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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-06 00:31:19 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-05-06 00:31:19 +0000 |
commit | 6e33fee6f4a7e2041dd276995b402ca036fcab14 (patch) | |
tree | 85be5c41f2715d7d4d24cfa220197f1e2c778259 /lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | cryptsetup-upstream/2%2.1.0.tar.xz cryptsetup-upstream/2%2.1.0.zip |
Adding upstream version 2:2.1.0.upstream/2%2.1.0upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c | 426 |
1 files changed, 426 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c b/lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc3f95d --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto_backend/pbkdf2_generic.c @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +/* + * Implementation of Password-Based Cryptography as per PKCS#5 + * Copyright (C) 2002,2003 Simon Josefsson + * Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation + * + * cryptsetup related changes + * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2012-2019 Milan Broz + * + * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + * + */ + +#include <errno.h> +#include <alloca.h> +#include "crypto_backend.h" + +static int hash_buf(const char *src, size_t src_len, + char *dst, size_t dst_len, + const char *hash_name) +{ + struct crypt_hash *hd = NULL; + int r; + + if (crypt_hash_init(&hd, hash_name)) + return -EINVAL; + + r = crypt_hash_write(hd, src, src_len); + + if (!r) + r = crypt_hash_final(hd, dst, dst_len); + + crypt_hash_destroy(hd); + return r; +} + +/* + * 5.2 PBKDF2 + * + * PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function (see Appendix B.1 for an + * example) to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially + * unbounded. (However, the maximum effective search space for the + * derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying + * pseudorandom function. See Appendix B.1 for further discussion.) + * PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications. + * + * PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen) + * + * Options: PRF underlying pseudorandom function (hLen + * denotes the length in octets of the + * pseudorandom function output) + * + * Input: P password, an octet string (ASCII or UTF-8) + * S salt, an octet string + * c iteration count, a positive integer + * dkLen intended length in octets of the derived + * key, a positive integer, at most + * (2^32 - 1) * hLen + * + * Output: DK derived key, a dkLen-octet string + */ + +/* + * if hash_block_size is not zero, the HMAC key is pre-hashed + * inside this function. + * This prevents situation when crypto backend doesn't support + * long HMAC keys or it tries hash long key in every iteration + * (because of crypt_final() cannot do simple key reset. + */ + +#define MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN 80 + +int pkcs5_pbkdf2(const char *hash, + const char *P, size_t Plen, + const char *S, size_t Slen, + unsigned int c, unsigned int dkLen, + char *DK, unsigned int hash_block_size) +{ + struct crypt_hmac *hmac; + char U[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN]; + char T[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN]; + char P_hash[MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN]; + int i, k, rc = -EINVAL; + unsigned int u, hLen, l, r; + size_t tmplen = Slen + 4; + char *tmp; + + tmp = alloca(tmplen); + if (tmp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + hLen = crypt_hmac_size(hash); + if (hLen == 0 || hLen > MAX_PRF_BLOCK_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + if (c == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (dkLen == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * + * Steps: + * + * 1. If dkLen > (2^32 - 1) * hLen, output "derived key too long" and + * stop. + */ + + if (dkLen > 4294967295U) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * 2. Let l be the number of hLen-octet blocks in the derived key, + * rounding up, and let r be the number of octets in the last + * block: + * + * l = CEIL (dkLen / hLen) , + * r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen . + * + * Here, CEIL (x) is the "ceiling" function, i.e. the smallest + * integer greater than, or equal to, x. + */ + + l = dkLen / hLen; + if (dkLen % hLen) + l++; + r = dkLen - (l - 1) * hLen; + + /* + * 3. For each block of the derived key apply the function F defined + * below to the password P, the salt S, the iteration count c, and + * the block index to compute the block: + * + * T_1 = F (P, S, c, 1) , + * T_2 = F (P, S, c, 2) , + * ... + * T_l = F (P, S, c, l) , + * + * where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of the + * first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function PRF + * applied to the password P and the concatenation of the salt S + * and the block index i: + * + * F (P, S, c, i) = U_1 \xor U_2 \xor ... \xor U_c + * + * where + * + * U_1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) , + * U_2 = PRF (P, U_1) , + * ... + * U_c = PRF (P, U_{c-1}) . + * + * Here, INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most + * significant octet first. + * + * 4. Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dkLen octets to + * produce a derived key DK: + * + * DK = T_1 || T_2 || ... || T_l<0..r-1> + * + * 5. Output the derived key DK. + * + * Note. The construction of the function F follows a "belt-and- + * suspenders" approach. The iterates U_i are computed recursively to + * remove a degree of parallelism from an opponent; they are exclusive- + * ored together to reduce concerns about the recursion degenerating + * into a small set of values. + * + */ + + /* If hash_block_size is provided, hash password in advance. */ + if (hash_block_size > 0 && Plen > hash_block_size) { + if (hash_buf(P, Plen, P_hash, hLen, hash)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P_hash, hLen)) + return -EINVAL; + crypt_backend_memzero(P_hash, sizeof(P_hash)); + } else { + if (crypt_hmac_init(&hmac, hash, P, Plen)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + for (i = 1; (unsigned int) i <= l; i++) { + memset(T, 0, hLen); + + for (u = 1; u <= c ; u++) { + if (u == 1) { + memcpy(tmp, S, Slen); + tmp[Slen + 0] = (i & 0xff000000) >> 24; + tmp[Slen + 1] = (i & 0x00ff0000) >> 16; + tmp[Slen + 2] = (i & 0x0000ff00) >> 8; + tmp[Slen + 3] = (i & 0x000000ff) >> 0; + + if (crypt_hmac_write(hmac, tmp, tmplen)) + goto out; + } else { + if (crypt_hmac_write(hmac, U, hLen)) + goto out; + } + + if (crypt_hmac_final(hmac, U, hLen)) + goto out; + + for (k = 0; (unsigned int) k < hLen; k++) + T[k] ^= U[k]; + } + + memcpy(DK + (i - 1) * hLen, T, (unsigned int) i == l ? r : hLen); + } + rc = 0; +out: + crypt_hmac_destroy(hmac); + crypt_backend_memzero(U, sizeof(U)); + crypt_backend_memzero(T, sizeof(T)); + crypt_backend_memzero(tmp, tmplen); + + return rc; +} + +#if 0 +#include <stdio.h> + +struct test_vector { + const char *hash; + unsigned int hash_block_length; + unsigned int iterations; + const char *password; + unsigned int password_length; + const char *salt; + unsigned int salt_length; + const char *output; + unsigned int output_length; +}; + +struct test_vector test_vectors[] = { + /* RFC 3962 */ + { + "sha1", 64, 1, + "password", 8, + "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21, + "\xcd\xed\xb5\x28\x1b\xb2\xf8\x01" + "\x56\x5a\x11\x22\xb2\x56\x35\x15" + "\x0a\xd1\xf7\xa0\x4b\xb9\xf3\xa3" + "\x33\xec\xc0\xe2\xe1\xf7\x08\x37", 32 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 2, + "password", 8, + "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21, + "\x01\xdb\xee\x7f\x4a\x9e\x24\x3e" + "\x98\x8b\x62\xc7\x3c\xda\x93\x5d" + "\xa0\x53\x78\xb9\x32\x44\xec\x8f" + "\x48\xa9\x9e\x61\xad\x79\x9d\x86", 32 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 1200, + "password", 8, + "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn", 21, + "\x5c\x08\xeb\x61\xfd\xf7\x1e\x4e" + "\x4e\xc3\xcf\x6b\xa1\xf5\x51\x2b" + "\xa7\xe5\x2d\xdb\xc5\xe5\x14\x2f" + "\x70\x8a\x31\xe2\xe6\x2b\x1e\x13", 32 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 5, + "password", 8, + "\0224VxxV4\022", 8, // "\x1234567878563412 + "\xd1\xda\xa7\x86\x15\xf2\x87\xe6" + "\xa1\xc8\xb1\x20\xd7\x06\x2a\x49" + "\x3f\x98\xd2\x03\xe6\xbe\x49\xa6" + "\xad\xf4\xfa\x57\x4b\x6e\x64\xee", 32 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 1200, + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 64, + "pass phrase equals block size", 29, + "\x13\x9c\x30\xc0\x96\x6b\xc3\x2b" + "\xa5\x5f\xdb\xf2\x12\x53\x0a\xc9" + "\xc5\xec\x59\xf1\xa4\x52\xf5\xcc" + "\x9a\xd9\x40\xfe\xa0\x59\x8e\xd1", 32 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 1200, + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65, + "pass phrase exceeds block size", 30, + "\x9c\xca\xd6\xd4\x68\x77\x0c\xd5" + "\x1b\x10\xe6\xa6\x87\x21\xbe\x61" + "\x1a\x8b\x4d\x28\x26\x01\xdb\x3b" + "\x36\xbe\x92\x46\x91\x5e\xc8\x2a", 32 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 50, + "\360\235\204\236", 4, // g-clef ("\xf09d849e) + "EXAMPLE.COMpianist", 18, + "\x6b\x9c\xf2\x6d\x45\x45\x5a\x43" + "\xa5\xb8\xbb\x27\x6a\x40\x3b\x39" + "\xe7\xfe\x37\xa0\xc4\x1e\x02\xc2" + "\x81\xff\x30\x69\xe1\xe9\x4f\x52", 32 + }, { + /* RFC-6070 */ + "sha1", 64, 1, + "password", 8, + "salt", 4, + "\x0c\x60\xc8\x0f\x96\x1f\x0e\x71\xf3\xa9" + "\xb5\x24\xaf\x60\x12\x06\x2f\xe0\x37\xa6", 20 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 2, + "password", 8, + "salt", 4, + "\xea\x6c\x01\x4d\xc7\x2d\x6f\x8c\xcd\x1e" + "\xd9\x2a\xce\x1d\x41\xf0\xd8\xde\x89\x57", 20 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 4096, + "password", 8, + "salt", 4, + "\x4b\x00\x79\x01\xb7\x65\x48\x9a\xbe\xad" + "\x49\xd9\x26\xf7\x21\xd0\x65\xa4\x29\xc1", 20 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 16777216, + "password", 8, + "salt", 4, + "\xee\xfe\x3d\x61\xcd\x4d\xa4\xe4\xe9\x94" + "\x5b\x3d\x6b\xa2\x15\x8c\x26\x34\xe9\x84", 20 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 4096, + "passwordPASSWORDpassword", 24, + "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", 36, + "\x3d\x2e\xec\x4f\xe4\x1c\x84\x9b\x80\xc8" + "\xd8\x36\x62\xc0\xe4\x4a\x8b\x29\x1a\x96" + "\x4c\xf2\xf0\x70\x38", 25 + }, { + "sha1", 64, 4096, + "pass\0word", 9, + "sa\0lt", 5, + "\x56\xfa\x6a\xa7\x55\x48\x09\x9d\xcc\x37" + "\xd7\xf0\x34\x25\xe0\xc3", 16 + }, { + /* empty password test */ + "sha1", 64, 2, + "", 0, + "salt", 4, + "\x13\x3a\x4c\xe8\x37\xb4\xd2\x52\x1e\xe2" + "\xbf\x03\xe1\x1c\x71\xca\x79\x4e\x07\x97", 20 + }, { + /* Password exceeds block size test */ + "sha256", 64, 1200, + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65, + "pass phrase exceeds block size", 30, + "\x22\x34\x4b\xc4\xb6\xe3\x26\x75" + "\xa8\x09\x0f\x3e\xa8\x0b\xe0\x1d" + "\x5f\x95\x12\x6a\x2c\xdd\xc3\xfa" + "\xcc\x4a\x5e\x6d\xca\x04\xec\x58", 32 + }, { + "sha512", 128, 1200, + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 129, + "pass phrase exceeds block size", 30, + "\x0f\xb2\xed\x2c\x0e\x6e\xfb\x7d" + "\x7d\x8e\xdd\x58\x01\xb4\x59\x72" + "\x99\x92\x16\x30\x5e\xa4\x36\x8d" + "\x76\x14\x80\xf3\xe3\x7a\x22\xb9", 32 + }, { + "whirlpool", 64, 1200, + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX" + "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", 65, + "pass phrase exceeds block size", 30, + "\x9c\x1c\x74\xf5\x88\x26\xe7\x6a" + "\x53\x58\xf4\x0c\x39\xe7\x80\x89" + "\x07\xc0\x31\x19\x9a\x50\xa2\x48" + "\xf1\xd9\xfe\x78\x64\xe5\x84\x50", 32 + } +}; + +static void printhex(const char *s, const char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + + printf("%s: ", s); + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) + printf("\\x%02x", (unsigned char)buf[i]); + printf("\n"); + fflush(stdout); +} + +static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_test_vectors(void) +{ + char result[64]; + unsigned int i, j; + struct test_vector *vec; + + for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(test_vectors) / sizeof(*test_vectors)); i++) { + vec = &test_vectors[i]; + for (j = 1; j <= vec->output_length; j++) { + if (pkcs5_pbkdf2(vec->hash, + vec->password, vec->password_length, + vec->salt, vec->salt_length, + vec->iterations, + j, result, vec->hash_block_length)) { + printf("pbkdf2 failed, vector %d\n", i); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (memcmp(result, vec->output, j) != 0) { + printf("vector %u\n", i); + printhex(" got", result, j); + printhex("want", vec->output, j); + return -EINVAL; + } + memset(result, 0, sizeof(result)); + } + } + return 0; +} +#endif |