + character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session + fully transparent. + + -F configfile + Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a + configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide + configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The + default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config. + + -f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution. + This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or + passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This + implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a + remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm. + + If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], + then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port + forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in + the background. + + -G Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and + Match blocks and exit. + + -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used + on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified + on the master process. + + -I pkcs11 + Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate + with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. + + -i identity_file + Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public + key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa, + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Identity + files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the + configuration file. It is possible to have multiple -i options + (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). If + no certificates have been explicitly specified by the + CertificateFile directive, ssh will also try to load certificate + information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to + identity filenames. + + -J destination + Connect to the target host by first making a ssh connection to + the jump host described by destination and then establishing a + TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple + jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This + is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive. + + -K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) + of GSSAPI credentials to the server. + + -k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the + server. + + -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport + -L [bind_address:]port:remote_socket + -L local_socket:host:hostport + -L local_socket:remote_socket + Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket + on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host + and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by + allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port on the local + side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address, or to a + Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or + socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and + a connection is made to either host port hostport, or the Unix + socket remote_socket, from the remote machine. + + Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. + Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses + can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. + + By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the + GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be + used to bind the connection to a specific address. The + bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be + bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates + that the port should be available from all interfaces. + + -l login_name + Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also + may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. + + -M Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing. + Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode but with + confirmation required using ssh-askpass(1) before each operation + that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session). + Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for + details. + + -m mac_spec + A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) + algorithms, specified in order of preference. See the MACs + keyword for more information. + + -N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just + forwarding ports. + + -n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from + stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A + common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote + machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will + start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will + be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh + program will be put in the background. (This does not work if + ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f + option.) + + -O ctl_cmd + Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When + the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted + and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^] + (check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request + forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel + forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^] + (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing + requests). + + -o option + Can be used to give options in the format used in the + configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for + which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details + of the options listed below, and their possible values, see + ssh_config(5). + + AddKeysToAgent + AddressFamily + BatchMode + BindAddress + CanonicalDomains + CanonicalizeFallbackLocal + CanonicalizeHostname + CanonicalizeMaxDots + CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs + CASignatureAlgorithms + CertificateFile + ChallengeResponseAuthentication + CheckHostIP + Ciphers + ClearAllForwardings + Compression + ConnectionAttempts + ConnectTimeout + ControlMaster + ControlPath + ControlPersist + DynamicForward + EscapeChar + ExitOnForwardFailure + FingerprintHash + ForwardAgent + ForwardX11 + ForwardX11Timeout + ForwardX11Trusted + GatewayPorts + GlobalKnownHostsFile + GSSAPIAuthentication + GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + HashKnownHosts + Host + HostbasedAuthentication + HostbasedKeyTypes + HostKeyAlgorithms + HostKeyAlias + HostName + IdentitiesOnly + IdentityAgent + IdentityFile + IPQoS + KbdInteractiveAuthentication + KbdInteractiveDevices + KexAlgorithms + LocalCommand + LocalForward + LogLevel + MACs + Match + NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost + NumberOfPasswordPrompts + PasswordAuthentication + PermitLocalCommand + PKCS11Provider + Port + PreferredAuthentications + ProxyCommand + ProxyJump + ProxyUseFdpass + PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes + PubkeyAuthentication + RekeyLimit + RemoteCommand + RemoteForward + RequestTTY + SendEnv + ServerAliveInterval + ServerAliveCountMax + SetEnv + StreamLocalBindMask + StreamLocalBindUnlink + StrictHostKeyChecking + TCPKeepAlive + Tunnel + TunnelDevice + UpdateHostKeys + User + UserKnownHostsFile + VerifyHostKeyDNS + VisualHostKey + XAuthLocation + + -p port + Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on + a per-host basis in the configuration file. + + -Q query_option + Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified + version 2. The available features are: cipher (supported + symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that + support authenticated encryption), help (supported query terms + for use with the -Q flag), mac (supported message integrity + codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types), key-cert + (certificate key types), key-plain (non-certificate key types), + protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions), and sig + (supported signature algorithms). + + -q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be + suppressed. + + -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport + -R [bind_address:]port:local_socket + -R remote_socket:host:hostport + -R remote_socket:local_socket + -R [bind_address:]port + Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket + on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local + side. + + This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port + or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is + made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded + over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local + machine to either an explicit destination specified by host port + hostport, or local_socket, or, if no explicit destination was + specified, ssh will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward + connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS + client. + + Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. + Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on + the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing + the address in square brackets. + + By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to + the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by + specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address + M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all + interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed + if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see + sshd_config(5)). + + If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically + allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. + When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be + printed to the standard output. + + -S ctl_path + Specifies the location of a control socket for connection + sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing. + Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in + ssh_config(5) for details. + + -s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote + system. Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure + transport for other applications (e.g. sftp(1)). The subsystem + is specified as the remote command. + + -T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. + + -t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute + arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be + very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t + options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty. + + -V Display the version number and exit. + + -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its + progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, + authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options + increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. + + -W host:port + Requests that standard input and output on the client be + forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N, + -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings, though these + can be overridden in the configuration file or using -o command + line options. + + -w local_tun[:remote_tun] + Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4) + devices between the client (local_tun) and the server + (remote_tun). + + The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword + M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device. If + remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. See also the + Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5). + + If the Tunnel directive is unset, it will be set to the default + tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^]. If a different Tunnel + forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before + -w. + + -X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host + basis in a configuration file. + + X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the + ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the + user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display + through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able + to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. + + For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY + extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y + option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for + more information. + + -x Disables X11 forwarding. + + -Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not + subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. + + -y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By + default this information is sent to stderr. + + ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user + configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format + and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). + +AUTHENTICATION + The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2. + + The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based + authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, + challenge-response authentication, and password authentication. + Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though + PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order. + + Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs + in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote + machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files + ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote + machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and + the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login. + Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key + (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts, + below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes + security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. + [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the + rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be + disabled if security is desired.] + + Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on + public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and + decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive + the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user + creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The + server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. + ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using + one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. The HISTORY section of + ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. + + The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted + for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server + which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client + proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that + the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. + + The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key + authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a + different method. These may be viewed by increasing the LogLevel to + DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the -v flag). + + The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores + the private key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA), + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public + key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's + home directory. The user should then copy the public key to + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine. + The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file, + and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, + the user can log in without giving the password. + + A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of + certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, + signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single + trusted certification authority can be used in place of many + public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for + more information. + + The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication + may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) and (optionally) + the AddKeysToAgent directive in ssh_config(5) for more information. + + Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an + arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Examples of + challenge-response authentication include BSD Authentication (see + login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems). + + Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a + password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, + since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by + someone listening on the network. + + ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing + identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are + stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, + the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known + hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a + host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables + password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle + attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The + StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines + whose host key is not known or has changed. + + When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server + either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no + command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a + normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the + remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. + + If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a + pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one. + The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour. + + If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape + characters noted below. + + If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and + can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting + the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent + even if a tty is used. + + The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine + exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. + +ESCAPE CHARACTERS + When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of + functions through the use of an escape character. + + A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a + character other than those described below. The escape character must + always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape + character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar + configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option. + + The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are: + + ~. Disconnect. + + ~^Z Background ssh. + + ~# List forwarded connections. + + ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / + X11 sessions to terminate. + + ~? Display a list of escape characters. + + ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer + supports it). + + ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port + forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also + allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with + -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for + remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings. + !command allows the user to execute a local command if the + PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic + help is available, using the -h option. + + ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer + supports it). + + ~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written + to stderr. + + ~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written + to stderr. + +TCP FORWARDING + Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be + specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One + possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail + server; another is going through firewalls. + + In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC + client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support + encrypted communications. This works as follows: the user connects to + the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward + connections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the + service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the + same local port, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection. + + The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine + M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] (localhost) to remote server M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]: + + $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 + $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1 + + This tunnels a connection to IRC server M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining + channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using port 1234. It doesn't matter + which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only + root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any + ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the + remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services. + + The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is + specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to + start the service which is to be tunnelled. If no connections are made + within the time specified, ssh will exit. + +X11 FORWARDING + If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the + -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY + environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is + automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 + programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the + encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made + from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY. + Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in + configuration files. + + The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a + display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because + ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the + connections over the encrypted channel. + + ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. + For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store + it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections + carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection + is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server + machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). + + If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of + the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication + agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the + remote side. + +VERIFYING HOST KEYS + When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the + server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option + StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined + using ssh-keygen(1): + + $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key + + If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be + accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server + are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the + fingerprint algorithm to match. + + Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at + fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, + using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small + ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the + session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known + server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed + when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns + are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern + remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, + not guaranteed proof. + + To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all + known hosts, the following command line can be used: + + $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts + + If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is + available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource + record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is + able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. + + In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, + M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. The SSHFP resource records should first be added to + the zonefile for host.example.com: + + $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. + + The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that + the zone is answering fingerprint queries: + + $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com + + Finally the client connects: + + $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com + [...] + Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. + Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? + + See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information. + +SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS + ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using + the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined + securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls + whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 + traffic). + + The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with + remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from + 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway + to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. + + On the client: + + # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true + # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 + # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 + + On the server: + + # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 + # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 + + Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys + file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following + entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on + tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to + M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]: + + tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane + tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john + + Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be + more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More + permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and + isakmpd(8). + +ENVIRONMENT + ssh will normally set the following environment variables: + + DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the + X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to + point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where + M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs, + and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1. ssh uses this special + value to forward X11 connections over the secure + channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY + explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection + insecure (and will require the user to manually + copy any required authorization cookies). + + HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. + + LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with + systems that use this variable. + + MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. + + PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when + compiling ssh. + + SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the + passphrase from the current terminal if it was run + from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal + associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are + set, it will execute the program specified by + SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the + passphrase. This is particularly useful when + calling ssh from a .xsession or related script. + (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to + redirect the input from /dev/null to make this + work.) + + SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to + communicate with the agent. + + SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the + connection. The variable contains four space- + separated values: client IP address, client port + number, server IP address, and server port number. + + SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if + a forced command is executed. It can be used to + extract the original arguments. + + SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the + device) associated with the current shell or + command. If the current session has no tty, this + variable is not set. + + SSH_TUNNEL Optionally set by sshd(8) to contain the interface + names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested + by the client. + + SSH_USER_AUTH Optionally set by sshd(8), this variable may + contain a pathname to a file that lists the + authentication methods successfully used when the + session was established, including any public keys + that were used. + + TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time + zone if it was set when the daemon was started + (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new + connections). + + USER Set to the name of the user logging in. + + Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format + M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are + allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the + PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5). + +FILES + ~/.rhosts + This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On + some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the + user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8) + reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the + user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The + recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the + user, and not accessible by others. + + ~/.shosts + This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows + host-based authentication without permitting login with + rlogin/rsh. + + ~/.ssh/ + This directory is the default location for all user-specific + configuration and authentication information. There is no + general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory + secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute + for the user, and not accessible by others. + + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys + Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used + for logging in as this user. The format of this file is + described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly + sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the + user, and not accessible by others. + + ~/.ssh/config + This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and + configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of + the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: + read/write for the user, and not writable by others. + + ~/.ssh/environment + Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see + ENVIRONMENT, above. + + ~/.ssh/id_dsa + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 + ~/.ssh/id_rsa + Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain + sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not + accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply + ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is + possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which + will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using + AES-128. + + ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub + ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub + Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not + sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. + + ~/.ssh/known_hosts + Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged + into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host + keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this + file. + + ~/.ssh/rc + Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, + just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the + sshd(8) manual page for more information. + + /etc/hosts.equiv + This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It + should only be writable by root. + + /etc/shosts.equiv + This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but + allows host-based authentication without permitting login with + rlogin/rsh. + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config + Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration + options are described in ssh_config(5). + + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key + These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are + used for host-based authentication. + + /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts + Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared + by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of + all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. + See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file. + + /etc/ssh/sshrc + Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, + just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the + sshd(8) manual page for more information. + +EXIT STATUS + ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an + error occurred. + +SEE ALSO + scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1), + tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8) + +STANDARDS + S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned + Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006. + + T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, + RFC 4251, January 2006. + + T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, + RFC 4252, January 2006. + + T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer + Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006. + + T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC + 4254, January 2006. + + J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell + (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006. + + F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the + Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006. + + J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break + Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006. + + M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport + Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006. + + B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport + Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006. + + M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for + the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006. + + J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File + Format, RFC 4716, November 2006. + + D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the + Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009. + + A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve + Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic + Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99). + +AUTHORS + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by + Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo + de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and + created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol + versions 1.5 and 2.0. + +OpenBSD 6.4 September 20, 2018 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7760c30 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh.1 @@ -0,0 +1,1709 @@ +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.399 2018/09/20 06:58:48 jmc Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 20 2018 $ +.Dt SSH 1 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh +.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program) +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm ssh +.Op Fl 46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy +.Op Fl B Ar bind_interface +.Op Fl b Ar bind_address +.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec +.Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port +.Op Fl E Ar log_file +.Op Fl e Ar escape_char +.Op Fl F Ar configfile +.Op Fl I Ar pkcs11 +.Op Fl i Ar identity_file +.Op Fl J Ar destination +.Op Fl L Ar address +.Op Fl l Ar login_name +.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec +.Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd +.Op Fl o Ar option +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl Q Ar query_option +.Op Fl R Ar address +.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path +.Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port +.Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun +.Ar destination +.Op Ar command +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for +executing commands on a remote machine. +It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between +two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. +X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and +.Ux Ns -domain +sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel. +.Pp +.Nm +connects and logs into the specified +.Ar destination , +which may be specified as either +.Sm off +.Oo user @ Oc hostname +.Sm on +or a URI of the form +.Sm off +.No ssh:// Oo user @ Oc hostname Op : port . +.Sm on +The user must prove +his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods +(see below). +.Pp +If a +.Ar command +is specified, +it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.It Fl 4 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv4 addresses only. +.Pp +.It Fl 6 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv6 addresses only. +.Pp +.It Fl A +Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. +This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. +.Pp +Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. +Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host +(for the agent's +.Ux Ns -domain +socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. +An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, +however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to +authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. +.Pp +.It Fl a +Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. +.Pp +.It Fl B Ar bind_interface +Bind to the address of +.Ar bind_interface +before attempting to connect to the destination host. +This is only useful on systems with more than one address. +.Pp +.It Fl b Ar bind_address +Use +.Ar bind_address +on the local machine as the source address +of the connection. +Only useful on systems with more than one address. +.Pp +.It Fl C +Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and +data for forwarded X11, TCP and +.Ux Ns -domain +connections). +The compression algorithm is the same used by +.Xr gzip 1 . +Compression is desirable on modem lines and other +slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. +The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the +configuration files; see the +.Cm Compression +option. +.Pp +.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec +Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. +.Ar cipher_spec +is a comma-separated list of ciphers +listed in order of preference. +See the +.Cm Ciphers +keyword in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for more information. +.Pp +.It Fl D Xo +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc +.Ar port +.Sm on +.Xc +Specifies a local +.Dq dynamic +application-level port forwarding. +This works by allocating a socket to listen to +.Ar port +on the local side, optionally bound to the specified +.Ar bind_address . +Whenever a connection is made to this port, the +connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application +protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the +remote machine. +Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and +.Nm +will act as a SOCKS server. +Only root can forward privileged ports. +Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. +.Pp +IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. +Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. +By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the +.Cm GatewayPorts +setting. +However, an explicit +.Ar bind_address +may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. +The +.Ar bind_address +of +.Dq localhost +indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an +empty address or +.Sq * +indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. +.Pp +.It Fl E Ar log_file +Append debug logs to +.Ar log_file +instead of standard error. +.Pp +.It Fl e Ar escape_char +Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: +.Ql ~ ) . +The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. +The escape character followed by a dot +.Pq Ql \&. +closes the connection; +followed by control-Z suspends the connection; +and followed by itself sends the escape character once. +Setting the character to +.Dq none +disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. +.Pp +.It Fl F Ar configfile +Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. +If a configuration file is given on the command line, +the system-wide configuration file +.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +will be ignored. +The default for the per-user configuration file is +.Pa ~/.ssh/config . +.Pp +.It Fl f +Requests +.Nm +to go to background just before command execution. +This is useful if +.Nm +is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user +wants it in the background. +This implies +.Fl n . +The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with +something like +.Ic ssh -f host xterm . +.Pp +If the +.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure +configuration option is set to +.Dq yes , +then a client started with +.Fl f +will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established +before placing itself in the background. +.Pp +.It Fl G +Causes +.Nm +to print its configuration after evaluating +.Cm Host +and +.Cm Match +blocks and exit. +.Pp +.It Fl g +Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. +If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified +on the master process. +.Pp +.It Fl I Ar pkcs11 +Specify the PKCS#11 shared library +.Nm +should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's +private RSA key. +.Pp +.It Fl i Ar identity_file +Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for +public key authentication is read. +The default is +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 +and +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . +Identity files may also be specified on +a per-host basis in the configuration file. +It is possible to have multiple +.Fl i +options (and multiple identities specified in +configuration files). +If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the +.Cm CertificateFile +directive, +.Nm +will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained +by appending +.Pa -cert.pub +to identity filenames. +.Pp +.It Fl J Ar destination +Connect to the target host by first making a +.Nm +connection to the jump host described by +.Ar destination +and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from +there. +Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. +This is a shortcut to specify a +.Cm ProxyJump +configuration directive. +.Pp +.It Fl K +Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI +credentials to the server. +.Pp +.It Fl k +Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. +.Pp +.It Fl L Xo +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc +.Ar port : host : hostport +.Sm on +.Xc +.It Fl L Xo +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc +.Ar port : remote_socket +.Sm on +.Xc +.It Fl L Xo +.Sm off +.Ar local_socket : host : hostport +.Sm on +.Xc +.It Fl L Xo +.Sm off +.Ar local_socket : remote_socket +.Sm on +.Xc +Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local +(client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket, +on the remote side. +This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP +.Ar port +on the local side, optionally bound to the specified +.Ar bind_address , +or to a Unix socket. +Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the +connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is +made to either +.Ar host +port +.Ar hostport , +or the Unix socket +.Ar remote_socket , +from the remote machine. +.Pp +Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. +Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. +IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. +.Pp +By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the +.Cm GatewayPorts +setting. +However, an explicit +.Ar bind_address +may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. +The +.Ar bind_address +of +.Dq localhost +indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an +empty address or +.Sq * +indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. +.Pp +.It Fl l Ar login_name +Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. +This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. +.Pp +.It Fl M +Places the +.Nm +client into +.Dq master +mode for connection sharing. +Multiple +.Fl M +options places +.Nm +into +.Dq master +mode but with confirmation required using +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 +before each operation that changes the multiplexing state +(e.g. opening a new session). +Refer to the description of +.Cm ControlMaster +in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for details. +.Pp +.It Fl m Ar mac_spec +A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms, +specified in order of preference. +See the +.Cm MACs +keyword for more information. +.Pp +.It Fl N +Do not execute a remote command. +This is useful for just forwarding ports. +.Pp +.It Fl n +Redirects stdin from +.Pa /dev/null +(actually, prevents reading from stdin). +This must be used when +.Nm +is run in the background. +A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. +For example, +.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & +will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 +connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. +The +.Nm +program will be put in the background. +(This does not work if +.Nm +needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the +.Fl f +option.) +.Pp +.It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd +Control an active connection multiplexing master process. +When the +.Fl O +option is specified, the +.Ar ctl_cmd +argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. +Valid commands are: +.Dq check +(check that the master process is running), +.Dq forward +(request forwardings without command execution), +.Dq cancel +(cancel forwardings), +.Dq exit +(request the master to exit), and +.Dq stop +(request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). +.Pp +.It Fl o Ar option +Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. +This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate +command-line flag. +For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact +.It AddKeysToAgent +.It AddressFamily +.It BatchMode +.It BindAddress +.It CanonicalDomains +.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal +.It CanonicalizeHostname +.It CanonicalizeMaxDots +.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs +.It CASignatureAlgorithms +.It CertificateFile +.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication +.It CheckHostIP +.It Ciphers +.It ClearAllForwardings +.It Compression +.It ConnectionAttempts +.It ConnectTimeout +.It ControlMaster +.It ControlPath +.It ControlPersist +.It DynamicForward +.It EscapeChar +.It ExitOnForwardFailure +.It FingerprintHash +.It ForwardAgent +.It ForwardX11 +.It ForwardX11Timeout +.It ForwardX11Trusted +.It GatewayPorts +.It GlobalKnownHostsFile +.It GSSAPIAuthentication +.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials +.It HashKnownHosts +.It Host +.It HostbasedAuthentication +.It HostbasedKeyTypes +.It HostKeyAlgorithms +.It HostKeyAlias +.It HostName +.It IdentitiesOnly +.It IdentityAgent +.It IdentityFile +.It IPQoS +.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication +.It KbdInteractiveDevices +.It KexAlgorithms +.It LocalCommand +.It LocalForward +.It LogLevel +.It MACs +.It Match +.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost +.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts +.It PasswordAuthentication +.It PermitLocalCommand +.It PKCS11Provider +.It Port +.It PreferredAuthentications +.It ProxyCommand +.It ProxyJump +.It ProxyUseFdpass +.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +.It PubkeyAuthentication +.It RekeyLimit +.It RemoteCommand +.It RemoteForward +.It RequestTTY +.It SendEnv +.It ServerAliveInterval +.It ServerAliveCountMax +.It SetEnv +.It StreamLocalBindMask +.It StreamLocalBindUnlink +.It StrictHostKeyChecking +.It TCPKeepAlive +.It Tunnel +.It TunnelDevice +.It UpdateHostKeys +.It User +.It UserKnownHostsFile +.It VerifyHostKeyDNS +.It VisualHostKey +.It XAuthLocation +.El +.Pp +.It Fl p Ar port +Port to connect to on the remote host. +This can be specified on a +per-host basis in the configuration file. +.Pp +.It Fl Q Ar query_option +Queries +.Nm +for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2. +The available features are: +.Ar cipher +(supported symmetric ciphers), +.Ar cipher-auth +(supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), +.Ar help +(supported query terms for use with the +.Fl Q +flag), +.Ar mac +(supported message integrity codes), +.Ar kex +(key exchange algorithms), +.Ar key +(key types), +.Ar key-cert +(certificate key types), +.Ar key-plain +(non-certificate key types), +.Ar protocol-version +(supported SSH protocol versions), and +.Ar sig +(supported signature algorithms). +.Pp +.It Fl q +Quiet mode. +Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. +.Pp +.It Fl R Xo +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc +.Ar port : host : hostport +.Sm on +.Xc +.It Fl R Xo +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc +.Ar port : local_socket +.Sm on +.Xc +.It Fl R Xo +.Sm off +.Ar remote_socket : host : hostport +.Sm on +.Xc +.It Fl R Xo +.Sm off +.Ar remote_socket : local_socket +.Sm on +.Xc +.It Fl R Xo +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc +.Ar port +.Sm on +.Xc +Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote +(server) host are to be forwarded to the local side. +.Pp +This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP +.Ar port +or to a Unix socket on the remote side. +Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the +connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection +is made from the local machine to either an explicit destination specified by +.Ar host +port +.Ar hostport , +or +.Ar local_socket , +or, if no explicit destination was specified, +.Nm +will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward connections to the destinations +requested by the remote SOCKS client. +.Pp +Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. +Privileged ports can be forwarded only when +logging in as root on the remote machine. +IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. +.Pp +By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback +interface only. +This may be overridden by specifying a +.Ar bind_address . +An empty +.Ar bind_address , +or the address +.Ql * , +indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. +Specifying a remote +.Ar bind_address +will only succeed if the server's +.Cm GatewayPorts +option is enabled (see +.Xr sshd_config 5 ) . +.Pp +If the +.Ar port +argument is +.Ql 0 , +the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported +to the client at run time. +When used together with +.Ic -O forward +the allocated port will be printed to the standard output. +.Pp +.It Fl S Ar ctl_path +Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing, +or the string +.Dq none +to disable connection sharing. +Refer to the description of +.Cm ControlPath +and +.Cm ControlMaster +in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for details. +.Pp +.It Fl s +May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. +Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH +as a secure transport for other applications (e.g.\& +.Xr sftp 1 ) . +The subsystem is specified as the remote command. +.Pp +.It Fl T +Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. +.Pp +.It Fl t +Force pseudo-terminal allocation. +This can be used to execute arbitrary +screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, +e.g. when implementing menu services. +Multiple +.Fl t +options force tty allocation, even if +.Nm +has no local tty. +.Pp +.It Fl V +Display the version number and exit. +.Pp +.It Fl v +Verbose mode. +Causes +.Nm +to print debugging messages about its progress. +This is helpful in +debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. +Multiple +.Fl v +options increase the verbosity. +The maximum is 3. +.Pp +.It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port +Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to +.Ar host +on +.Ar port +over the secure channel. +Implies +.Fl N , +.Fl T , +.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure +and +.Cm ClearAllForwardings , +though these can be overridden in the configuration file or using +.Fl o +command line options. +.Pp +.It Fl w Xo +.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun +.Xc +Requests +tunnel +device forwarding with the specified +.Xr tun 4 +devices between the client +.Pq Ar local_tun +and the server +.Pq Ar remote_tun . +.Pp +The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword +.Dq any , +which uses the next available tunnel device. +If +.Ar remote_tun +is not specified, it defaults to +.Dq any . +See also the +.Cm Tunnel +and +.Cm TunnelDevice +directives in +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +.Pp +If the +.Cm Tunnel +directive is unset, it will be set to the default tunnel mode, which is +.Dq point-to-point . +If a different +.Cm Tunnel +forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before +.Fl w . +.Pp +.It Fl X +Enables X11 forwarding. +This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. +.Pp +X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. +Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host +(for the user's X authorization database) +can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. +An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. +.Pp +For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension +restrictions by default. +Please refer to the +.Nm +.Fl Y +option and the +.Cm ForwardX11Trusted +directive in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for more information. +.Pp +.It Fl x +Disables X11 forwarding. +.Pp +.It Fl Y +Enables trusted X11 forwarding. +Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension +controls. +.Pp +.It Fl y +Send log information using the +.Xr syslog 3 +system module. +By default this information is sent to stderr. +.El +.Pp +.Nm +may additionally obtain configuration data from +a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. +The file format and configuration options are described in +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +.Sh AUTHENTICATION +The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2. +.Pp +The methods available for authentication are: +GSSAPI-based authentication, +host-based authentication, +public key authentication, +challenge-response authentication, +and password authentication. +Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, +though +.Cm PreferredAuthentications +can be used to change the default order. +.Pp +Host-based authentication works as follows: +If the machine the user logs in from is listed in +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +or +.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv +on the remote machine, and the user names are +the same on both sides, or if the files +.Pa ~/.rhosts +or +.Pa ~/.shosts +exist in the user's home directory on the +remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client +machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is +considered for login. +Additionally, the server +.Em must +be able to verify the client's +host key (see the description of +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts +and +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , +below) +for login to be permitted. +This authentication method closes security holes due to IP +spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. +[Note to the administrator: +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv , +.Pa ~/.rhosts , +and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be +disabled if security is desired.] +.Pp +Public key authentication works as follows: +The scheme is based on public-key cryptography, +using cryptosystems +where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, +and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. +The idea is that each user creates a public/private +key pair for authentication purposes. +The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. +.Nm +implements public key authentication protocol automatically, +using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. +The HISTORY section of +.Xr ssl 8 +contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. +.Pp +The file +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in. +When the user logs in, the +.Nm +program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for +authentication. +The client proves that it has access to the private key +and the server checks that the corresponding public key +is authorized to accept the account. +.Pp +The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key +authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a +different method. +These may be viewed by increasing the +.Cm LogLevel +to +.Cm DEBUG +or higher (e.g. by using the +.Fl v +flag). +.Pp +The user creates his/her key pair by running +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +This stores the private key in +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa +(DSA), +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa +(ECDSA), +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 +(Ed25519), +or +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa +(RSA) +and stores the public key in +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub +(DSA), +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub +(ECDSA), +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub +(Ed25519), +or +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub +(RSA) +in the user's home directory. +The user should then copy the public key +to +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +in his/her home directory on the remote machine. +The +.Pa authorized_keys +file corresponds to the conventional +.Pa ~/.rhosts +file, and has one key +per line, though the lines can be very long. +After this, the user can log in without giving the password. +.Pp +A variation on public key authentication +is available in the form of certificate authentication: +instead of a set of public/private keys, +signed certificates are used. +This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority +can be used in place of many public/private keys. +See the CERTIFICATES section of +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +for more information. +.Pp +The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication +may be with an authentication agent. +See +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +and (optionally) the +.Cm AddKeysToAgent +directive in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for more information. +.Pp +Challenge-response authentication works as follows: +The server sends an arbitrary +.Qq challenge +text, and prompts for a response. +Examples of challenge-response authentication include +.Bx +Authentication (see +.Xr login.conf 5 ) +and PAM (some +.Pf non- Ox +systems). +.Pp +Finally, if other authentication methods fail, +.Nm +prompts the user for a password. +The password is sent to the remote +host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, +the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. +.Pp +.Nm +automatically maintains and checks a database containing +identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. +Host keys are stored in +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +in the user's home directory. +Additionally, the file +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts +is automatically checked for known hosts. +Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. +If a host's identification ever changes, +.Nm +warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent +server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, +which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. +The +.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking +option can be used to control logins to machines whose +host key is not known or has changed. +.Pp +When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server +either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, +if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives +the user a normal shell as an interactive session. +All communication with +the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. +.Pp +If an interactive session is requested +.Nm +by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive +sessions when the client has one. +The flags +.Fl T +and +.Fl t +can be used to override this behaviour. +.Pp +If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the +user may use the escape characters noted below. +.Pp +If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, +the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. +On most systems, setting the escape character to +.Dq none +will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used. +.Pp +The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote +machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. +.Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS +When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, +.Nm +supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character. +.Pp +A single tilde character can be sent as +.Ic ~~ +or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. +The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as +special. +The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the +.Cm EscapeChar +configuration directive or on the command line by the +.Fl e +option. +.Pp +The supported escapes (assuming the default +.Ql ~ ) +are: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm ~. +Disconnect. +.It Cm ~^Z +Background +.Nm . +.It Cm ~# +List forwarded connections. +.It Cm ~& +Background +.Nm +at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate. +.It Cm ~? +Display a list of escape characters. +.It Cm ~B +Send a BREAK to the remote system +(only useful if the peer supports it). +.It Cm ~C +Open command line. +Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the +.Fl L , +.Fl R +and +.Fl D +options (see above). +It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings +with +.Sm off +.Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port +.Sm on +for local, +.Sm off +.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port +.Sm on +for remote and +.Sm off +.Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port +.Sm on +for dynamic port-forwardings. +.Ic !\& Ns Ar command +allows the user to execute a local command if the +.Ic PermitLocalCommand +option is enabled in +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +Basic help is available, using the +.Fl h +option. +.It Cm ~R +Request rekeying of the connection +(only useful if the peer supports it). +.It Cm ~V +Decrease the verbosity +.Pq Ic LogLevel +when errors are being written to stderr. +.It Cm ~v +Increase the verbosity +.Pq Ic LogLevel +when errors are being written to stderr. +.El +.Sh TCP FORWARDING +Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can +be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. +One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a +mail server; another is going through firewalls. +.Pp +In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between +an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly +support encrypted communications. +This works as follows: +the user connects to the remote host using +.Nm , +specifying a port to be used to forward connections +to the remote server. +After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted +on the client machine, +connecting to the same local port, +and +.Nm +will encrypt and forward the connection. +.Pp +The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine +.Dq 127.0.0.1 +(localhost) +to remote server +.Dq server.example.com : +.Bd -literal -offset 4n +$ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 +$ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1 +.Ed +.Pp +This tunnels a connection to IRC server +.Dq server.example.com , +joining channel +.Dq #users , +nickname +.Dq pinky , +using port 1234. +It doesn't matter which port is used, +as long as it's greater than 1023 +(remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports) +and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use. +The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server, +since that's the standard port for IRC services. +.Pp +The +.Fl f +option backgrounds +.Nm +and the remote command +.Dq sleep 10 +is specified to allow an amount of time +(10 seconds, in the example) +to start the service which is to be tunnelled. +If no connections are made within the time specified, +.Nm +will exit. +.Sh X11 FORWARDING +If the +.Cm ForwardX11 +variable is set to +.Dq yes +(or see the description of the +.Fl X , +.Fl x , +and +.Fl Y +options above) +and the user is using X11 (the +.Ev DISPLAY +environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is +automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 +programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the +encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made +from the local machine. +The user should not manually set +.Ev DISPLAY . +Forwarding of X11 connections can be +configured on the command line or in configuration files. +.Pp +The +.Ev DISPLAY +value set by +.Nm +will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. +This is normal, and happens because +.Nm +creates a +.Dq proxy +X server on the server machine for forwarding the +connections over the encrypted channel. +.Pp +.Nm +will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. +For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, +store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded +connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when +the connection is opened. +The real authentication cookie is never +sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). +.Pp +If the +.Cm ForwardAgent +variable is set to +.Dq yes +(or see the description of the +.Fl A +and +.Fl a +options above) and +the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent +is automatically forwarded to the remote side. +.Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS +When connecting to a server for the first time, +a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user +(unless the option +.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking +has been disabled). +Fingerprints can be determined using +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 : +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +.Pp +If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched +and the key can be accepted or rejected. +If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +.Fl E +option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match. +.Pp +Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys +just by looking at fingerprint strings, +there is also support to compare host keys visually, +using +.Em random art . +By setting the +.Cm VisualHostKey +option to +.Dq yes , +a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter +if the session itself is interactive or not. +By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily +find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern +is displayed. +Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks +similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the +host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. +.Pp +To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for +all known hosts, the following command line can be used: +.Pp +.Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts +.Pp +If the fingerprint is unknown, +an alternative method of verification is available: +SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. +An additional resource record (RR), +SSHFP, +is added to a zonefile +and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint +with that of the key presented. +.Pp +In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, +.Dq host.example.com . +The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for +host.example.com: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. +.Ed +.Pp +The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. +To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: +.Pp +.Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com +.Pp +Finally the client connects: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com +[...] +Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. +Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? +.Ed +.Pp +See the +.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS +option in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for more information. +.Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS +.Nm +contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling +using the +.Xr tun 4 +network pseudo-device, +allowing two networks to be joined securely. +The +.Xr sshd_config 5 +configuration option +.Cm PermitTunnel +controls whether the server supports this, +and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic). +.Pp +The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 +with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection +from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, +provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, +at 192.168.1.15, allows it. +.Pp +On the client: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true +# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 +# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 +.Ed +.Pp +On the server: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 +# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 +.Ed +.Pp +Client access may be more finely tuned via the +.Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys +file (see below) and the +.Cm PermitRootLogin +server option. +The following entry would permit connections on +.Xr tun 4 +device 1 from user +.Dq jane +and on tun device 2 from user +.Dq john , +if +.Cm PermitRootLogin +is set to +.Dq forced-commands-only : +.Bd -literal -offset 2n +tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane +tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john +.Ed +.Pp +Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, +it may be more suited to temporary setups, +such as for wireless VPNs. +More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as +.Xr ipsecctl 8 +and +.Xr isakmpd 8 . +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Nm +will normally set the following environment variables: +.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" +.It Ev DISPLAY +The +.Ev DISPLAY +variable indicates the location of the X11 server. +It is automatically set by +.Nm +to point to a value of the form +.Dq hostname:n , +where +.Dq hostname +indicates the host where the shell runs, and +.Sq n +is an integer \*(Ge 1. +.Nm +uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure +channel. +The user should normally not set +.Ev DISPLAY +explicitly, as that +will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to +manually copy any required authorization cookies). +.It Ev HOME +Set to the path of the user's home directory. +.It Ev LOGNAME +Synonym for +.Ev USER ; +set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. +.It Ev MAIL +Set to the path of the user's mailbox. +.It Ev PATH +Set to the default +.Ev PATH , +as specified when compiling +.Nm . +.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS +If +.Nm +needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current +terminal if it was run from a terminal. +If +.Nm +does not have a terminal associated with it but +.Ev DISPLAY +and +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +are set, it will execute the program specified by +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. +This is particularly useful when calling +.Nm +from a +.Pa .xsession +or related script. +(Note that on some machines it +may be necessary to redirect the input from +.Pa /dev/null +to make this work.) +.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK +Identifies the path of a +.Ux Ns -domain +socket used to communicate with the agent. +.It Ev SSH_CONNECTION +Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. +The variable contains +four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number, +server IP address, and server port number. +.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND +This variable contains the original command line if a forced command +is executed. +It can be used to extract the original arguments. +.It Ev SSH_TTY +This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated +with the current shell or command. +If the current session has no tty, +this variable is not set. +.It Ev SSH_TUNNEL +Optionally set by +.Xr sshd 8 +to contain the interface names assigned if tunnel forwarding was +requested by the client. +.It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH +Optionally set by +.Xr sshd 8 , +this variable may contain a pathname to a file that lists the authentication +methods successfully used when the session was established, including any +public keys that were used. +.It Ev TZ +This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it +was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value +on to new connections). +.It Ev USER +Set to the name of the user logging in. +.El +.Pp +Additionally, +.Nm +reads +.Pa ~/.ssh/environment , +and adds lines of the format +.Dq VARNAME=value +to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to +change their environment. +For more information, see the +.Cm PermitUserEnvironment +option in +.Xr sshd_config 5 . +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.It Pa ~/.rhosts +This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). +On some machines this file may need to be +world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, +because +.Xr sshd 8 +reads it as root. +Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, +and must not have write permissions for anyone else. +The recommended +permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not +accessible by others. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.shosts +This file is used in exactly the same way as +.Pa .rhosts , +but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with +rlogin/rsh. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/ +This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration +and authentication information. +There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory +secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, +and not accessible by others. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) +that can be used for logging in as this user. +The format of this file is described in the +.Xr sshd 8 +manual page. +This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended +permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/config +This is the per-user configuration file. +The file format and configuration options are described in +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: +read/write for the user, and not writable by others. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment +Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see +.Sx ENVIRONMENT , +above. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa +Contains the private key for authentication. +These files +contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not +accessible by others (read/write/execute). +.Nm +will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. +It is possible to specify a passphrase when +generating the key which will be used to encrypt the +sensitive part of this file using AES-128. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub +.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub +Contains the public key for authentication. +These files are not +sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into +that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. +See +.Xr sshd 8 +for further details of the format of this file. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc +Commands in this file are executed by +.Nm +when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is +started. +See the +.Xr sshd 8 +manual page for more information. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +This file is for host-based authentication (see above). +It should only be writable by root. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv +This file is used in exactly the same way as +.Pa hosts.equiv , +but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with +rlogin/rsh. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +Systemwide configuration file. +The file format and configuration options are described in +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +These files contain the private parts of the host keys +and are used for host-based authentication. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts +Systemwide list of known host keys. +This file should be prepared by the +system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the +organization. +It should be world-readable. +See +.Xr sshd 8 +for further details of the format of this file. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc +Commands in this file are executed by +.Nm +when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. +See the +.Xr sshd 8 +manual page for more information. +.El +.Sh EXIT STATUS +.Nm +exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 +if an error occurred. +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr scp 1 , +.Xr sftp 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , +.Xr tun 4 , +.Xr ssh_config 5 , +.Xr ssh-keysign 8 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Sh STANDARDS +.Rs +.%A S. Lehtinen +.%A C. Lonvick +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4250 +.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A C. Lonvick +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4251 +.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A C. Lonvick +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4252 +.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A C. Lonvick +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4253 +.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A T. Ylonen +.%A C. Lonvick +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4254 +.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A J. Schlyter +.%A W. Griffin +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4255 +.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A F. Cusack +.%A M. Forssen +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4256 +.%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A J. Galbraith +.%A P. Remaker +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4335 +.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A M. Bellare +.%A T. Kohno +.%A C. Namprempre +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4344 +.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A B. Harris +.%D January 2006 +.%R RFC 4345 +.%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A M. Friedl +.%A N. Provos +.%A W. Simpson +.%D March 2006 +.%R RFC 4419 +.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A J. Galbraith +.%A R. Thayer +.%D November 2006 +.%R RFC 4716 +.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A D. Stebila +.%A J. Green +.%D December 2009 +.%R RFC 5656 +.%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer +.Re +.Pp +.Rs +.%A A. Perrig +.%A D. Song +.%D 1999 +.%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) +.%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security +.Re +.Sh AUTHORS +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt and Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH +protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0777c31 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh.c @@ -0,0 +1,2145 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.494 2018/10/03 06:38:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine. + * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding + * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos + * in Canada (German citizen). + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +#endif +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "clientloop.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "sshconnect.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "mac.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "msg.h" +#include "version.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "utf8.h" + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +#endif + +extern char *__progname; + +/* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */ +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE +static char **saved_av; +#endif + +/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */ +int debug_flag = 0; + +/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */ +int tty_flag = 0; + +/* don't exec a shell */ +int no_shell_flag = 0; + +/* + * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set + * on the command line. + */ +int stdin_null_flag = 0; + +/* + * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and + * a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist. + */ +int need_controlpersist_detach = 0; + +/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */ +int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty; + +/* + * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful + * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the + * background. + */ +int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; + +/* + * General data structure for command line options and options configurable + * in configuration files. See readconf.h. + */ +Options options; + +/* optional user configfile */ +char *config = NULL; + +/* + * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the + * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a + * configuration file. + */ +char *host; + +/* Various strings used to to percent_expand() arguments */ +static char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; +static char uidstr[32], *host_arg, *conn_hash_hex; + +/* socket address the host resolves to */ +struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; + +/* Private host keys. */ +Sensitive sensitive_data; + +/* command to be executed */ +struct sshbuf *command; + +/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */ +int subsystem_flag = 0; + +/* # of replies received for global requests */ +static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0; + +/* mux.c */ +extern int muxserver_sock; +extern u_int muxclient_command; + +/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */ + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, +"usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]\n" +" [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]\n" +" [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]\n" +" [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]\n" +" [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n" +" [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n" +" [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command]\n" + ); + exit(255); +} + +static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, struct passwd *); +static void load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *); +static void main_sigchld_handler(int); + +/* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */ +static void +tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths) +{ + u_int i; + char *cp; + + for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { + cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], getuid()); + free(paths[i]); + paths[i] = cp; + } +} + +/* + * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and + * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way. + * Returns NULL on failure. + * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. + */ +static struct addrinfo * +resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen) +{ + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + struct addrinfo hints, *res; + int gaierr, loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + + if (port <= 0) + port = default_ssh_port(); + + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? + AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + if (cname != NULL) + hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { + if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA)) + loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; + do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", + __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return NULL; + } + if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) { + if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) { + error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", + __func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen); + if (clen > 0) + *cname = '\0'; + } + } + return res; +} + +/* Returns non-zero if name can only be an address and not a hostname */ +static int +is_addr_fast(const char *name) +{ + return (strchr(name, '%') != NULL || strchr(name, ':') != NULL || + strspn(name, "0123456789.") == strlen(name)); +} + +/* Returns non-zero if name represents a valid, single address */ +static int +is_addr(const char *name) +{ + char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + struct addrinfo hints, *res; + + if (is_addr_fast(name)) + return 1; + + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", default_ssh_port()); + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? + AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; + if (getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res) != 0) + return 0; + if (res == NULL || res->ai_next != NULL) { + freeaddrinfo(res); + return 0; + } + freeaddrinfo(res); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address. + * Returns a canonical address string. + * Returns NULL on failure. + * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. + */ +static struct addrinfo * +resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen) +{ + char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + struct addrinfo hints, *res; + int gaierr; + + if (port <= 0) + port = default_ssh_port(); + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? + AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { + debug2("%s: could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s", + __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return NULL; + } + if (res == NULL) { + debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses", + __func__, name); + return NULL; + } + if (res->ai_next != NULL) { + debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses", + __func__, name); + goto fail; + } + if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, + addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { + debug("%s: Could not format address for name %.100s: %s", + __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); + goto fail; + } + if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) { + error("%s: host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", + __func__, name, addr, (u_long)clen); + if (clen > 0) + *caddr = '\0'; + fail: + freeaddrinfo(res); + return NULL; + } + return res; +} + +/* + * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname + * and perform the replacement if it is. + * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. + */ +static int +check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname) +{ + int i; + struct allowed_cname *rule; + + if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 || + strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0) + return 0; + if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) + return 0; + /* + * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by + * a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so. + */ + if (!direct && + options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) + return 0; + debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) { + rule = options.permitted_cnames + i; + if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 || + match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1) + continue; + verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname " + "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname); + free(*namep); + *namep = xstrdup(cname); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's + * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL + * if no name was found after canonicalization. + * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. + */ +static struct addrinfo * +resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port) +{ + int i, direct, ndots; + char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST]; + struct addrinfo *addrs; + + /* + * Attempt to canonicalise addresses, regardless of + * whether hostname canonicalisation was requested + */ + if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port, + newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) { + debug2("%s: hostname %.100s is address", __func__, *hostp); + if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) { + debug2("%s: canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"", + __func__, *hostp, newname); + free(*hostp); + *hostp = xstrdup(newname); + } + return addrs; + } + + /* + * If this looks like an address but didn't parse as one, it might + * be an address with an invalid interface scope. Skip further + * attempts at canonicalisation. + */ + if (is_addr_fast(*hostp)) { + debug("%s: hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address", + __func__, *hostp); + return NULL; + } + + if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) + return NULL; + + /* + * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by + * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. + */ + direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && + options.jump_host == NULL; + if (!direct && + options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) + return NULL; + + /* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */ + if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') { + debug3("%s: name is fully qualified", __func__); + fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp); + if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, + newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) + goto found; + free(fullhost); + goto notfound; + } + + /* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */ + ndots = 0; + for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { + if (*cp == '.') + ndots++; + } + if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) { + debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)", + __func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots); + return NULL; + } + /* Attempt each supplied suffix */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) { + *newname = '\0'; + xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp, + options.canonical_domains[i]); + debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__, + *hostp, fullhost); + if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, + newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) { + free(fullhost); + continue; + } + found: + /* Remove trailing '.' */ + fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0'; + /* Follow CNAME if requested */ + if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) { + debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"", + *hostp, fullhost); + } + free(*hostp); + *hostp = fullhost; + return addrs; + } + notfound: + if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local) + fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp); + debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp); + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and + * fatal()ing for others. + */ +static void +check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message) +{ + switch (r) { + case 0: + break; + case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: + case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: + fatal("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r)); + case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: + /* Ignore missing files */ + if (errno == ENOENT) + break; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + error("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r)); + break; + } +} + +/* + * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config + * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line. + */ +static void +process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int post_canon) +{ + char buf[PATH_MAX]; + int r; + + if (config != NULL) { + if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 && + !read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_name, &options, + SSHCONF_USERCONF | (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0))) + fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: " + "%.100s", config, strerror(errno)); + } else { + r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, + _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); + if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) + (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name, + &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF | + (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0)); + + /* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */ + (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, + host, host_name, &options, + post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0); + } +} + +/* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */ +static void +set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port) +{ + struct addrinfo *addr; + + for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) { + switch (addr->ai_family) { + case AF_INET: + ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)-> + sin_port = htons(port); + break; + case AF_INET6: + ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)-> + sin6_port = htons(port); + break; + } + } +} + +/* + * Main program for the ssh client. + */ +int +main(int ac, char **av) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = NULL; + int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms; + int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0; + char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *logfile; + char cname[NI_MAXHOST]; + struct stat st; + struct passwd *pw; + extern int optind, optreset; + extern char *optarg; + struct Forward fwd; + struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL; + struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; + u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ + /* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */ + saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av)); + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) + saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); + saved_av[i] = NULL; + compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); + av = saved_av; +#endif + + /* + * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem + * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist. + */ + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + + /* Get user data. */ + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + if (!pw) { + logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); + exit(255); + } + /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */ + pw = pwcopy(pw); + + /* + * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created + * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but + * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we + * don't set the modes explicitly. + */ + umask(022); + + msetlocale(); + + /* + * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been + * set. + */ + initialize_options(&options); + + /* + * Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures + */ + if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL) + fatal("Couldn't allocate session state"); + channel_init_channels(ssh); + active_state = ssh; /* XXX legacy API compat */ + + /* Parse command-line arguments. */ + host = NULL; + use_syslog = 0; + logfile = NULL; + argv0 = av[0]; + + again: + while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" + "AB:CD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case '1': + fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported"); + break; + case '2': + /* Ignored */ + break; + case '4': + options.address_family = AF_INET; + break; + case '6': + options.address_family = AF_INET6; + break; + case 'n': + stdin_null_flag = 1; + break; + case 'f': + fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; + stdin_null_flag = 1; + break; + case 'x': + options.forward_x11 = 0; + break; + case 'X': + options.forward_x11 = 1; + break; + case 'y': + use_syslog = 1; + break; + case 'E': + logfile = optarg; + break; + case 'G': + config_test = 1; + break; + case 'Y': + options.forward_x11 = 1; + options.forward_x11_trusted = 1; + break; + case 'g': + options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1; + break; + case 'O': + if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) + fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing " + "command with -W"); + else if (muxclient_command != 0) + fatal("Multiplexing command already specified"); + if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0) + muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0) + muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD; + else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0) + muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE; + else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0) + muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP; + else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0) + muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD; + else if (strcmp(optarg, "proxy") == 0) + muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY; + else + fatal("Invalid multiplex command."); + break; + case 'P': /* deprecated */ + break; + case 'Q': + cp = NULL; + if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0) + cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0) + cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0) + cp = mac_alg_list('\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0) + cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) + cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) + cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0) + cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "sig") == 0) + cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, '\n'); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) + cp = xstrdup("2"); + else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) { + cp = xstrdup( + "cipher\ncipher-auth\nkex\nkey\n" + "key-cert\nkey-plain\nmac\n" + "protocol-version\nsig"); + } + if (cp == NULL) + fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); + printf("%s\n", cp); + free(cp); + exit(0); + break; + case 'a': + options.forward_agent = 0; + break; + case 'A': + options.forward_agent = 1; + break; + case 'k': + options.gss_deleg_creds = 0; + break; + case 'K': + options.gss_authentication = 1; + options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; + break; + case 'i': + p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid()); + if (stat(p, &st) < 0) + fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " + "not accessible: %s.\n", p, + strerror(errno)); + else + add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1); + free(p); + break; + case 'I': +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + free(options.pkcs11_provider); + options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg); +#else + fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n"); +#endif + break; + case 'J': + if (options.jump_host != NULL) + fatal("Only a single -J option permitted"); + if (options.proxy_command != NULL) + fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand"); + if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1) + fatal("Invalid -J argument"); + options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none"); + break; + case 't': + if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES) + options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE; + else + options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES; + break; + case 'v': + if (debug_flag == 0) { + debug_flag = 1; + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + } else { + if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) { + debug_flag++; + options.log_level++; + } + } + break; + case 'V': + fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", + SSH_RELEASE, +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) +#else + "without OpenSSL" +#endif + ); + if (opt == 'V') + exit(0); + break; + case 'w': + if (options.tun_open == -1) + options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT; + options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote); + if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { + fprintf(stderr, + "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg); + exit(255); + } + break; + case 'W': + if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL) + fatal("stdio forward already specified"); + if (muxclient_command != 0) + fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O"); + if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { + options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host; + options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port; + free(fwd.connect_host); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, + "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n", + optarg); + exit(255); + } + options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; + no_shell_flag = 1; + break; + case 'q': + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; + break; + case 'e': + if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 && + (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 && + (u_char) optarg[1] < 128) + options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31; + else if (strlen(optarg) == 1) + options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0]; + else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0) + options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; + else { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", + optarg); + exit(255); + } + break; + case 'c': + if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' ? + optarg + 1 : optarg)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", + optarg); + exit(255); + } + free(options.ciphers); + options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 'm': + if (mac_valid(optarg)) { + free(options.macs); + options.macs = xstrdup(optarg); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n", + optarg); + exit(255); + } + break; + case 'M': + if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES) + options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK; + else + options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES; + break; + case 'p': + if (options.port == -1) { + options.port = a2port(optarg); + if (options.port <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", + optarg); + exit(255); + } + } + break; + case 'l': + if (options.user == NULL) + options.user = optarg; + break; + + case 'L': + if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0)) + add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); + else { + fprintf(stderr, + "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n", + optarg); + exit(255); + } + break; + + case 'R': + if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) || + parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) { + add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, + "Bad remote forwarding specification " + "'%s'\n", optarg); + exit(255); + } + break; + + case 'D': + if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { + add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, + "Bad dynamic forwarding specification " + "'%s'\n", optarg); + exit(255); + } + break; + + case 'C': + options.compression = 1; + break; + case 'N': + no_shell_flag = 1; + options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; + break; + case 'T': + options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; + break; + case 'o': + line = xstrdup(optarg); + if (process_config_line(&options, pw, + host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line, + "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0) + exit(255); + free(line); + break; + case 's': + subsystem_flag = 1; + break; + case 'S': + free(options.control_path); + options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 'b': + options.bind_address = optarg; + break; + case 'B': + options.bind_interface = optarg; + break; + case 'F': + config = optarg; + break; + default: + usage(); + } + } + + if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0) + opt_terminated = 1; + + ac -= optind; + av += optind; + + if (ac > 0 && !host) { + int tport; + char *tuser; + switch (parse_ssh_uri(*av, &tuser, &host, &tport)) { + case -1: + usage(); + break; + case 0: + if (options.user == NULL) { + options.user = tuser; + tuser = NULL; + } + free(tuser); + if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1) + options.port = tport; + break; + default: + p = xstrdup(*av); + cp = strrchr(p, '@'); + if (cp != NULL) { + if (cp == p) + usage(); + if (options.user == NULL) { + options.user = p; + p = NULL; + } + *cp++ = '\0'; + host = xstrdup(cp); + free(p); + } else + host = p; + break; + } + if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) { + optind = optreset = 1; + goto again; + } + ac--, av++; + } + + /* Check that we got a host name. */ + if (!host) + usage(); + + host_arg = xstrdup(host); + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); +#endif + + /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ + if ((command = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); + + /* + * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There + * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum + * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command. + */ + if (!ac) { + /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */ + if (subsystem_flag) { + fprintf(stderr, + "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n"); + usage(); + } + } else { + /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */ + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(command, "%s%s", + i ? " " : "", av[i])) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + + /* + * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output + * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E. + */ + if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL) + fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E"); + if (logfile != NULL) + log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); + log_init(argv0, + options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, + options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? + SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility, + !use_syslog); + + if (debug_flag) + logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) +#else + "without OpenSSL" +#endif + ); + + /* Parse the configuration files */ + process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0); + + /* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */ + fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options); + + /* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */ + if (options.hostname != NULL) { + /* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */ + cp = percent_expand(options.hostname, + "h", host, (char *)NULL); + free(host); + host = cp; + free(options.hostname); + options.hostname = xstrdup(host); + } + + /* Don't lowercase addresses, they will be explicitly canonicalised */ + if ((was_addr = is_addr(host)) == 0) + lowercase(host); + + /* + * Try to canonicalize if requested by configuration or the + * hostname is an address. + */ + if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO || was_addr) + addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port); + + /* + * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but + * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested + * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed + * as a result of CNAME following. + * + * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's + * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules. + * + * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user + * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via + * CanonicalizeHostname=always + */ + direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && + options.jump_host == NULL; + if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (direct || + options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) { + if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, + direct, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) { + /* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */ + if (direct) + cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */ + } else + check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname); + } + + /* + * If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration + * files as new stanzas may match. + */ + if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0) { + debug("Re-reading configuration after hostname " + "canonicalisation"); + free(options.hostname); + options.hostname = xstrdup(host); + process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1); + /* + * Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation + * enabled and the port number may have changed since, so + * reset it in address list + */ + if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0) + set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port); + } + + /* Fill configuration defaults. */ + fill_default_options(&options); + + /* + * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now. + */ + if (options.jump_host != NULL) { + char port_s[8]; + const char *sshbin = argv0; + + /* + * Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to + * "ssh" if it appears unavailable. + */ + if (strchr(argv0, '/') != NULL && access(argv0, X_OK) != 0) + sshbin = "ssh"; + + /* Consistency check */ + if (options.proxy_command != NULL) + fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump"); + /* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */ + options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0; + snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port); + xasprintf(&options.proxy_command, + "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s", + sshbin, + /* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */ + options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ", + options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user, + /* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */ + options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ", + options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s, + /* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */ + options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ", + options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra, + /* Optional "-F" argumment if -F specified */ + config == NULL ? "" : " -F ", + config == NULL ? "" : config, + /* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */ + debug_flag ? " -" : "", + debug_flag, "vvv", + /* Mandatory hostname */ + options.jump_host); + debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s", + options.proxy_command); + } + + if (options.port == 0) + options.port = default_ssh_port(); + channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); + + /* Tidy and check options */ + if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) + lowercase(options.host_key_alias); + if (options.proxy_command != NULL && + strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 && + options.proxy_use_fdpass) + fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible"); + if (options.control_persist && + options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { + debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist; " + "disabling"); + options.update_hostkeys = 0; + } + if (options.connection_attempts <= 0) + fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts"); + + if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL) + fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command."); + + /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ + if (fork_after_authentication_flag && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && + options.remote_command == NULL && !no_shell_flag) + fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command " + "to execute."); + + /* reinit */ + log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog); + + if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES || + options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) + tty_flag = 1; + + /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */ + if (sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL) + tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO; + + /* Force no tty */ + if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO || + (muxclient_command && muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY)) + tty_flag = 0; + /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */ + if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && + options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) { + if (tty_flag) + logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because " + "stdin is not a terminal."); + tty_flag = 0; + } + + seed_rng(); + + if (options.user == NULL) + options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + + /* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */ + if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) + fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); + strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); + shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; + snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port); + snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu", + (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid); + + if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || + ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 || + ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || + ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 || + ssh_digest_update(md, options.user, strlen(options.user)) < 0 || + ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0) + fatal("%s: mux digest failed", __func__); + ssh_digest_free(md); + conn_hash_hex = tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); + + /* + * Expand tokens in arguments. NB. LocalCommand is expanded later, + * after port-forwarding is set up, so it may pick up any local + * tunnel interface name allocated. + */ + if (options.remote_command != NULL) { + debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); + cp = options.remote_command; + options.remote_command = percent_expand(cp, + "C", conn_hash_hex, + "L", shorthost, + "d", pw->pw_dir, + "h", host, + "i", uidstr, + "l", thishost, + "n", host_arg, + "p", portstr, + "r", options.user, + "u", pw->pw_name, + (char *)NULL); + debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command); + free(cp); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(command, options.remote_command, + strlen(options.remote_command))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + if (options.control_path != NULL) { + cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, getuid()); + free(options.control_path); + options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, + "C", conn_hash_hex, + "L", shorthost, + "h", host, + "i", uidstr, + "l", thishost, + "n", host_arg, + "p", portstr, + "r", options.user, + "u", pw->pw_name, + "i", uidstr, + (char *)NULL); + free(cp); + } + + if (config_test) { + dump_client_config(&options, host); + exit(0); + } + + if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL) + fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command"); + if (options.control_path != NULL) { + int sock; + if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) { + ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock); + packet_set_mux(); + goto skip_connect; + } + } + + /* + * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not + * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now. + */ + if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) { + debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port); + if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1, + cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) + cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */ + } + + timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; + + /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ + if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, + options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, + &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) + exit(255); + + if (addrs != NULL) + freeaddrinfo(addrs); + + packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval, + options.server_alive_count_max); + + ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + + if (timeout_ms > 0) + debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms); + + /* + * If we successfully made the connection and we have hostbased auth + * enabled, load the public keys so we can later use the ssh-keysign + * helper to sign challenges. + */ + sensitive_data.nkeys = 0; + sensitive_data.keys = NULL; + if (options.hostbased_authentication) { + sensitive_data.nkeys = 10; + sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys, + sizeof(struct sshkey)); + + /* XXX check errors? */ +#define L_PUBKEY(p,o) do { \ + if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \ + fatal("%s pubkey out of array bounds", __func__); \ + check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \ + p, "pubkey"); \ +} while (0) +#define L_CERT(p,o) do { \ + if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \ + fatal("%s cert out of array bounds", __func__); \ + check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \ +} while (0) + + if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) { + L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0); + L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 1); + L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 2); + L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 3); + L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 4); + L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 5); + L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 6); + L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 7); + L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 8); + L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 9); + } + } + + /* Create ~/.ssh * directory if it doesn't already exist. */ + if (config == NULL) { + r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, + strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); + if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0) { +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf); +#endif + if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0) + error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", + buf); +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL); +#endif + } + } + /* load options.identity_files */ + load_public_identity_files(pw); + + /* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */ + if (options.identity_agent && + strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) { + if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) { + unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + } else { + p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent, + getuid()); + cp = percent_expand(p, + "d", pw->pw_dir, + "h", host, + "i", uidstr, + "l", thishost, + "r", options.user, + "u", pw->pw_name, + (char *)NULL); + free(p); + /* + * If identity_agent represents an environment variable + * then recheck that it is valid (since processing with + * percent_expand() may have changed it) and substitute + * its value. + */ + if (cp[0] == '$') { + if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) { + fatal("Invalid IdentityAgent " + "environment variable name %s", cp); + } + if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) == NULL) + unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); + else + setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, p, 1); + } else { + /* identity_agent specifies a path directly */ + setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1); + } + free(cp); + } + } + + /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */ + tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles, + options.num_system_hostfiles); + tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles); + + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */ + signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); + + /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */ + ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, + options.port, pw, timeout_ms); + + if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { + verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + } else { + verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host); + } + + /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ + if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) { + /* Destroys contents safely */ + debug3("clear hostkey %d", i); + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]); + sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; + } + } + free(sensitive_data.keys); + } + for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { + free(options.identity_files[i]); + options.identity_files[i] = NULL; + if (options.identity_keys[i]) { + sshkey_free(options.identity_keys[i]); + options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { + free(options.certificate_files[i]); + options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; + } + + skip_connect: + exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, pw); + packet_close(); + + if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) + unlink(options.control_path); + + /* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */ + ssh_kill_proxy_command(); + + return exit_status; +} + +static void +control_persist_detach(void) +{ + pid_t pid; + int devnull, keep_stderr; + + debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__); + + /* + * master (current process) into the background, and make the + * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master. + */ + switch ((pid = fork())) { + case -1: + fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + case 0: + /* Child: master process continues mainloop */ + break; + default: + /* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */ + debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid); + stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag; + options.request_tty = orequest_tty; + tty_flag = otty_flag; + close(muxserver_sock); + muxserver_sock = -1; + options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; + muxclient(options.control_path); + /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */ + fatal("Failed to connect to new control master"); + } + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + } else { + keep_stderr = log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag; + if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || + dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || + (!keep_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)) + error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); + } + daemon(1, 1); + setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path); +} + +/* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */ +static void +fork_postauth(void) +{ + if (need_controlpersist_detach) + control_persist_detach(); + debug("forking to background"); + fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; + if (daemon(1, 1) < 0) + fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); +} + +/* Callback for remote forward global requests */ +static void +ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +{ + struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt; + + /* XXX verbose() on failure? */ + debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d", + type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", + rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path : + rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "", + (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "", + rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : + rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); + if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) { + if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { + rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int(); + logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", + rfwd->allocated_port, + rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); + channel_update_permission(ssh, + rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); + } else { + channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1); + } + } + + if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) { + if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) { + if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) + fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " + "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); + else + fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " + "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + } else { + if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) + logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " + "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); + else + logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " + "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + } + } + if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) { + debug("All remote forwarding requests processed"); + if (fork_after_authentication_flag) + fork_postauth(); + } +} + +static void +client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg) +{ + debug("stdio forwarding: done"); + cleanup_exit(0); +} + +static void +ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) +{ + if (!success) + fatal("stdio forwarding failed"); +} + +static void +ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c; + int in, out; + + if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL) + return; + + debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, options.stdio_forward_host, + options.stdio_forward_port); + + if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) < 0 || + (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0) + fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed"); + if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host, + options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__); + channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); + channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); +} + +static void +ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, char **ifname) +{ + int success = 0; + int i; + + /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { + debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote " + "address %.200s:%d", + (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? + options.local_forwards[i].listen_path : + (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? + (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : + options.local_forwards[i].listen_host, + options.local_forwards[i].listen_port, + (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? + options.local_forwards[i].connect_path : + options.local_forwards[i].connect_host, + options.local_forwards[i].connect_port); + success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, + &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts); + } + if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure) + fatal("Could not request local forwarding."); + if (i > 0 && success == 0) + error("Could not request local forwarding."); + + /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { + debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to " + "local address %.200s:%d", + (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? + options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path : + (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? + "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host, + options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port, + (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? + options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path : + options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host, + options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port); + options.remote_forwards[i].handle = + channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, + &options.remote_forwards[i]); + if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) { + if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) + fatal("Could not request remote forwarding."); + else + logit("Warning: Could not request remote " + "forwarding."); + } else { + client_register_global_confirm( + ssh_confirm_remote_forward, + &options.remote_forwards[i]); + } + } + + /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */ + if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { + if ((*ifname = client_request_tun_fwd(ssh, + options.tun_open, options.tun_local, + options.tun_remote)) == NULL) { + if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) + fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); + else + error("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); + } + } +} + +static void +check_agent_present(void) +{ + int r; + + if (options.forward_agent) { + /* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */ + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) { + options.forward_agent = 0; + if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) + debug("ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", + ssh_err(r)); + } + } +} + +static void +ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg) +{ + extern char **environ; + const char *display; + int interactive = tty_flag; + char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL; + + if (!success) + return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */ + + display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) + debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); + if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, + options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, + options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) { + /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ + debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " + "spoofing."); + x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto, + data, 1); + client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); + /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ + interactive = 1; + } + + check_agent_present(); + if (options.forward_agent) { + debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); + channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); + packet_send(); + } + + /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ + packet_set_interactive(interactive, + options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); + + client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"), + NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ); +} + +/* open new channel for a session */ +static int +ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Channel *c; + int window, packetmax, in, out, err; + + if (stdin_null_flag) { + in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); + } else { + in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + } + out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); + err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); + + if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0) + fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); + + /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ + if (!isatty(in)) + set_nonblock(in); + if (!isatty(out)) + set_nonblock(out); + if (!isatty(err)) + set_nonblock(err); + + window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; + packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; + if (tty_flag) { + window >>= 1; + packetmax >>= 1; + } + c = channel_new(ssh, + "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, + window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, + "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); + + debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self); + + channel_send_open(ssh, c->self); + if (!no_shell_flag) + channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, + ssh_session2_setup, NULL); + + return c->self; +} + +static int +ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw) +{ + int devnull, id = -1; + char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL; + + /* XXX should be pre-session */ + if (!options.control_persist) + ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); + + ssh_init_forwarding(ssh, &tun_fwd_ifname); + + if (options.local_command != NULL) { + debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); + cp = options.local_command; + options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, + "C", conn_hash_hex, + "L", shorthost, + "d", pw->pw_dir, + "h", host, + "i", uidstr, + "l", thishost, + "n", host_arg, + "p", portstr, + "r", options.user, + "u", pw->pw_name, + "T", tun_fwd_ifname == NULL ? "NONE" : tun_fwd_ifname, + (char *)NULL); + debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); + free(cp); + } + + /* Start listening for multiplex clients */ + if (!packet_get_mux()) + muxserver_listen(ssh); + + /* + * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen + * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground + * client attach as a control slave. + * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for + * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until + * after the connection is fully established (in particular, + * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure). + */ + if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) { + ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag; + ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag; + orequest_tty = options.request_tty; + otty_flag = tty_flag; + stdin_null_flag = 1; + no_shell_flag = 1; + tty_flag = 0; + if (!fork_after_authentication_flag) + need_controlpersist_detach = 1; + fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; + } + /* + * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the + * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier. + */ + if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1) + ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh); + + if (!no_shell_flag) + id = ssh_session2_open(ssh); + else { + packet_set_interactive( + options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO, + options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); + } + + /* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */ + if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO && + (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) { + debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring("no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); + packet_put_char(0); + packet_send(); + } + + /* Execute a local command */ + if (options.local_command != NULL && + options.permit_local_command) + ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); + + /* + * stdout is now owned by the session channel; clobber it here + * so future channel closes are propagated to the local fd. + * NB. this can only happen after LocalCommand has completed, + * as it may want to write to stdout. + */ + if (!need_controlpersist_detach) { + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1) + error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, + _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); + if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + fatal("%s: dup2() stdout failed", __func__); + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); + } + + /* + * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote + * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. + */ + if (fork_after_authentication_flag) { + if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && + options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { + debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " + "confirmation received"); + } else + fork_postauth(); + } + + return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ? + options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); +} + +/* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */ +static void +load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *filename, *cp; + struct sshkey *public; + int i; + u_int n_ids, n_certs; + char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; + char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; + int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES]; +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + struct sshkey **keys; + int nkeys; +#endif /* PKCS11 */ + + n_ids = n_certs = 0; + memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); + memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys)); + memset(identity_file_userprovided, 0, + sizeof(identity_file_userprovided)); + memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files)); + memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates)); + memset(certificate_file_userprovided, 0, + sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && + options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && + (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && + (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, + &keys)) > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { + sshkey_free(keys[i]); + continue; + } + identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; + identity_files[n_ids] = + xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */ + n_ids++; + } + free(keys); + } +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { + if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || + strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { + free(options.identity_files[i]); + options.identity_files[i] = NULL; + continue; + } + cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid()); + filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir, + "u", pw->pw_name, "l", thishost, "h", host, + "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); + free(cp); + check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), + filename, "pubkey"); + debug("identity file %s type %d", filename, + public ? public->type : -1); + free(options.identity_files[i]); + identity_files[n_ids] = filename; + identity_keys[n_ids] = public; + identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] = + options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; + if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) + continue; + + /* + * If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try + * to add the default certificate variant too. + */ + if (options.num_certificate_files != 0) + continue; + xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename); + check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL), + filename, "pubkey"); + debug("identity file %s type %d", cp, + public ? public->type : -1); + if (public == NULL) { + free(cp); + continue; + } + if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) { + debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate", + __func__, cp, sshkey_type(public)); + sshkey_free(public); + free(cp); + continue; + } + /* NB. leave filename pointing to private key */ + identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename); + identity_keys[n_ids] = public; + identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] = + options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; + n_ids++; + } + + if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) + fatal("%s: too many certificates", __func__); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { + cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i], + getuid()); + filename = percent_expand(cp, + "d", pw->pw_dir, + "h", host, + "i", uidstr, + "l", thishost, + "r", options.user, + "u", pw->pw_name, + (char *)NULL); + free(cp); + + check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL), + filename, "certificate"); + debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename, + public ? public->type : -1); + free(options.certificate_files[i]); + options.certificate_files[i] = NULL; + if (public == NULL) { + free(filename); + continue; + } + if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) { + debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate", + __func__, filename, sshkey_type(public)); + sshkey_free(public); + free(filename); + continue; + } + certificate_files[n_certs] = filename; + certificates[n_certs] = public; + certificate_file_userprovided[n_certs] = + options.certificate_file_userprovided[i]; + ++n_certs; + } + + options.num_identity_files = n_ids; + memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files)); + memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys)); + memcpy(options.identity_file_userprovided, + identity_file_userprovided, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided)); + + options.num_certificate_files = n_certs; + memcpy(options.certificate_files, + certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files)); + memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates)); + memcpy(options.certificate_file_userprovided, + certificate_file_userprovided, + sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided)); +} + +static void +main_sigchld_handler(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + pid_t pid; + int status; + + while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || + (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) + ; + errno = save_errno; +} diff --git a/ssh.h b/ssh.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5abfd7a --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh.h @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.88 2018/06/06 18:29:18 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */ +#define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER SSH_CIPHER_3DES + +/* Default port number. */ +#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22 + +/* + * Maximum number of certificate files that can be specified + * in configuration files or on the command line. + */ +#define SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES 100 + +/* + * Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified + * in configuration files or on the command line. + */ +#define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100 + +/* + * Major protocol version. Different version indicates major incompatibility + * that prevents communication. + * + * Minor protocol version. Different version indicates minor incompatibility + * that does not prevent interoperation. + */ +#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 1 +#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 5 + +/* We support only SSH2 */ +#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 2 +#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 0 + +/* + * Name for the service. The port named by this service overrides the + * default port if present. + */ +#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME "ssh" + +/* + * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the + * authentication agent. + */ +#define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME "SSH_AGENT_PID" + +/* + * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the + * authentication socket. + */ +#define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" + +/* + * Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass + */ +#define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV "SSH_ASKPASS" + +/* + * Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this + * many bits. This is to make double encryption with rsaref work. + */ +#define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED 128 + +/* + * Length of the session key in bytes. (Specified as 256 bits in the + * protocol.) + */ +#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH 32 + +/* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */ +#define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE -2 + +/* + * unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes; + * sshd will change its privileges to this user and its + * primary group. + */ +#ifndef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER +#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "sshd" +#endif + +/* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */ +#define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG 128 diff --git a/ssh2.h b/ssh2.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2e37c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh2.h @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.18 2016/05/04 14:22:33 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-05.txt + * + * Transport layer protocol: + * + * 1-19 Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug, + * etc) + * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation + * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for + * different authentication methods) + * + * User authentication protocol: + * + * 50-59 User authentication generic + * 60-79 User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused + * for different authentication methods) + * + * Connection protocol: + * + * 80-89 Connection protocol generic + * 90-127 Channel related messages + * + * Reserved for client protocols: + * + * 128-191 Reserved + * + * Local extensions: + * + * 192-255 Local extensions + */ + +/* special marker for no message */ + +#define SSH_MSG_NONE 0 + +/* ranges */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN 1 +#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX 49 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN 50 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX 79 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN 60 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX +#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN 80 +#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX 127 +#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MIN 128 +#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MAX 191 +#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN 192 +#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MAX 255 +#define SSH2_MSG_MIN 1 +#define SSH2_MSG_MAX 255 + +/* transport layer: generic */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT 1 +#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE 2 +#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED 3 +#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG 4 +#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST 5 +#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT 6 +#define SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO 7 + +/* transport layer: alg negotiation */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT 20 +#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS 21 + +/* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT 30 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY 31 + +/* dh-group-exchange */ +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD 30 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP 31 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT 32 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 34 + +/* ecdh */ +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT 30 +#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY 31 + +/* user authentication: generic */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE 51 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS 52 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER 53 + +/* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK 60 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ 60 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST 60 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE 61 + +/* connection protocol: generic */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST 80 +#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS 81 +#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE 82 + +/* channel related messages */ + +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN 90 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION 91 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE 92 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST 93 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA 94 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA 95 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF 96 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE 97 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST 98 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS 99 +#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE 100 + +/* disconnect reason code */ + +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT 1 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR 2 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED 3 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 4 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED 4 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR 5 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR 6 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE 7 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED 8 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE 9 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST 10 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION 11 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS 12 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER 13 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE 14 +#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME 15 + +/* misc */ + +#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED 1 +#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED 2 +#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE 3 +#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE 4 + +#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR 1 + +/* Certificate types for OpenSSH certificate keys extension */ +#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER 1 +#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2 diff --git a/ssh_api.c b/ssh_api.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c84b4e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh_api.c @@ -0,0 +1,540 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.8 2017/04/30 23:13:25 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "ssh_api.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "version.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#include + +int _ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *); +int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *, char **); +int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *, char **); +int _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *); +int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *); +struct sshkey *_ssh_host_public_key(int, int, struct ssh *); +struct sshkey *_ssh_host_private_key(int, int, struct ssh *); +int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, + u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); + +/* + * stubs for the server side implementation of kex. + * disable privsep so our stubs will never be called. + */ +int use_privsep = 0; +int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *, + u_char *, u_int, char *, u_int); +DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); + +/* Define these two variables here so that they are part of the library */ +u_char *session_id2 = NULL; +u_int session_id2_len = 0; + +int +mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, + u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *alg, u_int compat) +{ + return (-1); +} + +DH * +mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) +{ + return (NULL); +} + +/* API */ + +int +ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params) +{ + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; + struct ssh *ssh; + char **proposal; + static int called; + int r; + + if (!called) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + called = 1; + } + + if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (is_server) + ssh_packet_set_server(ssh); + + /* Initialize key exchange */ + proposal = kex_params ? kex_params->proposal : myproposal; + if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0) { + ssh_free(ssh); + return r; + } + ssh->kex->server = is_server; + if (is_server) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; +# endif +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; + ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key; + ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key; + ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign; + } else { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; +# endif +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; + ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key; + } + *sshp = ssh; + return 0; +} + +void +ssh_free(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct key_entry *k; + + ssh_packet_close(ssh); + /* + * we've only created the public keys variants in case we + * are a acting as a server. + */ + while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->public_keys)) != NULL) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->public_keys, k, next); + if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->server) + sshkey_free(k->key); + free(k); + } + while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->private_keys)) != NULL) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->private_keys, k, next); + free(k); + } + if (ssh->kex) + kex_free(ssh->kex); + free(ssh); +} + +void +ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *ssh, void *app_data) +{ + ssh->app_data = app_data; +} + +void * +ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return ssh->app_data; +} + +/* Returns < 0 on error, 0 otherwise */ +int +ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL; + struct key_entry *k = NULL, *k_prv = NULL; + int r; + + if (ssh->kex->server) { + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0) + return r; + if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL || + (k_prv = malloc(sizeof(*k_prv))) == NULL) { + free(k); + sshkey_free(pubkey); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + k_prv->key = key; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->private_keys, k_prv, next); + + /* add the public key, too */ + k->key = pubkey; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next); + r = 0; + } else { + if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + k->key = key; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next); + r = 0; + } + + return r; +} + +int +ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh, + int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *)) +{ + if (cb == NULL || ssh->kex == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + ssh->kex->verify_host_key = cb; + + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len) +{ + return sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), data, len); +} + +int +ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep) +{ + int r; + u_int32_t seqnr; + u_char type; + + /* + * Try to read a packet. Return SSH_MSG_NONE if no packet or not + * enough data. + */ + *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; + if (ssh->kex->client_version_string == NULL || + ssh->kex->server_version_string == NULL) + return _ssh_exchange_banner(ssh); + /* + * If we enough data and a dispatch function then + * call the function and get the next packet. + * Otherwise return the packet type to the caller so it + * can decide how to go on. + * + * We will only call the dispatch function for: + * 20-29 Algorithm negotiation + * 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for + * different authentication methods) + */ + for (;;) { + if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, &type, &seqnr)) != 0) + return r; + if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && + type >= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX && + ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) { + if ((r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh)) != 0) + return r; + } else { + *typep = type; + return 0; + } + } +} + +const u_char * +ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp) +{ + return sshpkt_ptr(ssh, lenp); +} + +int +ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, size_t len) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, data, len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +const u_char * +ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len) +{ + struct sshbuf *output = ssh_packet_get_output(ssh); + + *len = sshbuf_len(output); + return sshbuf_ptr(output); +} + +int +ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len) +{ + return sshbuf_consume(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len); +} + +int +ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len) +{ + return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len)); +} + +int +ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len) +{ + return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), len)); +} + +/* Read other side's version identification. */ +int +_ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, char **bannerp) +{ + struct sshbuf *input; + const char *s; + char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ + const char *mismatch = "Protocol mismatch.\r\n"; + int r, remote_major, remote_minor; + size_t i, n, j, len; + + *bannerp = NULL; + input = ssh_packet_get_input(ssh); + len = sshbuf_len(input); + s = (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(input); + for (j = n = 0;;) { + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { + if (j >= len) + return (0); + buf[i] = s[j++]; + if (buf[i] == '\r') { + buf[i] = '\n'; + buf[i + 1] = 0; + continue; /**XXX wait for \n */ + } + if (buf[i] == '\n') { + buf[i + 1] = 0; + break; + } + } + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; + if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) + break; + debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf); + if (ssh->kex->server || ++n > 65536) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), + mismatch, strlen(mismatch))) != 0) + return r; + return SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, j)) != 0) + return r; + + /* + * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept + * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. + */ + if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", + &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", + remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); + + ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); + if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99) { + remote_major = 2; + remote_minor = 0; + } + if (remote_major != 2) + return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH; + chop(buf); + debug("Remote version string %.100s", buf); + if ((*bannerp = strdup(buf)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; +} + +/* Send our own protocol version identification. */ +int +_ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, char **bannerp) +{ + char buf[256]; + int r; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), buf, strlen(buf))) != 0) + return r; + chop(buf); + debug("Local version string %.100s", buf); + if ((*bannerp = strdup(buf)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; +} + +int +_ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + int r; + + /* + * if _ssh_read_banner() cannot parse a full version string + * it will return NULL and we end up calling it again. + */ + + r = 0; + if (kex->server) { + if (kex->server_version_string == NULL) + r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, &kex->server_version_string); + if (r == 0 && + kex->server_version_string != NULL && + kex->client_version_string == NULL) + r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, &kex->client_version_string); + } else { + if (kex->server_version_string == NULL) + r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, &kex->server_version_string); + if (r == 0 && + kex->server_version_string != NULL && + kex->client_version_string == NULL) + r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, &kex->client_version_string); + } + if (r != 0) + return r; + /* start initial kex as soon as we have exchanged the banners */ + if (kex->server_version_string != NULL && + kex->client_version_string != NULL) { + if ((r = _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) + return r; + } + return 0; +} + +struct sshkey * +_ssh_host_public_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct key_entry *k; + + debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type); + TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) { + debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key)); + if (k->key->type == type && + (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid)) + return (k->key); + } + return (NULL); +} + +struct sshkey * +_ssh_host_private_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct key_entry *k; + + debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type); + TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->private_keys, next) { + debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key)); + if (k->key->type == type && + (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid)) + return (k->key); + } + return (NULL); +} + +int +_ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct key_entry *k; + + debug3("%s: need %s", __func__, sshkey_type(hostkey)); + TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) { + debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key)); + if (sshkey_equal_public(hostkey, k->key)) + return (0); /* ok */ + } + return (-1); /* failed */ +} + +/* offer hostkey algorithms in kexinit depending on registered keys */ +int +_ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct key_entry *k; + char *orig, *avail, *oavail = NULL, *alg, *replace = NULL; + char **proposal; + size_t maxlen; + int ktype, r; + + /* XXX we de-serialize ssh->kex->my, modify it, and change it */ + if ((r = kex_buf2prop(ssh->kex->my, NULL, &proposal)) != 0) + return r; + orig = proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; + if ((oavail = avail = strdup(orig)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; + if ((replace = calloc(1, maxlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + *replace = '\0'; + while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') { + if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) + continue; + TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) { + if (k->key->type == ktype || + (sshkey_is_cert(k->key) && k->key->type == + sshkey_type_plain(ktype))) { + if (*replace != '\0') + strlcat(replace, ",", maxlen); + strlcat(replace, alg, maxlen); + break; + } + } + } + if (*replace != '\0') { + debug2("%s: orig/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, orig); + debug2("%s: replace/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, replace); + free(orig); + proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = replace; + replace = NULL; /* owned by proposal */ + r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal); + } + out: + free(oavail); + free(replace); + kex_prop_free(proposal); + return r; +} + +int +_ssh_host_key_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey, + u_char **signature, size_t *slen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, + const char *alg, u_int compat) +{ + return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen, alg, compat); +} diff --git a/ssh_api.h b/ssh_api.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..584f896 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh_api.h @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.2 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef API_H +#define API_H + +#include +#include + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +#include "cipher.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "packet.h" + +struct kex_params { + char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; +}; + +/* public SSH API functions */ + +/* + * ssh_init() create a ssh connection object with given (optional) + * key exchange parameters. + */ +int ssh_init(struct ssh **, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params); + +/* + * release ssh connection state. + */ +void ssh_free(struct ssh *); + +/* + * attach application specific data to the connection state + */ +void ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *, void *); +void *ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *); + +/* + * ssh_add_hostkey() registers a private/public hostkey for an ssh + * connection. + * ssh_add_hostkey() needs to be called before a key exchange is + * initiated with ssh_packet_next(). + * private hostkeys are required if we need to act as a server. + * public hostkeys are used to verify the servers hostkey. + */ +int ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key); + +/* + * ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback() registers a callback function + * which should be called instead of the default verification. The + * function given must return 0 if the hostkey is ok, -1 if the + * verification has failed. + */ +int ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh, + int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *)); + +/* + * ssh_packet_next() advances to the next input packet and returns + * the packet type in typep. + * ssh_packet_next() works by processing an input byte-stream, + * decrypting the received data and hiding the key-exchange from + * the caller. + * ssh_packet_next() sets typep if there is no new packet available. + * in this case the caller must fill the input byte-stream by passing + * the data received over network to ssh_input_append(). + * additionally, the caller needs to send the resulting output + * byte-stream back over the network. otherwise the key exchange + * would not proceed. the output byte-stream is accessed through + * ssh_output_ptr(). + */ +int ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep); + +/* + * ssh_packet_payload() returns a pointer to the raw payload data of + * the current input packet and the length of this payload. + * the payload is accessible until ssh_packet_next() is called again. + */ +const u_char *ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp); + +/* + * ssh_packet_put() creates an encrypted packet with the given type + * and payload. + * the encrypted packet is appended to the output byte-stream. + */ +int ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, + size_t len); + +/* + * ssh_input_space() checks if 'len' bytes can be appended to the + * input byte-stream. + */ +int ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len); + +/* + * ssh_input_append() appends data to the input byte-stream. + */ +int ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len); + +/* + * ssh_output_space() checks if 'len' bytes can be appended to the + * output byte-stream. XXX + */ +int ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len); + +/* + * ssh_output_ptr() retrieves both a pointer and the length of the + * current output byte-stream. the bytes need to be sent over the + * network. the number of bytes that have been successfully sent can + * be removed from the output byte-stream with ssh_output_consume(). + */ +const u_char *ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len); + +/* + * ssh_output_consume() removes the given number of bytes from + * the output byte-stream. + */ +int ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len); + +#endif diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c12f5ef --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh_config @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +# $OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.33 2017/05/07 23:12:57 djm Exp $ + +# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file. See +# ssh_config(5) for more information. This file provides defaults for +# users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files +# or on the command line. + +# Configuration data is parsed as follows: +# 1. command line options +# 2. user-specific file +# 3. system-wide file +# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. +# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the +# configuration file, and defaults at the end. + +# Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options. For a comprehensive +# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the +# ssh_config(5) man page. + +# Host * +# ForwardAgent no +# ForwardX11 no +# PasswordAuthentication yes +# HostbasedAuthentication no +# GSSAPIAuthentication no +# GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no +# BatchMode no +# CheckHostIP yes +# AddressFamily any +# ConnectTimeout 0 +# StrictHostKeyChecking ask +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa +# IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 +# Port 22 +# Protocol 2 +# Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc +# MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com +# EscapeChar ~ +# Tunnel no +# TunnelDevice any:any +# PermitLocalCommand no +# VisualHostKey no +# ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com +# RekeyLimit 1G 1h diff --git a/ssh_config.0 b/ssh_config.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eb7f929 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh_config.0 @@ -0,0 +1,1109 @@ +SSH_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSH_CONFIG(5) + +NAME + ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client configuration files + +DESCRIPTION + ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the + following order: + + 1. command-line options + 2. user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config) + 3. system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) + + For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The + configuration files contain sections separated by Host specifications, + and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns + given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one + given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for + exceptions). + + Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host- + specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and + general defaults at the end. + + The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting + with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may + optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent + arguments containing spaces. Configuration options may be separated by + whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one M-bM-^@M-^X=M-bM-^@M-^Y; the latter format + is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying + configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option. + + The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that + keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): + + Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or + Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the + patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is + provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y + as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all + hosts. The host is usually the hostname argument given on the + command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname keyword for + exceptions). + + A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an + exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). If a negated entry is matched, then the + Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns + on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to + provide exceptions for wildcard matches. + + See PATTERNS for more information on patterns. + + Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or + Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the + Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified + using one or more criteria or the single token all which always + matches. The available criteria keywords are: canonical, exec, + host, originalhost, user, and localuser. The all criteria must + appear alone or immediately after canonical. Other criteria may + be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but all and canonical + require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an + exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). + + The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is + being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the + CanonicalizeHostname option.) This may be useful to specify + conditions that work with canonical host names only. The exec + keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. + If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is + considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must + be quoted. Arguments to exec accept the tokens described in the + TOKENS section. + + The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma- + separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators + described in the PATTERNS section. The criteria for the host + keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any + substitution by the Hostname or CanonicalizeHostname options. + The originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was + specified on the command-line. The user keyword matches against + the target username on the remote host. The localuser keyword + matches against the name of the local user running ssh(1) (this + keyword may be useful in system-wide ssh_config files). + + AddKeysToAgent + Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running + ssh-agent(1). If this option is set to yes and a key is loaded + from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to the agent + with the default lifetime, as if by ssh-add(1). If this option + is set to ask, ssh(1) will require confirmation using the + SSH_ASKPASS program before adding a key (see ssh-add(1) for + details). If this option is set to confirm, each use of the key + must be confirmed, as if the -c option was specified to + ssh-add(1). If this option is set to no, no keys are added to + the agent. The argument must be yes, confirm, ask, or no (the + default). + + AddressFamily + Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid + arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6 + (use IPv6 only). + + BatchMode + If set to yes, passphrase/password querying will be disabled. + This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no + user is present to supply the password. The argument must be yes + or no (the default). + + BindAddress + Use the specified address on the local machine as the source + address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than + one address. + + BindInterface + Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine + as the source address of the connection. + + CanonicalDomains + When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the + list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified + destination host. + + CanonicalizeFallbackLocal + Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname + canonicalization fails. The default, yes, will attempt to look + up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search + rules. A value of no will cause ssh(1) to fail instantly if + CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be + found in any of the domains specified by CanonicalDomains. + + CanonicalizeHostname + Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. + The default, no, is not to perform any name rewriting and let the + system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to yes then, + for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand or ProxyJump, + ssh(1) will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the + command line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and + CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If CanonicalizeHostname is + set to always, then canonicalization is applied to proxied + connections too. + + If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are + processed again using the new target name to pick up any new + configuration in matching Host and Match stanzas. + + CanonicalizeMaxDots + Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname + before canonicalization is disabled. The default, 1, allows a + single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). + + CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs + Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed + when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more + arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where + source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow + CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern- + list of domains that they may resolve to. + + For example, "*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com" + will allow hostnames matching "*.a.example.com" to be + canonicalized to names in the "*.b.example.com" or + "*.c.example.com" domains. + + CASignatureAlgorithms + Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of + certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: + + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, + ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa + + ssh(1) will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms + other than those specified. + + CertificateFile + Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. A + corresponding private key must be provided separately in order to + use this certificate either from an IdentityFile directive or -i + flag to ssh(1), via ssh-agent(1), or via a PKCS11Provider. + + Arguments to CertificateFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to + a user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS + section. + + It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in + configuration files; these certificates will be tried in + sequence. Multiple CertificateFile directives will add to the + list of certificates used for authentication. + + ChallengeResponseAuthentication + Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The + argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no. + + CheckHostIP + If set to yes (the default), ssh(1) will additionally check the + host IP address in the known_hosts file. This allows it to + detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add + addresses of destination hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the + process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking. If + the option is set to no, the check will not be executed. + + Ciphers + Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. + Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified value + begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be + appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the + specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified + ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default + set instead of replacing them. + + The supported ciphers are: + + 3des-cbc + aes128-cbc + aes192-cbc + aes256-cbc + aes128-ctr + aes192-ctr + aes256-ctr + aes128-gcm@openssh.com + aes256-gcm@openssh.com + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com + + The default is: + + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, + aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, + aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com + + The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q + cipher". + + ClearAllForwardings + Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings + specified in the configuration files or on the command line be + cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the + ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in + configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and + sftp(1). The argument must be yes or no (the default). + + Compression + Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be yes + or no (the default). + + ConnectionAttempts + Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before + exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in + scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. + + ConnectTimeout + Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the + SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. + This value is used only when the target is down or really + unreachable, not when it refuses the connection. + + ControlMaster + Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network + connection. When set to yes, ssh(1) will listen for connections + on a control socket specified using the ControlPath argument. + Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same + ControlPath with ControlMaster set to no (the default). These + sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network + connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to + connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is + not listening. + + Setting this to ask will cause ssh(1) to listen for control + connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1). If + the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh(1) will continue without + connecting to a master instance. + + X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these + multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded + will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not + possible to forward multiple displays or agents. + + Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try + to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if + one does not already exist. These options are: auto and autoask. + The latter requires confirmation like the ask option. + + ControlPath + Specify the path to the control socket used for connection + sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the + string none to disable connection sharing. Arguments to + ControlPath may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home + directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS section. It is + recommended that any ControlPath used for opportunistic + connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or + alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not + writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections + are uniquely identified. + + ControlPersist + When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the + master connection should remain open in the background (waiting + for future client connections) after the initial client + connection has been closed. If set to no, then the master + connection will not be placed into the background, and will close + as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to + yes or 0, then the master connection will remain in the + background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism + such as the "ssh -O exit"). If set to a time in seconds, or a + time in any of the formats documented in sshd_config(5), then the + backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after + it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the + specified time. + + DynamicForward + Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over + the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to + determine where to connect to from the remote machine. + + The argument must be [bind_address:]port. IPv6 addresses can be + specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, + the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts + setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind + the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of + localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local + use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port + should be available from all interfaces. + + Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and + ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be + specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command + line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. + + EnableSSHKeysign + Setting this option to yes in the global client configuration + file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program + ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication. The argument must + be yes or no (the default). This option should be placed in the + non-hostspecific section. See ssh-keysign(8) for more + information. + + EscapeChar + Sets the escape character (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). The escape character + can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a + single character, M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y followed by a letter, or none to disable + the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent + for binary data). + + ExitOnForwardFailure + Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it + cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote + port forwardings, (e.g. if either end is unable to bind and + listen on a specified port). Note that ExitOnForwardFailure does + not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not, + for example, cause ssh(1) to exit if TCP connections to the + ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be yes + or no (the default). + + FingerprintHash + Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key + fingerprints. Valid options are: md5 and sha256 (the default). + + ForwardAgent + Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if + any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must + be yes or no (the default). + + Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the + ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the + agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through + the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material + from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys + that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into + the agent. + + ForwardX11 + Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically + redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument + must be yes or no (the default). + + X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the + ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the + user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 + display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then + be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the + ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. + + ForwardX11Timeout + Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format + described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). X11 + connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused. + Setting ForwardX11Timeout to zero will disable the timeout and + permit X11 forwarding for the life of the connection. The + default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty + minutes has elapsed. + + ForwardX11Trusted + If this option is set to yes, remote X11 clients will have full + access to the original X11 display. + + If this option is set to no (the default), remote X11 clients + will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or + tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. + Furthermore, the xauth(1) token used for the session will be set + to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused + access after this time. + + See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on + the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. + + GatewayPorts + Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local + forwarded ports. By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings + to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from + connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to + specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the + wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to + forwarded ports. The argument must be yes or no (the default). + + GlobalKnownHostsFile + Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key + database, separated by whitespace. The default is + /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2. + + GSSAPIAuthentication + Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. + The default is no. + + GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is no. + + HashKnownHosts + Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when + they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts. These hashed names may be + used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal + identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. + The default is no. Note that existing names and addresses in + known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be + manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1). + + HostbasedAuthentication + Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public + key authentication. The argument must be yes or no (the + default). + + HostbasedKeyTypes + Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased + authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. + Alternately if the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, + then the specified key types will be appended to the default set + instead of replacing them. If the specified value begins with a + M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) + will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. + The default for this option is: + + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, + rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, + ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa + + The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types. + + HostKeyAlgorithms + Specifies the host key algorithms that the client wants to use in + order of preference. Alternately if the specified value begins + with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be + appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the + specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified + key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default + set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: + + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, + rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, + ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa + + If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default + is modified to prefer their algorithms. + + The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh + -Q key". + + HostKeyAlias + Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host + name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key + database files and when validating host certificates. This + option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple + servers running on a single host. + + HostName + Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to + specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. Arguments to + HostName accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. + Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line + and in HostName specifications). The default is the name given + on the command line. + + IdentitiesOnly + Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the authentication identity + and certificate files explicitly configured in the ssh_config + files or passed on the ssh(1) command-line, even if ssh-agent(1) + or a PKCS11Provider offers more identities. The argument to this + keyword must be yes or no (the default). This option is intended + for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. + + IdentityAgent + Specifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the + authentication agent. + + This option overrides the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable and + can be used to select a specific agent. Setting the socket name + to none disables the use of an authentication agent. If the + string "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket + will be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. + Otherwise if the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y character, + then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the + location of the socket. + + Arguments to IdentityAgent may use the tilde syntax to refer to a + user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS + section. + + IdentityFile + Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA + authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa, + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. + Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication + agent will be used for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is + set. If no certificates have been explicitly specified by + CertificateFile, ssh(1) will try to load certificate information + from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of + a specified IdentityFile. + + Arguments to IdentityFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a + user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS + section. + + It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in + configuration files; all these identities will be tried in + sequence. Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list + of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other + configuration directives). + + IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to + select which identities in an agent are offered during + authentication. IdentityFile may also be used in conjunction + with CertificateFile in order to provide any certificate also + needed for authentication with the identity. + + IgnoreUnknown + Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they + are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to + suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are + unrecognised by ssh(1). It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be + listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied + to unknown options that appear before it. + + Include + Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames + may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards + and, for user configurations, shell-like M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y references to user + home directories. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be + in ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or /etc/ssh if + included from the system configuration file. Include directive + may appear inside a Match or Host block to perform conditional + inclusion. + + IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. + Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22, af23, af31, + af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3, cs4, cs5, cs6, + cs7, ef, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a numeric value, or + none to use the operating system default. This option may take + one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument + is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If + two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for + interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. + The default is af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions + and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-interactive sessions. + + KbdInteractiveAuthentication + Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. + The argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no. + + KbdInteractiveDevices + Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive + authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. + The default is to use the server specified list. The methods + available vary depending on what the server supports. For an + OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: bsdauth and pam. + + KexAlgorithms + Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple + algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified + value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods + will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the + specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the + default set instead of replacing them. The default is: + + curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, + ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, + diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, + diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, + diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, + diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 + + The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be + obtained using "ssh -Q kex". + + LocalCommand + Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after + successfully connecting to the server. The command string + extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's + shell. Arguments to LocalCommand accept the tokens described in + the TOKENS section. + + The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the + session of the ssh(1) that spawned it. It should not be used for + interactive commands. + + This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been + enabled. + + LocalForward + Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over + the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote + machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the + second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be + specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple + forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be + given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward + privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in + accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit + bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific + address. The bind_address of localhost indicates that the + listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty + address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from + all interfaces. + + LogLevel + Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from + ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, + VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. + DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify + higher levels of verbose output. + + MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in + order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used for data + integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma- + separated. If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, + then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set + instead of replacing them. If the specified value begins with a + M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms (including + wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of + replacing them. + + The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after + encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and + their use recommended. + + The default is: + + umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, + hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, + hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, + umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, + hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 + + The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using + "ssh -Q mac". + + NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost + Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses). + The argument to this keyword must be yes or no (the default). + + NumberOfPasswordPrompts + Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The + argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. + + PasswordAuthentication + Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument + to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no. + + PermitLocalCommand + Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or + using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must + be yes or no (the default). + + PKCS11Provider + Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. The argument to this + keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use to + communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA + key. + + Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The + default is 22. + + PreferredAuthentications + Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication + methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g. + keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password). The + default is: + + gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, + keyboard-interactive,password + + ProxyCommand + Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The + command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed + using the user's shell M-bM-^@M-^XexecM-bM-^@M-^Y directive to avoid a lingering + shell process. + + Arguments to ProxyCommand accept the tokens described in the + TOKENS section. The command can be basically anything, and + should read from its standard input and write to its standard + output. It should eventually connect an sshd(8) server running + on some machine, or execute sshd -i somewhere. Host key + management will be done using the HostName of the host being + connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting + the command to none disables this option entirely. Note that + CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. + + This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy + support. For example, the following directive would connect via + an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: + + ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p + + ProxyJump + Specifies one or more jump proxies as either [user@]host[:port] + or an ssh URI. Multiple proxies may be separated by comma + characters and will be visited sequentially. Setting this option + will cause ssh(1) to connect to the target host by first making a + ssh(1) connection to the specified ProxyJump host and then + establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there. + + Note that this option will compete with the ProxyCommand option - + whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the + other from taking effect. + + ProxyUseFdpass + Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor + back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data. + The default is no. + + PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes + Specifies the key types that will be used for public key + authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. + Alternately if the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, + then the key types after it will be appended to the default + instead of replacing it. If the specified value begins with a + M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) + will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. + The default for this option is: + + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, + rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, + ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa + + The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh + -Q key". + + PubkeyAuthentication + Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument + to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no. + + RekeyLimit + Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted + before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a + maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is + renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may + have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes, + Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between + M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second + value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units + documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The + default value for RekeyLimit is default none, which means that + rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data + has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. + + RemoteCommand + Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after + successfully connecting to the server. The command string + extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's + shell. Arguments to RemoteCommand accept the tokens described in + the TOKENS section. + + RemoteForward + Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over + the secure channel. The remote port may either be forwarded to a + specified host and port from the local machine, or may act as a + SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote client to connect to + arbitrary destinations from the local machine. The first + argument must be [bind_address:]port If forwarding to a specific + destination then the second argument must be host:hostport, + otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote + forwarding will be established as a SOCKS proxy. + + IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square + brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional + forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports + can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote + machine. + + If the port argument is 0, the listen port will be dynamically + allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. + + If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind + to loopback addresses. If the bind_address is M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y or an empty + string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all + interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed + if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see + sshd_config(5)). + + RequestTTY + Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The + argument may be one of: no (never request a TTY), yes (always + request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), force (always + request a TTY) or auto (request a TTY when opening a login + session). This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for ssh(1). + + RevokedHostKeys + Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file + will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file + does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will + be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file, + listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation + List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information + on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). + + SendEnv + Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent + to the server. The server must also support it, and the server + must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note + that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a + pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. + Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the + server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain + wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be + separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv + directives. + + See PATTERNS for more information on patterns. + + It is possible to clear previously set SendEnv variable names by + prefixing patterns with -. The default is not to send any + environment variables. + + ServerAliveCountMax + Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be + sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server. + If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are + being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the + session. It is important to note that the use of server alive + messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The server + alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and + therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option + enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism + is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a + connection has become inactive. + + The default value is 3. If, for example, ServerAliveInterval + (see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the + default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect + after approximately 45 seconds. + + ServerAliveInterval + Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has + been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through + the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The + default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to + the server. + + SetEnv Directly specify one or more environment variables and their + contents to be sent to the server. Similarly to SendEnv, the + server must be prepared to accept the environment variable. + + StreamLocalBindMask + Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating + a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. + This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain + socket file. + + The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket + file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that + not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain + socket files. + + StreamLocalBindUnlink + Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file + for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. + If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is + not enabled, ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix- + domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding + to a Unix-domain socket file. + + The argument must be yes or no (the default). + + StrictHostKeyChecking + If this flag is set to yes, ssh(1) will never automatically add + host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect + to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum + protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, though it + can be annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly + maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. + This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. + + If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\accept-newM-bM-^@M-^] then ssh will automatically + add new host keys to the user known hosts files, but will not + permit connections to hosts with changed host keys. If this flag + is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\offM-bM-^@M-^], ssh will automatically add new host keys + to the user known hosts files and allow connections to hosts with + changed hostkeys to proceed, subject to some restrictions. If + this flag is set to ask (the default), new host keys will be + added to the user known host files only after the user has + confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will + refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host + keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. + + SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from + ssh(1). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, + LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The + default is USER. + + TCPKeepAlive + Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages + to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or + crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, + this means that connections will die if the route is down + temporarily, and some people find it annoying. + + The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the + client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host + dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. + + To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no. + See also ServerAliveInterval for protocol-level keepalives. + + Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the + server. The argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3), + ethernet (layer 2), or no (the default). Specifying yes requests + the default tunnel mode, which is point-to-point. + + TunnelDevice + Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun) + and the server (remote_tun). + + The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun]. The devices may be + specified by numerical ID or the keyword any, which uses the next + available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it + defaults to any. The default is any:any. + + UpdateHostKeys + Specifies whether ssh(1) should accept notifications of + additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has + completed and add them to UserKnownHostsFile. The argument must + be yes, no (the default) or ask. Enabling this option allows + learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports graceful + key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement public keys + before old ones are removed. Additional hostkeys are only + accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was already + trusted or explicitly accepted by the user. If UpdateHostKeys is + set to ask, then the user is asked to confirm the modifications + to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is currently incompatible + with ControlPersist, and will be disabled if it is enabled. + + Presently, only sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the + "hostkeys@openssh.com" protocol extension used to inform the + client of all the server's hostkeys. + + User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a + different user name is used on different machines. This saves + the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the + command line. + + UserKnownHostsFile + Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key + database, separated by whitespace. The default is + ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2. + + VerifyHostKeyDNS + Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP + resource records. If this option is set to yes, the client will + implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. + Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set + to ask. If this option is set to ask, information on fingerprint + match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm + new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking option. The + default is no. + + See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1). + + VisualHostKey + If this flag is set to yes, an ASCII art representation of the + remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the + fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this + flag is set to no (the default), no fingerprint strings are + printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed + for unknown host keys. + + XAuthLocation + Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default + is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. + +PATTERNS + A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y (a + wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that + matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of + declarations for any host in the ".co.uk" set of domains, the following + pattern could be used: + + Host *.co.uk + + The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network + range: + + Host 192.168.0.? + + A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within + pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark + (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an + organization except from the "dialup" pool, the following entry (in + authorized_keys) could be used: + + from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com" + + Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself. + For example, attempting to match "host3" against the following pattern- + list will fail: + + from="!host1,!host2" + + The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match, + such as a wildcard: + + from="!host1,!host2,*" + +TOKENS + Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at + runtime: + + %% A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y. + %C Hash of %l%h%p%r. + %d Local user's home directory. + %h The remote hostname. + %i The local user ID. + %L The local hostname. + %l The local hostname, including the domain name. + %n The original remote hostname, as given on the command line. + %p The remote port. + %r The remote username. + %T The local tun(4) or tap(4) network interface assigned if + tunnel forwarding was requested, or "NONE" otherwise. + %u The local username. + + Match exec accepts the tokens %%, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. + + CertificateFile accepts the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u. + + ControlPath accepts the tokens %%, %C, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and + %u. + + HostName accepts the tokens %% and %h. + + IdentityAgent and IdentityFile accept the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, + and %u. + + LocalCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, %T, + and %u. + + ProxyCommand accepts the tokens %%, %h, %p, and %r. + + RemoteCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, and + %u. + +FILES + ~/.ssh/config + This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file + is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. + Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict + permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by + others. + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config + Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for + those values that are not specified in the user's configuration + file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. + This file must be world-readable. + +SEE ALSO + ssh(1) + +AUTHORS + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by + Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo + de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and + created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol + versions 1.5 and 2.0. + +OpenBSD 6.4 October 3, 2018 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d5b01d --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -0,0 +1,1810 @@ +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.286 2018/10/03 06:38:35 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: October 3 2018 $ +.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm ssh_config +.Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Xr ssh 1 +obtains configuration data from the following sources in +the following order: +.Pp +.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact +.It +command-line options +.It +user's configuration file +.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config +.It +system-wide configuration file +.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +.El +.Pp +For each parameter, the first obtained value +will be used. +The configuration files contain sections separated by +.Cm Host +specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that +match one of the patterns given in the specification. +The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line +(see the +.Cm CanonicalizeHostname +option for exceptions). +.Pp +Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more +host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the +file, and general defaults at the end. +.Pp +The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. +Lines starting with +.Ql # +and empty lines are interpreted as comments. +Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes +.Pq \&" +in order to represent arguments containing spaces. +Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or +optional whitespace and exactly one +.Ql = ; +the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace +when specifying configuration options using the +.Nm ssh , +.Nm scp , +and +.Nm sftp +.Fl o +option. +.Pp +The possible +keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that +keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm Host +Restricts the following declarations (up to the next +.Cm Host +or +.Cm Match +keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns +given after the keyword. +If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. +A single +.Ql * +as a pattern can be used to provide global +defaults for all hosts. +The host is usually the +.Ar hostname +argument given on the command line +(see the +.Cm CanonicalizeHostname +keyword for exceptions). +.Pp +A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark +.Pq Sq !\& . +If a negated entry is matched, then the +.Cm Host +entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line +match. +Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard +matches. +.Pp +See +.Sx PATTERNS +for more information on patterns. +.It Cm Match +Restricts the following declarations (up to the next +.Cm Host +or +.Cm Match +keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the +.Cm Match +keyword are satisfied. +Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria +or the single token +.Cm all +which always matches. +The available criteria keywords are: +.Cm canonical , +.Cm exec , +.Cm host , +.Cm originalhost , +.Cm user , +and +.Cm localuser . +The +.Cm all +criteria must appear alone or immediately after +.Cm canonical . +Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily. +All criteria but +.Cm all +and +.Cm canonical +require an argument. +Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark +.Pq Sq !\& . +.Pp +The +.Cm canonical +keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed +after hostname canonicalization (see the +.Cm CanonicalizeHostname +option.) +This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host +names only. +The +.Cm exec +keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. +If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. +Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. +Arguments to +.Cm exec +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +.Pp +The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated +lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the +.Sx PATTERNS +section. +The criteria for the +.Cm host +keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution +by the +.Cm Hostname +or +.Cm CanonicalizeHostname +options. +The +.Cm originalhost +keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line. +The +.Cm user +keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. +The +.Cm localuser +keyword matches against the name of the local user running +.Xr ssh 1 +(this keyword may be useful in system-wide +.Nm +files). +.It Cm AddKeysToAgent +Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +If this option is set to +.Cm yes +and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to +the agent with the default lifetime, as if by +.Xr ssh-add 1 . +If this option is set to +.Cm ask , +.Xr ssh 1 +will require confirmation using the +.Ev SSH_ASKPASS +program before adding a key (see +.Xr ssh-add 1 +for details). +If this option is set to +.Cm confirm , +each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the +.Fl c +option was specified to +.Xr ssh-add 1 . +If this option is set to +.Cm no , +no keys are added to the agent. +The argument must be +.Cm yes , +.Cm confirm , +.Cm ask , +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm AddressFamily +Specifies which address family to use when connecting. +Valid arguments are +.Cm any +(the default), +.Cm inet +(use IPv4 only), or +.Cm inet6 +(use IPv6 only). +.It Cm BatchMode +If set to +.Cm yes , +passphrase/password querying will be disabled. +This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user +is present to supply the password. +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm BindAddress +Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of +the connection. +Only useful on systems with more than one address. +.It Cm BindInterface +Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine as the +source address of the connection. +.It Cm CanonicalDomains +When +.Cm CanonicalizeHostname +is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to +search for the specified destination host. +.It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal +Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. +The default, +.Cm yes , +will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's +search rules. +A value of +.Cm no +will cause +.Xr ssh 1 +to fail instantly if +.Cm CanonicalizeHostname +is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains +specified by +.Cm CanonicalDomains . +.It Cm CanonicalizeHostname +Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. +The default, +.Cm no , +is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all +hostname lookups. +If set to +.Cm yes +then, for connections that do not use a +.Cm ProxyCommand +or +.Cm ProxyJump , +.Xr ssh 1 +will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line +using the +.Cm CanonicalDomains +suffixes and +.Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs +rules. +If +.Cm CanonicalizeHostname +is set to +.Cm always , +then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. +.Pp +If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed +again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching +.Cm Host +and +.Cm Match +stanzas. +.It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots +Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before +canonicalization is disabled. +The default, 1, +allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). +.It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs +Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when +canonicalizing hostnames. +The rules consist of one or more arguments of +.Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list , +where +.Ar source_domain_list +is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, +and +.Ar target_domain_list +is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to. +.Pp +For example, +.Qq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com +will allow hostnames matching +.Qq *.a.example.com +to be canonicalized to names in the +.Qq *.b.example.com +or +.Qq *.c.example.com +domains. +.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms +Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates +by certificate authorities (CAs). +The default is: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +.Ed +.Pp +.Xr ssh 1 +will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those +specified. +.It Cm CertificateFile +Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. +A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order +to use this certificate either +from an +.Cm IdentityFile +directive or +.Fl i +flag to +.Xr ssh 1 , +via +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +or via a +.Cm PKCS11Provider . +.Pp +Arguments to +.Cm CertificateFile +may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory +or the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +.Pp +It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in +configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence. +Multiple +.Cm CertificateFile +directives will add to the list of certificates used for +authentication. +.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication +Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Cm yes +(the default) +or +.Cm no . +.It Cm CheckHostIP +If set to +.Cm yes +(the default), +.Xr ssh 1 +will additionally check the host IP address in the +.Pa known_hosts +file. +This allows it to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing +and will add addresses of destination hosts to +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +in the process, regardless of the setting of +.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking . +If the option is set to +.Cm no , +the check will not be executed. +.It Cm Ciphers +Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference. +Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +.Pp +The supported ciphers are: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +3des-cbc +aes128-cbc +aes192-cbc +aes256-cbc +aes128-ctr +aes192-ctr +aes256-ctr +aes128-gcm@openssh.com +aes256-gcm@openssh.com +chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com +.Ed +.Pp +The default is: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, +aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, +aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q cipher . +.It Cm ClearAllForwardings +Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings +specified in the configuration files or on the command line be +cleared. +This option is primarily useful when used from the +.Xr ssh 1 +command line to clear port forwardings set in +configuration files, and is automatically set by +.Xr scp 1 +and +.Xr sftp 1 . +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm Compression +Specifies whether to use compression. +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm ConnectionAttempts +Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. +The argument must be an integer. +This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. +The default is 1. +.It Cm ConnectTimeout +Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the +SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. +This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable, +not when it refuses the connection. +.It Cm ControlMaster +Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. +When set to +.Cm yes , +.Xr ssh 1 +will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the +.Cm ControlPath +argument. +Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same +.Cm ControlPath +with +.Cm ControlMaster +set to +.Cm no +(the default). +These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection +rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally +if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. +.Pp +Setting this to +.Cm ask +will cause +.Xr ssh 1 +to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 . +If the +.Cm ControlPath +cannot be opened, +.Xr ssh 1 +will continue without connecting to a master instance. +.Pp +X11 and +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the +display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master +connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. +.Pp +Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a +master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already +exist. +These options are: +.Cm auto +and +.Cm autoask . +The latter requires confirmation like the +.Cm ask +option. +.It Cm ControlPath +Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described +in the +.Cm ControlMaster +section above or the string +.Cm none +to disable connection sharing. +Arguments to +.Cm ControlPath +may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory +or the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +It is recommended that any +.Cm ControlPath +used for opportunistic connection sharing include +at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory +that is not writable by other users. +This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. +.It Cm ControlPersist +When used in conjunction with +.Cm ControlMaster , +specifies that the master connection should remain open +in the background (waiting for future client connections) +after the initial client connection has been closed. +If set to +.Cm no , +then the master connection will not be placed into the background, +and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. +If set to +.Cm yes +or 0, +then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely +(until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the +.Qq ssh -O exit ) . +If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in +.Xr sshd_config 5 , +then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate +after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the +specified time. +.It Cm DynamicForward +Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded +over the secure channel, and the application +protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the +remote machine. +.Pp +The argument must be +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port . +.Sm on +IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. +By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the +.Cm GatewayPorts +setting. +However, an explicit +.Ar bind_address +may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. +The +.Ar bind_address +of +.Cm localhost +indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an +empty address or +.Sq * +indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. +.Pp +Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and +.Xr ssh 1 +will act as a SOCKS server. +Multiple forwardings may be specified, and +additional forwardings can be given on the command line. +Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. +.It Cm EnableSSHKeysign +Setting this option to +.Cm yes +in the global client configuration file +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +enables the use of the helper program +.Xr ssh-keysign 8 +during +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication . +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. +See +.Xr ssh-keysign 8 +for more information. +.It Cm EscapeChar +Sets the escape character (default: +.Ql ~ ) . +The escape character can also +be set on the command line. +The argument should be a single character, +.Ql ^ +followed by a letter, or +.Cm none +to disable the escape +character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary +data). +.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure +Specifies whether +.Xr ssh 1 +should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested +dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\& +if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port). +Note that +.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure +does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not, +for example, cause +.Xr ssh 1 +to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail. +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm FingerprintHash +Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. +Valid options are: +.Cm md5 +and +.Cm sha256 +(the default). +.It Cm ForwardAgent +Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) +will be forwarded to the remote machine. +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.Pp +Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. +Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host +(for the agent's Unix-domain socket) +can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. +An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, +however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to +authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. +.It Cm ForwardX11 +Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected +over the secure channel and +.Ev DISPLAY +set. +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.Pp +X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. +Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host +(for the user's X11 authorization database) +can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. +An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring +if the +.Cm ForwardX11Trusted +option is also enabled. +.It Cm ForwardX11Timeout +Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding +using the format described in the +.Sx TIME FORMATS +section of +.Xr sshd_config 5 . +X11 connections received by +.Xr ssh 1 +after this time will be refused. +Setting +.Cm ForwardX11Timeout +to zero will disable the timeout and permit X11 forwarding for the life +of the connection. +The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has +elapsed. +.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted +If this option is set to +.Cm yes , +remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. +.Pp +If this option is set to +.Cm no +(the default), +remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented +from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 +clients. +Furthermore, the +.Xr xauth 1 +token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. +Remote clients will be refused access after this time. +.Pp +See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on +the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. +.It Cm GatewayPorts +Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local +forwarded ports. +By default, +.Xr ssh 1 +binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. +This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. +.Cm GatewayPorts +can be used to specify that ssh +should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, +thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile +Specifies one or more files to use for the global +host key database, separated by whitespace. +The default is +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts , +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 . +.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication +Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials +Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm HashKnownHosts +Indicates that +.Xr ssh 1 +should hash host names and addresses when they are added to +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts . +These hashed names may be used normally by +.Xr ssh 1 +and +.Xr sshd 8 , +but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents +be disclosed. +The default is +.Cm no . +Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files +will not be converted automatically, +but may be manually hashed using +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication +Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key +authentication. +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm HostbasedKeyTypes +Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication +as a comma-separated list of patterns. +Alternately if the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +The default for this option is: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +.Ed +.Pp +The +.Fl Q +option of +.Xr ssh 1 +may be used to list supported key types. +.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms +Specifies the host key algorithms +that the client wants to use in order of preference. +Alternately if the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +The default for this option is: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +.Ed +.Pp +If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified +to prefer their algorithms. +.Pp +The list of available key types may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q key . +.It Cm HostKeyAlias +Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the +real host name when looking up or saving the host key +in the host key database files and when validating host certificates. +This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections +or for multiple servers running on a single host. +.It Cm HostName +Specifies the real host name to log into. +This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. +Arguments to +.Cm HostName +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in +.Cm HostName +specifications). +The default is the name given on the command line. +.It Cm IdentitiesOnly +Specifies that +.Xr ssh 1 +should only use the authentication identity and certificate files explicitly +configured in the +.Nm +files +or passed on the +.Xr ssh 1 +command-line, +even if +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +or a +.Cm PKCS11Provider +offers more identities. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent +offers many different identities. +.It Cm IdentityAgent +Specifies the +.Ux Ns -domain +socket used to communicate with the authentication agent. +.Pp +This option overrides the +.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK +environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent. +Setting the socket name to +.Cm none +disables the use of an authentication agent. +If the string +.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK +is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the +.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK +environment variable. +Otherwise if the specified value begins with a +.Sq $ +character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing +the location of the socket. +.Pp +Arguments to +.Cm IdentityAgent +may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory +or the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +.It Cm IdentityFile +Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication +identity is read. +The default is +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 +and +.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . +Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent +will be used for authentication unless +.Cm IdentitiesOnly +is set. +If no certificates have been explicitly specified by +.Cm CertificateFile , +.Xr ssh 1 +will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by +appending +.Pa -cert.pub +to the path of a specified +.Cm IdentityFile . +.Pp +Arguments to +.Cm IdentityFile +may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory +or the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +.Pp +It is possible to have +multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these +identities will be tried in sequence. +Multiple +.Cm IdentityFile +directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour +differs from that of other configuration directives). +.Pp +.Cm IdentityFile +may be used in conjunction with +.Cm IdentitiesOnly +to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. +.Cm IdentityFile +may also be used in conjunction with +.Cm CertificateFile +in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with +the identity. +.It Cm IgnoreUnknown +Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are +encountered in configuration parsing. +This may be used to suppress errors if +.Nm +contains options that are unrecognised by +.Xr ssh 1 . +It is recommended that +.Cm IgnoreUnknown +be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied +to unknown options that appear before it. +.It Cm Include +Include the specified configuration file(s). +Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain +.Xr glob 7 +wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like +.Sq ~ +references to user home directories. +Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in +.Pa ~/.ssh +if included in a user configuration file or +.Pa /etc/ssh +if included from the system configuration file. +.Cm Include +directive may appear inside a +.Cm Match +or +.Cm Host +block +to perform conditional inclusion. +.It Cm IPQoS +Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. +Accepted values are +.Cm af11 , +.Cm af12 , +.Cm af13 , +.Cm af21 , +.Cm af22 , +.Cm af23 , +.Cm af31 , +.Cm af32 , +.Cm af33 , +.Cm af41 , +.Cm af42 , +.Cm af43 , +.Cm cs0 , +.Cm cs1 , +.Cm cs2 , +.Cm cs3 , +.Cm cs4 , +.Cm cs5 , +.Cm cs6 , +.Cm cs7 , +.Cm ef , +.Cm lowdelay , +.Cm throughput , +.Cm reliability , +a numeric value, or +.Cm none +to use the operating system default. +This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. +If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. +If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for +interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. +The default is +.Cm af21 +(Low-Latency Data) +for interactive sessions and +.Cm cs1 +(Lower Effort) +for non-interactive sessions. +.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication +Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Cm yes +(the default) +or +.Cm no . +.It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices +Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. +Multiple method names must be comma-separated. +The default is to use the server specified list. +The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. +For an OpenSSH server, +it may be zero or more of: +.Cm bsdauth +and +.Cm pam . +.It Cm KexAlgorithms +Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. +Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +Alternately if the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +The default is: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, +ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, +diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, +diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, +diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, +diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, +diffie-hellman-group14-sha256, +diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q kex . +.It Cm LocalCommand +Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully +connecting to the server. +The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with +the user's shell. +Arguments to +.Cm LocalCommand +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +.Pp +The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the +session of the +.Xr ssh 1 +that spawned it. +It should not be used for interactive commands. +.Pp +This directive is ignored unless +.Cm PermitLocalCommand +has been enabled. +.It Cm LocalForward +Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over +the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. +The first argument must be +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port +.Sm on +and the second argument must be +.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport . +IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. +Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be +given on the command line. +Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. +By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the +.Cm GatewayPorts +setting. +However, an explicit +.Ar bind_address +may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. +The +.Ar bind_address +of +.Cm localhost +indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an +empty address or +.Sq * +indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. +.It Cm LogLevel +Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from +.Xr ssh 1 . +The possible values are: +QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. +The default is INFO. +DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. +DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. +.It Cm MACs +Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms +in order of preference. +The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. +Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +.Pp +The algorithms that contain +.Qq -etm +calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). +These are considered safer and their use recommended. +.Pp +The default is: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, +hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, +hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, +umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, +hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q mac . +.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost +Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses). +The argument to this keyword must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts +Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. +The argument to this keyword must be an integer. +The default is 3. +.It Cm PasswordAuthentication +Specifies whether to use password authentication. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Cm yes +(the default) +or +.Cm no . +.It Cm PermitLocalCommand +Allow local command execution via the +.Ic LocalCommand +option or using the +.Ic !\& Ns Ar command +escape sequence in +.Xr ssh 1 . +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm PKCS11Provider +Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. +The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library +.Xr ssh 1 +should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's +private RSA key. +.It Cm Port +Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. +The default is 22. +.It Cm PreferredAuthentications +Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods. +This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\& +.Cm keyboard-interactive ) +over another method (e.g.\& +.Cm password ) . +The default is: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, +keyboard-interactive,password +.Ed +.It Cm ProxyCommand +Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. +The command +string extends to the end of the line, and is executed +using the user's shell +.Ql exec +directive to avoid a lingering shell process. +.Pp +Arguments to +.Cm ProxyCommand +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +The command can be basically anything, +and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. +It should eventually connect an +.Xr sshd 8 +server running on some machine, or execute +.Ic sshd -i +somewhere. +Host key management will be done using the +HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by +the user). +Setting the command to +.Cm none +disables this option entirely. +Note that +.Cm CheckHostIP +is not available for connects with a proxy command. +.Pp +This directive is useful in conjunction with +.Xr nc 1 +and its proxy support. +For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at +192.0.2.0: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p +.Ed +.It Cm ProxyJump +Specifies one or more jump proxies as either +.Xo +.Sm off +.Op Ar user No @ +.Ar host +.Op : Ns Ar port +.Sm on +or an ssh URI +.Xc . +Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited +sequentially. +Setting this option will cause +.Xr ssh 1 +to connect to the target host by first making a +.Xr ssh 1 +connection to the specified +.Cm ProxyJump +host and then establishing a +TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there. +.Pp +Note that this option will compete with the +.Cm ProxyCommand +option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the +other from taking effect. +.It Cm ProxyUseFdpass +Specifies that +.Cm ProxyCommand +will pass a connected file descriptor back to +.Xr ssh 1 +instead of continuing to execute and pass data. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication +as a comma-separated list of patterns. +Alternately if the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default +instead of replacing it. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +The default for this option is: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available key types may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q key . +.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication +Specifies whether to try public key authentication. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Cm yes +(the default) +or +.Cm no . +.It Cm RekeyLimit +Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the +session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of +time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. +The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of +.Sq K , +.Sq M , +or +.Sq G +to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. +The default is between +.Sq 1G +and +.Sq 4G , +depending on the cipher. +The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the +units documented in the +.Sx TIME FORMATS +section of +.Xr sshd_config 5 . +The default value for +.Cm RekeyLimit +is +.Cm default none , +which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount +of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. +.It Cm RemoteCommand +Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully +connecting to the server. +The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with +the user's shell. +Arguments to +.Cm RemoteCommand +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +.It Cm RemoteForward +Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over +the secure channel. +The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port +from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote +client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine. +The first argument must be +.Sm off +.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port +.Sm on +If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be +.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport , +otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding +will be established as a SOCKS proxy. +.Pp +IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. +Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional +forwardings can be given on the command line. +Privileged ports can be forwarded only when +logging in as root on the remote machine. +.Pp +If the +.Ar port +argument is 0, +the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported +to the client at run time. +.Pp +If the +.Ar bind_address +is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. +If the +.Ar bind_address +is +.Ql * +or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all +interfaces. +Specifying a remote +.Ar bind_address +will only succeed if the server's +.Cm GatewayPorts +option is enabled (see +.Xr sshd_config 5 ) . +.It Cm RequestTTY +Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. +The argument may be one of: +.Cm no +(never request a TTY), +.Cm yes +(always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), +.Cm force +(always request a TTY) or +.Cm auto +(request a TTY when opening a login session). +This option mirrors the +.Fl t +and +.Fl T +flags for +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Cm RevokedHostKeys +Specifies revoked host public keys. +Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication. +Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable, +then host authentication will be refused for all hosts. +Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as +an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +.It Cm SendEnv +Specifies what variables from the local +.Xr environ 7 +should be sent to the server. +The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to +accept these environment variables. +Note that the +.Ev TERM +environment variable is always sent whenever a +pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. +Refer to +.Cm AcceptEnv +in +.Xr sshd_config 5 +for how to configure the server. +Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters. +Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread +across multiple +.Cm SendEnv +directives. +.Pp +See +.Sx PATTERNS +for more information on patterns. +.Pp +It is possible to clear previously set +.Cm SendEnv +variable names by prefixing patterns with +.Pa - . +The default is not to send any environment variables. +.It Cm ServerAliveCountMax +Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be +sent without +.Xr ssh 1 +receiving any messages back from the server. +If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, +ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. +It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very +different from +.Cm TCPKeepAlive +(below). +The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel +and therefore will not be spoofable. +The TCP keepalive option enabled by +.Cm TCPKeepAlive +is spoofable. +The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or +server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. +.Pp +The default value is 3. +If, for example, +.Cm ServerAliveInterval +(see below) is set to 15 and +.Cm ServerAliveCountMax +is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, +ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. +.It Cm ServerAliveInterval +Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received +from the server, +.Xr ssh 1 +will send a message through the encrypted +channel to request a response from the server. +The default +is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. +.It Cm SetEnv +Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to +be sent to the server. +Similarly to +.Cm SendEnv , +the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable. +.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask +Sets the octal file creation mode mask +.Pq umask +used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote +port forwarding. +This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. +.Pp +The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is +readable and writable only by the owner. +Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain +socket files. +.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink +Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local +or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. +If the socket file already exists and +.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink +is not enabled, +.Nm ssh +will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. +This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. +.Pp +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no +(the default). +.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking +If this flag is set to +.Cm yes , +.Xr ssh 1 +will never automatically add host keys to the +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. +This provides maximum protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, +though it can be annoying when the +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts +file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are +frequently made. +This option forces the user to manually +add all new hosts. +.Pp +If this flag is set to +.Dq accept-new +then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user +known hosts files, but will not permit connections to hosts with +changed host keys. +If this flag is set to +.Dq no +or +.Dq off , +ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files +and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed, +subject to some restrictions. +If this flag is set to +.Cm ask +(the default), +new host keys +will be added to the user known host files only after the user +has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and +ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. +The host keys of +known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. +.It Cm SyslogFacility +Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from +.Xr ssh 1 . +The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, +LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. +The default is USER. +.It Cm TCPKeepAlive +Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the +other side. +If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one +of the machines will be properly noticed. +However, this means that +connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people +find it annoying. +.Pp +The default is +.Cm yes +(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice +if the network goes down or the remote host dies. +This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. +.Pp +To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to +.Cm no . +See also +.Cm ServerAliveInterval +for protocol-level keepalives. +.It Cm Tunnel +Request +.Xr tun 4 +device forwarding between the client and the server. +The argument must be +.Cm yes , +.Cm point-to-point +(layer 3), +.Cm ethernet +(layer 2), +or +.Cm no +(the default). +Specifying +.Cm yes +requests the default tunnel mode, which is +.Cm point-to-point . +.It Cm TunnelDevice +Specifies the +.Xr tun 4 +devices to open on the client +.Pq Ar local_tun +and the server +.Pq Ar remote_tun . +.Pp +The argument must be +.Sm off +.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun . +.Sm on +The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword +.Cm any , +which uses the next available tunnel device. +If +.Ar remote_tun +is not specified, it defaults to +.Cm any . +The default is +.Cm any:any . +.It Cm UpdateHostKeys +Specifies whether +.Xr ssh 1 +should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent +after authentication has completed and add them to +.Cm UserKnownHostsFile . +The argument must be +.Cm yes , +.Cm no +(the default) or +.Cm ask . +Enabling this option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server +and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement +public keys before old ones are removed. +Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the +host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user. +If +.Cm UpdateHostKeys +is set to +.Cm ask , +then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. +Confirmation is currently incompatible with +.Cm ControlPersist , +and will be disabled if it is enabled. +.Pp +Presently, only +.Xr sshd 8 +from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the +.Qq hostkeys@openssh.com +protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys. +.It Cm User +Specifies the user to log in as. +This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. +This saves the trouble of +having to remember to give the user name on the command line. +.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile +Specifies one or more files to use for the user +host key database, separated by whitespace. +The default is +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 . +.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS +Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource +records. +If this option is set to +.Cm yes , +the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint +from DNS. +Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to +.Cm ask . +If this option is set to +.Cm ask , +information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still +need to confirm new host keys according to the +.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking +option. +The default is +.Cm no . +.Pp +See also +.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS +in +.Xr ssh 1 . +.It Cm VisualHostKey +If this flag is set to +.Cm yes , +an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is +printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and +for unknown host keys. +If this flag is set to +.Cm no +(the default), +no fingerprint strings are printed at login and +only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. +.It Cm XAuthLocation +Specifies the full pathname of the +.Xr xauth 1 +program. +The default is +.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth . +.El +.Sh PATTERNS +A +.Em pattern +consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, +.Sq * +(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), +or +.Sq ?\& +(a wildcard that matches exactly one character). +For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the +.Qq .co.uk +set of domains, +the following pattern could be used: +.Pp +.Dl Host *.co.uk +.Pp +The following pattern +would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: +.Pp +.Dl Host 192.168.0.? +.Pp +A +.Em pattern-list +is a comma-separated list of patterns. +Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated +by preceding them with an exclamation mark +.Pq Sq !\& . +For example, +to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization +except from the +.Qq dialup +pool, +the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: +.Pp +.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&" +.Pp +Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself. +For example, attempting to match +.Qq host3 +against the following pattern-list will fail: +.Pp +.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2\&" +.Pp +The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match, +such as a wildcard: +.Pp +.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2,*\&" +.Sh TOKENS +Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, +which are expanded at runtime: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact +.It %% +A literal +.Sq % . +.It \&%C +Hash of %l%h%p%r. +.It %d +Local user's home directory. +.It %h +The remote hostname. +.It %i +The local user ID. +.It %L +The local hostname. +.It %l +The local hostname, including the domain name. +.It %n +The original remote hostname, as given on the command line. +.It %p +The remote port. +.It %r +The remote username. +.It \&%T +The local +.Xr tun 4 +or +.Xr tap 4 +network interface assigned if +tunnel forwarding was requested, or +.Qq NONE +otherwise. +.It %u +The local username. +.El +.Pp +.Cm Match exec +accepts the tokens %%, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm CertificateFile +accepts the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm ControlPath +accepts the tokens %%, %C, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm HostName +accepts the tokens %% and %h. +.Pp +.Cm IdentityAgent +and +.Cm IdentityFile +accept the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm LocalCommand +accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, %T, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm ProxyCommand +accepts the tokens %%, %h, %p, and %r. +.Pp +.Cm RemoteCommand +accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa ~/.ssh/config +This is the per-user configuration file. +The format of this file is described above. +This file is used by the SSH client. +Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: +read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config +Systemwide configuration file. +This file provides defaults for those +values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and +for those users who do not have a configuration file. +This file must be world-readable. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr ssh 1 +.Sh AUTHORS +.An -nosplit +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by +.An Tatu Ylonen . +.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , +.An Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt +and +.An Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +.An Markus Friedl +contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5064825 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c @@ -0,0 +1,464 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.7 2017/06/01 04:51:58 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +int +sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0) + return r; + if (v != NULL && len != 0) + memcpy(v, p, len); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = PEEK_U64(p); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = PEEK_U32(p); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = PEEK_U16(p); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = (u_int8_t)*p; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + const u_char *val; + size_t len; + int r; + + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) { + if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + if (len != 0) + memcpy(*valp, val, len); + (*valp)[len] = '\0'; + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + size_t len; + const u_char *p; + int r; + + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = p; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, + size_t *lenp) +{ + u_int32_t len; + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE")); + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + } + len = PEEK_U32(p); + if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE")); + return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE; + } + if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE")); + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + } + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = p + 4; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + size_t len; + const u_char *p, *z; + int r; + + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0) + return r; + /* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */ + if (len > 0 && + (z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT")); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) + return -1; + if (valp != NULL) { + if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + if (len != 0) + memcpy(*valp, p, len); + (*valp)[len] = '\0'; + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = (size_t)len; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v) +{ + u_int32_t len; + u_char *p; + int r; + + /* + * Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is + * a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly + * into 'v'. + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0) + return r; + if (len != 0) + memcpy(p, v, len); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v)); +} + +int +sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int r; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return r; +} + +int +sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + va_list ap2; + int r, len; + u_char *p; + + VA_COPY(ap2, ap); + if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if (len == 0) { + r = 0; + goto out; /* Nothing to do */ + } + va_end(ap2); + VA_COPY(ap2, ap); + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0) + goto out; + if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */ + } + /* Consume terminating \0 */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: + va_end(ap2); + return r; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U64(p, val); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U32(p, val); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U16(p, val); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0) + return r; + p[0] = val; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + u_char *d; + int r; + + if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE")); + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U32(d, len); + if (len != 0) + memcpy(d + 4, v, len); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put_string(buf, v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v)); +} + +int +sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v)); +} + +int +sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp) +{ + const u_char *p; + size_t len; + struct sshbuf *ret; + int r; + + if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + *bufp = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0) + return r; + if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 || /* Shouldn't happen */ + (r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(ret); + return r; + } + *bufp = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + u_char *d; + const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v; + int r, prepend; + + if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE")); + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + } + /* Skip leading zero bytes */ + for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++) + ; + /* + * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to + * avoid interpretation as a negative number. + */ + prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U32(d, len + prepend); + if (prepend) + d[4] = 0; + if (len != 0) + memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, + const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + const u_char *d; + size_t len, olen; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &olen)) < 0) + return r; + len = olen; + /* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */ + if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0)) + return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE; + /* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */ + if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 || + (len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0)) + return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; + /* Trim leading zeros */ + while (len > 0 && *d == 0x00) { + d++; + len--; + } + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = d; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + if (sshbuf_consume(buf, olen + 4) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c b/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0d791b --- /dev/null +++ b/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.5 2016/01/12 23:42:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +# include +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +int +sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v) +{ + const u_char *d; + size_t len; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(buf, &d, &len)) != 0) + return r; + if (v != NULL && BN_bin2bn(d, len, v) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v) +{ + const u_char *d = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + u_int16_t len_bits; + size_t len_bytes; + + /* Length in bits */ + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 2) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + len_bits = PEEK_U16(d); + len_bytes = (len_bits + 7) >> 3; + if (len_bytes > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) + return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 2 + len_bytes) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + if (v != NULL && BN_bin2bn(d + 2, len_bytes, v) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (sshbuf_consume(buf, 2 + len_bytes) != 0) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +static int +get_ec(const u_char *d, size_t len, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) +{ + /* Refuse overlong bignums */ + if (len == 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) + return SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE; + /* Only handle uncompressed points */ + if (*d != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + if (v != NULL && EC_POINT_oct2point(g, v, d, len, NULL) != 1) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX assumption */ + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) +{ + const u_char *d; + size_t len; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) + return r; + if ((r = get_ec(d, len, v, g)) != 0) + return r; + /* Skip string */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v) +{ + EC_POINT *pt = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(v)); + int r; + const u_char *d; + size_t len; + + if (pt == NULL) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) { + EC_POINT_free(pt); + return r; + } + if ((r = get_ec(d, len, pt, EC_KEY_get0_group(v))) != 0) { + EC_POINT_free(pt); + return r; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(v, pt) != 1) { + EC_POINT_free(pt); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* XXX assumption */ + } + EC_POINT_free(pt); + /* Skip string */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + +int +sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v) +{ + u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1]; + int len = BN_num_bytes(v), prepend = 0, r; + + if (len < 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + *d = '\0'; + if (BN_bn2bin(v, d + 1) != len) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */ + /* If MSB is set, prepend a \0 */ + if (len > 0 && (d[1] & 0x80) != 0) + prepend = 1; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d + 1 - prepend, len + prepend)) < 0) { + explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d)); + return r; + } + explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d)); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v) +{ + int r, len_bits = BN_num_bits(v); + size_t len_bytes = (len_bits + 7) / 8; + u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM], *dp; + + if (len_bits < 0 || len_bytes > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (BN_bn2bin(v, d) != (int)len_bytes) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len_bytes + 2, &dp)) < 0) { + explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d)); + return r; + } + POKE_U16(dp, len_bits); + if (len_bytes != 0) + memcpy(dp + 2, d, len_bytes); + explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d)); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +int +sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) +{ + u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT]; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx; + size_t len; + int ret; + + if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + NULL, 0, bn_ctx)) > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) { + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + d, len, bn_ctx) != len) { + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */ + } + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + ret = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d, len); + explicit_bzero(d, len); + return ret; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put_ec(buf, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(v), + EC_KEY_get0_group(v)); +} +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + diff --git a/sshbuf-misc.c b/sshbuf-misc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..15dcfbc --- /dev/null +++ b/sshbuf-misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.6 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssherr.h" +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void +sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f) +{ + size_t i, j; + const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { + fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i); + for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { + if (j < len) + fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]); + else + fprintf(f, " "); + } + fprintf(f, " "); + for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { + if (j < len) { + if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j])) + fprintf(f, "%c", p[j]); + else + fprintf(f, "."); + } + } + fprintf(f, "\n"); + } +} + +void +sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f) +{ + fprintf(f, "buffer %p len = %zu\n", buf, sshbuf_len(buf)); + sshbuf_dump_data(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), f); +} + +char * +sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + size_t i, j, len = sshbuf_len(buf); + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + char *ret; + const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef"; + + if (len == 0) + return strdup(""); + if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(len * 2 + 1)) == NULL) + return NULL; + for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) { + ret[j++] = hex[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf]; + ret[j++] = hex[p[i] & 0xf]; + } + ret[j] = '\0'; + return ret; +} + +char * +sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + size_t len = sshbuf_len(buf), plen; + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + char *ret; + int r; + + if (len == 0) + return strdup(""); + plen = ((len + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1; + if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(plen)) == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((r = b64_ntop(p, len, ret, plen)) == -1) { + explicit_bzero(ret, plen); + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +int +sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64) +{ + size_t plen = strlen(b64); + int nlen, r; + u_char *p; + + if (plen == 0) + return 0; + if ((p = malloc(plen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((nlen = b64_pton(b64, p, plen)) < 0) { + explicit_bzero(p, plen); + free(p); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, nlen)) < 0) { + explicit_bzero(p, plen); + free(p); + return r; + } + explicit_bzero(p, plen); + free(p); + return 0; +} + +char * +sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + const u_char *p = NULL, *s = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + size_t l = sshbuf_len(buf); + char *r; + + if (s == NULL || l > SIZE_MAX) + return NULL; + /* accept a nul only as the last character in the buffer */ + if (l > 0 && (p = memchr(s, '\0', l)) != NULL) { + if (p != s + l - 1) + return NULL; + l--; /* the nul is put back below */ + } + if ((r = malloc(l + 1)) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (l > 0) + memcpy(r, s, l); + r[l] = '\0'; + return r; +} + diff --git a/sshbuf.c b/sshbuf.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..20ddf9e --- /dev/null +++ b/sshbuf.c @@ -0,0 +1,399 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.12 2018/07/09 21:56:06 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" + +static inline int +sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + SSHBUF_TELL("sanity"); + if (__predict_false(buf == NULL || + (!buf->readonly && buf->d != buf->cd) || + buf->refcount < 1 || buf->refcount > SSHBUF_REFS_MAX || + buf->cd == NULL || + buf->max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || + buf->alloc > buf->max_size || + buf->size > buf->alloc || + buf->off > buf->size)) { + /* Do not try to recover from corrupted buffer internals */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL); + raise(SIGSEGV); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +sshbuf_maybe_pack(struct sshbuf *buf, int force) +{ + SSHBUF_DBG(("force %d", force)); + SSHBUF_TELL("pre-pack"); + if (buf->off == 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return; + if (force || + (buf->off >= SSHBUF_PACK_MIN && buf->off >= buf->size / 2)) { + memmove(buf->d, buf->d + buf->off, buf->size - buf->off); + buf->size -= buf->off; + buf->off = 0; + SSHBUF_TELL("packed"); + } +} + +struct sshbuf * +sshbuf_new(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *ret; + + if ((ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL) + return NULL; + ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; + ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; + ret->readonly = 0; + ret->refcount = 1; + ret->parent = NULL; + if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +struct sshbuf * +sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len) +{ + struct sshbuf *ret; + + if (blob == NULL || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || + (ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL) + return NULL; + ret->alloc = ret->size = ret->max_size = len; + ret->readonly = 1; + ret->refcount = 1; + ret->parent = NULL; + ret->cd = blob; + ret->d = NULL; + return ret; +} + +int +sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(child)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_check_sanity(parent)) != 0) + return r; + child->parent = parent; + child->parent->refcount++; + return 0; +} + +struct sshbuf * +sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + struct sshbuf *ret; + + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) + return NULL; + if ((ret = sshbuf_from(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf))) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +void +sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + if (buf == NULL) + return; + /* + * The following will leak on insane buffers, but this is the safest + * course of action - an invalid pointer or already-freed pointer may + * have been passed to us and continuing to scribble over memory would + * be bad. + */ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) + return; + /* + * If we are a child, the free our parent to decrement its reference + * count and possibly free it. + */ + sshbuf_free(buf->parent); + buf->parent = NULL; + /* + * If we are a parent with still-extant children, then don't free just + * yet. The last child's call to sshbuf_free should decrement our + * refcount to 0 and trigger the actual free. + */ + buf->refcount--; + if (buf->refcount > 0) + return; + if (!buf->readonly) { + explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc); + free(buf->d); + } + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(*buf)); + free(buf); +} + +void +sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + u_char *d; + + if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) { + /* Nonsensical. Just make buffer appear empty */ + buf->off = buf->size; + return; + } + (void) sshbuf_check_sanity(buf); + buf->off = buf->size = 0; + if (buf->alloc != SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) { + if ((d = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT, + 1)) != NULL) { + buf->cd = buf->d = d; + buf->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; + } + } + explicit_bzero(buf->d, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT); +} + +size_t +sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + return buf->max_size; +} + +size_t +sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + return buf->alloc; +} + +const struct sshbuf * +sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + return buf->parent; +} + +u_int +sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + return buf->refcount; +} + +int +sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size) +{ + size_t rlen; + u_char *dp; + int r; + + SSHBUF_DBG(("set max buf = %p len = %zu", buf, max_size)); + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) + return r; + if (max_size == buf->max_size) + return 0; + if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY; + if (max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + /* pack and realloc if necessary */ + sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, max_size < buf->size); + if (max_size < buf->alloc && max_size > buf->size) { + if (buf->size < SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) + rlen = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; + else + rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->size, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); + if (rlen > max_size) + rlen = max_size; + SSHBUF_DBG(("new alloc = %zu", rlen)); + if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + buf->cd = buf->d = dp; + buf->alloc = rlen; + } + SSHBUF_TELL("new-max"); + if (max_size < buf->alloc) + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + buf->max_size = max_size; + return 0; +} + +size_t +sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) + return 0; + return buf->size - buf->off; +} + +size_t +sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return 0; + return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off); +} + +const u_char * +sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) + return NULL; + return buf->cd + buf->off; +} + +u_char * +sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return NULL; + return buf->d + buf->off; +} + +int +sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) + return r; + if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY; + SSHBUF_TELL("check"); + /* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */ + if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off) + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t rlen, need; + u_char *dp; + int r; + + SSHBUF_DBG(("allocate buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0) + return r; + /* + * If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size + * then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off. + */ + sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size); + SSHBUF_TELL("allocate"); + if (len + buf->size <= buf->alloc) + return 0; /* already have it. */ + + /* + * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but + * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size. + */ + need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc; + rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); + SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen)); + if (rlen > buf->max_size) + rlen = buf->alloc + need; + SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen)); + if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail")); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + buf->alloc = rlen; + buf->cd = buf->d = dp; + if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) { + /* shouldn't fail */ + return r; + } + SSHBUF_TELL("done"); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp) +{ + u_char *dp; + int r; + + if (dpp != NULL) + *dpp = NULL; + + SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(buf, len)) != 0) + return r; + + dp = buf->d + buf->size; + buf->size += len; + if (dpp != NULL) + *dpp = dp; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) +{ + int r; + + SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) + return r; + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if (len > sshbuf_len(buf)) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + buf->off += len; + /* deal with empty buffer */ + if (buf->off == buf->size) + buf->off = buf->size = 0; + SSHBUF_TELL("done"); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) +{ + int r; + + SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) + return r; + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if (len > sshbuf_len(buf)) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + buf->size -= len; + SSHBUF_TELL("done"); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/sshbuf.h b/sshbuf.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a43598c --- /dev/null +++ b/sshbuf.h @@ -0,0 +1,348 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.11 2018/07/09 21:56:06 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _SSHBUF_H +#define _SSHBUF_H + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# include +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +# include +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */ +#define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */ +#define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */ +#define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */ + +/* + * NB. do not depend on the internals of this. It will be made opaque + * one day. + */ +struct sshbuf { + u_char *d; /* Data */ + const u_char *cd; /* Const data */ + size_t off; /* First available byte is buf->d + buf->off */ + size_t size; /* Last byte is buf->d + buf->size - 1 */ + size_t max_size; /* Maximum size of buffer */ + size_t alloc; /* Total bytes allocated to buf->d */ + int readonly; /* Refers to external, const data */ + int dont_free; /* Kludge to support sshbuf_init */ + u_int refcount; /* Tracks self and number of child buffers */ + struct sshbuf *parent; /* If child, pointer to parent */ +}; + +/* + * Create a new sshbuf buffer. + * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. + */ +struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void); + +/* + * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data. + * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. + */ +struct sshbuf *sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len); + +/* + * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of an existing + * buffer. The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the + * resultant buffer. + * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. + */ +struct sshbuf *sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of a string in + * an existing buffer (the string is consumed in the process). + * The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the resultant + * buffer. + * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. + */ +int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp); + +/* + * Clear and free buf + */ +void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Reset buf, clearing its contents. NB. max_size is preserved. + */ +void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Return the maximum size of buf + */ +size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Set the maximum size of buf + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size); + +/* + * Returns the length of data in buf + */ +size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Returns number of bytes left in buffer before hitting max_size. + */ +size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the data in buf + */ +const u_char *sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the data in buf, or + * NULL if the buffer is read-only. + */ +u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf + * Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes + * with unsigned overflows correctly. + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); + +/* + * Preallocates len additional bytes in buf. + * Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be + * required to avoid realloc in the buffer code. + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); + +/* + * Reserve len bytes in buf. + * Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the + * optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp); + +/* + * Consume len bytes from the start of buf + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); + +/* + * Consume len bytes from the end of buf + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); + +/* Extract or deposit some bytes */ +int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len); +int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); +int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v); + +/* Append using a printf(3) format */ +int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); +int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap); + +/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */ +int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp); +int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp); +int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp); +int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp); +int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val); +int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val); +int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val); +int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val); + +/* + * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded strings (u32 len || data) + * The "cstring" variants admit no \0 characters in the string contents. + * Caller must free *valp. + */ +int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); +int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp); +int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v); +int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); +int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v); +int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v); + +/* + * "Direct" variant of sshbuf_get_string, returns pointer into the sshbuf to + * avoid an malloc+memcpy. The pointer is guaranteed to be valid until the + * next sshbuf-modifying function call. Caller does not free. + */ +int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, + size_t *lenp); + +/* Skip past a string */ +#define sshbuf_skip_string(buf) sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) + +/* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */ +int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, + size_t *lenp); +/* XXX peek_u8 / peek_u32 */ + +/* + * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic + * curve points. + */ +int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); +int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, + const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v); +int sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v); +int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v); +int sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v); +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +int sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); +int sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v); +int sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); +int sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v); +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +/* Dump the contents of the buffer in a human-readable format */ +void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f); + +/* Dump specified memory in a human-readable format */ +void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f); + +/* Return the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the buffer */ +char *sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* Encode the contents of the buffer as base64 */ +char *sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* Decode base64 data and append it to the buffer */ +int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64); + +/* + * Duplicate the contents of a buffer to a string (caller to free). + * Returns NULL on buffer error, or if the buffer contains a premature + * nul character. + */ +char *sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */ +#define PEEK_U64(p) \ + (((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \ + (u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[7])) +#define PEEK_U32(p) \ + (((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \ + ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \ + ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \ + (u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3])) +#define PEEK_U16(p) \ + (((u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \ + (u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1])) + +#define POKE_U64(p, v) \ + do { \ + const u_int64_t __v = (v); \ + ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 56) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 48) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 40) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[3] = (__v >> 32) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[4] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[5] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[6] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[7] = __v & 0xff; \ + } while (0) +#define POKE_U32(p, v) \ + do { \ + const u_int32_t __v = (v); \ + ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[3] = __v & 0xff; \ + } while (0) +#define POKE_U16(p, v) \ + do { \ + const u_int16_t __v = (v); \ + ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \ + } while (0) + +/* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */ +#ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL + +/* + * Return the allocation size of buf + */ +size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Increment the reference count of buf. + */ +int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent); + +/* + * Return the parent buffer of buf, or NULL if it has no parent. + */ +const struct sshbuf *sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Return the reference count of buf + */ +u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT 256 /* Initial allocation */ +# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INC 256 /* Preferred increment length */ +# define SSHBUF_PACK_MIN 8192 /* Minimim packable offset */ + +/* # define SSHBUF_ABORT abort */ +/* # define SSHBUF_DEBUG */ + +# ifndef SSHBUF_ABORT +# define SSHBUF_ABORT() +# endif + +# ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG +# define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \ + printf("%s:%d %s: %s size %zu alloc %zu off %zu max %zu\n", \ + __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, what, \ + buf->size, buf->alloc, buf->off, buf->max_size); \ + fflush(stdout); \ + } while (0) +# define SSHBUF_DBG(x) do { \ + printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \ + printf x; \ + printf("\n"); \ + fflush(stdout); \ + } while (0) +# else +# define SSHBUF_TELL(what) +# define SSHBUF_DBG(x) +# endif +#endif /* SSHBUF_INTERNAL */ + +#endif /* _SSHBUF_H */ diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d81927 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshconnect.c @@ -0,0 +1,1581 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.305 2018/09/20 03:30:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the + * login (authentication) dialog. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#include +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H +# include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshconnect.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "dns.h" +#include "monitor_fdpass.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "version.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "authfd.h" + +char *client_version_string = NULL; +char *server_version_string = NULL; +struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL; + +static int matching_host_key_dns = 0; + +static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0; + +/* import */ +extern Options options; +extern char *__progname; + +static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *); +static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *); + +/* Expand a proxy command */ +static char * +expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, + const char *host, int port) +{ + char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command); + ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport, + "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); + free(tmp); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a + * a connected fd back to us. + */ +static int +ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, + const char *proxy_command) +{ + char *command_string; + int sp[2], sock; + pid_t pid; + char *shell; + + if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) < 0) + fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with " + "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, + host, port); + debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string); + + /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + char *argv[10]; + + close(sp[1]); + /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ + if (sp[0] != 0) { + if (dup2(sp[0], 0) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdin"); + } + if (sp[0] != 1) { + if (dup2(sp[0], 1) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdout"); + } + if (sp[0] >= 2) + close(sp[0]); + + /* + * Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get + * printed on the user's terminal. + */ + argv[0] = shell; + argv[1] = "-c"; + argv[2] = command_string; + argv[3] = NULL; + + /* + * Execute the proxy command. + * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. + */ + execv(argv[0], argv); + perror(argv[0]); + exit(1); + } + /* Parent. */ + if (pid < 0) + fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + close(sp[0]); + free(command_string); + + if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1) + fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection"); + close(sp[1]); + + while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ + if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) + return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. + */ +static int +ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port, + const char *proxy_command) +{ + char *command_string; + int pin[2], pout[2]; + pid_t pid; + char *shell; + + if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ + if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0) + fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + + command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, + host, port); + debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); + + /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + char *argv[10]; + + /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ + close(pin[1]); + if (pin[0] != 0) { + if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdin"); + close(pin[0]); + } + close(pout[0]); + if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) + perror("dup2 stdout"); + /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ + close(pout[1]); + + /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get + printed on the user's terminal. */ + argv[0] = shell; + argv[1] = "-c"; + argv[2] = command_string; + argv[3] = NULL; + + /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any + extra privileges above. */ + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); + execv(argv[0], argv); + perror(argv[0]); + exit(1); + } + /* Parent. */ + if (pid < 0) + fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + else + proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */ + + /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ + close(pin[0]); + close(pout[1]); + + /* Free the command name. */ + free(command_string); + + /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ + if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL) + return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ + + return 0; +} + +void +ssh_kill_proxy_command(void) +{ + /* + * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in + * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child + */ + if (proxy_command_pid > 1) + kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP); +} + +#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H +/* + * Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an + * address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface. + * Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure. + */ +static int +check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs, + struct sockaddr_storage *resultp, socklen_t *rlenp) +{ + struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; + struct sockaddr_in *sa; + struct in6_addr *v6addr; + const struct ifaddrs *ifa; + int allow_local; + + /* + * Prefer addresses that are not loopback or linklocal, but use them + * if nothing else matches. + */ + for (allow_local = 0; allow_local < 2; allow_local++) { + for (ifa = ifaddrs; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) { + if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL || ifa->ifa_name == NULL || + (ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 || + ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != af || + strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, options.bind_interface) != 0) + continue; + switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr; + if (!allow_local && sa->sin_addr.s_addr == + htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK)) + continue; + if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) { + error("%s: v4 addr doesn't fit", + __func__); + return -1; + } + *rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + memcpy(resultp, sa, *rlenp); + return 0; + case AF_INET6: + sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr; + v6addr = &sa6->sin6_addr; + if (!allow_local && + (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(v6addr) || + IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(v6addr))) + continue; + if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) { + error("%s: v6 addr doesn't fit", + __func__); + return -1; + } + *rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + memcpy(resultp, sa6, *rlenp); + return 0; + } + } + } + return -1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection. + */ +static int +ssh_create_socket(struct addrinfo *ai) +{ + int sock, r; + struct sockaddr_storage bindaddr; + socklen_t bindaddrlen = 0; + struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL; +#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H + struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs = NULL; +#endif + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; + + sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); + if (sock < 0) { + error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + + /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */ + if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL) + return sock; + + if (options.bind_address != NULL) { + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family; + hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype; + hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + if ((r = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, + &hints, &res)) != 0) { + error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address, + ssh_gai_strerror(r)); + goto fail; + } + if (res == NULL) { + error("getaddrinfo: no addrs"); + goto fail; + } + if (res->ai_addrlen > sizeof(bindaddr)) { + error("%s: addr doesn't fit", __func__); + goto fail; + } + memcpy(&bindaddr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); + bindaddrlen = res->ai_addrlen; + } else if (options.bind_interface != NULL) { +#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H + if ((r = getifaddrs(&ifaddrs)) != 0) { + error("getifaddrs: %s: %s", options.bind_interface, + strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + bindaddrlen = sizeof(bindaddr); + if (check_ifaddrs(options.bind_interface, ai->ai_family, + ifaddrs, &bindaddr, &bindaddrlen) != 0) { + logit("getifaddrs: %s: no suitable addresses", + options.bind_interface); + goto fail; + } +#else + error("BindInterface not supported on this platform."); +#endif + } + if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { + error("%s: getnameinfo failed: %s", __func__, + ssh_gai_strerror(r)); + goto fail; + } + if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen) != 0) { + error("bind %s: %s", ntop, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + debug("%s: bound to %s", __func__, ntop); + /* success */ + goto out; +fail: + close(sock); + sock = -1; + out: + if (res != NULL) + freeaddrinfo(res); +#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H + if (ifaddrs != NULL) + freeifaddrs(ifaddrs); +#endif + return sock; +} + +/* + * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates + * *timeoutp with time remaining. + * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno). + */ +static int +waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp) +{ + struct pollfd pfd; + struct timeval t_start; + int oerrno, r; + + monotime_tv(&t_start); + pfd.fd = fd; + pfd.events = POLLIN; + for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) { + r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp); + oerrno = errno; + ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp); + errno = oerrno; + if (r > 0) + return 0; + else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN) + return -1; + else if (r == 0) + break; + } + /* timeout */ + errno = ETIMEDOUT; + return -1; +} + +static int +timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, + socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp) +{ + int optval = 0; + socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval); + + /* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */ + if (*timeoutp <= 0) + return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); + + set_nonblock(sockfd); + if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) { + /* Succeeded already? */ + unset_nonblock(sockfd); + return 0; + } else if (errno != EINPROGRESS) + return -1; + + if (waitrfd(sockfd, timeoutp) == -1) + return -1; + + /* Completed or failed */ + if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) { + debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (optval != 0) { + errno = optval; + return -1; + } + unset_nonblock(sockfd); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. + * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr. + * If port is 0, the default port will be used. + * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per + * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h + * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact + * the daemon. + */ +static int +ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, + struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, + int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) +{ + int on = 1; + int oerrno, sock = -1, attempt; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + struct addrinfo *ai; + + debug2("%s", __func__); + memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop)); + memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport)); + + for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) { + if (attempt > 0) { + /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ + sleep(1); + debug("Trying again..."); + } + /* + * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in + * sequence until the connection succeeds. + */ + for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && + ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) { + errno = EAFNOSUPPORT; + continue; + } + if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + oerrno = errno; + error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); + errno = oerrno; + continue; + } + debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.", + host, ntop, strport); + + /* Create a socket for connecting. */ + sock = ssh_create_socket(ai); + if (sock < 0) { + /* Any error is already output */ + errno = 0; + continue; + } + + if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, + timeout_ms) >= 0) { + /* Successful connection. */ + memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); + break; + } else { + oerrno = errno; + debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s", + ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + sock = -1; + errno = oerrno; + } + } + if (sock != -1) + break; /* Successful connection. */ + } + + /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ + if (sock == -1) { + error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s", + host, strport, errno == 0 ? "failure" : strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + + debug("Connection established."); + + /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ + if (want_keepalive && + setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, + sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Set the connection. */ + if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL) + return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ + + return 0; +} + +int +ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs, + struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, + int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive) +{ + if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { + return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port, + family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive); + } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) { + if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, + STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO)) == NULL) + return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */ + return 0; + } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) { + return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, port, + options.proxy_command); + } + return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, port, options.proxy_command); +} + +static void +send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1) +{ + /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ + xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n", + PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION); + if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string, + strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string)) + fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + chop(client_version_string); + debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string); +} + +/* + * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own + * identification string. + */ +void +ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms) +{ + char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ + int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch; + int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); + int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); + u_int i, n; + size_t len; + int rc; + + send_client_banner(connection_out, 0); + + /* Read other side's version identification. */ + for (n = 0;;) { + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { + if (timeout_ms > 0) { + rc = waitrfd(connection_in, &timeout_ms); + if (rc == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) { + fatal("Connection timed out during " + "banner exchange"); + } else if (rc == -1) { + fatal("%s: %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + } + + len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1); + if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) + fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " + "Connection closed by remote host"); + else if (len != 1) + fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " + "read: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (buf[i] == '\r') { + buf[i] = '\n'; + buf[i + 1] = 0; + continue; /**XXX wait for \n */ + } + if (buf[i] == '\n') { + buf[i + 1] = 0; + break; + } + if (++n > 65536) + fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " + "No banner received"); + } + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; + if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) + break; + debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf); + } + server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); + + /* + * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept + * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. + */ + if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", + &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) + fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf); + debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", + remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); + + active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); + mismatch = 0; + + switch (remote_major) { + case 2: + break; + case 1: + if (remote_minor != 99) + mismatch = 1; + break; + default: + mismatch = 1; + break; + } + if (mismatch) + fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", + PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major); + if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) + logit("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " + "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); + chop(server_version_string); +} + +/* defaults to 'no' */ +static int +confirm(const char *prompt) +{ + const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': "; + char *p; + int ret = -1; + + if (options.batch_mode) + return 0; + for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) { + p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO); + if (p == NULL) + return 0; + p[strcspn(p, "\n")] = '\0'; + if (p[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(p, "no") == 0) + ret = 0; + else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0) + ret = 1; + free(p); + if (ret != -1) + return ret; + } +} + +static int +check_host_cert(const char *host, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + const char *reason; + int r; + + if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) { + error("%s", reason); + return 0; + } + if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) != 0) { + error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported " + "critical options(s)", host); + return 0; + } + if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, + options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) { + logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__, + (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ? + "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r)); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int +sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr) +{ + switch (hostaddr->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: + return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)-> + sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; + case AF_INET6: + return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK( + &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr)); + default: + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup + * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended. + */ +void +get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, + u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr) +{ + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; + socklen_t addrlen; + + switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) { + case -1: + addrlen = 0; + break; + case AF_INET: + addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); + break; + case AF_INET6: + addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + break; + default: + addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr); + break; + } + + /* + * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections + * using a proxy command + */ + if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) { + if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { + if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) + fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); + *hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port); + } else { + *hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup(""); + } + } + + /* + * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or + * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh + * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple + * sshd's on different ports on the same machine. + */ + if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) { + if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) { + *hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias); + debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname); + } else { + *hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port); + } + } +} + +/* + * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key + * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true. + */ +#define RDRW 0 +#define RDONLY 1 +#define ROQUIET 2 +static int +check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, + struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly, + char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, + char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles) +{ + HostStatus host_status; + HostStatus ip_status; + struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL; + char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL; + char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra; + char msg[1024]; + const char *type; + const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found; + int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0; + int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr); + int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0; + int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */ + struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys; + u_int i; + + /* + * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The + * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple + * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of + * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This + * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, + * this is probably not a real problem. + */ + if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local && + options.host_key_alias == NULL) { + debug("Forcing accepting of host key for " + "loopback/localhost."); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup. + * In some cases, these will have a port number appended. + */ + get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip); + + /* + * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy + * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with + */ + if (options.check_host_ip && (local || + strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL)) + options.check_host_ip = 0; + + host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); + for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]); + for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]); + + ip_hostkeys = NULL; + if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) { + ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); + for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]); + for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]); + } + + retry: + /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */ + want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key); + type = sshkey_type(host_key); + + /* + * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known + * hosts or in the systemwide list. + */ + host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key, + &host_found); + + /* + * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are + * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip + * address to begin with. + */ + if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) { + ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key, + &ip_found); + if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && + (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || + (ip_found != NULL && + !sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key)))) + host_ip_differ = 1; + } else + ip_status = host_status; + + switch (host_status) { + case HOST_OK: + /* The host is known and the key matches. */ + debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.", + host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key"); + debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", + host_found->file, host_found->line); + if (want_cert && + !check_host_cert(options.host_key_alias == NULL ? + hostname : options.host_key_alias, host_key)) + goto fail; + if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { + if (readonly || want_cert) + logit("%s host key for IP address " + "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.", + type, ip); + else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, + host_key, options.hash_known_hosts)) + logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP " + "address '%.128s' to the list of known " + "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip, + user_hostfiles[0]); + else + logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host " + "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " + "of known hosts.", type, ip); + } else if (options.visual_host_key) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); + logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); + } + hostkey_trusted = 1; + break; + case HOST_NEW: + if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 && + port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { + debug("checking without port identifier"); + if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key, + ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles, + system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) { + debug("found matching key w/out port"); + break; + } + } + if (readonly || want_cert) + goto fail; + /* The host is new. */ + if (options.strict_host_key_checking == + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) { + /* + * User has requested strict host key checking. We + * will not add the host key automatically. The only + * alternative left is to abort. + */ + error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you " + "have requested strict checking.", type, host); + goto fail; + } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { + char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; + + if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) + snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), + "\nbut keys of different type are already" + " known for this host."); + else + snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); + /* The default */ + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); + msg2[0] = '\0'; + if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { + if (matching_host_key_dns) + snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), + "Matching host key fingerprint" + " found in DNS.\n"); + else + snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), + "No matching host key fingerprint" + " found in DNS.\n"); + } + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), + "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " + "established%s\n" + "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" + "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " + "(yes/no)? ", + host, ip, msg1, type, fp, + options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", + options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", + msg2); + free(ra); + free(fp); + if (!confirm(msg)) + goto fail; + hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */ + } + /* + * If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically + * to the local known_hosts file. + */ + if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { + snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); + hostp = hostline; + if (options.hash_known_hosts) { + /* Add hash of host and IP separately */ + r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], + host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) && + add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, + host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); + } else { + /* Add unhashed "host,ip" */ + r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], + hostline, host_key, + options.hash_known_hosts); + } + } else { + r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, + host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); + hostp = host; + } + + if (!r) + logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known " + "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]); + else + logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the " + "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); + break; + case HOST_REVOKED: + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host); + error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to"); + error("impersonate this host."); + + /* + * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have + * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. + */ + if (options.strict_host_key_checking != + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { + error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have " + "requested strict checking.", type, host); + goto fail; + } + goto continue_unsafe; + + case HOST_CHANGED: + if (want_cert) { + /* + * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have + * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match + * all hosts that one might visit. + */ + debug("Host certificate authority does not " + "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER, + host_found->file, host_found->line); + goto fail; + } + if (readonly == ROQUIET) + goto fail; + if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { + char *key_msg; + if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) + key_msg = "is unknown"; + else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) + key_msg = "is unchanged"; + else + key_msg = "has a different value"; + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host); + error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip); + error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg); + error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); + error("and its host key have changed at the same time."); + if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) + error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu", + ip_found->file, ip_found->line); + } + /* The host key has changed. */ + warn_changed_key(host_key); + error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", + user_hostfiles[0]); + error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", + sshkey_type(host_found->key), + host_found->file, host_found->line); + + /* + * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have + * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. + */ + if (options.strict_host_key_checking != + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { + error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have " + "requested strict checking.", type, host); + goto fail; + } + + continue_unsafe: + /* + * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow + * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or + * forwarding. + */ + if (options.password_authentication) { + error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid " + "man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.password_authentication = 0; + cancelled_forwarding = 1; + } + if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) { + error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled" + " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; + options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; + cancelled_forwarding = 1; + } + if (options.challenge_response_authentication) { + error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled" + " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; + cancelled_forwarding = 1; + } + if (options.forward_agent) { + error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid " + "man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.forward_agent = 0; + cancelled_forwarding = 1; + } + if (options.forward_x11) { + error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid " + "man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.forward_x11 = 0; + cancelled_forwarding = 1; + } + if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 || + options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { + error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid " + "man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.num_local_forwards = + options.num_remote_forwards = 0; + cancelled_forwarding = 1; + } + if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { + error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid " + "man-in-the-middle attacks."); + options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; + cancelled_forwarding = 1; + } + if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding) + fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key " + "check failure"); + + /* + * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. + * This could be done by converting the host key to an + * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself + * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to + * accept the authentication. + */ + break; + case HOST_FOUND: + fatal("internal error"); + break; + } + + if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && + ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) { + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), + "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' " + "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'" + "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu", + type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line); + if (host_status == HOST_OK) { + len = strlen(msg); + snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len, + "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu", + host_found->file, host_found->line); + } + if (options.strict_host_key_checking == + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) { + strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want " + "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg)); + if (!confirm(msg)) + goto fail; + } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking != + SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { + logit("%s", msg); + error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); + goto fail; + } else { + logit("%s", msg); + } + } + + if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) { + debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: " + "disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__); + options.update_hostkeys = 0; + } + + free(ip); + free(host); + if (host_hostkeys != NULL) + free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); + if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) + free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); + return 0; + +fail: + if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) { + /* + * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and + * search normally. + */ + debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key"); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshkey_from_private: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r)); + host_key = raw_key; + goto retry; + } + sshkey_free(raw_key); + free(ip); + free(host); + if (host_hostkeys != NULL) + free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); + if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) + free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); + return -1; +} + +/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ +int +verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key) +{ + u_int i; + int r = -1, flags = 0; + char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL; + struct sshkey *plain = NULL; + + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + r = -1; + goto out; + } + + if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) { + if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + r = -1; + goto out; + } + sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert, + valid, sizeof(valid)); + debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu " + "ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s", + sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp, + (unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial, + host_key->cert->key_id, + sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp, + valid); + for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) { + debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s", + host_key->cert->principals[i]); + } + } else { + debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp); + } + + if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) { + debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key", + __func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp); + r = 0; + goto out; + } + + /* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */ + if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) { + r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys); + switch (r) { + case 0: + break; /* not revoked */ + case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: + error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s", + sshkey_type(host_key), fp, + options.revoked_host_keys); + r = -1; + goto out; + default: + error("Error checking host key %s %s in " + "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key), + fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r)); + r = -1; + goto out; + } + } + + if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { + /* + * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade + * them and try the plain key. + */ + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0) + goto out; + if (sshkey_is_cert(plain)) + sshkey_drop_cert(plain); + if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) { + if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { + if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && + flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && + flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { + r = 0; + goto out; + } + if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { + matching_host_key_dns = 1; + } else { + warn_changed_key(plain); + error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS " + "with the new host key to get rid " + "of this message."); + } + } + } + } + r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, + options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles, + options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); + +out: + sshkey_free(plain); + free(fp); + free(cafp); + if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) { + sshkey_free(previous_host_key); + r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key); + } + + return r; +} + +/* + * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the + * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection + * to the server must already have been established before this is called. + * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. + * This function does not require super-user privileges. + */ +void +ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, + struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms) +{ + char *host; + char *server_user, *local_user; + + local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; + + /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ + host = xstrdup(orighost); + lowercase(host); + + /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ + ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms); + + /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ + packet_set_nonblocking(); + + /* key exchange */ + /* authenticate user */ + debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user); + ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port); + ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); + free(local_user); +} + +void +ssh_put_password(char *password) +{ + int size; + char *padded; + + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) { + packet_put_cstring(password); + return; + } + size = ROUNDUP(strlen(password) + 1, 32); + padded = xcalloc(1, size); + strlcpy(padded, password, size); + packet_put_string(padded, size); + explicit_bzero(padded, size); + free(padded); +} + +/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */ +static int +show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key) +{ + int type[] = { + KEY_RSA, + KEY_DSA, + KEY_ECDSA, + KEY_ED25519, + KEY_XMSS, + -1 + }; + int i, ret = 0; + char *fp, *ra; + const struct hostkey_entry *found; + + for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) { + if (type[i] == key->type) + continue; + if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found)) + continue; + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); + logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" + "in %s:%lu\n" + "%s key fingerprint %s.", + sshkey_type(found->key), + found->host, found->file, found->line, + sshkey_type(found->key), fp); + if (options.visual_host_key) + logit("%s", ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); + ret = 1; + } + return ret; +} + +static void +warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key) +{ + char *fp; + + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + if (fp == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); + + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); + error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); + error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); + error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", + sshkey_type(host_key), fp); + error("Please contact your system administrator."); + + free(fp); +} + +/* + * Execute a local command + */ +int +ssh_local_cmd(const char *args) +{ + char *shell; + pid_t pid; + int status; + void (*osighand)(int); + + if (!options.permit_local_command || + args == NULL || !*args) + return (1); + + if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') + shell = _PATH_BSHELL; + + osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); + debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); + execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); + error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s", + shell, args, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } else if (pid == -1) + fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) + if (errno != EINTR) + fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); + signal(SIGCHLD, osighand); + + if (!WIFEXITED(status)) + return (1); + + return (WEXITSTATUS(status)); +} + +void +maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, const struct sshkey *private, + char *comment, char *passphrase) +{ + int auth_sock = -1, r; + + if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0) + return; + + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { + debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key"); + return; + } + + if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 && + !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) { + debug3("user denied adding this key"); + close(auth_sock); + return; + } + + if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private, comment, 0, + (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0)) == 0) + debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile); + else + debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r); + close(auth_sock); +} diff --git a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..890d857 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshconnect.h @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.35 2018/07/19 10:28:47 dtucker Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive; +struct Sensitive { + struct sshkey **keys; + int nkeys; +}; + +struct addrinfo; +struct ssh; + +int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, struct addrinfo *, + struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int, int *, int); +void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void); + +void ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, + struct passwd *, int); + +void ssh_exchange_identification(int); + +int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *); + +void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short, + char **, char **); + +void ssh_kex(char *, struct sockaddr *); +void ssh_kex2(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short); + +void ssh_userauth1(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *); +void ssh_userauth2(const char *, const char *, char *, Sensitive *); + +void ssh_put_password(char *); +int ssh_local_cmd(const char *); + +void maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *, const struct sshkey *, char *, char *); diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1675f39 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -0,0 +1,2159 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.288 2018/10/11 03:48:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) +#include +#endif + +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "sshconnect.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "dh.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "readconf.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "msg.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "utf8.h" + +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif + +/* import */ +extern char *client_version_string; +extern char *server_version_string; +extern Options options; + +/* + * SSH2 key exchange + */ + +u_char *session_id2 = NULL; +u_int session_id2_len = 0; + +char *xxx_host; +struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; + +static int +verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1) + fatal("Host key verification failed."); + return 0; +} + +static char * +order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) +{ + char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret; + size_t maxlen; + struct hostkeys *hostkeys; + int ktype; + u_int i; + + /* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */ + get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL); + hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); + + oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); + maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; + first = xmalloc(maxlen); + last = xmalloc(maxlen); + *first = *last = '\0'; + +#define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \ + do { \ + if (*to != '\0') \ + strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \ + strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \ + } while (0) + + while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') { + if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) + fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg); + if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, + sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) + ALG_APPEND(first, alg); + else + ALG_APPEND(last, alg); + } +#undef ALG_APPEND + xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first, + (*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last); + if (*first != '\0') + debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first); + + free(first); + free(last); + free(hostname); + free(oavail); + free_hostkeys(hostkeys); + + return ret; +} + +void +ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) +{ + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; + char *s, *all_key; + struct kex *kex; + int r; + + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + + if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = + compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = options.compression ? + "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none" : "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"; + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; + if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) { + all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); + if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms, + KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0) + fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__); + free(all_key); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = + compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms); + } else { + /* Enforce default */ + options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); + /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */ + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = + compat_pkalg_proposal( + order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port)); + } + + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit, + options.rekey_interval); + + /* start key exchange */ + if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); + kex = active_state->kex; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; +# endif +#endif + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); + + /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = + compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms); + if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r)); + + session_id2 = kex->session_id; + session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#endif +} + +/* + * Authenticate user + */ + +typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt; +typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod; +typedef struct identity Identity; +typedef struct idlist Idlist; + +struct identity { + TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; + int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */ + struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */ + char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */ + int tried; + int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */ + int userprovided; +}; +TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity); + +struct cauthctxt { + const char *server_user; + const char *local_user; + const char *host; + const char *service; + struct cauthmethod *method; + sig_atomic_t success; + char *authlist; + int attempt; + /* pubkey */ + struct idlist keys; + int agent_fd; + /* hostbased */ + Sensitive *sensitive; + char *oktypes, *ktypes; + const char *active_ktype; + /* kbd-interactive */ + int info_req_seen; + /* generic */ + void *methoddata; +}; + +struct cauthmethod { + char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */ + int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); + void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt); + int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */ + int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */ +}; + +int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +int userauth_none(Authctxt *); +int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *); +int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *); +int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *); +int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *); + +#ifdef GSSAPI +int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt); +int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +#endif + +void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); + +static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *, Identity *); +static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *); +static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *); +static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *); +static struct sshkey *load_identity_file(Identity *); + +static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); +static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); +static char *authmethods_get(void); + +Authmethod authmethods[] = { +#ifdef GSSAPI + {"gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, + NULL, + &options.gss_authentication, + NULL}, +#endif + {"hostbased", + userauth_hostbased, + NULL, + &options.hostbased_authentication, + NULL}, + {"publickey", + userauth_pubkey, + NULL, + &options.pubkey_authentication, + NULL}, + {"keyboard-interactive", + userauth_kbdint, + NULL, + &options.kbd_interactive_authentication, + &options.batch_mode}, + {"password", + userauth_passwd, + NULL, + &options.password_authentication, + &options.batch_mode}, + {"none", + userauth_none, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL}, + {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL} +}; + +void +ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, + Sensitive *sensitive) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; + Authctxt authctxt; + int r; + + if (options.challenge_response_authentication) + options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; + if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL) + options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get(); + + /* setup authentication context */ + memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt)); + pubkey_prepare(&authctxt); + authctxt.server_user = server_user; + authctxt.local_user = local_user; + authctxt.host = host; + authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */ + authctxt.success = 0; + authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none"); + authctxt.authlist = NULL; + authctxt.methoddata = NULL; + authctxt.sensitive = sensitive; + authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL; + authctxt.info_req_seen = 0; + authctxt.agent_fd = -1; + if (authctxt.method == NULL) + fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request"); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + ssh->authctxt = &authctxt; + ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */ + ssh->authctxt = NULL; + + pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt); + ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); + + if (!authctxt.success) + fatal("Authentication failed."); + debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name); +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + int r; + + if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { + char *reply; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + debug2("service_accept: %s", reply); + free(reply); + } else { + debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received"); + + /* initial userauth request */ + userauth_none(authctxt); + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh); +} + +void +userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + + if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) + authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); + + free(authctxt->methoddata); + authctxt->methoddata = NULL; + if (authlist == NULL) { + authlist = authctxt->authlist; + } else { + free(authctxt->authlist); + authctxt->authlist = authlist; + } + for (;;) { + Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist); + if (method == NULL) + fatal("%s@%s: Permission denied (%s).", + authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host, authlist); + authctxt->method = method; + + /* reset the per method handler */ + ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN, + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL); + + /* and try new method */ + if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) { + debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name); + break; + } else { + debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method"); + method->enabled = NULL; + } + } +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: " + "type %d", type); + return 0; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + char *msg, *lang; + u_int len; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + msg = packet_get_string(&len); + lang = packet_get_string(NULL); + if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) + fmprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); + free(msg); + free(lang); + return 0; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context"); + free(authctxt->authlist); + authctxt->authlist = NULL; + if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) + authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); + free(authctxt->methoddata); + authctxt->methoddata = NULL; + authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ + return 0; +} + +int +input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__); + + fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.", + authctxt->method->name); + return 0; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + char *authlist = NULL; + u_char partial; + int r; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context"); + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &authlist, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &partial)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + if (partial != 0) { + verbose("Authenticated with partial success."); + /* reset state */ + pubkey_reset(authctxt); + } + debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist); + + userauth(authctxt, authlist); + authlist = NULL; + out: + free(authlist); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Format an identity for logging including filename, key type, fingerprint + * and location (agent, etc.). Caller must free. + */ +static char * +format_identity(Identity *id) +{ + char *fp = NULL, *ret = NULL; + + if (id->key != NULL) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + } + xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s%s%s%s", + id->filename, + id->key ? sshkey_type(id->key) : "", id->key ? " " : "", + fp ? fp : "", + id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "", + (id->key && (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) ? " token" : "", + id->agent_fd != -1 ? " agent" : ""); + free(fp); + return ret; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + Identity *id = NULL; + int pktype, found = 0, sent = 0; + size_t blen; + char *pkalg = NULL, *fp = NULL, *ident = NULL; + u_char *pkblob = NULL; + int r; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context"); + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto done; + + if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) { + debug("%s: server sent unknown pkalg %s", __func__, pkalg); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s: %s", pkalg, ssh_err(r)); + goto done; + } + if (key->type != pktype) { + error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch " + "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)", + key->type, pktype); + goto done; + } + + /* + * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been + * moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by + * duplicate keys + */ + TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) { + if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found || id == NULL) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + error("%s: server replied with unknown key: %s %s", __func__, + sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "" : fp); + goto done; + } + ident = format_identity(id); + debug("Server accepts key: %s", ident); + sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, authctxt, id); + r = 0; + done: + sshkey_free(key); + free(ident); + free(fp); + free(pkalg); + free(pkblob); + + /* try another method if we did not send a packet */ + if (r == 0 && sent == 0) + userauth(authctxt, NULL); + return r; +} + +#ifdef GSSAPI +int +userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL; + static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL; + static u_int mech = 0; + OM_uint32 min; + int r, ok = 0; + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ + + if (gss_supported == NULL) + gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); + + /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ + while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && + ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, + &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + mech++; + } + } + + if (!ok) + return 0; + + authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, + (gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, + gss_supported->elements[mech].length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, + gss_supported->elements[mech].elements, + gss_supported->elements[mech].length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); + + mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */ + + return 1; +} + +static OM_uint32 +process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; + OM_uint32 status, ms, flags; + int r; + + status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, + recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags); + + if (send_tok.length > 0) { + u_char type = GSS_ERROR(status) ? + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK : + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); + } + + if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */ + if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + struct sshbuf *b; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, + authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic"); + + if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__); + gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); + + status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) { + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, + mic.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + sshbuf_free(b); + gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); + } + } + + return status; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; + size_t oidlen; + u_char *oidv = NULL; + int r; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); + gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; + + /* Setup our OID */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &oidv, &oidlen)) != 0) + goto done; + + if (oidlen <= 2 || + oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE || + oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) { + debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received"); + userauth(authctxt, NULL); + goto ok; + } + + if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2)) + fatal("Server returned different OID than expected"); + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto done; + + if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { + /* Start again with next method on list */ + debug("Trying to start again"); + userauth(authctxt, NULL); + goto ok; + } + ok: + r = 0; + done: + free(oidv); + return r; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; + u_char *p = NULL; + size_t len; + OM_uint32 status; + int r; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + recv_tok.value = p; + recv_tok.length = len; + status = process_gssapi_token(ssh, &recv_tok); + + /* Start again with the next method in the list */ + if (GSS_ERROR(status)) { + userauth(authctxt, NULL); + /* ok */ + } + r = 0; + out: + free(p); + return r; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; + gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; + OM_uint32 ms; + u_char *p = NULL; + size_t len; + int r; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); + gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { + free(p); + return r; + } + + /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */ + recv_tok.value = p; + recv_tok.length = len; + (void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, + &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL); + free(p); + gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); + + /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */ + return 0; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + char *msg = NULL; + char *lang = NULL; + int r; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* maj */ + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* min */ + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh); + debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg); + out: + free(msg); + free(lang); + return r; +} +#endif /* GSSAPI */ + +int +userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + int r; + + /* initial userauth request */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return 1; +} + +int +userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + static int attempt = 0; + char prompt[256]; + char *password; + const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : + authctxt->host; + int r; + + if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) + return 0; + + if (attempt != 1) + error("Permission denied, please try again."); + + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", + authctxt->server_user, host); + password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + if (password) + freezero(password, strlen(password)); + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, + &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); + + return 1; +} + +/* + * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST + */ +/* ARGSUSED */ +int +input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + char *info = NULL, *lang = NULL, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; + char prompt[256]; + const char *host; + int r; + + debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq"); + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: " + "no authentication context"); + host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &info, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if (strlen(info) > 0) + logit("%s", info); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* additional info */ + goto out; + + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ", + authctxt->server_user, host); + password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0) + goto out; + + freezero(password, strlen(password)); + password = NULL; + while (password == NULL) { + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", + authctxt->server_user, host); + password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); + if (password == NULL) { + /* bail out */ + r = 0; + goto out; + } + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", + authctxt->server_user, host); + retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); + if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) { + freezero(password, strlen(password)); + logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit."); + password = NULL; + } + freezero(retype, strlen(retype)); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, + &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); + r = 0; + out: + if (password) + freezero(password, strlen(password)); + free(info); + free(lang); + return r; +} + +/* + * Select an algorithm for publickey signatures. + * Returns algorithm (caller must free) or NULL if no mutual algorithm found. + * + * Call with ssh==NULL to ignore server-sig-algs extension list and + * only attempt with the key's base signature type. + */ +static char * +key_sig_algorithm(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + char *allowed, *oallowed, *cp, *tmp, *alg = NULL; + + /* + * The signature algorithm will only differ from the key algorithm + * for RSA keys/certs and when the server advertises support for + * newer (SHA2) algorithms. + */ + if (ssh == NULL || ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL || + (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) || + (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE))) { + /* Filter base key signature alg against our configuration */ + return match_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), + options.pubkey_key_types, NULL); + } + + /* + * For RSA keys/certs, since these might have a different sig type: + * find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes of the right type + * that also appears in the supported signature algorithms list from + * the server. + */ + oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types); + while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) { + if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type) + continue; + tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, NULL); + if (tmp != NULL) + alg = xstrdup(cp); + free(tmp); + if (alg != NULL) + break; + } + free(oallowed); + return alg; +} + +static int +identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg) +{ + struct sshkey *prv; + int r; + + /* The agent supports this key. */ + if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1) { + return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp, + data, datalen, alg, compat); + } + + /* + * We have already loaded the private key or the private key is + * stored in external hardware. + */ + if (id->key != NULL && + (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) { + if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, + alg, compat)) != 0) + return r; + /* + * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms, + * so check what we get back. + */ + if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; + } + + /* Load the private key from the file. */ + if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) { + error("%s: private key %s contents do not match public", + __func__, id->filename); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + } + r = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); + sshkey_free(prv); + return r; +} + +static int +id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id) +{ + const char *suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL }; + size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename); + size_t i, slen; + + if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0) + return 1; + for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) { + slen = strlen(suffixes[i]); + if (len > slen && plen == len - slen && + strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 && + memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int +sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + Identity *private_id, *sign_id = NULL; + u_char *signature = NULL; + size_t slen = 0, skip = 0; + int r, fallback_sigtype, sent = 0; + char *alg = NULL, *fp = NULL; + const char *loc = ""; + + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + return 0; + + debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); + + /* + * If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key + * and use it to complete the signature. + * If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate + * key itself in case it has a private half already loaded. + * This will try to set sign_id to the private key that will perform + * the signature. + */ + if (sshkey_is_cert(id->key)) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) && + id->key->type != private_id->key->type) { + sign_id = private_id; + break; + } + } + /* + * Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow + * filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that + * didn't load public keys. This supports the case + * of keeping just a private key file and public + * certificate on disk. + */ + if (sign_id == NULL && + !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 && + (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { + if (private_id->key == NULL && + id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) { + sign_id = private_id; + break; + } + } + } + if (sign_id != NULL) { + debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for " + "certificate", __func__, id->filename, + id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : ""); + } else { + debug("%s: no separate private key for certificate " + "\"%s\"", __func__, id->filename); + } + } + + /* + * If the above didn't select another identity to do the signing + * then default to the one we started with. + */ + if (sign_id == NULL) + sign_id = id; + + /* assemble and sign data */ + for (fallback_sigtype = 0; fallback_sigtype <= 1; fallback_sigtype++) { + free(alg); + slen = 0; + signature = NULL; + if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(fallback_sigtype ? NULL : ssh, + id->key)) == NULL) { + error("%s: no mutual signature supported", __func__); + goto out; + } + debug3("%s: signing using %s", __func__, alg); + + sshbuf_free(b); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + skip = sshbuf_len(b); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, alg)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(id->key, b)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: assemble signed data: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + /* generate signature */ + r = identity_sign(sign_id, &signature, &slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows, alg); + if (r == 0) + break; + else if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) + goto out; /* soft failure */ + else if (r == SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED && + !fallback_sigtype) { + if (sign_id->agent_fd != -1) + loc = "agent "; + else if ((sign_id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) + loc = "token "; + logit("%skey %s %s returned incorrect signature type", + loc, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); + continue; + } + error("%s: signing failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if (slen == 0 || signature == NULL) /* shouldn't happen */ + fatal("%s: no signature", __func__); + + /* append signature */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: append signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + /* skip session id and packet type */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, skip + 1)) != 0) + fatal("%s: consume: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, b)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: enqueue request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* success */ + sent = 1; + + out: + free(fp); + free(alg); + sshbuf_free(b); + freezero(signature, slen); + return sent; +} + +static int +send_pubkey_test(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) +{ + u_char *blob = NULL; + char *alg = NULL; + size_t bloblen; + u_int have_sig = 0; + int sent = 0, r; + + if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(ssh, id->key)) == NULL) { + debug("%s: no mutual signature algorithm", __func__); + goto out; + } + + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0) { + /* we cannot handle this key */ + debug3("%s: cannot handle key", __func__); + goto out; + } + /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */ + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, have_sig)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, alg)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, blob, bloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sent = 1; + + out: + free(alg); + free(blob); + return sent; +} + +static struct sshkey * +load_identity_file(Identity *id) +{ + struct sshkey *private = NULL; + char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment; + int r, perm_ok = 0, quit = 0, i; + struct stat st; + + if (stat(id->filename, &st) < 0) { + (id->userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s", + id->filename, strerror(errno)); + return NULL; + } + snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, + "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename); + for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { + if (i == 0) + passphrase = ""; + else { + passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); + if (*passphrase == '\0') { + debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); + free(passphrase); + break; + } + } + switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename, + passphrase, &private, &comment, &perm_ok))) { + case 0: + break; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: + if (options.batch_mode) { + quit = 1; + break; + } + if (i != 0) + debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); + break; + case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: + if (errno == ENOENT) { + debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s", + id->filename, ssh_err(r)); + quit = 1; + break; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + error("Load key \"%s\": %s", id->filename, ssh_err(r)); + quit = 1; + break; + } + if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 && + !(id->key && id->isprivate)) + maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment, + passphrase); + if (i > 0) + freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + free(comment); + if (private != NULL || quit) + break; + } + return private; +} + +static int +key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key) +{ + if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + + /* RSA keys/certs might be allowed by alternate signature types */ + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + break; + } + return 0; +} + + +/* + * try keys in the following order: + * 1. certificates listed in the config file + * 2. other input certificates + * 3. agent keys that are found in the config file + * 4. other agent keys + * 5. keys that are only listed in the config file + */ +static void +pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp; + struct idlist agent, files, *preferred; + struct sshkey *key; + int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found; + size_t j; + struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; + char *ident; + + TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */ + TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */ + preferred = &authctxt->keys; + TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */ + + /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { + key = options.identity_keys[i]; + if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) + continue; + options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); + id->agent_fd = -1; + id->key = key; + id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]); + id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next); + } + /* list of certificates specified by user */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { + key = options.certificates[i]; + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL || + key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) + continue; + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); + id->agent_fd = -1; + id->key = key; + id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]); + id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i]; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); + } + /* list of keys supported by the agent */ + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) + debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) + debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + close(agent_fd); + } else { + for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) { + found = 0; + TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) { + /* + * agent keys from the config file are + * preferred + */ + if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); + id->agent_fd = agent_fd; + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found && !options.identities_only) { + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); + /* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */ + id->key = idlist->keys[j]; + id->filename = idlist->comments[j]; + idlist->keys[j] = NULL; + idlist->comments[j] = NULL; + id->agent_fd = agent_fd; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next); + } + } + ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); + /* append remaining agent keys */ + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); + } + authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd; + } + /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */ + TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) { + if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) + continue; + found = 0; + TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) { + if (id2->key == NULL || + (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) + continue; + if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); + found = 1; + break; + } + } + /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */ + if (!found && options.identities_only) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); + freezero(id, sizeof(*id)); + } + } + /* append remaining keys from the config file */ + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); + } + /* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes */ + TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) { + if (id->key != NULL && !key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) { + debug("Skipping %s key %s - " + "not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", + sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename); + TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next); + sshkey_free(id->key); + free(id->filename); + memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id)); + continue; + } + } + /* List the keys we plan on using */ + TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) { + ident = format_identity(id); + debug("Will attempt key: %s", ident); + free(ident); + } + debug2("%s: done", __func__); +} + +static void +pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + Identity *id; + + if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) + ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd); + for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id; + id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); + sshkey_free(id->key); + free(id->filename); + free(id); + } +} + +static void +pubkey_reset(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + Identity *id; + + TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &authctxt->keys, next) + id->tried = 0; +} + +static int +try_identity(Identity *id) +{ + if (!id->key) + return (0); + if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && + (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { + debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server", + sshkey_type(id->key), id->filename); + return (0); + } + return 1; +} + +int +userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + Identity *id; + int sent = 0; + char *ident; + + while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) { + if (id->tried++) + return (0); + /* move key to the end of the queue */ + TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next); + /* + * send a test message if we have the public key. for + * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the + * private key instead + */ + if (id->key != NULL) { + if (try_identity(id)) { + ident = format_identity(id); + debug("Offering public key: %s", ident); + free(ident); + sent = send_pubkey_test(ssh, authctxt, id); + } + } else { + debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename); + id->key = load_identity_file(id); + if (id->key != NULL) { + if (try_identity(id)) { + id->isprivate = 1; + sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, + authctxt, id); + } + sshkey_free(id->key); + id->key = NULL; + id->isprivate = 0; + } + } + if (sent) + return (sent); + } + return (0); +} + +/* + * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method. + */ +int +userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + static int attempt = 0; + int r; + + if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) + return 0; + /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */ + if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) { + debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen"); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL); + return 0; + } + + debug2("userauth_kbdint"); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* lang */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, options.kbd_interactive_devices ? + options.kbd_interactive_devices : "")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req); + return 1; +} + +/* + * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE + */ +int +input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *lang = NULL, *prompt = NULL; + char *response = NULL; + u_char echo = 0; + u_int num_prompts, i; + int r; + + debug2("input_userauth_info_req"); + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context"); + + authctxt->info_req_seen = 1; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &inst, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if (strlen(name) > 0) + logit("%s", name); + if (strlen(inst) > 0) + logit("%s", inst); + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &num_prompts)) != 0) + goto out; + /* + * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested. + * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if + * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to + * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response. + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, num_prompts)) != 0) + goto out; + + debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts); + for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) { + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &prompt, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &echo)) != 0) + goto out; + response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, response)) != 0) + goto out; + freezero(response, strlen(response)); + free(prompt); + response = prompt = NULL; + } + /* done with parsing incoming message. */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0) + goto out; + r = sshpkt_send(ssh); + out: + if (response) + freezero(response, strlen(response)); + free(prompt); + free(name); + free(inst); + free(lang); + return r; +} + +static int +ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + struct stat st; + pid_t pid; + int i, r, to[2], from[2], status, sock = packet_get_connection_in(); + u_char rversion = 0, version = 2; + void (*osigchld)(int); + + *sigp = NULL; + *lenp = 0; + + if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) { + error("%s: not installed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (fflush(stdout) != 0) { + error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (pipe(to) < 0) { + error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if (pipe(from) < 0) { + error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { + error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + if (pid == 0) { + /* keep the socket on exec */ + fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); + close(from[0]); + if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(to[1]); + if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0) + fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(from[1]); + close(to[0]); + /* Close everything but stdio and the socket */ + for (i = STDERR_FILENO + 1; i < sock; i++) + close(i); + closefrom(sock + 1); + debug3("%s: [child] pid=%ld, exec %s", + __func__, (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN); + execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL); + fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, + strerror(errno)); + } + close(from[1]); + close(to[0]); + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + /* send # of sock, data to be signed */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1) + fatal("%s: couldn't send request", __func__); + sshbuf_reset(b); + r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b); + close(from[0]); + close(to[1]); + if (r < 0) { + error("%s: no reply", __func__); + goto fail; + } + + errno = 0; + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR) { + error("%s: waitpid %ld: %s", + __func__, (long)pid, strerror(errno)); + goto fail; + } + } + if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { + error("%s: exited abnormally", __func__); + goto fail; + } + if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { + error("%s: exited with status %d", + __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); + goto fail; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto fail; + } + if (rversion != version) { + error("%s: bad version", __func__); + goto fail; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + fail: + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + sshbuf_free(b); + return -1; + } + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + sshbuf_free(b); + + return 0; +} + +int +userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + struct sshkey *private = NULL; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL; + char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL; + size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0; + int i, r, success = 0; + + if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) { + authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_key_types); + authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes; + } + + /* + * Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedKeyTypes, + * trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn. + */ + for (;;) { + if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL) + authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ","); + if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL || + *authctxt->active_ktype == '\0') + break; + debug3("%s: trying key type %s", __func__, + authctxt->active_ktype); + + /* check for a useful key */ + private = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) { + if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL || + authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC) + continue; + if (match_pattern_list( + sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]), + authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1) + continue; + /* we take and free the key */ + private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]; + authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL; + break; + } + /* Found one */ + if (private != NULL) + break; + /* No more keys of this type; advance */ + authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; + } + if (private == NULL) { + free(authctxt->oktypes); + authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL; + authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; + debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication."); + goto out; + } + + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); + goto out; + } + debug("%s: trying hostkey %s %s", + __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); + + /* figure out a name for the client host */ + if ((lname = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in())) == NULL) { + error("%s: cannot get local ipaddr/name", __func__); + goto out; + } + + /* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */ + xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname); + debug2("%s: chost %s", __func__, chost); + + /* construct data */ + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) { + error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + r = ssh_keysign(private, &sig, &siglen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); + if (r != 0) { + error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed", + sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { + error("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + success = 1; + + out: + if (sig != NULL) + freezero(sig, siglen); + free(keyblob); + free(lname); + free(fp); + free(chost); + sshkey_free(private); + sshbuf_free(b); + + return success; +} + +/* find auth method */ + +/* + * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill + * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false. + */ +static int +authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method) +{ + if (method == NULL) + return 0; + /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */ + if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0) + return 0; + /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */ + if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static Authmethod * +authmethod_lookup(const char *name) +{ + Authmethod *method = NULL; + if (name != NULL) + for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) + if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0) + return method; + debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); + return NULL; +} + +/* XXX internal state */ +static Authmethod *current = NULL; +static char *supported = NULL; +static char *preferred = NULL; + +/* + * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the + * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list, + * use a built-in default list. + */ +static Authmethod * +authmethod_get(char *authlist) +{ + char *name = NULL; + u_int next; + + /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */ + if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0) + authlist = options.preferred_authentications; + + if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) { + debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist); + free(supported); + supported = xstrdup(authlist); + preferred = options.preferred_authentications; + debug3("preferred %s", preferred); + current = NULL; + } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) + return current; + + for (;;) { + if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) { + debug("No more authentication methods to try."); + current = NULL; + return NULL; + } + preferred += next; + debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name); + debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred); + if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL && + authmethod_is_enabled(current)) { + debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name); + debug("Next authentication method: %s", name); + free(name); + return current; + } + free(name); + } +} + +static char * +authmethods_get(void) +{ + Authmethod *method = NULL; + struct sshbuf *b; + char *list; + int r; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { + if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) { + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", + sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", method->name)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); + sshbuf_free(b); + return list; +} diff --git a/sshd.0 b/sshd.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac7e707 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshd.0 @@ -0,0 +1,653 @@ +SSHD(8) System Manager's Manual SSHD(8) + +NAME + sshd M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH daemon + +SYNOPSIS + sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_certificate_file] + [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time] + [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len] + +DESCRIPTION + sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Together these + programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted + communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. + + sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at + boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. + The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, + command execution, and data exchange. + + sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file + (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values + specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file + when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the + name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd. + + The options are as follows: + + -4 Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only. + + -6 Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only. + + -C connection_spec + Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test + mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration + file that would apply are applied before the configuration is + written to standard output. The connection parameters are + supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order, + either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. + The keywords are M-bM-^@M-^\addr,M-bM-^@M-^] M-bM-^@M-^\userM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\hostM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\laddrM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\lportM-bM-^@M-^], and + M-bM-^@M-^\rdomainM-bM-^@M-^] and correspond to source address, user, resolved source + host name, local address, local port number and routing domain + respectively. + + -c host_certificate_file + Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during + key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file + specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration + directive. + + -D When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not + become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd. + + -d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard + error, and does not put itself in the background. The server + also will not fork and will only process one connection. This + option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple + -d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. + + -E log_file + Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log. + + -e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. + + -f config_file + Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is + /etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no + configuration file. + + -g login_grace_time + Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves + (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the + user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. + A value of zero indicates no limit. + + -h host_key_file + Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must + be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files + are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key. It is possible to have multiple host + key files for the different host key algorithms. + + -i Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8). + + -o option + Can be used to give options in the format used in the + configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for + which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details + of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5). + + -p port + Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections + (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports + specified in the configuration file with the Port option are + ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified + using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports. + + -q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the + beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is + logged. + + -T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration + file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. + Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the + connection parameters using one or more -C options. + + -t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and + sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as + configuration options may change. + + -u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp + structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host + name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used + instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that + overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying + -u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put + into the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from + making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or + configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may + require DNS include HostbasedAuthentication and using a + from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options + that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in AllowUsers + or DenyUsers. + +AUTHENTICATION + The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only. Each host has a + host-specific key, used to identify the host. Whenever a client + connects, the daemon responds with its public host key. The client + compares the host key against its own database to verify that it has not + changed. Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key + agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest + of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit + AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The + client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the + server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a + cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, + umac-128, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). + + Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The + client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, + public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password + authentication. + + Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure + that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, + listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The + definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms have + their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( + M-bM-^@M-^X*LK*M-bM-^@M-^Y on Solaris and UnixWare, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y on HP-UX, containing M-bM-^@M-^XNologinM-bM-^@M-^Y on + Tru64, a leading M-bM-^@M-^X*LOCKED*M-bM-^@M-^Y on FreeBSD and a leading M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y on most + Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication + for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field + should be set to something other than these values (eg M-bM-^@M-^XNPM-bM-^@M-^Y or M-bM-^@M-^X*NP*M-bM-^@M-^Y ). + + If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing + the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like + allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP + connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the + secure channel. + + After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. + The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send + data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command + on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. + + When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other + connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the + client, and both sides exit. + +LOGIN PROCESS + When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following: + + 1. If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, + prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the + configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section). + + 2. If the login is on a tty, records login time. + + 3. Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits + (unless root). + + 4. Changes to run with normal user privileges. + + 5. Sets up basic environment. + + 6. Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are + allowed to change their environment. See the + PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5). + + 7. Changes to user's home directory. + + 8. If ~/.ssh/rc exists and the sshd_config(5) PermitUserRC option + is set, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; + otherwise runs xauth. The M-bM-^@M-^\rcM-bM-^@M-^] files are given the X11 + authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See + SSHRC, below. + + 9. Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the + user's login shell as specified in the system password + database. + +SSHRC + If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment + files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not + produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 + forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its + standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call + xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11 + cookies. + + The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines + which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; + AFS is a particular example of such an environment. + + This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by + something similar to: + + if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then + if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then + # X11UseLocalhost=yes + echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | + cut -c11-` $proto $cookie + else + # X11UseLocalhost=no + echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie + fi | xauth -q - + fi + + If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not + exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. + +AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT + AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public + key authentication; if this option is not specified, the default is + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2. Each line of the + file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are + ignored as comments). Public keys consist of the following space- + separated fields: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The + options field is optional. The keytype is M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp256M-bM-^@M-^], + M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp384M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp521M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-dssM-bM-^@M-^] or + M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^]; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be + convenient for the user to identify the key). + + Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long (because + of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, + which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. + You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the id_dsa.pub, + id_ecdsa.pub, id_ed25519.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it. + + sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits. + + The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option + specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. + The following option specifications are supported (note that option + keywords are case-insensitive): + + agent-forwarding + Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the + restrict option. + + cert-authority + Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) + that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user + authentication. + + Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key + options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are + present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. + + command="command" + Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used + for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is + ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a + pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean + channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify + no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it + with a backslash. + + This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to + perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key + that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the + client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are + explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the restrict key option. + + The command originally supplied by the client is available in the + SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option + applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that + this command may be superseded by a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand + directive. + + If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a + certificate used for authentication, then the certificate will be + accepted only if the two commands are identical. + + environment="NAME=value" + Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when + logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way + override other default environment values. Multiple options of + this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by + default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option. + + expiry-time="timespec" + Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted. The + time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] + time in the system time-zone. + + from="pattern-list" + Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either + the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be + present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in + ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. + + In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to + hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses + using CIDR address/masklen notation. + + The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: + public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or + name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody + somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in + from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a + stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have + to be compromised in addition to just the key). + + no-agent-forwarding + Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for + authentication. + + no-port-forwarding + Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. + Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. + This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option. + + no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). + + no-user-rc + Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc. + + no-X11-forwarding + Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. + Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. + + permitlisten="[host:]port" + Limit remote port forwarding with the ssh(1) -R option such that + it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port. + IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in + square brackets. Multiple permitlisten options may be applied + separated by commas. Hostnames may include wildcards as + described in the PATTERNS section in ssh_config(5). A port + specification of * matches any port. Note that the setting of + GatewayPorts may further restrict listen addresses. Note that + ssh(1) will send a hostname of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if a listen host was + not specified when the forwarding was requested, and that this + name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses + M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^]. + + permitopen="host:port" + Limit local port forwarding with the ssh(1) -L option such that + it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 + addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square + brackets. Multiple permitopen options may be applied separated + by commas. No pattern matching is performed on the specified + hostnames, they must be literal domains or addresses. A port + specification of * matches any port. + + port-forwarding + Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the restrict + option. + + principals="principals" + On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for + certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least + one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of + principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is + ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate + signers using the cert-authority option. + + pty Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the restrict + option. + + restrict + Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 + forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of + ~/.ssh/rc. If any future restriction capabilities are added to + authorized_keys files they will be included in this set. + + tunnel="n" + Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the + next available device will be used if the client requests a + tunnel. + + user-rc + Enables execution of ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the + restrict option. + + X11-forwarding + Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the restrict + option. + + An example authorized_keys file: + + # Comments allowed at start of line + ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net + from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa + AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net + command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa + AAAAC3...51R== example.net + permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa + AAAAB5...21S== + permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitopen="localhost:22000" ssh-rsa + AAAAB5...21S== + tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== + jane@example.net + restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv== + user@example.net + restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5== + user@example.net + +SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT + The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host + public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by + the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained + automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is + added to the per-user file. + + Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers + (optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The fields + are separated by spaces. + + The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of + M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the line contains a certification + authority (CA) key, or M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the key contained on + the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker + should be used on a key line. + + Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y act as + wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. When + sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using + HostbasedAuthentication, this will be the canonical client host name. + When ssh(1) is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given + by the user, the value of the ssh(1) HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or + the canonical server hostname if the ssh(1) CanonicalizeHostname option + was used. + + A pattern may also be preceded by M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate negation: if the host + name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if + it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may + optionally be enclosed within M-bM-^@M-^X[M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X]M-bM-^@M-^Y brackets then followed by M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y + and a non-standard port number. + + Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host + names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed + hostnames start with a M-bM-^@M-^X|M-bM-^@M-^Y character. Only one hashed hostname may + appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard + operators may be applied. + + The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; + they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub. + The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not + used. + + Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are ignored as comments. + + When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any + matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if + the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the + certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be + trusted as a certification authority, it must use the M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^] + marker described above. + + The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, + for example when it is known that the associated private key has been + stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^] marker at + the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication + or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from + ssh(1) when they are encountered. + + It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or + different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when + short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It + is possible that the files contain conflicting information; + authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either + file. + + Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters + long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. + Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking, for + example, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub and adding the host names at the + front. ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for + ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and + converting all host names to their hashed representations. + + An example ssh_known_hosts file: + + # Comments allowed at start of line + closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net + cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= + # A hashed hostname + |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa + AAAA1234.....= + # A revoked key + @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... + # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org + @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... + +FILES + ~/.hushlogin + This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and + /etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are + enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified + by Banner. + + ~/.rhosts + This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for + more information). On some machines this file may need to be + world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS + partition, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this + file must be owned by the user, and must not have write + permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most + machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by + others. + + ~/.shosts + This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows + host-based authentication without permitting login with + rlogin/rsh. + + ~/.ssh/ + This directory is the default location for all user-specific + configuration and authentication information. There is no + general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory + secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute + for the user, and not accessible by others. + + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys + Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used + for logging in as this user. The format of this file is + described above. The content of the file is not highly + sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the + user, and not accessible by others. + + If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory + are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or + replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not + allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to + M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. + + ~/.ssh/environment + This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). + It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with + M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y), and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file + should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by + anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and + is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option. + + ~/.ssh/known_hosts + Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged + into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host + keys. The format of this file is described above. This file + should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not + be, world-readable. + + ~/.ssh/rc + Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home + directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only + by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. + + /etc/hosts.equiv + This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)). It + should only be writable by root. + + /etc/moduli + Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group + Exchange" key exchange method. The file format is described in + moduli(5). If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed + internal groups will be used. + + /etc/motd + See motd(5). + + /etc/nologin + If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log + in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to + log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be + world-readable. + + /etc/shosts.equiv + This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but + allows host-based authentication without permitting login with + rlogin/rsh. + + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key + These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These + files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and + not accessible to others. Note that sshd does not start if these + files are group/world-accessible. + + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub + These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These + files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their + contents should match the respective private parts. These files + are not really used for anything; they are provided for the + convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known + hosts files. These files are created using ssh-keygen(1). + + /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts + Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared + by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of + all machines in the organization. The format of this file is + described above. This file should be writable only by root/the + owner and should be world-readable. + + /etc/ssh/sshd_config + Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and + configuration options are described in sshd_config(5). + + /etc/ssh/sshrc + Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific + login-time initializations globally. This file should be + writable only by root, and should be world-readable. + + /var/empty + chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in + the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain + any files and must be owned by root and not group or world- + writable. + + /var/run/sshd.pid + Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if + there are several daemons running concurrently for different + ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). + The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world- + readable. + +SEE ALSO + scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), + ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), login.conf(5), moduli(5), sshd_config(5), + inetd(8), sftp-server(8) + +AUTHORS + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by + Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo + de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and + created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol + versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support + for privilege separation. + +OpenBSD 6.4 July 22, 2018 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb133c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,993 @@ +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.304 2018/07/22 12:16:59 dtucker Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: July 22 2018 $ +.Dt SSHD 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm sshd +.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm sshd +.Bk -words +.Op Fl 46DdeiqTt +.Op Fl C Ar connection_spec +.Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file +.Op Fl E Ar log_file +.Op Fl f Ar config_file +.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time +.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file +.Op Fl o Ar option +.Op Fl p Ar port +.Op Fl u Ar len +.Ek +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Nm +(OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for +.Xr ssh 1 . +Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, +and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts +over an insecure network. +.Pp +.Nm +listens for connections from clients. +It is normally started at boot from +.Pa /etc/rc . +It forks a new +daemon for each incoming connection. +The forked daemons handle +key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, +and data exchange. +.Pp +.Nm +can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file +(by default +.Xr sshd_config 5 ) ; +command-line options override values specified in the +configuration file. +.Nm +rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, +.Dv SIGHUP , +by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\& +.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd . +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl 4 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv4 addresses only. +.It Fl 6 +Forces +.Nm +to use IPv6 addresses only. +.It Fl C Ar connection_spec +Specify the connection parameters to use for the +.Fl T +extended test mode. +If provided, any +.Cm Match +directives in the configuration file that would apply are applied before the +configuration is written to standard output. +The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be +supplied in any order, either with multiple +.Fl C +options or as a comma-separated list. +The keywords are +.Dq addr, +.Dq user , +.Dq host , +.Dq laddr , +.Dq lport , +and +.Dq rdomain +and correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name, +local address, local port number and routing domain respectively. +.It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file +Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify +.Nm +during key exchange. +The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the +.Fl h +option or the +.Cm HostKey +configuration directive. +.It Fl D +When this option is specified, +.Nm +will not detach and does not become a daemon. +This allows easy monitoring of +.Nm sshd . +.It Fl d +Debug mode. +The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, +and does not put itself in the background. +The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. +This option is only intended for debugging for the server. +Multiple +.Fl d +options increase the debugging level. +Maximum is 3. +.It Fl E Ar log_file +Append debug logs to +.Ar log_file +instead of the system log. +.It Fl e +Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. +.It Fl f Ar config_file +Specifies the name of the configuration file. +The default is +.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config . +.Nm +refuses to start if there is no configuration file. +.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time +Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default +120 seconds). +If the client fails to authenticate the user within +this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. +A value of zero indicates no limit. +.It Fl h Ar host_key_file +Specifies a file from which a host key is read. +This option must be given if +.Nm +is not run as root (as the normal +host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). +The default is +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key +and +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key . +It is possible to have multiple host key files for +the different host key algorithms. +.It Fl i +Specifies that +.Nm +is being run from +.Xr inetd 8 . +.It Fl o Ar option +Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. +This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate +command-line flag. +For full details of the options, and their values, see +.Xr sshd_config 5 . +.It Fl p Ar port +Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections +(default 22). +Multiple port options are permitted. +Ports specified in the configuration file with the +.Cm Port +option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. +Ports specified using the +.Cm ListenAddress +option override command-line ports. +.It Fl q +Quiet mode. +Nothing is sent to the system log. +Normally the beginning, +authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. +.It Fl T +Extended test mode. +Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration +to stdout and then exit. +Optionally, +.Cm Match +rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more +.Fl C +options. +.It Fl t +Test mode. +Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. +This is useful for updating +.Nm +reliably as configuration options may change. +.It Fl u Ar len +This option is used to specify the size of the field +in the +.Li utmp +structure that holds the remote host name. +If the resolved host name is longer than +.Ar len , +the dotted decimal value will be used instead. +This allows hosts with very long host names that +overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. +Specifying +.Fl u0 +indicates that only dotted decimal addresses +should be put into the +.Pa utmp +file. +.Fl u0 +may also be used to prevent +.Nm +from making DNS requests unless the authentication +mechanism or configuration requires it. +Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication +and using a +.Cm from="pattern-list" +option in a key file. +Configuration options that require DNS include using a +USER@HOST pattern in +.Cm AllowUsers +or +.Cm DenyUsers . +.El +.Sh AUTHENTICATION +The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only. +Each host has a host-specific key, +used to identify the host. +Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public +host key. +The client compares the +host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. +Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. +This key agreement results in a shared session key. +The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently +128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. +The client selects the encryption algorithm +to use from those offered by the server. +Additionally, session integrity is provided +through a cryptographic message authentication code +(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, +hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). +.Pp +Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. +The client tries to authenticate itself using +host-based authentication, +public key authentication, +challenge-response authentication, +or password authentication. +.Pp +Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to +ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is +locked, listed in +.Cm DenyUsers +or its group is listed in +.Cm DenyGroups +\&. The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms +have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( +.Ql \&*LK\&* +on Solaris and UnixWare, +.Ql \&* +on HP-UX, containing +.Ql Nologin +on Tru64, +a leading +.Ql \&*LOCKED\&* +on FreeBSD and a leading +.Ql \&! +on most Linuxes). +If there is a requirement to disable password authentication +for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field +should be set to something other than these values (eg +.Ql NP +or +.Ql \&*NP\&* +). +.Pp +If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for +preparing the session is entered. +At this time the client may request +things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, +forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent +connection over the secure channel. +.Pp +After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. +The sides then enter session mode. +In this mode, either side may send +data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or +command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. +.Pp +When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other +connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to +the client, and both sides exit. +.Sh LOGIN PROCESS +When a user successfully logs in, +.Nm +does the following: +.Bl -enum -offset indent +.It +If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, +prints last login time and +.Pa /etc/motd +(unless prevented in the configuration file or by +.Pa ~/.hushlogin ; +see the +.Sx FILES +section). +.It +If the login is on a tty, records login time. +.It +Checks +.Pa /etc/nologin ; +if it exists, prints contents and quits +(unless root). +.It +Changes to run with normal user privileges. +.It +Sets up basic environment. +.It +Reads the file +.Pa ~/.ssh/environment , +if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. +See the +.Cm PermitUserEnvironment +option in +.Xr sshd_config 5 . +.It +Changes to user's home directory. +.It +If +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +exists and the +.Xr sshd_config 5 +.Cm PermitUserRC +option is set, runs it; else if +.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc +exists, runs +it; otherwise runs xauth. +The +.Dq rc +files are given the X11 +authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. +See +.Sx SSHRC , +below. +.It +Runs user's shell or command. +All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the +system password database. +.El +.Sh SSHRC +If the file +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +exists, +.Xr sh 1 +runs it after reading the +environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. +It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used +instead. +If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in +its standard input (and +.Ev DISPLAY +in its environment). +The script must call +.Xr xauth 1 +because +.Nm +will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. +.Pp +The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines +which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes +accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. +.Pp +This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by +something similar to: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then + if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then + # X11UseLocalhost=yes + echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | + cut -c11-` $proto $cookie + else + # X11UseLocalhost=no + echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie + fi | xauth -q - +fi +.Ed +.Pp +If this file does not exist, +.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc +is run, and if that +does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. +.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +specifies the files containing public keys for +public key authentication; +if this option is not specified, the default is +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +and +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 . +Each line of the file contains one +key (empty lines and lines starting with a +.Ql # +are ignored as +comments). +Public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: +options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. +The options field is optional. +The keytype is +.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 , +.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 , +.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 , +.Dq ssh-ed25519 , +.Dq ssh-dss +or +.Dq ssh-rsa ; +the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the +user to identify the key). +.Pp +Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long +(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of +8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA +keys up to 16 kilobits. +You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the +.Pa id_dsa.pub , +.Pa id_ecdsa.pub , +.Pa id_ed25519.pub , +or the +.Pa id_rsa.pub +file and edit it. +.Pp +.Nm +enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits. +.Pp +The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option +specifications. +No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. +The following option specifications are supported (note +that option keywords are case-insensitive): +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm agent-forwarding +Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict +option. +.It Cm cert-authority +Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is +trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. +.Pp +Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. +If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most +restrictive union of the two is applied. +.It Cm command="command" +Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for +authentication. +The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. +The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; +otherwise it is run without a tty. +If an 8-bit clean channel is required, +one must not request a pty or should specify +.Cm no-pty . +A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. +.Pp +This option might be useful +to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. +An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. +Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 +forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the +.Cm restrict +key option. +.Pp +The command originally supplied by the client is available in the +.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND +environment variable. +Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. +Also note that this command may be superseded by a +.Xr sshd_config 5 +.Cm ForceCommand +directive. +.Pp +If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate +used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the +two commands are identical. +.It Cm environment="NAME=value" +Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when +logging in using this key. +Environment variables set this way +override other default environment values. +Multiple options of this type are permitted. +Environment processing is disabled by default and is +controlled via the +.Cm PermitUserEnvironment +option. +.It Cm expiry-time="timespec" +Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted. +The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time +in the system time-zone. +.It Cm from="pattern-list" +Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical +name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the +comma-separated list of patterns. +See PATTERNS in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for more information on patterns. +.Pp +In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or +addresses, a +.Cm from +stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. +.Pp +The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key +authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or +anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key +permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. +This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name +servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to +just the key). +.It Cm no-agent-forwarding +Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for +authentication. +.It Cm no-port-forwarding +Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. +Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. +This might be used, e.g. in connection with the +.Cm command +option. +.It Cm no-pty +Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). +.It Cm no-user-rc +Disables execution of +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc . +.It Cm no-X11-forwarding +Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. +Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. +.It Cm permitlisten="[host:]port" +Limit remote port forwarding with the +.Xr ssh 1 +.Fl R +option such that it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port. +IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. +Multiple +.Cm permitlisten +options may be applied separated by commas. +Hostnames may include wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +A port specification of +.Cm * +matches any port. +Note that the setting of +.Cm GatewayPorts +may further restrict listen addresses. +Note that +.Xr ssh 1 +will send a hostname of +.Dq localhost +if a listen host was not specified when the forwarding was requested, and +that this name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses +.Dq 127.0.0.1 +and +.Dq ::1 . +.It Cm permitopen="host:port" +Limit local port forwarding with the +.Xr ssh 1 +.Fl L +option such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. +IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. +Multiple +.Cm permitopen +options may be applied separated by commas. +No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, +they must be literal domains or addresses. +A port specification of +.Cm * +matches any port. +.It Cm port-forwarding +Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict +option. +.It Cm principals="principals" +On a +.Cm cert-authority +line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a +comma-separated list. +At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's +list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. +This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate +signers using the +.Cm cert-authority +option. +.It Cm pty +Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict +option. +.It Cm restrict +Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding, +as well as disabling PTY allocation +and execution of +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc . +If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files +they will be included in this set. +.It Cm tunnel="n" +Force a +.Xr tun 4 +device on the server. +Without this option, the next available device will be used if +the client requests a tunnel. +.It Cm user-rc +Enables execution of +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict +option. +.It Cm X11-forwarding +Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the +.Cm restrict +option. +.El +.Pp +An example authorized_keys file: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +# Comments allowed at start of line +ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net +from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa +AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net +command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa +AAAAC3...51R== example.net +permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa +AAAAB5...21S== +permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitopen="localhost:22000" ssh-rsa +AAAAB5...21S== +tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== +jane@example.net +restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv== +user@example.net +restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5== +user@example.net +.Ed +.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT +The +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts +and +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +files contain host public keys for all known hosts. +The global file should +be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is +maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, +its key is added to the per-user file. +.Pp +Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional), +hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. +The fields are separated by spaces. +.Pp +The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of +.Dq @cert-authority , +to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, +or +.Dq @revoked , +to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever +be accepted. +Only one marker should be used on a key line. +.Pp +Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns +.Pf ( Ql * +and +.Ql \&? +act as +wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. +When +.Nm sshd +is authenticating a client, such as when using +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication , +this will be the canonical client host name. +When +.Xr ssh 1 +is authenticating a server, this will be the host name +given by the user, the value of the +.Xr ssh 1 +.Cm HostkeyAlias +if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the +.Xr ssh 1 +.Cm CanonicalizeHostname +option was used. +.Pp +A pattern may also be preceded by +.Ql \&! +to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated +pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another +pattern on the line. +A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within +.Ql \&[ +and +.Ql \&] +brackets then followed by +.Ql \&: +and a non-standard port number. +.Pp +Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names +and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. +Hashed hostnames start with a +.Ql | +character. +Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above +negation or wildcard operators may be applied. +.Pp +The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they +can be obtained, for example, from +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub . +The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. +.Pp +Lines starting with +.Ql # +and empty lines are ignored as comments. +.Pp +When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any +matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, +if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key +of the certification authority that signed the certificate. +For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the +.Dq @cert-authority +marker described above. +.Pp +The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, +for example when it is known that the associated private key has been +stolen. +Revoked keys are specified by including the +.Dq @revoked +marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for +authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will +produce a warning from +.Xr ssh 1 +when they are encountered. +.Pp +It is permissible (but not +recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same +names. +This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names +from different domains are put in the file. +It is possible +that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is +accepted if valid information can be found from either file. +.Pp +Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters +long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. +Rather, generate them by a script, +.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 +or by taking, for example, +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub +and adding the host names at the front. +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +also offers some basic automated editing for +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host +names to their hashed representations. +.Pp +An example ssh_known_hosts file: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +# Comments allowed at start of line +closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net +cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= +# A hashed hostname +|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa +AAAA1234.....= +# A revoked key +@revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... +# A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org +@cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... +.Ed +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.It Pa ~/.hushlogin +This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and +.Pa /etc/motd , +if +.Cm PrintLastLog +and +.Cm PrintMotd , +respectively, +are enabled. +It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by +.Cm Banner . +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.rhosts +This file is used for host-based authentication (see +.Xr ssh 1 +for more information). +On some machines this file may need to be +world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, +because +.Nm +reads it as root. +Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, +and must not have write permissions for anyone else. +The recommended +permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not +accessible by others. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.shosts +This file is used in exactly the same way as +.Pa .rhosts , +but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with +rlogin/rsh. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/ +This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration +and authentication information. +There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory +secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, +and not accessible by others. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) +that can be used for logging in as this user. +The format of this file is described above. +The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended +permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. +.Pp +If this file, the +.Pa ~/.ssh +directory, or the user's home directory are writable +by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized +users. +In this case, +.Nm +will not allow it to be used unless the +.Cm StrictModes +option has been set to +.Dq no . +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment +This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). +It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with +.Ql # ) , +and assignment lines of the form name=value. +The file should be writable +only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. +Environment processing is disabled by default and is +controlled via the +.Cm PermitUserEnvironment +option. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into +that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. +The format of this file is described above. +This file should be writable only by root/the owner and +can, but need not be, world-readable. +.Pp +.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc +Contains initialization routines to be run before +the user's home directory becomes accessible. +This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be +readable by anyone else. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +This file is for host-based authentication (see +.Xr ssh 1 ) . +It should only be writable by root. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/moduli +Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange" +key exchange method. +The file format is described in +.Xr moduli 5 . +If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will +be used. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/motd +See +.Xr motd 5 . +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/nologin +If this file exists, +.Nm +refuses to let anyone except root log in. +The contents of the file +are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are +refused. +The file should be world-readable. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv +This file is used in exactly the same way as +.Pa hosts.equiv , +but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with +rlogin/rsh. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +These files contain the private parts of the host keys. +These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not +accessible to others. +Note that +.Nm +does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub +These files contain the public parts of the host keys. +These files should be world-readable but writable only by +root. +Their contents should match the respective private parts. +These files are not +really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of +the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. +These files are created using +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts +Systemwide list of known host keys. +This file should be prepared by the +system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the +organization. +The format of this file is described above. +This file should be writable only by root/the owner and +should be world-readable. +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config +Contains configuration data for +.Nm sshd . +The file format and configuration options are described in +.Xr sshd_config 5 . +.Pp +.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc +Similar to +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc , +it can be used to specify +machine-specific login-time initializations globally. +This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. +.Pp +.It Pa /var/empty +.Xr chroot 2 +directory used by +.Nm +during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. +The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root +and not group or world-writable. +.Pp +.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid +Contains the process ID of the +.Nm +listening for connections (if there are several daemons running +concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one +started last). +The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr scp 1 , +.Xr sftp 1 , +.Xr ssh 1 , +.Xr ssh-add 1 , +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 , +.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , +.Xr chroot 2 , +.Xr login.conf 5 , +.Xr moduli 5 , +.Xr sshd_config 5 , +.Xr inetd 8 , +.Xr sftp-server 8 +.Sh AUTHORS +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. +Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, +Theo de Raadt and Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH +protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. +Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support +for privilege separation. diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba26287 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshd.c @@ -0,0 +1,2353 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.516 2018/09/21 12:23:17 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, + * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards + * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted + * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and + * authentication agent connections. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * SSH2 implementation: + * Privilege Separation: + * + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H +# include +#endif +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +#include +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "servconf.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "myproposal.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "canohost.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "msg.h" +#include "dispatch.h" +#include "channels.h" +#include "session.h" +#include "monitor.h" +#ifdef GSSAPI +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#endif +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "auth-options.h" +#include "version.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +/* Re-exec fds */ +#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) +#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2) +#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3) +#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4) + +extern char *__progname; + +/* Server configuration options. */ +ServerOptions options; + +/* Name of the server configuration file. */ +char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; + +/* + * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug + * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system + * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing + * the first connection. + */ +int debug_flag = 0; + +/* + * Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. + * If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective + * configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the + * "-C" flag. + */ +int test_flag = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ +int inetd_flag = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ +int no_daemon_flag = 0; + +/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ +int log_stderr = 0; + +/* Saved arguments to main(). */ +char **saved_argv; +int saved_argc; + +/* re-exec */ +int rexeced_flag = 0; +int rexec_flag = 1; +int rexec_argc = 0; +char **rexec_argv; + +/* + * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP + * signal handler. + */ +#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 +int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; +int num_listen_socks = 0; + +/* + * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, + * sshd will skip the version-number exchange + */ +char *client_version_string = NULL; +char *server_version_string = NULL; + +/* Daemon's agent connection */ +int auth_sock = -1; +int have_agent = 0; + +/* + * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this + * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so + * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some + * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) + * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is + * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. + */ +struct { + struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ + struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ + struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ + int have_ssh2_key; +} sensitive_data; + +/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ +static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; +static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; + +/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ +u_char session_id[16]; + +/* same for ssh2 */ +u_char *session_id2 = NULL; +u_int session_id2_len = 0; + +/* record remote hostname or ip */ +u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1; + +/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ +int *startup_pipes = NULL; +int startup_pipe; /* in child */ + +/* variables used for privilege separation */ +int use_privsep = -1; +struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL; +int privsep_is_preauth = 1; +static int privsep_chroot = 1; + +/* global authentication context */ +Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL; + +/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ +struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL; + +/* sshd_config buffer */ +struct sshbuf *cfg; + +/* message to be displayed after login */ +struct sshbuf *loginmsg; + +/* Unprivileged user */ +struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; + +/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ +void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +void demote_sensitive_data(void); +static void do_ssh2_kex(void); + +/* + * Close all listening sockets + */ +static void +close_listen_socks(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) + close(listen_socks[i]); + num_listen_socks = -1; +} + +static void +close_startup_pipes(void) +{ + int i; + + if (startup_pipes) + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) + if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) + close(startup_pipes[i]); +} + +/* + * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; + * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate + * the server key). + */ + +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +sighup_handler(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + + received_sighup = 1; + errno = save_errno; +} + +/* + * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. + * Restarts the server. + */ +static void +sighup_restart(void) +{ + logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); + if (options.pid_file != NULL) + unlink(options.pid_file); + platform_pre_restart(); + close_listen_socks(); + close_startup_pipes(); + alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */ + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */ + execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); + logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], + strerror(errno)); + exit(1); +} + +/* + * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +sigterm_handler(int sig) +{ + received_sigterm = sig; +} + +/* + * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then + * reap any zombies left by exited children. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +main_sigchld_handler(int sig) +{ + int save_errno = errno; + pid_t pid; + int status; + + while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || + (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) + ; + errno = save_errno; +} + +/* + * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. + */ +/*ARGSUSED*/ +static void +grace_alarm_handler(int sig) +{ + if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0) + kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM); + + /* + * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized + * keys command helpers. + */ + if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) { + signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN); + kill(0, SIGTERM); + } + + /* Log error and exit. */ + sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ssh_remote_port(active_state)); +} + +static void +sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out) +{ + u_int i; + int remote_major, remote_minor; + char *s; + char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ + char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ + + xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n", + PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, + *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", + options.version_addendum); + + /* Send our protocol version identification. */ + if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string, + strlen(server_version_string)) + != strlen(server_version_string)) { + logit("Could not write ident string to %s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + + /* Read other sides version identification. */ + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { + if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { + logit("Did not receive identification string " + "from %s port %d", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + if (buf[i] == '\r') { + buf[i] = 0; + /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ + if (i == 12 && + strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) + break; + continue; + } + if (buf[i] == '\n') { + buf[i] = 0; + break; + } + } + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; + client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); + + /* + * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept + * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. + */ + if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", + &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { + s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; + (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); + logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' " + "from %s port %d", client_version_string, + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + close(sock_in); + close(sock_out); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", + remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); + + ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); + + if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) { + logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), + client_version_string); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) { + logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), + client_version_string); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { + logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " + "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); + } + + chop(server_version_string); + debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); + + if (remote_major != 2 && + !(remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99)) { + s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; + (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); + close(sock_in); + close(sock_out); + logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s port %d: " + "%.200s vs. %.200s", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), + server_version_string, client_version_string); + cleanup_exit(255); + } +} + +/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ +void +destroy_sensitive_data(void) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + } + if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; + } + } +} + +/* Demote private to public keys for network child */ +void +demote_sensitive_data(void) +{ + struct sshkey *tmp; + u_int i; + int r; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + if ((r = sshkey_from_private( + sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0) + fatal("could not demote host %s key: %s", + sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]), + ssh_err(r)); + sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; + } + /* Certs do not need demotion */ + } +} + +static void +reseed_prngs(void) +{ + u_int32_t rnd[256]; + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + RAND_poll(); +#endif + arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */ + arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */ + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + /* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */ + if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) + fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); +#endif + + explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); +} + +static void +privsep_preauth_child(void) +{ + gid_t gidset[1]; + + /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ + privsep_challenge_enable(); + +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */ + ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); +#endif + + reseed_prngs(); + + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); + + /* Demote the child */ + if (privsep_chroot) { + /* Change our root directory */ + if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) + fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, + strerror(errno)); + if (chdir("/") == -1) + fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Drop our privileges */ + debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid, + (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid); + gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid; + if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0) + fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw); + } +} + +static int +privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + int status, r; + pid_t pid; + struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; + + /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ + pmonitor = monitor_init(); + /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ + pmonitor->m_pkex = &active_state->kex; + + if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) + box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); + pid = fork(); + if (pid == -1) { + fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); + } else if (pid != 0) { + debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); + + pmonitor->m_pid = pid; + if (have_agent) { + r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock); + if (r != 0) { + error("Could not get agent socket: %s", + ssh_err(r)); + have_agent = 0; + } + } + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid); + monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor); + + /* Wait for the child's exit status */ + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + pmonitor->m_pid = -1; + fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } + privsep_is_preauth = 0; + pmonitor->m_pid = -1; + if (WIFEXITED(status)) { + if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) + fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d", + __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); + } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) + fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d", + __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box); + return 1; + } else { + /* child */ + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); + close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); + + /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */ + set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); + + privsep_preauth_child(); + setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_child(box); + + return 0; + } +} + +static void +privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ +#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING + if (1) { +#else + if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) { +#endif + /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ + use_privsep = 0; + goto skip; + } + + /* New socket pair */ + monitor_reinit(pmonitor); + + pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); + if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) + fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); + else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { + verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); + sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); + monitor_clear_keystate(pmonitor); + monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); + + /* NEVERREACHED */ + exit(0); + } + + /* child */ + + close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); + pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; + + /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ + demote_sensitive_data(); + + reseed_prngs(); + + /* Drop privileges */ + do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); + + skip: + /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ + monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); + + /* + * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since + * this information is not part of the key state. + */ + packet_set_authenticated(); +} + +static void +append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s) +{ + int r; + + if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) { + debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", + __func__, s); + return; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +} + +static char * +list_hostkey_types(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + struct sshkey *key; + char *ret; + u_int i; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; + if (key == NULL) + key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; + if (key == NULL) + continue; + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */ + append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512"); + append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256"); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_XMSS: + append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + break; + } + /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */ + key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; + if (key == NULL) + continue; + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + /* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */ + append_hostkey_type(b, + "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"); + append_hostkey_type(b, + "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); + break; + } + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); + sshbuf_free(b); + debug("%s: %s", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} + +static struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + struct sshkey *key; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + switch (type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; + break; + default: + key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; + if (key == NULL && !need_private) + key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; + break; + } + if (key != NULL && key->type == type && + (key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa_nid == nid)) + return need_private ? + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key; + } + return NULL; +} + +struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh); +} + +struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh); +} + +struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) +{ + if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files) + return (NULL); + return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); +} + +struct sshkey * +get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files) + return (NULL); + return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]); +} + +int +get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] || + (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] && + sshkey_equal(key, + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]))) + return (i); + } else { + if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] || + (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] && + sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))) + return (i); + if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] || + (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] && + sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]))) + return (i); + } + } + return (-1); +} + +/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */ +static void +notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + struct sshbuf *buf; + struct sshkey *key; + u_int i, nkeys; + int r; + char *fp; + + /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */ + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS) + return; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); + for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh); + if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC || + sshkey_is_cert(key)) + continue; + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i, + sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp); + free(fp); + if (nkeys == 0) { + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring("hostkeys-00@openssh.com"); + packet_put_char(0); /* want-reply */ + } + sshbuf_reset(buf); + if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s", + __func__, i, ssh_err(r)); + packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + nkeys++; + } + debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys); + if (nkeys == 0) + fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__); + packet_send(); + sshbuf_free(buf); +} + +/* + * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. + * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability + * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until + * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups + */ +static int +drop_connection(int startups) +{ + int p, r; + + if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) + return 0; + if (startups >= options.max_startups) + return 1; + if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) + return 1; + + p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; + p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; + p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; + p += options.max_startups_rate; + r = arc4random_uniform(100); + + debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r); + return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", + SSH_RELEASE, +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) +#else + "without OpenSSL" +#endif + ); + fprintf(stderr, +"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n" +" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n" +" [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n" + ); + exit(1); +} + +static void +send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + int r; + + debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd, + sshbuf_len(conf)); + + /* + * Protocol from reexec master to child: + * string configuration + * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded) + */ + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY) + rexec_send_rng_seed(m); +#endif + + if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1) + fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__); + + sshbuf_free(m); + + debug3("%s: done", __func__); +} + +static void +recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf) +{ + struct sshbuf *m; + u_char *cp, ver; + size_t len; + int r; + + debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd); + + if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1) + fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (ver != 0) + fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len))) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY) + rexec_recv_rng_seed(m); +#endif + + free(cp); + sshbuf_free(m); + + debug3("%s: done", __func__); +} + +/* Accept a connection from inetd */ +static void +server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out) +{ + int fd; + + startup_pipe = -1; + if (rexeced_flag) { + close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); + *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + if (!debug_flag) { + startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + } + } else { + *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); + } + /* + * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 + * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if + * ttyfd happens to be one of those. + */ + if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { + dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); + if (!log_stderr) + dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); + if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO)) + close(fd); + } + debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out); +} + +/* + * Listen for TCP connections + */ +static void +listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la) +{ + int ret, listen_sock; + struct addrinfo *ai; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + + for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { + if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + continue; + if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) + fatal("Too many listen sockets. " + "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); + if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { + error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", + ssh_gai_strerror(ret)); + continue; + } + /* Create socket for listening. */ + listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, + ai->ai_protocol); + if (listen_sock < 0) { + /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ + verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + continue; + } + if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) { + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) { + verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno)); + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + /* Socket options */ + set_reuseaddr(listen_sock); + if (la->rdomain != NULL && + set_rdomain(listen_sock, la->rdomain) == -1) { + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + + /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */ + if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) + sock_set_v6only(listen_sock); + + debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); + + /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ + if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { + error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", + strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); + close(listen_sock); + continue; + } + listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; + num_listen_socks++; + + /* Start listening on the port. */ + if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) + fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s", + ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); + logit("Server listening on %s port %s%s%s.", + ntop, strport, + la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ", + la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain); + } +} + +static void +server_listen(void) +{ + u_int i; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_listen_addrs; i++) { + listen_on_addrs(&options.listen_addrs[i]); + freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs[i].addrs); + free(options.listen_addrs[i].rdomain); + memset(&options.listen_addrs[i], 0, + sizeof(options.listen_addrs[i])); + } + free(options.listen_addrs); + options.listen_addrs = NULL; + options.num_listen_addrs = 0; + + if (!num_listen_socks) + fatal("Cannot bind any address."); +} + +/* + * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns + * from this function are in a forked subprocess. + */ +static void +server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) +{ + fd_set *fdset; + int i, j, ret, maxfd; + int startups = 0; + int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }; + struct sockaddr_storage from; + socklen_t fromlen; + pid_t pid; + u_char rnd[256]; + + /* setup fd set for accept */ + fdset = NULL; + maxfd = 0; + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) + if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) + maxfd = listen_socks[i]; + /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ + startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) + startup_pipes[i] = -1; + + /* + * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or + * the daemon is killed with a signal. + */ + for (;;) { + if (received_sighup) + sighup_restart(); + free(fdset); + fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS), + sizeof(fd_mask)); + + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) + FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) + if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) + FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); + + /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ + ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) + error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (received_sigterm) { + logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", + (int) received_sigterm); + close_listen_socks(); + if (options.pid_file != NULL) + unlink(options.pid_file); + exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); + } + if (ret < 0) + continue; + + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) + if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && + FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { + /* + * the read end of the pipe is ready + * if the child has closed the pipe + * after successful authentication + * or if the child has died + */ + close(startup_pipes[i]); + startup_pipes[i] = -1; + startups--; + } + for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { + if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) + continue; + fromlen = sizeof(from); + *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], + (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); + if (*newsock < 0) { + if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && + errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN) + error("accept: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) + usleep(100 * 1000); + continue; + } + if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) { + close(*newsock); + continue; + } + if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { + char *laddr = get_local_ipaddr(*newsock); + char *raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(*newsock); + + verbose("drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d " + "on [%s]:%d past MaxStartups", startups, + raddr, get_peer_port(*newsock), + laddr, get_local_port(*newsock)); + free(laddr); + free(raddr); + close(*newsock); + continue; + } + if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { + close(*newsock); + continue; + } + + if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX, + SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) { + error("reexec socketpair: %s", + strerror(errno)); + close(*newsock); + close(startup_p[0]); + close(startup_p[1]); + continue; + } + + for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) + if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { + startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; + if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) + maxfd = startup_p[0]; + startups++; + break; + } + + /* + * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless + * we are in debugging mode. + */ + if (debug_flag) { + /* + * In debugging mode. Close the listening + * socket, and start processing the + * connection without forking. + */ + debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); + close_listen_socks(); + *sock_in = *newsock; + *sock_out = *newsock; + close(startup_p[0]); + close(startup_p[1]); + startup_pipe = -1; + pid = getpid(); + if (rexec_flag) { + send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg); + close(config_s[0]); + } + break; + } + + /* + * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have + * the child process the connection. The + * parent continues listening. + */ + platform_pre_fork(); + if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { + /* + * Child. Close the listening and + * max_startup sockets. Start using + * the accepted socket. Reinitialize + * logging (since our pid has changed). + * We break out of the loop to handle + * the connection. + */ + platform_post_fork_child(); + startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; + close_startup_pipes(); + close_listen_socks(); + *sock_in = *newsock; + *sock_out = *newsock; + log_init(__progname, + options.log_level, + options.log_facility, + log_stderr); + if (rexec_flag) + close(config_s[0]); + break; + } + + /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ + platform_post_fork_parent(pid); + if (pid < 0) + error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + else + debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid); + + close(startup_p[1]); + + if (rexec_flag) { + send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg); + close(config_s[0]); + close(config_s[1]); + } + close(*newsock); + + /* + * Ensure that our random state differs + * from that of the child + */ + arc4random_stir(); + arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1) + fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__); +#endif + explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); + } + + /* child process check (or debug mode) */ + if (num_listen_socks < 0) + break; + } +} + +/* + * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and + * return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about + * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody + * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable" + * under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless + * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped + * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do + * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we + * exit here if we detect any IP options. + */ +static void +check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh) +{ +#ifdef IP_OPTIONS + int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); + struct sockaddr_storage from; + u_char opts[200]; + socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from); + char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1]; + + memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); + if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, + &fromlen) < 0) + return; + if (from.ss_family != AF_INET) + return; + /* XXX IPv6 options? */ + + if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts, + &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { + text[0] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) + snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, + " %2.2x", opts[i]); + fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text); + } + return; +#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ +} + +/* Set the routing domain for this process */ +static void +set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name) +{ +#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN) + if (name == NULL) + return; /* default */ + + if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) { + /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */ + if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL) + return; + } + /* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */ + return sys_set_process_rdomain(name); +#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) + int rtable, ortable = getrtable(); + const char *errstr; + + if (name == NULL) + return; /* default */ + + if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) { + /* "expands" to routing domain of connection */ + if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL) + return; + } + + rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */ + fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr); + if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0) + fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s", + rtable, strerror(errno)); + debug("%s: set routing domain %d (was %d)", __func__, rtable, ortable); +#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */ + fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform"); +#endif +} + +static void +accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg, + const struct sshkey *key) +{ + static struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx; + u_char *hash; + size_t len; + struct sshbuf *buf; + int r; + + if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start", __func__); + if (key == NULL) { /* finalize */ + /* add server config in case we are using agent for host keys */ + if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(server_cfg), + sshbuf_len(server_cfg)) != 0) + fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__); + len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512); + hash = xmalloc(len); + if (ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, len) != 0) + fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final", __func__); + options.timing_secret = PEEK_U64(hash); + freezero(hash, len); + ssh_digest_free(ctx); + ctx = NULL; + return; + } + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s could not allocate buffer", __func__); + if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, buf)) != 0) + fatal("sshkey_private_serialize: %s", ssh_err(r)); + if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__); + sshbuf_reset(buf); + sshbuf_free(buf); +} + +/* + * Main program for the daemon. + */ +int +main(int ac, char **av) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = NULL; + extern char *optarg; + extern int optind; + int r, opt, on = 1, already_daemon, remote_port; + int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; + const char *remote_ip, *rdomain; + char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL; + int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; + u_int i, j; + u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; + mode_t new_umask; + struct sshkey *key; + struct sshkey *pubkey; + int keytype; + Authctxt *authctxt; + struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL; + + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ + +#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE + (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); +#endif + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); + + /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ + saved_argc = ac; + rexec_argc = ac; + saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv)); + for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++) + saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); + saved_argv[i] = NULL; + +#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE + /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ + compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); + av = saved_argv; +#endif + + if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1) + debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ + initialize_server_options(&options); + + /* Parse command-line arguments. */ + while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, + "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case '4': + options.address_family = AF_INET; + break; + case '6': + options.address_family = AF_INET6; + break; + case 'f': + config_file_name = optarg; + break; + case 'c': + servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0, + &options, optarg); + break; + case 'd': + if (debug_flag == 0) { + debug_flag = 1; + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) + options.log_level++; + break; + case 'D': + no_daemon_flag = 1; + break; + case 'E': + logfile = optarg; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 'e': + log_stderr = 1; + break; + case 'i': + inetd_flag = 1; + break; + case 'r': + rexec_flag = 0; + break; + case 'R': + rexeced_flag = 1; + inetd_flag = 1; + break; + case 'Q': + /* ignored */ + break; + case 'q': + options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; + break; + case 'b': + /* protocol 1, ignored */ + break; + case 'p': + options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; + if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { + fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); + exit(1); + } + options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); + if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'g': + if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'k': + /* protocol 1, ignored */ + break; + case 'h': + servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0, + &options, optarg); + break; + case 't': + test_flag = 1; + break; + case 'T': + test_flag = 2; + break; + case 'C': + connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0); + if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info, + optarg) == -1) + exit(1); + break; + case 'u': + utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL); + if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) { + fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n"); + exit(1); + } + break; + case 'o': + line = xstrdup(optarg); + if (process_server_config_line(&options, line, + "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0) + exit(1); + free(line); + break; + case '?': + default: + usage(); + break; + } + } + if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) + rexec_flag = 0; + if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))) + fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); + if (rexeced_flag) + closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); + else + closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +#endif + + /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ + if (logfile != NULL) + log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); + /* + * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host + * key (unless started from inetd) + */ + log_init(__progname, + options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, + options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? + SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, + log_stderr || !inetd_flag); + + /* + * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from + * root's environment + */ + if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL) + (void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME"); + + sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; + + /* + * If we're not doing an extended test do not silently ignore connection + * test params. + */ + if (test_flag < 2 && connection_info != NULL) + fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without " + "test mode (-T)"); + + /* Fetch our configuration */ + if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if (rexeced_flag) + recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg); + else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0) + load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg); + + parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, + cfg, NULL); + + seed_rng(); + + /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ + fill_default_server_options(&options); + + /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */ + if (options.challenge_response_authentication) + options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; + + /* Check that options are sensible */ + if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL && + (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0)) + fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without " + "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser"); + if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL && + (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0)) + fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser"); + + /* + * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods. + * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before + * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches + * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login. + */ + if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) { + if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], + 1) == 0) + break; + } + if (i >= options.num_auth_methods) + fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by " + "enabled authentication methods"); + } + + /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ + if (optind < ac) { + fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); + exit(1); + } + + debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) +#else + "without OpenSSL" +#endif + ); + + /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ + privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0); + if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) { + if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication) + fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); + } else { + privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw); + freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd)); + privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*"); + } + endpwent(); + + /* load host keys */ + sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, + sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, + sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + + if (options.host_key_agent) { + if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) + setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, + options.host_key_agent, 1); + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0) + have_agent = 1; + else + error("Could not connect to agent \"%s\": %s", + options.host_key_agent, ssh_err(r)); + } + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL) + continue; + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", + &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) + error("Error loading host key \"%s\": %s", + options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], + &pubkey, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) + error("Error loading host key \"%s\": %s", + options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r)); + if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0) + fatal("Could not demote key: \"%s\": %s", + options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r)); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; + sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey; + + if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) { + debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s", + options.host_key_files[i]); + keytype = pubkey->type; + } else if (key != NULL) { + keytype = key->type; + accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key); + } else { + error("Could not load host key: %s", + options.host_key_files[i]); + sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL; + continue; + } + + switch (keytype) { + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_XMSS: + if (have_agent || key != NULL) + sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; + break; + } + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s", + key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp); + free(fp); + } + accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL); + if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { + logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); + } + + /* + * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical + * indices to the public keys that they relate to. + */ + sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, + sizeof(struct sshkey *)); + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) + sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) { + if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL) + continue; + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], + &key, NULL)) != 0) { + error("Could not load host certificate \"%s\": %s", + options.host_cert_files[i], ssh_err(r)); + continue; + } + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s", + options.host_cert_files[i]); + sshkey_free(key); + continue; + } + /* Find matching private key */ + for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(key, + sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) { + sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; + break; + } + } + if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) { + error("No matching private key for certificate: %s", + options.host_cert_files[i]); + sshkey_free(key); + continue; + } + sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; + debug("host certificate: #%u type %d %s", j, key->type, + sshkey_type(key)); + } + + if (privsep_chroot) { + struct stat st; + + if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) || + (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0)) + fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s", + _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); + +#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) && + (st.st_uid != getuid () || + (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)) +#else + if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0) +#endif + fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or " + "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); + } + + if (test_flag > 1) { + /* + * If no connection info was provided by -C then use + * use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match. + */ + if (connection_info == NULL) + connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0); + parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info); + dump_config(&options); + } + + /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ + if (test_flag) + exit(0); + + /* + * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This + * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the + * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM + * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every + * module which might be used). + */ + if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) + debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + if (rexec_flag) { + if (rexec_argc < 0) + fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc); + rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *)); + for (i = 0; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) { + debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]); + rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i]; + } + rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R"; + rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; + } + + /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ + new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; + (void) umask(new_umask); + + /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ + if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) + log_stderr = 1; + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + + /* + * If not in debugging mode, not started from inetd and not already + * daemonized (eg re-exec via SIGHUP), disconnect from the controlling + * terminal, and fork. The original process exits. + */ + already_daemon = daemonized(); + if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag || already_daemon)) { + + if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) + fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); + + disconnect_controlling_tty(); + } + /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); + + /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be + unmounted if desired. */ + if (chdir("/") == -1) + error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); + + /* ignore SIGPIPE */ + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + + /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ + if (inetd_flag) { + server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); + } else { + platform_pre_listen(); + server_listen(); + + signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); + signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); + signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); + signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); + + /* + * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler + * is setup and the listen sockets are bound + */ + if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) { + FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w"); + + if (f == NULL) { + error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", + options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); + } else { + fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); + fclose(f); + } + } + + /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ + server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, + &newsock, config_s); + } + + /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ + setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]"); + + /* + * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD + * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't + * want the child to be able to affect the parent. + */ +#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY) + /* + * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a + * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set + * controlling tty" errors. + */ + if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0) + error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#endif + + if (rexec_flag) { + int fd; + + debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", + sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); + dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); + if (startup_pipe == -1) + close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) { + dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + close(startup_pipe); + startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD; + } + + dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); + close(config_s[1]); + + execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv); + + /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */ + error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno)); + recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL); + log_init(__progname, options.log_level, + options.log_facility, log_stderr); + + /* Clean up fds */ + close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); + newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); + if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { + dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); + dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); + if (fd > STDERR_FILENO) + close(fd); + } + debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", + sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); + } + + /* Executed child processes don't need these. */ + fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); + + /* + * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the + * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We + * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. + */ + alarm(0); + signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); + + /* + * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do + * not have a key. + */ + packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); + packet_set_server(); + ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + + check_ip_options(ssh); + + /* Prepare the channels layer */ + channel_init_channels(ssh); + channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family); + process_permitopen(ssh, &options); + + /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ + if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() && + setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) + error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) { + debug("ssh_remote_port failed"); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + + if (options.routing_domain != NULL) + set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain); + + /* + * The rest of the code depends on the fact that + * ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if + * the socket goes away. + */ + remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); +#endif + + rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh); + + /* Log the connection. */ + laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in); + verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s", + remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh), + rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"", + rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain, + rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\""); + free(laddr); + + /* + * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side + * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is + * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero + * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging + * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you + * are about to discover the bug. + */ + signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); + if (!debug_flag) + alarm(options.login_grace_time); + + sshd_exchange_identification(ssh, sock_in, sock_out); + packet_set_nonblocking(); + + /* allocate authentication context */ + authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt)); + + authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg; + + /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */ + the_authctxt = authctxt; + + /* Set default key authentication options */ + if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL) + fatal("allocation failed"); + + /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */ + if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + auth_debug_reset(); + + if (use_privsep) { + if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1) + goto authenticated; + } else if (have_agent) { + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { + error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); + have_agent = 0; + } + } + + /* perform the key exchange */ + /* authenticate user and start session */ + do_ssh2_kex(); + do_authentication2(authctxt); + + /* + * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers + * the current keystate and exits + */ + if (use_privsep) { + mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); + packet_clear_keys(); + exit(0); + } + + authenticated: + /* + * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for + * authentication. + */ + alarm(0); + signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); + authctxt->authenticated = 1; + if (startup_pipe != -1) { + close(startup_pipe); + startup_pipe = -1; + } + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); +#endif + +#ifdef GSSAPI + if (options.gss_authentication) { + temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); + ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); + restore_uid(); + } +#endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { + do_pam_setcred(1); + do_pam_session(ssh); + } +#endif + + /* + * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare + * file descriptor passing. + */ + if (use_privsep) { + privsep_postauth(authctxt); + /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ + } + + packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, + options.client_alive_count_max); + + /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */ + notify_hostkeys(ssh); + + /* Start session. */ + do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); + + /* The connection has been terminated. */ + packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); + verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", + (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); + + verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) + finish_pam(); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE)); +#endif + + packet_close(); + + if (use_privsep) + mm_terminate(); + + exit(0); +} + +int +sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey, + u_char **signature, size_t *slenp, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, + const char *alg, u_int flag) +{ + int r; + + if (privkey) { + if (PRIVSEP(sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, + alg, datafellows)) < 0) + fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__); + } else if (use_privsep) { + if (mm_sshkey_sign(pubkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, + alg, datafellows) < 0) + fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__); + } else { + if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slenp, + data, dlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) + fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + return 0; +} + +/* SSH2 key exchange */ +static void +do_ssh2_kex(void) +{ + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; + struct kex *kex; + int r; + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( + options.kex_algorithms); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal( + options.ciphers); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal( + options.ciphers); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; + + if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; + } + + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) + packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit, + options.rekey_interval); + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( + list_hostkey_types()); + + /* start key exchange */ + if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); + kex = active_state->kex; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; +# endif +#endif + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; + kex->server = 1; + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; + kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; + kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; + kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; + + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); + + session_id2 = kex->session_id; + session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; + +#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH + /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); + packet_put_cstring("markus"); + packet_send(); + packet_write_wait(); +#endif + debug("KEX done"); +} + +/* server specific fatal cleanup */ +void +cleanup_exit(int i) +{ + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + + if (the_authctxt) { + do_cleanup(ssh, the_authctxt); + if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && + pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { + debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); + if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 && + errno != ESRCH) + error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__, + pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); + } + } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ + if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) + audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); +#endif + _exit(i); +} diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config new file mode 100644 index 0000000..19b7c91 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshd_config @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.103 2018/04/09 20:41:22 tj Exp $ + +# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See +# sshd_config(5) for more information. + +# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin + +# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with +# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where +# possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the +# default value. + +#Port 22 +#AddressFamily any +#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 +#ListenAddress :: + +#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key + +# Ciphers and keying +#RekeyLimit default none + +# Logging +#SyslogFacility AUTH +#LogLevel INFO + +# Authentication: + +#LoginGraceTime 2m +#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password +#StrictModes yes +#MaxAuthTries 6 +#MaxSessions 10 + +#PubkeyAuthentication yes + +# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2 +# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys +AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys + +#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none + +#AuthorizedKeysCommand none +#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody + +# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts +#HostbasedAuthentication no +# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for +# HostbasedAuthentication +#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no +# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files +#IgnoreRhosts yes + +# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! +#PasswordAuthentication yes +#PermitEmptyPasswords no + +# Change to no to disable s/key passwords +#ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes + +# Kerberos options +#KerberosAuthentication no +#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes +#KerberosTicketCleanup yes +#KerberosGetAFSToken no + +# GSSAPI options +#GSSAPIAuthentication no +#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + +# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, +# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +# be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and +# PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, +# PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass +# the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password". +# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without +# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication +# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. +#UsePAM no + +#AllowAgentForwarding yes +#AllowTcpForwarding yes +#GatewayPorts no +#X11Forwarding no +#X11DisplayOffset 10 +#X11UseLocalhost yes +#PermitTTY yes +#PrintMotd yes +#PrintLastLog yes +#TCPKeepAlive yes +#PermitUserEnvironment no +#Compression delayed +#ClientAliveInterval 0 +#ClientAliveCountMax 3 +#UseDNS no +#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid +#MaxStartups 10:30:100 +#PermitTunnel no +#ChrootDirectory none +#VersionAddendum none + +# no default banner path +#Banner none + +# override default of no subsystems +Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server + +# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis +#Match User anoncvs +# X11Forwarding no +# AllowTcpForwarding no +# PermitTTY no +# ForceCommand cvs server diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af54da6 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshd_config.0 @@ -0,0 +1,1092 @@ +SSHD_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5) + +NAME + sshd_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file + +DESCRIPTION + sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file + specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword- + argument pairs, one per line. For each keyword, the first obtained value + will be used. Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as + comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in + order to represent arguments containing spaces. + + The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that + keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): + + AcceptEnv + Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be + copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv and SetEnv in + ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. The TERM + environment variable is always accepted whenever the client + requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. + Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard + characters M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple environment variables may be + separated by whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv + directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be + used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, + care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default + is not to accept any environment variables. + + AddressFamily + Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8). Valid + arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6 + (use IPv6 only). + + AllowAgentForwarding + Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The + default is yes. Note that disabling agent forwarding does not + improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as + they can always install their own forwarders. + + AllowGroups + This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, + separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for + users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one + of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group + ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all + groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following + order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally + AllowGroups. + + See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. + + AllowStreamLocalForwarding + Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is + permitted. The available options are yes (the default) or all to + allow StreamLocal forwarding, no to prevent all StreamLocal + forwarding, local to allow local (from the perspective of ssh(1)) + forwarding only or remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note + that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security + unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always + install their own forwarders. + + AllowTcpForwarding + Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available + options are yes (the default) or all to allow TCP forwarding, no + to prevent all TCP forwarding, local to allow local (from the + perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or remote to allow remote + forwarding only. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not + improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as + they can always install their own forwarders. + + AllowUsers + This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, + separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for + user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are + valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login + is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form + USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting + logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria + may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR + address/masklen format. The allow/deny directives are processed + in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and + finally AllowGroups. + + See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. + + AuthenticationMethods + Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully + completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be + followed by one or more lists of comma-separated authentication + method names, or by the single string any to indicate the default + behaviour of accepting any single authentication method. If the + default is overridden, then successful authentication requires + completion of every method in at least one of these lists. + + For example, "publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive" + would require the user to complete public key authentication, + followed by either password or keyboard interactive + authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists + are offered at each stage, so for this example it would not be + possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive + authentication before public key. + + For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to + restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon + followed by the device identifier bsdauth or pam. depending on + the server configuration. For example, + "keyboard-interactive:bsdauth" would restrict keyboard + interactive authentication to the bsdauth device. + + If the publickey method is listed more than once, sshd(8) + verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not + reused for subsequent authentications. For example, + "publickey,publickey" requires successful authentication using + two different public keys. + + Note that each authentication method listed should also be + explicitly enabled in the configuration. + + The available authentication methods are: "gssapi-with-mic", + "hostbased", "keyboard-interactive", "none" (used for access to + password-less accounts when PermitEmptyPasswords is enabled), + "password" and "publickey". + + AuthorizedKeysCommand + Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. + The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or + others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to + AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS + section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the + target user is used. + + The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines + of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a + key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully + authenticate and authorize the user then public key + authentication continues using the usual AuthorizedKeysFile + files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. + + AuthorizedKeysCommandUser + Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand + is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no + other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If + AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser + is not, then sshd(8) will refuse to start. + + AuthorizedKeysFile + Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user + authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS + FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8). Arguments to AuthorizedKeysFile + accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. After + expansion, AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or + one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be + listed, separated by whitespace. Alternately this option may be + set to none to skip checking for user keys in files. The default + is ".ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2". + + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed + certificate principals as per AuthorizedPrincipalsFile. The + program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others + and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accept the tokens described in the + TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username + of the target user is used. + + The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines + of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is + specified, then certificates offered by the client for + authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By + default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. + + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser + Specifies the user under whose account the + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a + dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running + authorized principals commands. If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + is specified but AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then + sshd(8) will refuse to start. + + AuthorizedPrincipalsFile + Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for + certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a + key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of + which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for + authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key + options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)). + Empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored. + + Arguments to AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accept the tokens described + in the TOKENS section. After expansion, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile + is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's + home directory. The default is none, i.e. not to use a + principals file M-bM-^@M-^S in this case, the username of the user must + appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. + + Note that AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when + authentication proceeds using a CA listed in TrustedUserCAKeys + and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the principals= key option offers + a similar facility (see sshd(8) for details). + + Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user + before authentication is allowed. If the argument is none then + no banner is displayed. By default, no banner is displayed. + + CASignatureAlgorithms + Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of + certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is: + + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, + ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa + + Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted + for public key or host-based authentication. + + ChallengeResponseAuthentication + Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed + (e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in + login.conf(5)) The default is yes. + + ChrootDirectory + Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after + authentication. At session startup sshd(8) checks that all + components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are + not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, + sshd(8) changes the working directory to the user's home + directory. Arguments to ChrootDirectory accept the tokens + described in the TOKENS section. + + The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and + directories to support the user's session. For an interactive + session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and + basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4), + stderr(4), and tty(4) devices. For file transfer sessions using + SFTP no additional configuration of the environment is necessary + if the in-process sftp-server is used, though sessions which use + logging may require /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some + operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for details). + + For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be + prevented from modification by other processes on the system + (especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead + to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect. + + The default is none, indicating not to chroot(2). + + Ciphers + Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma- + separated. If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, + then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set + instead of replacing them. If the specified value begins with a + M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) + will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. + + The supported ciphers are: + + 3des-cbc + aes128-cbc + aes192-cbc + aes256-cbc + aes128-ctr + aes192-ctr + aes256-ctr + aes128-gcm@openssh.com + aes256-gcm@openssh.com + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com + + The default is: + + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, + aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, + aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com + + The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q + cipher". + + ClientAliveCountMax + Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent + without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client. If + this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being + sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. + It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is + very different from TCPKeepAlive. The client alive messages are + sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be + spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is + spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the + client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become + inactive. + + The default value is 3. If ClientAliveInterval is set to 15, and + ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH + clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. + + ClientAliveInterval + Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has + been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message + through the encrypted channel to request a response from the + client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will + not be sent to the client. + + Compression + Specifies whether compression is enabled after the user has + authenticated successfully. The argument must be yes, delayed (a + legacy synonym for yes) or no. The default is yes. + + DenyGroups + This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, + separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary + group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. + Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not + recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The + allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: + DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. + + See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. + + DenyUsers + This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, + separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that + match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a + numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is + allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST + then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to + particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may + additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen + format. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following + order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally + AllowGroups. + + See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. + + DisableForwarding + Disables all forwarding features, including X11, ssh-agent(1), + TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding- + related options and may simplify restricted configurations. + + ExposeAuthInfo + Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication + methods and public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate + the user. The location of the file is exposed to the user + session through the SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable. The + default is no. + + FingerprintHash + Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. + Valid options are: md5 and sha256. The default is sha256. + + ForceCommand + Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand, + ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if + present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell + with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem + execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command + originally supplied by the client is available in the + SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command + of internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process SFTP server + that requires no support files when used with ChrootDirectory. + The default is none. + + GatewayPorts + Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports + forwarded for the client. By default, sshd(8) binds remote port + forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote + hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be + used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to + bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to + connect. The argument may be no to force remote port forwardings + to be available to the local host only, yes to force remote port + forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or clientspecified + to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding + is bound. The default is no. + + GSSAPIAuthentication + Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. + The default is no. + + GSSAPICleanupCredentials + Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials + cache on logout. The default is yes. + + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck + Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI + acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to yes then the + client must authenticate against the host service on the current + hostname. If set to no then the client may authenticate against + any service key stored in the machine's default store. This + facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed + machines. The default is yes. + + HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes + Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased + authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. + Alternately if the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, + then the specified key types will be appended to the default set + instead of replacing them. If the specified value begins with a + M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) + will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. + The default for this option is: + + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, + rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, + ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa + + The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh + -Q key". + + HostbasedAuthentication + Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication + together with successful public key client host authentication is + allowed (host-based authentication). The default is no. + + HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly + Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a + reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts, + ~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during + HostbasedAuthentication. A setting of yes means that sshd(8) + uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to + resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is + no. + + HostCertificate + Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The + certificate's public key must match a private host key already + specified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to + load any certificates. + + HostKey + Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The + defaults are /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key. + + Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file if it is group/world- + accessible and that the HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which + of the keys are actually used by sshd(8). + + It is possible to have multiple host key files. It is also + possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case + operations on the private key will be delegated to an + ssh-agent(1). + + HostKeyAgent + Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an + agent that has access to the private host keys. If the string + "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket will be + read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. + + HostKeyAlgorithms + Specifies the host key algorithms that the server offers. The + default for this option is: + + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, + rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, + ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa + + The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh + -Q key". + + IgnoreRhosts + Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in + HostbasedAuthentication. + + /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The + default is yes. + + IgnoreUserKnownHosts + Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's + ~/.ssh/known_hosts during HostbasedAuthentication and use only + the system-wide known hosts file /etc/ssh/known_hosts. The + default is no. + + IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the + connection. Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22, + af23, af31, af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3, + cs4, cs5, cs6, cs7, ef, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a + numeric value, or none to use the operating system default. This + option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. + If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class + unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is + automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second + for non-interactive sessions. The default is af21 (Low-Latency + Data) for interactive sessions and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non- + interactive sessions. + + KbdInteractiveAuthentication + Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. + The argument to this keyword must be yes or no. The default is + to use whatever value ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to + (by default yes). + + KerberosAuthentication + Specifies whether the password provided by the user for + PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos + KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab + which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default + is no. + + KerberosGetAFSToken + If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to + acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. + The default is no. + + KerberosOrLocalPasswd + If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the + password will be validated via any additional local mechanism + such as /etc/passwd. The default is yes. + + KerberosTicketCleanup + Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket + cache file on logout. The default is yes. + + KexAlgorithms + Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple + algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified + value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods + will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. + If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the + specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the + default set instead of replacing them. The supported algorithms + are: + + curve25519-sha256 + curve25519-sha256@libssh.org + diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 + diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 + diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 + diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 + diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 + ecdh-sha2-nistp256 + ecdh-sha2-nistp384 + ecdh-sha2-nistp521 + + The default is: + + curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, + ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, + diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, + diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 + + The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be + obtained using "ssh -Q kex". + + ListenAddress + Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The + following forms may be used: + + ListenAddress hostname|address [rdomain domain] + ListenAddress hostname:port [rdomain domain] + ListenAddress IPv4_address:port [rdomain domain] + ListenAddress [hostname|address]:port [rdomain domain] + + The optional rdomain qualifier requests sshd(8) listen in an + explicit routing domain. If port is not specified, sshd will + listen on the address and all Port options specified. The + default is to listen on all local addresses on the current + default routing domain. Multiple ListenAddress options are + permitted. For more information on routing domains, see + rdomain(4). + + LoginGraceTime + The server disconnects after this time if the user has not + successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time + limit. The default is 120 seconds. + + LogLevel + Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from + sshd(8). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, + VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. + DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify + higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level + violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. + + MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) + algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity + protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the + specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified + algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of + replacing them. If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y + character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) + will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. + + The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after + encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and + their use recommended. The supported MACs are: + + hmac-md5 + hmac-md5-96 + hmac-sha1 + hmac-sha1-96 + hmac-sha2-256 + hmac-sha2-512 + umac-64@openssh.com + umac-128@openssh.com + hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com + hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com + umac-64-etm@openssh.com + umac-128-etm@openssh.com + + The default is: + + umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, + hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, + hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, + umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, + hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 + + The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using + "ssh -Q mac". + + Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the + Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines + override those set in the global section of the config file, + until either another Match line or the end of the file. If a + keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisfied, only + the first instance of the keyword is applied. + + The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or + the single token All which matches all criteria. The available + criteria are User, Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, RDomain, + and Address (with RDomain representing the rdomain(4) on which + the connection was received.) + + The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma- + separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators + described in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5). + + The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain + addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, such as + 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32. Note that the mask length + provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to + specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one + with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, + 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively. + + Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a + Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv, + AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowStreamLocalForwarding, + AllowTcpForwarding, AllowUsers, AuthenticationMethods, + AuthorizedKeysCommand, AuthorizedKeysCommandUser, + AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, + Banner, ChrootDirectory, ClientAliveCountMax, + ClientAliveInterval, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand, + GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, + HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, IPQoS, + KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, LogLevel, + MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication, + PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitListen, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, + PermitTTY, PermitTunnel, PermitUserRC, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, + PubkeyAuthentication, RekeyLimit, RevokedKeys, RDomain, SetEnv, + StreamLocalBindMask, StreamLocalBindUnlink, TrustedUserCAKeys, + X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost. + + MaxAuthTries + Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted + per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this + value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. + + MaxSessions + Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem + (e.g. sftp) sessions permitted per network connection. Multiple + sessions may be established by clients that support connection + multiplexing. Setting MaxSessions to 1 will effectively disable + session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 will prevent all + shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting + forwarding. The default is 10. + + MaxStartups + Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated + connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be + dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime + expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. + + Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the + three colon separated values start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60"). + sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a probability of + rate/100 (30%) if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated + connections. The probability increases linearly and all + connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated + connections reaches full (60). + + PasswordAuthentication + Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The + default is yes. + + PermitEmptyPasswords + When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the + server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The + default is no. + + PermitListen + Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port + forwarding may listen. The listen specification must be one of + the following forms: + + PermitListen port + PermitListen host:port + + Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with + whitespace. An argument of any can be used to remove all + restrictions and permit any listen requests. An argument of none + can be used to prohibit all listen requests. The host name may + contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in + ssh_config(5). The wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can also be used in place of a + port number to allow all ports. By default all port forwarding + listen requests are permitted. Note that the GatewayPorts option + may further restrict which addresses may be listened on. Note + also that ssh(1) will request a listen host of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if no + listen host was specifically requested, and this this name is + treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of + M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^]. + + PermitOpen + Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is + permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the + following forms: + + PermitOpen host:port + PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port + PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port + + Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with + whitespace. An argument of any can be used to remove all + restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of + none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The + wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or + ports, respectively. By default all port forwarding requests are + permitted. + + PermitRootLogin + Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument + must be yes, prohibit-password, forced-commands-only, or no. The + default is prohibit-password. + + If this option is set to prohibit-password (or its deprecated + alias, without-password), password and keyboard-interactive + authentication are disabled for root. + + If this option is set to forced-commands-only, root login with + public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the + command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking + remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All + other authentication methods are disabled for root. + + If this option is set to no, root is not allowed to log in. + + PermitTTY + Specifies whether pty(4) allocation is permitted. The default is + yes. + + PermitTunnel + Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The + argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3), ethernet (layer + 2), or no. Specifying yes permits both point-to-point and + ethernet. The default is no. + + Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected + tun(4) device must allow access to the user. + + PermitUserEnvironment + Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8). Valid options + are yes, no or a pattern-list specifying which environment + variable names to accept (for example "LANG,LC_*"). The default + is no. Enabling environment processing may enable users to + bypass access restrictions in some configurations using + mechanisms such as LD_PRELOAD. + + PermitUserRC + Specifies whether any ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is + yes. + + PidFile + Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH + daemon, or none to not write one. The default is + /var/run/sshd.pid. + + Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default + is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also + ListenAddress. + + PrintLastLog + Specifies whether sshd(8) should print the date and time of the + last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default + is yes. + + PrintMotd + Specifies whether sshd(8) should print /etc/motd when a user logs + in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the + shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.) The default is yes. + + PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes + Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key + authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns. + Alternately if the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, + then the specified key types will be appended to the default set + instead of replacing them. If the specified value begins with a + M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) + will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them. + The default for this option is: + + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, + rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, + ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, + ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa + + The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh + -Q key". + + PubkeyAuthentication + Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The + default is yes. + + RekeyLimit + Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted + before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a + maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is + renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may + have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes, + Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between + M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second + value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units + documented in the TIME FORMATS section. The default value for + RekeyLimit is default none, which means that rekeying is + performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent + or received and no time based rekeying is done. + + RevokedKeys + Specifies revoked public keys file, or none to not use one. Keys + listed in this file will be refused for public key + authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then + public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys + may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, + or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by + ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY + REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). + + RDomain + Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after + authentication has completed. The user session, as well and any + forwarded or listening IP sockets, will be bound to this + rdomain(4). If the routing domain is set to %D, then the domain + in which the incoming connection was received will be applied. + + SetEnv Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child + sessions started by sshd(8) as M-bM-^@M-^\NAME=VALUEM-bM-^@M-^]. The environment + value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace characters). + Environment variables set by SetEnv override the default + environment and any variables specified by the user via AcceptEnv + or PermitUserEnvironment. + + StreamLocalBindMask + Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating + a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. + This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain + socket file. + + The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket + file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that + not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain + socket files. + + StreamLocalBindUnlink + Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file + for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. + If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is + not enabled, sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix- + domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding + to a Unix-domain socket file. + + The argument must be yes or no. The default is no. + + StrictModes + Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership + of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. + This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally + leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is + yes. Note that this does not apply to ChrootDirectory, whose + permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. + + Subsystem + Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). + Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional + arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. + + The command sftp-server implements the SFTP file transfer + subsystem. + + Alternately the name internal-sftp implements an in-process SFTP + server. This may simplify configurations using ChrootDirectory + to force a different filesystem root on clients. + + By default no subsystems are defined. + + SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from + sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, + LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The + default is AUTH. + + TCPKeepAlive + Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages + to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or + crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, + this means that connections will die if the route is down + temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other + hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang + indefinitely on the server, leaving "ghost" users and consuming + server resources. + + The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the + server will notice if the network goes down or the client host + crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. + + To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no. + + TrustedUserCAKeys + Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate + authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for + authentication, or none to not use one. Keys are listed one per + line; empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed. If + a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing + CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for + authentication for any user listed in the certificate's + principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of + principals will not be permitted for authentication using + TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on certificates, see the + CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1). + + UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name, + and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP + address maps back to the very same IP address. + + If this option is set to no (the default) then only addresses and + not host names may be used in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys from and + sshd_config Match Host directives. + + UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to + yes this will enable PAM authentication using + ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in + addition to PAM account and session module processing for all + authentication types. + + Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an + equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable + either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication. + + If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a + non-root user. The default is no. + + VersionAddendum + Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH + protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default + is none. + + X11DisplayOffset + Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11 + forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 + servers. The default is 10. + + X11Forwarding + Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must + be yes or no. The default is no. + + When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure + to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display + is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see + X11UseLocalhost), though this is not the default. Additionally, + the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification + and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of + using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may + be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see + the warnings for ForwardX11 in ssh_config(5)). A system + administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect + clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly + requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a no setting. + + Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from + forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own + forwarders. + + X11UseLocalhost + Specifies whether sshd(8) should bind the X11 forwarding server + to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, + sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets + the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to + localhost. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the + proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function + with this configuration. X11UseLocalhost may be set to no to + specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the + wildcard address. The argument must be yes or no. The default + is yes. + + XAuthLocation + Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program, or none to + not use one. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. + +TIME FORMATS + sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that + specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: + time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is + one of the following: + + M-bM-^_M-(noneM-bM-^_M-) seconds + s | S seconds + m | M minutes + h | H hours + d | D days + w | W weeks + + Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time + value. + + Time format examples: + + 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) + 10m 10 minutes + 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) + +TOKENS + Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at + runtime: + + %% A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y. + %D The routing domain in which the incoming connection was + received. + %F The fingerprint of the CA key. + %f The fingerprint of the key or certificate. + %h The home directory of the user. + %i The key ID in the certificate. + %K The base64-encoded CA key. + %k The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication. + %s The serial number of the certificate. + %T The type of the CA key. + %t The key or certificate type. + %U The numeric user ID of the target user. + %u The username. + + AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u. + + AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. + + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, + %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u. + + AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. + + ChrootDirectory accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. + + RoutingDomain accepts the token %D. + +FILES + /etc/ssh/sshd_config + Contains configuration data for sshd(8). This file should be + writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not + necessary) that it be world-readable. + +SEE ALSO + sftp-server(8), sshd(8) + +AUTHORS + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by + Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo + de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and + created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol + versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support + for privilege separation. + +OpenBSD 6.4 September 20, 2018 OpenBSD 6.4 diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c648437 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -0,0 +1,1822 @@ +.\" +.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen +.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland +.\" All rights reserved +.\" +.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software +.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this +.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is +.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be +.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". +.\" +.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. +.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES +.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. +.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT +.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, +.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY +.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT +.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF +.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.282 2018/09/20 03:28:06 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: September 20 2018 $ +.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm sshd_config +.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file +.Sh DESCRIPTION +.Xr sshd 8 +reads configuration data from +.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config +(or the file specified with +.Fl f +on the command line). +The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. +For each keyword, the first obtained value will be used. +Lines starting with +.Ql # +and empty lines are interpreted as comments. +Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes +.Pq \&" +in order to represent arguments containing spaces. +.Pp +The possible +keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that +keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Cm AcceptEnv +Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into +the session's +.Xr environ 7 . +See +.Cm SendEnv +and +.Cm SetEnv +in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for how to configure the client. +The +.Ev TERM +environment variable is always accepted whenever the client +requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. +Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters +.Ql * +and +.Ql \&? . +Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread +across multiple +.Cm AcceptEnv +directives. +Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted +user environments. +For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive. +The default is not to accept any environment variables. +.It Cm AddressFamily +Specifies which address family should be used by +.Xr sshd 8 . +Valid arguments are +.Cm any +(the default), +.Cm inet +(use IPv4 only), or +.Cm inet6 +(use IPv6 only). +.It Cm AllowAgentForwarding +Specifies whether +.Xr ssh-agent 1 +forwarding is permitted. +The default is +.Cm yes . +Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security +unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install +their own forwarders. +.It Cm AllowGroups +This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated +by spaces. +If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary +group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. +Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. +By default, login is allowed for all groups. +The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: +.Cm DenyUsers , +.Cm AllowUsers , +.Cm DenyGroups , +and finally +.Cm AllowGroups . +.Pp +See PATTERNS in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for more information on patterns. +.It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding +Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted. +The available options are +.Cm yes +(the default) +or +.Cm all +to allow StreamLocal forwarding, +.Cm no +to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding, +.Cm local +to allow local (from the perspective of +.Xr ssh 1 ) +forwarding only or +.Cm remote +to allow remote forwarding only. +Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless +users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their +own forwarders. +.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding +Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. +The available options are +.Cm yes +(the default) +or +.Cm all +to allow TCP forwarding, +.Cm no +to prevent all TCP forwarding, +.Cm local +to allow local (from the perspective of +.Xr ssh 1 ) +forwarding only or +.Cm remote +to allow remote forwarding only. +Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless +users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their +own forwarders. +.It Cm AllowUsers +This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated +by spaces. +If specified, login is allowed only for user names that +match one of the patterns. +Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. +By default, login is allowed for all users. +If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST +are separately checked, restricting logins to particular +users from particular hosts. +HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR +address/masklen format. +The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: +.Cm DenyUsers , +.Cm AllowUsers , +.Cm DenyGroups , +and finally +.Cm AllowGroups . +.Pp +See PATTERNS in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for more information on patterns. +.It Cm AuthenticationMethods +Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed +for a user to be granted access. +This option must be followed by one or more lists of comma-separated +authentication method names, or by the single string +.Cm any +to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication +method. +If the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires +completion of every method in at least one of these lists. +.Pp +For example, +.Qq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive +would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by +either password or keyboard interactive authentication. +Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, +so for this example it would not be possible to attempt password or +keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. +.Pp +For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to +restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a +colon followed by the device identifier +.Cm bsdauth +or +.Cm pam . +depending on the server configuration. +For example, +.Qq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth +would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the +.Cm bsdauth +device. +.Pp +If the publickey method is listed more than once, +.Xr sshd 8 +verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for +subsequent authentications. +For example, +.Qq publickey,publickey +requires successful authentication using two different public keys. +.Pp +Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled +in the configuration. +.Pp +The available authentication methods are: +.Qq gssapi-with-mic , +.Qq hostbased , +.Qq keyboard-interactive , +.Qq none +(used for access to password-less accounts when +.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords +is enabled), +.Qq password +and +.Qq publickey . +.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand +Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. +The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and +specified by an absolute path. +Arguments to +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. +.Pp +The program should produce on standard output zero or +more lines of authorized_keys output (see +.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS +in +.Xr sshd 8 ) . +If a key supplied by +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand +does not successfully authenticate +and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +files. +By default, no +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand +is run. +.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser +Specifies the user under whose account the +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand +is run. +It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host +than running authorized keys commands. +If +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand +is specified but +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser +is not, then +.Xr sshd 8 +will refuse to start. +.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user authentication. +The format is described in the +.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT +section of +.Xr sshd 8 . +Arguments to +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +After expansion, +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home +directory. +Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. +Alternately this option may be set to +.Cm none +to skip checking for user keys in files. +The default is +.Qq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 . +.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed +certificate principals as per +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile . +The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and +specified by an absolute path. +Arguments to +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used. +.Pp +The program should produce on standard output zero or +more lines of +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +output. +If either +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +or +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication +must contain a principal that is listed. +By default, no +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +is run. +.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser +Specifies the user under whose account the +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +is run. +It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host +than running authorized principals commands. +If +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +is specified but +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser +is not, then +.Xr sshd 8 +will refuse to start. +.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for +certificate authentication. +When using certificates signed by a key listed in +.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , +this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it +to be accepted for authentication. +Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in +.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT +in +.Xr sshd 8 ) . +Empty lines and comments starting with +.Ql # +are ignored. +.Pp +Arguments to +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +After expansion, +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. +The default is +.Cm none , +i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username +of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be +accepted. +.Pp +Note that +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in +.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys +and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys , +though the +.Cm principals= +key option offers a similar facility (see +.Xr sshd 8 +for details). +.It Cm Banner +The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before +authentication is allowed. +If the argument is +.Cm none +then no banner is displayed. +By default, no banner is displayed. +.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms +Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates +by certificate authorities (CAs). +The default is: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +.Ed +.Pp +Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for +public key or host-based authentication. +.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication +Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via +PAM or through authentication styles supported in +.Xr login.conf 5 ) +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm ChrootDirectory +Specifies the pathname of a directory to +.Xr chroot 2 +to after authentication. +At session startup +.Xr sshd 8 +checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories +which are not writable by any other user or group. +After the chroot, +.Xr sshd 8 +changes the working directory to the user's home directory. +Arguments to +.Cm ChrootDirectory +accept the tokens described in the +.Sx TOKENS +section. +.Pp +The +.Cm ChrootDirectory +must contain the necessary files and directories to support the +user's session. +For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically +.Xr sh 1 , +and basic +.Pa /dev +nodes such as +.Xr null 4 , +.Xr zero 4 , +.Xr stdin 4 , +.Xr stdout 4 , +.Xr stderr 4 , +and +.Xr tty 4 +devices. +For file transfer sessions using SFTP +no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process +sftp-server is used, +though sessions which use logging may require +.Pa /dev/log +inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see +.Xr sftp-server 8 +for details). +.Pp +For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be +prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially +those outside the jail). +Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which +.Xr sshd 8 +cannot detect. +.Pp +The default is +.Cm none , +indicating not to +.Xr chroot 2 . +.It Cm Ciphers +Specifies the ciphers allowed. +Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +.Pp +The supported ciphers are: +.Pp +.Bl -item -compact -offset indent +.It +3des-cbc +.It +aes128-cbc +.It +aes192-cbc +.It +aes256-cbc +.It +aes128-ctr +.It +aes192-ctr +.It +aes256-ctr +.It +aes128-gcm@openssh.com +.It +aes256-gcm@openssh.com +.It +chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com +.El +.Pp +The default is: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, +aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, +aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q cipher . +.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax +Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent without +.Xr sshd 8 +receiving any messages back from the client. +If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, +sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. +It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very +different from +.Cm TCPKeepAlive . +The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel +and therefore will not be spoofable. +The TCP keepalive option enabled by +.Cm TCPKeepAlive +is spoofable. +The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or +server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. +.Pp +The default value is 3. +If +.Cm ClientAliveInterval +is set to 15, and +.Cm ClientAliveCountMax +is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients +will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. +.It Cm ClientAliveInterval +Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received +from the client, +.Xr sshd 8 +will send a message through the encrypted +channel to request a response from the client. +The default +is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. +.It Cm Compression +Specifies whether compression is enabled after +the user has authenticated successfully. +The argument must be +.Cm yes , +.Cm delayed +(a legacy synonym for +.Cm yes ) +or +.Cm no . +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm DenyGroups +This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated +by spaces. +Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary +group list matches one of the patterns. +Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. +By default, login is allowed for all groups. +The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: +.Cm DenyUsers , +.Cm AllowUsers , +.Cm DenyGroups , +and finally +.Cm AllowGroups . +.Pp +See PATTERNS in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for more information on patterns. +.It Cm DenyUsers +This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated +by spaces. +Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. +Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. +By default, login is allowed for all users. +If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST +are separately checked, restricting logins to particular +users from particular hosts. +HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR +address/masklen format. +The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: +.Cm DenyUsers , +.Cm AllowUsers , +.Cm DenyGroups , +and finally +.Cm AllowGroups . +.Pp +See PATTERNS in +.Xr ssh_config 5 +for more information on patterns. +.It Cm DisableForwarding +Disables all forwarding features, including X11, +.Xr ssh-agent 1 , +TCP and StreamLocal. +This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may +simplify restricted configurations. +.It Cm ExposeAuthInfo +Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and +public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user. +The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the +.Ev SSH_USER_AUTH +environment variable. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm FingerprintHash +Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. +Valid options are: +.Cm md5 +and +.Cm sha256 . +The default is +.Cm sha256 . +.It Cm ForceCommand +Forces the execution of the command specified by +.Cm ForceCommand , +ignoring any command supplied by the client and +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +if present. +The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. +This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. +It is most useful inside a +.Cm Match +block. +The command originally supplied by the client is available in the +.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND +environment variable. +Specifying a command of +.Cm internal-sftp +will force the use of an in-process SFTP server that requires no support +files when used with +.Cm ChrootDirectory . +The default is +.Cm none . +.It Cm GatewayPorts +Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports +forwarded for the client. +By default, +.Xr sshd 8 +binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. +This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. +.Cm GatewayPorts +can be used to specify that sshd +should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus +allowing other hosts to connect. +The argument may be +.Cm no +to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, +.Cm yes +to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or +.Cm clientspecified +to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication +Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials +Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache +on logout. +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck +Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor +a client authenticates against. +If set to +.Cm yes +then the client must authenticate against the host +service on the current hostname. +If set to +.Cm no +then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the +machine's default store. +This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes +Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication +as a list of comma-separated patterns. +Alternately if the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +The default for this option is: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available key types may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q key . +.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication +Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together +with successful public key client host authentication is allowed +(host-based authentication). +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly +Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse +name lookup when matching the name in the +.Pa ~/.shosts , +.Pa ~/.rhosts , +and +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +files during +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication . +A setting of +.Cm yes +means that +.Xr sshd 8 +uses the name supplied by the client rather than +attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm HostCertificate +Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. +The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified +by +.Cm HostKey . +The default behaviour of +.Xr sshd 8 +is not to load any certificates. +.It Cm HostKey +Specifies a file containing a private host key +used by SSH. +The defaults are +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key +and +.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key . +.Pp +Note that +.Xr sshd 8 +will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible +and that the +.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms +option restricts which of the keys are actually used by +.Xr sshd 8 . +.Pp +It is possible to have multiple host key files. +It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. +In this case operations on the private key will be delegated +to an +.Xr ssh-agent 1 . +.It Cm HostKeyAgent +Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate +with an agent that has access to the private host keys. +If the string +.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK +is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the +.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK +environment variable. +.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms +Specifies the host key algorithms +that the server offers. +The default for this option is: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available key types may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q key . +.It Cm IgnoreRhosts +Specifies that +.Pa .rhosts +and +.Pa .shosts +files will not be used in +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication . +.Pp +.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv +and +.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv +are still used. +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts +Specifies whether +.Xr sshd 8 +should ignore the user's +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +during +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication +and use only the system-wide known hosts file +.Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts . +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm IPQoS +Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. +Accepted values are +.Cm af11 , +.Cm af12 , +.Cm af13 , +.Cm af21 , +.Cm af22 , +.Cm af23 , +.Cm af31 , +.Cm af32 , +.Cm af33 , +.Cm af41 , +.Cm af42 , +.Cm af43 , +.Cm cs0 , +.Cm cs1 , +.Cm cs2 , +.Cm cs3 , +.Cm cs4 , +.Cm cs5 , +.Cm cs6 , +.Cm cs7 , +.Cm ef , +.Cm lowdelay , +.Cm throughput , +.Cm reliability , +a numeric value, or +.Cm none +to use the operating system default. +This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. +If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. +If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for +interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. +The default is +.Cm af21 +(Low-Latency Data) +for interactive sessions and +.Cm cs1 +(Lower Effort) +for non-interactive sessions. +.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication +Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. +The argument to this keyword must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no . +The default is to use whatever value +.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication +is set to +(by default +.Cm yes ) . +.It Cm KerberosAuthentication +Specifies whether the password provided by the user for +.Cm PasswordAuthentication +will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. +To use this option, the server needs a +Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken +If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire +an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd +If password authentication through Kerberos fails then +the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism +such as +.Pa /etc/passwd . +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup +Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache +file on logout. +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm KexAlgorithms +Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. +Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +Alternately if the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +The supported algorithms are: +.Pp +.Bl -item -compact -offset indent +.It +curve25519-sha256 +.It +curve25519-sha256@libssh.org +.It +diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 +.It +diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 +.It +diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 +.It +diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 +.It +diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 +.It +diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 +.It +diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 +.It +ecdh-sha2-nistp256 +.It +ecdh-sha2-nistp384 +.It +ecdh-sha2-nistp521 +.El +.Pp +The default is: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, +ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, +diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, +diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512, +diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q kex . +.It Cm ListenAddress +Specifies the local addresses +.Xr sshd 8 +should listen on. +The following forms may be used: +.Pp +.Bl -item -offset indent -compact +.It +.Cm ListenAddress +.Sm off +.Ar hostname | address +.Sm on +.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain +.It +.Cm ListenAddress +.Sm off +.Ar hostname : port +.Sm on +.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain +.It +.Cm ListenAddress +.Sm off +.Ar IPv4_address : port +.Sm on +.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain +.It +.Cm ListenAddress +.Sm off +.Oo Ar hostname | address Oc : Ar port +.Sm on +.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain +.El +.Pp +The optional +.Cm rdomain +qualifier requests +.Xr sshd 8 +listen in an explicit routing domain. +If +.Ar port +is not specified, +sshd will listen on the address and all +.Cm Port +options specified. +The default is to listen on all local addresses on the current default +routing domain. +Multiple +.Cm ListenAddress +options are permitted. +For more information on routing domains, see +.Xr rdomain 4 . +.It Cm LoginGraceTime +The server disconnects after this time if the user has not +successfully logged in. +If the value is 0, there is no time limit. +The default is 120 seconds. +.It Cm LogLevel +Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from +.Xr sshd 8 . +The possible values are: +QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. +The default is INFO. +DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. +DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. +Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. +.It Cm MACs +Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. +The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection. +Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +.Pp +The algorithms that contain +.Qq -etm +calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). +These are considered safer and their use recommended. +The supported MACs are: +.Pp +.Bl -item -compact -offset indent +.It +hmac-md5 +.It +hmac-md5-96 +.It +hmac-sha1 +.It +hmac-sha1-96 +.It +hmac-sha2-256 +.It +hmac-sha2-512 +.It +umac-64@openssh.com +.It +umac-128@openssh.com +.It +hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com +.It +umac-64-etm@openssh.com +.It +umac-128-etm@openssh.com +.El +.Pp +The default is: +.Bd -literal -offset indent +umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, +hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, +hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, +umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, +hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1 +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q mac . +.It Cm Match +Introduces a conditional block. +If all of the criteria on the +.Cm Match +line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those +set in the global section of the config file, until either another +.Cm Match +line or the end of the file. +If a keyword appears in multiple +.Cm Match +blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is +applied. +.Pp +The arguments to +.Cm Match +are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token +.Cm All +which matches all criteria. +The available criteria are +.Cm User , +.Cm Group , +.Cm Host , +.Cm LocalAddress , +.Cm LocalPort , +.Cm RDomain , +and +.Cm Address +(with +.Cm RDomain +representing the +.Xr rdomain 4 +on which the connection was received.) +.Pp +The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated +lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the +.Sx PATTERNS +section of +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +.Pp +The patterns in an +.Cm Address +criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR +address/masklen format, +such as 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32. +Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - +it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address +or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. +For example, 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively. +.Pp +Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a +.Cm Match +keyword. +Available keywords are +.Cm AcceptEnv , +.Cm AllowAgentForwarding , +.Cm AllowGroups , +.Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding , +.Cm AllowTcpForwarding , +.Cm AllowUsers , +.Cm AuthenticationMethods , +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand , +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser , +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile , +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand , +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser , +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile , +.Cm Banner , +.Cm ChrootDirectory , +.Cm ClientAliveCountMax , +.Cm ClientAliveInterval , +.Cm DenyGroups , +.Cm DenyUsers , +.Cm ForceCommand , +.Cm GatewayPorts , +.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication , +.Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes , +.Cm HostbasedAuthentication , +.Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , +.Cm IPQoS , +.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , +.Cm KerberosAuthentication , +.Cm LogLevel , +.Cm MaxAuthTries , +.Cm MaxSessions , +.Cm PasswordAuthentication , +.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , +.Cm PermitListen , +.Cm PermitOpen , +.Cm PermitRootLogin , +.Cm PermitTTY , +.Cm PermitTunnel , +.Cm PermitUserRC , +.Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes , +.Cm PubkeyAuthentication , +.Cm RekeyLimit , +.Cm RevokedKeys , +.Cm RDomain , +.Cm SetEnv , +.Cm StreamLocalBindMask , +.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink , +.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , +.Cm X11DisplayOffset , +.Cm X11Forwarding +and +.Cm X11UseLocalHost . +.It Cm MaxAuthTries +Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per +connection. +Once the number of failures reaches half this value, +additional failures are logged. +The default is 6. +.It Cm MaxSessions +Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp) +sessions permitted per network connection. +Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection +multiplexing. +Setting +.Cm MaxSessions +to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 +will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting +forwarding. +The default is 10. +.It Cm MaxStartups +Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the +SSH daemon. +Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the +.Cm LoginGraceTime +expires for a connection. +The default is 10:30:100. +.Pp +Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying +the three colon separated values +start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60"). +.Xr sshd 8 +will refuse connection attempts with a probability of rate/100 (30%) +if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated connections. +The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts +are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches full (60). +.It Cm PasswordAuthentication +Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords +When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the +server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm PermitListen +Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port forwarding may listen. +The listen specification must be one of the following forms: +.Pp +.Bl -item -offset indent -compact +.It +.Cm PermitListen +.Sm off +.Ar port +.Sm on +.It +.Cm PermitListen +.Sm off +.Ar host : port +.Sm on +.El +.Pp +Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with whitespace. +An argument of +.Cm any +can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any listen requests. +An argument of +.Cm none +can be used to prohibit all listen requests. +The host name may contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in +.Xr ssh_config 5 . +The wildcard +.Sq * +can also be used in place of a port number to allow all ports. +By default all port forwarding listen requests are permitted. +Note that the +.Cm GatewayPorts +option may further restrict which addresses may be listened on. +Note also that +.Xr ssh 1 +will request a listen host of +.Dq localhost +if no listen host was specifically requested, and this this name is +treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of +.Dq 127.0.0.1 +and +.Dq ::1 . +.It Cm PermitOpen +Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. +The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: +.Pp +.Bl -item -offset indent -compact +.It +.Cm PermitOpen +.Sm off +.Ar host : port +.Sm on +.It +.Cm PermitOpen +.Sm off +.Ar IPv4_addr : port +.Sm on +.It +.Cm PermitOpen +.Sm off +.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port +.Sm on +.El +.Pp +Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. +An argument of +.Cm any +can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. +An argument of +.Cm none +can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. +The wildcard +.Sq * +can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports, respectively. +By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. +.It Cm PermitRootLogin +Specifies whether root can log in using +.Xr ssh 1 . +The argument must be +.Cm yes , +.Cm prohibit-password , +.Cm forced-commands-only , +or +.Cm no . +The default is +.Cm prohibit-password . +.Pp +If this option is set to +.Cm prohibit-password +(or its deprecated alias, +.Cm without-password ) , +password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root. +.Pp +If this option is set to +.Cm forced-commands-only , +root login with public key authentication will be allowed, +but only if the +.Ar command +option has been specified +(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is +normally not allowed). +All other authentication methods are disabled for root. +.Pp +If this option is set to +.Cm no , +root is not allowed to log in. +.It Cm PermitTTY +Specifies whether +.Xr pty 4 +allocation is permitted. +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm PermitTunnel +Specifies whether +.Xr tun 4 +device forwarding is allowed. +The argument must be +.Cm yes , +.Cm point-to-point +(layer 3), +.Cm ethernet +(layer 2), or +.Cm no . +Specifying +.Cm yes +permits both +.Cm point-to-point +and +.Cm ethernet . +The default is +.Cm no . +.Pp +Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected +.Xr tun 4 +device must allow access to the user. +.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment +Specifies whether +.Pa ~/.ssh/environment +and +.Cm environment= +options in +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +are processed by +.Xr sshd 8 . +Valid options are +.Cm yes , +.Cm no +or a pattern-list specifying which environment variable names to accept +(for example +.Qq LANG,LC_* ) . +The default is +.Cm no . +Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access +restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as +.Ev LD_PRELOAD . +.It Cm PermitUserRC +Specifies whether any +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +file is executed. +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm PidFile +Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the +SSH daemon, or +.Cm none +to not write one. +The default is +.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid . +.It Cm Port +Specifies the port number that +.Xr sshd 8 +listens on. +The default is 22. +Multiple options of this type are permitted. +See also +.Cm ListenAddress . +.It Cm PrintLastLog +Specifies whether +.Xr sshd 8 +should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs +in interactively. +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm PrintMotd +Specifies whether +.Xr sshd 8 +should print +.Pa /etc/motd +when a user logs in interactively. +(On some systems it is also printed by the shell, +.Pa /etc/profile , +or equivalent.) +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication +as a list of comma-separated patterns. +Alternately if the specified value begins with a +.Sq + +character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set +instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. +The default for this option is: +.Bd -literal -offset 3n +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa +.Ed +.Pp +The list of available key types may also be obtained using +.Qq ssh -Q key . +.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication +Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm RekeyLimit +Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the +session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of +time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. +The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of +.Sq K , +.Sq M , +or +.Sq G +to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. +The default is between +.Sq 1G +and +.Sq 4G , +depending on the cipher. +The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the +units documented in the +.Sx TIME FORMATS +section. +The default value for +.Cm RekeyLimit +is +.Cm default none , +which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount +of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. +.It Cm RevokedKeys +Specifies revoked public keys file, or +.Cm none +to not use one. +Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. +Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will +be refused for all users. +Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as +an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +.It Cm RDomain +Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after authentication +has completed. +The user session, as well and any forwarded or listening IP sockets, +will be bound to this +.Xr rdomain 4 . +If the routing domain is set to +.Cm \&%D , +then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied. +.It Cm SetEnv +Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started +by +.Xr sshd 8 +as +.Dq NAME=VALUE . +The environment value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace +characters). +Environment variables set by +.Cm SetEnv +override the default environment and any variables specified by the user +via +.Cm AcceptEnv +or +.Cm PermitUserEnvironment . +.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask +Sets the octal file creation mode mask +.Pq umask +used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote +port forwarding. +This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. +.Pp +The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is +readable and writable only by the owner. +Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain +socket files. +.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink +Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local +or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. +If the socket file already exists and +.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink +is not enabled, +.Nm sshd +will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. +This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. +.Pp +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no . +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm StrictModes +Specifies whether +.Xr sshd 8 +should check file modes and ownership of the +user's files and home directory before accepting login. +This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their +directory or files world-writable. +The default is +.Cm yes . +Note that this does not apply to +.Cm ChrootDirectory , +whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. +.It Cm Subsystem +Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). +Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) +to execute upon subsystem request. +.Pp +The command +.Cm sftp-server +implements the SFTP file transfer subsystem. +.Pp +Alternately the name +.Cm internal-sftp +implements an in-process SFTP server. +This may simplify configurations using +.Cm ChrootDirectory +to force a different filesystem root on clients. +.Pp +By default no subsystems are defined. +.It Cm SyslogFacility +Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from +.Xr sshd 8 . +The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, +LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. +The default is AUTH. +.It Cm TCPKeepAlive +Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the +other side. +If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one +of the machines will be properly noticed. +However, this means that +connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people +find it annoying. +On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, +sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving +.Qq ghost +users and consuming server resources. +.Pp +The default is +.Cm yes +(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice +if the network goes down or the client host crashes. +This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. +.Pp +To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to +.Cm no . +.It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys +Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are +trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or +.Cm none +to not use one. +Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with +.Ql # +are allowed. +If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key +listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user +listed in the certificate's principals list. +Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted +for authentication using +.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys . +For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 . +.It Cm UseDNS +Specifies whether +.Xr sshd 8 +should look up the remote host name, and to check that +the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the +very same IP address. +.Pp +If this option is set to +.Cm no +(the default) then only addresses and not host names may be used in +.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys +.Cm from +and +.Nm +.Cm Match +.Cm Host +directives. +.It Cm UsePAM +Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. +If set to +.Cm yes +this will enable PAM authentication using +.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication +and +.Cm PasswordAuthentication +in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all +authentication types. +.Pp +Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent +role to password authentication, you should disable either +.Cm PasswordAuthentication +or +.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication. +.Pp +If +.Cm UsePAM +is enabled, you will not be able to run +.Xr sshd 8 +as a non-root user. +The default is +.Cm no . +.It Cm VersionAddendum +Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner +sent by the server upon connection. +The default is +.Cm none . +.It Cm X11DisplayOffset +Specifies the first display number available for +.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's +X11 forwarding. +This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. +The default is 10. +.It Cm X11Forwarding +Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no . +The default is +.Cm no . +.Pp +When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to +the server and to client displays if the +.Xr sshd 8 +proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see +.Cm X11UseLocalhost ) , +though this is not the default. +Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data +verification and substitution occur on the client side. +The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 +display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests +forwarding (see the warnings for +.Cm ForwardX11 +in +.Xr ssh_config 5 ) . +A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to +protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly +requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a +.Cm no +setting. +.Pp +Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from +forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. +.It Cm X11UseLocalhost +Specifies whether +.Xr sshd 8 +should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to +the wildcard address. +By default, +sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the +hostname part of the +.Ev DISPLAY +environment variable to +.Cm localhost . +This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. +However, some older X11 clients may not function with this +configuration. +.Cm X11UseLocalhost +may be set to +.Cm no +to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard +address. +The argument must be +.Cm yes +or +.Cm no . +The default is +.Cm yes . +.It Cm XAuthLocation +Specifies the full pathname of the +.Xr xauth 1 +program, or +.Cm none +to not use one. +The default is +.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth . +.El +.Sh TIME FORMATS +.Xr sshd 8 +command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time +may be expressed using a sequence of the form: +.Sm off +.Ar time Op Ar qualifier , +.Sm on +where +.Ar time +is a positive integer value and +.Ar qualifier +is one of the following: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent +.It Aq Cm none +seconds +.It Cm s | Cm S +seconds +.It Cm m | Cm M +minutes +.It Cm h | Cm H +hours +.It Cm d | Cm D +days +.It Cm w | Cm W +weeks +.El +.Pp +Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate +the total time value. +.Pp +Time format examples: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent +.It 600 +600 seconds (10 minutes) +.It 10m +10 minutes +.It 1h30m +1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) +.El +.Sh TOKENS +Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, +which are expanded at runtime: +.Pp +.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact +.It %% +A literal +.Sq % . +.It \&%D +The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received. +.It %F +The fingerprint of the CA key. +.It %f +The fingerprint of the key or certificate. +.It %h +The home directory of the user. +.It %i +The key ID in the certificate. +.It %K +The base64-encoded CA key. +.It %k +The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication. +.It %s +The serial number of the certificate. +.It \&%T +The type of the CA key. +.It %t +The key or certificate type. +.It \&%U +The numeric user ID of the target user. +.It %u +The username. +.El +.Pp +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand +accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile +accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm ChrootDirectory +accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u. +.Pp +.Cm RoutingDomain +accepts the token %D. +.Sh FILES +.Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config +Contains configuration data for +.Xr sshd 8 . +This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended +(though not necessary) that it be world-readable. +.El +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr sftp-server 8 , +.Xr sshd 8 +.Sh AUTHORS +.An -nosplit +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free +ssh 1.2.12 release by +.An Tatu Ylonen . +.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , +.An Theo de Raadt +and +.An Dug Song +removed many bugs, re-added newer features and +created OpenSSH. +.An Markus Friedl +contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. +.An Niels Provos +and +.An Markus Friedl +contributed support for privilege separation. diff --git a/ssherr.c b/ssherr.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ad3d57 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssherr.c @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.8 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include "ssherr.h" + +const char * +ssh_err(int n) +{ + switch (n) { + case SSH_ERR_SUCCESS: + return "success"; + case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: + return "unexpected internal error"; + case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: + return "memory allocation failed"; + case SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE: + return "incomplete message"; + case SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT: + return "invalid format"; + case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE: + return "bignum is negative"; + case SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE: + return "string is too large"; + case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE: + return "bignum is too large"; + case SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE: + return "elliptic curve point is too large"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE: + return "insufficient buffer space"; + case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return "invalid argument"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH: + return "key bits do not match"; + case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID: + return "invalid elliptic curve"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH: + return "key type does not match"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN: + return "unknown or unsupported key type"; + case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH: + return "elliptic curve does not match"; + case SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT: + return "plain key provided where certificate required"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB: + return "key lacks certificate data"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE: + return "unknown/unsupported certificate type"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY: + return "invalid certificate signing key"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE: + return "invalid elliptic curve value"; + case SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID: + return "incorrect signature"; + case SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR: + return "error in libcrypto"; /* XXX fetch and return */ + case SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA: + return "unexpected bytes remain after decoding"; + case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: + return strerror(errno); + case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID: + return "invalid certificate"; + case SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION: + return "communication with agent failed"; + case SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE: + return "agent refused operation"; + case SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE: + return "DH GEX group out of range"; + case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: + return "disconnected"; + case SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID: + return "message authentication code incorrect"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching cipher found"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching MAC found"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching compression method found"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching key exchange method found"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching host key type found"; + case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH: + return "protocol version mismatch"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION: + return "could not read protocol version"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED: + return "could not load host key"; + case SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY: + return "rekeying not supported by peer"; + case SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT: + return "passphrase is too short (minimum five characters)"; + case SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED: + return "file changed while reading"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER: + return "key encrypted using unsupported cipher"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: + return "incorrect passphrase supplied to decrypt private key"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS: + return "bad permissions"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH: + return "certificate does not match key"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: + return "key not found"; + case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT: + return "agent not present"; + case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES: + return "agent contains no identities"; + case SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY: + return "internal error: buffer is read-only"; + case SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC: + return "KRL file has invalid magic number"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: + return "Key is revoked"; + case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: + return "Connection closed"; + case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: + return "Connection timed out"; + case SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT: + return "Connection corrupted"; + case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR: + return "Protocol error"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH: + return "Invalid key length"; + case SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE: + return "number is too large"; + case SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED: + return "signature algorithm not supported"; + default: + return "unknown error"; + } +} diff --git a/ssherr.h b/ssherr.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..348da5a --- /dev/null +++ b/ssherr.h @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.6 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _SSHERR_H +#define _SSHERR_H + +/* XXX are these too granular? not granular enough? I can't decide - djm */ + +/* Error codes */ +#define SSH_ERR_SUCCESS 0 +#define SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR -1 +#define SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL -2 +#define SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE -3 +#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT -4 +#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE -5 +#define SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE -6 +#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE -7 +#define SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE -8 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE -9 +#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -10 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH -11 +#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID -12 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH -13 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN -14 /* XXX UNSUPPORTED? */ +#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH -15 +#define SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT -16 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB -17 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE -18 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY -19 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE -20 +#define SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID -21 +#define SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR -22 +#define SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA -23 +#define SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR -24 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID -25 +#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION -26 +#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE -27 +#define SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE -28 +#define SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED -29 +#define SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID -30 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH -31 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH -32 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH -33 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH -34 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH -35 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED -36 +#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH -37 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION -38 +#define SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY -39 +#define SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT -40 +#define SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED -41 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -42 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE -43 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS -44 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH -45 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND -46 +#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT -47 +#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES -48 +#define SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY -49 +#define SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC -50 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED -51 +#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED -52 +#define SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT -53 +#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT -54 +#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR -55 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH -56 +#define SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE -57 +#define SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED -58 + +/* Translate a numeric error code to a human-readable error string */ +const char *ssh_err(int n); + +#endif /* _SSHERR_H */ diff --git a/sshkey-xmss.c b/sshkey-xmss.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aaae702 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshkey-xmss.c @@ -0,0 +1,1055 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.3 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H +# include +#endif + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshkey-xmss.h" +#include "atomicio.h" + +#include "xmss_fast.h" + +/* opaque internal XMSS state */ +#define XMSS_MAGIC "xmss-state-v1" +#define XMSS_CIPHERNAME "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" +struct ssh_xmss_state { + xmss_params params; + u_int32_t n, w, h, k; + + bds_state bds; + u_char *stack; + u_int32_t stackoffset; + u_char *stacklevels; + u_char *auth; + u_char *keep; + u_char *th_nodes; + u_char *retain; + treehash_inst *treehash; + + u_int32_t idx; /* state read from file */ + u_int32_t maxidx; /* restricted # of signatures */ + int have_state; /* .state file exists */ + int lockfd; /* locked in sshkey_xmss_get_state() */ + int allow_update; /* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */ + char *enc_ciphername;/* encrypt state with cipher */ + u_char *enc_keyiv; /* encrypt state with key */ + u_int32_t enc_keyiv_len; /* length of enc_keyiv */ +}; + +int sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *, const char *); +void sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, + int *, sshkey_printfn *); +int sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, + struct sshbuf **); +int sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, + struct sshbuf **); +int sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); + +#define PRINT(s...) do { if (pr) pr(s); } while (0) + +int +sshkey_xmss_init(struct sshkey *key, const char *name) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state; + + if (key->xmss_state != NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + if (name == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + state = calloc(sizeof(struct ssh_xmss_state), 1); + if (state == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME) == 0) { + state->n = 32; + state->w = 16; + state->h = 10; + } else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME) == 0) { + state->n = 32; + state->w = 16; + state->h = 16; + } else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME) == 0) { + state->n = 32; + state->w = 16; + state->h = 20; + } else { + free(state); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } + if ((key->xmss_name = strdup(name)) == NULL) { + free(state); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + state->k = 2; /* XXX hardcoded */ + state->lockfd = -1; + if (xmss_set_params(&state->params, state->n, state->h, state->w, + state->k) != 0) { + free(state); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + key->xmss_state = state; + return 0; +} + +void +sshkey_xmss_free_state(struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; + + sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key); + if (state) { + if (state->enc_keyiv) { + explicit_bzero(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len); + free(state->enc_keyiv); + } + free(state->enc_ciphername); + free(state); + } + key->xmss_state = NULL; +} + +#define SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC "k=2" +#define num_stack(x) ((x->h+1)*(x->n)) +#define num_stacklevels(x) (x->h+1) +#define num_auth(x) ((x->h)*(x->n)) +#define num_keep(x) ((x->h >> 1)*(x->n)) +#define num_th_nodes(x) ((x->h - x->k)*(x->n)) +#define num_retain(x) (((1ULL << x->k) - x->k - 1) * (x->n)) +#define num_treehash(x) ((x->h) - (x->k)) + +int +sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; + u_int32_t i; + + state->stackoffset = 0; + if ((state->stack = calloc(num_stack(state), 1)) == NULL || + (state->stacklevels = calloc(num_stacklevels(state), 1))== NULL || + (state->auth = calloc(num_auth(state), 1)) == NULL || + (state->keep = calloc(num_keep(state), 1)) == NULL || + (state->th_nodes = calloc(num_th_nodes(state), 1)) == NULL || + (state->retain = calloc(num_retain(state), 1)) == NULL || + (state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state), + sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL) { + sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + for (i = 0; i < state->h - state->k; i++) + state->treehash[i].node = &state->th_nodes[state->n*i]; + xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset, + state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash, + state->retain, 0); + return 0; +} + +void +sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; + + if (state == NULL) + return; + free(state->stack); + free(state->stacklevels); + free(state->auth); + free(state->keep); + free(state->th_nodes); + free(state->retain); + free(state->treehash); + state->stack = NULL; + state->stacklevels = NULL; + state->auth = NULL; + state->keep = NULL; + state->th_nodes = NULL; + state->retain = NULL; + state->treehash = NULL; +} + +void * +sshkey_xmss_params(const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; + + if (state == NULL) + return NULL; + return &state->params; +} + +void * +sshkey_xmss_bds_state(const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; + + if (state == NULL) + return NULL; + return &state->bds; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_siglen(const struct sshkey *key, size_t *lenp) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; + + if (lenp == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (state == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + *lenp = 4 + state->n + + state->params.wots_par.keysize + + state->h * state->n; + return 0; +} + +size_t +sshkey_xmss_pklen(const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; + + if (state == NULL) + return 0; + return state->n * 2; +} + +size_t +sshkey_xmss_sklen(const struct sshkey *key) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state; + + if (state == NULL) + return 0; + return state->n * 4 + 4; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, const char *ciphername) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + const struct sshcipher *cipher; + size_t keylen = 0, ivlen = 0; + + if (state == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if ((state->enc_ciphername = strdup(ciphername)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); + ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); + state->enc_keyiv_len = keylen + ivlen; + if ((state->enc_keyiv = calloc(state->enc_keyiv_len, 1)) == NULL) { + free(state->enc_ciphername); + state->enc_ciphername = NULL; + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + arc4random_buf(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len); + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + int r; + + if (state == NULL || state->enc_keyiv == NULL || + state->enc_ciphername == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, state->enc_ciphername)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->enc_keyiv, + state->enc_keyiv_len)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + size_t len; + int r; + + if (state == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &state->enc_ciphername, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->enc_keyiv, &len)) != 0) + return r; + state->enc_keyiv_len = len; + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + u_char have_info = 1; + u_int32_t idx; + int r; + + if (state == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (opts != SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO) + return 0; + idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_info)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, idx)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->maxidx)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + u_char have_info; + int r; + + if (state == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + /* optional */ + if (sshbuf_len(b) == 0) + return 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_info)) != 0) + return r; + if (have_info != 1) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->maxidx)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(struct sshkey *k, u_int bits) +{ + int r; + const char *name; + + if (bits == 10) { + name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME; + } else if (bits == 16) { + name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME; + } else if (bits == 20) { + name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME; + } else { + name = XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME; + } + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, name)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(k)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(k, XMSS_CIPHERNAME)) != 0) + return r; + if ((k->xmss_pk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) == NULL || + (k->xmss_sk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_sklen(k))) == NULL) { + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + xmss_keypair(k->xmss_pk, k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k), + sshkey_xmss_params(k)); + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, + int *have_file, sshkey_printfn *pr) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, r, fd = -1; + u_int32_t len; + unsigned char buf[4], *data = NULL; + + *have_file = 0; + if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) { + *have_file = 1; + if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { + PRINT("%s: corrupt state file: %s", __func__, filename); + goto done; + } + len = PEEK_U32(buf); + if ((data = calloc(len, 1)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + if (atomicio(read, fd, data, len) != len) { + PRINT("%s: cannot read blob: %s", __func__, filename); + goto done; + } + if ((enc = sshbuf_from(data, len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + sshkey_xmss_free_bds(k); + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(k, enc, &b)) != 0) { + ret = r; + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) { + ret = r; + goto done; + } + ret = 0; + } +done: + if (fd != -1) + close(fd); + free(data); + sshbuf_free(enc); + sshbuf_free(b); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + u_int32_t idx = 0; + char *filename = NULL; + char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *lockfile = NULL; + int lockfd = -1, have_state = 0, have_ostate, tries = 0; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, r; + + if (state == NULL) + goto done; + /* + * If maxidx is set, then we are allowed a limited number + * of signatures, but don't need to access the disk. + * Otherwise we need to deal with the on-disk state. + */ + if (state->maxidx) { + /* xmss_sk always contains the current state */ + idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); + if (idx < state->maxidx) { + state->allow_update = 1; + return 0; + } + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL) + goto done; + if (asprintf(&lockfile, "%s.lock", filename) < 0 || + asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) < 0 || + asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) < 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + if ((lockfd = open(lockfile, O_CREAT|O_RDONLY, 0600)) < 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: cannot open/create: %s", __func__, lockfile); + goto done; + } + while (flock(lockfd, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB) < 0) { + if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: cannot lock: %s", __func__, lockfile); + goto done; + } + if (++tries > 10) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: giving up on: %s", __func__, lockfile); + goto done; + } + usleep(1000*100*tries); + } + /* XXX no longer const */ + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k, + statefile, &have_state, pr)) != 0) { + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k, + ostatefile, &have_ostate, pr)) == 0) { + state->allow_update = 1; + r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, 1); + state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); + state->allow_update = 0; + } + } + if (!have_state && !have_ostate) { + /* check that bds state is initialized */ + if (state->bds.auth == NULL) + goto done; + PRINT("%s: start from scratch idx 0: %u", __func__, state->idx); + } else if (r != 0) { + ret = r; + goto done; + } + if (state->idx + 1 < state->idx) { + PRINT("%s: state wrap: %u", __func__, state->idx); + goto done; + } + state->have_state = have_state; + state->lockfd = lockfd; + state->allow_update = 1; + lockfd = -1; + ret = 0; +done: + if (lockfd != -1) + close(lockfd); + free(lockfile); + free(statefile); + free(ostatefile); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_forward_state(const struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t reserve) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + u_char *sig = NULL; + size_t required_siglen; + unsigned long long smlen; + u_char data; + int ret, r; + + if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (reserve == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (state->idx + reserve <= state->idx) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(k, &required_siglen)) != 0) + return r; + if ((sig = malloc(required_siglen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + while (reserve-- > 0) { + state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); + smlen = required_siglen; + if ((ret = xmss_sign(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k), + sig, &smlen, &data, 0, sshkey_xmss_params(k))) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + } + free(sig); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL; + u_int32_t idx = 0; + unsigned char buf[4]; + char *filename = NULL; + char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *nstatefile = NULL; + int fd = -1; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update) + return ret; + if (state->maxidx) { + /* no update since the number of signatures is limited */ + ret = 0; + goto done; + } + idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); + if (idx == state->idx) { + /* no signature happened, no need to update */ + ret = 0; + goto done; + } else if (idx != state->idx + 1) { + PRINT("%s: more than one signature happened: idx %u state %u", + __func__, idx, state->idx); + goto done; + } + state->idx = idx; + if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL) + goto done; + if (asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) < 0 || + asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) < 0 || + asprintf(&nstatefile, "%s.nstate", filename) < 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + unlink(nstatefile); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } + if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b)) != 0) { + PRINT("%s: SERLIALIZE FAILED: %d", __func__, ret); + goto done; + } + if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(k, b, &enc)) != 0) { + PRINT("%s: ENCRYPT FAILED: %d", __func__, ret); + goto done; + } + if ((fd = open(nstatefile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0600)) < 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: open new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile); + goto done; + } + POKE_U32(buf, sshbuf_len(enc)); + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: write new state file hdr: %s", __func__, nstatefile); + close(fd); + goto done; + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(enc), sshbuf_len(enc)) != + sshbuf_len(enc)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: write new state file data: %s", __func__, nstatefile); + close(fd); + goto done; + } + if (fsync(fd) < 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: sync new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile); + close(fd); + goto done; + } + if (close(fd) < 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: close new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile); + goto done; + } + if (state->have_state) { + unlink(ostatefile); + if (link(statefile, ostatefile)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: backup state %s to %s", __func__, statefile, + ostatefile); + goto done; + } + } + if (rename(nstatefile, statefile) < 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + PRINT("%s: rename %s to %s", __func__, nstatefile, statefile); + goto done; + } + ret = 0; +done: + if (state->lockfd != -1) { + close(state->lockfd); + state->lockfd = -1; + } + if (nstatefile) + unlink(nstatefile); + free(statefile); + free(ostatefile); + free(nstatefile); + sshbuf_free(b); + sshbuf_free(enc); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + treehash_inst *th; + u_int32_t i, node; + int r; + + if (state == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (state->stack == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + state->stackoffset = state->bds.stackoffset; /* copy back */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->idx)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stack, num_stack(state))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->stackoffset)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stacklevels, num_stacklevels(state))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->auth, num_auth(state))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->keep, num_keep(state))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->th_nodes, num_th_nodes(state))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->retain, num_retain(state))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, num_treehash(state))) != 0) + return r; + for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) { + th = &state->treehash[i]; + node = th->node - state->th_nodes; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->h)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->next_idx)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->stackusage)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, th->completed)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, node)) != 0) + return r; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + int r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if (state == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, opts)) != 0) + return r; + switch (opts) { + case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE: + r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b); + break; + case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL: + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0) + break; + r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b); + break; + case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT: + r = 0; + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + treehash_inst *th; + u_int32_t i, lh, node; + size_t ls, lsl, la, lk, ln, lr; + char *magic; + int r; + + if (state == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (k->xmss_sk == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state), + sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &magic, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stack, &ls)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->stackoffset)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stacklevels, &lsl)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->auth, &la)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->keep, &lk)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->th_nodes, &ln)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->retain, &lr)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &lh)) != 0) + return r; + if (strcmp(magic, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC) != 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + /* XXX check stackoffset */ + if (ls != num_stack(state) || + lsl != num_stacklevels(state) || + la != num_auth(state) || + lk != num_keep(state) || + ln != num_th_nodes(state) || + lr != num_retain(state) || + lh != num_treehash(state)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) { + th = &state->treehash[i]; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->h)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->next_idx)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->stackusage)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &th->completed)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &node)) != 0) + return r; + if (node < num_th_nodes(state)) + th->node = &state->th_nodes[node]; + } + POKE_U32(k->xmss_sk, state->idx); + xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset, + state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash, + state->retain, 0); + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts; + u_char have_state; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_state)) != 0) + return r; + + opts = have_state; + switch (opts) { + case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT: + r = 0; + break; + case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE: + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) + return r; + break; + case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL: + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) + return r; + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + break; + } + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, + struct sshbuf **retp) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + struct sshbuf *encrypted = NULL, *encoded = NULL, *padded = NULL; + struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; + const struct sshcipher *cipher; + u_char *cp, *key, *iv = NULL; + size_t i, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen, encrypted_len, aadlen; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (retp != NULL) + *retp = NULL; + if (state == NULL || + state->enc_keyiv == NULL || + state->enc_ciphername == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); + keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); + ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); + authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); + if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + key = state->enc_keyiv; + if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (padded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */ + memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen); + POKE_U32(iv, state->idx); + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, state->idx)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* padded state will be encrypted */ + if ((r = sshbuf_putb(padded, b)) != 0) + goto out; + i = 0; + while (sshbuf_len(padded) % blocksize) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(padded, ++i & 0xff)) != 0) + goto out; + } + encrypted_len = sshbuf_len(padded); + + /* header including the length of state is used as AAD */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, encrypted_len)) != 0) + goto out; + aadlen = sshbuf_len(encoded); + + /* concat header and state */ + if ((r = sshbuf_putb(encoded, padded)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* reserve space for encryption of encoded data plus auth tag */ + /* encrypt at offset addlen */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted, + encrypted_len + aadlen + authlen, &cp)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, + iv, ivlen, 1)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encoded), + encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + if (retp != NULL) { + *retp = encrypted; + encrypted = NULL; + } + sshbuf_free(padded); + sshbuf_free(encoded); + sshbuf_free(encrypted); + cipher_free(ciphercontext); + free(iv); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *encoded, + struct sshbuf **retp) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *decrypted = NULL; + struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; + const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL; + u_char *key, *iv = NULL, *dp; + size_t keylen, ivlen, authlen, aadlen; + u_int blocksize, encrypted_len, index; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (retp != NULL) + *retp = NULL; + if (state == NULL || + state->enc_keyiv == NULL || + state->enc_ciphername == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); + keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); + ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); + authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); + if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + key = state->enc_keyiv; + + if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(encoded)) == NULL || + (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* check magic */ + if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC) || + memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(encoded), XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* parse public portion */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &index)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* check size of encrypted key blob */ + if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */ + if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + aadlen = sshbuf_len(copy) - sshbuf_len(encoded); + + /* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */ + memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen); + POKE_U32(iv, index); + + /* decrypt private state of key */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, aadlen + encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, + iv, ivlen, 0)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(copy), + encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* there should be no trailing data */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (sshbuf_len(encoded) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* remove AAD */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decrypted, aadlen)) != 0) + goto out; + /* XXX encrypted includes unchecked padding */ + + /* success */ + r = 0; + if (retp != NULL) { + *retp = decrypted; + decrypted = NULL; + } + out: + cipher_free(ciphercontext); + sshbuf_free(copy); + sshbuf_free(decrypted); + free(iv); + return r; +} + +u_int32_t +sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + u_int32_t idx; + + if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS && state && + state->maxidx) { + idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx; + if (idx < state->maxidx) + return state->maxidx - idx; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign) +{ + struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state; + + if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (maxsign == 0) + return 0; + if (state->idx + maxsign < state->idx) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + state->maxidx = state->idx + maxsign; + return 0; +} +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/sshkey-xmss.h b/sshkey-xmss.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9f8ead --- /dev/null +++ b/sshkey-xmss.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.h,v 1.1 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef SSHKEY_XMSS_H +#define SSHKEY_XMSS_H + +#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H10" +#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H16" +#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME "XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20" +#define XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME + +size_t sshkey_xmss_pklen(const struct sshkey *); +size_t sshkey_xmss_sklen(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_xmss_init(struct sshkey *, const char *); +void sshkey_xmss_free_state(struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(struct sshkey *, u_int); +int sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep); +int sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep); +int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); + +int sshkey_xmss_siglen(const struct sshkey *, size_t *); +void *sshkey_xmss_params(const struct sshkey *); +void *sshkey_xmss_bds_state(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *, sshkey_printfn *); +int sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t); +int sshkey_xmss_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t); +int sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *, sshkey_printfn *); +u_int32_t sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *); + +#endif /* SSHKEY_XMSS_H */ diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6555c5e --- /dev/null +++ b/sshkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,4165 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.72 2018/10/11 00:52:46 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "crypto_api.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */ + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshkey-xmss.h" +#include "match.h" + +#include "xmss_fast.h" + +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +/* openssh private key file format */ +#define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1) +#define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1) +#define KDFNAME "bcrypt" +#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1" +#define SALT_LEN 16 +#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-ctr" +#define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16 + +/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */ +#define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n" + +int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(const struct sshkey *key, + struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep); +static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf, + struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert); +static int get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep); + +/* Supported key types */ +struct keytype { + const char *name; + const char *shortname; + const char *sigalg; + int type; + int nid; + int cert; + int sigonly; +}; +static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { + { "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", NULL, KEY_ED25519, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", NULL, + KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + { "ssh-xmss@openssh.com", "XMSS", NULL, KEY_XMSS, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "XMSS-CERT", NULL, + KEY_XMSS_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 }, + { "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 }, + { "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 }, + { "ssh-dss", "DSA", NULL, KEY_DSA, 0, 0, 0 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 }, + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0, 0 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", NULL, + KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0, 0 }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + { "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", NULL, + KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, + { "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", + "rsa-sha2-256", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 }, + { "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", + "rsa-sha2-512", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 }, + { "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", NULL, + KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL, + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 }, + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL, + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1, 0 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL, + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1, 0 }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 } +}; + +const char * +sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->type == k->type) + return kt->shortname; + } + return "unknown"; +} + +static const char * +sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid)) + return kt->name; + } + return "ssh-unknown"; +} + +int +sshkey_type_is_cert(int type) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->type == type) + return kt->cert; + } + return 0; +} + +const char * +sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid); +} + +const char * +sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type), + k->ecdsa_nid); +} + +int +sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + /* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */ + if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) || + (!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0)) + return kt->type; + } + return KEY_UNSPEC; +} + +int +sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->type != KEY_ECDSA && kt->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT) + continue; + if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) + return kt->nid; + } + return -1; +} + +char * +sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep) +{ + char *tmp, *ret = NULL; + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->name == NULL) + continue; + if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly) + continue; + if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert)) + continue; + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = sep; + nlen = strlen(kt->name); + if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret = tmp; + memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1); + rlen += nlen; + } + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard) +{ + char *s, *cp, *p; + const struct keytype *kt; + int type; + + if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) + return 0; + if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) + return 0; + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + type = sshkey_type_from_name(p); + if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { + if (allow_wildcard) { + /* + * Try matching key types against the string. + * If any has a positive or negative match then + * the component is accepted. + */ + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (match_pattern_list(kt->name, + p, 0) != 0) + break; + } + if (kt->type != -1) + continue; + } + free(s); + return 0; + } + } + free(s); + return 1; +} + +u_int +sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k) +{ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *dsa_p; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (k->rsa == NULL) + return 0; + RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); + return BN_num_bits(rsa_n); + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if (k->dsa == NULL) + return 0; + DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, NULL, NULL); + return BN_num_bits(dsa_p); + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + return 256; /* XXX */ + } + return 0; +} + +static int +sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_XMSS: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +int +sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + if (k == NULL) + return 0; + return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type); +} + +/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */ +int +sshkey_type_plain(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + return KEY_RSA; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + return KEY_DSA; + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + return KEY_ECDSA; + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + return KEY_ED25519; + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + return KEY_XMSS; + default: + return type; + } +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */ +int +sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name) +{ + if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0) + return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0) + return NID_secp384r1; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0) + return NID_secp521r1; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + else + return -1; +} + +u_int +sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid) +{ + switch (nid) { + case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: + return 256; + case NID_secp384r1: + return 384; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + case NID_secp521r1: + return 521; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + default: + return 0; + } +} + +int +sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits) +{ + switch (bits) { + case 256: + return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + case 384: + return NID_secp384r1; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + case 521: + return NID_secp521r1; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + default: + return -1; + } +} + +const char * +sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid) +{ + switch (nid) { + case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: + return "nistp256"; + case NID_secp384r1: + return "nistp384"; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + case NID_secp521r1: + return "nistp521"; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +int +sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid) +{ + int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); + + if (kbits <= 0) + return -1; + + /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */ + if (kbits <= 256) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + else if (kbits <= 384) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384; + else + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +static void +cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert) +{ + u_int i; + + if (cert == NULL) + return; + sshbuf_free(cert->certblob); + sshbuf_free(cert->critical); + sshbuf_free(cert->extensions); + free(cert->key_id); + for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) + free(cert->principals[i]); + free(cert->principals); + sshkey_free(cert->signature_key); + free(cert->signature_type); + freezero(cert, sizeof(*cert)); +} + +static struct sshkey_cert * +cert_new(void) +{ + struct sshkey_cert *cert; + + if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + cert_free(cert); + return NULL; + } + cert->key_id = NULL; + cert->principals = NULL; + cert->signature_key = NULL; + cert->signature_type = NULL; + return cert; +} + +struct sshkey * +sshkey_new(int type) +{ + struct sshkey *k; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + RSA *rsa; + DSA *dsa; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL) + return NULL; + k->type = type; + k->ecdsa = NULL; + k->ecdsa_nid = -1; + k->dsa = NULL; + k->rsa = NULL; + k->cert = NULL; + k->ed25519_sk = NULL; + k->ed25519_pk = NULL; + k->xmss_sk = NULL; + k->xmss_pk = NULL; + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { + free(k); + return NULL; + } + k->rsa = rsa; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) { + free(k); + return NULL; + } + k->dsa = dsa; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + /* no need to prealloc */ + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + break; + default: + free(k); + return NULL; + } + + if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) { + if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) { + sshkey_free(k); + return NULL; + } + } + + return k; +} + +void +sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k) +{ + if (k == NULL) + return; + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + RSA_free(k->rsa); + k->rsa = NULL; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + DSA_free(k->dsa); + k->dsa = NULL; + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa); + k->ecdsa = NULL; + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + freezero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); + k->ed25519_pk = NULL; + freezero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ); + k->ed25519_sk = NULL; + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + freezero(k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k)); + k->xmss_pk = NULL; + freezero(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)); + k->xmss_sk = NULL; + sshkey_xmss_free_state(k); + free(k->xmss_name); + k->xmss_name = NULL; + free(k->xmss_filename); + k->xmss_filename = NULL; + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + case KEY_UNSPEC: + break; + default: + break; + } + if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) + cert_free(k->cert); + freezero(k, sizeof(*k)); +} + +static int +cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b) +{ + if (a == NULL && b == NULL) + return 1; + if (a == NULL || b == NULL) + return 0; + if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob)) + return 0; + if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob), + sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between + * certificates and plain keys too. + */ +int +sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) +{ +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + const BIGNUM *rsa_e_a, *rsa_n_a; + const BIGNUM *rsa_e_b, *rsa_n_b; + const BIGNUM *dsa_p_a, *dsa_q_a, *dsa_g_a, *dsa_pub_key_a; + const BIGNUM *dsa_p_b, *dsa_q_b, *dsa_g_b, *dsa_pub_key_b; +# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + BN_CTX *bnctx; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + if (a == NULL || b == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type)) + return 0; + + switch (a->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA: + if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL) + return 0; + RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &rsa_n_a, &rsa_e_a, NULL); + RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &rsa_n_b, &rsa_e_b, NULL); + return BN_cmp(rsa_e_a, rsa_e_b) == 0 && + BN_cmp(rsa_n_a, rsa_n_b) == 0; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL) + return 0; + DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &dsa_p_a, &dsa_q_a, &dsa_g_a); + DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &dsa_p_b, &dsa_q_b, &dsa_g_b); + DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_a, NULL); + DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_b, NULL); + return BN_cmp(dsa_p_a, dsa_p_b) == 0 && + BN_cmp(dsa_q_a, dsa_q_b) == 0 && + BN_cmp(dsa_g_a, dsa_g_b) == 0 && + BN_cmp(dsa_pub_key_a, dsa_pub_key_b) == 0; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL || + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL || + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL) + return 0; + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return 0; + if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 || + EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) { + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + return 0; + } + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + return 1; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL && + memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + return a->xmss_pk != NULL && b->xmss_pk != NULL && + sshkey_xmss_pklen(a) == sshkey_xmss_pklen(b) && + memcmp(a->xmss_pk, b->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(a)) == 0; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + return 0; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +int +sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) +{ + if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type) + return 0; + if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) { + if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert)) + return 0; + } + return sshkey_equal_public(a, b); +} + +static int +to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) +{ + int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + const char *typename; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + if (key == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + if (key->cert == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; + if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB; + } + type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type; + typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid); + + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + /* Use the existing blob */ + /* XXX modified flag? */ + if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + if (key->dsa == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); + DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (key->ecdsa == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, + sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +# endif + case KEY_RSA: + if (key->rsa == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, + key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + if (key->xmss_name == NULL || key->xmss_pk == NULL || + sshkey_xmss_pklen(key) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, + key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 || + (ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(key, b, opts)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); +} + +int +sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) +{ + struct sshbuf *tmp; + int r; + + if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0, opts); + if (r == 0) + r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp); + sshbuf_free(tmp); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return sshkey_puts_opts(key, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); +} + +int +sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); +} + +static int +to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) +{ + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t len; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (blobp != NULL) + *blobp = NULL; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain, opts)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + if (blobp != NULL) { + if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); + } + ret = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) +{ + return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); +} + +int +sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) +{ + return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); +} + +int +sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, + u_char **retp, size_t *lenp) +{ + u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL; + size_t blob_len = 0; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (retp != NULL) + *retp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT)) + != 0) + goto out; + if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len, + ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + if (retp != NULL) { + *retp = ret; + ret = NULL; + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg); + r = 0; + out: + free(ret); + if (blob != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(blob, blob_len); + free(blob); + } + return r; +} + +static char * +fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) +{ + char *ret; + size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1; + size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1; + int r; + + if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL) + return NULL; + strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen); + strlcat(ret, ":", rlen); + if (dgst_raw_len == 0) + return ret; + if ((r = b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, + ret + plen, rlen - plen)) == -1) { + freezero(ret, rlen); + return NULL; + } + /* Trim padding characters from end */ + ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0'; + return ret; +} + +static char * +fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) +{ + char *retval, hex[5]; + size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2; + + if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL) + return NULL; + strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen); + strlcat(retval, ":", rlen); + for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { + snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x", + i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]); + strlcat(retval, hex, rlen); + } + return retval; +} + +static char * +fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) +{ + char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' }; + char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm', + 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' }; + u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1; + char *retval; + + rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1; + if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL) + return NULL; + retval[j++] = 'x'; + for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { + u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4; + if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) { + idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) + + seed) % 6; + idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15; + idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) + + (seed / 6)) % 6; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; + if ((i + 1) < rounds) { + idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15; + idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx3]; + retval[j++] = '-'; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx4]; + seed = ((seed * 5) + + ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) + + ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36; + } + } else { + idx0 = seed % 6; + idx1 = 16; + idx2 = seed / 6; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; + } + } + retval[j++] = 'x'; + retval[j++] = '\0'; + return retval; +} + +/* + * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can + * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability. + * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some + * scientific publications like this original paper: + * + * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security", + * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic + * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) + * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf + * + * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too. + * + * If you see the picture is different, the key is different. + * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing. + * + * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane, + * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes. + * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls + * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn. + * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be + * walked in either direction. + */ + +/* + * Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point + * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 . + * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would + * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore. + */ +#define FLDBASE 8 +#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1) +#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1) +static char * +fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len, + const struct sshkey *k) +{ + /* + * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm + * intersects with itself. Matter of taste. + */ + char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE"; + char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X]; + u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y]; + size_t i, tlen, hlen; + u_int b; + int x, y, r; + size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1; + + if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* initialize field */ + memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char)); + x = FLDSIZE_X / 2; + y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2; + + /* process raw key */ + for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { + int input; + /* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */ + input = dgst_raw[i]; + for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) { + /* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */ + x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1; + y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1; + + /* assure we are still in bounds */ + x = MAXIMUM(x, 0); + y = MAXIMUM(y, 0); + x = MINIMUM(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1); + y = MINIMUM(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1); + + /* augment the field */ + if (field[x][y] < len - 2) + field[x][y]++; + input = input >> 2; + } + } + + /* mark starting point and end point*/ + field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1; + field[x][y] = len; + + /* assemble title */ + r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]", + sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k)); + /* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */ + if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title)) + r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k)); + tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title); + + /* assemble hash ID. */ + r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg); + hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash); + + /* output upper border */ + p = retval; + *p++ = '+'; + for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++) + *p++ = '-'; + memcpy(p, title, tlen); + p += tlen; + for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) + *p++ = '-'; + *p++ = '+'; + *p++ = '\n'; + + /* output content */ + for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) { + *p++ = '|'; + for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++) + *p++ = augmentation_string[MINIMUM(field[x][y], len)]; + *p++ = '|'; + *p++ = '\n'; + } + + /* output lower border */ + *p++ = '+'; + for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++) + *p++ = '-'; + memcpy(p, hash, hlen); + p += hlen; + for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) + *p++ = '-'; + *p++ = '+'; + + return retval; +} + +char * +sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, + enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep) +{ + char *retval = NULL; + u_char *dgst_raw; + size_t dgst_raw_len; + + if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0) + return NULL; + switch (dgst_rep) { + case SSH_FP_DEFAULT: + if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) { + retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), + dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + } else { + retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), + dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + } + break; + case SSH_FP_HEX: + retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), + dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + break; + case SSH_FP_BASE64: + retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), + dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + break; + case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE: + retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + break; + case SSH_FP_RANDOMART: + retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), + dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k); + break; + default: + explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + free(dgst_raw); + return NULL; + } + explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + free(dgst_raw); + return retval; +} + +static int +peek_type_nid(const char *s, size_t l, int *nid) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->name == NULL || strlen(kt->name) != l) + continue; + if (memcmp(s, kt->name, l) == 0) { + *nid = -1; + if (kt->type == KEY_ECDSA || kt->type == KEY_ECDSA_CERT) + *nid = kt->nid; + return kt->type; + } + } + return KEY_UNSPEC; +} + +/* XXX this can now be made const char * */ +int +sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp) +{ + struct sshkey *k; + char *cp, *blobcopy; + size_t space; + int r, type, curve_nid = -1; + struct sshbuf *blob; + + if (ret == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + switch (ret->type) { + case KEY_UNSPEC: + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + break; /* ok */ + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Decode type */ + cp = *cpp; + space = strcspn(cp, " \t"); + if (space == strlen(cp)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + if ((type = peek_type_nid(cp, space, &curve_nid)) == KEY_UNSPEC) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + + /* skip whitespace */ + for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (*cp == '\0') + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* find end of keyblob and decode */ + space = strcspn(cp, " \t"); + if ((blobcopy = strndup(cp, space)) == NULL) { + sshbuf_free(blob); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, blobcopy)) != 0) { + free(blobcopy); + sshbuf_free(blob); + return r; + } + free(blobcopy); + if ((r = sshkey_fromb(blob, &k)) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(blob); + return r; + } + sshbuf_free(blob); + + /* skip whitespace and leave cp at start of comment */ + for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + + /* ensure type of blob matches type at start of line */ + if (k->type != type) { + sshkey_free(k); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) { + sshkey_free(k); + return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; + } + + /* Fill in ret from parsed key */ + ret->type = type; + if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) { + if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) { + sshkey_free(k); + return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; + } + if (ret->cert != NULL) + cert_free(ret->cert); + ret->cert = k->cert; + k->cert = NULL; + } + switch (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type)) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + RSA_free(ret->rsa); + ret->rsa = k->rsa; + k->rsa = NULL; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8); +#endif + break; + case KEY_DSA: + DSA_free(ret->dsa); + ret->dsa = k->dsa; + k->dsa = NULL; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8); +#endif + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa); + ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa; + ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; + k->ecdsa = NULL; + k->ecdsa_nid = -1; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa); +#endif + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + freezero(ret->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); + ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk; + k->ed25519_pk = NULL; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + /* XXX */ +#endif + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + free(ret->xmss_pk); + ret->xmss_pk = k->xmss_pk; + k->xmss_pk = NULL; + free(ret->xmss_state); + ret->xmss_state = k->xmss_state; + k->xmss_state = NULL; + free(ret->xmss_name); + ret->xmss_name = k->xmss_name; + k->xmss_name = NULL; + free(ret->xmss_filename); + ret->xmss_filename = k->xmss_filename; + k->xmss_filename = NULL; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + /* XXX */ +#endif + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + sshkey_free(k); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + sshkey_free(k); + + /* success */ + *cpp = cp; + return 0; +} + + +int +sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *uu = NULL; + + if (b64p != NULL) + *b64p = NULL; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(b)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* Success */ + if (b64p != NULL) { + *b64p = uu; + uu = NULL; + } + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + free(uu); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + char *uu = NULL; + + if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s", + sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: + free(uu); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0) + goto out; + if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) { + if (feof(f)) + errno = EPIPE; + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } + /* Success */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +const char * +sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (k->cert->type) { + case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER: + return "user"; + case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST: + return "host"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +static int +rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap) +{ + RSA *private = NULL; + BIGNUM *f4 = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (rsap == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || + bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + *rsap = NULL; + if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || + !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + *rsap = private; + private = NULL; + ret = 0; + out: + RSA_free(private); + BN_free(f4); + return ret; +} + +static int +dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap) +{ + DSA *private; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (dsap == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (bits != 1024) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + *dsap = NULL; + if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL, + NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + *dsap = private; + private = NULL; + ret = 0; + out: + DSA_free(private); + return ret; +} + +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +int +sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k) +{ + EC_GROUP *eg; + int nids[] = { + NID_X9_62_prime256v1, + NID_secp384r1, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + NID_secp521r1, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + -1 + }; + int nid; + u_int i; + BN_CTX *bnctx; + const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k); + + /* + * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two + * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID + * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the + * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure + * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that + * are supported. + */ + if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0) + return nid; + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return -1; + for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) { + if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL) { + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + return -1; + } + if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0) + break; + EC_GROUP_free(eg); + } + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + if (nids[i] != -1) { + /* Use the group with the NID attached */ + EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); + if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) { + EC_GROUP_free(eg); + return -1; + } + } + return nids[i]; +} + +static int +ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap) +{ + EC_KEY *private; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + *ecdsap = NULL; + if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); + *ecdsap = private; + private = NULL; + ret = 0; + out: + EC_KEY_free(private); + return ret; +} +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +int +sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp) +{ + struct sshkey *k; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (keyp == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + *keyp = NULL; + if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + switch (type) { + case KEY_ED25519: + if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL || + (k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + break; + } + crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk); + ret = 0; + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + ret = sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(k, bits); + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + ret = dsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->dsa); + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + ret = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid, + &k->ecdsa); + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA: + ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa); + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (ret == 0) { + k->type = type; + *keyp = k; + } else + sshkey_free(k); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key) +{ + u_int i; + const struct sshkey_cert *from; + struct sshkey_cert *to; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (to_key == NULL || (from = from_key->cert) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if ((to = cert_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + if ((r = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions)) != 0) + goto out; + + to->serial = from->serial; + to->type = from->type; + if (from->key_id == NULL) + to->key_id = NULL; + else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + to->valid_after = from->valid_after; + to->valid_before = from->valid_before; + if (from->signature_key == NULL) + to->signature_key = NULL; + else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key, + &to->signature_key)) != 0) + goto out; + if (from->signature_type != NULL && + (to->signature_type = strdup(from->signature_type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if (from->nprincipals > 0) { + if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals, + sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) { + to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]); + if (to->principals[i] == NULL) { + to->nprincipals = i; + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + } + } + to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals; + + /* success */ + cert_free(to_key->cert); + to_key->cert = to; + to = NULL; + r = 0; + out: + cert_free(to); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp) +{ + struct sshkey *n = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e; + BIGNUM *rsa_n_dup = NULL, *rsa_e_dup = NULL; + const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key; + BIGNUM *dsa_p_dup = NULL, *dsa_q_dup = NULL, *dsa_g_dup = NULL; + BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + *pkp = NULL; + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); + DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL); + if ((dsa_p_dup = BN_dup(dsa_p)) == NULL || + (dsa_q_dup = BN_dup(dsa_q)) == NULL || + (dsa_g_dup = BN_dup(dsa_g)) == NULL || + (dsa_pub_key_dup = BN_dup(dsa_pub_key)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (!DSA_set0_pqg(n->dsa, dsa_p_dup, dsa_q_dup, dsa_g_dup)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + dsa_p_dup = dsa_q_dup = dsa_g_dup = NULL; /* transferred */ + if (!DSA_set0_key(n->dsa, dsa_pub_key_dup, NULL)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; /* transferred */ + + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; + n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); + if (n->ecdsa == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); + if ((rsa_n_dup = BN_dup(rsa_n)) == NULL || + (rsa_e_dup = BN_dup(rsa_e)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (!RSA_set0_key(n->rsa, rsa_n_dup, rsa_e_dup, NULL)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rsa_n_dup = rsa_e_dup = NULL; /* transferred */ + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { + if ((n->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); + } + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(n, k->xmss_name)) != 0) + goto out; + if (k->xmss_pk != NULL) { + size_t pklen = sshkey_xmss_pklen(k); + if (pklen == 0 || sshkey_xmss_pklen(n) != pklen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((n->xmss_pk = malloc(pklen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(n->xmss_pk, k->xmss_pk, pklen); + } + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + if (sshkey_is_cert(k) && (r = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + *pkp = n; + n = NULL; + r = 0; + out: + sshkey_free(n); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + BN_clear_free(rsa_n_dup); + BN_clear_free(rsa_e_dup); + BN_clear_free(dsa_p_dup); + BN_clear_free(dsa_q_dup); + BN_clear_free(dsa_g_dup); + BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key_dup); +#endif + + return r; +} + +static int +cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf) +{ + struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL; + struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL; + u_char *sig = NULL; + size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */ + if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0) + return ret; + + /* Parse body of certificate up to signature */ + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) { + /* XXX debug print error for ret */ + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */ + signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b); + + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER && + key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE; + goto out; + } + + /* Parse principals section */ + while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) { + char *principal = NULL; + char **oprincipals = NULL; + + if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal, + NULL)) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + oprincipals = key->cert->principals; + key->cert->principals = recallocarray(key->cert->principals, + key->cert->nprincipals, key->cert->nprincipals + 1, + sizeof(*key->cert->principals)); + if (key->cert->principals == NULL) { + free(principal); + key->cert->principals = oprincipals; + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal; + } + + /* + * Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections + * for later use. + */ + if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 || + (exts != NULL && + (ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0)) + goto out; + + /* + * Validate critical options and extensions sections format. + */ + while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical); + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions); + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + + /* Parse CA key and check signature */ + if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + goto out; + } + if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen, + sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig, slen, &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Success */ + ret = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(ca); + sshbuf_free(crit); + sshbuf_free(exts); + sshbuf_free(principals); + free(sig); + return ret; +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +static int +check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa) +{ + const BIGNUM *rsa_n; + + RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL); + if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH; + return 0; +} +#endif + +static int +sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, + int allow_cert) +{ + int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + size_t len; + u_char *pk = NULL; + struct sshbuf *copy; +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL; + BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL, *dsa_pub_key = NULL; +# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + EC_POINT *q = NULL; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */ + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); + if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + goto out; + } + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + /* Skip nonce */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_RSA: + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, rsa_e) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, rsa_n) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */ + if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0) + goto out; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8); +#endif + break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + /* Skip nonce */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_DSA: + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, dsa_p) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, dsa_q) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, dsa_g) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ + if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, NULL)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + dsa_pub_key = NULL; /* transferred */ +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); +#endif + break; + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + /* Skip nonce */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype); + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa); + if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) + == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa)) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), + q) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; + goto out; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) { + /* XXX assume it is a allocation error */ + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q); +#endif + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + /* Skip nonce */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0) + goto out; + if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + key->ed25519_pk = pk; + pk = NULL; + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + /* Skip nonce */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_XMSS: + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_init(key, xmss_name)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0) + goto out; + if (len == 0 || len != sshkey_xmss_pklen(key)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + key->xmss_pk = pk; + pk = NULL; + if (type != KEY_XMSS_CERT && + (ret = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(key, b)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + case KEY_UNSPEC: + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + + /* Parse certificate potion */ + if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0) + goto out; + + if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + ret = 0; + if (keyp != NULL) { + *keyp = key; + key = NULL; + } + out: + sshbuf_free(copy); + sshkey_free(key); + free(xmss_name); + free(ktype); + free(curve); + free(pk); +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) + BN_clear_free(rsa_n); + BN_clear_free(rsa_e); + BN_clear_free(dsa_p); + BN_clear_free(dsa_q); + BN_clear_free(dsa_g); + BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key); +# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + EC_POINT_free(q); +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + int r; + + if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp) +{ + return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); +} + +int +sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0) + return r; + r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +static int +get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep) +{ + int r; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *sigtype = NULL; + + if (sigtypep != NULL) + *sigtypep = NULL; + if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + if (sigtypep != NULL) { + *sigtypep = sigtype; + sigtype = NULL; + } + r = 0; + out: + free(sigtype); + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; +} + +/* + * + * Checks whether a certificate's signature type is allowed. + * Returns 0 (success) if the certificate signature type appears in the + * "allowed" pattern-list, or the key is not a certificate to begin with. + * Otherwise returns a ssherr.h code. + */ +int +sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *key, const char *allowed) +{ + if (key == NULL || allowed == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(key->type)) + return 0; + if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (match_pattern_list(key->cert->signature_type, allowed, 0) != 1) + return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Returns the expected signature algorithm for a given public key algorithm. + */ +const char * +sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *name) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (strcmp(kt->name, name) != 0) + continue; + if (kt->sigalg != NULL) + return kt->sigalg; + if (!kt->cert) + return kt->name; + return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid( + sshkey_type_plain(kt->type), kt->nid); + } + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Verifies that the signature algorithm appearing inside the signature blob + * matches that which was requested. + */ +int +sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, + const char *requested_alg) +{ + const char *expected_alg; + char *sigtype = NULL; + int r; + + if (requested_alg == NULL) + return 0; + if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((r = get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0) + return r; + r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0; + free(sigtype); + return r ? 0 : SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; +} + +int +sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *key, + u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat) +{ + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + return ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA: + return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + return ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + return ssh_xmss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +/* + * ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error. + * If "alg" specified, then the signature must use that algorithm. + */ +int +sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, + const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat) +{ + if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + return ssh_dss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA: + return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, alg); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + return ssh_xmss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */ +int +sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k) +{ + int newtype; + + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + newtype = KEY_RSA_CERT; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + newtype = KEY_DSA_CERT; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + newtype = KEY_ECDSA_CERT; + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + newtype = KEY_ED25519_CERT; + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + newtype = KEY_XMSS_CERT; + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + k->type = newtype; + return 0; +} + +/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */ +int +sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k) +{ + if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type)) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + cert_free(k->cert); + k->cert = NULL; + k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type); + return 0; +} + +/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */ +int +sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg, + sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx) +{ + struct sshbuf *principals = NULL; + u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32]; + size_t i, ca_len, sig_len; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *cert = NULL; + char *sigtype = NULL; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL || + k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type)) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + + /* + * If no alg specified as argument but a signature_type was set, + * then prefer that. If both were specified, then they must match. + */ + if (alg == NULL) + alg = k->cert->signature_type; + else if (k->cert->signature_type != NULL && + strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + + cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */ + sshbuf_reset(cert); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* -v01 certs put nonce first */ + arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */ + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); + DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_p)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_q)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_g)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_pub_key)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, + sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_ec(cert, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa))) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_e)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_n)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, + k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + if (k->xmss_name == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->xmss_name)) || + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, + k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, + k->cert->principals[i])) != 0) + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */ + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Sign the whole mess */ + if ((ret = signer(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert), + sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) + goto out; + /* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */ + if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0) + goto out; + if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED; + goto out; + } + if (k->cert->signature_type == NULL) { + k->cert->signature_type = sigtype; + sigtype = NULL; + } + /* Append signature and we are done */ + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0) + goto out; + ret = 0; + out: + if (ret != 0) + sshbuf_reset(cert); + free(sig_blob); + free(ca_blob); + free(sigtype); + sshbuf_free(principals); + return ret; +} + +static int +default_key_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *alg, u_int compat, void *ctx) +{ + if (ctx != NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); +} + +int +sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg) +{ + return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, default_key_sign, NULL); +} + +int +sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k, + int want_host, int require_principal, + const char *name, const char **reason) +{ + u_int i, principal_matches; + time_t now = time(NULL); + + if (reason != NULL) + *reason = NULL; + + if (want_host) { + if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + } else { + if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + } + if (now < 0) { + /* yikes - system clock before epoch! */ + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) { + if (require_principal) { + *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + } else if (name != NULL) { + principal_matches = 0; + for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { + if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) { + principal_matches = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!principal_matches) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed " + "principal"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + } + return 0; +} + +size_t +sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l) +{ + char from[32], to[32], ret[64]; + time_t tt; + struct tm *tm; + + *from = *to = '\0'; + if (cert->valid_after == 0 && + cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) + return strlcpy(s, "forever", l); + + if (cert->valid_after != 0) { + /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ + tt = cert->valid_after > INT_MAX ? + INT_MAX : cert->valid_after; + tm = localtime(&tt); + strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); + } + if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { + /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ + tt = cert->valid_before > INT_MAX ? + INT_MAX : cert->valid_before; + tm = localtime(&tt); + strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); + } + + if (cert->valid_after == 0) + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to); + else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from); + else + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to); + + return strlcpy(s, ret, l); +} + +int +sshkey_private_serialize_opt(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *rsa_d, *rsa_iqmp, *rsa_p, *rsa_q; + const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key, *dsa_priv_key; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0) + goto out; + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); + RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q); + RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d); + RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q); + RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g); + DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, &dsa_priv_key); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &dsa_priv_key); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, + sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, + EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, + EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, + ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, + ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, + ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, + ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + if (key->xmss_name == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk, + sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk, + sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0 || + key->xmss_name == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk, + sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk, + sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(key, b, + SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); +} + +int +sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp) +{ + char *tname = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL; + struct sshkey *k = NULL; + size_t pklen = 0, sklen = 0; + int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + u_char *ed25519_pk = NULL, *ed25519_sk = NULL; + u_char *xmss_pk = NULL, *xmss_sk = NULL; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + BIGNUM *exponent = NULL; + BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL; + BIGNUM *rsa_iqmp = NULL, *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL; + BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL; + BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + if (kp != NULL) + *kp = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_q)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_g)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_pub_key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_priv_key)) != 0) + goto out; + if (!DSA_set0_pqg(k->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ + if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */ + break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if ((dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, dsa_priv_key)) != 0) + goto out; + if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, dsa_priv_key)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */ + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { + r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); + if (k->ecdsa == NULL || (exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent))) + goto out; + if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent)) != 0) + goto out; + if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA: + if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_n)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_e)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_q)) != 0) + goto out; + if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ + if (!RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ + if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if ((rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, rsa_q)) != 0) + goto out; + if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, rsa_d)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ + if (!RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ + if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; + k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; + ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; + break; + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; + k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; + ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; + break; +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: + if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, xmss_name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(k) || + sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + k->xmss_pk = xmss_pk; + k->xmss_sk = xmss_sk; + xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL; + /* optional internal state */ + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(k, buf)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (strcmp(xmss_name, k->xmss_name)) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(k) || + sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + k->xmss_pk = xmss_pk; + k->xmss_sk = xmss_sk; + xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL; + /* optional internal state */ + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(k, buf)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + default: + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* enable blinding */ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + break; + } +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + /* success */ + r = 0; + if (kp != NULL) { + *kp = k; + k = NULL; + } + out: + free(tname); + free(curve); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + BN_clear_free(exponent); + BN_clear_free(dsa_p); + BN_clear_free(dsa_q); + BN_clear_free(dsa_g); + BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key); + BN_clear_free(dsa_priv_key); + BN_clear_free(rsa_n); + BN_clear_free(rsa_e); + BN_clear_free(rsa_d); + BN_clear_free(rsa_p); + BN_clear_free(rsa_q); + BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + sshkey_free(k); + freezero(ed25519_pk, pklen); + freezero(ed25519_sk, sklen); + free(xmss_name); + freezero(xmss_pk, pklen); + freezero(xmss_sk, sklen); + return r; +} + +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +int +sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public) +{ + BN_CTX *bnctx; + EC_POINT *nq = NULL; + BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp; + int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; + + /* + * NB. This assumes OpenSSL has already verified that the public + * point lies on the curve. This is done by EC_POINT_oct2point() + * implicitly calling EC_POINT_is_on_curve(). If this code is ever + * reachable with public points not unmarshalled using + * EC_POINT_oct2point then the caller will need to explicitly check. + */ + + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + BN_CTX_start(bnctx); + + /* + * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint() + * refuses to load GF2m points. + */ + if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != + NID_X9_62_prime_field) + goto out; + + /* Q != infinity */ + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public)) + goto out; + + if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */ + if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1 || + EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public, + x, y, bnctx) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 || + BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) + goto out; + + /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */ + if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1) + goto out; + + /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */ + if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0) + goto out; + ret = 0; + out: + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + EC_POINT_free(nq); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key) +{ + BN_CTX *bnctx; + BIGNUM *order, *tmp; + int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; + + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + BN_CTX_start(bnctx); + + if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */ + if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <= + BN_num_bits(order) / 2) + goto out; + + /* private < order - 1 */ + if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0) + goto out; + ret = 0; + out: + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + return ret; +} + +void +sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) +{ + BIGNUM *x, *y; + BN_CTX *bnctx; + + if (point == NULL) { + fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr); + return; + } + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_new failed\n", __func__); + return; + } + BN_CTX_start(bnctx); + if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_get failed\n", __func__); + return; + } + if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != + NID_X9_62_prime_field) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__); + return; + } + if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, + bnctx) != 1) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n", + __func__); + return; + } + fputs("x=", stderr); + BN_print_fp(stderr, x); + fputs("\ny=", stderr); + BN_print_fp(stderr, y); + fputs("\n", stderr); + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); +} + +void +sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key) +{ + const BIGNUM *exponent; + + sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)); + fputs("exponent=", stderr); + if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) + fputs("(NULL)", stderr); + else + BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)); + fputs("\n", stderr); +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + +static int +sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob, + const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername, + int rounds) +{ + u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL; + u_char salt[SALT_LEN]; + char *b64 = NULL; + size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen; + u_int check; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; + const struct sshcipher *cipher; + const char *kdfname = KDFNAME; + struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL; + + if (rounds <= 0) + rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS; + if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) { + ciphername = "none"; + kdfname = "none"; + } else if (ciphername == NULL) + ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME; + if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + + if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); + keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); + ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); + authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); + if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { + arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN); + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), + salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0) + goto out; + } else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) { + /* Unsupported KDF type */ + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; + goto out; + } + if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, + key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */ + (r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */ + + /* Random check bytes */ + check = arc4random(); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* append private key and comment*/ + if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(prv, encrypted, + SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* padding */ + i = 0; + while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + /* length in destination buffer */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* encrypt */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded, + sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, + sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* uuencode */ + if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + sshbuf_reset(blob); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0) + goto out; + for (i = 0; i < strlen(b64); i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, b64[i])) != 0) + goto out; + /* insert line breaks */ + if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (i % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* success */ + r = 0; + + out: + sshbuf_free(kdf); + sshbuf_free(encoded); + sshbuf_free(encrypted); + cipher_free(ciphercontext); + explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt)); + if (key != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); + free(key); + } + if (pubkeyblob != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen); + free(pubkeyblob); + } + if (b64 != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(b64, strlen(b64)); + free(b64); + } + return r; +} + +static int +sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL; + const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL; + const u_char *cp; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t encoded_len; + size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0; + struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL; + struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL; + struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL; + struct sshkey *k = NULL; + u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last; + u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* check preamble */ + cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob); + encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob); + if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) || + memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN; + encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN; + + /* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */ + while (encoded_len > 0) { + if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0) + goto out; + } + last = *cp; + encoded_len--; + cp++; + if (last == '\n') { + if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN && + memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) { + /* \0 terminate */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + } + } + } + if (encoded_len == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* decode base64 */ + if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* check magic */ + if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) || + memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* parse public portion of key */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* pubkey */ + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; + goto out; + } + if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) && + strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { + /* passphrase required */ + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; + goto out; + } + if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (nkeys != 1) { + /* XXX only one key supported */ + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* check size of encrypted key blob */ + blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); + if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* setup key */ + keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); + ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); + authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); + if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0) + goto out; + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen, + key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + + /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */ + if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* decrypt private portion of key */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, + key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded), + encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) { + /* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */ + if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0) + goto out; + /* there should be no trailing data */ + if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* check check bytes */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0) + goto out; + if (check1 != check2) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + goto out; + } + + /* Load the private key and comment */ + if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Check deterministic padding */ + i = 0; + while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0) + goto out; + if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + + /* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */ + + /* success */ + r = 0; + if (keyp != NULL) { + *keyp = k; + k = NULL; + } + if (commentp != NULL) { + *commentp = comment; + comment = NULL; + } + out: + pad = 0; + cipher_free(ciphercontext); + free(ciphername); + free(kdfname); + free(comment); + if (salt != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(salt, slen); + free(salt); + } + if (key != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); + free(key); + } + sshbuf_free(encoded); + sshbuf_free(decoded); + sshbuf_free(kdf); + sshbuf_free(decrypted); + sshkey_free(k); + return r; +} + + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */ +static int +sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, + const char *_passphrase, const char *comment) +{ + int success, r; + int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase); + u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL; + char *bptr; + BIO *bio = NULL; + + if (len > 0 && len <= 4) + return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT; + if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_DSA: + success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa, + cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa, + cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); + break; +#endif + case KEY_RSA: + success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa, + cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); + break; + default: + success = 0; + break; + } + if (success == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: + BIO_free(bio); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */ +int +sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, + const char *passphrase, const char *comment, + int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) +{ + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_RSA: + if (force_new_format) { + return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, + comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); + } + return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob, + passphrase, comment); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, + comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } +} + + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +static int +translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err) +{ + int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err); + + switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) { + case ERR_LIB_PEM: + switch (pem_reason) { + case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ: + case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD: + case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + case ERR_LIB_EVP: + switch (pem_reason) { + case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; +#ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR + case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR: +#endif + case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR: +#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR + case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR: +#endif + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + default: + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + case ERR_LIB_ASN1: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +} + +static void +clear_libcrypto_errors(void) +{ + while (ERR_get_error() != 0) + ; +} + +/* + * Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether + * passphrase is required/incorrect. + */ +static int +convert_libcrypto_error(void) +{ + /* + * Some password errors are reported at the beginning + * of the error queue. + */ + if (translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_error()) == + SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + return translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_last_error()); +} + +static int +pem_passphrase_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u) +{ + char *p = (char *)u; + size_t len; + + if (p == NULL || (len = strlen(p)) == 0) + return -1; + if (size < 0 || len > (size_t)size) + return -1; + memcpy(buf, p, len); + return (int)len; +} + +static int +sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, + const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; + struct sshkey *prv = NULL; + BIO *bio = NULL; + int r; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + + if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) != + (int)sshbuf_len(blob)) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + clear_libcrypto_errors(); + if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, pem_passphrase_cb, + (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) { + /* + * libcrypto may return various ASN.1 errors when attempting + * to parse a key with an incorrect passphrase. + * Treat all format errors as "incorrect passphrase" if a + * passphrase was supplied. + */ + if (passphrase != NULL && *passphrase != '\0') + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + else + r = convert_libcrypto_error(); + goto out; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA && + (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) { + if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk); + prv->type = KEY_RSA; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8); +#endif + if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0) + goto out; + } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA && + (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) { + if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk); + prv->type = KEY_DSA; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8); +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + } else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC && + (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) { + if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk); + prv->type = KEY_ECDSA; + prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa); + if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 || + sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL || + sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 || + sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } +# ifdef DEBUG_PK + if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL) + sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa); +# endif +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + } else { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + r = 0; + if (keyp != NULL) { + *keyp = prv; + prv = NULL; + } + out: + BIO_free(bio); + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + sshkey_free(prv); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +int +sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, + const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_RSA: + return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, + passphrase, keyp); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + case KEY_XMSS: +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, + keyp, commentp); + case KEY_UNSPEC: + r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp, + commentp); + /* Do not fallback to PEM parser if only passphrase is wrong. */ + if (r == 0 || r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + return r; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, + passphrase, keyp); +#else + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +int +sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC, + passphrase, keyp, commentp); +} + +#ifdef WITH_XMSS +/* + * serialize the key with the current state and forward the state + * maxsign times. + */ +int +sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, + u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr) +{ + int r, rupdate; + + if (maxsign == 0 || + sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS) + return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, + SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); + if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(k, pr)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, + SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, maxsign)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; +out: + if ((rupdate = sshkey_xmss_update_state(k, pr)) != 0) { + if (r == 0) + r = rupdate; + } + return r; +} + +u_int32_t +sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS) + return sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k); + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign) +{ + if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign); +} + +int +sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename) +{ + if (k == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS) + return 0; + if (filename == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((k->xmss_filename = strdup(filename)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + return 0; +} +#else +int +sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b, + u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr) +{ + return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT); +} + +u_int32_t +sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign) +{ + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +int +sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename) +{ + if (k == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return 0; +} +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f6a007f --- /dev/null +++ b/sshkey.h @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.30 2018/09/14 04:17:44 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef SSHKEY_H +#define SSHKEY_H + +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +# include +# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +# define EC_KEY void +# define EC_GROUP void +# define EC_POINT void +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +# define BIGNUM void +# define RSA void +# define DSA void +# define EC_KEY void +# define EC_GROUP void +# define EC_POINT void +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 1024 +#define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20) + +struct sshbuf; + +/* Key types */ +enum sshkey_types { + KEY_RSA, + KEY_DSA, + KEY_ECDSA, + KEY_ED25519, + KEY_RSA_CERT, + KEY_DSA_CERT, + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, + KEY_ED25519_CERT, + KEY_XMSS, + KEY_XMSS_CERT, + KEY_UNSPEC +}; + +/* Default fingerprint hash */ +#define SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 + +/* Fingerprint representation formats */ +enum sshkey_fp_rep { + SSH_FP_DEFAULT = 0, + SSH_FP_HEX, + SSH_FP_BASE64, + SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE, + SSH_FP_RANDOMART +}; + +/* Private key serialisation formats, used on the wire */ +enum sshkey_serialize_rep { + SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT = 0, + SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE = 1, + SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL = 2, + SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254, +}; + +/* key is stored in external hardware */ +#define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 + +#define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256 +/* XXX opaquify? */ +struct sshkey_cert { + struct sshbuf *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */ + u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */ + u_int64_t serial; + char *key_id; + u_int nprincipals; + char **principals; + u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before; + struct sshbuf *critical; + struct sshbuf *extensions; + struct sshkey *signature_key; + char *signature_type; +}; + +/* XXX opaquify? */ +struct sshkey { + int type; + int flags; + RSA *rsa; + DSA *dsa; + int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */ + EC_KEY *ecdsa; + u_char *ed25519_sk; + u_char *ed25519_pk; + char *xmss_name; + char *xmss_filename; /* for state file updates */ + void *xmss_state; /* depends on xmss_name, opaque */ + u_char *xmss_sk; + u_char *xmss_pk; + struct sshkey_cert *cert; +}; + +#define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES +#define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES + +struct sshkey *sshkey_new(int); +void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *, + const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *); +char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *, + int, enum sshkey_fp_rep); +int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, + int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp); +const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *); +const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); +int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **); +u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *); + +int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); +int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); +int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); +int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); +int sshkey_type_plain(int); +int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int, + const char *, const char **); +size_t sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *, + char *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__, 2, 3))); +int sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *, const char *); + +int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *); +/* Variant allowing use of a custom signature function (e.g. for ssh-agent) */ +typedef int sshkey_certify_signer(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, void *); +int sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *, + sshkey_certify_signer *, void *); + +int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *); +int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *); +const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int); +u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int); +int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int); +int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *); +int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid); +int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); +int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *); +const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *); +const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int); +char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char); + +int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **); +int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); +int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); +int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); +int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **); +int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep); +int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); +int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); + +int sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); +int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, + const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int); +int sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *); +const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *); + +/* for debug */ +void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); +void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *); + +/* private key parsing and serialisation */ +int sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf); +int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf, + enum sshkey_serialize_rep); +int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp); + +/* private key file format parsing and serialisation */ +int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, + const char *passphrase, const char *comment, + int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds); +int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, + const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); +int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, + const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); + +/* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */ +int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *); + +/* stateful keys (e.g. XMSS) */ +#ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS +typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...); +#else +typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +#endif +int sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *, const char *); +int sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t); +u_int32_t sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t, sshkey_printfn *); +int sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf, + u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr); + +#ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL +int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, + u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *ident); +int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *alg); +int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_xmss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_xmss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +#endif + +#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) +# undef RSA +# undef DSA +# undef EC_KEY +# undef EC_GROUP +# undef EC_POINT +#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +# undef EC_KEY +# undef EC_GROUP +# undef EC_POINT +#endif + +#endif /* SSHKEY_H */ diff --git a/sshlogin.c b/sshlogin.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b2ee5f --- /dev/null +++ b/sshlogin.c @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.33 2018/07/09 21:26:02 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does. We cannot + * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are + * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of + * login the current system has. Also, we want to be able to execute commands + * on a tty. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * + * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "sshlogin.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "loginrec.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" + +extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg; +extern ServerOptions options; + +/* + * Returns the time when the user last logged in. Returns 0 if the + * information is not available. This must be called before record_login. + * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf. + */ +time_t +get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname, + char *buf, size_t bufsize) +{ + struct logininfo li; + + login_get_lastlog(&li, uid); + strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize); + return (time_t)li.tv_sec; +} + +/* + * Generate and store last login message. This must be done before + * login_login() is called and lastlog is updated. + */ +static void +store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid) +{ +#ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG + char *time_string, hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX+1] = ""; + time_t last_login_time; + int r; + + if (!options.print_lastlog) + return; + +# ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG + time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid); + if (time_string != NULL) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, + time_string, strlen(time_string))) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(time_string); + } +# else + last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname, + sizeof(hostname)); + + if (last_login_time != 0) { + time_string = ctime(&last_login_time); + time_string[strcspn(time_string, "\n")] = '\0'; + if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0) + r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Last login: %s\r\n", + time_string); + else + r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Last login: %s from %s\r\n", + time_string, hostname); + if (r != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } +# endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */ +#endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */ +} + +/* + * Records that the user has logged in. I wish these parts of operating + * systems were more standardized. + */ +void +record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid, + const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) +{ + struct logininfo *li; + + /* save previous login details before writing new */ + store_lastlog_message(user, uid); + + li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty); + login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen); + login_login(li); + login_free_entry(li); +} + +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +void +record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, + const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) +{ + struct logininfo *li; + + li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname); + login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen); + login_utmp_only(li); + login_free_entry(li); +} +#endif + +/* Records that the user has logged out. */ +void +record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user) +{ + struct logininfo *li; + + li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty); + login_logout(li); + login_free_entry(li); +} diff --git a/sshlogin.h b/sshlogin.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52119a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshlogin.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.8 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +void record_login(pid_t, const char *, const char *, uid_t, + const char *, struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); +void record_logout(pid_t, const char *, const char *); +time_t get_last_login_time(uid_t, const char *, char *, size_t); + +#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX +void record_utmp_only(pid_t, const char *, const char *, const char *, + struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); +#endif diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4da84d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshpty.c @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.31 2016/11/29 03:54:50 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include +#endif +#include + +#include "sshpty.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H +# include +#endif + +#ifndef O_NOCTTY +#define O_NOCTTY 0 +#endif + +#ifdef __APPLE__ +# include +# if (MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5) +# define __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ +# endif +#endif + +/* + * Allocates and opens a pty. Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or + * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated. On success, open file + * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are + * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters). + */ + +int +pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) +{ + /* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */ + char *name; + int i; + + i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (i < 0) { + error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return 0; + } + name = ttyname(*ttyfd); + if (!name) + fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails."); + + strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); /* possible truncation */ + return 1; +} + +/* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */ + +void +pty_release(const char *tty) +{ +#if !defined(__APPLE_PRIVPTY__) && !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) + if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0) + error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); + if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) < 0) + error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); +#endif /* !__APPLE_PRIVPTY__ && !HAVE_OPENPTY */ +} + +/* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */ + +void +pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty) +{ + int fd; + + /* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */ +#ifdef TIOCNOTTY + fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (fd >= 0) { + (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); + close(fd); + } +#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ + if (setsid() < 0) + error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + + /* + * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling + * tty. + */ + fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); + if (fd >= 0) { + error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty."); + close(fd); + } + /* Make it our controlling tty. */ +#ifdef TIOCSCTTY + debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY."); + if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0) + error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#endif /* TIOCSCTTY */ +#ifdef NEED_SETPGRP + if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0) + error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno)); +#endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */ + fd = open(tty, O_RDWR); + if (fd < 0) + error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); + else + close(fd); + + /* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */ + fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY); + if (fd < 0) + error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s", + strerror(errno)); + else + close(fd); +} + +/* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */ + +void +pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col, + u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel) +{ + struct winsize w; + + /* may truncate u_int -> u_short */ + w.ws_row = row; + w.ws_col = col; + w.ws_xpixel = xpixel; + w.ws_ypixel = ypixel; + (void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w); +} + +void +pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty) +{ + struct group *grp; + gid_t gid; + mode_t mode; + struct stat st; + + /* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */ + grp = getgrnam("tty"); + gid = (grp != NULL) ? grp->gr_gid : pw->pw_gid; + mode = (grp != NULL) ? 0620 : 0600; + + /* + * Change owner and mode of the tty as required. + * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/ + * tty is owned by root. + */ + if (stat(tty, &st)) + fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty, + strerror(errno)); + +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty); +#endif + + if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) { + if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) { + if (errno == EROFS && + (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) + debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s", + tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid, + strerror(errno)); + else + fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s", + tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid, + strerror(errno)); + } + } + + if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) { + if (chmod(tty, mode) < 0) { + if (errno == EROFS && + (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0) + debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", + tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno)); + else + fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", + tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno)); + } + } +} + +/* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ +void +disconnect_controlling_tty(void) +{ +#ifdef TIOCNOTTY + int fd; + + if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) { + (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); + close(fd); + } +#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ +} diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9ec7e9a --- /dev/null +++ b/sshpty.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.h,v 1.13 2016/11/29 03:54:50 dtucker Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Functions for allocating a pseudo-terminal and making it the controlling + * tty. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include + +struct termios *get_saved_tio(void); +void leave_raw_mode(int); +void enter_raw_mode(int); + +int pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t); +void pty_release(const char *); +void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *); +void pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int); +void pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *); +void disconnect_controlling_tty(void); diff --git a/sshtty.c b/sshtty.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d214ce3 --- /dev/null +++ b/sshtty.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshtty.c,v 1.14 2010/01/09 05:04:24 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "sshpty.h" + +static struct termios _saved_tio; +static int _in_raw_mode = 0; + +struct termios * +get_saved_tio(void) +{ + return _in_raw_mode ? &_saved_tio : NULL; +} + +void +leave_raw_mode(int quiet) +{ + if (!_in_raw_mode) + return; + if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &_saved_tio) == -1) { + if (!quiet) + perror("tcsetattr"); + } else + _in_raw_mode = 0; +} + +void +enter_raw_mode(int quiet) +{ + struct termios tio; + + if (tcgetattr(fileno(stdin), &tio) == -1) { + if (!quiet) + perror("tcgetattr"); + return; + } + _saved_tio = tio; + tio.c_iflag |= IGNPAR; + tio.c_iflag &= ~(ISTRIP | INLCR | IGNCR | ICRNL | IXON | IXANY | IXOFF); +#ifdef IUCLC + tio.c_iflag &= ~IUCLC; +#endif + tio.c_lflag &= ~(ISIG | ICANON | ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL); +#ifdef IEXTEN + tio.c_lflag &= ~IEXTEN; +#endif + tio.c_oflag &= ~OPOST; + tio.c_cc[VMIN] = 1; + tio.c_cc[VTIME] = 0; + if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &tio) == -1) { + if (!quiet) + perror("tcsetattr"); + } else + _in_raw_mode = 1; +} diff --git a/survey.sh.in b/survey.sh.in new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6075a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/survey.sh.in @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker +# +# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any +# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above +# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES +# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR +# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES +# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN +# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF +# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + +host="@host@" +AWK="@AWK@" +CC="@CC@" +CPP="@CPP@" +CFLAGS="@CFLAGS@" +CPPFLAGS="@CPPFLAGS@" +LDFLAGS="@LDFLAGS@" +LIBS="@LIBS@" + +# Note format: +# identifier: [data] CRCR + +echo "openssh-survey-version: 1" +echo +echo "openssh-version: `./ssh -V 2>&1`" +echo +configinv=`$AWK '/^ \\\$.*configure/' config.log | sed 's/^ \\\$ //g'` +echo "configure-invocation: $configinv" +echo +echo "host: $host" +echo +echo "uname: `uname`" +echo +echo "uname-r: `uname -r`" +echo +echo "uname-m: `uname -m`" +echo +echo "uname-p: `uname -p`" +echo +echo "oslevel: `oslevel 2>/dev/null`" +echo +echo "oslevel-r: `oslevel -r 2>/dev/null`" +echo +echo "cc: $CC" +echo +echo "cflags: $CFLAGS" +echo +echo "cppflags: $CPPFLAGS" +echo +echo "ldflags: $LDFLAGS" +echo +echo "libs: $LIBS" +echo +echo "ccver-v: `$CC -v 2>&1 | sed '/^[ \t]*$/d'`" +echo +echo "ccver-V: `$CC -V 2>&1 | sed '/^[ \t]*$/d'`" +echo +echo "cppdefines:" +${CPP} -dM - + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* + * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Encoding and decoding of terminal modes in a portable way. + * Much of the format is defined in ttymodes.h; it is included multiple times + * into this file with the appropriate macro definitions to generate the + * suitable code. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "packet.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "compat.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +#define TTY_OP_END 0 +/* + * uint32 (u_int) follows speed. + */ +#define TTY_OP_ISPEED 128 +#define TTY_OP_OSPEED 129 + +/* + * Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate. The values of the + * constants for speed_t are not themselves portable. + */ +static int +speed_to_baud(speed_t speed) +{ + switch (speed) { + case B0: + return 0; + case B50: + return 50; + case B75: + return 75; + case B110: + return 110; + case B134: + return 134; + case B150: + return 150; + case B200: + return 200; + case B300: + return 300; + case B600: + return 600; + case B1200: + return 1200; + case B1800: + return 1800; + case B2400: + return 2400; + case B4800: + return 4800; + case B9600: + return 9600; + +#ifdef B19200 + case B19200: + return 19200; +#else /* B19200 */ +#ifdef EXTA + case EXTA: + return 19200; +#endif /* EXTA */ +#endif /* B19200 */ + +#ifdef B38400 + case B38400: + return 38400; +#else /* B38400 */ +#ifdef EXTB + case EXTB: + return 38400; +#endif /* EXTB */ +#endif /* B38400 */ + +#ifdef B7200 + case B7200: + return 7200; +#endif /* B7200 */ +#ifdef B14400 + case B14400: + return 14400; +#endif /* B14400 */ +#ifdef B28800 + case B28800: + return 28800; +#endif /* B28800 */ +#ifdef B57600 + case B57600: + return 57600; +#endif /* B57600 */ +#ifdef B76800 + case B76800: + return 76800; +#endif /* B76800 */ +#ifdef B115200 + case B115200: + return 115200; +#endif /* B115200 */ +#ifdef B230400 + case B230400: + return 230400; +#endif /* B230400 */ + default: + return 9600; + } +} + +/* + * Converts a numeric baud rate to a POSIX speed_t. + */ +static speed_t +baud_to_speed(int baud) +{ + switch (baud) { + case 0: + return B0; + case 50: + return B50; + case 75: + return B75; + case 110: + return B110; + case 134: + return B134; + case 150: + return B150; + case 200: + return B200; + case 300: + return B300; + case 600: + return B600; + case 1200: + return B1200; + case 1800: + return B1800; + case 2400: + return B2400; + case 4800: + return B4800; + case 9600: + return B9600; + +#ifdef B19200 + case 19200: + return B19200; +#else /* B19200 */ +#ifdef EXTA + case 19200: + return EXTA; +#endif /* EXTA */ +#endif /* B19200 */ + +#ifdef B38400 + case 38400: + return B38400; +#else /* B38400 */ +#ifdef EXTB + case 38400: + return EXTB; +#endif /* EXTB */ +#endif /* B38400 */ + +#ifdef B7200 + case 7200: + return B7200; +#endif /* B7200 */ +#ifdef B14400 + case 14400: + return B14400; +#endif /* B14400 */ +#ifdef B28800 + case 28800: + return B28800; +#endif /* B28800 */ +#ifdef B57600 + case 57600: + return B57600; +#endif /* B57600 */ +#ifdef B76800 + case 76800: + return B76800; +#endif /* B76800 */ +#ifdef B115200 + case 115200: + return B115200; +#endif /* B115200 */ +#ifdef B230400 + case 230400: + return B230400; +#endif /* B230400 */ + default: + return B9600; + } +} + +/* + * Encode a special character into SSH line format. + */ +static u_int +special_char_encode(cc_t c) +{ +#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE + if (c == _POSIX_VDISABLE) + return 255; +#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */ + return c; +} + +/* + * Decode a special character from SSH line format. + */ +static cc_t +special_char_decode(u_int c) +{ +#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE + if (c == 255) + return _POSIX_VDISABLE; +#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */ + return c; +} + +/* + * Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd + * or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet + * being constructed. + */ +void +ssh_tty_make_modes(struct ssh *ssh, int fd, struct termios *tiop) +{ + struct termios tio; + struct sshbuf *buf; + int r, ibaud, obaud; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + if (tiop == NULL) { + if (fd == -1) { + debug("%s: no fd or tio", __func__); + goto end; + } + if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) { + logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + goto end; + } + } else + tio = *tiop; + + /* Store input and output baud rates. */ + obaud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio)); + ibaud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio)); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_OSPEED)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, obaud)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_ISPEED)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, ibaud)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + /* Store values of mode flags. */ +#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, OP)) != 0 || \ + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, \ + special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME]))) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ + +#define SSH_TTYMODE_IUTF8 42 /* for SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE */ + +#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \ + if (OP == SSH_TTYMODE_IUTF8 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE)) { \ + debug3("%s: SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE", __func__); \ + } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, OP)) != 0 || \ + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0))) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); \ + +#include "ttymodes.h" + +#undef TTYCHAR +#undef TTYMODE + +end: + /* Mark end of mode data. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_END)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sshbuf_free(buf); +} + +/* + * Decodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd in a portable + * manner from a packet being read. + */ +void +ssh_tty_parse_modes(struct ssh *ssh, int fd) +{ + struct termios tio; + struct sshbuf *buf; + const u_char *data; + u_char opcode; + u_int baud, u; + int r, failure = 0; + size_t len; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (len == 0) + return; + if ((buf = sshbuf_from(data, len)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); + return; + } + + /* + * Get old attributes for the terminal. We will modify these + * flags. I am hoping that if there are any machine-specific + * modes, they will initially have reasonable values. + */ + if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) { + logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + failure = -1; + } + + while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &opcode)) != 0) + fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + switch (opcode) { + case TTY_OP_END: + goto set; + + case TTY_OP_ISPEED: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &baud)) != 0) + fatal("%s: packet error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (failure != -1 && + cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1) + error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud); + break; + + case TTY_OP_OSPEED: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &baud)) != 0) + fatal("%s: packet error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (failure != -1 && + cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1) + error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud); + break; + +#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \ + case OP: \ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &u)) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, \ + ssh_err(r)); \ + tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(u); \ + break; +#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \ + case OP: \ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &u)) != 0) \ + fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, \ + ssh_err(r)); \ + if (u) \ + tio.FIELD |= NAME; \ + else \ + tio.FIELD &= ~NAME; \ + break; + +#include "ttymodes.h" + +#undef TTYCHAR +#undef TTYMODE + + default: + debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)", + opcode, opcode); + /* + * SSH2: + * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have a uint32 + * argument. + * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and cause parsing + * to stop. + */ + if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0) + fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, + ssh_err(r)); + break; + } else { + logit("%s: unknown opcode %d", __func__, + opcode); + goto set; + } + } + } + +set: + len = sshbuf_len(buf); + sshbuf_free(buf); + if (len > 0) { + logit("%s: %zu bytes left", __func__, len); + return; /* Don't process bytes passed */ + } + if (failure == -1) + return; /* Packet parsed ok but tcgetattr() failed */ + + /* Set the new modes for the terminal. */ + if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tio) == -1) + logit("Setting tty modes failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +} diff --git a/ttymodes.h b/ttymodes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24f0756 --- /dev/null +++ b/ttymodes.h @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.16 2017/04/30 23:26:54 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +/* + * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves. + * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * The tty mode description is a string, consisting of + * opcode-arguments pairs. It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0). + * Opcodes 1-159 have uint32 arguments. + * Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined and cause parsing to stop (they + * should only be used after any other data). + * + * The client puts in the string any modes it knows about, and the + * server ignores any modes it does not know about. This allows some degree + * of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a posix-like + * tty interface. The protocol can support other systems as well, but might + * require reimplementing as mode names would likely be different. + */ + +/* + * Some constants and prototypes are defined in packet.h; this file + * is only intended for including from ttymodes.c. + */ + +/* termios macro */ +/* name, op */ +TTYCHAR(VINTR, 1) +TTYCHAR(VQUIT, 2) +TTYCHAR(VERASE, 3) +#if defined(VKILL) +TTYCHAR(VKILL, 4) +#endif /* VKILL */ +TTYCHAR(VEOF, 5) +#if defined(VEOL) +TTYCHAR(VEOL, 6) +#endif /* VEOL */ +#ifdef VEOL2 +TTYCHAR(VEOL2, 7) +#endif /* VEOL2 */ +TTYCHAR(VSTART, 8) +TTYCHAR(VSTOP, 9) +#if defined(VSUSP) +TTYCHAR(VSUSP, 10) +#endif /* VSUSP */ +#if defined(VDSUSP) +TTYCHAR(VDSUSP, 11) +#endif /* VDSUSP */ +#if defined(VREPRINT) +TTYCHAR(VREPRINT, 12) +#endif /* VREPRINT */ +#if defined(VWERASE) +TTYCHAR(VWERASE, 13) +#endif /* VWERASE */ +#if defined(VLNEXT) +TTYCHAR(VLNEXT, 14) +#endif /* VLNEXT */ +#if defined(VFLUSH) +TTYCHAR(VFLUSH, 15) +#endif /* VFLUSH */ +#ifdef VSWTCH +TTYCHAR(VSWTCH, 16) +#endif /* VSWTCH */ +#if defined(VSTATUS) +TTYCHAR(VSTATUS, 17) +#endif /* VSTATUS */ +#ifdef VDISCARD +TTYCHAR(VDISCARD, 18) +#endif /* VDISCARD */ + +/* name, field, op */ +TTYMODE(IGNPAR, c_iflag, 30) +TTYMODE(PARMRK, c_iflag, 31) +TTYMODE(INPCK, c_iflag, 32) +TTYMODE(ISTRIP, c_iflag, 33) +TTYMODE(INLCR, c_iflag, 34) +TTYMODE(IGNCR, c_iflag, 35) +TTYMODE(ICRNL, c_iflag, 36) +#if defined(IUCLC) +TTYMODE(IUCLC, c_iflag, 37) +#endif +TTYMODE(IXON, c_iflag, 38) +TTYMODE(IXANY, c_iflag, 39) +TTYMODE(IXOFF, c_iflag, 40) +#ifdef IMAXBEL +TTYMODE(IMAXBEL,c_iflag, 41) +#endif /* IMAXBEL */ +#ifdef IUTF8 +TTYMODE(IUTF8, c_iflag, 42) +#endif /* IUTF8 */ + +TTYMODE(ISIG, c_lflag, 50) +TTYMODE(ICANON, c_lflag, 51) +#ifdef XCASE +TTYMODE(XCASE, c_lflag, 52) +#endif +TTYMODE(ECHO, c_lflag, 53) +TTYMODE(ECHOE, c_lflag, 54) +TTYMODE(ECHOK, c_lflag, 55) +TTYMODE(ECHONL, c_lflag, 56) +TTYMODE(NOFLSH, c_lflag, 57) +TTYMODE(TOSTOP, c_lflag, 58) +#ifdef IEXTEN +TTYMODE(IEXTEN, c_lflag, 59) +#endif /* IEXTEN */ +#if defined(ECHOCTL) +TTYMODE(ECHOCTL,c_lflag, 60) +#endif /* ECHOCTL */ +#ifdef ECHOKE +TTYMODE(ECHOKE, c_lflag, 61) +#endif /* ECHOKE */ +#if defined(PENDIN) +TTYMODE(PENDIN, c_lflag, 62) +#endif /* PENDIN */ + +TTYMODE(OPOST, c_oflag, 70) +#if defined(OLCUC) +TTYMODE(OLCUC, c_oflag, 71) +#endif +#ifdef ONLCR +TTYMODE(ONLCR, c_oflag, 72) +#endif +#ifdef OCRNL +TTYMODE(OCRNL, c_oflag, 73) +#endif +#ifdef ONOCR +TTYMODE(ONOCR, c_oflag, 74) +#endif +#ifdef ONLRET +TTYMODE(ONLRET, c_oflag, 75) +#endif + +TTYMODE(CS7, c_cflag, 90) +TTYMODE(CS8, c_cflag, 91) +TTYMODE(PARENB, c_cflag, 92) +TTYMODE(PARODD, c_cflag, 93) diff --git a/uidswap.c b/uidswap.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49f76d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/uidswap.c @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.41 2018/07/18 11:34:04 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Code for uid-swapping. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "uidswap.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* + * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases: + * 1. euid=0, ruid=0 + * 2. euid=0, ruid!=0 + * 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0 + * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has + * POSIX saved uids or not. + */ + +#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) +/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that + is not part of the posix specification. */ +#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID +/* Saved effective uid. */ +static uid_t saved_euid = 0; +static gid_t saved_egid = 0; +#endif + +/* Saved effective uid. */ +static int privileged = 0; +static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; +static uid_t user_groups_uid; +static gid_t *saved_egroups = NULL, *user_groups = NULL; +static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1; + +/* + * Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user + * id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested. + */ +void +temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) +{ + /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */ +#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID + saved_euid = geteuid(); + saved_egid = getegid(); + debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)", + (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, + (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); +#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN + if (saved_euid != 0) { + privileged = 0; + return; + } +#endif +#else + if (geteuid() != 0) { + privileged = 0; + return; + } +#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + + privileged = 1; + temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1; + + saved_egroupslen = getgroups(0, NULL); + if (saved_egroupslen < 0) + fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (saved_egroupslen > 0) { + saved_egroups = xreallocarray(saved_egroups, + saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); + if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) + fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */ + free(saved_egroups); + saved_egroups = NULL; + } + + /* set and save the user's groups */ + if (user_groupslen == -1 || user_groups_uid != pw->pw_uid) { + if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, + strerror(errno)); + + user_groupslen = getgroups(0, NULL); + if (user_groupslen < 0) + fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + if (user_groupslen > 0) { + user_groups = xreallocarray(user_groups, + user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); + if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) + fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + } else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */ + free(user_groups); + user_groups = NULL; + } + user_groups_uid = pw->pw_uid; + } + /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */ + if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) + fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); +#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID + /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */ + if (setgid(getegid()) < 0) + debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno)); + /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */ + if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) + debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno)); +#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, + strerror(errno)); + if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) + fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, + strerror(errno)); +} + +/* + * Restores to the original (privileged) uid. + */ +void +restore_uid(void) +{ + /* it's a no-op unless privileged */ + if (!privileged) { + debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)"); + return; + } + if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective) + fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective"); + +#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID + debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); + /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */ + if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0) + fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno)); + if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0) + fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno)); +#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + /* + * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value. + * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid + * as well. + */ + setuid(getuid()); + setgid(getgid()); +#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ + + if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) + fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; +} + +/* + * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be + * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective. + */ +void +permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw) +{ +#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST + uid_t old_uid = getuid(); + gid_t old_gid = getgid(); +#endif + + if (pw == NULL) + fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given"); + if (temporarily_use_uid_effective) + fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective"); + debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, + (u_int)pw->pw_gid); + + if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); + +#ifdef __APPLE__ + /* + * OS X requires initgroups after setgid to opt back into + * memberd support for >16 supplemental groups. + */ + if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) + fatal("initgroups %.100s %u: %.100s", + pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); +#endif + + if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0) + fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); + +#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST + /* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */ + if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 && + (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1)) + fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__); +#endif + + /* Verify GID drop was successful */ + if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) { + fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)", + __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(), + (u_int)pw->pw_gid); + } + +#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST + /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */ + if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid && + (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1)) + fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__); +#endif + + /* Verify UID drop was successful */ + if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) { + fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)", + __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), + (u_int)pw->pw_uid); + } +} diff --git a/uidswap.h b/uidswap.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ac91aa --- /dev/null +++ b/uidswap.h @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.h,v 1.14 2018/07/18 11:34:05 dtucker Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +void temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *); +void restore_uid(void); +void permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *); diff --git a/umac.c b/umac.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ccae39f --- /dev/null +++ b/umac.c @@ -0,0 +1,1282 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.17 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + * + * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication + * + * Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18 + * + * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC + * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac + * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage. + * + * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and + * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby + * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies + * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright + * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to + * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission. + * + * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) + * + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + + /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES ///////////////////////////////// + * + * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB + * + * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte + * aligned + * + * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in + * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself + * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be + * zeroed. + * + * 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of + * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found + * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for + * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and + * rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU + * Public lisence at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It + * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is + * the third. + * + * 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes + * produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why. + * + /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */ + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN +#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 8 /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16 */ +#endif + +#if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \ + UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16 +# error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16 +#endif + +/* #define FORCE_C_ONLY 1 ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd */ +/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */ +/* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */ +/* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */ +/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable authenticated encryption */ + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "umac.h" +#include "misc.h" + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* --- Primitive Data Types --- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* The following assumptions may need change on your system */ +typedef u_int8_t UINT8; /* 1 byte */ +typedef u_int16_t UINT16; /* 2 byte */ +typedef u_int32_t UINT32; /* 4 byte */ +typedef u_int64_t UINT64; /* 8 bytes */ +typedef unsigned int UWORD; /* Register */ + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#define UMAC_KEY_LEN 16 /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */ + +/* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner. */ +/* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must */ +/* be set true if the host computer is little-endian. */ + +#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN +#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1 +#else +#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0 +#endif + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b))) + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) +#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32(p) +#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32(p,v) +#else +#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32_le(p) +#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32_le(p,v) +#endif + +#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p) (get_u32_le(p)) +#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v) put_u32(p, v) + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */ +#define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16 + +/* OpenSSL's AES */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL +# include +#endif +typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1]; +#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \ + AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key) +#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \ + AES_set_encrypt_key((const u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key) +#else +#include "rijndael.h" +#define AES_ROUNDS ((UMAC_KEY_LEN / 4) + 6) +typedef UINT8 aes_int_key[AES_ROUNDS+1][4][4]; /* AES internal */ +#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \ + rijndaelEncrypt((u32 *)(int_key), AES_ROUNDS, (u8 *)(in), (u8 *)(out)) +#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \ + rijndaelKeySetupEnc((u32 *)(int_key), (const unsigned char *)(key), \ + UMAC_KEY_LEN*8) +#endif + +/* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter + * mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes + * an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of + * 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct + * 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream. + */ +static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes) +{ + UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0}; + UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; + UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp; + int i; + + /* Setup the initial value */ + in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx; + in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1; + + while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) { + aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key); + memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN); + in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i; + nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN; + dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN; + } + if (nbytes) { + aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key); + memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes); + } + explicit_bzero(in_buf, sizeof(in_buf)); + explicit_bzero(out_buf, sizeof(out_buf)); +} + +/* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom + * function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and + * xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce. + * This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces. + */ + +typedef struct { + UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* Previous AES output is saved */ + UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* The AES input making above cache */ + aes_int_key prf_key; /* Expanded AES key for PDF */ +} pdf_ctx; + +static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key) +{ + UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN]; + + kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN); + aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key); + + /* Initialize pdf and cache */ + memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce)); + aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8]) +{ + /* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes + * of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st + * element, then we may have the result in the cache already. + */ + +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) +#define LOW_BIT_MASK 3 +#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) +#define LOW_BIT_MASK 1 +#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8) +#define LOW_BIT_MASK 0 +#endif + union { + UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4]; + UINT32 align; + } t; +#if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0 + int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK; +#endif + *(UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[1]; + t.tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */ + + if ( (((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) || + (((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) ) + { + ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0]; + ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0]; + aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key); + } + +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) + *((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx]; +#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) + *((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx]; +#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12) + ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0]; + ((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2]; +#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) + ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0]; + ((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1]; +#endif +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper + * and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website. + * The interface to this implementation has two + * versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed + * in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second + * allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the + * muliple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as + * many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the + * hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output. + * Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine + * must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to + * the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is + * optimized and should be preferred whenever the multiple-buffer interface + * is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's + * responsibility to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result. + * + * The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and + * must be called once, before any other PDF routine. + */ + + /* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They + * expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines + * produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call, + * allowing the parallel implementation of the streams. + */ + +#define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied */ +#define L1_KEY_LEN 1024 /* Internal key bytes */ +#define L1_KEY_SHIFT 16 /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */ +#define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY 32 /* pad message to boundary multiple */ +#define ALLOC_BOUNDARY 16 /* Keep buffers aligned to this */ +#define HASH_BUF_BYTES 64 /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple */ + +typedef struct { + UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */ + UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */ + int next_data_empty; /* Bookkeeping variable for data buffer. */ + int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorporated. */ + UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */ +} nh_ctx; + + +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) + +static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) +/* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and +* then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp", +* "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32). Key +* is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup. +*/ +{ + UINT64 h; + UWORD c = dlen / 32; + UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; + const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; + UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; + UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7; + + h = *((UINT64 *)hp); + do { + d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); + d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); + d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); + d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); + k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); + k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); + h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); + h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); + h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); + h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); + + d += 8; + k += 8; + } while (--c); + *((UINT64 *)hp) = h; +} + +#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) + +static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) +/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, + * reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call. + */ +{ + UINT64 h1,h2; + UWORD c = dlen / 32; + UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; + const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; + UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; + UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, + k8,k9,k10,k11; + + h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); + h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); + k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); + do { + d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); + d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); + d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); + d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); + k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); + k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); + + h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); + h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); + + h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); + h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); + + h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); + h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); + + h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); + h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); + + k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; + + d += 8; + k += 8; + } while (--c); + ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; + ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; +} + +#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12) + +static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) +/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, + * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call. +*/ +{ + UINT64 h1,h2,h3; + UWORD c = dlen / 32; + UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; + const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; + UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; + UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, + k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15; + + h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); + h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); + h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2); + k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); + k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); + do { + d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); + d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); + d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); + d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); + k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); + k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15); + + h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); + h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); + h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4)); + + h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); + h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); + h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5)); + + h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); + h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); + h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6)); + + h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); + h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); + h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7)); + + k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; + k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15; + + d += 8; + k += 8; + } while (--c); + ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; + ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; + ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3; +} + +#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) + +static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) +/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, + * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call. +*/ +{ + UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4; + UWORD c = dlen / 32; + UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; + const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; + UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; + UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, + k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15, + k16,k17,k18,k19; + + h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); + h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); + h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2); + h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3); + k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); + k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); + do { + d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); + d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); + d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); + d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); + k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); + k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15); + k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19); + + h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); + h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); + h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4)); + h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4)); + + h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); + h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); + h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5)); + h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5)); + + h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); + h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); + h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6)); + h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6)); + + h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); + h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); + h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7)); + h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7)); + + k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; + k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15; + k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19; + + d += 8; + k += 8; + } while (--c); + ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; + ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; + ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3; + ((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4; +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +#endif /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes) +/* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes + * as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a + * multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset + * appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already. + */ +{ + UINT8 *key; + + key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed; + nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) +static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes) +/* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to */ +/* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing. */ +{ + UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw; + if (bpw == 4) { + UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf; + do { + *p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p); + p++; + } while (--iters); + } else if (bpw == 8) { + UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf; + UINT32 t; + do { + t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1); + p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p); + p[0] = t; + p += 2; + } while (--iters); + } +} +#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z)) +#else +#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0) /* Do nothing */ +#endif + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc) +/* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */ +{ + hc->bytes_hashed = 0; + hc->next_data_empty = 0; + hc->state[0] = 0; +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) + hc->state[1] = 0; +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) + hc->state[2] = 0; +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) + hc->state[3] = 0; +#endif + +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key) +/* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing. */ +{ + kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key)); + endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key)); + nh_reset(hc); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes) +/* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an */ +/* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES. */ +{ + UINT32 i,j; + + j = hc->next_data_empty; + if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) { + if (j) { + i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j; + memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i); + nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES); + nbytes -= i; + buf += i; + hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES; + } + if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) { + i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1); + nh_transform(hc, buf, i); + nbytes -= i; + buf += i; + hc->bytes_hashed += i; + } + j = 0; + } + memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes); + hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes; +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes) +{ +/* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */ + if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) { + while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) { + *p = 0; + nbytes--; + p++; + } + while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) { + *(UWORD *)p = 0; + nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD); + p += sizeof(UWORD); + } + } + while (nbytes) { + *p = 0; + nbytes--; + p++; + } +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result) +/* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration + * into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any + * bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the + * NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number + * of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result". + * If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated. + */ +{ + int nh_len, nbits; + + if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) { + nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & + ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); + zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty, + nh_len - hc->next_data_empty); + nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len); + hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty; + } else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) { + nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; + zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY); + nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len); + } + + nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3); + ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits; +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) + ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits; +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) + ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits; +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) + ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits; +#endif + nh_reset(hc); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len, + UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result) +/* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent. + * Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is + * well aligned + */ +{ + UINT32 nbits; + + /* Initialize the hash state */ + nbits = (unpadded_len << 3); + + ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits; +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) + ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits; +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) + ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits; +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) + ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits; +#endif + + nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first + * hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer + * unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial- + * layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output. + * + * UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data + * buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the + * UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary. + * When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls + * uhash_final() which + * calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation + * the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine, + * uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and + * uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be + * used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary. + * + * The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and + * must be called once, before any other UHASH routine. + */ + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* Primes and masks */ +#define p36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull) /* 2^36 - 5 */ +#define p64 ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull) /* 2^64 - 59 */ +#define m36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull) /* The low 36 of 64 bits */ + + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +typedef struct uhash_ctx { + nh_ctx hash; /* Hash context for L1 NH hash */ + UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS]; /* p64 poly keys */ + UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS]; /* poly hash result */ + UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4]; /* Inner-product keys */ + UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS]; /* Inner-product translation */ + UINT32 msg_len; /* Total length of data passed */ + /* to uhash */ +} uhash_ctx; +typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t; + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + + +/* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one + * word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64 + * require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit + * the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to + * be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation + * patches any errant values. + */ + +static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data) +{ + UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32), + key_lo = (UINT32)key, + cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32), + cur_lo = (UINT32)cur, + x_lo, + x_hi; + UINT64 X,T,res; + + X = MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo); + x_lo = (UINT32)X; + x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32); + + res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo); + + T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32); + res += T; + if (res < T) + res += 59; + + res += data; + if (res < data) + res += 59; + + return res; +} + + +/* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this + * implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle + * the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to + * 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24 + * bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB). + */ +static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[]) +{ + int i; + UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in; + + for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { + if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) { + hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], + hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1); + hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], + hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59)); + } else { + hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], + hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]); + } + } +} + + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + + +/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash + * produces a result not necessarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner- + * product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and + * multiplies each with a 36 bit key. + */ + +static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data) +{ + t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48); + t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32); + t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16); + t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data); + + return t; +} + +static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t) +{ +/* Divisionless modular reduction */ + UINT64 ret; + + ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36); + if (ret >= p36) + ret -= p36; + + /* return least significant 32 bits */ + return (UINT32)(ret); +} + + +/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then + * the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the + * NH output. + */ +static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res) +{ + UINT64 t; + UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res; + + t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]); + STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]); +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) + t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]); + STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]); +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) + t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]); + STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]); +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) + t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]); + STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]); +#endif +} + +/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then + * the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the + * polyhash output. + */ +static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res) +{ + int i; + UINT64 t; + + for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { + /* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */ + if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64) + ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64; + t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]); + STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i, + ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]); + } +} + + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* Reset uhash context for next hash session */ +static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc) +{ + nh_reset(&pc->hash); + pc->msg_len = 0; + pc->poly_accum[0] = 1; +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) + pc->poly_accum[1] = 1; +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) + pc->poly_accum[2] = 1; +#endif +#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) + pc->poly_accum[3] = 1; +#endif + return 1; +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context, + * initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner- + * product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native + * loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation. + */ +static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key) +{ + int i; + UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)]; + + /* Zero the entire uhash context */ + memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx)); + + /* Initialize the L1 hash */ + nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key); + + /* Setup L2 hash variables */ + kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */ + for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { + /* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not + * used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a + * little-endian computer. + */ + memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8); + endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8); + /* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */ + ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu; + ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1; /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */ + } + + /* Setup L3-1 hash variables */ + kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */ + for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) + memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64), + 4*sizeof(UINT64)); + endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64), + sizeof(ahc->ip_keys)); + for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++) + ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36; /* Bring into Z_p36 */ + + /* Setup L3-2 hash variables */ + /* Fill buffer with index 4 key */ + kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); + endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32), + STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#if 0 +static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[]) +{ +/* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */ + uhash_ctx_t ctx; + u_char bytes_to_add; + aes_int_key prf_key; + + ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY); + if (ctx) { + if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { + bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY - + ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1)); + ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add); + *((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add; + } + aes_key_setup(key,prf_key); + uhash_init(ctx, prf_key); + } + return (ctx); +} +#endif + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#if 0 +static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx) +{ +/* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */ + u_char bytes_to_sub; + + if (ctx) { + if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { + bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1); + ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub); + } + free(ctx); + } + return (1); +} +#endif +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, const u_char *input, long len) +/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and + * hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output. + */ +{ + UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining; + UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS]; + UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf; + + if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) { + nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len); + ctx->msg_len += len; + } else { + + bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN; + if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN) + bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN; + + if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) { + + /* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function */ + /* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */ + /* bytes to complete the current nh_block. */ + if (bytes_hashed) { + bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed); + nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining); + nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); + ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining; + poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); + len -= bytes_remaining; + input += bytes_remaining; + } + + /* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */ + while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) { + nh(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN, + L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result); + ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN; + len -= L1_KEY_LEN; + input += L1_KEY_LEN; + poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); + } + } + + /* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */ + if (len) { + nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len); + ctx->msg_len += len; + } + } + + return (1); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res) +/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */ +{ + UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS]; + UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf; + + if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) { + if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) { + nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); + poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); + } + ip_long(ctx, res); + } else { + nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); + ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res); + } + uhash_reset(ctx); + return (1); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#if 0 +static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res) +/* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */ +/* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed. */ +{ + UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)]; + UINT32 nh_len; + int extra_zeroes_needed; + + /* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip + * the polyhash. + */ + if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) { + if (len == 0) /* If zero length messages will not */ + nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; /* be seen, comment out this case */ + else + nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); + extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len; + zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed); + nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result); + ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res); + } else { + /* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH + * output to poly_hash(). + */ + do { + nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result); + poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result); + len -= L1_KEY_LEN; + msg += L1_KEY_LEN; + } while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN); + if (len) { + nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); + extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len; + zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed); + nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result); + poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result); + } + + ip_long(ahc, res); + } + + uhash_reset(ahc); + return 1; +} +#endif + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +/* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where + * the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer, + * and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a + * time. The all-at-once is more optimaized than the sequential version and + * should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required. + */ +struct umac_ctx { + uhash_ctx hash; /* Hash function for message compression */ + pdf_ctx pdf; /* PDF for hashed output */ + void *free_ptr; /* Address to free this struct via */ +} umac_ctx; + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#if 0 +int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx) +/* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication. */ +{ + uhash_reset(&ctx->hash); + return (1); +} +#endif + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx) +/* Deallocate the ctx structure */ +{ + if (ctx) { + if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) + ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr; + explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY); + free(ctx); + } + return (1); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[]) +/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables, + * generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary. + */ +{ + struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx; + size_t bytes_to_add; + aes_int_key prf_key; + + octx = ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY); + if (ctx) { + if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { + bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY - + ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1)); + ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add); + } + ctx->free_ptr = octx; + aes_key_setup(key, prf_key); + pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key); + uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key); + explicit_bzero(prf_key, sizeof(prf_key)); + } + + return (ctx); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]) +/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */ +{ + uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag); + pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (const UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag); + + return (1); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len) +/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and */ +/* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */ +/* output buffer is full. */ +{ + uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len); + return (1); +} + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + +#if 0 +int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, + long len, u_char tag[], + u_char nonce[8]) +/* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final(). */ +{ + uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag); + pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag); + + return (1); +} +#endif + +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ diff --git a/umac.h b/umac.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7fb770f --- /dev/null +++ b/umac.h @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: umac.h,v 1.3 2013/07/22 12:20:02 djm Exp $ */ +/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + * + * umac.h -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication + * + * Version 0.93a of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 14 + * + * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC + * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac + * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage. + * + * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Ted Krovetz + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and + * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby + * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies + * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright + * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to + * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission. + * + * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) + * + * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ + + /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES ///////////////////////////////// + * + * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB + * + * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte + * aligned + * + * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in + * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself + * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be + * zeroed. + * + * 4) Two free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of + * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found + * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for + * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and + * rijndael-alg-fst.h. + * Brian Gladman's version is distributed with GNU Public lisence + * and can be found at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It + * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. + * + /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */ +#ifndef HEADER_UMAC_H +#define HEADER_UMAC_H + + +#ifdef __cplusplus + extern "C" { +#endif + +struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[]); +/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables, + * generate subkeys from key. + */ + +#if 0 +int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx); +/* Reset a umac_ctx to begin authenicating a new message */ +#endif + +int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len); +/* Incorporate len bytes pointed to by input into context ctx */ + +int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]); +/* Incorporate any pending data and the ctr value, and return tag. + * This function returns error code if ctr < 0. + */ + +int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx); +/* Deallocate the context structure */ + +#if 0 +int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, + long len, u_char tag[], + u_char nonce[8]); +/* All-in-one implementation of the functions Reset, Update and Final */ +#endif + +/* uhash.h */ + + +#if 0 +typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t; + /* The uhash_ctx structure is defined by the implementation of the */ + /* UHASH functions. */ + +uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[16]); + /* Dynamically allocate a uhash_ctx struct and generate subkeys using */ + /* the kdf and kdf_key passed in. If kdf_key_len is 0 then RC6 is */ + /* used to generate key with a fixed key. If kdf_key_len > 0 but kdf */ + /* is NULL then the first 16 bytes pointed at by kdf_key is used as a */ + /* key for an RC6 based KDF. */ + +int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx); + +int uhash_set_params(uhash_ctx_t ctx, + void *params); + +int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t ctx); + +int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, + u_char *input, + long len); + +int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, + u_char ouput[]); + +int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ctx, + u_char *input, + long len, + u_char output[]); + +#endif + +/* matching umac-128 API, we reuse umac_ctx, since it's opaque */ +struct umac_ctx *umac128_new(const u_char key[]); +int umac128_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len); +int umac128_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]); +int umac128_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx); + +#ifdef __cplusplus + } +#endif + +#endif /* HEADER_UMAC_H */ diff --git a/umac128.c b/umac128.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f717925 --- /dev/null +++ b/umac128.c @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: umac128.c,v 1.2 2018/02/08 04:12:32 dtucker Exp $ */ + +#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 16 +#define umac_new umac128_new +#define umac_update umac128_update +#define umac_final umac128_final +#define umac_delete umac128_delete +#define umac_ctx umac128_ctx + +#include "umac.c" diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db7cb8f --- /dev/null +++ b/utf8.c @@ -0,0 +1,340 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.8 2018/08/21 13:56:27 schwarze Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Utility functions for multibyte-character handling, + * in particular to sanitize untrusted strings for terminal output. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) +# include +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_WCHAR_H +# include +#endif + +#include "utf8.h" + +static int dangerous_locale(void); +static int grow_dst(char **, size_t *, size_t, char **, size_t); +static int vasnmprintf(char **, size_t, int *, const char *, va_list); + + +/* + * For US-ASCII and UTF-8 encodings, we can safely recover from + * encoding errors and from non-printable characters. For any + * other encodings, err to the side of caution and abort parsing: + * For state-dependent encodings, recovery is impossible. + * For arbitrary encodings, replacement of non-printable + * characters would be non-trivial and too fragile. + * The comments indicate what nl_langinfo(CODESET) + * returns for US-ASCII on various operating systems. + */ + +static int +dangerous_locale(void) { + char *loc; + + loc = nl_langinfo(CODESET); + return strcmp(loc, "UTF-8") != 0 && + strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") != 0 && /* OpenBSD */ + strcmp(loc, "ANSI_X3.4-1968") != 0 && /* Linux */ + strcmp(loc, "ISO8859-1") != 0 && /* AIX */ + strcmp(loc, "646") != 0 && /* Solaris, NetBSD */ + strcmp(loc, "") != 0; /* Solaris 6 */ +} + +static int +grow_dst(char **dst, size_t *sz, size_t maxsz, char **dp, size_t need) +{ + char *tp; + size_t tsz; + + if (*dp + need < *dst + *sz) + return 0; + tsz = *sz + 128; + if (tsz > maxsz) + tsz = maxsz; + if ((tp = recallocarray(*dst, *sz, tsz, 1)) == NULL) + return -1; + *dp = tp + (*dp - *dst); + *dst = tp; + *sz = tsz; + return 0; +} + +/* + * The following two functions limit the number of bytes written, + * including the terminating '\0', to sz. Unless wp is NULL, + * they limit the number of display columns occupied to *wp. + * Whichever is reached first terminates the output string. + * To stay close to the standard interfaces, they return the number of + * non-NUL bytes that would have been written if both were unlimited. + * If wp is NULL, newline, carriage return, and tab are allowed; + * otherwise, the actual number of columns occupied by what was + * written is returned in *wp. + */ + +static int +vasnmprintf(char **str, size_t maxsz, int *wp, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *src; /* Source string returned from vasprintf. */ + char *sp; /* Pointer into src. */ + char *dst; /* Destination string to be returned. */ + char *dp; /* Pointer into dst. */ + char *tp; /* Temporary pointer for dst. */ + size_t sz; /* Number of bytes allocated for dst. */ + wchar_t wc; /* Wide character at sp. */ + int len; /* Number of bytes in the character at sp. */ + int ret; /* Number of bytes needed to format src. */ + int width; /* Display width of the character wc. */ + int total_width, max_width, print; + + src = NULL; + if ((ret = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap)) <= 0) + goto fail; + + sz = strlen(src) + 1; + if ((dst = malloc(sz)) == NULL) { + free(src); + ret = -1; + goto fail; + } + + if (maxsz > INT_MAX) + maxsz = INT_MAX; + + sp = src; + dp = dst; + ret = 0; + print = 1; + total_width = 0; + max_width = wp == NULL ? INT_MAX : *wp; + while (*sp != '\0') { + if ((len = mbtowc(&wc, sp, MB_CUR_MAX)) == -1) { + (void)mbtowc(NULL, NULL, MB_CUR_MAX); + if (dangerous_locale()) { + ret = -1; + break; + } + len = 1; + width = -1; + } else if (wp == NULL && + (wc == L'\n' || wc == L'\r' || wc == L'\t')) { + /* + * Don't use width uninitialized; the actual + * value doesn't matter because total_width + * is only returned for wp != NULL. + */ + width = 0; + } else if ((width = wcwidth(wc)) == -1 && + dangerous_locale()) { + ret = -1; + break; + } + + /* Valid, printable character. */ + + if (width >= 0) { + if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - len || + total_width > max_width - width)) + print = 0; + if (print) { + if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz, + &dp, len) == -1) { + ret = -1; + break; + } + total_width += width; + memcpy(dp, sp, len); + dp += len; + } + sp += len; + if (ret >= 0) + ret += len; + continue; + } + + /* Escaping required. */ + + while (len > 0) { + if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - 4 || + total_width > max_width - 4)) + print = 0; + if (print) { + if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz, + &dp, 4) == -1) { + ret = -1; + break; + } + tp = vis(dp, *sp, VIS_OCTAL | VIS_ALL, 0); + width = tp - dp; + total_width += width; + dp = tp; + } else + width = 4; + len--; + sp++; + if (ret >= 0) + ret += width; + } + if (len > 0) + break; + } + free(src); + *dp = '\0'; + *str = dst; + if (wp != NULL) + *wp = total_width; + + /* + * If the string was truncated by the width limit but + * would have fit into the size limit, the only sane way + * to report the problem is using the return value, such + * that the usual idiom "if (ret < 0 || ret >= sz) error" + * works as expected. + */ + + if (ret < (int)maxsz && !print) + ret = -1; + return ret; + +fail: + if (wp != NULL) + *wp = 0; + if (ret == 0) { + *str = src; + return 0; + } else { + *str = NULL; + return -1; + } +} + +int +snmprintf(char *str, size_t sz, int *wp, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + char *cp; + int ret; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = vasnmprintf(&cp, sz, wp, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + if (cp != NULL) { + (void)strlcpy(str, cp, sz); + free(cp); + } else + *str = '\0'; + return ret; +} + +/* + * To stay close to the standard interfaces, the following functions + * return the number of non-NUL bytes written. + */ + +int +vfmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + char *str; + int ret; + + if ((ret = vasnmprintf(&str, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap)) < 0) + return -1; + if (fputs(str, stream) == EOF) + ret = -1; + free(str); + return ret; +} + +int +fmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = vfmprintf(stream, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +int +mprintf(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int ret; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = vfmprintf(stdout, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set up libc for multibyte output in the user's chosen locale. + * + * XXX: we are known to have problems with Turkish (i/I confusion) so we + * deliberately fall back to the C locale for now. Longer term we should + * always prefer to select C.[encoding] if possible, but there's no + * standardisation in locales between systems, so we'll need to survey + * what's out there first. + */ +void +msetlocale(void) +{ + const char *vars[] = { "LC_ALL", "LC_CTYPE", "LANG", NULL }; + char *cp; + int i; + + /* + * We can't yet cope with dotless/dotted I in Turkish locales, + * so fall back to the C locale for these. + */ + for (i = 0; vars[i] != NULL; i++) { + if ((cp = getenv(vars[i])) == NULL) + continue; + if (strncasecmp(cp, "TR", 2) != 0) + break; + /* + * If we're in a UTF-8 locale then prefer to use + * the C.UTF-8 locale (or equivalent) if it exists. + */ + if ((strcasestr(cp, "UTF-8") != NULL || + strcasestr(cp, "UTF8") != NULL) && + (setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C.UTF-8") != NULL || + setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "POSIX.UTF-8") != NULL)) + return; + setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C"); + return; + } + /* We can handle this locale */ + setlocale(LC_CTYPE, ""); +} diff --git a/utf8.h b/utf8.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88c5a34 --- /dev/null +++ b/utf8.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: utf8.h,v 1.1 2016/05/25 23:48:45 schwarze Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +int mprintf(const char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); +int fmprintf(FILE *, const char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); +int vfmprintf(FILE *, const char *, va_list); +int snmprintf(char *, size_t, int *, const char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5))); +void msetlocale(void); diff --git a/uuencode.c b/uuencode.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7fc867a --- /dev/null +++ b/uuencode.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.28 2015/04/24 01:36:24 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "uuencode.h" + +/* + * Encode binary 'src' of length 'srclength', writing base64-encoded text + * to 'target' of size 'targsize'. Will always nul-terminate 'target'. + * Returns the number of bytes stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc. + * 'targsize' too small). + */ +int +uuencode(const u_char *src, u_int srclength, + char *target, size_t targsize) +{ + return __b64_ntop(src, srclength, target, targsize); +} + +/* + * Decode base64-encoded 'src' into buffer 'target' of 'targsize' bytes. + * Will skip leading and trailing whitespace. Returns the number of bytes + * stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc. targsize too small). + */ +int +uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize) +{ + int len; + char *encoded, *p; + + /* copy the 'readonly' source */ + encoded = xstrdup(src); + /* skip whitespace and data */ + for (p = encoded; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; p++) + ; + for (; *p != '\0' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++) + ; + /* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */ + *p = '\0'; + len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize); + free(encoded); + return len; +} + +void +dump_base64(FILE *fp, const u_char *data, u_int len) +{ + char *buf; + int i, n; + + if (len > 65536) { + fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n"); + return; + } + buf = xreallocarray(NULL, 2, len); + n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len); + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]); + if (i % 70 == 69) + fprintf(fp, "\n"); + } + if (i % 70 != 69) + fprintf(fp, "\n"); + free(buf); +} diff --git a/uuencode.h b/uuencode.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d98881 --- /dev/null +++ b/uuencode.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.h,v 1.14 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +int uuencode(const u_char *, u_int, char *, size_t); +int uudecode(const char *, u_char *, size_t); +void dump_base64(FILE *, const u_char *, u_int); diff --git a/verify.c b/verify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1671a41 --- /dev/null +++ b/verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: verify.c,v 1.3 2013/12/09 11:03:45 markus Exp $ */ + +/* + * Public Domain, Author: Daniel J. Bernstein + * Copied from nacl-20110221/crypto_verify/32/ref/verify.c + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include "crypto_api.h" + +int crypto_verify_32(const unsigned char *x,const unsigned char *y) +{ + unsigned int differentbits = 0; +#define F(i) differentbits |= x[i] ^ y[i]; + F(0) + F(1) + F(2) + F(3) + F(4) + F(5) + F(6) + F(7) + F(8) + F(9) + F(10) + F(11) + F(12) + F(13) + F(14) + F(15) + F(16) + F(17) + F(18) + F(19) + F(20) + F(21) + F(22) + F(23) + F(24) + F(25) + F(26) + F(27) + F(28) + F(29) + F(30) + F(31) + return (1 & ((differentbits - 1) >> 8)) - 1; +} diff --git a/version.h b/version.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..422dfbc --- /dev/null +++ b/version.h @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.83 2018/10/10 16:43:49 deraadt Exp $ */ + +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_7.9" + +#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" +#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE diff --git a/xmalloc.c b/xmalloc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5cc0310 --- /dev/null +++ b/xmalloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.34 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return + * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" + +void +ssh_malloc_init(void) +{ +#if defined(__OpenBSD__) + extern char *malloc_options; + + malloc_options = "S"; +#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */ +} + +void * +xmalloc(size_t size) +{ + void *ptr; + + if (size == 0) + fatal("xmalloc: zero size"); + ptr = malloc(size); + if (ptr == NULL) + fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size); + return ptr; +} + +void * +xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) +{ + void *ptr; + + if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0) + fatal("xcalloc: zero size"); + if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) + fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX"); + ptr = calloc(nmemb, size); + if (ptr == NULL) + fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", + size * nmemb); + return ptr; +} + +void * +xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) +{ + void *new_ptr; + + new_ptr = reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size); + if (new_ptr == NULL) + fatal("xreallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)", + nmemb, size); + return new_ptr; +} + +void * +xrecallocarray(void *ptr, size_t onmemb, size_t nmemb, size_t size) +{ + void *new_ptr; + + new_ptr = recallocarray(ptr, onmemb, nmemb, size); + if (new_ptr == NULL) + fatal("xrecallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)", + nmemb, size); + return new_ptr; +} + +char * +xstrdup(const char *str) +{ + size_t len; + char *cp; + + len = strlen(str) + 1; + cp = xmalloc(len); + strlcpy(cp, str, len); + return cp; +} + +int +xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int i; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL) + fatal("xasprintf: could not allocate memory"); + + return (i); +} diff --git a/xmalloc.h b/xmalloc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf38ddf --- /dev/null +++ b/xmalloc.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.17 2017/05/31 09:15:42 deraadt Exp $ */ + +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen + * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo + * + * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return + * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +void ssh_malloc_init(void); +void *xmalloc(size_t); +void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t); +void *xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); +void *xrecallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t); +char *xstrdup(const char *); +int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...) + __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) + __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); diff --git a/xmss_commons.c b/xmss_commons.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59486ae --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_commons.c @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_commons.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* +xmss_commons.c 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + +#include "xmss_commons.h" +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif + +void to_byte(unsigned char *out, unsigned long long in, uint32_t bytes) +{ + int32_t i; + for (i = bytes-1; i >= 0; i--) { + out[i] = in & 0xff; + in = in >> 8; + } +} + +#if 0 +void hexdump(const unsigned char *a, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + printf("%02x", a[i]); +} +#endif +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/xmss_commons.h b/xmss_commons.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a98e479 --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_commons.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +#ifdef WITH_XMSS +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_commons.h,v 1.3 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* +xmss_commons.h 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ +#ifndef XMSS_COMMONS_H +#define XMSS_COMMONS_H + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#endif +void to_byte(unsigned char *output, unsigned long long in, uint32_t bytes); +#if 0 +void hexdump(const unsigned char *a, size_t len); +#endif +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/xmss_fast.c b/xmss_fast.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e37447f --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_fast.c @@ -0,0 +1,1106 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_fast.c,v 1.3 2018/03/22 07:06:11 markus Exp $ */ +/* +xmss_fast.c version 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif + +#include "xmss_fast.h" +#include "crypto_api.h" +#include "xmss_wots.h" +#include "xmss_hash.h" + +#include "xmss_commons.h" +#include "xmss_hash_address.h" +// For testing +#include "stdio.h" + + + +/** + * Used for pseudorandom keygeneration, + * generates the seed for the WOTS keypair at address addr + * + * takes n byte sk_seed and returns n byte seed using 32 byte address addr. + */ +static void get_seed(unsigned char *seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed, int n, uint32_t addr[8]) +{ + unsigned char bytes[32]; + // Make sure that chain addr, hash addr, and key bit are 0! + setChainADRS(addr,0); + setHashADRS(addr,0); + setKeyAndMask(addr,0); + // Generate pseudorandom value + addr_to_byte(bytes, addr); + prf(seed, bytes, sk_seed, n); +} + +/** + * Initialize xmss params struct + * parameter names are the same as in the draft + * parameter k is K as used in the BDS algorithm + */ +int xmss_set_params(xmss_params *params, int n, int h, int w, int k) +{ + if (k >= h || k < 2 || (h - k) % 2) { + fprintf(stderr, "For BDS traversal, H - K must be even, with H > K >= 2!\n"); + return 1; + } + params->h = h; + params->n = n; + params->k = k; + wots_params wots_par; + wots_set_params(&wots_par, n, w); + params->wots_par = wots_par; + return 0; +} + +/** + * Initialize BDS state struct + * parameter names are the same as used in the description of the BDS traversal + */ +void xmss_set_bds_state(bds_state *state, unsigned char *stack, int stackoffset, unsigned char *stacklevels, unsigned char *auth, unsigned char *keep, treehash_inst *treehash, unsigned char *retain, int next_leaf) +{ + state->stack = stack; + state->stackoffset = stackoffset; + state->stacklevels = stacklevels; + state->auth = auth; + state->keep = keep; + state->treehash = treehash; + state->retain = retain; + state->next_leaf = next_leaf; +} + +/** + * Initialize xmssmt_params struct + * parameter names are the same as in the draft + * + * Especially h is the total tree height, i.e. the XMSS trees have height h/d + */ +int xmssmt_set_params(xmssmt_params *params, int n, int h, int d, int w, int k) +{ + if (h % d) { + fprintf(stderr, "d must divide h without remainder!\n"); + return 1; + } + params->h = h; + params->d = d; + params->n = n; + params->index_len = (h + 7) / 8; + xmss_params xmss_par; + if (xmss_set_params(&xmss_par, n, (h/d), w, k)) { + return 1; + } + params->xmss_par = xmss_par; + return 0; +} + +/** + * Computes a leaf from a WOTS public key using an L-tree. + */ +static void l_tree(unsigned char *leaf, unsigned char *wots_pk, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) +{ + unsigned int l = params->wots_par.len; + unsigned int n = params->n; + uint32_t i = 0; + uint32_t height = 0; + uint32_t bound; + + //ADRS.setTreeHeight(0); + setTreeHeight(addr, height); + + while (l > 1) { + bound = l >> 1; //floor(l / 2); + for (i = 0; i < bound; i++) { + //ADRS.setTreeIndex(i); + setTreeIndex(addr, i); + //wots_pk[i] = RAND_HASH(pk[2i], pk[2i + 1], SEED, ADRS); + hash_h(wots_pk+i*n, wots_pk+i*2*n, pub_seed, addr, n); + } + //if ( l % 2 == 1 ) { + if (l & 1) { + //pk[floor(l / 2) + 1] = pk[l]; + memcpy(wots_pk+(l>>1)*n, wots_pk+(l-1)*n, n); + //l = ceil(l / 2); + l=(l>>1)+1; + } + else { + //l = ceil(l / 2); + l=(l>>1); + } + //ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1); + height++; + setTreeHeight(addr, height); + } + //return pk[0]; + memcpy(leaf, wots_pk, n); +} + +/** + * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair, then computes leaf using l_tree. As this happens position independent, we only require that addr encodes the right ltree-address. + */ +static void gen_leaf_wots(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t ltree_addr[8], uint32_t ots_addr[8]) +{ + unsigned char seed[params->n]; + unsigned char pk[params->wots_par.keysize]; + + get_seed(seed, sk_seed, params->n, ots_addr); + wots_pkgen(pk, seed, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); + + l_tree(leaf, pk, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr); +} + +static int treehash_minheight_on_stack(bds_state* state, const xmss_params *params, const treehash_inst *treehash) { + unsigned int r = params->h, i; + for (i = 0; i < treehash->stackusage; i++) { + if (state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset - i - 1] < r) { + r = state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset - i - 1]; + } + } + return r; +} + +/** + * Merkle's TreeHash algorithm. The address only needs to initialize the first 78 bits of addr. Everything else will be set by treehash. + * Currently only used for key generation. + * + */ +static void treehash_setup(unsigned char *node, int height, int index, bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) +{ + unsigned int idx = index; + unsigned int n = params->n; + unsigned int h = params->h; + unsigned int k = params->k; + // use three different addresses because at this point we use all three formats in parallel + uint32_t ots_addr[8]; + uint32_t ltree_addr[8]; + uint32_t node_addr[8]; + // only copy layer and tree address parts + memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12); + // type = ots + setType(ots_addr, 0); + memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12); + setType(ltree_addr, 1); + memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12); + setType(node_addr, 2); + + uint32_t lastnode, i; + unsigned char stack[(height+1)*n]; + unsigned int stacklevels[height+1]; + unsigned int stackoffset=0; + unsigned int nodeh; + + lastnode = idx+(1<treehash[i].h = i; + state->treehash[i].completed = 1; + state->treehash[i].stackusage = 0; + } + + i = 0; + for (; idx < lastnode; idx++) { + setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx); + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx); + gen_leaf_wots(stack+stackoffset*n, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr); + stacklevels[stackoffset] = 0; + stackoffset++; + if (h - k > 0 && i == 3) { + memcpy(state->treehash[0].node, stack+stackoffset*n, n); + } + while (stackoffset>1 && stacklevels[stackoffset-1] == stacklevels[stackoffset-2]) + { + nodeh = stacklevels[stackoffset-1]; + if (i >> nodeh == 1) { + memcpy(state->auth + nodeh*n, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n); + } + else { + if (nodeh < h - k && i >> nodeh == 3) { + memcpy(state->treehash[nodeh].node, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n); + } + else if (nodeh >= h - k) { + memcpy(state->retain + ((1 << (h - 1 - nodeh)) + nodeh - h + (((i >> nodeh) - 3) >> 1)) * n, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n); + } + } + setTreeHeight(node_addr, stacklevels[stackoffset-1]); + setTreeIndex(node_addr, (idx >> (stacklevels[stackoffset-1]+1))); + hash_h(stack+(stackoffset-2)*n, stack+(stackoffset-2)*n, pub_seed, + node_addr, n); + stacklevels[stackoffset-2]++; + stackoffset--; + } + i++; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + node[i] = stack[i]; +} + +static void treehash_update(treehash_inst *treehash, bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) { + int n = params->n; + + uint32_t ots_addr[8]; + uint32_t ltree_addr[8]; + uint32_t node_addr[8]; + // only copy layer and tree address parts + memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12); + // type = ots + setType(ots_addr, 0); + memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12); + setType(ltree_addr, 1); + memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12); + setType(node_addr, 2); + + setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, treehash->next_idx); + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, treehash->next_idx); + + unsigned char nodebuffer[2 * n]; + unsigned int nodeheight = 0; + gen_leaf_wots(nodebuffer, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr); + while (treehash->stackusage > 0 && state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1] == nodeheight) { + memcpy(nodebuffer + n, nodebuffer, n); + memcpy(nodebuffer, state->stack + (state->stackoffset-1)*n, n); + setTreeHeight(node_addr, nodeheight); + setTreeIndex(node_addr, (treehash->next_idx >> (nodeheight+1))); + hash_h(nodebuffer, nodebuffer, pub_seed, node_addr, n); + nodeheight++; + treehash->stackusage--; + state->stackoffset--; + } + if (nodeheight == treehash->h) { // this also implies stackusage == 0 + memcpy(treehash->node, nodebuffer, n); + treehash->completed = 1; + } + else { + memcpy(state->stack + state->stackoffset*n, nodebuffer, n); + treehash->stackusage++; + state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset] = nodeheight; + state->stackoffset++; + treehash->next_idx++; + } +} + +/** + * Computes a root node given a leaf and an authapth + */ +static void validate_authpath(unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf, unsigned long leafidx, const unsigned char *authpath, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) +{ + unsigned int n = params->n; + + uint32_t i, j; + unsigned char buffer[2*n]; + + // If leafidx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child and authpath has to go to the left. + // Otherwise, it is the other way around + if (leafidx & 1) { + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) + buffer[n+j] = leaf[j]; + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) + buffer[j] = authpath[j]; + } + else { + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) + buffer[j] = leaf[j]; + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) + buffer[n+j] = authpath[j]; + } + authpath += n; + + for (i=0; i < params->h-1; i++) { + setTreeHeight(addr, i); + leafidx >>= 1; + setTreeIndex(addr, leafidx); + if (leafidx&1) { + hash_h(buffer+n, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n); + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) + buffer[j] = authpath[j]; + } + else { + hash_h(buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n); + for (j = 0; j < n; j++) + buffer[j+n] = authpath[j]; + } + authpath += n; + } + setTreeHeight(addr, (params->h-1)); + leafidx >>= 1; + setTreeIndex(addr, leafidx); + hash_h(root, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n); +} + +/** + * Performs one treehash update on the instance that needs it the most. + * Returns 1 if such an instance was not found + **/ +static char bds_treehash_update(bds_state *state, unsigned int updates, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) { + uint32_t i, j; + unsigned int level, l_min, low; + unsigned int h = params->h; + unsigned int k = params->k; + unsigned int used = 0; + + for (j = 0; j < updates; j++) { + l_min = h; + level = h - k; + for (i = 0; i < h - k; i++) { + if (state->treehash[i].completed) { + low = h; + } + else if (state->treehash[i].stackusage == 0) { + low = i; + } + else { + low = treehash_minheight_on_stack(state, params, &(state->treehash[i])); + } + if (low < l_min) { + level = i; + l_min = low; + } + } + if (level == h - k) { + break; + } + treehash_update(&(state->treehash[level]), state, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, addr); + used++; + } + return updates - used; +} + +/** + * Updates the state (typically NEXT_i) by adding a leaf and updating the stack + * Returns 1 if all leaf nodes have already been processed + **/ +static char bds_state_update(bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) { + uint32_t ltree_addr[8]; + uint32_t node_addr[8]; + uint32_t ots_addr[8]; + + int n = params->n; + int h = params->h; + int k = params->k; + + int nodeh; + int idx = state->next_leaf; + if (idx == 1 << h) { + return 1; + } + + // only copy layer and tree address parts + memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12); + // type = ots + setType(ots_addr, 0); + memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12); + setType(ltree_addr, 1); + memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12); + setType(node_addr, 2); + + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx); + setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx); + + gen_leaf_wots(state->stack+state->stackoffset*n, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr); + + state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset] = 0; + state->stackoffset++; + if (h - k > 0 && idx == 3) { + memcpy(state->treehash[0].node, state->stack+state->stackoffset*n, n); + } + while (state->stackoffset>1 && state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1] == state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-2]) { + nodeh = state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]; + if (idx >> nodeh == 1) { + memcpy(state->auth + nodeh*n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n); + } + else { + if (nodeh < h - k && idx >> nodeh == 3) { + memcpy(state->treehash[nodeh].node, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n); + } + else if (nodeh >= h - k) { + memcpy(state->retain + ((1 << (h - 1 - nodeh)) + nodeh - h + (((idx >> nodeh) - 3) >> 1)) * n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n); + } + } + setTreeHeight(node_addr, state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]); + setTreeIndex(node_addr, (idx >> (state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]+1))); + hash_h(state->stack+(state->stackoffset-2)*n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-2)*n, pub_seed, node_addr, n); + + state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-2]++; + state->stackoffset--; + } + state->next_leaf++; + return 0; +} + +/** + * Returns the auth path for node leaf_idx and computes the auth path for the + * next leaf node, using the algorithm described by Buchmann, Dahmen and Szydlo + * in "Post Quantum Cryptography", Springer 2009. + */ +static void bds_round(bds_state *state, const unsigned long leaf_idx, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) +{ + unsigned int i; + unsigned int n = params->n; + unsigned int h = params->h; + unsigned int k = params->k; + + unsigned int tau = h; + unsigned int startidx; + unsigned int offset, rowidx; + unsigned char buf[2 * n]; + + uint32_t ots_addr[8]; + uint32_t ltree_addr[8]; + uint32_t node_addr[8]; + // only copy layer and tree address parts + memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12); + // type = ots + setType(ots_addr, 0); + memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12); + setType(ltree_addr, 1); + memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12); + setType(node_addr, 2); + + for (i = 0; i < h; i++) { + if (! ((leaf_idx >> i) & 1)) { + tau = i; + break; + } + } + + if (tau > 0) { + memcpy(buf, state->auth + (tau-1) * n, n); + // we need to do this before refreshing state->keep to prevent overwriting + memcpy(buf + n, state->keep + ((tau-1) >> 1) * n, n); + } + if (!((leaf_idx >> (tau + 1)) & 1) && (tau < h - 1)) { + memcpy(state->keep + (tau >> 1)*n, state->auth + tau*n, n); + } + if (tau == 0) { + setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, leaf_idx); + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, leaf_idx); + gen_leaf_wots(state->auth, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr); + } + else { + setTreeHeight(node_addr, (tau-1)); + setTreeIndex(node_addr, leaf_idx >> tau); + hash_h(state->auth + tau * n, buf, pub_seed, node_addr, n); + for (i = 0; i < tau; i++) { + if (i < h - k) { + memcpy(state->auth + i * n, state->treehash[i].node, n); + } + else { + offset = (1 << (h - 1 - i)) + i - h; + rowidx = ((leaf_idx >> i) - 1) >> 1; + memcpy(state->auth + i * n, state->retain + (offset + rowidx) * n, n); + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < ((tau < h - k) ? tau : (h - k)); i++) { + startidx = leaf_idx + 1 + 3 * (1 << i); + if (startidx < 1U << h) { + state->treehash[i].h = i; + state->treehash[i].next_idx = startidx; + state->treehash[i].completed = 0; + state->treehash[i].stackusage = 0; + } + } + } +} + +/* + * Generates a XMSS key pair for a given parameter set. + * Format sk: [(32bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root] + * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid. + */ +int xmss_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, xmss_params *params) +{ + unsigned int n = params->n; + // Set idx = 0 + sk[0] = 0; + sk[1] = 0; + sk[2] = 0; + sk[3] = 0; + // Init SK_SEED (n byte), SK_PRF (n byte), and PUB_SEED (n byte) + randombytes(sk+4, 3*n); + // Copy PUB_SEED to public key + memcpy(pk+n, sk+4+2*n, n); + + uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + + // Compute root + treehash_setup(pk, params->h, 0, state, sk+4, params, sk+4+2*n, addr); + // copy root to sk + memcpy(sk+4+3*n, pk, n); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Signs a message. + * Returns + * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND + * 2. an updated secret key! + * + */ +int xmss_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmss_params *params) +{ + unsigned int h = params->h; + unsigned int n = params->n; + unsigned int k = params->k; + uint16_t i = 0; + + // Extract SK + unsigned long idx = ((unsigned long)sk[0] << 24) | ((unsigned long)sk[1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)sk[2] << 8) | sk[3]; + unsigned char sk_seed[n]; + memcpy(sk_seed, sk+4, n); + unsigned char sk_prf[n]; + memcpy(sk_prf, sk+4+n, n); + unsigned char pub_seed[n]; + memcpy(pub_seed, sk+4+2*n, n); + + // index as 32 bytes string + unsigned char idx_bytes_32[32]; + to_byte(idx_bytes_32, idx, 32); + + unsigned char hash_key[3*n]; + + // Update SK + sk[0] = ((idx + 1) >> 24) & 255; + sk[1] = ((idx + 1) >> 16) & 255; + sk[2] = ((idx + 1) >> 8) & 255; + sk[3] = (idx + 1) & 255; + // -- Secret key for this non-forward-secure version is now updated. + // -- A productive implementation should use a file handle instead and write the updated secret key at this point! + + // Init working params + unsigned char R[n]; + unsigned char msg_h[n]; + unsigned char ots_seed[n]; + uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + + // --------------------------------- + // Message Hashing + // --------------------------------- + + // Message Hash: + // First compute pseudorandom value + prf(R, idx_bytes_32, sk_prf, n); + // Generate hash key (R || root || idx) + memcpy(hash_key, R, n); + memcpy(hash_key+n, sk+4+3*n, n); + to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n); + // Then use it for message digest + h_msg(msg_h, msg, msglen, hash_key, 3*n, n); + + // Start collecting signature + *sig_msg_len = 0; + + // Copy index to signature + sig_msg[0] = (idx >> 24) & 255; + sig_msg[1] = (idx >> 16) & 255; + sig_msg[2] = (idx >> 8) & 255; + sig_msg[3] = idx & 255; + + sig_msg += 4; + *sig_msg_len += 4; + + // Copy R to signature + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + sig_msg[i] = R[i]; + + sig_msg += n; + *sig_msg_len += n; + + // ---------------------------------- + // Now we start to "really sign" + // ---------------------------------- + + // Prepare Address + setType(ots_addr, 0); + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx); + + // Compute seed for OTS key pair + get_seed(ots_seed, sk_seed, n, ots_addr); + + // Compute WOTS signature + wots_sign(sig_msg, msg_h, ots_seed, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); + + sig_msg += params->wots_par.keysize; + *sig_msg_len += params->wots_par.keysize; + + // the auth path was already computed during the previous round + memcpy(sig_msg, state->auth, h*n); + + if (idx < (1U << h) - 1) { + bds_round(state, idx, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ots_addr); + bds_treehash_update(state, (h - k) >> 1, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ots_addr); + } + +/* TODO: save key/bds state here! */ + + sig_msg += params->h*n; + *sig_msg_len += params->h*n; + + //Whipe secret elements? + //zerobytes(tsk, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES); + + + memcpy(sig_msg, msg, msglen); + *sig_msg_len += msglen; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key. + */ +int xmss_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmss_params *params) +{ + unsigned int n = params->n; + + unsigned long long i, m_len; + unsigned long idx=0; + unsigned char wots_pk[params->wots_par.keysize]; + unsigned char pkhash[n]; + unsigned char root[n]; + unsigned char msg_h[n]; + unsigned char hash_key[3*n]; + + unsigned char pub_seed[n]; + memcpy(pub_seed, pk+n, n); + + // Init addresses + uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + uint32_t ltree_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + uint32_t node_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + + setType(ots_addr, 0); + setType(ltree_addr, 1); + setType(node_addr, 2); + + // Extract index + idx = ((unsigned long)sig_msg[0] << 24) | ((unsigned long)sig_msg[1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)sig_msg[2] << 8) | sig_msg[3]; + printf("verify:: idx = %lu\n", idx); + + // Generate hash key (R || root || idx) + memcpy(hash_key, sig_msg+4,n); + memcpy(hash_key+n, pk, n); + to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n); + + sig_msg += (n+4); + sig_msg_len -= (n+4); + + // hash message + unsigned long long tmp_sig_len = params->wots_par.keysize+params->h*n; + m_len = sig_msg_len - tmp_sig_len; + h_msg(msg_h, sig_msg + tmp_sig_len, m_len, hash_key, 3*n, n); + + //----------------------- + // Verify signature + //----------------------- + + // Prepare Address + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx); + // Check WOTS signature + wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, msg_h, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); + + sig_msg += params->wots_par.keysize; + sig_msg_len -= params->wots_par.keysize; + + // Compute Ltree + setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx); + l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr); + + // Compute root + validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx, sig_msg, params, pub_seed, node_addr); + + sig_msg += params->h*n; + sig_msg_len -= params->h*n; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + if (root[i] != pk[i]) + goto fail; + + *msglen = sig_msg_len; + for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++) + msg[i] = sig_msg[i]; + + return 0; + + +fail: + *msglen = sig_msg_len; + for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++) + msg[i] = 0; + *msglen = -1; + return -1; +} + +/* + * Generates a XMSSMT key pair for a given parameter set. + * Format sk: [(ceil(h/8) bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root] + * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid. + */ +int xmssmt_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, xmssmt_params *params) +{ + unsigned int n = params->n; + unsigned int i; + unsigned char ots_seed[params->n]; + // Set idx = 0 + for (i = 0; i < params->index_len; i++) { + sk[i] = 0; + } + // Init SK_SEED (n byte), SK_PRF (n byte), and PUB_SEED (n byte) + randombytes(sk+params->index_len, 3*n); + // Copy PUB_SEED to public key + memcpy(pk+n, sk+params->index_len+2*n, n); + + // Set address to point on the single tree on layer d-1 + uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + setLayerADRS(addr, (params->d-1)); + // Set up state and compute wots signatures for all but topmost tree root + for (i = 0; i < params->d - 1; i++) { + // Compute seed for OTS key pair + treehash_setup(pk, params->xmss_par.h, 0, states + i, sk+params->index_len, &(params->xmss_par), pk+n, addr); + setLayerADRS(addr, (i+1)); + get_seed(ots_seed, sk+params->index_len, n, addr); + wots_sign(wots_sigs + i*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, pk, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pk+n, addr); + } + treehash_setup(pk, params->xmss_par.h, 0, states + i, sk+params->index_len, &(params->xmss_par), pk+n, addr); + memcpy(sk+params->index_len+3*n, pk, n); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Signs a message. + * Returns + * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND + * 2. an updated secret key! + * + */ +int xmssmt_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmssmt_params *params) +{ + unsigned int n = params->n; + + unsigned int tree_h = params->xmss_par.h; + unsigned int h = params->h; + unsigned int k = params->xmss_par.k; + unsigned int idx_len = params->index_len; + uint64_t idx_tree; + uint32_t idx_leaf; + uint64_t i, j; + int needswap_upto = -1; + unsigned int updates; + + unsigned char sk_seed[n]; + unsigned char sk_prf[n]; + unsigned char pub_seed[n]; + // Init working params + unsigned char R[n]; + unsigned char msg_h[n]; + unsigned char hash_key[3*n]; + unsigned char ots_seed[n]; + uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + unsigned char idx_bytes_32[32]; + bds_state tmp; + + // Extract SK + unsigned long long idx = 0; + for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) { + idx |= ((unsigned long long)sk[i]) << 8*(idx_len - 1 - i); + } + + memcpy(sk_seed, sk+idx_len, n); + memcpy(sk_prf, sk+idx_len+n, n); + memcpy(pub_seed, sk+idx_len+2*n, n); + + // Update SK + for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) { + sk[i] = ((idx + 1) >> 8*(idx_len - 1 - i)) & 255; + } + // -- Secret key for this non-forward-secure version is now updated. + // -- A productive implementation should use a file handle instead and write the updated secret key at this point! + + + // --------------------------------- + // Message Hashing + // --------------------------------- + + // Message Hash: + // First compute pseudorandom value + to_byte(idx_bytes_32, idx, 32); + prf(R, idx_bytes_32, sk_prf, n); + // Generate hash key (R || root || idx) + memcpy(hash_key, R, n); + memcpy(hash_key+n, sk+idx_len+3*n, n); + to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n); + + // Then use it for message digest + h_msg(msg_h, msg, msglen, hash_key, 3*n, n); + + // Start collecting signature + *sig_msg_len = 0; + + // Copy index to signature + for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) { + sig_msg[i] = (idx >> 8*(idx_len - 1 - i)) & 255; + } + + sig_msg += idx_len; + *sig_msg_len += idx_len; + + // Copy R to signature + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + sig_msg[i] = R[i]; + + sig_msg += n; + *sig_msg_len += n; + + // ---------------------------------- + // Now we start to "really sign" + // ---------------------------------- + + // Handle lowest layer separately as it is slightly different... + + // Prepare Address + setType(ots_addr, 0); + idx_tree = idx >> tree_h; + idx_leaf = (idx & ((1 << tree_h)-1)); + setLayerADRS(ots_addr, 0); + setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree); + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf); + + // Compute seed for OTS key pair + get_seed(ots_seed, sk_seed, n, ots_addr); + + // Compute WOTS signature + wots_sign(sig_msg, msg_h, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); + + sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; + *sig_msg_len += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; + + memcpy(sig_msg, states[0].auth, tree_h*n); + sig_msg += tree_h*n; + *sig_msg_len += tree_h*n; + + // prepare signature of remaining layers + for (i = 1; i < params->d; i++) { + // put WOTS signature in place + memcpy(sig_msg, wots_sigs + (i-1)*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize); + + sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; + *sig_msg_len += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; + + // put AUTH nodes in place + memcpy(sig_msg, states[i].auth, tree_h*n); + sig_msg += tree_h*n; + *sig_msg_len += tree_h*n; + } + + updates = (tree_h - k) >> 1; + + setTreeADRS(addr, (idx_tree + 1)); + // mandatory update for NEXT_0 (does not count towards h-k/2) if NEXT_0 exists + if ((1 + idx_tree) * (1 << tree_h) + idx_leaf < (1ULL << h)) { + bds_state_update(&states[params->d], sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr); + } + + for (i = 0; i < params->d; i++) { + // check if we're not at the end of a tree + if (! (((idx + 1) & ((1ULL << ((i+1)*tree_h)) - 1)) == 0)) { + idx_leaf = (idx >> (tree_h * i)) & ((1 << tree_h)-1); + idx_tree = (idx >> (tree_h * (i+1))); + setLayerADRS(addr, i); + setTreeADRS(addr, idx_tree); + if (i == (unsigned int) (needswap_upto + 1)) { + bds_round(&states[i], idx_leaf, sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr); + } + updates = bds_treehash_update(&states[i], updates, sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr); + setTreeADRS(addr, (idx_tree + 1)); + // if a NEXT-tree exists for this level; + if ((1 + idx_tree) * (1 << tree_h) + idx_leaf < (1ULL << (h - tree_h * i))) { + if (i > 0 && updates > 0 && states[params->d + i].next_leaf < (1ULL << h)) { + bds_state_update(&states[params->d + i], sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr); + updates--; + } + } + } + else if (idx < (1ULL << h) - 1) { + memcpy(&tmp, states+params->d + i, sizeof(bds_state)); + memcpy(states+params->d + i, states + i, sizeof(bds_state)); + memcpy(states + i, &tmp, sizeof(bds_state)); + + setLayerADRS(ots_addr, (i+1)); + setTreeADRS(ots_addr, ((idx + 1) >> ((i+2) * tree_h))); + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, (((idx >> ((i+1) * tree_h)) + 1) & ((1 << tree_h)-1))); + + get_seed(ots_seed, sk+params->index_len, n, ots_addr); + wots_sign(wots_sigs + i*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, states[i].stack, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); + + states[params->d + i].stackoffset = 0; + states[params->d + i].next_leaf = 0; + + updates--; // WOTS-signing counts as one update + needswap_upto = i; + for (j = 0; j < tree_h-k; j++) { + states[i].treehash[j].completed = 1; + } + } + } + + //Whipe secret elements? + //zerobytes(tsk, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES); + + memcpy(sig_msg, msg, msglen); + *sig_msg_len += msglen; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key. + */ +int xmssmt_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmssmt_params *params) +{ + unsigned int n = params->n; + + unsigned int tree_h = params->xmss_par.h; + unsigned int idx_len = params->index_len; + uint64_t idx_tree; + uint32_t idx_leaf; + + unsigned long long i, m_len; + unsigned long long idx=0; + unsigned char wots_pk[params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize]; + unsigned char pkhash[n]; + unsigned char root[n]; + unsigned char msg_h[n]; + unsigned char hash_key[3*n]; + + unsigned char pub_seed[n]; + memcpy(pub_seed, pk+n, n); + + // Init addresses + uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + uint32_t ltree_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + uint32_t node_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}; + + // Extract index + for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) { + idx |= ((unsigned long long)sig_msg[i]) << (8*(idx_len - 1 - i)); + } + printf("verify:: idx = %llu\n", idx); + sig_msg += idx_len; + sig_msg_len -= idx_len; + + // Generate hash key (R || root || idx) + memcpy(hash_key, sig_msg,n); + memcpy(hash_key+n, pk, n); + to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n); + + sig_msg += n; + sig_msg_len -= n; + + + // hash message (recall, R is now on pole position at sig_msg + unsigned long long tmp_sig_len = (params->d * params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize) + (params->h * n); + m_len = sig_msg_len - tmp_sig_len; + h_msg(msg_h, sig_msg + tmp_sig_len, m_len, hash_key, 3*n, n); + + + //----------------------- + // Verify signature + //----------------------- + + // Prepare Address + idx_tree = idx >> tree_h; + idx_leaf = (idx & ((1 << tree_h)-1)); + setLayerADRS(ots_addr, 0); + setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree); + setType(ots_addr, 0); + + memcpy(ltree_addr, ots_addr, 12); + setType(ltree_addr, 1); + + memcpy(node_addr, ltree_addr, 12); + setType(node_addr, 2); + + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf); + + // Check WOTS signature + wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, msg_h, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); + + sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; + sig_msg_len -= params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; + + // Compute Ltree + setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx_leaf); + l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, ltree_addr); + + // Compute root + validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx_leaf, sig_msg, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, node_addr); + + sig_msg += tree_h*n; + sig_msg_len -= tree_h*n; + + for (i = 1; i < params->d; i++) { + // Prepare Address + idx_leaf = (idx_tree & ((1 << tree_h)-1)); + idx_tree = idx_tree >> tree_h; + + setLayerADRS(ots_addr, i); + setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree); + setType(ots_addr, 0); + + memcpy(ltree_addr, ots_addr, 12); + setType(ltree_addr, 1); + + memcpy(node_addr, ltree_addr, 12); + setType(node_addr, 2); + + setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf); + + // Check WOTS signature + wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, root, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr); + + sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; + sig_msg_len -= params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize; + + // Compute Ltree + setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx_leaf); + l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, ltree_addr); + + // Compute root + validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx_leaf, sig_msg, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, node_addr); + + sig_msg += tree_h*n; + sig_msg_len -= tree_h*n; + + } + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + if (root[i] != pk[i]) + goto fail; + + *msglen = sig_msg_len; + for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++) + msg[i] = sig_msg[i]; + + return 0; + + +fail: + *msglen = sig_msg_len; + for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++) + msg[i] = 0; + *msglen = -1; + return -1; +} +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/xmss_fast.h b/xmss_fast.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ffba70 --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_fast.h @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +#ifdef WITH_XMSS +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_fast.h,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* +xmss_fast.h version 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ + +#include "xmss_wots.h" + +#ifndef XMSS_H +#define XMSS_H +typedef struct{ + unsigned int level; + unsigned long long subtree; + unsigned int subleaf; +} leafaddr; + +typedef struct{ + wots_params wots_par; + unsigned int n; + unsigned int h; + unsigned int k; +} xmss_params; + +typedef struct{ + xmss_params xmss_par; + unsigned int n; + unsigned int h; + unsigned int d; + unsigned int index_len; +} xmssmt_params; + +typedef struct{ + unsigned int h; + unsigned int next_idx; + unsigned int stackusage; + unsigned char completed; + unsigned char *node; +} treehash_inst; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char *stack; + unsigned int stackoffset; + unsigned char *stacklevels; + unsigned char *auth; + unsigned char *keep; + treehash_inst *treehash; + unsigned char *retain; + unsigned int next_leaf; +} bds_state; + +/** + * Initialize BDS state struct + * parameter names are the same as used in the description of the BDS traversal + */ +void xmss_set_bds_state(bds_state *state, unsigned char *stack, int stackoffset, unsigned char *stacklevels, unsigned char *auth, unsigned char *keep, treehash_inst *treehash, unsigned char *retain, int next_leaf); +/** + * Initializes parameter set. + * Needed, for any of the other methods. + */ +int xmss_set_params(xmss_params *params, int n, int h, int w, int k); +/** + * Initialize xmssmt_params struct + * parameter names are the same as in the draft + * + * Especially h is the total tree height, i.e. the XMSS trees have height h/d + */ +int xmssmt_set_params(xmssmt_params *params, int n, int h, int d, int w, int k); +/** + * Generates a XMSS key pair for a given parameter set. + * Format sk: [(32bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root] + * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid. + */ +int xmss_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, xmss_params *params); +/** + * Signs a message. + * Returns + * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND + * 2. an updated secret key! + * + */ +int xmss_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg,unsigned long long msglen, const xmss_params *params); +/** + * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key. + * + * Note: msg and msglen are pure outputs which carry the message in case verification succeeds. The (input) message is assumed to be within sig_msg which has the form (sig||msg). + */ +int xmss_sign_open(unsigned char *msg,unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg,unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmss_params *params); + +/* + * Generates a XMSSMT key pair for a given parameter set. + * Format sk: [(ceil(h/8) bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root] + * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid. + */ +int xmssmt_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, xmssmt_params *params); +/** + * Signs a message. + * Returns + * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND + * 2. an updated secret key! + * + */ +int xmssmt_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *wots_sigs, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmssmt_params *params); +/** + * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key. + */ +int xmssmt_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmssmt_params *params); +#endif +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/xmss_hash.c b/xmss_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9eee7c --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* +hash.c version 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + +#include "xmss_hash_address.h" +#include "xmss_commons.h" +#include "xmss_hash.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *, const unsigned int, const unsigned char *, + unsigned int, const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, unsigned int); + +unsigned char* addr_to_byte(unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]){ +#if IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN==1 + int i = 0; + for(i=0;i<8;i++) + to_byte(bytes+i*4, addr[i],4); + return bytes; +#else + memcpy(bytes, addr, 32); + return bytes; +#endif +} + +int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *out, const unsigned int type, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, unsigned int n){ + unsigned long long i = 0; + unsigned char buf[inlen + n + keylen]; + + // Input is (toByte(X, 32) || KEY || M) + + // set toByte + to_byte(buf, type, n); + + for (i=0; i < keylen; i++) { + buf[i+n] = key[i]; + } + + for (i=0; i < inlen; i++) { + buf[keylen + n + i] = in[i]; + } + + if (n == 32) { + SHA256(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out); + return 0; + } + else { + if (n == 64) { + SHA512(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * Implements PRF + */ +int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + return core_hash_SHA2(out, 3, key, keylen, in, 32, keylen); +} + +/* + * Implemts H_msg + */ +int h_msg(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n) +{ + if (keylen != 3*n){ + // H_msg takes 3n-bit keys, but n does not match the keylength of keylen + return -1; + } + return core_hash_SHA2(out, 2, key, keylen, in, inlen, n); +} + +/** + * We assume the left half is in in[0]...in[n-1] + */ +int hash_h(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n) +{ + + unsigned char buf[2*n]; + unsigned char key[n]; + unsigned char bitmask[2*n]; + unsigned char byte_addr[32]; + unsigned int i; + + setKeyAndMask(addr, 0); + addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); + prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); + // Use MSB order + setKeyAndMask(addr, 1); + addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); + prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); + setKeyAndMask(addr, 2); + addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); + prf(bitmask+n, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); + for (i = 0; i < 2*n; i++) { + buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i]; + } + return core_hash_SHA2(out, 1, key, n, buf, 2*n, n); +} + +int hash_f(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n) +{ + unsigned char buf[n]; + unsigned char key[n]; + unsigned char bitmask[n]; + unsigned char byte_addr[32]; + unsigned int i; + + setKeyAndMask(addr, 0); + addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); + prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); + + setKeyAndMask(addr, 1); + addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr); + prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n); + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i]; + } + return core_hash_SHA2(out, 0, key, n, buf, n, n); +} +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/xmss_hash.h b/xmss_hash.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d19c621 --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#ifdef WITH_XMSS +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.h,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* +hash.h version 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ + +#ifndef HASH_H +#define HASH_H + +#define IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN 1 + +unsigned char* addr_to_byte(unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]); +int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen); +int h_msg(unsigned char *out,const unsigned char *in,unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n); +int hash_h(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n); +int hash_f(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n); + +#endif +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/xmss_hash_address.c b/xmss_hash_address.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6c1347 --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_hash_address.c @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash_address.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* +hash_address.c version 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include "xmss_hash_address.h" /* prototypes */ + +void setLayerADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t layer){ + adrs[0] = layer; +} + +void setTreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint64_t tree){ + adrs[1] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32); + adrs[2] = (uint32_t) tree; +} + +void setType(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t type){ + adrs[3] = type; + int i; + for(i = 4; i < 8; i++){ + adrs[i] = 0; + } +} + +void setKeyAndMask(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t keyAndMask){ + adrs[7] = keyAndMask; +} + +// OTS + +void setOTSADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ots){ + adrs[4] = ots; +} + +void setChainADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t chain){ + adrs[5] = chain; +} + +void setHashADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t hash){ + adrs[6] = hash; +} + +// L-tree + +void setLtreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ltree){ + adrs[4] = ltree; +} + +// Hash Tree & L-tree + +void setTreeHeight(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeHeight){ + adrs[5] = treeHeight; +} + +void setTreeIndex(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeIndex){ + adrs[6] = treeIndex; +} +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/xmss_hash_address.h b/xmss_hash_address.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..66bb4cc --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_hash_address.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +#ifdef WITH_XMSS +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash_address.h,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* +hash_address.h version 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ + +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif + +void setLayerADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t layer); + +void setTreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint64_t tree); + +void setType(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t type); + +void setKeyAndMask(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t keyAndMask); + +// OTS + +void setOTSADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ots); + +void setChainADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t chain); + +void setHashADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t hash); + +// L-tree + +void setLtreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ltree); + +// Hash Tree & L-tree + +void setTreeHeight(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeHeight); + +void setTreeIndex(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeIndex); + +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/xmss_wots.c b/xmss_wots.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed904cd --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_wots.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* +wots.c version 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include "xmss_commons.h" +#include "xmss_hash.h" +#include "xmss_wots.h" +#include "xmss_hash_address.h" + + +/* libm-free version of log2() for wots */ +static inline int +wots_log2(uint32_t v) +{ + int b; + + for (b = sizeof (v) * CHAR_BIT - 1; b >= 0; b--) { + if ((1U << b) & v) { + return b; + } + } + return 0; +} + +void +wots_set_params(wots_params *params, int n, int w) +{ + params->n = n; + params->w = w; + params->log_w = wots_log2(params->w); + params->len_1 = (CHAR_BIT * n) / params->log_w; + params->len_2 = (wots_log2(params->len_1 * (w - 1)) / params->log_w) + 1; + params->len = params->len_1 + params->len_2; + params->keysize = params->len * params->n; +} + +/** + * Helper method for pseudorandom key generation + * Expands an n-byte array into a len*n byte array + * this is done using PRF + */ +static void expand_seed(unsigned char *outseeds, const unsigned char *inseed, const wots_params *params) +{ + uint32_t i = 0; + unsigned char ctr[32]; + for(i = 0; i < params->len; i++){ + to_byte(ctr, i, 32); + prf((outseeds + (i*params->n)), ctr, inseed, params->n); + } +} + +/** + * Computes the chaining function. + * out and in have to be n-byte arrays + * + * interprets in as start-th value of the chain + * addr has to contain the address of the chain + */ +static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int start, unsigned int steps, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) +{ + uint32_t i, j; + for (j = 0; j < params->n; j++) + out[j] = in[j]; + + for (i = start; i < (start+steps) && i < params->w; i++) { + setHashADRS(addr, i); + hash_f(out, out, pub_seed, addr, params->n); + } +} + +/** + * base_w algorithm as described in draft. + * + * + */ +static void base_w(int *output, const int out_len, const unsigned char *input, const wots_params *params) +{ + int in = 0; + int out = 0; + uint32_t total = 0; + int bits = 0; + int consumed = 0; + + for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) { + if (bits == 0) { + total = input[in]; + in++; + bits += 8; + } + bits -= params->log_w; + output[out] = (total >> bits) & (params->w - 1); + out++; + } +} + +void wots_pkgen(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) +{ + uint32_t i; + expand_seed(pk, sk, params); + for (i=0; i < params->len; i++) { + setChainADRS(addr, i); + gen_chain(pk+i*params->n, pk+i*params->n, 0, params->w-1, params, pub_seed, addr); + } +} + + +int wots_sign(unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) +{ + //int basew[params->len]; + int csum = 0; + uint32_t i = 0; + int *basew = calloc(params->len, sizeof(int)); + if (basew == NULL) + return -1; + + base_w(basew, params->len_1, msg, params); + + for (i=0; i < params->len_1; i++) { + csum += params->w - 1 - basew[i]; + } + + csum = csum << (8 - ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) % 8)); + + int len_2_bytes = ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) + 7) / 8; + + unsigned char csum_bytes[len_2_bytes]; + to_byte(csum_bytes, csum, len_2_bytes); + + int csum_basew[params->len_2]; + base_w(csum_basew, params->len_2, csum_bytes, params); + + for (i = 0; i < params->len_2; i++) { + basew[params->len_1 + i] = csum_basew[i]; + } + + expand_seed(sig, sk, params); + + for (i = 0; i < params->len; i++) { + setChainADRS(addr, i); + gen_chain(sig+i*params->n, sig+i*params->n, 0, basew[i], params, pub_seed, addr); + } + free(basew); + return 0; +} + +int wots_pkFromSig(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]) +{ + int csum = 0; + uint32_t i = 0; + int *basew = calloc(params->len, sizeof(int)); + if (basew == NULL) + return -1; + + base_w(basew, params->len_1, msg, params); + + for (i=0; i < params->len_1; i++) { + csum += params->w - 1 - basew[i]; + } + + csum = csum << (8 - ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) % 8)); + + int len_2_bytes = ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) + 7) / 8; + + unsigned char csum_bytes[len_2_bytes]; + to_byte(csum_bytes, csum, len_2_bytes); + + int csum_basew[params->len_2]; + base_w(csum_basew, params->len_2, csum_bytes, params); + + for (i = 0; i < params->len_2; i++) { + basew[params->len_1 + i] = csum_basew[i]; + } + for (i=0; i < params->len; i++) { + setChainADRS(addr, i); + gen_chain(pk+i*params->n, sig+i*params->n, basew[i], params->w-1-basew[i], params, pub_seed, addr); + } + free(basew); + return 0; +} +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ diff --git a/xmss_wots.h b/xmss_wots.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1eebf3b --- /dev/null +++ b/xmss_wots.h @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +#ifdef WITH_XMSS +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.h,v 1.3 2018/02/26 12:14:53 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* +wots.h version 20160722 +Andreas Hülsing +Joost Rijneveld +Public domain. +*/ + +#ifndef WOTS_H +#define WOTS_H + +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include "stdint.h" +#endif + +/** + * WOTS parameter set + * + * Meaning as defined in draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-02 + */ +typedef struct { + uint32_t len_1; + uint32_t len_2; + uint32_t len; + uint32_t n; + uint32_t w; + uint32_t log_w; + uint32_t keysize; +} wots_params; + +/** + * Set the WOTS parameters, + * only m, n, w are required as inputs, + * len, len_1, and len_2 are computed from those. + * + * Assumes w is a power of 2 + */ +void wots_set_params(wots_params *params, int n, int w); + +/** + * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32byte seed for the secret key, expands it to a full WOTS secret key and computes the corresponding public key. + * For this it takes the seed pub_seed which is used to generate bitmasks and hash keys and the address of this WOTS key pair addr + * + * params, must have been initialized before using wots_set params for params ! This is not done in this function + * + * Places the computed public key at address pk. + */ +void wots_pkgen(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]); + +/** + * Takes a m-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the secret key to compute a signature that is placed at "sig". + * + */ +int wots_sign(unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]); + +/** + * Takes a WOTS signature, a m-byte message and computes a WOTS public key that it places at pk. + * + */ +int wots_pkFromSig(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]); + +#endif +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ -- cgit v1.2.3