Adding upstream version 3.4.23.upstream/3.4.23upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 88 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/util/chroot_uid.c b/src/util/chroot_uid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a7660f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/util/chroot_uid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	chroot_uid 3
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	limit possible damage a process can do
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	#include <chroot_uid.h>
+/*
+/*	void	chroot_uid(root_dir, user_name)
+/*	const char *root_dir;
+/*	const char *user_name;
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/*	\fBchroot_uid\fR changes the process root to \fIroot_dir\fR and
+/*	changes process privileges to those of \fIuser_name\fR.
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/*	System call errors are reported via the msg(3) interface.
+/*	All errors are fatal.
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Wietse Venema
+/*	IBM T.J. Watson Research
+/*	P.O. Box 704
+/*	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
+/*--*/
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "chroot_uid.h"
+
+/* chroot_uid - restrict the damage that this program can do */
+
+void    chroot_uid(const char *root_dir, const char *user_name)
+{
+    struct passwd *pwd;
+    uid_t   uid;
+    gid_t   gid;
+
+    /*
+     * Look up the uid/gid before entering the jail, and save them so they
+     * can't be clobbered. Set up the primary and secondary groups.
+     */
+    if (user_name != 0) {
+	if ((pwd = getpwnam(user_name)) == 0)
+	    msg_fatal("unknown user: %s", user_name);
+	uid = pwd->pw_uid;
+	gid = pwd->pw_gid;
+	if (setgid(gid) < 0)
+	    msg_fatal("setgid(%ld): %m", (long) gid);
+	if (initgroups(user_name, gid) < 0)
+	    msg_fatal("initgroups: %m");
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Enter the jail.
+     */
+    if (root_dir) {
+	if (chroot(root_dir))
+	    msg_fatal("chroot(%s): %m", root_dir);
+	if (chdir("/"))
+	    msg_fatal("chdir(/): %m");
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Drop the user privileges.
+     */
+    if (user_name != 0)
+	if (setuid(uid) < 0)
+	    msg_fatal("setuid(%ld): %m", (long) uid);
+
+    /*
+     * Give the desperate developer a clue of what is happening.
+     */
+    if (msg_verbose > 1)
+	msg_info("chroot %s user %s",
+		 root_dir ? root_dir : "(none)",
+		 user_name ? user_name : "(none)");
+}