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-rw-r--r--src/test/test-seccomp.c768
1 files changed, 768 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/test-seccomp.c b/src/test/test-seccomp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbfeedd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/test-seccomp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,768 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
+
+#include <poll.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/eventfd.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/personality.h>
+#include <sys/shm.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "macro.h"
+#include "missing.h"
+#include "nsflags.h"
+#include "process-util.h"
+#include "raw-clone.h"
+#include "seccomp-util.h"
+#include "set.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "tests.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "virt.h"
+
+#if SCMP_SYS(socket) < 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__)
+/* On these archs, socket() is implemented via the socketcall() syscall multiplexer,
+ * and we can't restrict it hence via seccomp. */
+# define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 1
+#else
+# define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 0
+#endif
+
+static void test_seccomp_arch_to_string(void) {
+ uint32_t a, b;
+ const char *name;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ a = seccomp_arch_native();
+ assert_se(a > 0);
+ name = seccomp_arch_to_string(a);
+ assert_se(name);
+ assert_se(seccomp_arch_from_string(name, &b) >= 0);
+ assert_se(a == b);
+}
+
+static void test_architecture_table(void) {
+ const char *n, *n2;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ NULSTR_FOREACH(n,
+ "native\0"
+ "x86\0"
+ "x86-64\0"
+ "x32\0"
+ "arm\0"
+ "arm64\0"
+ "mips\0"
+ "mips64\0"
+ "mips64-n32\0"
+ "mips-le\0"
+ "mips64-le\0"
+ "mips64-le-n32\0"
+ "ppc\0"
+ "ppc64\0"
+ "ppc64-le\0"
+ "s390\0"
+ "s390x\0") {
+ uint32_t c;
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_arch_from_string(n, &c) >= 0);
+ n2 = seccomp_arch_to_string(c);
+ log_info("seccomp-arch: %s → 0x%"PRIx32" → %s", n, c, n2);
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(n, n2));
+ }
+}
+
+static void test_syscall_filter_set_find(void) {
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find(NULL));
+ assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find(""));
+ assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find("quux"));
+ assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find("@quux"));
+
+ assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@clock") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK);
+ assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@default") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT);
+ assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@raw-io") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO);
+}
+
+static void test_filter_sets(void) {
+ unsigned i;
+ int r;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++) {
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ log_info("Testing %s", syscall_filter_sets[i].name);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) { /* Child? */
+ int fd;
+
+ /* If we look at the default set (or one that includes it), whitelist instead of blacklist */
+ if (IN_SET(i, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SYSTEM_SERVICE))
+ r = seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), syscall_filter_sets + i, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, true);
+ else
+ r = seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + i, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), true);
+ if (r < 0)
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ /* Test the sycall filter with one random system call */
+ fd = eventfd(0, EFD_NONBLOCK|EFD_CLOEXEC);
+ if (IN_SET(i, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT))
+ assert_se(fd < 0 && errno == EUCLEAN);
+ else {
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+ }
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check(syscall_filter_sets[i].name, pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+}
+
+static void test_filter_sets_ordered(void) {
+ size_t i;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ /* Ensure "@default" always remains at the beginning of the list */
+ assert_se(SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT == 0);
+ assert_se(streq(syscall_filter_sets[0].name, "@default"));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++) {
+ const char *k, *p = NULL;
+
+ /* Make sure each group has a description */
+ assert_se(!isempty(syscall_filter_sets[0].help));
+
+ /* Make sure the groups are ordered alphabetically, except for the first entry */
+ assert_se(i < 2 || strcmp(syscall_filter_sets[i-1].name, syscall_filter_sets[i].name) < 0);
+
+ NULSTR_FOREACH(k, syscall_filter_sets[i].value) {
+
+ /* Ensure each syscall list is in itself ordered, but groups before names */
+ assert_se(!p ||
+ (*p == '@' && *k != '@') ||
+ (((*p == '@' && *k == '@') ||
+ (*p != '@' && *k != '@')) &&
+ strcmp(p, k) < 0));
+
+ p = k;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void test_restrict_namespace(void) {
+ char *s = NULL;
+ unsigned long ul;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (!have_namespaces()) {
+ log_notice("Testing without namespaces, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(0, &s) == 0 && streq(s, ""));
+ s = mfree(s);
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(CLONE_NEWNS, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "mnt"));
+ s = mfree(s);
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWIPC, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "ipc mnt"));
+ s = mfree(s);
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(CLONE_NEWCGROUP, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "cgroup"));
+ s = mfree(s);
+
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("mnt", &ul) == 0 && ul == CLONE_NEWNS);
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string(NULL, &ul) == 0 && ul == 0);
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("", &ul) == 0 && ul == 0);
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("uts", &ul) == 0 && ul == CLONE_NEWUTS);
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("mnt uts ipc", &ul) == 0 && ul == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC));
+
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(CLONE_NEWUTS, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "uts"));
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string(s, &ul) == 0 && ul == CLONE_NEWUTS);
+ s = mfree(s);
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string("ipc", &ul) == 0 && ul == CLONE_NEWIPC);
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(ul, &s) == 0 && streq(s, "ipc"));
+ s = mfree(s);
+
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_to_string(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL, &s) == 0);
+ assert_se(streq(s, "cgroup ipc net mnt pid user uts"));
+ assert_se(namespace_flags_from_string(s, &ul) == 0 && ul == NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL);
+ s = mfree(s);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping remaining tests in %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping remaining tests in %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_restrict_namespaces(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWNET) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) == 0);
+ assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) == 0);
+ assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+ assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWIPC) == -1);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+ assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+
+ /* We use fd 0 (stdin) here, which of course will fail with EINVAL on setns(). Except of course our
+ * seccomp filter worked, and hits first and makes it return EPERM */
+ assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWNS) == -1);
+ assert_se(errno == EINVAL);
+ assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWNET) == -1);
+ assert_se(errno == EINVAL);
+ assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+ assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWIPC) == -1);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+ assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+ assert_se(setns(0, 0) == -1);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+
+ pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWNS);
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+ if (pid == 0)
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWNET);
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+ if (pid == 0)
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWUTS);
+ assert_se(pid < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+ pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWIPC);
+ assert_se(pid < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+ pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWUTS);
+ assert_se(pid < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("nsseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static void test_protect_sysctl(void) {
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* in containers _sysctl() is likely missing anyway */
+ if (detect_container() > 0) {
+ log_notice("Testing in container, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+#if __NR__sysctl > 0
+ assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, NULL) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EFAULT);
+#endif
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_protect_sysctl() >= 0);
+
+#if __NR__sysctl > 0
+ assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, 0, 0, 0) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+#endif
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("sysctlseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static void test_restrict_address_families(void) {
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ int fd;
+ Set *s;
+
+ fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+
+ fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+
+ fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+
+ assert_se(s = set_new(NULL));
+ assert_se(set_put(s, INT_TO_PTR(AF_UNIX)) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_restrict_address_families(s, false) >= 0);
+
+ fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+
+ fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+#if SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+#else
+ assert_se(fd < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EAFNOSUPPORT);
+#endif
+
+ fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+
+ set_clear(s);
+
+ assert_se(set_put(s, INT_TO_PTR(AF_INET)) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_restrict_address_families(s, true) >= 0);
+
+ fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+
+ fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+#if SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+#else
+ assert_se(fd < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EAFNOSUPPORT);
+#endif
+
+ fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+#if SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN
+ assert_se(fd >= 0);
+ safe_close(fd);
+#else
+ assert_se(fd < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EAFNOSUPPORT);
+#endif
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("socketseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static void test_restrict_realtime(void) {
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* in containers RT privs are likely missing anyway */
+ if (detect_container() > 0) {
+ log_notice("Testing in container, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) >= 0);
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_RR, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) >= 0);
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_IDLE, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0);
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_BATCH, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0);
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_OTHER, &(struct sched_param) {}) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_restrict_realtime() >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_IDLE, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0);
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_BATCH, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0);
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_OTHER, &(struct sched_param) {}) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+ assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_RR, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("realtimeseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static void test_memory_deny_write_execute_mmap(void) {
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ void *p;
+
+ p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0);
+ assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0);
+
+ p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0);
+ assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute() >= 0);
+
+ p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0);
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
+ assert_se(p == MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+#else /* unknown architectures */
+ assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0);
+#endif
+
+ p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0);
+ assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0);
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("memoryseccomp-mmap", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static void test_memory_deny_write_execute_shmat(void) {
+ int shmid;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ shmid = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, page_size(), 0);
+ assert_se(shmid >= 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ void *p;
+
+ p = shmat(shmid, NULL, 0);
+ assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0);
+
+ p = shmat(shmid, NULL, SHM_EXEC);
+ assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0);
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute() >= 0);
+
+ p = shmat(shmid, NULL, SHM_EXEC);
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
+ assert_se(p == MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+#else /* __i386__, __powerpc64__, and "unknown" architectures */
+ assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0);
+#endif
+
+ p = shmat(shmid, NULL, 0);
+ assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
+ assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0);
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("memoryseccomp-shmat", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static void test_restrict_archs(void) {
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ _cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
+
+ assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(s = set_new(NULL));
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+ assert_se(set_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(SCMP_ARCH_X86+1)) >= 0);
+#endif
+ assert_se(seccomp_restrict_archs(s) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
+ assert_se(seccomp_restrict_archs(NULL) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("archseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ _cleanup_hashmap_free_ Hashmap *s = NULL;
+
+ assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
+ assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0);
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, NULL, SCMP_ACT_KILL, true) >= 0);
+ assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
+ assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0);
+
+ assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
+#if SCMP_SYS(access) >= 0
+ assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
+#else
+ assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
+#endif
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), true) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EUCLEAN);
+
+ assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0);
+
+ s = hashmap_free(s);
+
+ assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
+#if SCMP_SYS(access) >= 0
+ assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
+#else
+ assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
+#endif
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), true) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EILSEQ);
+
+ assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0);
+
+ s = hashmap_free(s);
+
+ assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
+#if SCMP_SYS(poll) >= 0
+ assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
+#else
+ assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0);
+#endif
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUNATCH), true) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EILSEQ);
+
+ assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EUNATCH);
+
+ s = hashmap_free(s);
+
+ assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL));
+#if SCMP_SYS(poll) >= 0
+ assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
+#else
+ assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0);
+#endif
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUNATCH), true) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EILSEQ);
+
+ assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) < 0);
+ assert_se(errno == EILSEQ);
+
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("syscallrawseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static void test_lock_personality(void) {
+ unsigned long current;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ log_info("/* %s */", __func__);
+
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_notice("Seccomp not available, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ log_notice("Not root, skipping %s", __func__);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ assert_se(opinionated_personality(&current) >= 0);
+
+ log_info("current personality=%lu", current);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ assert_se(seccomp_lock_personality(current) >= 0);
+
+ assert_se((unsigned long) safe_personality(current) == current);
+
+ /* Note, we also test that safe_personality() works correctly, by checkig whether errno is properly
+ * set, in addition to the return value */
+ errno = 0;
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX | ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(errno == EPERM);
+
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX | MMAP_PAGE_ZERO) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX | ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX | READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX_32BIT) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PER_SVR4) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PER_BSD) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(safe_personality(current == PER_LINUX ? PER_LINUX32 : PER_LINUX) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PER_LINUX32_3GB) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PER_UW7) == -EPERM);
+ assert_se(safe_personality(0x42) == -EPERM);
+
+ assert_se(safe_personality(PERSONALITY_INVALID) == -EPERM); /* maybe remove this later */
+
+ assert_se((unsigned long) personality(current) == current);
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+ assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_check("lockpersonalityseccomp", pid, WAIT_LOG) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ test_setup_logging(LOG_DEBUG);
+
+ test_seccomp_arch_to_string();
+ test_architecture_table();
+ test_syscall_filter_set_find();
+ test_filter_sets();
+ test_filter_sets_ordered();
+ test_restrict_namespace();
+ test_protect_sysctl();
+ test_restrict_address_families();
+ test_restrict_realtime();
+ test_memory_deny_write_execute_mmap();
+ test_memory_deny_write_execute_shmat();
+ test_restrict_archs();
+ test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw();
+ test_lock_personality();
+
+ return 0;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-23 02:55:19 +0000