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diff --git a/proto/TLS_LEGACY_README.html b/proto/TLS_LEGACY_README.html new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1bc80e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/proto/TLS_LEGACY_README.html @@ -0,0 +1,1606 @@ +<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> + +<html> + +<head> + +<title>Postfix legacy TLS Support </title> + +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"> + +</head> + +<body> + +<h1><img src="postfix-logo.jpg" width="203" height="98" ALT="">Postfix legacy TLS Support +</h1> + +<hr> + +<h2> NOTE </h2> + +<p> This document describes an old TLS user interface that is based +on a third-party TLS patch by Lutz Jänicke. As of Postfix +version 2.3, the old user interface still exists to allow migration +from earlier Postfix releases, but its functionality is frozen. </p> + +<h2> What Postfix TLS support does for you </h2> + +<p> Transport Layer Security (TLS, formerly called SSL) provides +certificate-based authentication and encrypted sessions. An +encrypted session protects the information that is transmitted with +SMTP mail or with SASL authentication. + +<p> Postfix version 2.2 introduces support for TLS as described in +RFC 3207. TLS Support for older Postfix versions was available as +an add-on patch. The section "<a href="#compat">Compatibility with +Postfix < 2.2 TLS support</a>" below discusses the differences +between these implementations. </p> + +<p> Topics covered in this document: </p> + +<ul> + +<li><a href="#how">How Postfix TLS support works</a> + +<li><a href="#build_tls">Building Postfix with TLS support</a> + +<li><a href="#server_tls">SMTP Server specific settings</a> + +<li> <a href="#client_tls">SMTP Client specific settings</a> + +<li><a href="#tlsmgr_controls"> TLS manager specific settings </a> + +<li><a href="#problems"> Reporting problems </a> + +<li><a href="#compat">Compatibility with Postfix < 2.2 TLS support</a> + +<li><a href="#credits"> Credits </a> + +</ul> + +<p> And last but not least, for the impatient: </p> + +<ul> + +<li><a href="#quick-start">Getting started, quick and dirty</a> + +</ul> + +<h2><a name="how">How Postfix TLS support works</a></h2> + +<p> The diagram below shows the main elements of the Postfix TLS +architecture and their relationships. Colored boxes with numbered +names represent Postfix daemon programs. Other colored boxes +represent storage elements. </p> + +<ul> + +<li> <p> The smtpd(8) server implements the SMTP over TLS server +side. </p> + +<li> <p> The smtp(8) client implements the SMTP over TLS client +side. </p> + +<li> <p> The tlsmgr(8) server maintains the pseudo-random number +generator (PRNG) that seeds the TLS engines in the smtpd(8) server +and smtp(8) client processes, and maintains the TLS session key +cache files. </p> + +</ul> + +<table> + +<tr> <td>Network<tt>-> </tt> </td> <td align="center" +bgcolor="#f0f0ff"> <br> <a href="smtpd.8.html">smtpd(8)</a> <br> </td> <td colspan="2"> + +<tt> <---seed---<br><br><-session-> </tt> </td> <td +align="center" bgcolor="#f0f0ff"> <br> <a href="tlsmgr.8.html">tlsmgr(8)</a> <br> </td> +<td colspan="3"> <tt> ---seed---><br> <br><-session-> + +</tt> </td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#f0f0ff"> <br> <a href="smtp.8.html">smtp(8)</a> <br> + </td> <td> <tt> -></tt>Network </td> </tr> + +<tr> <td colspan="3"> </td> <td align="right"> <table> <tr> <td> + +</td> <td> / </td> </tr> <tr> <td> / </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> +</td> <td align="center"> |<br> |</td> <td align="left"> <table> + +<tr> <td> \ </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> \ </td> +</tr> </table> </td> <td colspan="3"> </td> </tr> + +<tr> <td colspan="2"> </td> <td align="center" bgcolor="#f0f0ff"> +smtpd<br> session<br> key cache </td> <td> </td> <td align="center" +bgcolor="#f0f0ff"> PRNG<br> state <br>file </td> <td> </td> <td +align="center" bgcolor="#f0f0ff"> smtp<br> session<br> key cache +</td> + +<td colspan="2"> </td> </tr> + +</table> + +<h2><a name="build_tls">Building Postfix with TLS support</a></h2> + +<p> To build Postfix with TLS support, first we need to generate +the <tt>make(1)</tt> files with the necessary definitions. This is +done by invoking the command "<tt>make makefiles</tt>" in the Postfix +top-level directory and with arguments as shown next. </p> + +<p> <b> NOTE: Do not use Gnu TLS. It will spontaneously terminate +a Postfix daemon process with exit status code 2, instead of allowing +Postfix to 1) report the error to the maillog file, and to 2) provide +plaintext service where this is appropriate. </b> </p> + +<ul> + +<li> <p> If the OpenSSL include files (such as <tt>ssl.h</tt>) are +in directory <tt>/usr/include/openssl</tt>, and the OpenSSL libraries +(such as <tt>libssl.so</tt> and <tt>libcrypto.so</tt>) are in +directory <tt>/usr/lib</tt>: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>make tidy</b> # if you have left-over files from a previous build +% <b>make makefiles CCARGS="-DUSE_TLS" AUXLIBS="-lssl -lcrypto"</b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<li> <p> If the OpenSSL include files (such as <tt>ssl.h</tt>) are +in directory <tt>/usr/local/include/openssl</tt>, and the OpenSSL +libraries (such as <tt>libssl.so</tt> and <tt>libcrypto.so</tt>) +are in directory <tt>/usr/local/lib</tt>: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>make tidy</b> # if you have left-over files from a previous build +% <b>make makefiles CCARGS="-DUSE_TLS -I/usr/local/include" \ + AUXLIBS="-L/usr/local/lib -lssl -lcrypto" </b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> On Solaris, specify the <tt>-R</tt> option as shown below: + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>make tidy</b> # if you have left-over files from a previous build +% <b>make makefiles CCARGS="-DUSE_TLS -I/usr/local/include" \ + AUXLIBS="-R/usr/local/lib -L/usr/local/lib -lssl -lcrypto" </b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +</ul> + +<p> If you need to apply other customizations (such as Berkeley DB +databases, MySQL, PosgreSQL, LDAP or SASL), see the respective +Postfix README documents, and combine their "<tt>make makefiles</tt>" +instructions with the instructions above: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>make tidy</b> # if you have left-over files from a previous build +% <b>make makefiles CCARGS="-DUSE_TLS \ + <i>(other -D or -I options)</i>" \ + AUXLIBS="-lssl -lcrypto \ + <i>(other -l options for libraries in /usr/lib)</i> \ + <i>(-L/path/name + -l options for other libraries)</i>"</b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> To complete the build process, see the Postfix INSTALL +instructions. Postfix has TLS support turned off by default, so +you can start using Postfix as soon as it is installed. </p> + +<h2><a name="server_tls">SMTP Server specific settings</a></h2> + +<p> Topics covered in this section: </p> + +<ul> + +<li><a href="#server_cert_key">Server-side certificate and private +key configuration </a> + +<li><a href="#server_logging"> Server-side TLS activity logging +</a> + +<li><a href="#server_enable">Enabling TLS in the Postfix SMTP server </a> + +<li><a href="#server_vrfy_client">Client certificate verification</a> + +<li><a href="#server_tls_auth">Supporting AUTH over TLS only</a> + +<li><a href="#server_tls_cache">Server-side TLS session cache</a> + +<li><a href="#server_access">Server access control</a> + +<li><a href="#server_cipher">Server-side cipher controls</a> + +<li><a href="#server_misc"> Miscellaneous server controls</a> + +</ul> + +<h3><a name="server_cert_key">Server-side certificate and private +key configuration </a> </h3> + +<p> In order to use TLS, the Postfix SMTP server needs a certificate +and a private key. Both must be in "pem" format. The private key +must not be encrypted, meaning: the key must be accessible without +password. Both certificate and private key may be in the same +file. </p> + +<p> Both RSA and DSA certificates are supported. Typically you will +only have RSA certificates issued by a commercial CA. In addition, +the tools supplied with OpenSSL will by default issue RSA certificates. +You can have both at the same time, in which case the cipher used +determines which certificate is presented. For Netscape and OpenSSL +clients without special cipher choices, the RSA certificate is +preferred. </p> + +<p> In order for remote SMTP clients to check the Postfix SMTP +server certificates, the CA certificate (in case of a certificate +chain, all CA certificates) must be available. You should add +these certificates to the server certificate, the server certificate +first, then the issuing CA(s). </p> + +<p> Example: the certificate for "server.dom.ain" was issued by +"intermediate CA" which itself has a certificate issued by "root +CA". Create the server.pem file with: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>cat server_cert.pem intermediate_CA.pem > server.pem</b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> A Postfix SMTP server certificate supplied here must be usable +as SSL server certificate and hence pass the "openssl verify -purpose +sslserver ..." test. </p> + +<p> A client that trusts the root CA has a local copy of the root +CA certificate, so it is not necessary to include the root CA +certificate here. Leaving it out of the "server.pem" file reduces +the overhead of the TLS exchange. </p> + +<p> If you want the Postfix SMTP server to accept remote SMTP client +certificates issued by these CAs, append the root certificate to +$smtpd_tls_CAfile or install it in the $smtpd_tls_CApath directory. When +you configure trust in a root CA, it is not necessary to explicitly trust +intermediary CAs signed by the root CA, unless $smtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth +is less than the number of CAs in the certificate chain for the clients +of interest. With a verify depth of 1 you can only verify certificates +directly signed by a trusted CA, and all trusted intermediary CAs need to +be configured explicitly. With a verify depth of 2 you can verify clients +signed by a root CA or a direct intermediary CA (so long as the client +is correctly configured to supply its intermediate CA certificate). </p> + +<p> RSA key and certificate examples: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/server.pem + smtpd_tls_key_file = $smtpd_tls_cert_file +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> Their DSA counterparts: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_dcert_file = /etc/postfix/server-dsa.pem + smtpd_tls_dkey_file = $smtpd_tls_dcert_file +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> To verify a remote SMTP client certificate, the Postfix SMTP +server needs to trust the certificates of the issuing Certification +Authorities. These certificates in "pem" format can be stored in a +single $smtpd_tls_CAfile or in multiple files, one CA per file in +the $smtpd_tls_CApath directory. If you use a directory, don't forget +to create the necessary "hash" links with: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +# <b>$OPENSSL_HOME/bin/c_rehash <i>/path/to/directory</i> </b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> The $smtpd_tls_CAfile contains the CA certificates of one or +more trusted CAs. The file is opened (with root privileges) before +Postfix enters the optional chroot jail and so need not be accessible +from inside the chroot jail. </p> + +<p> Additional trusted CAs can be specified via the $smtpd_tls_CApath +directory, in which case the certificates are read (with $mail_owner +privileges) from the files in the directory when the information +is needed. Thus, the $smtpd_tls_CApath directory needs to be +accessible inside the optional chroot jail. </p> + +<p> When you configure Postfix to request client certificates (by +setting $smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = yes), any certificates in +$smtpd_tls_CAfile are sent to the client, in order to allow it to +choose an identity signed by a CA you trust. If no $smtpd_tls_CAfile +is specified, no preferred CA list is sent, and the client is free +to choose an identity signed by any CA. Many clients use a fixed +identity regardless of the preferred CA list and you may be able +to reduce TLS negotiation overhead by installing client CA certificates +mostly or only in $smtpd_tls_CApath. In the latter case you need +not specify a $smtpd_tls_CAfile. </p> + +<p> Note, that unless client certificates are used to allow greater +access to TLS authenticated clients, it is best to not ask for +client certificates at all, as in addition to increased overhead +some clients (notably in some cases qmail) are unable to complete +the TLS handshake when client certificates are requested. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem + smtpd_tls_CApath = /etc/postfix/certs +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="server_logging"> Server-side TLS activity logging </a> </h3> + +<p> To get additional information about Postfix SMTP server TLS +activity you can increase the loglevel from 0..4. Each logging +level also includes the information that is logged at a lower +logging level. </p> + +<blockquote> + +<table> + +<tr> <td> 0 </td> <td> Disable logging of TLS activity.</td> </tr> + +<tr> <td> 1 </td> <td> Log TLS handshake and certificate information. +</td> </tr> + +<tr> <td> 2 </td> <td> Log levels during TLS negotiation. </td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td> 3 </td> <td> Log hexadecimal and ASCII dump of TLS +negotiation process </td> </tr> + +<tr> <td> 4 </td> <td> Log hexadecimal and ASCII dump of complete +transmission after STARTTLS </td> </tr> + +</table> + +</blockquote> + +<p> Use loglevel 3 only in case of problems. Use of loglevel 4 is +strongly discouraged. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_loglevel = 0 +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> To include information about the protocol and cipher used as +well as the client and issuer CommonName into the "Received:" +message header, set the smtpd_tls_received_header variable to true. +The default is no, as the information is not necessarily authentic. +Only information recorded at the final destination is reliable, +since the headers may be changed by intermediate servers. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_received_header = yes +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="server_enable">Enabling TLS in the Postfix SMTP server </a> </h3> + +<p> By default, TLS is disabled in the Postfix SMTP server, so no +difference to plain Postfix is visible. Explicitly switch it on +using "smtpd_use_tls = yes". </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_use_tls = yes +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> With this, Postfix SMTP server announces STARTTLS support to +SMTP clients, but does not require that clients use TLS encryption. +</p> + +<p> Note: when an unprivileged user invokes "sendmail -bs", STARTTLS +is never offered due to insufficient privileges to access the server +private key. This is intended behavior. </p> + +<p> You can ENFORCE the use of TLS, so that the Postfix SMTP server +announces STARTTLS and accepts no mail without TLS encryption, by +setting "smtpd_enforce_tls = yes". According to RFC 2487 this MUST +NOT be applied in case of a publicly-referenced Postfix SMTP server. +This option is off by default and should only seldom be used. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_enforce_tls = yes +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> TLS is sometimes used in the non-standard "wrapper" mode where +a server always uses TLS, instead of announcing STARTTLS support +and waiting for clients to request TLS service. Some clients, namely +Outlook [Express] prefer the "wrapper" mode. This is true for OE +(Win32 < 5.0 and Win32 >=5.0 when run on a port<>25 +and OE (5.01 Mac on all ports). </p> + +<p> It is strictly discouraged to use this mode from main.cf. If +you want to support this service, enable a special port in master.cf +and specify "-o smtpd_tls_wrappermode = yes" as an smtpd(8) command +line option. Port 465 (smtps) was once chosen for this feature. +</p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/master.cf: + smtps inet n - n - - smtpd + -o smtpd_tls_wrappermode=yes -o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="server_vrfy_client">Client certificate verification</a> </h3> + +<p> To receive a remote SMTP client certificate, the Postfix SMTP +server must explicitly ask for one (any contents of $smtpd_tls_CAfile +are also sent to the client as a hint for choosing a certificate +from a suitable CA). Unfortunately, Netscape clients will either +complain if no matching client certificate is available or will +offer the user client a list of certificates to choose from. +Additionally some MTAs (notably some versions of qmail) are unable +to complete TLS negotiation when client certificates are requested, +and abort the SMTP session. So this option is "off" by default. +You will however need the certificate if you want to use certificate +based relaying with, for example, the permit_tls_clientcerts +feature. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = no +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> You may also decide to REQUIRE a remote SMTP client certificate +before allowing TLS connections. This feature is included for +completeness, and implies "smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = yes". </p> + +<p> Please be aware, that this will inhibit TLS connections without +a proper client certificate and that it makes sense only when +non-TLS submission is disabled (smtpd_enforce_tls = yes). Otherwise, +clients could bypass the restriction by simply not using STARTTLS +at all. </p> + +<p> When TLS is not enforced, the connection will be handled as +if only "smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = yes" is specified, and a warning is +logged. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_req_ccert = no +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> A client certificate verification depth of 1 is sufficient if +the certificate is directly issued by a CA listed in the CA file. +The default value (5) should also suffice for longer chains (root +CA issues special CA which then issues the actual certificate...) +</p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth = 5 +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="server_tls_auth">Supporting AUTH over TLS only</a></h3> + +<p> Sending AUTH data over an unencrypted channel poses a security +risk. When TLS layer encryption is required (smtpd_enforce_tls = +yes), the Postfix SMTP server will announce and accept AUTH only +after the TLS layer has been activated with STARTTLS. When TLS +layer encryption is optional (smtpd_enforce_tls = no), it may +however still be useful to only offer AUTH when TLS is active. To +maintain compatibility with non-TLS clients, the default is to +accept AUTH without encryption. In order to change this behavior, +set "smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes". </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_auth_only = no +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="server_tls_cache">Server-side TLS session cache</a> </h3> + +<p> The Postfix SMTP server and the remote SMTP client negotiate +a session, which takes some computer time and network bandwidth. +By default, this session information is cached only in the smtpd(8) +process actually using this session and is lost when the process +terminates. To share the session information between multiple +smtpd(8) processes, a persistent session cache can be used. You +can specify any database type that can store objects of several +kbytes and that supports the sequence operator. DBM databases are +not suitable because they can only store small objects. The cache +is maintained by the tlsmgr(8) process, so there is no problem with +concurrent access. Session caching is highly recommended, because +the cost of repeatedly negotiating TLS session keys is high.</p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_session_cache_database = btree:/etc/postfix/smtpd_scache +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> As of version 2.5, Postfix will no longer maintain this file +in a directory with non-Postfix ownership. As a migration aid, +attempts to open such files are redirected to the Postfix-owned +$data_directory, and a warning is logged. </p> + +<p> Cached Postfix SMTP server session information expires after +a certain amount of time. Postfix/TLS does not use the OpenSSL +default of 300s, but a longer time of 3600sec (=1 hour). RFC 2246 +recommends a maximum of 24 hours. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout = 3600s +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="server_access">Server access control</a> </h3> + +<p> Postfix TLS support introduces three additional features for +Postfix SMTP server access control: </p> + +<blockquote> + +<dl> + +<dt> permit_tls_clientcerts </dt> <dd> <p> Allow the remote SMTP +client SMTP request if the client certificate passes verification, +and if its fingerprint is listed in the list of client certificates +(see relay_clientcerts discussion below). </p> </dd> + +<dt> permit_tls_all_clientcerts </dt> <dd> <p> Allow the remote +client SMTP request if the client certificate passes verification. +</p> </dd> + +<dt> check_ccert_access type:table</dt> <dd> +<p> If the client certificate passes verification, use its fingerprint +as a key for the specified access(5) table. </p> </dd> + +</dl> + +</blockquote> + +<p> The permit_tls_all_clientcerts feature must be used with caution, +because it can result in too many access permissions. Use this +feature only if a special CA issues the client certificates, and +only if this CA is listed as trusted CA. If other CAs are trusted, +any owner of a valid client certificate would be authorized. +The permit_tls_all_clientcerts feature can be practical for a +specially created email relay server. </p> + +<p> It is however recommended to stay with the permit_tls_clientcerts +feature and list all certificates via $relay_clientcerts, as +permit_tls_all_clientcerts does not permit any control when a +certificate must no longer be used (e.g. an employee leaving). </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_recipient_restrictions = + ... + permit_tls_clientcerts + reject_unauth_destination + ... +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> The Postfix list manipulation routines give special treatment +to whitespace and some other characters, making the use of certificate +names impractical. Instead we use the certificate fingerprints as +they are difficult to fake but easy to use for lookup. Postfix +lookup tables are in the form of (key, value) pairs. Since we only +need the key, the value can be chosen freely, e.g. the name of +the user or host.</p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + relay_clientcerts = hash:/etc/postfix/relay_clientcerts + +/etc/postfix/relay_clientcerts: + D7:04:2F:A7:0B:8C:A5:21:FA:31:77:E1:41:8A:EE:80 lutzpc.at.home +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="server_cipher">Server-side cipher controls</a> </h3> + +<p> To influence the Postfix SMTP server cipher selection scheme, +you can give cipherlist string. A detailed description would go +to far here; please refer to the OpenSSL documentation. If you +don't know what to do with it, simply don't touch it and leave the +(openssl-)compiled in default! </p> + +<p> DO NOT USE " to enclose the string, specify just the string!!! </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_cipherlist = DEFAULT +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> If you want to take advantage of ciphers with EDH, DH parameters +are needed. Instead of using the built-in DH parameters for both +1024bit and 512bit, it is better to generate "own" parameters, +since otherwise it would "pay" for a possible attacker to start a +brute force attack against parameters that are used by everybody. +For this reason, the parameters chosen are already different from +those distributed with other TLS packages. </p> + +<p> To generate your own set of DH parameters, use: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>openssl gendh -out /etc/postfix/dh_1024.pem -2 -rand /var/run/egd-pool 1024</b> +% <b>openssl gendh -out /etc/postfix/dh_512.pem -2 -rand /var/run/egd-pool 512</b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> Examples: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file = /etc/postfix/dh_1024.pem + smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file = /etc/postfix/dh_512.pem +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="server_misc"> Miscellaneous server controls</a> </h3> + +<p> The smtpd_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time of Postfix +SMTP server write and read operations during TLS startup and shutdown +handshake procedures. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtpd_starttls_timeout = 300s +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h2> <a name="client_tls">SMTP Client specific settings</a> </h2> + +<p> Topics covered in this section: </p> + +<ul> + +<li><a href="#client_cert_key">Client-side certificate and private +key configuration </a> + +<li><a href="#client_logging"> Client-side TLS activity logging +</a> + +<li><a href="#client_tls_cache">Client-side TLS session cache</a> + +<li><a href="#client_tls_enable"> Enabling TLS in the Postfix SMTP client </a> + +<li><a href="#client_tls_require"> Requiring TLS encryption </a> + +<li><a href="#client_tls_nopeer"> Disabling server certificate verification </a> + +<li><a href="#client_tls_per_site"> Per-site TLS policies </a> + +<!-- +<li><a href="#client_tls_obs"> Obsolete per-site TLS policy support </a> +--> + +<li><a href="#client_tls_harden"> Closing a DNS loophole with <!-- legacy --> per-site TLS policies </a> + +<li><a href="#client_tls_discover"> Discovering servers that support TLS </a> + +<li><a href="#client_vrfy_server">Server certificate verification depth</a> + +<li> <a href="#client_cipher">Client-side cipher controls </a> + +<li> <a href="#client_misc"> Miscellaneous client controls </a> + +</ul> + +<h3><a name="client_cert_key">Client-side certificate and private +key configuration </a> </h3> + +<p> During TLS startup negotiation the Postfix SMTP client may present +a certificate to the remote SMTP server. The Netscape client is +rather clever here and lets the user select between only those +certificates that match CA certificates offered by the remote SMTP +server. As the Postfix SMTP client uses the "SSL_connect()" function +from the OpenSSL package, this is not possible and we have to choose +just one certificate. So for now the default is to use _no_ +certificate and key unless one is explicitly specified here. </p> + +<p> Both RSA and DSA certificates are supported. You can have both +at the same time, in which case the cipher used determines which +certificate is presented. </p> + +<p> It is possible for the Postfix SMTP client to use the same +key/certificate pair as the Postfix SMTP server. If a certificate +is to be presented, it must be in "pem" format. The private key +must not be encrypted, meaning: it must be accessible without +password. Both parts (certificate and private key) may be in the +same file. </p> + +<p> In order for remote SMTP servers to verify the Postfix SMTP +client certificates, the CA certificate (in case of a certificate +chain, all CA certificates) must be available. You should add +these certificates to the client certificate, the client certificate +first, then the issuing CA(s). </p> + +<p> Example: the certificate for "client.example.com" was issued by +"intermediate CA" which itself has a certificate of "root CA". +Create the client.pem file with: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>cat client_cert.pem intermediate_CA.pem > client.pem </b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> A Postfix SMTP client certificate supplied here must be usable +as SSL client certificate and hence pass the "openssl verify -purpose +sslclient ..." test. </p> + +<p> A server that trusts the root CA has a local copy of the root +CA certificate, so it is not necessary to include the root CA +certificate here. Leaving it out of the "client.pem" file reduces +the overhead of the TLS exchange. </p> + +<p> If you want the Postfix SMTP client to accept remote SMTP server +certificates issued by these CAs, append the root certificate to +$smtp_tls_CAfile or install it in the $smtp_tls_CApath directory. When +you configure trust in a root CA, it is not necessary to explicitly trust +intermediary CAs signed by the root CA, unless $smtp_tls_scert_verifydepth +is less than the number of CAs in the certificate chain for the servers +of interest. With a verify depth of 1 you can only verify certificates +directly signed by a trusted CA, and all trusted intermediary CAs need to +be configured explicitly. With a verify depth of 2 you can verify servers +signed by a root CA or a direct intermediary CA (so long as the server +is correctly configured to supply its intermediate CA certificate). </p> + +<p> RSA key and certificate examples: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/client.pem + smtp_tls_key_file = $smtp_tls_cert_file +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> Their DSA counterparts: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_dcert_file = /etc/postfix/client-dsa.pem + smtp_tls_dkey_file = $smtp_tls_dcert_file +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> To verify a remote SMTP server certificate, the Postfix SMTP +client needs to trust the certificates of the issuing Certification +Authorities. These certificates in "pem" format can be stored in a +single $smtp_tls_CAfile or in multiple files, one CA per file in +the $smtp_tls_CApath directory. If you use a directory, don't forget +to create the necessary "hash" links with: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +# <b>$OPENSSL_HOME/bin/c_rehash <i>/path/to/directory</i> </b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> The $smtp_tls_CAfile contains the CA certificates of one or more +trusted CAs. The file is opened (with root privileges) before Postfix +enters the optional chroot jail and so need not be accessible from inside the +chroot jail. </p> + +<p> Additional trusted CAs can be specified via the $smtp_tls_CApath +directory, in which case the certificates are read (with $mail_owner +privileges) from the files in the directory when the information +is needed. Thus, the $smtp_tls_CApath directory needs to be accessible +inside the optional chroot jail. </p> + +<p> The choice between $smtp_tls_CAfile and $smtp_tls_CApath is +a space/time tradeoff. If there are many trusted CAs, the cost of +preloading them all into memory may not pay off in reduced access time +when the certificate is needed. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem + smtp_tls_CApath = /etc/postfix/certs +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="client_logging"> Client-side TLS activity logging </a> </h3> + +<p> To get additional information about Postfix SMTP client TLS +activity you can increase the loglevel from 0..4. Each logging +level also includes the information that is logged at a lower +logging level. </p> + +<blockquote> + +<table> + +<tr> <td> 0 </td> <td> Disable logging of TLS activity.</td> </tr> + +<tr> <td> 1 </td> <td> Log TLS handshake and certificate information. +</td> </tr> + +<tr> <td> 2 </td> <td> Log levels during TLS negotiation. </td> +</tr> + +<tr> <td> 3 </td> <td> Log hexadecimal and ASCII dump of TLS +negotiation process </td> </tr> + +<tr> <td> 4 </td> <td> Log hexadecimal and ASCII dump of complete +transmission after STARTTLS </td> </tr> + +</table> + +</blockquote> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_loglevel = 0 +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="client_tls_cache">Client-side TLS session cache</a> </h3> + +<p> The remote SMTP server and the Postfix SMTP client negotiate a +session, which takes some computer time and network bandwidth. By +default, this session information is cached only in the smtp(8) +process actually using this session and is lost when the process +terminates. To share the session information between multiple +smtp(8) processes, a persistent session cache can be used. You +can specify any database type that can store objects of several +kbytes and that supports the sequence operator. DBM databases are +not suitable because they can only store small objects. The cache +is maintained by the tlsmgr(8) process, so there is no problem with +concurrent access. Session caching is highly recommended, because +the cost of repeatedly negotiating TLS session keys is high. Future +Postfix SMTP servers may limit the number of sessions that a client +is allowed to negotiate per unit time.</p> + + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_session_cache_database = btree:/etc/postfix/smtp_scache +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> As of version 2.5, Postfix will no longer maintain this file +in a directory with non-Postfix ownership. As a migration aid, +attempts to open such files are redirected to the Postfix-owned +$data_directory, and a warning is logged. </p> + +<p> Cached Postfix SMTP client session information expires after +a certain amount of time. Postfix/TLS does not use the OpenSSL +default of 300s, but a longer time of 3600s (=1 hour). RFC 2246 +recommends a maximum of 24 hours. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_session_cache_timeout = 3600s +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="client_tls_enable"> Enabling TLS in the Postfix SMTP +client </a> </h3> + +<p> By default, TLS is disabled in the Postfix SMTP client, so no +difference to plain Postfix is visible. If you enable TLS, the +Postfix SMTP client will send STARTTLS when TLS support is announced +by the remote SMTP server. </p> + +<p> When the server accepts the STARTTLS command, but the subsequent +TLS handshake fails, and no other server is available, the Postfix SMTP +client defers the delivery attempt, and the mail stays in the queue. After +a handshake failure, the communications channel is in an indeterminate +state and cannot be used for non-TLS deliveries. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_use_tls = yes +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="client_tls_require"> Requiring TLS encryption </a> +</h3> + +<p> You can ENFORCE the use of TLS, so that the Postfix SMTP client +will not deliver mail over unencrypted connections. In this mode, +the remote SMTP server hostname must match the information in the +remote server certificate, and the server certificate must be issued +by a CA that is trusted by the Postfix SMTP client. If the remote +server certificate doesn't verify or the remote SMTP server hostname +doesn't match, and no other server is available, the delivery +attempt is deferred and the mail stays in the queue. </p> + +<p> The remote SMTP server hostname is verified against all names +provided as dNSNames +in the SubjectAlternativeName. If no dNSNames are specified, the +CommonName is checked. Verification may be turned off with the +smtp_tls_enforce_peername option which is discussed below. </p> + +<p> Enforcing the use of TLS is useful if you know that you will +only +connect to servers that support RFC 2487 _and_ that present server +certificates that meet the above requirements. An example would +be a client only sends email to one specific mailhub that offers +the necessary STARTTLS support. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_enforce_tls = yes +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3> <a name="client_tls_nopeer"> Disabling server certificate +verification </a> </h3> + +<p> As of RFC 2487 the requirements for hostname checking for MTA +clients are not set. When TLS is required (smtp_enforce_tls = yes), +the option smtp_tls_enforce_peername can be set to "no" to disable +strict remote SMTP server hostname checking. In this case, the mail +delivery will proceed regardless of the CommonName etc. listed in +the certificate. </p> + +<p> Despite the potential for eliminating "man-in-the-middle" and +other attacks, mandatory certificate/peername verification is not +viable as a default Internet mail delivery policy at this time. A +significant fraction of TLS enabled MTAs uses self-signed certificates, +or certificates that are signed by a private Certification Authority. +On a machine that delivers mail to the Internet, if you set +smtp_enforce_tls = yes, you should probably also set +smtp_tls_enforce_peername = no. You can use the per-site TLS +policies (see below) to enable full peer verification for specific +destinations that are known to have verifiable TLS server certificates. +</p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_enforce_tls = yes + smtp_tls_enforce_peername = no +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3> <a name="client_tls_per_site"> Per-site TLS policies </a> </h3> + +<p> A small fraction of servers offer STARTTLS but the negotiation +consistently fails, leading to mail aging out of the queue and +bouncing back to the sender. In such cases, you can use the per-site +policies to disable TLS for the problem sites. Alternatively, you +can enable TLS for just a few specific sites and not enable it for +all sites. </p> + +<!-- insert new-style TLS policy mechanism here + +<h3> <a name="client_tls_obs"> Obsolete per-site TLS policy support +</a> </h3> + +<p> This section describes an obsolete per-site TLS policy mechanism. +Unlike the newer mechanism it supports TLS policy lookup by server +hostname, and lacks control over what names can appear in server +certificates. Because of this, the obsolete mechanism is vulnerable +to false DNS hostname information in MX or CNAME records. These +attacks can be eliminated only with great difficulty. </p> + +--> + +<p> The smtp_tls_per_site table is searched for a policy that matches +the following information: </p> + +<blockquote> + +<dl> + +<dt> remote SMTP server hostname </dt> <dd> This is simply the DNS +name of the server that the Postfix SMTP client connects to; this +name may be obtained from other DNS lookups, such as MX lookups or +CNAME lookups. </dd> + +<dt> next-hop destination </dt> <dd> This is normally the domain +portion of the recipient address, but it may be overruled by +information from the transport(5) table, from the relayhost parameter +setting, or from the relay_transport setting. When it's not the +recipient domain, the next-hop destination can have the Postfix-specific +form "<tt>[name]</tt>", <tt>[name]:port</tt>", "<tt>name</tt>" or +"<tt>name:port</tt>". </dd> + +</dl> + +</blockquote> + +<p> When both the hostname lookup and the next-hop lookup succeed, +the host policy does not automatically override the next-hop policy. +Instead, precedence is given to either the more specific or the +more secure per-site policy as described below. </p> + +<p> The smtp_tls_per_site table uses a simple "<i>name whitespace +value</i>" format. Specify host names or next-hop destinations on +the left-hand side; no wildcards are allowed. On the right hand +side specify one of the following keywords: </p> + +<blockquote> + +<dl> + +<dt> NONE </dt> <dd> Don't use TLS at all. This overrides a less +specific <b>MAY</b> lookup result from the alternate host or next-hop +lookup key, and overrides the global smtp_use_tls, smtp_enforce_tls, +and smtp_tls_enforce_peername settings. </dd> + +<dt> MAY </dt> <dd> Try to use TLS if the server announces support, +otherwise use the unencrypted connection. This has less precedence +than a more specific result (including <b>NONE</b>) from the alternate +host or next-hop lookup key, and has less precedence than the more +specific global "smtp_enforce_tls = yes" or "smtp_tls_enforce_peername += yes". </dd> + +<dt> MUST_NOPEERMATCH </dt> <dd> Require TLS encryption, but do not +require that the remote SMTP server hostname matches the information +in the remote SMTP server certificate, or that the server certificate +was issued by a trusted CA. This overrides a less secure <b>NONE</b> +or a less specific <b>MAY</b> lookup result from the alternate host +or next-hop lookup key, and overrides the global smtp_use_tls, +smtp_enforce_tls and smtp_tls_enforce_peername settings. </dd> + +<dt> MUST </dt> <dd> Require TLS encryption, require that the remote +SMTP server hostname matches the information in the remote SMTP +server certificate, and require that the remote SMTP server certificate +was issued by a trusted CA. This overrides a less secure <b>NONE</b> +and <b>MUST_NOPEERMATCH</b> or a less specific <b>MAY</b> lookup +result from the alternate host or next-hop lookup key, and overrides +the global smtp_use_tls, smtp_enforce_tls and smtp_tls_enforce_peername +settings. </dd> + +</dl> + +</blockquote> + +<p> The precedences between global (main.cf) and per-site TLS +policies can be summarized as follows: </p> + +<ul> + +<li> <p> When neither the remote SMTP server hostname nor the +next-hop destination are found in the smtp_tls_per_site table, the +policy is based on smtp_use_tls, smtp_enforce_tls and +smtp_tls_enforce_peername. Note: "smtp_enforce_tls = yes" and +"smtp_tls_enforce_peername = yes" imply "smtp_use_tls = yes". </p> + +<li> <p> When both hostname and next-hop destination lookups produce +a result, the more specific per-site policy (NONE, MUST, etc) +overrides the less specific one (MAY), and the more secure per-site +policy (MUST, etc) overrides the less secure one (NONE). </p> + +<li> <p> After the per-site policy lookups are combined, the result +generally overrides the global policy. The exception is the less +specific <b>MAY</b> per-site policy, which is overruled by the more +specific global "smtp_enforce_tls = yes" with server certificate +verification as specified with the smtp_tls_enforce_peername +parameter. </p> + +</ul> + +<h3> <a name="client_tls_harden"> Closing a DNS loophole with +<!-- legacy --> per-site TLS policies </a> </h3> + +<p> As long as no secure DNS lookup mechanism is available, false +hostnames in MX or CNAME responses can change the server hostname +that Postfix uses for TLS policy lookup and server certificate +verification. Even with a perfect match between the server hostname +and the server certificate, there is no guarantee that Postfix is +connected to the right server. To avoid this loophole take the +following steps: </p> + +<ul> + +<li> <p> Eliminate MX lookups. Specify local transport(5) table +entries for sensitive domains with explicit smtp:[<i>mailhost</i>] +or smtp:[<i>mailhost</i>]:<i>port</i> destinations (you can assure +security of this table unlike DNS); in the smtp_tls_per_site table +specify the value <b>MUST</b> for the key [<i>mailhost</i>] or +smtp:[<i>mailhost</i>]:<i>port</i>. This prevents false hostname +information in DNS MX records from changing the server hostname +that Postfix uses for TLS policy lookup and server certificate +verification. </p> + +<li> <p> Disallow CNAME hostname overrides. In main.cf specify +"smtp_cname_overrides_servername = no". This prevents false hostname +information in DNS CNAME records from changing the server hostname +that Postfix uses for TLS policy lookup and server certificate +verification. This feature requires Postfix 2.2.9 or later. </p> + +</ul> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> <pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_per_site = hash:/etc/postfix/tls_per_site + relayhost = [msa.example.net]:587 + +/etc/postfix/tls_per_site: + # relayhost exact nexthop match + [msa.example.net]:587 MUST + + # TLS should not be used with the <i>example.org</i> MX hosts. + example.org NONE + + # TLS should not be used with the host <i>smtp.example.com</i>. + smtp.example.com NONE +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3> <a name="client_tls_discover"> Discovering servers that support +TLS </a> </h3> + +<p> As we decide on a "per site" basis whether or not to use TLS, +it would be good to have a list of sites that offered "STARTTLS". +We can collect it ourselves with this option. </p> + +<p> If the smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer feature is enabled and a +server offers STARTTLS while TLS is not already enabled for that +server, the Postfix SMTP client logs a line as follows: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +postfix/smtp[pid]: Host offered STARTTLS: [hostname.example.com] +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer = yes +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3><a name="client_vrfy_server">Server certificate verification depth</a> </h3> + +<p> When verifying a remote SMTP server certificate, a verification +depth of 1 is sufficient if the certificate is directly issued by +a CA specified with smtp_tls_CAfile or smtp_tls_CApath. The default +value of 5 should also suffice for longer chains (root CA issues +special CA which then issues the actual certificate...) </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_scert_verifydepth = 5 +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3> <a name="client_cipher">Client-side cipher controls </a> </h3> + +<p> To influence the Postfix SMTP client cipher selection scheme, +you can give cipherlist string. A detailed description would go +to far here; please refer to the OpenSSL documentation. If you +don't know what to do with it, simply don't touch it and leave the +(openssl-)compiled in default! </p> + +<p> DO NOT USE " to enclose the string, specify just the string!!! </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_tls_cipherlist = DEFAULT +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h3> <a name="client_misc"> Miscellaneous client controls </a> </h3> + +<p> The smtp_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time of Postfix +SMTP client write and read operations during TLS startup and shutdown +handshake procedures. In case of problems the Postfix SMTP client +tries the next network address on the mail exchanger list, and +defers delivery if no alternative server is available. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + smtp_starttls_timeout = 300s +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h2><a name="tlsmgr_controls"> TLS manager specific settings </a> </h2> + +<p> The security of cryptographic software such as TLS depends +critically on the ability to generate unpredictable numbers for +keys and other information. To this end, the tlsmgr(8) process +maintains a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) pool. This is +queried by the smtp(8) and smtpd(8) processes when they initialize. +By default, these daemons request 32 bytes, the equivalent to 256 +bits. This is more than sufficient to generate a 128bit (or 168bit) +session key. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + tls_daemon_random_bytes = 32 +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> In order to feed its in-memory PRNG pool, the tlsmgr(8) reads +entropy from an external source, both at startup and during run-time. +Specify a good entropy source, like EGD or /dev/urandom; be sure +to only use non-blocking sources (on OpenBSD, use /dev/arandom +when tlsmgr(8) complains about /dev/urandom timeout errors). +If the entropy source is not a +regular file, you must prepend the source type to the source name: +"dev:" for a device special file, or "egd:" for a source with EGD +compatible socket interface. </p> + +<p> Examples (specify only one in main.cf): </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + tls_random_source = dev:/dev/urandom + tls_random_source = egd:/var/run/egd-pool +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> By default, tlsmgr(8) reads 32 bytes from the external entropy +source at each seeding event. This amount (256bits) is more than +sufficient for generating a 128bit symmetric key. With EGD and +device entropy sources, the tlsmgr(8) limits the amount of data +read at each step to 255 bytes. If you specify a regular file as +entropy source, a larger amount of data can be read. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + tls_random_bytes = 32 +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> In order to update its in-memory PRNG pool, the tlsmgr(8) +queries the external entropy source again after a pseudo-random +amount of time. The time is calculated using the PRNG, and is +between 0 and the maximal time specified with tls_random_reseed_period. +The default maximal time interval is 1 hour. </p> + +<p> Example: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + tls_random_reseed_period = 3600s +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<p> The tlsmgr(8) process saves the PRNG state to a persistent +exchange file at regular times and when the process terminates, so +that it can recover the PRNG state the next time it starts up. +This file is created when it does not exist. Its default location +is under the Postfix configuration directory, which is not the +proper place for information that is modified by Postfix. Instead, +the file location should probably be on the /var partition (but +<b>not</b> inside the chroot jail). </p> + +<p> Examples: </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +/etc/postfix/main.cf: + tls_random_exchange_name = /etc/postfix/prng_exch + tls_random_prng_update_period = 3600s +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<h2><a name="quick-start">Getting started, quick and dirty</a></h2> + +<p> The following steps will get you started quickly. Because you +sign your own Postfix public key certificate, you get TLS encryption +but no TLS authentication. This is sufficient for testing, and +for exchanging email with sites that you have no trust relationship +with. For real authentication, your Postfix public key certificate +needs to be signed by a recognized Certification Authority, and +Postfix needs to be configured with a list of public key certificates +of Certification Authorities, so that Postfix can verify the public key +certificates of remote hosts. </p> + +<p> In the examples below, user input is shown in <b><tt>bold</tt></b> +font, and a "<tt>#</tt>" prompt indicates a super-user shell. </p> + +<ul> + +<li> <p> Become your own Certification Authority, so that you can +sign your own public keys. This example uses the CA.pl script that +ships with OpenSSL. By default, OpenSSL installs this as +<tt>/usr/local/ssl/misc/CA.pl</tt>, but your mileage may vary. +The script creates a private key in <tt>./demoCA/private/cakey.pem</tt> +and a public key in <tt>./demoCA/cacert.pem</tt>.</p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>/usr/local/ssl/misc/CA.pl -newca</b> +CA certificate filename (or enter to create) + +Making CA certificate ... +Using configuration from /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf +Generating a 1024 bit RSA private key +....................++++++ +.....++++++ +writing new private key to './demoCA/private/cakey.pem' +Enter PEM pass phrase:<b>whatever</b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<li> <p> Create an unpassworded private key for host FOO and create +an unsigned public key certificate. </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>openssl req -new -nodes -keyout FOO-key.pem -out FOO-req.pem -days 365</b> +Using configuration from /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf +Generating a 1024 bit RSA private key +........................................++++++ +....++++++ +writing new private key to 'FOO-key.pem' +----- +You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated +into your certificate request. +What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN. +There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank +For some fields there will be a default value, +If you enter '.', the field will be left blank. +----- +Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:<b>US</b> +State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:<b>New York</b> +Locality Name (eg, city) []:<b>Westchester</b> +Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:<b>Porcupine</b> +Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []: +Common Name (eg, YOUR name) []:<b>FOO</b> +Email Address []:<b>wietse@porcupine.org</b> + +Please enter the following 'extra' attributes +to be sent with your certificate request +A challenge password []:<b>whatever</b> +An optional company name []: +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<li> <p> Sign the public key certificate for host FOO with the +Certification Authority private key that we created a few +steps ago. </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +% <b>openssl ca -out FOO-cert.pem -infiles FOO-req.pem</b> +Uing configuration from /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf +Enter PEM pass phrase:<b>whatever</b> +Check that the request matches the signature +Signature ok +The Subjects Distinguished Name is as follows +countryName :PRINTABLE:'US' +stateOrProvinceName :PRINTABLE:'New York' +localityName :PRINTABLE:'Westchester' +organizationName :PRINTABLE:'Porcupine' +commonName :PRINTABLE:'FOO' +emailAddress :IA5STRING:'wietse@porcupine.org' +Certificate is to be certified until Nov 21 19:40:56 2005 GMT (365 days) +Sign the certificate? [y/n]:<b>y</b> + + +1 out of 1 certificate requests certified, commit? [y/n]<b>y</b> +Write out database with 1 new entries +Data Base Updated +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<li> <p> Install the host private key, the host public key certificate, +and the Certification Authority certificate files. This requires +super-user privileges. </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +# <b>cp demoCA/cacert.pem FOO-key.pem FOO-cert.pem /etc/postfix</b> +# <b>chmod 644 /etc/postfix/FOO-cert.pem /etc/postfix/cacert.pem</b> +# <b>chmod 400 /etc/postfix/FOO-key.pem</b> +</pre> +</blockquote> + +<li> <p> Configure Postfix, by adding the following to +<tt>/etc/postfix/main.cf </tt>. </p> + +<blockquote> +<pre> +smtp_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/cacert.pem +smtp_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/FOO-cert.pem +smtp_tls_key_file = /etc/postfix/FOO-key.pem +smtp_tls_session_cache_database = btree:/var/run/smtp_tls_session_cache +smtp_use_tls = yes +smtpd_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/cacert.pem +smtpd_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/FOO-cert.pem +smtpd_tls_key_file = /etc/postfix/FOO-key.pem +smtpd_tls_received_header = yes +smtpd_tls_session_cache_database = btree:/var/run/smtpd_tls_session_cache +smtpd_use_tls = yes +tls_random_source = dev:/dev/urandom +</pre> +</blockquote> + +</ul> + + +<h2> <a name="problems"> Reporting problems </a> </h2> + +<p> When reporting a problem, please be thorough in the report. +Patches, when possible, are greatly appreciated too. </p> + +<p> Please differentiate when possible between: </p> + +<ul> + +<li> Problems in the TLS code: <postfix_tls@aet.tu-cottbus.de> + +<li> Problems in vanilla Postfix: <postfix-users@postfix.org> + +</ul> + +<h2><a name="compat">Compatibility with Postfix <2.2 TLS support</a></h2> + +<p> Postfix version 2.2 TLS support is based on the Postfix/TLS +patch by Lutz Jänicke, but differs in a few minor ways. </p> + +<ul> + +<li> <p> main.cf: Specify "btree" instead of "sdbm" for TLS +session cache databases. </p> + +<p> TLS session cache databases are now accessed only by the +tlsmgr(8) process, so there are no more concurrency issues. Although +Postfix has an sdbm client, the sdbm library (1000 +lines of code) is not included with Postfix. </p> + +<p> TLS session caches can use any database that can store objects +of several kbytes or more, and that implements the sequence operation. +In most cases, btree databases should be adequate. </p> + +<p> NOTE: You cannot use dbm databases. TLS session objects +are too large. </p> + +<li> <p> master.cf: Specify "unix" instead of "fifo" as +the tlsmgr service type. </p> + +<p> The smtp(8) and smtpd(8) processes now use a client-server +protocol in order to access the tlsmgr(8) pseudo-random number +generation (PRNG) pool, and in order to access the TLS session +cache databases. Such a protocol cannot be run across fifos. </p> + +<li> <p> smtp_tls_per_site: the MUST_NOPEERMATCH per-site policy +cannot override the global "smtp_tls_enforce_peername = yes" setting. +</p> + +<li> <p> smtp_tls_per_site: a combined (NONE + MAY) lookup result +for (hostname and next-hop destination) produces counter-intuitive +results for different main.cf settings. TLS is enabled with +"smtp_tls_enforce_peername = no", but it is disabled when both +"smtp_enforce_tls = yes" and "smtp_tls_enforce_peername = yes". +</p> + +</ul> + +<p> The smtp_tls_per_site limitations were removed by the end of +the Postfix 2.2 support cycle. </p> + +<h2><a name="credits">Credits </a> </h2> + +<ul> + +<li> TLS support for Postfix was originally developed by Lutz +Jänicke at Cottbus Technical University. + +<li> Wietse Venema adopted the code, did some restructuring, and +compiled this part of the documentation from Lutz's documents. + +<li> Victor Duchovni was instrumental with the re-implementation +of the smtp_tls_per_site code in terms of enforcement levels, which +simplified the implementation greatly. + +</ul> + +</body> + +</html> |