diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch | 15791 |
1 files changed, 15791 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch b/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfc2628 --- /dev/null +++ b/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.1t-patch @@ -0,0 +1,15791 @@ +Index: openssl/Configure +diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.19 +--- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:46 2016 ++++ openssl/Configure Mon Jun 13 15:20:23 2016 +@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ + + # see INSTALL for instructions. + +-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; ++my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; + + # Options: + # +@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ + # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can + # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". + # ++# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. ++# (No default) ++# ++# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only ++# (No default) ++# + # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected + # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in + # include/. A value is required. +@@ -355,24 +361,23 @@ + #### + # *-generic* is endian-neutral target, but ./config is free to + # throw in -D[BL]_ENDIAN, whichever appropriate... +-"linux-generic32","gcc:-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"linux-generic32","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"linux-ppc", "gcc:-DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc32_asm}:linux32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + # It's believed that majority of ARM toolchains predefine appropriate -march. + # If you compiler does not, do complement config command line with one! +-"linux-armv4", "gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", + #### IA-32 targets... +-"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", ++"linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", + #### +-"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +-"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", +-"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +-"linux-x86_64-clang","clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", +-"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", ++"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"linux-ppc64", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", ++"linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", ++"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", ++"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", + #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs + # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see + # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of +@@ -668,6 +673,10 @@ + my $idx_arflags = $idx++; + my $idx_multilib = $idx++; + ++# PKCS#11 engine patch ++my $pk11_libname=""; ++my $pk11_flavor=""; ++ + my $prefix=""; + my $libdir=""; + my $openssldir=""; +@@ -895,6 +904,14 @@ + $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei; + $flags.=$_." "; + } ++ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) ++ { ++ $pk11_libname=$1; ++ } ++ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/) ++ { ++ $pk11_flavor=$1; ++ } + elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) + { + $prefix=$1; +@@ -1062,6 +1079,22 @@ + exit 0; + } + ++if (! $pk11_libname) ++ { ++ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; ++ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; ++ exit 1; ++ } ++ ++if (! $pk11_flavor ++ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only")) ++ { ++ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n"; ++ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n"; ++ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; ++ exit 1; ++ } ++ + if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { + $target = "Cygwin".$1; + } +@@ -1139,6 +1172,25 @@ + $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO"; + } + ++if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator") ++ { ++ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; ++ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; ++ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; ++ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so"; ++ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]"; ++ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; ++ } ++else ++ { ++ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; ++ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; ++ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; ++ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca"; ++ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]"; ++ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; ++} ++ + my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds; + + $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/); +@@ -1228,6 +1280,8 @@ + if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } + else { $no_user_cflags=1; } + ++$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; ++ + # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through + # the script "config" or manually. + if (!$no_krb5) +@@ -1626,6 +1680,7 @@ + s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; + s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; + s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; ++ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; + s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; + s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; + s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; +Index: openssl/Makefile.org +diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.10.1.2.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.12 +--- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.10.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:47 2016 ++++ openssl/Makefile.org Mon Jun 13 15:20:23 2016 +@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ + INSTALL_PREFIX= + INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl + ++# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. ++PK11_LIB_LOCATION= ++ + # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! + OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl + +Index: openssl/README.pkcs11 +diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.8 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:28 2016 ++++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:16:43 2013 +@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ ++ISC modified ++============ ++ ++The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility. ++ ++The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and ++sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the ++PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second ++is a stripped down version which provides only the useful ++function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device ++protected key store and key loading). ++ ++As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor, ++external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example ++of the first, AEP Keyper of the second. ++ ++Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in ++config/Configure. ++ ++It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine. ++The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared ++(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine ++(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs). ++ ++PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l ++========================================= ++ ++[Nov 19, 2009] ++ ++Contents: ++ ++Overview ++Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch ++FAQs ++Feedback ++ ++Overview ++======== ++ ++This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11 ++engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against ++OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system ++must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the ++PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below. ++ ++Patch can be applied like this: ++ ++ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris ++ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz ++ # now download the patch to the current directory ++ # ... ++ cd openssl-0.9.8l ++ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system) ++ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19 ++ ++It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the ++symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share ++except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA. ++ ++According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support ++following mechanisms: ++ ++ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4, ++ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB, ++ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224, ++ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 ++ ++Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP ++functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may ++see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an ++example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety ++problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested). ++ ++You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the ++configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the ++config script: ++ ++ $ ./config ++ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2 ++ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc ++ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library. ++ See README.pkcs11 for more information. ++ ++Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run ++configure script like this: ++ ++ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so ++ ++To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run ++"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the ++output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary ++and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits. ++ ++The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against ++PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and ++OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project ++(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more ++information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the ++system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself ++and has functional PKCS#11 library. ++ ++The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface ++(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are ++copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information. ++ ++Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems, ++Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more ++information). ++ ++Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch ++======================================= ++ ++2009-11-19 ++- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l ++ ++- bugs and RFEs: ++ ++ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores ++ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split ++ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the ++ PKCS#11 engine ++ ++2009-03-11 ++- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j ++ ++- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a ++ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied. ++ ++- fixed bugs: ++ ++ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4 ++ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if ++ meta slot is disabled ++ ++2008-12-02 ++- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal) ++ ++ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine ++ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true ++ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean ++ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take ++ it seriously ++ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean ++ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11 ++ engine code ++ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API ++ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if ++ meta slot is disabled ++ ++2008-08-01 ++- fixed bug ++ ++ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers ++ and digests ++ ++- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic ++ ++2008-07-29 ++- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version ++- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version: ++ ++ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users ++ ++- fixed bugs in the engine code: ++ ++ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for ++ asymmetric key operations ++ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called ++ atomically ++ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys ++ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners ++ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in ++ suboptimal way ++ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more ++ resilient to destroy failures ++ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free() ++ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys ++ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine ++ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size ++ of big numbers leading to failures ++ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of ++ -1 ++ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references ++ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not ++ checked ++ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to ++ structure reuse ++ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of ++ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH} ++ defines but fails miserably ++ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss ++ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing ++ generate_params parameter ++ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes ++ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the ++ PKCS#11 engine ++ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish() ++ ++- new features and enhancements: ++ ++ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512 ++ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes ++ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric ++ ciphers and digests ++ ++2007-10-15 ++- update for 0.9.8f version ++- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" ++ ++2007-10-02 ++- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" ++- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys" ++ ++2007-09-26 ++- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes ++ significant performance drop ++- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine ++ ++2007-05-25 ++- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers ++ ++2007-05-19 ++- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code ++ ++FAQs ++==== ++ ++(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error: ++ ++../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init': ++hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork' ++ ++Answer: ++ ++ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring ++ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by ++ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the ++ architecture that Configure printed, for example: ++ ++Configured for linux-elf. ++ ++ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes), ++ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string. ++ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With ++ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after ++ "-D_REENTRANT", like this: ++ ++....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:..... ++ ++(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for ++pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch. ++ ++Answer: ++ ++ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32 ++ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there. ++ ++ ++Feedback ++======== ++ ++Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was ++created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris. ++ ++Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp. ++ +Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h +diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.6.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.10 +--- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.6.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:49 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Mon Jun 13 15:20:26 2016 +@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ + + #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */ + ++#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS ++# define OPENSSL_THREADS ++#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE + # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE + #endif +@@ -94,6 +97,8 @@ + # endif + #endif + ++#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ ++ + /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */ + + /* Generate 80386 code? */ +@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ + * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word + * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. + */ +-#undef RC4_CHUNK ++#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long + #endif + #endif + +@@ -148,7 +153,7 @@ + /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a + * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ + #ifndef DES_LONG +-#define DES_LONG unsigned long ++#define DES_LONG unsigned int + #endif + #endif + +@@ -159,9 +164,9 @@ + /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ + + /* Only one for the following should be defined */ +-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG ++#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG + #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT +-#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT ++#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT + #endif + + #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) +@@ -173,7 +178,7 @@ + + #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) + #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H +-#undef BF_PTR ++#define BF_PTR2 + #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */ + + #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) +@@ -203,7 +208,7 @@ + /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. + * Very mucy CPU dependant */ + #ifndef DES_UNROLL +-#undef DES_UNROLL ++#define DES_UNROLL + #endif + + /* These default values were supplied by +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile +diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.10 +--- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 18:09:29 2015 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Wed Dec 23 18:27:10 2015 +@@ -22,13 +22,15 @@ + tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ + tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \ + eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \ +- eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c ++ eng_rsax.c eng_rdrand.c \ ++ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c + LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ + eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ + tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ + tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \ + eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \ +- eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o ++ eng_rsax.o eng_rdrand.o \ ++ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o + + SRC= $(LIBSRC) + +@@ -296,6 +298,83 @@ + eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h + eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h + eng_table.o: eng_table.c ++hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h ++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c ++hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h ++hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h ++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h ++hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h ++hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h ++hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h + tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h + tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h + tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008 +@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ ++/* ++ * CDDL HEADER START ++ * ++ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the ++ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only ++ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance ++ * with the License. ++ * ++ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE ++ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. ++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions ++ * and limitations under the License. ++ * ++ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each ++ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. ++ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the ++ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying ++ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] ++ * ++ * CDDL HEADER END ++ */ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H ++#define _CRYPTOKI_H ++ ++/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */ ++ ++#ifdef __cplusplus ++extern "C" { ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef CK_PTR ++#define CK_PTR * ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION ++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name) ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION ++#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name) ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef NULL_PTR ++#include <unistd.h> /* For NULL */ ++#define NULL_PTR NULL ++#endif ++ ++/* ++ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint ++ */ ++#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE ++#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE ++#ifndef TRUE ++#define TRUE 1 ++#endif /* TRUE */ ++#ifndef FALSE ++#define FALSE 0 ++#endif /* FALSE */ ++#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */ ++ ++#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO ++ ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++ ++/* Solaris specific functions */ ++ ++#include <stdlib.h> ++ ++/* ++ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all ++ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of ++ * providing operations on the requested mechanism ++ */ ++CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession); ++ ++/* ++ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given ++ * mechanism from the rawkey data. ++ */ ++CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len, ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj); ++ ++ ++#ifdef __cplusplus ++} ++#endif ++ ++#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */ +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c +diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.8 +--- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:10:52 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Mon Jun 13 15:20:31 2016 +@@ -122,6 +122,14 @@ + # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG) + ENGINE_load_capi(); + # endif ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA ++ ENGINE_load_pk11ca(); ++# endif ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO ++ ENGINE_load_pk11so(); ++# endif ++# endif + #endif + ENGINE_register_all_complete(); + } +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h +diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.7 +--- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 18:09:30 2015 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Dec 23 18:27:11 2015 +@@ -416,6 +416,12 @@ + void ENGINE_load_rsax(void); + void ENGINE_load_rdrand(void); + void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA ++void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void); ++# endif ++# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO ++void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void); ++# endif + + /* + * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.33 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:07:41 2013 +@@ -0,0 +1,4010 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ */ ++ ++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ ++/* ++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for ++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). ++ * ++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by ++ * Afchine Madjlessi. ++ */ ++/* ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in ++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the ++ * distribution. ++ * ++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this ++ * software must display the following acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to ++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without ++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact ++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. ++ * ++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" ++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written ++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. ++ * ++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following ++ * acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY ++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR ++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR ++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, ++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; ++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * ++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young ++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim ++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include <stdio.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> ++#include <string.h> ++#include <sys/types.h> ++ ++#include <openssl/e_os2.h> ++#include <openssl/crypto.h> ++#include <cryptlib.h> ++#include <openssl/engine.h> ++#include <openssl/dso.h> ++#include <openssl/err.h> ++#include <openssl/bn.h> ++#include <openssl/md5.h> ++#include <openssl/pem.h> ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++#include <openssl/rsa.h> ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++#include <openssl/dsa.h> ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++#include <openssl/dh.h> ++#endif ++#include <openssl/rand.h> ++#include <openssl/objects.h> ++#include <openssl/x509.h> ++#include <openssl/aes.h> ++#include <openssl/des.h> ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++typedef int pid_t; ++#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() ++#define NOPTHREADS ++#ifndef NULL_PTR ++#define NULL_PTR NULL ++#endif ++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) ++#else ++#include <signal.h> ++#include <unistd.h> ++#include <dlfcn.h> ++#endif ++ ++/* Debug mutexes */ ++/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ ++#define DEBUG_MUTEX ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ ++#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX ++#define __USE_UNIX98 ++#endif ++#include <pthread.h> ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA ++ ++/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ ++#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" ++/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ ++/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++/* ++ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more ++ * information. ++ */ ++#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) ++#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) ++#include "cryptoki.h" ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) ++#else ++#include "cryptoki.h" ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++#endif ++#include "hw_pk11ca.h" ++#include "hw_pk11_err.c" ++ ++/* ++ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), ++ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the ++ * RSA keys by reference feature. ++ */ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++/* ++ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel ++ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. ++ */ ++static int *hw_cnids; ++static int *hw_dnids; ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ ++static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; ++ ++/* ++ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when ++ * logging into the token. ++ */ ++CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; ++ ++/* ++ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for ++ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given ++ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be ++ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already ++ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each ++ * PK11_SESSION object. ++ * ++ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the ++ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also ++ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another ++ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in ++ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. ++ * ++ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. ++ * They are also used for active list protection. ++ */ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; ++#endif ++ ++/* ++ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one ++ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session ++ * list) for given algorithm type ++ */ ++PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; ++ ++/* ++ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available ++ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed ++ * without losing the secret key objects. ++ */ ++static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ ++/* ENGINE level stuff */ ++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); ++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); ++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); ++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); ++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); ++ ++/* RAND stuff */ ++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); ++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); ++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); ++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); ++static int pk11_rand_status(void); ++ ++/* These functions are also used in other files */ ++PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++ ++/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ ++extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); ++extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); ++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); ++int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); ++int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++#endif ++ ++/* Local helper functions */ ++static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); ++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); ++static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, ++ CK_BBOOL persistent); ++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); ++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); ++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); ++ ++/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ ++static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); ++static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); ++static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); ++static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, ++ const unsigned char *iv, int enc); ++static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L ++static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, ++ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); ++#else ++static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, ++ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); ++#endif ++static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); ++static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, ++ const int **nids, int nid); ++static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, ++ const int **nids, int nid); ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, ++ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); ++static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, ++ int key_len); ++static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); ++static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); ++static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, ++ size_t count); ++static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); ++static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); ++static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); ++ ++static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); ++static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, ++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, ++ int *local_cipher_nids); ++static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, ++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, ++ int *local_digest_nids); ++static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, ++ int id); ++static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, ++ int id); ++ ++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); ++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); ++ ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); ++static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++/* Index for the supported ciphers */ ++enum pk11_cipher_id { ++ PK11_DES_CBC, ++ PK11_DES3_CBC, ++ PK11_DES_ECB, ++ PK11_DES3_ECB, ++ PK11_RC4, ++ PK11_AES_128_CBC, ++ PK11_AES_192_CBC, ++ PK11_AES_256_CBC, ++ PK11_AES_128_ECB, ++ PK11_AES_192_ECB, ++ PK11_AES_256_ECB, ++ PK11_AES_128_CTR, ++ PK11_AES_192_CTR, ++ PK11_AES_256_CTR, ++ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, ++ PK11_CIPHER_MAX ++}; ++ ++/* Index for the supported digests */ ++enum pk11_digest_id { ++ PK11_MD5, ++ PK11_SHA1, ++ PK11_SHA224, ++ PK11_SHA256, ++ PK11_SHA384, ++ PK11_SHA512, ++ PK11_DIGEST_MAX ++}; ++ ++#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ ++ { \ ++ if (uselock) \ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ ++ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ ++ { \ ++ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ ++ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ ++ } \ ++ if (uselock) \ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ ++ } ++ ++static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; ++static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; ++static int cipher_count = 0; ++static int digest_count = 0; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; ++ ++typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st ++ { ++ enum pk11_cipher_id id; ++ int nid; ++ int iv_len; ++ int min_key_len; ++ int max_key_len; ++ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; ++ } PK11_CIPHER; ++ ++static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = ++ { ++ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, ++ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, ++ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, ++ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, ++ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, ++ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, ++ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, ++ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, ++ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, ++ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, ++ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, ++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, ++ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, ++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, ++ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, ++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, ++ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, ++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, ++ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, ++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, ++ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, ++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, ++ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 16, 16, ++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, ++ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_aes_192_ctr, 16, 24, 24, ++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, ++ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_aes_256_ctr, 16, 32, 32, ++ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, ++ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, ++ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, ++ }; ++ ++typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st ++ { ++ enum pk11_digest_id id; ++ int nid; ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; ++ } PK11_DIGEST; ++ ++static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = ++ { ++ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, ++ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, ++ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, ++ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, ++ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, ++ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, ++ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, ++ }; ++ ++/* ++ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in ++ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 ++ * session in multiple cipher_update calls ++ */ ++typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st ++ { ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; ++ ++ ++/* ++ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets ++ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. ++ * ++ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. ++ */ ++ ++/* DES CBC EVP */ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = ++ { ++ NID_des_cbc, ++ 8, 8, 8, ++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, ++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++/* 3DES CBC EVP */ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = ++ { ++ NID_des_ede3_cbc, ++ 8, 24, 8, ++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, ++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++/* ++ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and ++ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. ++ */ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = ++ { ++ NID_des_ecb, ++ 8, 8, 8, ++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ NULL, ++ NULL, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = ++ { ++ NID_des_ede3_ecb, ++ 8, 24, 8, ++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ NULL, ++ NULL, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = ++ { ++ NID_aes_128_cbc, ++ 16, 16, 16, ++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, ++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = ++ { ++ NID_aes_192_cbc, ++ 16, 24, 16, ++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, ++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = ++ { ++ NID_aes_256_cbc, ++ 16, 32, 16, ++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, ++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++/* ++ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and ++ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. ++ */ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = ++ { ++ NID_aes_128_ecb, ++ 16, 16, 0, ++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ NULL, ++ NULL, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = ++ { ++ NID_aes_192_ecb, ++ 16, 24, 0, ++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ NULL, ++ NULL, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = ++ { ++ NID_aes_256_ecb, ++ 16, 32, 0, ++ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ NULL, ++ NULL, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = ++ { ++ NID_aes_128_ctr, ++ 16, 16, 16, ++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, ++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = ++ { ++ NID_aes_192_ctr, ++ 16, 24, 16, ++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, ++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = ++ { ++ NID_aes_256_ctr, ++ 16, 32, 16, ++ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, ++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = ++ { ++ NID_bf_cbc, ++ 8, 16, 8, ++ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, ++ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = ++ { ++ NID_rc4, ++ 1, 16, 0, ++ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, ++ pk11_cipher_init, ++ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, ++ pk11_cipher_cleanup, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ NULL, ++ NULL, ++ NULL ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = ++ { ++ NID_md5, ++ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, ++ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, ++ 0, ++ pk11_digest_init, ++ pk11_digest_update, ++ pk11_digest_final, ++ pk11_digest_copy, ++ pk11_digest_cleanup, ++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, ++ MD5_CBLOCK, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = ++ { ++ NID_sha1, ++ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, ++ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, ++ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, ++ pk11_digest_init, ++ pk11_digest_update, ++ pk11_digest_final, ++ pk11_digest_copy, ++ pk11_digest_cleanup, ++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, ++ SHA_CBLOCK, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = ++ { ++ NID_sha224, ++ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, ++ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, ++ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, ++ pk11_digest_init, ++ pk11_digest_update, ++ pk11_digest_final, ++ pk11_digest_copy, ++ pk11_digest_cleanup, ++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, ++ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ ++ SHA256_CBLOCK, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = ++ { ++ NID_sha256, ++ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, ++ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, ++ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, ++ pk11_digest_init, ++ pk11_digest_update, ++ pk11_digest_final, ++ pk11_digest_copy, ++ pk11_digest_cleanup, ++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, ++ SHA256_CBLOCK, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = ++ { ++ NID_sha384, ++ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, ++ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, ++ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, ++ pk11_digest_init, ++ pk11_digest_update, ++ pk11_digest_final, ++ pk11_digest_copy, ++ pk11_digest_cleanup, ++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, ++ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ ++ SHA512_CBLOCK, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ }; ++ ++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = ++ { ++ NID_sha512, ++ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, ++ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, ++ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, ++ pk11_digest_init, ++ pk11_digest_update, ++ pk11_digest_final, ++ pk11_digest_copy, ++ pk11_digest_cleanup, ++ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, ++ SHA512_CBLOCK, ++ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), ++ }; ++ ++/* ++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. ++ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine ++ */ ++#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE ++#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) ++#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) ++static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = ++ { ++ { ++ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, ++ "SO_PATH", ++ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", ++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING ++ }, ++ { ++ PK11_CMD_PIN, ++ "PIN", ++ "Specifies the pin code", ++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING ++ }, ++ { ++ PK11_CMD_SLOT, ++ "SLOT", ++ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", ++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, ++ }, ++ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ ++static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = ++ { ++ pk11_rand_seed, ++ pk11_rand_bytes, ++ pk11_rand_cleanup, ++ pk11_rand_add, ++ pk11_rand_bytes, ++ pk11_rand_status ++ }; ++ ++ ++/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO ++#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" ++#endif ++static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; ++static const char *engine_pk11_name = ++ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)"; ++ ++CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; ++static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; ++ ++/* ++ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function ++ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether ++ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. ++ */ ++static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; ++ ++static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; ++static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; ++/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ ++CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; ++static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; ++static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; ++char *pk11_pin = NULL; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; ++static int pk11_pid = 0; ++ ++static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; ++ ++/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ ++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int type; ++ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; ++ ++ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX ++ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); ++ return (0); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) ++ goto malloc_err; ++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); ++ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) ++ goto malloc_err; ++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); ++ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) ++ goto malloc_err; ++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); ++ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) ++ goto malloc_err; ++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++ ++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) ++ { ++ session_cache[type].lock = ++ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); ++ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) ++ goto malloc_err; ++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ ++malloc_err: ++ pk11_free_all_locks(); ++ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return (0); ++#else ++ return (1); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int type; ++ ++ if (token_lock != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); ++ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); ++ token_lock = NULL; ++ } ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); ++ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); ++ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); ++ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); ++ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); ++ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); ++ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++ ++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) ++ { ++ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); ++ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); ++ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. ++ */ ++static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) ++ { ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; ++ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++ if (!pk11_library_initialized) ++ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || ++ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || ++ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || ++ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) ++ return (0); ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) ++ { ++ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || ++ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || ++ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) ++ return (0); ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) ++ { ++ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) ++ return (0); ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) ++ { ++ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) ++ return (0); ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++ if (pk11_have_random) ++ { ++ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) ++ return (0); ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } ++ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || ++ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || ++ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || ++ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || ++ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) ++ return (0); ++ ++/* ++ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup ++ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp ++ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. ++ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. ++ */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); ++ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; ++ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; ++ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE) ++ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec; ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++ ++ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ ++ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ ++#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT ++#error "dynamic engine not supported" ++static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) ++ { ++ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (!bind_pk11(e)) ++ return (0); ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() ++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) ++ ++#else ++static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) ++ { ++ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); ++ ++ if (!ret) ++ return (NULL); ++ ++ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) ++ { ++ ENGINE_free(ret); ++ return (NULL); ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++void ++ENGINE_load_pk11(void) ++ { ++ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; ++ ++ /* ++ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to ++ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. ++ */ ++ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ ++ if (!pk11_dso) ++ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); ++ ++ if (pk11_dso == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); ++ if (!e_pk11) ++ { ++ DSO_free(pk11_dso); ++ pk11_dso = NULL; ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically ++ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 ++ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter ++ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information ++ */ ++ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) ++ { ++ DSO_free(pk11_dso); ++ pk11_dso = NULL; ++ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); ++ ++ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); ++ ERR_clear_error(); ++ } ++#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ ++ ++/* ++ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and ++ * the function symbol names to bind to. ++ */ ++static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; ++ ++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) ++ { ++ if (PK11_LIBNAME) ++ return (PK11_LIBNAME); ++ ++ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); ++ } ++ ++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) ++ { ++ if (PK11_LIBNAME) ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); ++ ++ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; ++ } ++ ++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) ++ { ++ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); ++ ++ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); ++ } ++ ++/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ ++static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int i; ++ ++ if (!pk11_library_initialized) ++ return; ++ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); ++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* release all engine specific mutexes */ ++static void pk11_fork_parent(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int i; ++ ++ if (!pk11_library_initialized) ++ return; ++ ++ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); ++ } ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them ++ * accessible to all threads. ++ */ ++static void pk11_fork_child(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int i; ++ ++ if (!pk11_library_initialized) ++ return; ++ ++ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); ++ } ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ ++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) ++{ ++ return (pk11_library_init(e)); ++} ++ ++static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = ++ { ++ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ ++ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ ++ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ ++ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ ++ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ ++ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ ++ }; ++ ++/* ++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. ++ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also ++ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and ++ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function ++ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. ++ */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) ++ { ++ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; ++ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; ++ CK_INFO info; ++ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; ++ int any_slot_found; ++ int i; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; ++#endif ++ ++ /* ++ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which ++ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still ++ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine ++ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is ++ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application ++ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() ++ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can ++ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional ++ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In ++ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly ++ * initialize the engine again. ++ */ ++ if (pk11_library_initialized) ++ { ++ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) ++ { ++ return (1); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ /* ++ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case ++ * the application calls fork() without finishing the ++ * engine first. ++ */ ++ pk11_free_all_locks(); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (pk11_dso == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) ++ goto err; ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ ++ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, ++ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); ++ if (!p) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ ++ rv = p(&pFuncList); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ ++ ++ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); ++ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); ++ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); ++#endif ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); ++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); ++#endif ++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* ++ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any ++ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an ++ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 ++ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just ++ * because no slot was present. ++ */ ++ if (any_slot_found == 0) ++ return (1); ++ ++ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, ++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, ++ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since ++ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function ++ */ ++ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */ ++ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) ++ != CKR_OK) { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " ++ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ digest_count = 0; ++ } ++ ++ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; ++ pk11_pid = getpid(); ++ /* ++ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() ++ * will do the cleanup. ++ */ ++ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) ++ goto err; ++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) ++ session_cache[i].head = NULL; ++ /* ++ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists ++ * for asymmetric ciphers. ++ */ ++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) ++ active_list[i] = NULL; ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) ++ { ++ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, ++ pk11_fork_child) != 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ return (1); ++ ++err: ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) ++ { ++ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); ++ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); ++ if (pk11_pin) { ++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = NULL; ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 ++ * library. ++ */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) ++ { ++ int i; ++ ++ if (pk11_pin) { ++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = NULL; ++ ++ if (pk11_dso == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); ++ ++ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* free all active lists */ ++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) ++ pk11_free_active_list(i); ++ ++ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); ++ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ ++ /* ++ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function ++ * may have side-effects. ++ */ ++#if 0 ++ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); ++#endif ++ ++ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ pk11_dso = NULL; ++ pFuncList = NULL; ++ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; ++ pk11_pid = 0; ++ /* ++ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than ++ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason ++ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out ++ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes ++ * the engine before calling fork(). ++ */ ++ pk11_free_all_locks(); ++ ++ return (1); ++ ++err: ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) ++ { ++ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); ++ ++ switch (cmd) ++ { ++ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: ++ if (p == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ if (initialized) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); ++ case PK11_CMD_PIN: ++ if (pk11_pin) { ++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = NULL; ++ ++ if (p == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); ++ if (pk11_pin == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: ++ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif ++ return (1); ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); ++ ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ ++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) ++ { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) ++ { ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ /* ++ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since ++ * the calling functions do not care anyway ++ */ ++ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); ++ ++ return; ++ } ++ ++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) ++ { ++ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); ++ } ++ ++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) ++ return (0); ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ ++static int pk11_rand_status(void) ++ { ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ ++static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ case OP_RSA: ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; ++ } ++ break; ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++ case OP_DSA: ++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); ++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); ++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; ++ } ++ break; ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++ case OP_DH: ++ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); ++ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; ++ } ++ break; ++#endif ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have ++ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here ++ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. ++ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. ++ */ ++PK11_SESSION * ++pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; ++#endif ++ static pid_t pid = 0; ++ pid_t new_pid; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ case OP_DSA: ++ case OP_DH: ++ case OP_RAND: ++ case OP_DIGEST: ++ case OP_CIPHER: ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; ++#endif ++ break; ++ default: ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); ++ return (NULL); ++ } ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ /* ++ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in ++ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session ++ * here, with no PID information. ++ */ ++ if (pid == 0) ++ pid = getpid(); ++ ++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; ++ sp = freelist; ++ ++ /* ++ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled ++ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first ++ * structure from the freelist. ++ */ ++ if (sp == NULL) ++ { ++ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, ++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); ++ ++ /* ++ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the ++ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so ++ * mark them as unused. ++ */ ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ freelist = sp->next; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all ++ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. ++ */ ++ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) ++ { ++ pid = new_pid; ++ ++ /* ++ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited ++ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which ++ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the ++ * head of the list). ++ */ ++ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) ++ { ++ freelist = sp1->next; ++ /* ++ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() ++ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 ++ * sessions and destroy all objects. ++ */ ++ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); ++ OPENSSL_free(sp1); ++ } ++ ++ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ ++ pk11_free_active_list(optype); ++ ++ /* Initialize the process */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); ++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, ++ rv); ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ sp = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this ++ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one ++ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. ++ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more ++ * information. ++ */ ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) ++ goto err; ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, ++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, ++ rv); ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ sp = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs ++ * re-initialization. ++ */ ++ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ sp = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let ++ * the caller cope with the situation. ++ */ ++ freelist = sp; ++ sp = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (sp->pid == 0) ++ { ++ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ ++ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ sp = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ ++ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; ++ ++err: ++ if (sp != NULL) ++ sp->next = NULL; ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ return (sp); ++ } ++ ++ ++void ++pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; ++#endif ++ PK11_SESSION *freelist; ++ ++ /* ++ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and ++ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the ++ * next time we will ask for a new session. ++ */ ++ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) ++ return; ++ ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ case OP_DSA: ++ case OP_DH: ++ case OP_RAND: ++ case OP_DIGEST: ++ case OP_CIPHER: ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; ++#endif ++ break; ++ default: ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; ++ sp->next = freelist; ++ session_cache[optype].head = sp; ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ ++/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ ++static int pk11_free_all_sessions() ++ { ++ int ret = 1; ++ int type; ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); ++ ++ /* ++ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will ++ * return 0 on exit. ++ */ ++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) ++ { ++ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) ++ ret = 0; ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many ++ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we ++ * return an error on return. ++ */ ++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; ++ pid_t mypid = getpid(); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; ++#endif ++ int ret = 1; ++ ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ case OP_DSA: ++ case OP_DH: ++ case OP_RAND: ++ case OP_DIGEST: ++ case OP_CIPHER: ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; ++#endif ++ break; ++ default: ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; ++ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) ++ { ++ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, ++ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); ++ ret = 0; ++ } ++ } ++ freelist = sp->next; ++ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++ ++static int ++pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; ++ ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ case OP_DSA: ++ case OP_DH: ++ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; ++ break; ++ case OP_RAND: ++ myslot = rand_SLOTID; ++ break; ++ case OP_DIGEST: ++ case OP_CIPHER: ++ myslot = SLOTID; ++ break; ++ default: ++ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, ++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); ++ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We are probably a child process so force the ++ * reinitialize of the session ++ */ ++ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; ++ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) ++ return (0); ++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, ++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); ++ } ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ sp->pid = getpid(); ++ ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ case OP_RSA: ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; ++ break; ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++ case OP_DSA: ++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; ++ break; ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++ case OP_DH: ++ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; ++ break; ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++ case OP_CIPHER: ++ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent ++ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. ++ */ ++ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; ++ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) ++ { ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, ++ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) ++ { ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, ++ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' ++ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We ++ * must free those as well. ++ */ ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all ++ * objects in the free list. ++ */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) ++ { ++ int ret = 1; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; ++ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; ++ ++ if (session != NULL) ++ local_free_session = session; ++ else ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; ++ uselock = FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects ++ */ ++ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) ++ { ++ local_free_session = sp->next; ++ ++ /* ++ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the ++ * destroy operations fails. ++ */ ++ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) ++ { ++ ret = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) ++ { ++ ret = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ if (session == NULL) ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ if (session == NULL) ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) ++ { ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, ++ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE); ++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; ++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); ++ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) ++ { ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, ++ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE); ++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; ++ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); ++ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all ++ * objects in the free list. ++ */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) ++ { ++ int ret = 1; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; ++ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; ++ ++ if (session != NULL) ++ local_free_session = session; ++ else ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; ++ uselock = FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects ++ */ ++ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) ++ { ++ local_free_session = sp->next; ++ ++ /* ++ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the ++ * destroy operations fails. ++ */ ++ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) ++ { ++ ret = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) ++ { ++ ret = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ if (session == NULL) ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ if (session == NULL) ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) ++ { ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, ++ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE); ++ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; ++ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); ++ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Destroy DH key object wrapper. ++ * ++ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure ++ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list ++ */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) ++ { ++ int ret = 1; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; ++ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; ++ ++ if (session != NULL) ++ local_free_session = session; ++ else ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; ++ uselock = FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) ++ { ++ local_free_session = sp->next; ++ ++ /* ++ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the ++ * destroy operations fails. ++ */ ++ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) ++ { ++ ret = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ if (session == NULL) ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ if (session == NULL) ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++ ++static int ++pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, ++ CK_BBOOL persistent) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++ /* ++ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects ++ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so ++ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. ++ */ ++ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) ++ return (1); ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, ++ rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ ++ ++static int ++cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) ++ { ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) ++ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) ++ return (ciphers[i].id); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++static int ++pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) ++ { ++ if (cipher_count > 0) ++ *nids = cipher_nids; ++ else ++ *nids = NULL; ++ return (cipher_count); ++ } ++ ++static int ++pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) ++ { ++ if (digest_count > 0) ++ *nids = digest_nids; ++ else ++ *nids = NULL; ++ return (digest_count); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. ++ */ ++static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, ++ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; ++ ++ /* ++ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and ++ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before ++ * pk11_init_symetric() is called. ++ */ ++ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0); ++ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); ++ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); ++ ++ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || ++ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || ++ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) ++ { ++ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); ++ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); ++ /* ++ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, ++ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 ++ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the ++ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can ++ * add code so that the counter length can be set via ++ * ENGINE_ctrl() function. ++ */ ++ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; ++ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) ++ { ++ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; ++ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ ++ if (ctx->encrypt) ++ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, ++ sp->opdata_cipher_key); ++ else ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, ++ sp->opdata_cipher_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? ++ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int ++pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, ++ const unsigned char *iv, int enc) ++ { ++ CK_MECHANISM mech; ++ int index; ++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; ++ ++ state->sp = NULL; ++ ++ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); ++ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) ++ return (0); ++ ++ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; ++ /* ++ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the ++ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our ++ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From ++ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a ++ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key ++ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this ++ * code serves as a sanity check. ++ * ++ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be ++ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs ++ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES ++ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. ++ */ ++ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || ++ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || ++ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) ++ return (0); ++ ++ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ ++ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; ++ mech.pParameter = NULL; ++ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; ++ ++ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ ++ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); ++ ++ /* ++ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then ++ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the ++ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). ++ */ ++ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && ++ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) ++ { ++ state->sp = sp; ++ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) ++ return (0); ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object ++ * needs to be created. ++ */ ++ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( ++ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); ++ } ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) ++ { ++ /* ++ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to ++ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. ++ */ ++ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) ++ { ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ /* now initialize the context with a new key */ ++ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) ++ return (0); ++ ++ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; ++ state->sp = sp; ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a ++ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session ++ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so ++ * that it needs not be recreated. ++ * ++ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this ++ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return ++ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good ++ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix ++ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. ++ */ ++static int ++pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, ++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient ++ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. ++ */ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L ++static int ++pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, ++ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) ++#else ++static int ++pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, ++ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) ++#endif ++ { ++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ unsigned long outl = inl; ++ ++ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) ++ return (0); ++ ++ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; ++ ++ if (!inl) ++ return (1); ++ ++ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ ++ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (ctx->encrypt) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, ++ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, ++ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, ++ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, ++ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always ++ * the same size of input. ++ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with ++ * correctly aligned buffers. ++ */ ++ if (inl != outl) ++ return (0); ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() ++ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's ++ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but ++ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't ++ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with ++ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, ++ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used ++ * context is initialized without finalizing it first. ++ */ ++static int ++pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; ++ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; ++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; ++ ++ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get ++ * rid of the context. ++ */ ++ if (ctx->encrypt) ++ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( ++ state->sp->session, buf, &len); ++ else ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( ++ state->sp->session, buf, &len); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? ++ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); ++ state->sp = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with ++ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the ++ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with ++ */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int ++pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, ++ const int **nids, int nid) ++ { ++ if (!cipher) ++ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); ++ ++ switch (nid) ++ { ++ case NID_des_ede3_cbc: ++ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; ++ break; ++ case NID_des_cbc: ++ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; ++ break; ++ case NID_des_ede3_ecb: ++ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; ++ break; ++ case NID_des_ecb: ++ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; ++ break; ++ case NID_aes_128_cbc: ++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; ++ break; ++ case NID_aes_192_cbc: ++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; ++ break; ++ case NID_aes_256_cbc: ++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; ++ break; ++ case NID_aes_128_ecb: ++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; ++ break; ++ case NID_aes_192_ecb: ++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; ++ break; ++ case NID_aes_256_ecb: ++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; ++ break; ++ case NID_bf_cbc: ++ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; ++ break; ++ case NID_rc4: ++ *cipher = &pk11_rc4; ++ break; ++ case NID_aes_128_ctr: ++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; ++ break; ++ case NID_aes_192_ctr: ++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; ++ break; ++ case NID_aes_256_ctr: ++ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; ++ break; ++ default: ++ *cipher = NULL; ++ break; ++ } ++ return (*cipher != NULL); ++ } ++ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int ++pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, ++ const int **nids, int nid) ++ { ++ if (!digest) ++ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); ++ ++ switch (nid) ++ { ++ case NID_md5: ++ *digest = &pk11_md5; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha1: ++ *digest = &pk11_sha1; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha224: ++ *digest = &pk11_sha224; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha256: ++ *digest = &pk11_sha256; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha384: ++ *digest = &pk11_sha384; ++ break; ++ case NID_sha512: ++ *digest = &pk11_sha512; ++ break; ++ default: ++ *digest = NULL; ++ break; ++ } ++ return (*digest != NULL); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, ++ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; ++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; ++ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; ++ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, ++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, ++ }; ++ ++ /* ++ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions ++ * can use the key handles. Here is why: ++ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. ++ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. ++ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with ++ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES ++ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and ++ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session ++ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key ++ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to ++ * terminate the active operation. ++ */ ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; ++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; ++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; ++ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) ++ { ++ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); ++ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len); ++ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) || ++ (key_type == CKK_DES2) || ++ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) ++ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]); ++ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) || ++ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) ++ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]); ++ if (key_type == CKK_DES3) ++ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]); ++ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf; ++ } ++ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, ++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, ++ rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Save the key information used in this session. ++ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. ++ */ ++ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) ++ { ++ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX; ++ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len; ++ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len); ++ } ++ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); ++err: ++ ++ return (h_key); ++ } ++ ++static int ++md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) ++ { ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) ++ if (digests[i].nid == nid) ++ return (digests[i].id); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++static int ++pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_MECHANISM mech; ++ int index; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ PK11_DIGEST *pdp; ++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; ++ ++ state->sp = NULL; ++ ++ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); ++ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) ++ return (0); ++ ++ pdp = &digests[index]; ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) ++ return (0); ++ ++ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ ++ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; ++ mech.pParameter = NULL; ++ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ state->sp = sp; ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++static int ++pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; ++ ++ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ ++ if (count == 0) ++ return (1); ++ ++ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) ++ return (0); ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, ++ count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); ++ state->sp = NULL; ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++static int ++pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ unsigned long len; ++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; ++ len = ctx->digest->md_size; ++ ++ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) ++ return (0); ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); ++ state->sp = NULL; ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) ++ return (0); ++ ++ /* ++ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session ++ * to the pool ++ */ ++ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); ++ state->sp = NULL; ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++static int ++pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ int ret = 0; ++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; ++ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; ++ ++ /* The copy-from state */ ++ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; ++ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* Initialize the copy-to state */ ++ if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) ++ goto err; ++ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; ++ ++ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, ++ &ul_state_len); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, ++ rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (ul_state_len == 0) ++ { ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); ++ if (pstate == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, ++ &ul_state_len); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, ++ rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, ++ ul_state_len, 0, 0); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, ++ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ ret = 1; ++err: ++ if (pstate != NULL) ++ OPENSSL_free(pstate); ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ ++static int ++pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) ++ { ++ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; ++ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ ++ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not ++ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory ++ * that might have been allocated in the token when ++ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() ++ * will return the session to the cache. ++ */ ++ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key ++ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key ++ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for ++ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first ++ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same ++ * prefix. ++ */ ++static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, ++ int key_len) ++ { ++ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || ++ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) ++ { ++ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ ++static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) ++ { ++ int ret = 0; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; ++ ++ if (session != NULL) ++ local_free_session = session; ++ else ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; ++ } ++ ++ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) ++ { ++ local_free_session = sp->next; ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ /* ++ * The secret key object is created in the ++ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). ++ */ ++ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, ++ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ } ++ ret = 1; ++err: ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ if (session == NULL) ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ if (session == NULL) ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* ++ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported ++ * ++ * CKM_RSA_X_509 ++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS ++ * CKM_DSA ++ * ++ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a ++ * public key slot. ++ * ++ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported ++ * ++ * CKM_DES3_CBC ++ * CKM_DES_CBC ++ * CKM_AES_CBC ++ * CKM_DES3_ECB ++ * CKM_DES_ECB ++ * CKM_AES_ECB ++ * CKM_AES_CTR ++ * CKM_RC4 ++ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC ++ * ++ * Digests optionally supported ++ * ++ * CKM_MD5 ++ * CKM_SHA_1 ++ * CKM_SHA224 ++ * CKM_SHA256 ++ * CKM_SHA384 ++ * CKM_SHA512 ++ * ++ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which ++ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of ++ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global ++ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key ++ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. ++ */ ++static int ++pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) ++ { ++ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; ++ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; ++ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; ++ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; ++ unsigned int i; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; ++ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; ++ int slot_n_cipher = 0; ++ int slot_n_digest = 0; ++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; ++ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; ++ int current_slot_n_digest = 0; ++ ++ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; ++ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; ++ ++ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ ++ if (any_slot_found != NULL) ++ *any_slot_found = 0; ++ ++ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ ++ if (ulSlotCount == 0) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); ++ ++ if (pSlotList == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ /* Get the slot list for processing */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); ++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); ++ ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) ++ { ++ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ /* Check if slot has random support. */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ continue; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; ++ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; ++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) ++ { ++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; ++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE; ++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; ++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; ++ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ continue; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ /* ++ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and ++ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. ++ */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, ++ &mech_info); ++ ++ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && ++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, ++ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. ++ */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, ++ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); ++ ++ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && ++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && ++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && ++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) ++ { ++ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; ++ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) ++ { ++ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++ /* ++ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and ++ * verifying with CKM_DSA. ++ */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, ++ &mech_info); ++ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && ++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) ++ { ++ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; ++ } ++ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++ /* ++ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and ++ * derivation. ++ */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, ++ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); ++ ++ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, ++ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); ++ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) ++ { ++ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; ++ } ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++ ++ if (!found_candidate_slot && ++ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; ++ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; ++ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover; ++ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; ++ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; ++ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; ++ /* ++ * Cache the flags for later use. We might ++ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature ++ * is used. ++ */ ++ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", ++ PK11_DBG); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ++ best_slot_sofar); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " ++ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); ++ } ++#else ++ } /* if */ ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } /* for */ ++ ++ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) ++ { ++ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; ++ } ++ ++ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; ++ best_slot_sofar = 0; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; ++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; ++ current_slot_n_cipher = 0; ++ current_slot_n_digest = 0; ++ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); ++ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); ++ ++ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, ++ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); ++ ++ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, ++ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, ++ current_slot_n_cipher); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, ++ current_slot_n_digest); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", ++ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ /* ++ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than ++ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, ++ * otherwise leave it where it is. ++ */ ++ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > ++ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", ++ PK11_DBG, current_slot); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; ++ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; ++ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; ++ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, ++ sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); ++ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, ++ sizeof (local_digest_nids)); ++ } ++ } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ if (pSlotList != NULL) ++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); ++ ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); ++ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ if (any_slot_found != NULL) ++ *any_slot_found = 1; ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, ++ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, ++ int *local_cipher_nids, int id) ++ { ++ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && ++ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) ++ { ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = ++ ciphers[id].nid; ++ } ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ else ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); ++ } ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ else ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); ++ } ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ return; ++ } ++ ++static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, ++ int id) ++ { ++ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) ++ { ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = ++ digests[id].nid; ++ } ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ else ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); ++ } ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ else ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); ++ } ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ return; ++ } ++ ++/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ ++static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, ++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) ++ { ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) ++ { ++ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, ++ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, ++ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); ++ } ++ } ++ ++/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ ++static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, ++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) ++ { ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) ++ { ++ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, ++ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); ++ } ++ } ++ ++#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION ++/* ++ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library ++ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation ++ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code ++ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the ++ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some ++ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a ++ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, ++ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the ++ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte ++ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products ++ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression ++ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the ++ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. ++ * ++ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for ++ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same ++ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 ++ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without ++ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use ++ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since ++ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said ++ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with ++ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code ++ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for ++ * asymmetric operations. ++ * ++ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what ++ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can ++ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be ++ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, ++ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. ++ * ++ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find ++ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric ++ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table ++ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays ++ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the ++ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token ++ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more ++ * information. ++ * ++ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined ++ * the code won't be used. ++ */ ++#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) ++static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; ++#else ++static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; ++#endif ++ ++/* ++ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, ++ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware ++ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. ++ */ ++static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) ++ { ++ int i; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ void *handle; ++ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; ++ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; ++ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; ++ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; ++ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; ++ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; ++ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; ++ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", ++ PK11_DBG); ++#endif ++ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, ++ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ ++ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); ++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, ++ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ ++ if (ulSlotCount == 0) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif ++ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); ++ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); ++ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, ++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ /* this means empty tables */ ++ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; ++ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); ++ if (pSlotList == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Get the slot list for processing */ ++ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also ++ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the ++ * search. ++ */ ++ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; ++ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; ++ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); ++ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); ++ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef ++ * is zero now. ++ */ ++ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) ++ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; ++ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) ++ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", ++ PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) ++ { ++ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) ++ continue; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ /* ++ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are ++ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. ++ */ ++ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], ++ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); ++ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], ++ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function ++ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by ++ * dlclose(3C). ++ */ ++#if 0 ++ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); ++#endif ++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); ++ (void) dlclose(handle); ++ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; ++ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ return (1); ++ ++err: ++ if (pSlotList != NULL) ++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); ++ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) ++ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); ++ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) ++ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); ++ ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., ++ * non-existent). ++ */ ++static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) ++ { ++ int i = 0; ++ ++ /* ++ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new ++ * table. ++ */ ++ if (nid_table == NULL) ++ return (1); ++ ++ /* ++ * the table is never full, there is always at least one ++ * NID_undef. ++ */ ++ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) ++ { ++ if (nid_table[i++] == nid) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (0); ++ } ++#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011 +@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ */ ++ ++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ ++/* ++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for ++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). ++ * ++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by ++ * Afchine Madjlessi. ++ */ ++/* ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in ++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the ++ * distribution. ++ * ++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this ++ * software must display the following acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to ++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without ++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact ++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. ++ * ++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" ++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written ++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. ++ * ++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following ++ * acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY ++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR ++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR ++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, ++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; ++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * ++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young ++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim ++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include <stdio.h> ++#include <openssl/err.h> ++#include "hw_pk11_err.h" ++ ++/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR ++static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= ++{ ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, ++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, ++{ 0, NULL} ++}; ++ ++static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= ++{ ++{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, ++{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, ++{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, ++{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, ++{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, ++{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, ++{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, ++{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, ++{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, ++{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, ++{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, ++{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, ++{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, ++{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, ++{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, ++{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, ++{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, ++{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, ++{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, ++{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, ++{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, ++{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, ++{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, ++{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, ++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, ++{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, ++{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, ++{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, ++{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, ++{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, ++{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" }, ++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" }, ++{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, ++{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, ++{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, ++{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, ++{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" }, ++{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" }, ++{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, ++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, ++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, ++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, ++{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, ++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, ++{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, ++{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, ++{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, ++{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" }, ++{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" }, ++{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, ++{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" }, ++{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" }, ++{ 0, NULL} ++}; ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ ++ ++static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; ++static int pk11_error_init = 1; ++ ++static void ++ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) ++ { ++ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) ++ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); ++ ++ if (pk11_error_init) ++ { ++ pk11_error_init = 0; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR ++ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); ++ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); ++#endif ++ } ++} ++ ++static void ++ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) ++ { ++ if (pk11_error_init == 0) ++ { ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR ++ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); ++ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); ++#endif ++ pk11_error_init = 1; ++ } ++} ++ ++void ++ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) ++{ ++ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) ++ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); ++ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); ++} ++ ++void ++PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) ++{ ++ char tmp_buf[20]; ++ ++ PK11err(function, reason); ++ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); ++ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); ++} +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.13 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:29 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:04:20 2013 +@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ */ ++ ++/* ++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for ++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). ++ * ++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by ++ * Afchine Madjlessi. ++ */ ++/* ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in ++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the ++ * distribution. ++ * ++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this ++ * software must display the following acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to ++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without ++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact ++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. ++ * ++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" ++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written ++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. ++ * ++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following ++ * acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY ++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR ++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR ++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, ++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; ++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * ++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young ++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim ++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H ++#define HW_PK11_ERR_H ++ ++void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); ++void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); ++#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) ++ ++/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ ++ ++/* Function codes. */ ++ ++#define PK11_F_INIT 100 ++#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 ++#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 ++#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 ++#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 ++#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 ++#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 ++#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 ++#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 ++#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 ++#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 ++#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 ++#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 ++#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 ++#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 ++#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 ++#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 ++#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 ++#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 ++#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 ++#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 ++#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 ++#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 ++#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 ++#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 ++#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 ++#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 ++#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 ++#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 ++#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 ++#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 ++#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 ++#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 ++#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 ++#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 ++#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 ++#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 ++#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 ++#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 ++#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 ++#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 ++#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 ++#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 ++#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 ++#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 ++#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 ++#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 ++#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 ++#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 ++#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 ++#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 ++#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 ++#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 ++#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 ++#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 ++ ++/* Reason codes. */ ++#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 ++#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 ++#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 ++#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 ++#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 ++#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 ++#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 ++#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 ++#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 ++#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 ++#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 ++#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 ++#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 ++#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 ++#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 ++#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 ++#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 ++#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 ++#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 ++#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 ++#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 ++#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 ++#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 ++#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 ++#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 ++#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 ++#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 ++#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 ++#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 ++#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 ++#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 ++#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 ++#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 ++#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 ++#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 ++#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 ++#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 ++#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 ++#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 ++#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 ++#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 ++#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 ++#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 ++#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 ++#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 ++#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 ++#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 ++#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 ++#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 ++#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 ++#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 ++#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 ++#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 ++#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 ++#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 ++#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 ++#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 ++#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 ++#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 ++#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 ++#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 ++#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 ++#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 ++#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 ++#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 ++#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 ++ ++#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 ++#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 ++#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 ++#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 ++#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 ++#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 ++#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 ++#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 ++#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 ++#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 ++#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 ++#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 ++#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 ++#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 ++#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 ++#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 ++#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 ++#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 ++#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 ++#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 ++#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 ++ ++/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ ++#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 ++ ++#ifdef NOPTHREADS ++/* ++ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the ++ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global ++ * per-process lock for the whole engine. ++ * ++ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as ++ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but ++ * it's safe. ++ */ ++#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC ++#endif ++ ++/* ++ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 ++ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the ++ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation ++ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. ++ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object ++ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. ++ * ++ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list ++ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request ++ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. ++ */ ++typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION ++ { ++ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ ++ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ ++ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */ ++ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */ ++ union ++ { ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++ struct ++ { ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ ++ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ ++ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ ++ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ ++ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ ++ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */ ++ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */ ++ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ ++ } u_RSA; ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++ struct ++ { ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ ++ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ ++ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ ++ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ ++ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ ++ } u_DSA; ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++ struct ++ { ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ ++ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ ++ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ ++ } u_DH; ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++ struct ++ { ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ ++ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; ++ int key_len; /* priv key len */ ++ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ ++ } u_cipher; ++ } opdata_u; ++ } PK11_SESSION; ++ ++#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key ++#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key ++#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub ++#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv ++#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num ++#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num ++#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num ++#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num ++#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num ++#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key ++#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key ++#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub ++#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num ++#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv ++#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num ++#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key ++#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh ++#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num ++#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key ++#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key ++#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len ++#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt ++ ++/* ++ * We have 3 different groups of operation types: ++ * 1) asymmetric operations ++ * 2) random operations ++ * 3) symmetric and digest operations ++ * ++ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware ++ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware ++ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support ++ * only a single group of operations. ++ * ++ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have ++ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from ++ * different groups may be initialized in different slots. ++ * ++ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are ++ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. ++ */ ++typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM ++ { ++ OP_RAND, ++ OP_RSA, ++ OP_DSA, ++ OP_DH, ++ OP_CIPHER, ++ OP_DIGEST, ++ OP_MAX ++ } PK11_OPTYPE; ++ ++/* ++ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches ++ * and locks associated with the lists. ++ */ ++typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE ++ { ++ PK11_SESSION *head; ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ pthread_mutex_t *lock; ++#endif ++ } PK11_CACHE; ++ ++/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ ++typedef struct PK11_active_st ++ { ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; ++ unsigned int refcnt; ++ struct PK11_active_st *prev; ++ struct PK11_active_st *next; ++ } PK11_active; ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; ++#endif ++extern PK11_active *active_list[]; ++/* ++ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See ++ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. ++ */ ++extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) ++#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) ++#else ++#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) ++#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) ++#endif ++ ++extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); ++extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); ++extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); ++extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); ++extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); ++extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++ ++extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; ++ ++#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */ +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.42 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:27:06 2013 +@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ */ ++ ++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ ++/* ++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for ++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). ++ * ++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by ++ * Afchine Madjlessi. ++ */ ++/* ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in ++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the ++ * distribution. ++ * ++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this ++ * software must display the following acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to ++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without ++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact ++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. ++ * ++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" ++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written ++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. ++ * ++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following ++ * acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY ++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR ++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR ++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, ++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; ++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * ++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young ++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim ++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). ++ * ++ */ ++ ++#include <stdio.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> ++#include <string.h> ++#include <sys/types.h> ++ ++#include <openssl/e_os2.h> ++#include <openssl/crypto.h> ++#include <cryptlib.h> ++#include <openssl/engine.h> ++#include <openssl/dso.h> ++#include <openssl/err.h> ++#include <openssl/bn.h> ++#include <openssl/pem.h> ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++#include <openssl/rsa.h> ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++#include <openssl/dsa.h> ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++#include <openssl/dh.h> ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ ++#include <openssl/rand.h> ++#include <openssl/objects.h> ++#include <openssl/x509.h> ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++#define NOPTHREADS ++typedef int pid_t; ++#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE ++static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); ++#ifndef NULL_PTR ++#define NULL_PTR NULL ++#endif ++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) ++#else ++#include <unistd.h> ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++#include <pthread.h> ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) ++#include "cryptoki.h" ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) ++#else ++#include "cryptoki.h" ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++#endif ++#include "hw_pk11ca.h" ++#include "hw_pk11_err.h" ++ ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; ++extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; ++#endif ++ ++#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) ++#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++/* RSA stuff */ ++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); ++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); ++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); ++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); ++static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); ++static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); ++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, ++ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L ++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, ++ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, ++ const RSA *rsa); ++#else ++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, ++ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, ++ const RSA *rsa); ++#endif ++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); ++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); ++ ++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); ++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); ++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); ++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); ++ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, ++ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, ++ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); ++ ++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); ++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); ++#endif ++ ++/* DSA stuff */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); ++static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); ++static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, ++ DSA *dsa); ++static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, ++ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); ++ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, ++ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, ++ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); ++ ++static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); ++static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); ++#endif ++ ++/* DH stuff */ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); ++static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); ++static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); ++static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, ++ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); ++ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, ++ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); ++ ++static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); ++#endif ++ ++static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); ++static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, ++ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); ++static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); ++ ++static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, ++ CK_BBOOL is_private); ++ ++/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ ++#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL ++static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; ++#else ++static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; ++#endif ++ ++/* ++ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list ++ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error ++ * variable and jump to the specified label. ++ */ ++#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ ++ { \ ++ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ ++ { \ ++ var = TRUE; \ ++ if (unlock) \ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ ++ goto label; \ ++ } \ ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the ++ * entry otherwise return NULL. ++ * ++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list ++ * held. ++ */ ++static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *entry; ++ ++ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) ++ if (entry->h == h) ++ return (entry); ++ ++ return (NULL); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a ++ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of ++ * failure. ++ * ++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list ++ * held. ++ */ ++int ++pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *entry = NULL; ++ ++ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ /* search for entry in the active list */ ++ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) ++ entry->refcnt++; ++ else ++ { ++ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ ++ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); ++ if (entry == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ entry->h = h; ++ entry->refcnt = 1; ++ entry->prev = NULL; ++ entry->next = NULL; ++ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ ++ if (active_list[type] == NULL) ++ active_list[type] = entry; ++ else /* make the entry first in the list */ ++ { ++ entry->next = active_list[type]; ++ active_list[type]->prev = entry; ++ active_list[type] = entry; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (entry->refcnt); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. ++ * ++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list ++ * held. ++ */ ++void ++pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *prev_entry; ++ ++ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ ++ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) ++ { ++ prev_entry->next = entry->next; ++ if (entry->next != NULL) ++ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ active_list[type] = entry->next; ++ /* we were the first but not the only one */ ++ if (entry->next != NULL) ++ entry->next->prev = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* sanitization */ ++ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ entry->prev = NULL; ++ entry->next = NULL; ++ OPENSSL_free(entry); ++ } ++ ++/* Free all entries from the active list. */ ++void ++pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *entry; ++ ++ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ ++ switch (type) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ case OP_DSA: ++ case OP_DH: ++ break; ++ default: ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); ++ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) ++ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, ++ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. ++ * ++ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, ++ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. ++ * ++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list ++ * held. ++ */ ++int ++pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *entry = NULL; ++ ++ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); ++ entry->refcnt--; ++ if (entry->refcnt == 0) ++ { ++ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ ++static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = ++ { ++ "PKCS#11 RSA method", ++ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ ++ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ ++ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ ++ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ ++ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ ++ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ ++ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ ++ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ ++ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ ++ NULL, /* app_data */ ++ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ ++ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ ++ }; ++ ++RSA_METHOD * ++PK11_RSA(void) ++ { ++ return (&pk11_rsa); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ ++static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = ++ { ++ "PKCS#11 DSA method", ++ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ ++ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ ++ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ ++ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ ++ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ ++ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ ++ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ ++ 0, /* flags */ ++ NULL /* app_data */ ++ }; ++ ++DSA_METHOD * ++PK11_DSA(void) ++ { ++ return (&pk11_dsa); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++/* ++ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for ++ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but ++ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by ++ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be ++ * enough. ++ */ ++#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 ++ ++/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ ++static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = ++ { ++ "PKCS#11 DH method", ++ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ ++ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ ++ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ ++ pk11_DH_init, /* init */ ++ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ ++ 0, /* flags */ ++ NULL, /* app_data */ ++ NULL /* generate_params */ ++ }; ++ ++DH_METHOD * ++PK11_DH(void) ++ { ++ return (&pk11_dh); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ ++#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 ++ ++/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ ++#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 ++#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 ++ ++static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; ++static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++/* ++ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to ++ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not ++ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. ++ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. ++ */ ++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) ++ { ++ int i, num = 0, r = -1; ++ unsigned char *buf = NULL; ++ ++ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); ++ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) ++ { ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ switch (padding) ++ { ++ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: ++ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); ++ break; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA ++ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: ++ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); ++ break; ++#endif ++ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: ++ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); ++ break; ++ case RSA_NO_PADDING: ++ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); ++ break; ++ default: ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (i <= 0) goto err; ++ ++ /* PK11 functions are called here */ ++ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); ++err: ++ if (buf != NULL) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); ++ OPENSSL_free(buf); ++ } ++ return (r); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* ++ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors ++ * should be catched in the padding functions ++ */ ++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) ++ { ++ int i, num = 0, r = -1; ++ unsigned char *buf = NULL; ++ ++ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); ++ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) ++ { ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ switch (padding) ++ { ++ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: ++ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); ++ break; ++ case RSA_NO_PADDING: ++ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); ++ break; ++ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: ++ default: ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (i <= 0) goto err; ++ ++ /* PK11 functions are called here */ ++ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); ++err: ++ if (buf != NULL) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); ++ OPENSSL_free(buf); ++ } ++ return (r); ++ } ++ ++/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ ++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) ++ { ++ BIGNUM f; ++ int j, num = 0, r = -1; ++ unsigned char *p; ++ unsigned char *buf = NULL; ++ ++ BN_init(&f); ++ ++ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); ++ ++ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) ++ { ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things ++ * and chops off the top '0' bytes ++ */ ++ if (flen > num) ++ { ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, ++ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* make data into a big number */ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) ++ { ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, ++ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* PK11 functions are called here */ ++ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); ++ ++ /* ++ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. ++ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. ++ */ ++ for (j = 0; j < r; j++) ++ if (buf[j] != 0) ++ break; ++ ++ p = buf + j; ++ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ ++ ++ switch (padding) ++ { ++ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: ++ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); ++ break; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA ++ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: ++ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); ++ break; ++#endif ++ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: ++ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); ++ break; ++ case RSA_NO_PADDING: ++ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); ++ break; ++ default: ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (r < 0) ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); ++ ++err: ++ BN_clear_free(&f); ++ if (buf != NULL) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); ++ OPENSSL_free(buf); ++ } ++ return (r); ++ } ++ ++/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ ++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, ++ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) ++ { ++ BIGNUM f; ++ int i, num = 0, r = -1; ++ unsigned char *p; ++ unsigned char *buf = NULL; ++ ++ BN_init(&f); ++ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); ++ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); ++ if (buf == NULL) ++ { ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things ++ * and chops off the top '0' bytes ++ */ ++ if (flen > num) ++ { ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) ++ { ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, ++ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* PK11 functions are called here */ ++ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); ++ ++ /* ++ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. ++ * Needs to skip these 0's here ++ */ ++ for (i = 0; i < r; i++) ++ if (buf[i] != 0) ++ break; ++ ++ p = buf + i; ++ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ ++ ++ switch (padding) ++ { ++ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: ++ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); ++ break; ++ case RSA_NO_PADDING: ++ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); ++ break; ++ default: ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (r < 0) ++ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); ++ ++err: ++ BN_clear_free(&f); ++ if (buf != NULL) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); ++ OPENSSL_free(buf); ++ } ++ return (r); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and ++ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. ++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. ++ */ ++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, ++ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; ++ int retval = -1; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; ++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ return (-1); ++ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); ++ ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; ++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, ++ sp->session); ++ ++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, ++ h_pub_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, ++ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, ++ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, ++ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ retval = bytes_encrypted; ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (retval); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* ++ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and ++ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. ++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. ++ */ ++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, ++ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; ++ int retval = -1; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; ++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ return (-1); ++ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); ++ ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; ++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); ++ } ++ ++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, ++ h_priv_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, ++ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, ++ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, ++ rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ retval = ul_sig_len; ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (retval); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* ++ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and ++ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. ++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. ++ */ ++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, ++ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; ++ int retval = -1; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; ++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ return (-1); ++ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); ++ ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; ++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); ++ ++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, ++ h_priv_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, ++ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, ++ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, ++ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ retval = bytes_decrypted; ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (retval); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* ++ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit ++ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. ++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. ++ */ ++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, ++ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; ++ int retval = -1; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; ++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ return (-1); ++ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); ++ ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; ++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, ++ sp->session); ++ ++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, ++ p_mech, h_pub_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, ++ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, ++ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, ++ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ retval = bytes_decrypted; ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (retval); ++ } ++ ++static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ /* ++ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, ++ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. ++ */ ++ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need ++ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum ++ * structures. ++ */ ++ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) ++ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); ++ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) ++ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); ++ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) ++ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from ++ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. ++ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c ++ */ ++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, ++ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ X509_SIG sig; ++ ASN1_TYPE parameter; ++ int i, j = 0; ++ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; ++ X509_ALGOR algor; ++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; ++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ int ret = 0; ++ unsigned long ulsiglen; ++ ++ /* Encode the digest */ ++ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ ++ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) ++ { ++ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; ++ s = (unsigned char *)m; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ sig.algor = &algor; ++ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); ++ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, ++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, ++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; ++ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; ++ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; ++ ++ sig.digest = &digest; ++ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; ++ sig.digest->length = m_len; ++ ++ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); ++ } ++ ++ j = RSA_size(rsa); ++ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) ++ { ++ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); ++ if (s == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ p = s; ++ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); ++ } ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); ++ ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; ++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, ++ sp->session); ++ ++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ ulsiglen = j; ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, ++ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); ++ *siglen = ulsiglen; ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ret = 1; ++ } ++ ++err: ++ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) ++ { ++ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); ++ OPENSSL_free(s); ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L ++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, ++ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, ++ const RSA *rsa) ++#else ++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, ++ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, ++ const RSA *rsa) ++#endif ++ { ++ X509_SIG sig; ++ ASN1_TYPE parameter; ++ int i, j = 0; ++ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; ++ X509_ALGOR algor; ++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; ++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ /* Encode the digest */ ++ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ ++ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) ++ { ++ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; ++ s = (unsigned char *)m; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ sig.algor = &algor; ++ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); ++ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, ++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, ++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; ++ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; ++ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; ++ sig.digest = &digest; ++ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; ++ sig.digest->length = m_len; ++ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); ++ } ++ ++ j = RSA_size(rsa); ++ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) ++ { ++ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); ++ if (s == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ p = s; ++ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); ++ } ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); ++ ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; ++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, ++ sp->session); ++ ++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, ++ h_pub_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, ++ rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, ++ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ret = 1; ++ } ++ ++err: ++ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) ++ { ++ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); ++ OPENSSL_free(s); ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++static int hndidx_rsa = -1; ++ ++#define MAXATTR 1024 ++ ++/* ++ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the ++ * PKCS#11 token. ++ */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) ++ { ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ FILE *privkey; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ RSA *rsa = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; ++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; ++ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ ++ ++ /* we look for private keys only */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, ++ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, ++ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ /* ++ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA ++ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we ++ * never ask for private components. ++ */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ ++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ ++ }; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ return (NULL); ++ ++ /* ++ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. ++ */ ++ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) ++ { ++ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; ++ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); ++ ++ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, ++ CK_TRUE) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition ++ for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ /* ++ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure ++ * if we can't find it. ++ */ ++ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, ++ &ks_key) == 0) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) ++ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, ++ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", ++ NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ /* ++ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm ++ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer ++ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, ++ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect ++ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We ++ * do not check the return value because even in case ++ * of failure the sp structure will have both key ++ * pointer and object handle cleaned and ++ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the ++ * OpenSSL error message buffer. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); ++ ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; ++ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ ++ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; ++ ++ /* ++ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not ++ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for ++ * consistency reasons. ++ */ ++ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, ++ * everything else is 0 or NULL. ++ */ ++ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; ++ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); ++ ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, ++ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, ++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we ++ * must take care of handle management ourselves. ++ */ ++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); ++ ++ /* ++ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export ++ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). ++ */ ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); ++ /* ++ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as ++ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key ++ * in the keystore. ++ */ ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) ++ { ++ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ (void) fclose(privkey); ++ if (pkey != NULL) ++ { ++ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); ++ if (rsa != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * This will always destroy the RSA ++ * object since we have a new RSA ++ * structure here. ++ */ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); ++ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; ++ ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); ++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (pkey); ++err: ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ if (rsa != NULL) ++ RSA_free(rsa); ++ if (pkey != NULL) ++ { ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ pkey = NULL; ++ } ++ rollback = rollback; ++ return (pkey); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the ++ * PKCS#11 token. ++ */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) ++ { ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ FILE *pubkey; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ RSA *rsa = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; ++ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ ++ ++ /* we look for public keys only */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, ++ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, ++ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ /* ++ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA ++ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. ++ */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ ++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ ++ }; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ return (NULL); ++ ++ /* ++ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. ++ */ ++ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) ++ { ++ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; ++ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); ++ ++ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, ++ CK_FALSE) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition ++ for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ /* ++ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure ++ * if we can't find it. ++ */ ++ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, ++ &ks_key) == 0) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA ++ * structure. No cache hit is possible. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); ++ ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; ++ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ ++ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; ++ ++ /* ++ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. ++ */ ++ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, ++ * everything else is 0 or NULL. ++ */ ++ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; ++ ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, ++ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, ++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* ++ * Create a session object from it so that when calling ++ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The ++ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA ++ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for ++ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears ++ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if ++ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different ++ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that ++ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore ++ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. ++ */ ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); ++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) ++ { ++ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ (void) fclose(pubkey); ++ if (pkey != NULL) ++ { ++ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); ++ if (rsa != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * This will always destroy the RSA ++ * object since we have a new RSA ++ * structure here. ++ */ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); ++ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; ++ ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); ++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (pkey); ++err: ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ if (rsa != NULL) ++ RSA_free(rsa); ++ if (pkey != NULL) ++ { ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ pkey = NULL; ++ } ++ return (pkey); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. ++ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. ++ */ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, ++ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ CK_ULONG found; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; ++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; ++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; ++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; ++ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, ++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ int i; ++ ++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; ++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; ++ ++ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); ++ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( ++ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); ++ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); ++ ++ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); ++ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( ++ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); ++ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, ++ ul_key_attr_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (found == 0) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, ++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) ++ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ rollback = TRUE; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) ++ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); ++ *rsa_n_num = NULL; ++ rollback = TRUE; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ ++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); ++ if (key_ptr != NULL) ++ *key_ptr = rsa; ++ ++err: ++ if (rollback) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() ++ * since we are doing rollback. ++ */ ++ if (found == 0) ++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); ++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++malloc_err: ++ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) ++ { ++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); ++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (h_key); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. ++ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. ++ */ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ++pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, ++ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ int i; ++ CK_ULONG found; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; ++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; ++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; ++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; ++ ++ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, ++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ }; ++ ++ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { ++ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto set; ++ } ++ ++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; ++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; ++ ++ /* Put the private key components into the template */ ++ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ /* ++ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' ++ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA ++ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for ++ * searching for the private key handle. ++ */ ++ if (rsa->d == NULL) ++ { ++ ul_key_attr_count = 8; ++ /* ++ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing ++ * session keys. ++ */ ++ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, ++ ul_key_attr_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (found == 0) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components ++ * only so we tried to find the private key in the ++ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a ++ * problem. Note that for other key types we just ++ * create a new session key using the private ++ * components from the RSA structure. ++ */ ++ if (rsa->d == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, ++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++set: ++ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never ++ * extract private components from the keystore. In ++ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the ++ * application to properly cope with that. It is ++ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by ++ * reference are used we expect it to be used ++ * exclusively using the high level API and then there ++ * is no problem. If the application expects the ++ * private components to be read from the keystore ++ * then that is not a supported way of usage. ++ */ ++ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ rollback = TRUE; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else ++ *rsa_d_num = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well ++ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache ++ * 'n'/'e' components as well. ++ */ ++ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); ++ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); ++ ++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ ++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); ++ if (key_ptr != NULL) ++ *key_ptr = rsa; ++ ++err: ++ if (rollback) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() ++ * since we are doing rollback. ++ */ ++ if (found == 0 && ++ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) ++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); ++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++malloc_err: ++ /* ++ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. ++ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. ++ */ ++ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) ++ { ++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, ++ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); ++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); ++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (h_key); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle ++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. ++ */ ++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the ++ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA ++ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values ++ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. ++ * ++ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public ++ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we ++ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public ++ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for ++ * both data signing and verifying. ++ */ ++ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || ++ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of ++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer ++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() ++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle ++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. ++ */ ++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making ++ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent ++ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure ++ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the ++ * public component since with the keys by reference ++ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA ++ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we ++ * compare the handle as well. ++ */ ++ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || ++ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || ++ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || ++ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of ++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer ++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() ++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++/* The DSA function implementation */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) ++ { ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) ++ { ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++ ++static DSA_SIG * ++pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) ++ { ++ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; ++ int i; ++ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; ++ ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; ++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; ++ ++ /* ++ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, ++ * each is 20 bytes long ++ */ ++ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; ++ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; ++ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; ++ ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ ++ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ ++ if (dlen > i) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) ++ goto ret; ++ ++ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); ++ ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; ++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = ++ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, ++ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, ++ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); ++ ++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, ++ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret, ++ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ ++ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || ++ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ dsa_sig->r = r; ++ dsa_sig->s = s; ++ ++ret: ++ if (dsa_sig == NULL) ++ { ++ if (r != NULL) ++ BN_free(r); ++ if (s != NULL) ++ BN_free(s); ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); ++ return (dsa_sig); ++ } ++ ++static int ++pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, ++ DSA *dsa) ++ { ++ int i; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ int retval = 0; ++ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; ++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; ++ ++ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; ++ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; ++ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; ++ ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ ++ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ ++ ++ if (dlen > i) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) ++ goto ret; ++ ++ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); ++ ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; ++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = ++ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, ++ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); ++ ++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, ++ h_pub_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, ++ rv); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could ++ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need ++ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. ++ */ ++ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); ++ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); ++ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - ++ BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, ++ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); ++ goto ret; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ retval = 1; ++ret: ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); ++ return (retval); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* ++ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. ++ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. ++ */ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, ++ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ CK_ULONG found; ++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; ++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; ++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; ++ int i; ++ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, ++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ ++ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ ++ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ ++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ ++ }; ++ ++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; ++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; ++ ++ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, ++ ul_key_attr_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (found == 0) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, ++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) ++ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ rollback = TRUE; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ ++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); ++ if (key_ptr != NULL) ++ *key_ptr = dsa; ++ ++err: ++ if (rollback) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() ++ * since we are doing rollback. ++ */ ++ if (found == 0) ++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); ++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); ++ ++malloc_err: ++ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) ++ { ++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); ++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (h_key); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure ++ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. ++ */ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, ++ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; ++ int i; ++ CK_ULONG found; ++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; ++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; ++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; ++ ++ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, ++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ ++ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ ++ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ ++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ ++ }; ++ ++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; ++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; ++ ++ /* Put the private key components into the template */ ++ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, ++ ul_key_attr_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (found == 0) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, ++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) ++ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ rollback = TRUE; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ ++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); ++ if (key_ptr != NULL) ++ *key_ptr = dsa; ++ ++err: ++ if (rollback) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() ++ * since we are doing rollback. ++ */ ++ if (found == 0) ++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); ++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); ++ ++malloc_err: ++ /* ++ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. ++ * They need to be freed apon exit or error. ++ */ ++ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) ++ { ++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, ++ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); ++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); ++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (h_key); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle ++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. ++ */ ++static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the ++ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA ++ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value ++ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. ++ */ ++ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of ++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer ++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() ++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle ++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. ++ */ ++static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the ++ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA ++ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value ++ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. ++ */ ++ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of ++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer ++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() ++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++/* The DH function implementation */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) ++ { ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) ++ { ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Generate DH key-pair. ++ * ++ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key ++ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key ++ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard ++ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem ++ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. ++ */ ++static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) ++ { ++ CK_ULONG i; ++ CK_RV rv, rv1; ++ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; ++ ++ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ ++ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)} ++ }; ++ ++ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); ++ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that ++ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of ++ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. ++ */ ++ pub_key_template[1].pValue = ++ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + ++ DH_BUF_RESERVE); ++ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); ++ } ++ else ++ goto err; ++ ++ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); ++ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) ++ { ++ pub_key_template[2].pValue = ++ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + ++ DH_BUF_RESERVE); ++ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); ++ } ++ else ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* ++ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting ++ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are ++ * destroyed before return and thus not cached. ++ */ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, ++ &mechanism, ++ pub_key_template, ++ ul_pub_key_attr_count, ++ priv_key_template, ++ ul_priv_key_attr_count, ++ &h_pub_key, ++ &h_priv_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory ++ * should be sufficient for reuse. ++ */ ++ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) ++ { ++ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; ++ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; ++ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, ++ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); ++ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, ++ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, ++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || ++ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ ++ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; ++ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, ++ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, ++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) ++ { ++ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) ++ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, ++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, ++ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); ++ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ ++ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; ++ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, ++ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, ++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) ++ { ++ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) ++ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, ++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, ++ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); ++ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ ret = 1; ++ ++err: ++ ++ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, ++ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, ++ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) ++ { ++ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); ++ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, ++ DH *dh) ++ { ++ unsigned int i; ++ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; ++ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ ++ CK_ULONG seclen; ++ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, ++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, ++ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)}, ++ }; ++ ++ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ CK_RV rv; ++ int ret = -1; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ ++ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; ++ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; ++ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); ++ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); ++ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); ++ ++ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); ++ ++ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; ++ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = ++ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, ++ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); ++ ++ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, ++ &mechanism, ++ h_key, ++ priv_key_template, ++ ul_priv_key_attr_count, ++ &h_derived_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, ++ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, ++ rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ priv_key_result[0].pValue = ++ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); ++ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, ++ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, ++ rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same ++ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key ++ */ ++ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) ++ { ++ /* ++ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip ++ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, ++ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The ++ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was ++ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading ++ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the ++ * pre-master secret. ++ */ ++ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) ++ { ++ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, ++ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); ++ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; ++ } ++ ++err: ++ ++ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, ++ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); ++ } ++ } ++ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); ++ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ if (mechanism.pParameter) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); ++ mechanism.pParameter = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, ++ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; ++ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; ++ CK_ULONG found; ++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; ++ int i; ++ ++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, ++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, ++ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, ++ }; ++ ++ key_template[0].pValue = &class; ++ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; ++ ++ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); ++ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( ++ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); ++ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); ++ ++ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); ++ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( ++ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); ++ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); ++ ++ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); ++ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( ++ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); ++ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, ++ ul_key_attr_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, ++ rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (found == 0) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, ++ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, ++ rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (dh_priv_num != NULL) ++ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ rollback = TRUE; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ ++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err); ++ if (key_ptr != NULL) ++ *key_ptr = dh; ++ ++err: ++ if (rollback) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() ++ * since we are doing rollback. ++ */ ++ if (found == 0) ++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); ++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); ++ ++malloc_err: ++ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) ++ { ++ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); ++ key_template[i].pValue = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (h_key); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle ++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. ++ * ++ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh ++ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. ++ */ ++static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the ++ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key ++ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached ++ * in PK11_SESSION structure. ++ */ ++ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of ++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer ++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() ++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++/* ++ * Local function to simplify key template population ++ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error ++ */ ++static int ++init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, ++ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) ++ { ++ CK_ULONG len = 0; ++ ++ /* ++ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is ++ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. ++ */ ++ if (bn != NULL) ++ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); ++ ++ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) ++ return (1); ++ ++ *ul_value_len = len; ++ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); ++ if (*p_value == NULL) ++ return (0); ++ ++ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++static void ++attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) ++ { ++ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) ++ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the ++ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. ++ * Assume object store locked. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 1 OK ++ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found ++ */ ++static int ++find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_ULONG objcnt; ++ ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, ++ rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); ++ ++ if (objcnt > 1) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, ++ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ else if (objcnt == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* from uri stuff */ ++ ++extern char *pk11_pin; ++ ++static int pk11_get_pin(void); ++ ++static int ++pk11_get_pin(void) ++{ ++ char *pin; ++ ++ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); ++ if (pin == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (0); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); ++ if (pk11_pin == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (0); ++ } ++ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of ++ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from ++ * multiple threads. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 1 on success ++ * 0 on failure ++ */ ++static int ++pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, ++ CK_BBOOL is_private) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++#if 0 ++ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ ++ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, ++ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); ++ return (0); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ /* ++ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been ++ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we ++ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access ++ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for ++ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED ++ * flag is set. ++ */ ++ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || ++ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && ++ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread ++ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We ++ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with ++ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the ++ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment ++ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to ++ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call ++ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We ++ * lock right before C_Login(). ++ */ ++ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || ++ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) ++ { ++ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) ++ { ++ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, ++ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from ++ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. ++ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in ++ * the engine. ++ * ++ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. ++ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) ++ { ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, ++ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, ++ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, ++ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); ++ goto err_locked; ++ } ++ ++ *login_done = CK_TRUE; ++ ++ } ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* ++ * If token does not require login we take it as the ++ * login was done. ++ */ ++ *login_done = CK_TRUE; ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ ++err_locked: ++ if (pk11_pin) { ++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = NULL; ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the ++ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() ++ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for ++ * this. ++ * ++ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is ++ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 1 on success ++ * 0 on failure ++ */ ++int ++pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) ++ return (0); ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, ++ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, ++ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (0); ++ } ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) ++ { ++ static char buf[128]; ++ HANDLE h; ++ DWORD cc, mode; ++ int cnt; ++ ++ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); ++ fputs(prompt, stderr); ++ fflush(stderr); ++ fflush(stdout); ++ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); ++ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); ++ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); ++ ++ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) ++ { ++ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); ++ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') ++ break; ++ fputc('*', stdout); ++ fflush(stderr); ++ fflush(stdout); ++ } ++ ++ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); ++ buf[cnt] = '\0'; ++ fputs("\n", stderr); ++ return buf; ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 +@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ ++/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */ ++ ++#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock ++#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock ++#define active_list pk11ca_active_list ++#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags ++#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID ++#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error ++#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data ++#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session ++#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session ++#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add ++#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete ++#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove ++#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list ++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects ++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub ++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv ++#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey ++#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey ++#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA ++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects ++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub ++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv ++#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA ++#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects ++#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object ++#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH ++#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin ++#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList ++#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin ++#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.8 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:16 2013 +@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ */ ++ ++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ ++/* ++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for ++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). ++ * ++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by ++ * Afchine Madjlessi. ++ */ ++/* ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in ++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the ++ * distribution. ++ * ++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this ++ * software must display the following acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to ++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without ++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact ++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. ++ * ++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" ++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written ++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. ++ * ++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following ++ * acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY ++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR ++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR ++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, ++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; ++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * ++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young ++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim ++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). ++ * ++ */ ++ ++/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++#error RSA is disabled ++#endif ++ ++#include <stdio.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> ++#include <string.h> ++#include <sys/types.h> ++ ++#include <openssl/e_os2.h> ++#include <openssl/crypto.h> ++#include <cryptlib.h> ++#include <openssl/engine.h> ++#include <openssl/dso.h> ++#include <openssl/err.h> ++#include <openssl/bn.h> ++#include <openssl/md5.h> ++#include <openssl/pem.h> ++#include <openssl/rsa.h> ++#include <openssl/rand.h> ++#include <openssl/objects.h> ++#include <openssl/x509.h> ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++typedef int pid_t; ++#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() ++#define NOPTHREADS ++#ifndef NULL_PTR ++#define NULL_PTR NULL ++#endif ++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) ++#else ++#include <signal.h> ++#include <unistd.h> ++#include <dlfcn.h> ++#endif ++ ++/* Debug mutexes */ ++/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ ++#define DEBUG_MUTEX ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ ++#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX ++#define __USE_UNIX98 ++#endif ++#include <pthread.h> ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO ++ ++/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ ++#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" ++/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ ++/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA ++#endif ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH ++#define OPENSSL_NO_DH ++#endif ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) ++#include "cryptoki.h" ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) ++#else ++#include "cryptoki.h" ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++#endif ++#include "hw_pk11so.h" ++#include "hw_pk11_err.c" ++ ++/* ++ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), ++ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the ++ * RSA keys by reference feature. ++ */ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; ++#endif ++ ++/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ ++static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; ++ ++/* ++ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when ++ * logging into the token. ++ */ ++CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; ++ ++/* ++ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for ++ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given ++ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be ++ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already ++ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each ++ * PK11_SESSION object. ++ * ++ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the ++ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also ++ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another ++ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in ++ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. ++ * ++ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. ++ * They are also used for active list protection. ++ */ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; ++#endif ++ ++/* ++ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one ++ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session ++ * list) for given algorithm type ++ */ ++PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; ++ ++/* ++ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available ++ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed ++ * without losing the secret key objects. ++ */ ++static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ ++/* ENGINE level stuff */ ++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); ++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); ++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); ++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); ++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); ++ ++/* RAND stuff */ ++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); ++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); ++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); ++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); ++static int pk11_rand_status(void); ++ ++/* These functions are also used in other files */ ++PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++ ++/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ ++extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); ++extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); ++ ++int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); ++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); ++ ++/* Local helper functions */ ++static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); ++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); ++static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, ++ CK_BBOOL persistent); ++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); ++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); ++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); ++ ++static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); ++ ++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); ++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); ++ ++#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ ++ { \ ++ if (uselock) \ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ ++ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ ++ { \ ++ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ ++ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ ++ } \ ++ if (uselock) \ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ ++ } ++ ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; ++ ++/* ++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. ++ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine ++ */ ++#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE ++#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) ++#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) ++static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = ++ { ++ { ++ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, ++ "SO_PATH", ++ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", ++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING ++ }, ++ { ++ PK11_CMD_PIN, ++ "PIN", ++ "Specifies the pin code", ++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING ++ }, ++ { ++ PK11_CMD_SLOT, ++ "SLOT", ++ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", ++ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, ++ }, ++ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ ++static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = ++ { ++ pk11_rand_seed, ++ pk11_rand_bytes, ++ pk11_rand_cleanup, ++ pk11_rand_add, ++ pk11_rand_bytes, ++ pk11_rand_status ++ }; ++ ++ ++/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA ++#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" ++#endif ++static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; ++static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)"; ++ ++CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; ++static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; ++ ++/* ++ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function ++ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether ++ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. ++ */ ++static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; ++ ++/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ ++CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; ++static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; ++static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; ++char *pk11_pin = NULL; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; ++static int pk11_pid = 0; ++ ++static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; ++ ++/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ ++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int type; ++ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; ++ ++ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX ++ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); ++ return (0); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) ++ goto malloc_err; ++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); ++ ++ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); ++ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) ++ goto malloc_err; ++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); ++ ++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) ++ { ++ session_cache[type].lock = ++ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); ++ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) ++ goto malloc_err; ++ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ ++malloc_err: ++ pk11_free_all_locks(); ++ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return (0); ++#else ++ return (1); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int type; ++ ++ if (token_lock != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); ++ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); ++ token_lock = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); ++ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); ++ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) ++ { ++ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); ++ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); ++ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. ++ */ ++static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) ++ { ++ if (!pk11_library_initialized) ++ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || ++ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name)) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) ++ { ++ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || ++ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || ++ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) ++ return (0); ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } ++ ++ if (pk11_have_random) ++ { ++ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) ++ return (0); ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } ++ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || ++ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || ++ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || ++ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || ++ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) ++ return (0); ++ ++ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ ++ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ ++#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT ++#error "dynamic engine not supported" ++static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) ++ { ++ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (!bind_pk11(e)) ++ return (0); ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() ++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) ++ ++#else ++static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) ++ { ++ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); ++ ++ if (!ret) ++ return (NULL); ++ ++ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) ++ { ++ ENGINE_free(ret); ++ return (NULL); ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++void ++ENGINE_load_pk11(void) ++ { ++ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; ++ ++ /* ++ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to ++ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. ++ */ ++ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ ++ if (!pk11_dso) ++ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); ++ ++ if (pk11_dso == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); ++ if (!e_pk11) ++ { ++ DSO_free(pk11_dso); ++ pk11_dso = NULL; ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically ++ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 ++ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter ++ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information ++ */ ++ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) ++ { ++ DSO_free(pk11_dso); ++ pk11_dso = NULL; ++ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); ++ ++ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); ++ ERR_clear_error(); ++ } ++#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ ++ ++/* ++ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and ++ * the function symbol names to bind to. ++ */ ++static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; ++ ++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) ++ { ++ if (PK11_LIBNAME) ++ return (PK11_LIBNAME); ++ ++ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); ++ } ++ ++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) ++ { ++ if (PK11_LIBNAME) ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); ++ ++ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; ++ } ++ ++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) ++ { ++ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); ++ ++ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); ++ } ++ ++/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ ++static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int i; ++ ++ if (!pk11_library_initialized) ++ return; ++ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); ++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* release all engine specific mutexes */ ++static void pk11_fork_parent(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int i; ++ ++ if (!pk11_library_initialized) ++ return; ++ ++ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); ++ } ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them ++ * accessible to all threads. ++ */ ++static void pk11_fork_child(void) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ int i; ++ ++ if (!pk11_library_initialized) ++ return; ++ ++ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); ++ } ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ ++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) ++{ ++ return (pk11_library_init(e)); ++} ++ ++static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = ++ { ++ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ ++ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ ++ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ ++ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ ++ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ ++ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ ++ }; ++ ++/* ++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. ++ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also ++ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and ++ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function ++ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. ++ */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) ++ { ++ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; ++ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; ++ CK_INFO info; ++ int any_slot_found; ++ int i; ++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; ++#endif ++ ++ /* ++ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which ++ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still ++ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine ++ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is ++ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application ++ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() ++ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can ++ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional ++ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In ++ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly ++ * initialize the engine again. ++ */ ++ if (pk11_library_initialized) ++ { ++ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) ++ { ++ return (1); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ /* ++ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case ++ * the application calls fork() without finishing the ++ * engine first. ++ */ ++ pk11_free_all_locks(); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (pk11_dso == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ ++ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, ++ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); ++ if (!p) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ ++ rv = p(&pFuncList); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ ++ ++ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); ++ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); ++ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); ++#endif ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); ++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); ++#endif ++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* ++ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any ++ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an ++ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 ++ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just ++ * because no slot was present. ++ */ ++ if (any_slot_found == 0) ++ return (1); ++ ++ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, ++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, ++ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; ++ pk11_pid = getpid(); ++ /* ++ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() ++ * will do the cleanup. ++ */ ++ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) ++ goto err; ++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) ++ session_cache[i].head = NULL; ++ /* ++ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists ++ * for asymmetric ciphers. ++ */ ++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) ++ active_list[i] = NULL; ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) ++ { ++ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, ++ pk11_fork_child) != 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ return (1); ++ ++err: ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) ++ { ++ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); ++ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); ++ if (pk11_pin) { ++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = NULL; ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 ++ * library. ++ */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) ++ { ++ int i; ++ ++ if (pk11_pin) { ++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = NULL; ++ ++ if (pk11_dso == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); ++ ++ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* free all active lists */ ++ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) ++ pk11_free_active_list(i); ++ ++ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); ++ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ ++ /* ++ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function ++ * may have side-effects. ++ */ ++#if 0 ++ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); ++#endif ++ ++ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ pk11_dso = NULL; ++ pFuncList = NULL; ++ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; ++ pk11_pid = 0; ++ /* ++ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than ++ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason ++ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out ++ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes ++ * the engine before calling fork(). ++ */ ++ pk11_free_all_locks(); ++ ++ return (1); ++ ++err: ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) ++ { ++ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); ++ ++ switch (cmd) ++ { ++ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: ++ if (p == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ if (initialized) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); ++ case PK11_CMD_PIN: ++ if (pk11_pin) { ++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = NULL; ++ ++ if (p == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); ++ if (pk11_pin == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: ++ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif ++ return (1); ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); ++ ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ ++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) ++ { ++ return; ++ } ++ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) ++ { ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ /* ++ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since ++ * the calling functions do not care anyway ++ */ ++ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); ++ ++ return; ++ } ++ ++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) ++ { ++ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); ++ } ++ ++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) ++ return (0); ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ ++static int pk11_rand_status(void) ++ { ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ ++static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; ++ } ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have ++ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here ++ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. ++ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. ++ */ ++PK11_SESSION * ++pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; ++#endif ++ static pid_t pid = 0; ++ pid_t new_pid; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ case OP_DSA: ++ case OP_DH: ++ case OP_RAND: ++ case OP_DIGEST: ++ case OP_CIPHER: ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; ++#endif ++ break; ++ default: ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); ++ return (NULL); ++ } ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ /* ++ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in ++ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session ++ * here, with no PID information. ++ */ ++ if (pid == 0) ++ pid = getpid(); ++ ++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; ++ sp = freelist; ++ ++ /* ++ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled ++ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first ++ * structure from the freelist. ++ */ ++ if (sp == NULL) ++ { ++ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, ++ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); ++ ++ /* ++ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the ++ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so ++ * mark them as unused. ++ */ ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ freelist = sp->next; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all ++ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. ++ */ ++ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) ++ { ++ pid = new_pid; ++ ++ /* ++ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited ++ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which ++ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the ++ * head of the list). ++ */ ++ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) ++ { ++ freelist = sp1->next; ++ /* ++ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() ++ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 ++ * sessions and destroy all objects. ++ */ ++ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); ++ OPENSSL_free(sp1); ++ } ++ ++ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ ++ pk11_free_active_list(optype); ++ ++ /* Initialize the process */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); ++ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, ++ rv); ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ sp = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this ++ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one ++ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. ++ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more ++ * information. ++ */ ++ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, ++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, ++ rv); ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ sp = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs ++ * re-initialization. ++ */ ++ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ sp = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let ++ * the caller cope with the situation. ++ */ ++ freelist = sp; ++ sp = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (sp->pid == 0) ++ { ++ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ ++ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ sp = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ ++ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; ++ ++err: ++ if (sp != NULL) ++ sp->next = NULL; ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ return (sp); ++ } ++ ++ ++void ++pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; ++#endif ++ PK11_SESSION *freelist; ++ ++ /* ++ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and ++ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the ++ * next time we will ask for a new session. ++ */ ++ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) ++ return; ++ ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ case OP_DSA: ++ case OP_DH: ++ case OP_RAND: ++ case OP_DIGEST: ++ case OP_CIPHER: ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; ++#endif ++ break; ++ default: ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; ++ sp->next = freelist; ++ session_cache[optype].head = sp; ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ ++/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ ++static int pk11_free_all_sessions() ++ { ++ int ret = 1; ++ int type; ++ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); ++ ++ /* ++ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will ++ * return 0 on exit. ++ */ ++ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) ++ { ++ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) ++ ret = 0; ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many ++ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we ++ * return an error on return. ++ */ ++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; ++ pid_t mypid = getpid(); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; ++#endif ++ int ret = 1; ++ ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ case OP_DSA: ++ case OP_DH: ++ case OP_RAND: ++ case OP_DIGEST: ++ case OP_CIPHER: ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; ++#endif ++ break; ++ default: ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; ++ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) ++ { ++ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, ++ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); ++ ret = 0; ++ } ++ } ++ freelist = sp->next; ++ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); ++ OPENSSL_free(sp); ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++ ++static int ++pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; ++ ++ switch (optype) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; ++ break; ++ case OP_RAND: ++ myslot = rand_SLOTID; ++ break; ++ default: ++ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, ++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); ++ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We are probably a child process so force the ++ * reinitialize of the session ++ */ ++ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; ++ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) ++ return (0); ++ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, ++ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); ++ } ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ sp->pid = getpid(); ++ ++ if (optype == OP_RSA) ++ { ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent ++ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. ++ */ ++ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; ++ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) ++ { ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, ++ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) ++ { ++ int ret = 0; ++ ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, ++ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' ++ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We ++ * must free those as well. ++ */ ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; ++ } ++ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) ++ { ++ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all ++ * objects in the free list. ++ */ ++int ++pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) ++ { ++ int ret = 1; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; ++ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; ++ ++ if (session != NULL) ++ local_free_session = session; ++ else ++ { ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; ++ uselock = FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects ++ */ ++ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) ++ { ++ local_free_session = sp->next; ++ ++ /* ++ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the ++ * destroy operations fails. ++ */ ++ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) ++ { ++ ret = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) ++ { ++ ret = 0; ++ continue; ++ } ++ } ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ if (session == NULL) ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); ++#else ++ if (session == NULL) ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++static int ++pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, ++ CK_BBOOL persistent) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++ /* ++ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects ++ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so ++ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. ++ */ ++ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) ++ return (1); ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, ++ rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++ ++/* ++ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported ++ * ++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS ++ * ++ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a ++ * public key slot. ++ * ++ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which ++ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of ++ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global ++ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key ++ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. ++ */ ++static int ++pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) ++ { ++ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; ++ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; ++ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; ++ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; ++ unsigned int i; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; ++ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; ++ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; ++ ++ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ ++ if (any_slot_found != NULL) ++ *any_slot_found = 0; ++ ++ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ ++ if (ulSlotCount == 0) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); ++ ++ if (pSlotList == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ /* Get the slot list for processing */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); ++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); ++ ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) ++ { ++ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ /* Check if slot has random support. */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ continue; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; ++ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; ++ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) ++ { ++ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; ++ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ continue; ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ /* ++ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS. ++ */ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, ++ &mech_info); ++ ++ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN))) ++ { ++ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; ++ } ++ ++ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa) ++ { ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; ++ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; ++ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; ++ /* ++ * Cache the flags for later use. We might ++ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature ++ * is used. ++ */ ++ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", ++ PK11_DBG); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ++ best_slot_sofar); ++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " ++ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG); ++ } ++#else ++ } /* if */ ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ } /* for */ ++ ++ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) ++ { ++ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; ++ } ++ ++ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/ ++ ++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); ++ fprintf(stderr, ++ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); ++#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ ++ ++ if (pSlotList != NULL) ++ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); ++ ++ if (any_slot_found != NULL) ++ *any_slot_found = 1; ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 +@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ ++/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */ ++ ++#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock ++#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock ++#define active_list pk11so_active_list ++#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags ++#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID ++#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error ++#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data ++#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session ++#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session ++#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add ++#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete ++#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove ++#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list ++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects ++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub ++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv ++#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey ++#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey ++#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA ++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects ++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub ++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv ++#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA ++#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects ++#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object ++#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH ++#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin ++#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList ++#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin ++#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.10 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:05:38 2013 +@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Use is subject to license terms. ++ */ ++ ++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ ++/* ++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for ++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). ++ * ++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by ++ * Afchine Madjlessi. ++ */ ++/* ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in ++ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the ++ * distribution. ++ * ++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this ++ * software must display the following acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to ++ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without ++ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact ++ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. ++ * ++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" ++ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written ++ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. ++ * ++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following ++ * acknowledgment: ++ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project ++ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY ++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR ++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR ++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, ++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; ++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) ++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, ++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED ++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ * ==================================================================== ++ * ++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young ++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim ++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). ++ * ++ */ ++ ++/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA ++#error RSA is disabled ++#endif ++ ++#include <stdio.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> ++#include <string.h> ++#include <sys/types.h> ++ ++#include <openssl/e_os2.h> ++#include <openssl/crypto.h> ++#include <cryptlib.h> ++#include <openssl/engine.h> ++#include <openssl/dso.h> ++#include <openssl/err.h> ++#include <openssl/bn.h> ++#include <openssl/pem.h> ++#include <openssl/rsa.h> ++#include <openssl/rand.h> ++#include <openssl/objects.h> ++#include <openssl/x509.h> ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++#define NOPTHREADS ++typedef int pid_t; ++#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE ++static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); ++#ifndef NULL_PTR ++#define NULL_PTR NULL ++#endif ++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name ++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ ++ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) ++#else ++#include <unistd.h> ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++#include <pthread.h> ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 ++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) ++#include "cryptoki.h" ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) ++#else ++#include "cryptoki.h" ++#include "pkcs11.h" ++#endif ++#include "hw_pk11so.h" ++#include "hw_pk11_err.h" ++ ++static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; ++extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; ++#endif ++ ++#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) ++#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) ++#endif ++ ++/* RSA stuff */ ++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, ++ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); ++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); ++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); ++ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, ++ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, ++ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); ++ ++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); ++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); ++ ++static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); ++static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, ++ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); ++static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); ++ ++static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, ++ CK_BBOOL is_private); ++ ++/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ ++#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL ++static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; ++#else ++static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; ++#endif ++ ++/* ++ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list ++ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error ++ * variable and jump to the specified label. ++ */ ++#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ ++ { \ ++ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ ++ { \ ++ var = TRUE; \ ++ if (unlock) \ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ ++ goto label; \ ++ } \ ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the ++ * entry otherwise return NULL. ++ * ++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list ++ * held. ++ */ ++static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *entry; ++ ++ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) ++ if (entry->h == h) ++ return (entry); ++ ++ return (NULL); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a ++ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of ++ * failure. ++ * ++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list ++ * held. ++ */ ++int ++pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *entry = NULL; ++ ++ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ /* search for entry in the active list */ ++ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) ++ entry->refcnt++; ++ else ++ { ++ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ ++ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); ++ if (entry == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ entry->h = h; ++ entry->refcnt = 1; ++ entry->prev = NULL; ++ entry->next = NULL; ++ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ ++ if (active_list[type] == NULL) ++ active_list[type] = entry; ++ else /* make the entry first in the list */ ++ { ++ entry->next = active_list[type]; ++ active_list[type]->prev = entry; ++ active_list[type] = entry; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (entry->refcnt); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. ++ * ++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list ++ * held. ++ */ ++void ++pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *prev_entry; ++ ++ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ ++ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) ++ { ++ prev_entry->next = entry->next; ++ if (entry->next != NULL) ++ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ active_list[type] = entry->next; ++ /* we were the first but not the only one */ ++ if (entry->next != NULL) ++ entry->next->prev = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* sanitization */ ++ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ entry->prev = NULL; ++ entry->next = NULL; ++ OPENSSL_free(entry); ++ } ++ ++/* Free all entries from the active list. */ ++void ++pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *entry; ++ ++ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ ++ switch (type) ++ { ++ case OP_RSA: ++ break; ++ default: ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); ++ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) ++ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, ++ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. ++ * ++ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, ++ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. ++ * ++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list ++ * held. ++ */ ++int ++pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) ++ { ++ PK11_active *entry = NULL; ++ ++ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); ++ return (-1); ++ } ++ ++ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); ++ entry->refcnt--; ++ if (entry->refcnt == 0) ++ { ++ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ ++static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa; ++ ++RSA_METHOD * ++PK11_RSA(void) ++ { ++ const RSA_METHOD *rsa; ++ ++ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL) ++ { ++ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); ++ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); ++ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method"; ++ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign; ++ } ++ return (&pk11_rsa); ++ } ++ ++/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ ++#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 ++ ++static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; ++static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; ++ ++/* ++ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from ++ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. ++ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c ++ */ ++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, ++ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ X509_SIG sig; ++ ASN1_TYPE parameter; ++ int i, j = 0; ++ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; ++ X509_ALGOR algor; ++ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; ++ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; ++ int ret = 0; ++ unsigned long ulsiglen; ++ ++ /* Encode the digest */ ++ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ ++ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) ++ { ++ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, ++ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; ++ s = (unsigned char *)m; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ sig.algor = &algor; ++ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); ++ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, ++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, ++ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; ++ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; ++ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; ++ ++ sig.digest = &digest; ++ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; ++ sig.digest->length = m_len; ++ ++ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); ++ } ++ ++ j = RSA_size(rsa); ++ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) ++ { ++ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); ++ if (s == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ p = s; ++ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); ++ } ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); ++ ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; ++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, ++ sp->session); ++ ++ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ ulsiglen = j; ++ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, ++ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); ++ *siglen = ulsiglen; ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ret = 1; ++ } ++ ++err: ++ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) ++ { ++ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); ++ OPENSSL_free(s); ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (ret); ++ } ++ ++static int hndidx_rsa = -1; ++ ++#define MAXATTR 1024 ++ ++/* ++ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the ++ * PKCS#11 token. ++ */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) ++ { ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ FILE *privkey; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ RSA *rsa = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; ++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; ++ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ ++ ++ /* we look for private keys only */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, ++ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, ++ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ /* ++ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA ++ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we ++ * never ask for private components. ++ */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ ++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ ++ }; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ return (NULL); ++ ++ /* ++ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. ++ */ ++ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) ++ { ++ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; ++ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); ++ ++ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, ++ CK_TRUE) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition ++ for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ /* ++ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure ++ * if we can't find it. ++ */ ++ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, ++ &ks_key) == 0) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) ++ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, ++ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", ++ NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ /* ++ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm ++ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer ++ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, ++ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect ++ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We ++ * do not check the return value because even in case ++ * of failure the sp structure will have both key ++ * pointer and object handle cleaned and ++ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the ++ * OpenSSL error message buffer. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); ++ ++ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; ++ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ ++ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; ++ ++ /* ++ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not ++ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for ++ * consistency reasons. ++ */ ++ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, ++ * everything else is 0 or NULL. ++ */ ++ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; ++ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); ++ ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, ++ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, ++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we ++ * must take care of handle management ourselves. ++ */ ++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); ++ ++ /* ++ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export ++ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). ++ */ ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); ++ /* ++ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as ++ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key ++ * in the keystore. ++ */ ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) ++ { ++ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ (void) fclose(privkey); ++ if (pkey != NULL) ++ { ++ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); ++ if (rsa != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * This will always destroy the RSA ++ * object since we have a new RSA ++ * structure here. ++ */ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); ++ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; ++ ++ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ++ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); ++ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (pkey); ++err: ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ if (rsa != NULL) ++ RSA_free(rsa); ++ if (pkey != NULL) ++ { ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ pkey = NULL; ++ } ++ rollback = rollback; ++ return (pkey); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the ++ * PKCS#11 token. ++ */ ++/* ARGSUSED */ ++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, ++ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) ++ { ++ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; ++ FILE *pubkey; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ RSA *rsa = NULL; ++ PK11_SESSION *sp; ++ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; ++ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ ++ ++ /* we look for public keys only */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, ++ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, ++ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ /* ++ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA ++ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. ++ */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ ++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ ++ }; ++ ++ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) ++ return (NULL); ++ ++ /* ++ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. ++ */ ++ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) ++ { ++ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; ++ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); ++ ++ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, ++ CK_FALSE) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition ++ for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ /* ++ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure ++ * if we can't find it. ++ */ ++ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, ++ &ks_key) == 0) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA ++ * structure. No cache hit is possible. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); ++ ++ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; ++ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ ++ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; ++ ++ /* ++ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. ++ */ ++ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, ++ * everything else is 0 or NULL. ++ */ ++ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; ++ ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, ++ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, ++ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); ++ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) ++ goto err; ++ ++ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* ++ * Create a session object from it so that when calling ++ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The ++ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA ++ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for ++ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears ++ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if ++ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different ++ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that ++ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore ++ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. ++ */ ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); ++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) ++ { ++ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); ++ (void) fclose(pubkey); ++ if (pkey != NULL) ++ { ++ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); ++ if (rsa != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * This will always destroy the RSA ++ * object since we have a new RSA ++ * structure here. ++ */ ++ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); ++ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; ++ ++ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ++ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, ++ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); ++ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ return (pkey); ++err: ++ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); ++ if (rsa != NULL) ++ RSA_free(rsa); ++ if (pkey != NULL) ++ { ++ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); ++ pkey = NULL; ++ } ++ return (pkey); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. ++ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. ++ */ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, ++ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ CK_ULONG found; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; ++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; ++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; ++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; ++ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, ++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} ++ }; ++ ++ int i; ++ ++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; ++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; ++ ++ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); ++ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( ++ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); ++ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); ++ ++ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); ++ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( ++ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); ++ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, ++ ul_key_attr_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (found == 0) ++ { ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, ++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) ++ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ rollback = TRUE; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) ++ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); ++ *rsa_n_num = NULL; ++ rollback = TRUE; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ ++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); ++ if (key_ptr != NULL) ++ *key_ptr = rsa; ++ ++err: ++ if (rollback) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() ++ * since we are doing rollback. ++ */ ++ if (found == 0) ++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); ++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++malloc_err: ++ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) ++ { ++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) ++ { ++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); ++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (h_key); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. ++ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. ++ */ ++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ++pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, ++ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ int i; ++ CK_ULONG found; ++ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; ++ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; ++ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; ++ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; ++ ++ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = ++ { ++ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, ++ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, ++ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, ++ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, ++ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, ++ }; ++ ++ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { ++ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ goto set; ++ } ++ ++ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; ++ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; ++ ++ /* Put the private key components into the template */ ++ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || ++ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, ++ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ goto malloc_err; ++ } ++ ++ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ ++ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++ /* ++ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' ++ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA ++ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for ++ * searching for the private key handle. ++ */ ++ if (rsa->d == NULL) ++ { ++ ul_key_attr_count = 8; ++ /* ++ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing ++ * session keys. ++ */ ++ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, ++ ul_key_attr_count); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); ++ ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ if (found == 0) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components ++ * only so we tried to find the private key in the ++ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a ++ * problem. Note that for other key types we just ++ * create a new session key using the private ++ * components from the RSA structure. ++ */ ++ if (rsa->d == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, ++ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, ++ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ ++set: ++ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never ++ * extract private components from the keystore. In ++ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the ++ * application to properly cope with that. It is ++ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by ++ * reference are used we expect it to be used ++ * exclusively using the high level API and then there ++ * is no problem. If the application expects the ++ * private components to be read from the keystore ++ * then that is not a supported way of usage. ++ */ ++ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++ rollback = TRUE; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ else ++ *rsa_d_num = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well ++ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache ++ * 'n'/'e' components as well. ++ */ ++ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); ++ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); ++ ++ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ ++ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); ++ if (key_ptr != NULL) ++ *key_ptr = rsa; ++ ++err: ++ if (rollback) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() ++ * since we are doing rollback. ++ */ ++ if (found == 0 && ++ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) ++ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); ++ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ++ } ++ ++ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); ++ ++malloc_err: ++ /* ++ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. ++ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. ++ */ ++ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) ++ { ++ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) ++ { ++ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, ++ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); ++ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); ++ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ return (h_key); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle ++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. ++ */ ++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the ++ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA ++ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values ++ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. ++ * ++ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public ++ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we ++ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public ++ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for ++ * both data signing and verifying. ++ */ ++ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || ++ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of ++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer ++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() ++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle ++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. ++ */ ++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making ++ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent ++ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure ++ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the ++ * public component since with the keys by reference ++ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA ++ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we ++ * compare the handle as well. ++ */ ++ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || ++ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || ++ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || ++ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || ++ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We do not check the return value because even in case of ++ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer ++ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() ++ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. ++ */ ++ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Local function to simplify key template population ++ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error ++ */ ++static int ++init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, ++ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) ++ { ++ CK_ULONG len = 0; ++ ++ /* ++ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is ++ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. ++ */ ++ if (bn != NULL) ++ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); ++ ++ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) ++ return (1); ++ ++ *ul_value_len = len; ++ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); ++ if (*p_value == NULL) ++ return (0); ++ ++ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++static void ++attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) ++ { ++ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) ++ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the ++ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. ++ * Assume object store locked. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 1 OK ++ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found ++ */ ++static int ++find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ CK_ULONG objcnt; ++ ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, ++ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); ++ if (rv != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, ++ rv); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); ++ ++ if (objcnt > 1) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, ++ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ else if (objcnt == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* from uri stuff */ ++ ++extern char *pk11_pin; ++ ++static int pk11_get_pin(void); ++ ++static int ++pk11_get_pin(void) ++{ ++ char *pin; ++ ++ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); ++ if (pin == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (0); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); ++ if (pk11_pin == NULL) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (0); ++ } ++ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of ++ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from ++ * multiple threads. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 1 on success ++ * 0 on failure ++ */ ++static int ++pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, ++ CK_BBOOL is_private) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++#if 0 ++ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ ++ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, ++ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); ++ return (0); ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ /* ++ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been ++ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we ++ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access ++ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for ++ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED ++ * flag is set. ++ */ ++ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || ++ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && ++ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread ++ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We ++ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with ++ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the ++ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment ++ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to ++ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call ++ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We ++ * lock right before C_Login(). ++ */ ++ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || ++ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) ++ { ++ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) ++ { ++ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) ++ { ++ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, ++ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from ++ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. ++ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in ++ * the engine. ++ * ++ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. ++ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) ++ { ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, ++ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, ++ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, ++ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); ++ goto err_locked; ++ } ++ ++ *login_done = CK_TRUE; ++ ++ } ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* ++ * If token does not require login we take it as the ++ * login was done. ++ */ ++ *login_done = CK_TRUE; ++ } ++ ++ return (1); ++ ++err_locked: ++ if (pk11_pin) { ++ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); ++ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); ++ } ++ pk11_pin = NULL; ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++/* ++ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the ++ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() ++ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for ++ * this. ++ * ++ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is ++ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. ++ * ++ * Returns: ++ * 1 on success ++ * 0 on failure ++ */ ++int ++pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) ++ { ++ CK_RV rv; ++ ++ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) ++ return (0); ++ ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, ++ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) ++ { ++ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, ++ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ return (0); ++ } ++#ifndef NOPTHREADS ++ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); ++#else ++ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); ++#endif ++ ++ return (1); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 ++char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) ++ { ++ static char buf[128]; ++ HANDLE h; ++ DWORD cc, mode; ++ int cnt; ++ ++ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); ++ fputs(prompt, stderr); ++ fflush(stderr); ++ fflush(stdout); ++ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); ++ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); ++ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); ++ ++ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) ++ { ++ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); ++ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') ++ break; ++ fputc('*', stdout); ++ fflush(stderr); ++ fflush(stdout); ++ } ++ ++ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); ++ buf[cnt] = '\0'; ++ fputs("\n", stderr); ++ return buf; ++ } ++#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ ++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 +@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ ++/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */ ++/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ ++ ++/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is ++ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface ++ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. ++ ++ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that ++ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 ++ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or ++ * referencing the derived work. ++ ++ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the ++ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for ++ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied ++ * warranty of any kind. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef _PKCS11_H_ ++#define _PKCS11_H_ 1 ++ ++#ifdef __cplusplus ++extern "C" { ++#endif ++ ++/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by ++ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These ++ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them ++ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend ++ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also ++ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or ++ * dynamically). ++ * ++ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention ++ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki ++ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte ++ * aligned. ++ * ++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce ++ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following ++ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: ++ * ++ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) ++ * ++ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including ++ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: ++ * ++ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) ++ * ++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer ++ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using ++ * the following preprocessor directive before including ++ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: ++ * ++ * #pragma pack(1) ++ * ++ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might ++ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything. ++ * ++ * ++ * Now for the macros: ++ * ++ * ++ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an ++ * object. It can be used like this: ++ * ++ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; ++ * ++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce ++ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_PTR * ++ * ++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer ++ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_PTR far * ++ * ++ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_PTR * ++ * ++ * ++ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes ++ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a ++ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the ++ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in ++ * a Cryptoki library: ++ * ++ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( ++ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved ++ * ) ++ * { ++ * ... ++ * } ++ * ++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a ++ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name ++ * ++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer ++ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it ++ * might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType __export _far _pascal name ++ * ++ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType name ++ * ++ * ++ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes ++ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a ++ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the ++ * following fashion: ++ * ++ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( ++ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved ++ * ); ++ * ++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a ++ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name ++ * ++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer ++ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it ++ * might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType __export _far _pascal name ++ * ++ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType name ++ * ++ * ++ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro ++ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or ++ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a ++ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion: ++ * ++ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function ++ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV. ++ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args); ++ * ++ * or ++ * ++ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a ++ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning ++ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type ++ * // funcPtrType. ++ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args); ++ * funcPtrType funcPtr; ++ * ++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access ++ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) ++ * ++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer ++ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might ++ * be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name) ++ * ++ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType (* name) ++ * ++ * ++ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes ++ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of ++ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback. ++ * It should be used in the following fashion: ++ * ++ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args); ++ * ++ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback ++ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also ++ * be used like this: ++ * ++ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args); ++ * myCallbackType myCallback; ++ * ++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32 ++ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType (* name) ++ * ++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer ++ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType _far _pascal (* name) ++ * ++ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: ++ * ++ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ ++ * returnType (* name) ++ * ++ * ++ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer. ++ * ++ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well), ++ * this should best be defined by ++ * ++ * #ifndef NULL_PTR ++ * #define NULL_PTR 0 ++ * #endif ++ */ ++ ++ ++/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the ++ * file pkcs11t.h. */ ++#include "pkcs11t.h" ++ ++#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y ++ ++ ++/* ============================================================== ++ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points. ++ * ============================================================== ++ */ ++ ++#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 ++#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ ++ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name) ++ ++/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki ++ * function prototypes. */ ++#include "pkcs11f.h" ++ ++#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO ++ ++ ++/* ============================================================== ++ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for ++ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is ++ * a pointer to that kind of function. ++ * ============================================================== ++ */ ++ ++#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 ++#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ ++ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name)) ++ ++/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki ++ * function prototypes. */ ++#include "pkcs11f.h" ++ ++#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO ++ ++ ++/* ============================================================== ++ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST ++ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version ++ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in ++ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in ++ * pkcs11t.h. ++ * ============================================================== ++ */ ++ ++#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ ++ __PASTE(CK_,name) name; ++ ++struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { ++ ++ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */ ++ ++/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */ ++/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki ++ * function prototypes. */ ++#include "pkcs11f.h" ++ ++}; ++ ++#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO ++ ++ ++#undef __PASTE ++ ++#ifdef __cplusplus ++} ++#endif ++ ++#endif +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 +@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@ ++/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */ ++/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ ++ ++/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is ++ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface ++ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. ++ ++ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that ++ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 ++ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or ++ * referencing the derived work. ++ ++ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the ++ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for ++ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied ++ * warranty of any kind. ++ */ ++ ++/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */ ++/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */ ++/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */ ++/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */ ++/* should not be altered. */ ++ ++/* General-purpose */ ++ ++/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets ++ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR ++ * and dereferenced */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the ++ * Cryptoki library. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to ++ * function list */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Slot and token management */ ++ ++/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */ ++ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in ++ * the system. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */ ++ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token ++ * in the system. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ ++ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types ++ * supported by a token. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular ++ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */ ++( ++ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */ ++ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */ ++ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Session management */ ++ ++/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a ++ * token. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */ ++ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */ ++ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */ ++ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */ ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a ++ * token. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation ++ * in a session. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic ++ * operation in a session. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */ ++ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Object management */ ++ ++/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */ ++ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the ++ * copy. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */ ++ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object ++ * attributes. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */ ++ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object ++ * attributes */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */ ++ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session ++ * objects that match a template. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */ ++ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session ++ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object ++ * handles. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */ ++ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session ++ * objects. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Encryption and decryption */ ++ ++/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */ ++ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption ++ * operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption ++ * operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */ ++ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption ++ * operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */ ++ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption ++ * operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Message digesting */ ++ ++/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */ ++ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting ++ * operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting ++ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of ++ * the data already digested. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting ++ * operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Signing and MACing */ ++ ++/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption) ++ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to ++ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the ++ *signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single ++ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the ++ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ ++ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, ++ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, ++ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, ++ * returning the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where ++ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the ++ * data can be recovered from the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ ++ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Verifying signatures and MACs */ ++ ++/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the ++ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot ++ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, ++ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext ++ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */ ++ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */ ++ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification ++ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, ++ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification ++ * operation, checking the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ ++ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification ++ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part ++ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ ++ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ ++ ++/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting ++ * and encryption operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and ++ * digesting operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ ++ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and ++ * encryption operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and ++ * verify operation. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ ++ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Key management */ ++ ++/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key ++ * object. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */ ++ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, ++ * creating new key objects. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session ++ * handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen ++ * mech. */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template ++ * for pub. ++ * key */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. ++ * attrs. */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template ++ * for priv. ++ * key */ ++ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. ++ * attrs. */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. ++ * key ++ * handle */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets ++ * priv. key ++ * handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */ ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new ++ * key object. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */ ++ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ ++ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key ++ * object. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */ ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ ++ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Random number generation */ ++ ++/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's ++ * random number generator. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */ ++ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */ ++ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Parallel function management */ ++ ++/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an ++ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an ++ * application. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function ++ * running in parallel. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ ++); ++#endif ++ ++ ++ ++/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */ ++ ++/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion, ++ * removal, etc.) to occur. */ ++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent) ++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST ++( ++ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */ ++ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */ ++ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ ++); ++#endif +Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h +diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2 +--- /dev/null Mon Jun 13 15:26:30 2016 ++++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008 +@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@ ++/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */ ++/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */ ++ ++/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is ++ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface ++ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. ++ ++ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that ++ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 ++ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or ++ * referencing the derived work. ++ ++ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the ++ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for ++ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied ++ * warranty of any kind. ++ */ ++ ++/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that ++ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that ++ * must be set before including this file. */ ++ ++#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_ ++#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1 ++ ++#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 ++#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 ++#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3 ++ ++#define CK_TRUE 1 ++#define CK_FALSE 0 ++ ++#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE ++#ifndef FALSE ++#define FALSE CK_FALSE ++#endif ++ ++#ifndef TRUE ++#define TRUE CK_TRUE ++#endif ++#endif ++ ++/* an unsigned 8-bit value */ ++typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; ++ ++/* an unsigned 8-bit character */ ++typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR; ++ ++/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */ ++typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR; ++ ++/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */ ++typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL; ++ ++/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */ ++typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; ++ ++/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */ ++/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef long int CK_LONG; ++ ++/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS; ++ ++ ++/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */ ++#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL) ++#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0 ++ ++ ++typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; ++typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR; ++typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR; ++typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR; ++ ++/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */ ++typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */ ++/* handle or object handle */ ++#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0 ++ ++ ++typedef struct CK_VERSION { ++ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */ ++ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */ ++} CK_VERSION; ++ ++typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR; ++ ++ ++typedef struct CK_INFO { ++ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from ++ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ ++ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ ++ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */ ++ ++ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */ ++ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */ ++} CK_INFO; ++ ++typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that ++ * Cryptoki provides to an application */ ++/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG ++ * for v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION; ++#define CKN_SURRENDER 0 ++ ++/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1 ++ ++ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID; ++ ++typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */ ++typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO { ++ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from ++ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ ++ CK_FLAGS flags; ++ ++ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */ ++ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ ++ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ ++} CK_SLOT_INFO; ++ ++/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot ++ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning ++ */ ++#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */ ++#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/ ++#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */ ++ ++typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */ ++typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO { ++ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from ++ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ ++ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */ ++ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */ ++ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ ++ ++ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, ++ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been ++ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ ++ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */ ++ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */ ++ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */ ++ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */ ++ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */ ++ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */ ++ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */ ++ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */ ++ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ ++ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ ++ ++ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for ++ * v2.0 */ ++ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ ++ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ ++ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */ ++} CK_TOKEN_INFO; ++ ++/* The flags parameter is defined as follows: ++ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning ++ */ ++#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # ++ * generator */ ++#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is ++ * write- ++ * protected */ ++#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must ++ * login */ ++#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's ++ * PIN is set */ ++ ++/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set, ++ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic ++ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys ++ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */ ++#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020 ++ ++/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means ++ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that ++ * clock is returned in the token info structure */ ++#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040 ++ ++/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is ++ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login ++ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */ ++#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100 ++ ++/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true, ++ * that means that a single session with the token can perform ++ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and ++ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt ++ * and sign) */ ++#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200 ++ ++/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the ++ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an ++ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11. ++ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause ++ * the token to be reinitialized. */ ++#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400 ++ ++/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is ++ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for ++ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and ++ onwards. */ ++#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800 ++ ++/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an ++ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once ++ * since the last successful authentication. */ ++#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000 ++ ++/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, ++ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */ ++#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000 ++ ++/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the ++ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not ++ * possible. */ ++#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000 ++ ++/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, ++ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token ++ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been ++ * expired by the card. */ ++#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000 ++ ++/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an ++ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since ++ * the last successful authentication. */ ++#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000 ++ ++/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, ++ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */ ++#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000 ++ ++/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO ++ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible. ++ */ ++#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000 ++ ++/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, ++ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token ++ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been ++ * expired by the card. */ ++#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000 ++ ++typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that ++ * identifies a session */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE; ++ ++typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */ ++/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for ++ * v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE; ++/* Security Officer */ ++#define CKU_SO 0 ++/* Normal user */ ++#define CKU_USER 1 ++/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */ ++#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2 ++ ++/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */ ++/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for ++ * v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE; ++#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0 ++#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1 ++#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2 ++#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3 ++#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4 ++ ++ ++/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */ ++typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO { ++ CK_SLOT_ID slotID; ++ CK_STATE state; ++ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ ++ ++ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for ++ * v2.0 */ ++ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */ ++} CK_SESSION_INFO; ++ ++/* The flags are defined in the following table: ++ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning ++ */ ++#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */ ++#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */ ++ ++typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an ++ * object */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; ++ ++typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or ++ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined ++ * as follows: */ ++/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for ++ * v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS; ++ ++/* The following classes of objects are defined: */ ++/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */ ++/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */ ++/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000 ++#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001 ++#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002 ++#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003 ++#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004 ++#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005 ++#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006 ++#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007 ++ ++/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ ++#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008 ++ ++#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 ++ ++typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a ++ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object ++ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE; ++ ++/* The following hardware feature types are defined */ ++/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001 ++#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002 ++#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003 ++#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 ++ ++/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */ ++/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE; ++ ++/* the following key types are defined: */ ++#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000 ++#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001 ++#define CKK_DH 0x00000002 ++ ++/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */ ++/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */ ++#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003 ++#define CKK_EC 0x00000003 ++#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004 ++#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005 ++ ++#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010 ++#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011 ++#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012 ++#define CKK_DES 0x00000013 ++#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014 ++#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015 ++ ++/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016 ++#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017 ++/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */ ++#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018 ++#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018 ++#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019 ++#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A ++#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B ++#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C ++#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D ++#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E ++#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F ++ ++/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020 ++#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021 ++ ++/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ ++#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022 ++#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023 ++#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024 ++ ++/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025 ++/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026 ++ ++ ++#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 ++ ++ ++/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate ++ * type */ ++/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG ++ * for v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; ++ ++/* The following certificate types are defined: */ ++/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */ ++/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000 ++#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001 ++#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002 ++#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 ++ ++ ++/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute ++ * type */ ++/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for ++ * v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE; ++ ++/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which ++ consists of an array of values. */ ++#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000 ++ ++/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 ++ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */ ++#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0 ++#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1 ++#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2 ++#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3 ++ ++/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 ++ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */ ++#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0 ++#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1 ++#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2 ++ ++/* The following attribute types are defined: */ ++#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000 ++#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001 ++#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002 ++#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003 ++#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010 ++#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011 ++ ++/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */ ++#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012 ++ ++#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080 ++#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081 ++#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082 ++ ++/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new ++ * for v2.10 */ ++#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083 ++#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084 ++#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085 ++ ++/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */ ++#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086 ++ ++/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ... ++ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087 ++#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088 ++#define CKA_URL 0x00000089 ++#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A ++#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B ++#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090 ++ ++#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100 ++#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101 ++#define CKA_ID 0x00000102 ++#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103 ++#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104 ++#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105 ++#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106 ++#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107 ++#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108 ++#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109 ++#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A ++#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B ++#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C ++#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110 ++#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111 ++#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120 ++#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121 ++#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122 ++#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123 ++#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124 ++#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125 ++#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126 ++#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127 ++#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128 ++#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130 ++#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131 ++#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132 ++ ++/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */ ++#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133 ++#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134 ++#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS ++/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */ ++ ++#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160 ++#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161 ++ ++/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, ++ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS, ++ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162 ++#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163 ++#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164 ++#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165 ++ ++/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */ ++#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166 ++ ++#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170 ++ ++/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11, ++ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */ ++#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180 ++#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180 ++ ++#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181 ++ ++/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, ++ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */ ++#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200 ++#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201 ++ ++/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ... ++ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202 ++ ++#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210 ++#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211) ++#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212) ++ ++/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */ ++#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220 ++#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221 ++#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222 ++#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223 ++#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224 ++#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225 ++#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226 ++#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227 ++#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E ++#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F ++#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A ++#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B ++#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C ++#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D ++ ++ ++/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET ++ * are new for v2.10 */ ++#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300 ++#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301 ++#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302 ++ ++/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400 ++#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401 ++#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402 ++#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403 ++#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404 ++#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405 ++#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406 ++#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480 ++#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481 ++#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482 ++#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500 ++#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501 ++#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502 ++#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503 ++#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600) ++ ++#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 ++ ++/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length ++ * and value of an attribute */ ++typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE { ++ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type; ++ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; ++ ++ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ ++ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */ ++} CK_ATTRIBUTE; ++ ++typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */ ++typedef struct CK_DATE{ ++ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */ ++ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */ ++ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */ ++} CK_DATE; ++ ++ ++/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism ++ * type */ ++/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for ++ * v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; ++ ++/* the following mechanism types are defined: */ ++#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000 ++#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001 ++#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002 ++#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003 ++ ++/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS ++ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */ ++#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004 ++#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005 ++#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006 ++ ++/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and ++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */ ++#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007 ++#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008 ++#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009 ++ ++/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31, ++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */ ++#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A ++#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B ++#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C ++#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D ++#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E ++ ++#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 ++#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 ++#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 ++#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 ++#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 ++ ++/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, ++ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for ++ * v2.11 */ ++#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030 ++#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031 ++#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032 ++#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033 ++ ++/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040 ++#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041 ++#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042 ++#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043 ++#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044 ++#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045 ++ ++/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046 ++#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047 ++ ++#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100 ++#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101 ++#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102 ++#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103 ++ ++/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104 ++#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105 ++ ++#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110 ++#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111 ++#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120 ++#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121 ++#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122 ++#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123 ++ ++/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124 ++#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125 ++ ++#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130 ++#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131 ++#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132 ++#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133 ++#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134 ++ ++/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN, ++ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC, ++ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135 ++#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136 ++#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140 ++#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141 ++#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142 ++#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143 ++#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144 ++#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145 ++ ++/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150 ++#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151 ++#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152 ++#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153 ++ ++#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200 ++ ++/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201 ++#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202 ++ ++#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210 ++ ++/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211 ++#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212 ++ ++#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220 ++ ++/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221 ++#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222 ++ ++/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC, ++ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, ++ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */ ++#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230 ++#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231 ++#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232 ++#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240 ++#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241 ++#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242 ++ ++/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250 ++#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251 ++#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252 ++ ++/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255 ++#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256 ++#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257 ++ ++#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260 ++#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261 ++#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262 ++#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270 ++#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271 ++#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272 ++ ++/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ ++#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280 ++#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282 ++ ++/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ ++#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290 ++#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291 ++ ++/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ ++#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0 ++#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1 ++ ++/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */ ++/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */ ++#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300 ++#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301 ++#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302 ++#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303 ++#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304 ++#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305 ++#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310 ++#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311 ++#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312 ++#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313 ++#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314 ++#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315 ++#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 ++#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 ++#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321 ++#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321 ++#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322 ++#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322 ++#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323 ++#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323 ++#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 ++#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 ++#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 ++#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 ++#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330 ++#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331 ++#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332 ++#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333 ++#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334 ++#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335 ++#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340 ++#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341 ++#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342 ++#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343 ++#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344 ++#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345 ++#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350 ++#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360 ++#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362 ++#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363 ++#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364 ++#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365 ++#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370 ++#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371 ++#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372 ++ ++/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, ++ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and ++ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */ ++#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373 ++#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374 ++#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375 ++#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376 ++#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377 ++ ++/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378 ++ ++#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380 ++#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381 ++#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390 ++#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391 ++#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392 ++ ++/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393 ++#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394 ++#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395 ++ ++/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396 ++ ++#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0 ++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1 ++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2 ++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3 ++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4 ++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4 ++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5 ++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5 ++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6 ++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7 ++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8 ++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9 ++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA ++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB ++ ++/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */ ++#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0 ++ ++#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0 ++ ++/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0 ++#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1 ++#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2 ++#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3 ++#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4 ++#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5 ++ ++#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400 ++#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401 ++ ++/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500 ++ ++/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ ++#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510 ++#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511 ++#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512 ++ ++/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550 ++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551 ++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552 ++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553 ++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554 ++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555 ++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556 ++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557 ++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558 ++ ++/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560 ++#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561 ++#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562 ++#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563 ++#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564 ++#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565 ++#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566 ++#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567 ++ ++/* Fortezza mechanisms */ ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009 ++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a ++#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010 ++#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011 ++#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020 ++#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030 ++#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031 ++#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032 ++#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033 ++#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034 ++#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035 ++#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036 ++ ++/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11, ++ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */ ++#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 ++#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 ++ ++#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 ++#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 ++ ++/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE ++ * are new for v2.11 */ ++#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050 ++#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051 ++#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052 ++ ++#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060 ++#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061 ++#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062 ++#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063 ++#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064 ++#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065 ++#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070 ++ ++/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC, ++ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, ++ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are ++ * new for v2.11 */ ++#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080 ++#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081 ++#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082 ++#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083 ++#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084 ++#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085 ++ ++/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086 ++ ++/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090 ++#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091 ++#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092 ++#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093 ++ ++ ++/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100 ++#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101 ++#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102 ++#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103 ++#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104 ++#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105 ++ ++#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000 ++#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001 ++#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002 ++ ++#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 ++ ++typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular ++ * mechanism */ ++typedef struct CK_MECHANISM { ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; ++ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter; ++ ++ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for ++ * v2.0 */ ++ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */ ++} CK_MECHANISM; ++ ++typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular ++ * mechanism */ ++typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO { ++ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize; ++ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize; ++ CK_FLAGS flags; ++} CK_MECHANISM_INFO; ++ ++/* The flags are defined as follows: ++ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */ ++#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */ ++ ++/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN, ++ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, ++ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP, ++ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not ++ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */ ++#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100 ++#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200 ++#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400 ++#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800 ++#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000 ++#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000 ++#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000 ++#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000 ++#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000 ++#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000 ++#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000 ++#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000 ++ ++/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE, ++ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They ++ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism ++ * information. */ ++#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000 ++#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000 ++#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000 ++#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000 ++#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000 ++#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000 ++ ++#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */ ++ ++typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a ++ * Cryptoki function */ ++/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV; ++ ++#define CKR_OK 0x00000000 ++#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001 ++#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002 ++#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003 ++ ++/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */ ++ ++/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005 ++#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006 ++ ++/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, ++ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */ ++#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007 ++#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008 ++#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009 ++#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A ++ ++#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010 ++#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011 ++#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012 ++#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013 ++#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020 ++#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021 ++#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030 ++#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031 ++#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032 ++#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040 ++#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041 ++#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050 ++#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051 ++ ++/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054 ++ ++#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060 ++ ++/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */ ++ ++#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062 ++#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063 ++ ++/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, ++ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, ++ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for ++ * v2.0 */ ++#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064 ++#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065 ++#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066 ++#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067 ++#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068 ++#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069 ++#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A ++ ++#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070 ++#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071 ++ ++/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID ++ * were removed for v2.0 */ ++#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082 ++#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090 ++#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091 ++#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0 ++#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1 ++#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2 ++ ++/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3 ++#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4 ++ ++#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0 ++#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1 ++#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3 ++#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4 ++#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5 ++#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6 ++ ++/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and ++ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */ ++#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7 ++#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8 ++ ++#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0 ++#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1 ++#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0 ++#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1 ++#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0 ++#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1 ++#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2 ++#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0 ++#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1 ++#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2 ++#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100 ++#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101 ++#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102 ++#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103 ++ ++/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES ++ * are new to v2.01 */ ++#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104 ++#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105 ++ ++#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110 ++#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112 ++#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113 ++#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114 ++#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115 ++#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120 ++ ++/* These are new to v2.0 */ ++#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121 ++ ++/* These are new to v2.11 */ ++#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130 ++ ++/* These are new to v2.0 */ ++#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150 ++#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160 ++#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170 ++#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180 ++ ++/* These are new to v2.01 */ ++#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190 ++#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191 ++#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0 ++#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1 ++ ++/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0 ++#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1 ++ ++/* This is new to v2.20 */ ++#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200 ++ ++#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 ++ ++ ++/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */ ++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)( ++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ ++ CK_NOTIFICATION event, ++ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */ ++); ++ ++ ++/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec ++ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the ++ * Cryptoki functions */ ++/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST; ++ ++typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; ++ ++typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a ++ * mutex object */ ++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)( ++ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */ ++); ++ ++ ++/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a ++ * mutex object */ ++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)( ++ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ ++); ++ ++ ++/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */ ++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)( ++ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ ++); ++ ++ ++/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a ++ * mutex */ ++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)( ++ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ ++); ++ ++ ++/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to ++ * C_Initialize */ ++typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS { ++ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex; ++ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex; ++ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex; ++ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex; ++ CK_FLAGS flags; ++ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved; ++} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; ++ ++/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot ++ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning ++ */ ++#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001 ++#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002 ++ ++typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* additional flags for parameters to functions */ ++ ++/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */ ++#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1 ++ ++/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10. ++ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message ++ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when ++ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption ++ * scheme. */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; ++ ++typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR; ++ ++/* The following MGFs are defined */ ++/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512 ++ * are new for v2.20 */ ++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001 ++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002 ++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003 ++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004 ++/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005 ++ ++/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. ++ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source ++ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block ++ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; ++ ++typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; ++ ++/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */ ++#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 ++ ++/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10. ++ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */ ++typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS { ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; ++ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; ++ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source; ++ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData; ++ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen; ++} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11. ++ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */ ++typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS { ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; ++ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; ++ CK_ULONG sLen; ++} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE; ++ ++/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */ ++#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001 ++#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002 ++ ++/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. ++ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms, ++ * where each party contributes one key pair. ++ */ ++typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { ++ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; ++ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; ++} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. ++ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */ ++typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { ++ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; ++ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; ++} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { ++ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; ++ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; ++} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the ++ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE; ++typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR; ++ ++/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined ++ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */ ++#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003 ++#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004 ++ ++/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. ++ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party ++ * contributes one key pair */ ++typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { ++ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; ++ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; ++} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. ++ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation ++ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */ ++typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { ++ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; ++ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; ++} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { ++ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; ++ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; ++} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */ ++/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS { ++ CK_BBOOL isSender; ++ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; ++} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and ++ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just ++ * holds the effective keysize */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC ++ * mechanism */ ++typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS { ++ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for ++ * v2.0 */ ++ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ ++ ++ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */ ++} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the ++ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ ++/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { ++ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ ++ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ ++} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ ++ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and ++ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */ ++/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS { ++ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ ++ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ ++} CK_RC5_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC ++ * mechanism */ ++/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS { ++ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ ++ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */ ++ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */ ++} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the ++ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ ++/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { ++ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ ++ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ ++ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ ++} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ ++ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block ++ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of ++ * the MAC */ ++/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */ ++typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { ++ CK_BYTE iv[8]; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; ++ CK_ULONG length; ++} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { ++ CK_BYTE iv[16]; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; ++ CK_ULONG length; ++} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */ ++/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS { ++ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword; ++ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen; ++ CK_ULONG ulQLen; ++ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ; ++} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ ++ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */ ++/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS { ++ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX; ++ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword; ++ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData; ++ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA; ++ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword; ++ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData; ++ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA; ++} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \ ++ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS { ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector; ++ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; ++ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; ++ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; ++ CK_ULONG ulIteration; ++} CK_PBE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the ++ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */ ++/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS { ++ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */ ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */ ++ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */ ++} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ ++ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA { ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; ++ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; ++ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; ++} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA; ++ ++ ++typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { ++ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; ++ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; ++} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ ++ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++ ++typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT { ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer; ++} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; ++ ++typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; ++ ++ ++typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { ++ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; ++ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; ++ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; ++ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; ++ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; ++ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; ++} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */ ++typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS { ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; ++ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; ++ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; ++} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */ ++typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA { ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; ++ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; ++ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; ++} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; ++ ++typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; ++ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion; ++} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ ++ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS { ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; ++ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; ++ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; ++ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; ++} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT { ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV; ++} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; ++ ++typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { ++ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; ++ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; ++ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; ++ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; ++ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber; ++ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; ++ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; ++ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; ++} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */ ++typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS { ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle; ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism; ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism; ++ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes; ++ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes; ++ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen; ++} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA { ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; ++ CK_ULONG ulLen; ++} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; ++ ++typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \ ++ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR; ++ ++ ++/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the ++ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit ++ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the ++ * derived key */ ++/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10. ++ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to ++ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate ++ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; ++ ++typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR; ++ ++/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ ++#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001 ++ ++ ++/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. ++ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the ++ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 ++ * PBKDF2. */ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; ++ ++typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; ++ ++/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ ++#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 ++ ++/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10. ++ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the ++ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */ ++typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS { ++ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource; ++ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData; ++ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen; ++ CK_ULONG iterations; ++ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf; ++ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData; ++ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen; ++ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; ++ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen; ++} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++ ++typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE; ++typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */ ++ ++typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM { ++ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type; ++ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; ++ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; ++} CK_OTP_PARAM; ++ ++typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS { ++ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; ++ CK_ULONG ulCount; ++} CK_OTP_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO { ++ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; ++ CK_ULONG ulCount; ++} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO; ++ ++typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR; ++ ++/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ ++#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0 ++#define CK_OTP_PIN 1 ++#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2 ++#define CK_OTP_TIME 3 ++#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4 ++#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5 ++#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6 ++#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7 ++ ++/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ ++#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001 ++#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002 ++#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004 ++#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008 ++#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010 ++#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020 ++ ++/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ ++typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS { ++ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism; ++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; ++ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; ++} CK_KIP_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS { ++ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; ++ CK_BYTE cb[16]; ++} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS { ++ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; ++ CK_BYTE cb[16]; ++} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { ++ CK_BYTE iv[16]; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; ++ CK_ULONG length; ++} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ ++typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { ++ CK_BYTE iv[16]; ++ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; ++ CK_ULONG length; ++} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; ++ ++typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; ++ ++#endif +Index: openssl/util/libeay.num +diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.15 +--- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:04 2016 ++++ openssl/util/libeay.num Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 +@@ -4316,3 +4316,5 @@ + BIO_s_datagram_sctp 4680 EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM,SCTP + BIO_dgram_is_sctp 4681 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP + BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb 4682 EXIST::FUNCTION:SCTP ++ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE ++ENGINE_load_pk11so 4683 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE +Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl +diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.14 +--- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016 ++++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 +@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ + no-ecdh - No ECDH + no-engine - No engine + no-hw - No hw ++ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor ++ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor + nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm + nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare + nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare +@@ -278,6 +280,8 @@ + $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost; + $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine; + $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw; ++$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca; ++$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so; + $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips; + $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake; + $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M" if $no_ec2m; +@@ -347,6 +351,9 @@ + $dir=$val; + } + ++ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION") ++ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";} ++ + if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES") + { $cflags .= " $val";} + +@@ -1136,6 +1143,8 @@ + "no-gost" => \$no_gost, + "no-engine" => \$no_engine, + "no-hw" => \$no_hw, ++ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca, ++ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so, + "no-rsax" => 0, + "just-ssl" => + [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast, +Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl +diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.6.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.12 +--- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.6.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016 ++++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 +@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ + # External "algorithms" + "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM", + # Engines +- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", ++ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO", + # RFC3779 + "RFC3779", + # TLS +@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ + my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2; + my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5; + my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; ++my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so; + my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated; + my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; + my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc; +@@ -248,6 +249,8 @@ + elsif (/^no-sctp$/) { $no_sctp=1; } + elsif (/^no-srtp$/) { $no_srtp=1; } + elsif (/^no-unit-test$/){ $no_unit_test=1; } ++ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; } ++ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; } + } + + +@@ -1202,6 +1205,8 @@ + if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; } + if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; } + if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; } ++ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; } ++ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; } + if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; } + if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; } + if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; } +Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl +diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.12 +--- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1 Mon Jun 13 15:11:05 2016 ++++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Mon Jun 13 15:21:08 2016 +@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ + my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT'; + $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib + $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox'; +- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; ++ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; + $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref"; + + *::perlasm_compile_target = sub { |