From 10ce8b7ddaee462b3d8aae3028df2937610712ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Wed, 8 May 2024 07:02:29 +0200 Subject: Adding debian version 2.33.1-0.1+deb10u1. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- debian/.gitlab-ci.yml | 16 -- debian/changelog | 14 ++ debian/patches/CVE-2021-37600.patch | 26 +++ debian/patches/CVE-2024-28085.patch | 28 +++ debian/patches/series | 5 + ...vert-homebrew-buffering-to-open_memstream.patch | 165 ++++++++++++++++ debian/patches/wall-use-fputs_careful.patch | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../write-correctly-handle-wide-characters.patch | 192 ++++++++++++++++++ debian/rules | 3 + debian/salsa-ci.yml | 10 + 10 files changed, 658 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 debian/.gitlab-ci.yml create mode 100644 debian/patches/CVE-2021-37600.patch create mode 100644 debian/patches/CVE-2024-28085.patch create mode 100644 debian/patches/series create mode 100644 debian/patches/wall-convert-homebrew-buffering-to-open_memstream.patch create mode 100644 debian/patches/wall-use-fputs_careful.patch create mode 100644 debian/patches/write-correctly-handle-wide-characters.patch create mode 100644 debian/salsa-ci.yml (limited to 'debian') diff --git a/debian/.gitlab-ci.yml b/debian/.gitlab-ci.yml deleted file mode 100644 index b7dc52a..0000000 --- a/debian/.gitlab-ci.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -include: https://salsa.debian.org/salsa-ci-team/pipeline/raw/master/salsa-ci.yml - -build: - extends: .build-unstable - -reprotest: - extends: .test-reprotest - -lintian: - extends: .test-lintian - -autopkgtest: - extends: .test-autopkgtest - -piuparts: - extends: .test-piuparts diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog index 6fefe46..e2b249d 100644 --- a/debian/changelog +++ b/debian/changelog @@ -1,3 +1,17 @@ +util-linux (2.33.1-0.1+deb10u1) buster-security; urgency=high + + * Non-maintainer upload by the LTS Security Team. + * Fix CVE-2021-37600: Potential integer overflow in ipcutils.c. + (Closes: #991619) + * Fix CVE-2024-28085: Escape sequence injection in wall(1). + (Closes: #1067849) + * Prerequisite for the CVE-2024-28085 fix: Backport upstream changes to use + fputs_careful() in order to handle UTF-8 characters. (Closes: #826596) + * d/rules: Build with --disable-use-tty-group to avoid installing wall(1) + setgid tty. + + -- Guilhem Moulin Sun, 07 Apr 2024 00:33:55 +0200 + util-linux (2.33.1-0.1) unstable; urgency=medium * Non-maintainer upload. diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2021-37600.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2021-37600.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2bb7f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2021-37600.patch @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +From: Karel Zak +Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 11:58:31 +0200 +Subject: sys-utils/ipcutils: be careful when call calloc() for uint64 nmembs + +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak +Bug: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/issues/1395 +Origin: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/1c9143d0c1f979c3daf10e1c37b5b1e916c22a1c +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/991619 +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-37600 +--- + sys-utils/ipcutils.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/sys-utils/ipcutils.c b/sys-utils/ipcutils.c +index 5fe297f..989e299 100644 +--- a/sys-utils/ipcutils.c ++++ b/sys-utils/ipcutils.c +@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static void get_sem_elements(struct sem_data *p) + { + size_t i; + +- if (!p || !p->sem_nsems || p->sem_perm.id < 0) ++ if (!p || !p->sem_nsems || p->sem_nsems > SIZE_MAX || p->sem_perm.id < 0) + return; + + p->elements = xcalloc(p->sem_nsems, sizeof(struct sem_elem)); diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2024-28085.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2024-28085.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6e9704d --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2024-28085.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From: Karel Zak +Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2024 11:16:20 +0100 +Subject: wall: fix escape sequence Injection + +Let's use for all cases the same output function. + +Reported-by: Skyler Ferrante +Signed-off-by: Karel Zak +Origin: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/404b0781f52f7c045ca811b2dceec526408ac253 +Bug-Debian: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-28085 +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1067849 +--- + term-utils/wall.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/term-utils/wall.c b/term-utils/wall.c +index f375eca..90d5b71 100644 +--- a/term-utils/wall.c ++++ b/term-utils/wall.c +@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static char *makemsg(char *fname, char **mvec, int mvecsz, + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < mvecsz; i++) { +- fputs(mvec[i], fs); ++ fputs_careful(mvec[i], fs, '^', true, TERM_WIDTH); + if (i < mvecsz - 1) + fputc(' ', fs); + } diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b7ac2a --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/series @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +CVE-2021-37600.patch +write-correctly-handle-wide-characters.patch +wall-convert-homebrew-buffering-to-open_memstream.patch +wall-use-fputs_careful.patch +CVE-2024-28085.patch diff --git a/debian/patches/wall-convert-homebrew-buffering-to-open_memstream.patch b/debian/patches/wall-convert-homebrew-buffering-to-open_memstream.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af129f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/wall-convert-homebrew-buffering-to-open_memstream.patch @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +From: наб +Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 16:16:43 +0100 +Subject: wall: convert homebrew buffering to open_memstream() + +The struct buffer system duplicates a plethora of standard I/O +functions (including a fork of fputc_careful()) +and adds a lot of complexity ‒ open_memstream() is standard, +and fits perfectly into this niche + +Origin: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/27ee6446503af7ec0c2647704ca47ac4de3852ef +--- + term-utils/wall.c | 94 ++++++++++++------------------------------------------- + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/term-utils/wall.c b/term-utils/wall.c +index 48e654a..ae8c22c 100644 +--- a/term-utils/wall.c ++++ b/term-utils/wall.c +@@ -269,73 +269,22 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); + } + +-struct buffer { +- size_t sz; +- size_t used; +- char *data; +-}; +- +-static void buf_enlarge(struct buffer *bs, size_t len) ++static void buf_putc_careful(FILE *fs, int c) + { +- if (bs->sz == 0 || len > bs->sz - bs->used) { +- bs->sz += len < 128 ? 128 : len; +- bs->data = xrealloc(bs->data, bs->sz); +- } +-} +- +-static void buf_puts(struct buffer *bs, const char *s) +-{ +- size_t len = strlen(s); +- +- buf_enlarge(bs, len + 1); +- memcpy(bs->data + bs->used, s, len + 1); +- bs->used += len; +-} +- +-static void buf_printf(struct buffer *bs, const char *fmt, ...) +-{ +- int rc; +- va_list ap; +- size_t limit; +- +- buf_enlarge(bs, 0); /* default size */ +- limit = bs->sz - bs->used; +- +- va_start(ap, fmt); +- rc = vsnprintf(bs->data + bs->used, limit, fmt, ap); +- va_end(ap); +- +- if (rc >= 0 && (size_t) rc >= limit) { /* not enough, enlarge */ +- buf_enlarge(bs, (size_t)rc + 1); +- limit = bs->sz - bs->used; +- va_start(ap, fmt); +- rc = vsnprintf(bs->data + bs->used, limit, fmt, ap); +- va_end(ap); +- } +- +- if (rc > 0) +- bs->used += rc; +-} +- +-static void buf_putc_careful(struct buffer *bs, int c) +-{ +- if (isprint(c) || c == '\a' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') { +- buf_enlarge(bs, 1); +- bs->data[bs->used++] = c; +- } else if (!isascii(c)) +- buf_printf(bs, "\\%3o", (unsigned char)c); +- else { +- char tmp[] = { '^', c ^ 0x40, '\0' }; +- buf_puts(bs, tmp); +- } ++ if (isprint(c) || c == '\a' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') ++ fputc(c, fs); ++ else if (!isascii(c)) ++ fprintf(fs, "\\%3o", (unsigned char)c); ++ else ++ fputs((char[]){ '^', c ^ 0x40, '\0' }, fs); + } + + static char *makemsg(char *fname, char **mvec, int mvecsz, + size_t *mbufsize, int print_banner) + { +- struct buffer _bs = {.used = 0}, *bs = &_bs; + register int ch, cnt; +- char *p, *lbuf; ++ char *p, *lbuf, *retbuf; ++ FILE * fs = open_memstream(&retbuf, mbufsize); + long line_max; + + line_max = sysconf(_SC_LINE_MAX); +@@ -376,16 +325,16 @@ static char *makemsg(char *fname, char **mvec, int mvecsz, + */ + /* snprintf is not always available, but the sprintf's here + will not overflow as long as %d takes at most 100 chars */ +- buf_printf(bs, "\r%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, " "); ++ fprintf(fs, "\r%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, " "); + + snprintf(lbuf, line_max, + _("Broadcast message from %s@%s (%s) (%s):"), + whom, hostname, where, date); +- buf_printf(bs, "%-*.*s\007\007\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, TERM_WIDTH, lbuf); ++ fprintf(fs, "%-*.*s\007\007\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, TERM_WIDTH, lbuf); + free(hostname); + free(date); + } +- buf_printf(bs, "%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, " "); ++ fprintf(fs, "%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, " "); + + if (mvec) { + /* +@@ -394,11 +343,11 @@ static char *makemsg(char *fname, char **mvec, int mvecsz, + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < mvecsz; i++) { +- buf_puts(bs, mvec[i]); ++ fputs(mvec[i], fs); + if (i < mvecsz - 1) +- buf_puts(bs, " "); ++ fputc(' ', fs); + } +- buf_puts(bs, "\r\n"); ++ fputs("\r\n", fs); + } else { + /* + * read message from +@@ -426,23 +375,20 @@ static char *makemsg(char *fname, char **mvec, int mvecsz, + while (fgets(lbuf, line_max, stdin)) { + for (cnt = 0, p = lbuf; (ch = *p) != '\0'; ++p, ++cnt) { + if (cnt == TERM_WIDTH || ch == '\n') { +- for (; cnt < TERM_WIDTH; ++cnt) +- buf_puts(bs, " "); +- buf_puts(bs, "\r\n"); ++ fprintf(fs, "%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH - cnt, ""); + cnt = 0; + } + if (ch == '\t') + cnt += (7 - (cnt % 8)); + if (ch != '\n') +- buf_putc_careful(bs, ch); ++ buf_putc_careful(fs, ch); + } + } + } +- buf_printf(bs, "%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, " "); ++ fprintf(fs, "%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, " "); + + free(lbuf); + +- bs->data[bs->used] = '\0'; /* be paranoid */ +- *mbufsize = bs->used; +- return bs->data; ++ fclose(fs); ++ return retbuf; + } diff --git a/debian/patches/wall-use-fputs_careful.patch b/debian/patches/wall-use-fputs_careful.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f14f327 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/wall-use-fputs_careful.patch @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +From: наб +Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 16:16:48 +0100 +Subject: wall: use fputs_careful() + +LINE_MAX only applies to teletypes in canonical mode: when stdin is a +file, it could still very much tear; start off at 512 for the sprintf(), +then use getline() like in write. + +The line wrapping has one suboptimal edge-case: + $ wall < all + + Broadcast message from nabijaczleweli@tarta (pts/4) (Tue Mar 14 22:31:25 + 2023): + + ^N^O^P^Q^R^S^T^U^V^W^X^Y^Z^[^\^]^^^_ + !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJ + KLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~^?\200\201\202\203\204\205\206 + \207\210\211\212\213\214\215\216\217\220\221\222\223\224\225\226\227\230\231\232 + \233\234\235\236\237\240\241\242\243\244\245\246\247\250\251\252\253\254\255\256 + \257\260\261\262\263\264\265\266\267\270\271\272\273\274\275\276\277\300\301\302 + \303\304\305\306\307\310\311\312\313\314\315\316\317\320\321\322\323\324\325\326 + \327\330\331\332\333\334\335\336\337\340\341\342\343\344\345\346\347\350\351\352 + \353\354\355\356\357\360\361\362\363\364\365\366\367\370\371\372\373\374\375\376 + \377 +but that's a pathological input, and the result is still infinitely +better than it was before, so fixing that is more trouble than it's +worth. + +Origin: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/aa13246a1bf1be9e4f6eb331f4d4d2dbc875e22f +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/826596 +--- + include/carefulputc.h | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + login-utils/last.c | 2 +- + term-utils/wall.c | 38 ++++++-------------------------------- + term-utils/write.c | 2 +- + 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/carefulputc.h b/include/carefulputc.h +index 38a61cc..8813783 100644 +--- a/include/carefulputc.h ++++ b/include/carefulputc.h +@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ + #include + #ifdef HAVE_WIDECHAR + #include ++#include + #endif + #include + +@@ -13,18 +14,35 @@ + * A puts() for use in write and wall (that sometimes are sgid tty). + * It avoids control and invalid characters. + * The locale of the recipient is nominally unknown, +- * but it's a solid bet that the encoding is compatible with the author's. ++ * but it's a solid bet that it's compatible with the author's. ++ * Use soft_width=0 to disable wrapping. + */ +-static inline int fputs_careful(const char * s, FILE *fp, const char ctrl, bool cr_lf) ++static inline int fputs_careful(const char * s, FILE *fp, const char ctrl, bool cr_lf, int soft_width) + { +- int ret = 0; ++ int ret = 0, col = 0; + + for (size_t slen = strlen(s); *s; ++s, --slen) { +- if (*s == '\n') ++ if (*s == '\t') ++ col += (7 - (col % 8)) - 1; ++ else if (*s == '\r') ++ col = -1; ++ else if (*s == '\a') ++ --col; ++ ++ if ((soft_width && col >= soft_width) || *s == '\n') { ++ if (soft_width) { ++ fprintf(fp, "%*s", soft_width - col, ""); ++ col = 0; ++ } + ret = fputs(cr_lf ? "\r\n" : "\n", fp); +- else if (isprint(*s) || *s == '\a' || *s == '\t' || *s == '\r') ++ if (*s == '\n' || ret < 0) ++ goto wrote; ++ } ++ ++ if (isprint(*s) || *s == '\a' || *s == '\t' || *s == '\r') { + ret = putc(*s, fp); +- else if (!isascii(*s)) { ++ ++col; ++ } else if (!isascii(*s)) { + #ifdef HAVE_WIDECHAR + wchar_t w; + size_t clen = mbtowc(&w, s, slen); +@@ -33,21 +51,27 @@ static inline int fputs_careful(const char * s, FILE *fp, const char ctrl, bool + case (size_t)-1: // EILSEQ + mbtowc(NULL, NULL, 0); + nonprint: +- ret = fprintf(fp, "\\%3hho", *s); ++ col += ret = fprintf(fp, "\\%3hho", *s); + break; + default: + if(!iswprint(w)) + goto nonprint; + ret = fwrite(s, 1, clen, fp); ++ if (soft_width) ++ col += wcwidth(w); + s += clen - 1; + slen -= clen - 1; + break; + } + #else +- ret = fprintf(fp, "\\%3hho", *s); ++ col += ret = fprintf(fp, "\\%3hho", *s); + #endif +- } else ++ } else { + ret = fputs((char[]){ ctrl, *s ^ 0x40, '\0' }, fp); ++ col += 2; ++ } ++ ++ wrote: + if (ret < 0) + return EOF; + } +diff --git a/login-utils/last.c b/login-utils/last.c +index e6a8c41..2acfb4a 100644 +--- a/login-utils/last.c ++++ b/login-utils/last.c +@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static int list(const struct last_control *ctl, struct utmpx *p, time_t logout_t + /* + * Print out "final" string safely. + */ +- fputs_careful(final, stdout, '*', false); ++ fputs_careful(final, stdout, '*', false, 0); + + if (len < 0 || (size_t)len >= sizeof(final)) + putchar('\n'); +diff --git a/term-utils/wall.c b/term-utils/wall.c +index ae8c22c..f375eca 100644 +--- a/term-utils/wall.c ++++ b/term-utils/wall.c +@@ -269,29 +269,13 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) + exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); + } + +-static void buf_putc_careful(FILE *fs, int c) +-{ +- if (isprint(c) || c == '\a' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') +- fputc(c, fs); +- else if (!isascii(c)) +- fprintf(fs, "\\%3o", (unsigned char)c); +- else +- fputs((char[]){ '^', c ^ 0x40, '\0' }, fs); +-} +- + static char *makemsg(char *fname, char **mvec, int mvecsz, + size_t *mbufsize, int print_banner) + { +- register int ch, cnt; +- char *p, *lbuf, *retbuf; ++ char *lbuf, *retbuf; + FILE * fs = open_memstream(&retbuf, mbufsize); +- long line_max; +- +- line_max = sysconf(_SC_LINE_MAX); +- if (line_max <= 0) +- line_max = 512; +- +- lbuf = xmalloc(line_max); ++ size_t lbuflen = 512; ++ lbuf = xmalloc(lbuflen); + + if (print_banner == TRUE) { + char *hostname = xgethostname(); +@@ -327,7 +311,7 @@ static char *makemsg(char *fname, char **mvec, int mvecsz, + will not overflow as long as %d takes at most 100 chars */ + fprintf(fs, "\r%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, " "); + +- snprintf(lbuf, line_max, ++ snprintf(lbuf, lbuflen, + _("Broadcast message from %s@%s (%s) (%s):"), + whom, hostname, where, date); + fprintf(fs, "%-*.*s\007\007\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, TERM_WIDTH, lbuf); +@@ -372,18 +356,8 @@ static char *makemsg(char *fname, char **mvec, int mvecsz, + /* + * Read message from stdin. + */ +- while (fgets(lbuf, line_max, stdin)) { +- for (cnt = 0, p = lbuf; (ch = *p) != '\0'; ++p, ++cnt) { +- if (cnt == TERM_WIDTH || ch == '\n') { +- fprintf(fs, "%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH - cnt, ""); +- cnt = 0; +- } +- if (ch == '\t') +- cnt += (7 - (cnt % 8)); +- if (ch != '\n') +- buf_putc_careful(fs, ch); +- } +- } ++ while (getline(&lbuf, &lbuflen, stdin) >= 0) ++ fputs_careful(lbuf, fs, '^', true, TERM_WIDTH); + } + fprintf(fs, "%*s\r\n", TERM_WIDTH, " "); + +diff --git a/term-utils/write.c b/term-utils/write.c +index 231c77f..eda52d1 100644 +--- a/term-utils/write.c ++++ b/term-utils/write.c +@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static void do_write(const struct write_control *ctl) + if (signal_received) + break; + +- if (fputs_careful(line, stdout, '^', true) == EOF) ++ if (fputs_careful(line, stdout, '^', true, 0) == EOF) + err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("carefulputc failed")); + } + free(line); diff --git a/debian/patches/write-correctly-handle-wide-characters.patch b/debian/patches/write-correctly-handle-wide-characters.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57954ac --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/write-correctly-handle-wide-characters.patch @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +From: наб +Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 16:16:31 +0100 +Subject: write: correctly handle wide characters + +Do this by replacing fputc_careful() (notice that the description said +it's locale-aware ‒ it very much is /not/), with a fputs_careful() which +does the same thing, but if it were to output a byte in the \123 format, +first it checks whether this byte starts a valid multibyte character. + +If it does, and that character is printable, write it verbatim. +This means that + echo 'foo åäö ąęćźżń bar' | write nabijaczleweli pts/4 +instead of + foo \303\245\303\244\303\266 + \304\205\304\231\304\207\305\272\305\274\305\204 bar +yields + foo åäö ąęćźżń bar +or, more realistically, from a message I got earlier today, + Filip powiedzia\305\202 \305\274e zap\305\202aci jutro +becomes + Filip powiedział że zapłaci jutro + +Invalid/non-printable sequences get processed as before. + +Line reading in write must become getline() to avoid dealing with +partial characters: for example on input consisting solely of +ąęćźżń, where every {1} is an instance, the output would be + {42}ąęć\305\272żń{84}ąęćź\305\274ń{84}ąęćźż\305\204{39} +with just fixed-512 fgets() + +Origin: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/8a7b8456d1dc0e7ca557d1ac31f638986704757f +Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/826596 +--- + include/carefulputc.h | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + login-utils/last.c | 4 +--- + term-utils/write.c | 25 ++++++--------------- + 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/carefulputc.h b/include/carefulputc.h +index 54a02bf..38a61cc 100644 +--- a/include/carefulputc.h ++++ b/include/carefulputc.h +@@ -1,29 +1,57 @@ + #ifndef UTIL_LINUX_CAREFULPUTC_H + #define UTIL_LINUX_CAREFULPUTC_H + +-/* +- * A putc() for use in write and wall (that sometimes are sgid tty). +- * It avoids control characters in our locale, and also ASCII control +- * characters. Note that the locale of the recipient is unknown. +-*/ + #include + #include + #include ++#ifdef HAVE_WIDECHAR ++#include ++#endif ++#include + +-static inline int fputc_careful(int c, FILE *fp, const char fail) ++/* ++ * A puts() for use in write and wall (that sometimes are sgid tty). ++ * It avoids control and invalid characters. ++ * The locale of the recipient is nominally unknown, ++ * but it's a solid bet that the encoding is compatible with the author's. ++ */ ++static inline int fputs_careful(const char * s, FILE *fp, const char ctrl, bool cr_lf) + { +- int ret; +- +- if (isprint(c) || c == '\a' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') +- ret = putc(c, fp); +- else if (!isascii(c)) +- ret = fprintf(fp, "\\%3o", (unsigned char)c); +- else { +- ret = putc(fail, fp); +- if (ret != EOF) +- ret = putc(c ^ 0x40, fp); ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ for (size_t slen = strlen(s); *s; ++s, --slen) { ++ if (*s == '\n') ++ ret = fputs(cr_lf ? "\r\n" : "\n", fp); ++ else if (isprint(*s) || *s == '\a' || *s == '\t' || *s == '\r') ++ ret = putc(*s, fp); ++ else if (!isascii(*s)) { ++#ifdef HAVE_WIDECHAR ++ wchar_t w; ++ size_t clen = mbtowc(&w, s, slen); ++ switch(clen) { ++ case (size_t)-2: // incomplete ++ case (size_t)-1: // EILSEQ ++ mbtowc(NULL, NULL, 0); ++ nonprint: ++ ret = fprintf(fp, "\\%3hho", *s); ++ break; ++ default: ++ if(!iswprint(w)) ++ goto nonprint; ++ ret = fwrite(s, 1, clen, fp); ++ s += clen - 1; ++ slen -= clen - 1; ++ break; ++ } ++#else ++ ret = fprintf(fp, "\\%3hho", *s); ++#endif ++ } else ++ ret = fputs((char[]){ ctrl, *s ^ 0x40, '\0' }, fp); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ return EOF; + } +- return (ret < 0) ? EOF : 0; ++ return 0; + } + + /* +diff --git a/login-utils/last.c b/login-utils/last.c +index 6b25efd..e6a8c41 100644 +--- a/login-utils/last.c ++++ b/login-utils/last.c +@@ -386,7 +386,6 @@ static int list(const struct last_control *ctl, struct utmpx *p, time_t logout_t + char final[512]; + char utline[sizeof(p->ut_line) + 1]; + char domain[256]; +- char *s; + int mins, hours, days; + int r, len; + struct last_timefmt *fmt; +@@ -543,8 +542,7 @@ static int list(const struct last_control *ctl, struct utmpx *p, time_t logout_t + /* + * Print out "final" string safely. + */ +- for (s = final; *s; s++) +- fputc_careful(*s, stdout, '*'); ++ fputs_careful(final, stdout, '*', false); + + if (len < 0 || (size_t)len >= sizeof(final)) + putchar('\n'); +diff --git a/term-utils/write.c b/term-utils/write.c +index bd64fc2..231c77f 100644 +--- a/term-utils/write.c ++++ b/term-utils/write.c +@@ -223,21 +223,6 @@ static void signal_handler(int signo) + signal_received = signo; + } + +-/* +- * write_line - like fputs(), but makes control characters visible and +- * turns \n into \r\n. +- */ +-static void write_line(char *s) +-{ +- while (*s) { +- const int c = *s++; +- +- if ((c == '\n' && fputc_careful('\r', stdout, '^') == EOF) +- || fputc_careful(c, stdout, '^') == EOF) +- err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("carefulputc failed")); +- } +-} +- + /* + * do_write - actually make the connection + */ +@@ -247,7 +232,8 @@ static void do_write(const struct write_control *ctl) + struct passwd *pwd; + time_t now; + struct tm *tm; +- char *host, line[512]; ++ char *host, *line = NULL; ++ size_t linelen = 0; + struct sigaction sigact; + + /* Determine our login name(s) before the we reopen() stdout */ +@@ -286,11 +272,14 @@ static void do_write(const struct write_control *ctl) + free(host); + printf("\r\n"); + +- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), stdin) != NULL) { ++ while (getline(&line, &linelen, stdin) >= 0) { + if (signal_received) + break; +- write_line(line); ++ ++ if (fputs_careful(line, stdout, '^', true) == EOF) ++ err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("carefulputc failed")); + } ++ free(line); + printf("EOF\r\n"); + } + diff --git a/debian/rules b/debian/rules index 86a1463..eeae9f7 100755 --- a/debian/rules +++ b/debian/rules @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ CONFOPTS += --disable-col --disable-colcrt --disable-colrm --disable-column CONFOPTS += --disable-ul CONFOPTS += --disable-cal +# Don't install wall(1) setgid tty, cf. CVE-2024-28085. +CONFOPTS += --disable-use-tty-group + # Get the list of binary package, except lib* and *-udeb, from # debian/control instead of hardcoding the list when installing # bash-completions below. diff --git a/debian/salsa-ci.yml b/debian/salsa-ci.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ffecef --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/salsa-ci.yml @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +--- +include: + - https://salsa.debian.org/salsa-ci-team/pipeline/raw/master/recipes/debian.yml + +variables: + RELEASE: 'buster' + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_REPROTEST: 1 + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_LINTIAN: 1 + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_BLHC: 1 + SALSA_CI_DISABLE_PIUPARTS: 1 -- cgit v1.2.3